05000315/LER-1998-049, :on 981020,emergency Boron Injection Flow Path Was Inoperable.Caused by Original Design Deficiency. Engineering Evaluation of Event Is Continuing

:on 981020,emergency Boron Injection Flow Path Was Inoperable.Caused by Original Design Deficiency. Engineering Evaluation of Event Is Continuing

ML17335A466
Person / Time
Site:	Cook
Issue date:	01/05/1999
From:	Finissi M INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML17335A465	List: 05000315/LER-1998-049, :on 981020,emergency Boron Injection Flow Path Was Inoperable.Caused by Original Design Deficiency. Engineering Evaluation of Event Is Continuing
References
LER-98-049, LER-98-49, NUDOCS 9901120180
Download: ML17335A466 (2)

LER-1998-049, on 981020,emergency Boron Injection Flow Path Was Inoperable.Caused by Original Design Deficiency. Engineering Evaluation of Event Is Continuing

Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion:	10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
3151998049R00 - NRC Website

text

NRC Form 366 U.S. NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSION (6-1998)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digitslcharacters for each block)

APPROVED BY OMB NO. 31504104 EXPIRES 06/30/2001 SSTSAATSD IKAIDFN PER

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TITLE(e)

Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 1 DOCKET NUMBER(2) 05000-315 PAGE (2) 1 of 1 Interim - Emergency Boron Injection Flow Path Inoperable Due to Original Design Deficiency EVENT DATE (5)

MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR LER NUMBER (6)

SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REPORT DATE (7)

DAY YEAR REVISION NUMBER MONTH Cook Unit 2 N

MB 05000-316 NU OTHER FACILITIESINVOLVED(8) 10 20 1998 1998 00 01 05 1999 OPERATING MODE (9) 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(viii) 20.2201 (b) 20.2203(a)(2)(v)

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTEDPURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR II: (Check one or more) (11)

POWER LEVEL(10) 000 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(2)(l) 20.2203(a)(2)(II) 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.36(c)(1) 50.36(c)(2)

UCENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 50.73(a)(2)(x) 73.71 OTHER Specify in Abstract below or nNRCFonns66A Mike Finissi, System Engineering Manager TELEPHONE NUMBER(Inc4de Area Code)

(616) 465-5901, x2830 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COIIPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE

SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO EPIX

~,

SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO EPIX SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 14 X

YES (IfYes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE NO EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE 15)

MONTH 02 OAY 19 1999 Abstract (Limitto 1400 spaces, I.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On October 20 1998, with Units 1 and 2 in Mode 5,'Cold Shutdown, Engineering noted potential problems with emergency boron injection utilizing the Boric Acid Storage Tanks and the Boric Acid Transfer (BAT) Pumps to provide concentrated boric acid to the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) charging pump suction header.

Technical Specifications (TS) 3.1.2.1 and 3.1.2.2 require boron injection flow paths to the RCS for reactivity control. One potential problem was that, in certain operating conditions, the BATpumps may not have had adequate net positive suction head (NPSH). The second potential problem involved the possibility of boric acid precipitation degrading an emergency boron injection flow path.

There is no evidence that boron injection capability had actually been diminshed at any time. However, since the requisite number of emergency boron injection paths may not have been available in all applicable plant conditions, the emergency boron injection path is conservatively considered to have been inoperable.

Therefore, there would have been times when the applicable TS action statements may not have been met.

In accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), this condition is being reported as a condition prohibited by the plant's TS.

Engineering evaluation of this event is continuing.

Due to the complex nature of the potential problems and the system interfaces, additional time is being taken to evaluate the identified conditions. Current expectations are to submit an update to this LER by February 19, 1999.

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