ML17335A514

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LER 99-001-00:on 990106,noted That GE Hfa Relays Installed in EDGs May Not Meet Seismic Qualification.Caused by Operating Experience Info Incorrectly Dispositioned in 1985. Updated LER Will Be Submitted by 990405
ML17335A514
Person / Time
Site: Cook American Electric Power icon.png
Issue date: 02/10/1999
From: POGUE B D
AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER CO., INC.
To:
Shared Package
ML17335A513 List:
References
LER-99-001, LER-99-1, NUDOCS 9902220016
Download: ML17335A514 (4)


Text

r(RCForm366U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSION(6-1998),LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)(Seereverseforrequirednumberofdigits/charactersforeachblock)APPROVEDBYOMBNo.3150-0(04EXPIRES06I30)2001ESTIIAATEDBVRDENPERRESPONSETOCOMPLYWITHT)eSMANDATORYBIFORMATIONCOUECTIONREOVESTI50.0HRS.REPORTEDlESSONSLEARNEDAREBICORPORATEDINTOTHEUCENSINGPROCESSANDFEDBACKTOINDVSTRY.FORWARDCOMMENTSREGARDBIGBVRDENESTBIATETOTHEINFORMATIONANORECORDSMANAGEMENTBRANCH(T4F55).V.S.NVCLEARRECIAATORYCOMMISSION.WASIeNGTON.DC20555000).ANOTOTHEP~REDVCTIONPROJECT(5)50OIOI),OFFICEOFMANAGEMENTANDBVDGET,WASHINGTON,DC20505FACILITYNAME(1)CookNuclearPlantUnit1DOCKETNUMBER(2)05000-315PAGE(5)1of3TITLE(4)GeneralElectricHFARelaysInstalledinEmergencyDieselGeneratorsMayNotMeetSeismicQualificationEVENTDATE(5)LERNUMBER(6)REPORTDATE(7)OTHERFACILITIESINVOLVED(8)MONTH01DAYYEARYEAR0619991999SEQUENTIALNUMBER0010002101999REVISIONNUMBERMONTHDAYYEARFAILITYNAMCookUnit2AILINAMCKNUMBR05000-316NUMOPERATINGMODE(9)POWERLEVEL(10)NAME0050.73(a)(2)(i)50.73(a)(2)(II)50.73(a)(2)(ill)re)(11)20.2203(a)(2)(v)2p.2203(a)(3)(i)20.2203(a)(3)(ii)20.2201(b)20.2203(a)(1)20.2203(a)(2)(1)50.73(a)(2)(viii)50.73(a)(2)(x)73.71OTHER50.73(a)(2)(iv)20.2203(a)(4)20.2203(a)(2)(ii)50.73(a)(2)(v)50.73(a)(2)(vii)50.36(c)(1)50.36(c)(2)SpecifyYIAbslraclbe)orrornNRCFormSEBA20.2203(a)(2)(iii)2p.2203(a)(2)(iv)LICENSEECONTACTFORTHISLER(12)TELEPHONENUMBER(IndudeAreaCods)THISREPORTISSUBMITTEDPURSUANTTOTHEREQUIREMENTSOF10CFR(I:(CheckoneormoMr.BrentD.Pogue,Licensing(616)465-5901x2604COMPLETEONELINEFOREACHCOMPONENTFAILUREDESCRIBEDINTHISREPORT(13)CAUSESYSTEMCOMPONENTMANUFACTURERREPORTABLETOEPIX,ACCAUSESYSTEMCOMPONENTMANUFACTURERREPORTABLETOEPIXSUPPLEMENTALREPORTEXPECTED(14)XYES(IfYes,completeEXPECTEDSUBMISSIONDATE)NOEXPECTEDSUBMISSIONDATE15)MONTH'04DAY051999Abstract(Limitto1400spaces,i.e.,approximately15single-spacedtypewrittenlines)(16)OnJanuary11,1999,Units1and2EmergencyDieselGenerators(EDGs)weredeclaredinoperableat1828hoursandanENSnotificationwasmadeat2026hoursinaccordancewith10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i)and10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iii)(A).The.EDGsweredeclaredinoperableduetoaconcernidentifiedbyplantpersonnelthattheGeneralElectricHFAsafetyrelatedrelaysinstalledintheEDGcircuitsmaynotbeconfiguredinaccordancewithvendorrecommendedrequirementsforrelaycontactadjustmentandservicinginstructions,andtherefore,maynotmeetseismicqualificationrequirements.TherelayissuehadbeenidentifiedinaConditionReportonJanuary6,1999,howeverduetoprocessproblems,actionswerenotinitiatedtodeterminethesafetysignificanceoftheconditionuntilJanuary11,1999.AsbothunitsarecurrentlyinMode5,allsafeshutdowncircuitswerereviewedandoperabilitydeterminationsperformedforbothunits.ItwasdeterminedthatonlytheEDGswereaffectedinsuchawaythatspuriousoperationoftheHFArelayfromaseismiceventcouldpreventtheEDGsfromperformingtheirsafetyrelatedfunction.PreliminaryevaluationindicatesthatoperatingexperienceinformationprovidedtotheindustryregardingtheHFArelayswasincorrectlydispositionedin1985.Thisresultedinthefailuretoprovideinstructionsforconversionofcontactposition,adjustmentofthecontacts,andverificationofthecontactsonceconverted.Engineeringhasreviewedtheelementarydrawingsforthecontrolcircuitsofallsafeshutdownequipmentanddeterminedthat9relaysassociatedwiththeEDGshavecontactconfigurationsthatarenotoneoftheGEseismicallyqualifiedvariationsfortheHFArelay.Correctiveactionshavebeendevelopedandarecurrentlybeinginitiated.Therootcauseinvestigationofthisev'entis,ongoing,asistheevaluationofsafetysignificance.Supplementalinformationregardingadditionalcorrectiveactions,preventiveactions,andsafetysignificance,willbeprovidedinanupdatetothisLERbyApril5,1999.99022200i69902i0PDRADQCK050003i5SPDR NRCFORM366AU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSION(6-1998)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONFACILITYNAME(1)CookNuclearPlantUnit1DOCKETNUMBER(2)05000-315YEAR1999LERNUMBER(6)SEQUENTIALNUMBER001REVISIONNUMBER00PAGE(3)2of3TEXT(Ilmorespaceisrequired,useedditionelcopiesofNRCForm(366A)(17)ConditionsPriortoEventUnit1wasinMode5,ColdShutdownUnit2wasinMode5,ColdShutdownDescritionofEventInlateDecember1998,engineeringpersonnelbeganareviewrelatedtoGeneralElectric(GE)HFArelaycontactconfiguration.whilereviewingadocumentationpackagerelatedtoaplantrestartissue.Asaresultofthereview,onJanuary6,1999,aconcernwasidentifiedthattheGEHFAsafetyrelatedrelaysinstalledinplantsystemcircuitsmaynotbeproperlyconfiguredinaccordancewithvendorinstructionsforrelaycontactadjustmentandservicinginstructions,andtherefore,maynotmeetseismicqualification.TheGEHFArelaysareprocuredwithallcontactsinthe"normallyopen"position,whichareconvertedto"normallyclosed"asrequiredbythecircuitinwhichtheyareinstalled.Whenconvertinga"normallyopen"contacttoa"normallyclosed"contact,pastandexistingplantpracticesdidnotverifythatallcriticalrelayadjustmentsarewithinthevendorspecifiedtolerances,norwerethealteredcontactarrangementsverifiedtobeoneoftheGEseismicallyapprovedconfigurations.Theseverificationsarenecessarytoensurethattheseismicqualificationhasbeenmaintained.AConditionReport(CR)waswrittendocumentingtheconcernwiththeHFArelaysandsubmittedtotheShiftTechnicalAdvisor(STA)onJanuary6,1999.Anoperabilitydeterminationcouldnotbemadeontheimpactofthisconditiononplantequipment,astherewasinsufficientinformationavailableonwhatcircuitswereaffected.Furtherinvestigationwasperformed,whichresultedintheidentificationthatHFArelayswereinstalledinvarioussafeshutdowncontrolcircuits,includingallfourEmergencyDieselGenerators(EDGs.Onceallsafeshutdowncircuitswerereviewedforbothunits,itwasdeterminedthatonlytheEDGswereaffectedinsuchawaythatspuriousoperationoftheHFArelaywouldpreventtheEDGsfromperformingtheirsafetyrelatedfunctioninMode5.TheEDGsweredeclaredinoperableat1828hoursonJanuary11,1999.CauseofEventPreliminaryevaluationindicatesthatoperatingexperienceinformationprovidedtotheindustryregardingtheHFArelayswasincorrectlydispositionedin1985.Thisresultedinthefailuretoprovideinstructionsforconversionofcontactposition,adjustmentofthecontacts,andverificationofthecontactsonceconverted.Additionally,engineeringhasreviewedtheelementarydrawingsforthecontrolcircuitsofallsafeshutdownequipmentanddeterminedthat9relaysassociatedwiththeEDGshavecontactconfigurationsthatarenotoneoftheGEseismicallyqualifiedvariationsfortheHFArelay.ProblemswiththetimelyprocessingofCRsandthecollectionofinformationneededtoperformoperabilitydeterminationsbecameapparentwhentheShiftSupervisordeclaredall4EDGsinoperableduetotheinabilitytodeterminewhateffecttheHFArelayconcernhadontheEDGs.TheconditionreportingprocesswasoverburdenedbylargenumbersofCRsgenerated,allofwhichrequiredreviewbytheSTA,whoisalsoexpectedtogeneratetheoperabilitydeterminationwhenrequired.ThisresultedinabacklogofbothunreviewedCRsandCRswaitingontheinformationnecessarytoperformtheoperabilitydeterminations.Therootcauseinvestigationforthiseventhasnotbeencompleted.SupplementalinformationregardingadditionalcorrectiveactionsandpreventiveactionswillbeprovidedinanupdatetothisLERbyApril5,1999.NRCFORM366A(6-1998)

NRCFORM366AU.s.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSION(6-1998)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONFACILITYNAME(1)CookNuclearPlantUnit1DOCKETNUMBER(2)05000-315YEAR1999LERNUMBER(6)SEQUENTIALNUMBER001REVISIONNUMBER00PAGE(3)3of3TEXT(ifmorespeceisrequired,useedditionelcopiesofNRCForm(366A)(17)AnalsisofEventThiseventwasreportedviatheENSonJanuary11,1999at2026hoursunder10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i),asaconditionwhichifhadbeenfoundwhiletheplantwasoperatingwouldhaveresultedintheplantbeingseriouslydegraded,andisalsobeingreportedunder10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iii)(A)tohavethepotentialtoalonepreventfulfillmentofthesafetyfunctionofsystemsthatareneededtomaintainthereactorinasafeshutdowncondition.ThisLERisbeingsubmittedinaccordancewith10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)and10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v)(A).TheGEHFArelaysareusedinnumeroussafeshutdownequipmentcontrolcircuits.ForallsafeshutdownequipmentrequiredinMode5thatutilizetheaffectedGEHFArelays,thecontrolcircuitshavebeenreviewedforimpactbasedontheidentifiedcondition.Asaresultofthisreview,onlytheEDGshavebeenidentifiedasbeingadverselyimpactedsuchthattheyhavebeendeclaredinoperable.Theimpactoftheserelaysinothersafeshutdownequipmentcontrolcircuitshasrevealedthattheequipment,incertaincases,isaffected,buttheeffectdoesnotjeopardizethesafetyfunctionoftheequipment.Additionalevaluationsarerequiredfortheeffectonequipmentinotherplantoperatingmodes.Thesafetysignificanceofthiseventisunderevaluation.FinaldeterminationregardingthesafetysignificanceandpastoperabilitywillbeprovidedinanupdatetothisLERbyApril5,1999.CorrectiveActionsAmulti-disciplineprojectteamwasformedtoaddresstheconditionoftheGEHFArelaysanddirectactivitiestorestoretheEDGstoanoperablecondition.AllsafeshutdownequipmentcontrolcircuitswerereviewedtodetermineinwhichcircuitstheHFArelaysareinstalled.Arelayinspectionprocedurewasdevelopedtoverify,andadjustasnecessary,thoseHFArelaysthatarenotwithinthevendorrecommendedspecifications.ThisprocedurealsoincorporatesvendorrecommendedguidanceforrelayadjustmentinanysubsequentmaintenanceactivitiesontheHFArelays.Uponcompletionoftherelayinspection,relaysthataredeterminedtobenon-compliantwillbeevaluatedforseismicperformance.NinerelaysassociatedwiththeEDGswerefoundinstalledinconfigurationsthatdonotmatchGEprocurementconfigurations,therefore,theseismicadequacyoftheseconfigurationsisconsideredtobeindeterminate.Theserelaysrequireadesignchangetorestoreeachoftherelaystotheirqualifiedcontactconfiguration.ThedesignchangewillbeimplementedpriortotheEDGsbeingdeclaredoperable.Apostmaintenancetestingprocedurehasbeendevelopedtotestandverifyoperabilityoftheserelays.Toaddresstheissueregardingthelackofatimelyresponsetodetermineoperability,asinglepoint,multi-disciplineteamtoreviewincomingconditionreportshasbeenimplemented.Theteam,whichincludesaSeniorReactorOperator,interfacesdirectlywiththeircounterpartswithintheirrespectiveorganizationstoincreaseconditionreportreviewefficiencyandimprovetimelyresponseuntilprogrammaticimprovementsareimplemented.Arevisiontotheoperabilitydeterminationprocedurehasbeenimplementedthatdirectstheengineeringorganizationtoperformoperabilitydeterminations,whenrequired,andprovidethemtotheOperationsShiftSupervisorforapproval.Therootcauseinvestigationforthiseventhasnotbeencompleted.Additionalcorrectiveactions,includingpreventiveactions,maybedevelopedbasedontheresultsoftherootcauseinvestigation.SupplementalinformationregardingadditionalcorrectiveactionsandpreventiveactionswillbeprovidedinanupdatetothisLERbyApril5,1999.PreviousSimilarEvents315/97-024-04NRCFORM366A(6-1998)