ML17309A236
| ML17309A236 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 03/11/1982 |
| From: | CAPLAN R N Sierra Club |
| To: | DENTON H R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17258A639 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737 NUDOCS 8203150125 | |
| Download: ML17309A236 (32) | |
Text
REGULATORYIRMATIONDISTRIBUTIONSYST(RIDS)rgb'PR'vACCESSIONNBR:82031501?5DOC~DATE:82/03/11NOTARIZED,'NO...DOCKETFACIL:50-244RobertEmmetGinnaNuclearPlantiUni,t1E'RochesterG05000240AUTHBYNAMEAUTHORAFFILIATIONCAPLANERAN~SierraClubRECIP~NAMERECIPIENTAFFILIATIONDENTONEH~REOfficeofNu'clearReactorRegulationpDirector
SUBJECT:
Forwardspetit)onforordertoshowcausewhyfacilityOLshouldnotbesuspendedorwhypermission',.torestartreactorshouldnetbewiIthhelduntil,actionshave'been"taken.toassureIprotectionof>publicsafety.DI'STRIBUTIONCODE:YE03SCOPIESRECEIVED:LTR[ENCL-LSIIE:.3-Ll~TITLE:RequestforNRRAction(e'g,2.206Petitions)8Related)CorrespondencNOTES:1copy:SEPSectsLdr.05000244RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEORB05BCLYONSRJ~01INTERNAL:EDO/ACBELD/REDNRR/PPAS'COPIES'TTRENCL1111111111RECIP'IENTIDCODE/NAMEORB05LAELDNRRDIR,'COPIESLTTRENCL11111111EXTERNAL:LPDRNSIC0305111NRCPDRNTIS021111'TOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:LTTR~ENCL HHI'1Hh'IH'1HPfhHH SPECIALHANDLINGREQUIREDCHANGEDTOPDRDATAENTRYCHANGE824IlEgQQQtcPDRandmakeotherchangesasnotedonpink'codingsheetDDCIQClppQgchangedtcPDR.RequestPDRQClistandattachnotetoDMBredistributionMICROGRAPHICS-RefilmPl-g>gF44gQandchangemicrofilmaddress SIERRA-=:CLUB530BushStreetSanFrancisco,California94108(415)981-8634Pleasereplyto:278WashingtonBlvd.Oswego,NewYork13126HaroldDenton,DirectorOfficeofNuclearReactorRegulationU.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionWashington,D.C.20555
DearMr.Denton:
EnclosedforfilingisaPetitionForpreparedbytheSierraClub.ThepetitionOrdpertainstotheseGinnaNuclearPowerPlant,DocketNo.50-244,andarisesfromtheJanuary25,1982,accident.Asstaffreviewoftheaccidentisalreadyinprogress,werequestpromptresponsetoourpetition.Verytnulyyours,RuthN.Caplan,ChairSierraClubNationalEnergyCommitteeEnclosurecc.withpetition:SenatorGaryHartSenatorAlanSimpsonCongressmanMorrisUdallCongressmanRichardOttingerCongressmanEdwardMarkeyCongressmanTobyMoffettRichardGoldsmith,Esq.KarinSheldon,Esq.VawterParker,SCLDFJosephFontaine,President,SierraClubEugeneCoan,SierraClubJesseRiley,NuclearSubcom,SierraClubRichardLippes,Chair,AtlanticChapterBeatriceAnderson,Chair,RochesterGroupRobertPollard,UnionofConcernedScientistsJohnE.Maier,RochesterGas8Electric~8P03150125820311PDRADOCK05000244'~~G,.'...,'PDR rlgg1~CttlII'Pf%f~Mk'Jf0 UNITEDSTATESOFAMERICANUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONIntheMatterof))RochesterGasandElectricCorporation))R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant))DocketNo.50-244SIERRACLUBPETITIONFORORDERTOSHOWCAUSEINTRODUCTIONThispetitionisbroughtbeforetheOfficeofNuclearReactorRegulationbytheSierraClub.Pursuantto10CFR2.206,50.54,50.100and50.109,andforreasonssetforthbelow,theSierraClubrequestsChatRochesterGasandElectricCompanyberequiredtoshowcause,asprovidedin10CFR2.202,whytheoperatinglicenseforCheGinnanuclearreactorinOntario,NewYork,shouldnotbesuspended,orinChealternative,whypermissionCore-startthereactorshouldnotbewithheld,untilsuchtimeasessentialactionshavebeentakenbyChelicenseeandCheCommissiontoassureCheprotectionofpublichealthandsafety.ThenecessityforsuchactionsarisesfromCheaccidentonJanuary25,1982,whichwasinitiatedbyasteamgeneratortubebreakandwhichtriggeredasiteemergency.Inrequestingthisaction,theSierraClubwishestostressourconcernregardingChepotentiallyserioussafetyimplicationsoftheGinnaaccident,notonlytoour500memberslivinginRochester,butalsoCoChegeneralpublic.Further,asanationalenvironmentalorganisationwithapproximately225,000membersacrossChecountryand18,000membersinNewYorkState,weareconcernedaboutthe 4~k$~~~4'~F~~lekrr,krkIr4J~I~tI'~Jk~(~rark.JkJI~4(F(~Jj~rCFkJl>r','FP~kkrr"i,~TP.t;4k~-\4~~,I,=(F,rl~An,'I\CllIII'kk'lF4~r4~4V~44~l'4r4If4CFI,4FF4'j implicationsofCheGinnaaccidentforChesafeoperationofotherpressurizedwaterreactors1nNewYorkandacrossChecountry.GivenCheclearsafetyimplicationsofbothunder-andover-pressurizationwhichcanarisesubsequent;toasteamgeneratortubebreak,theSierraClubconcurswithCheNovember24,1981,"Informa-tionReport;-SteamGeneratorTubeExperience"byNRCstaffwhichstates:TheseCubes,likemanyinterfacecomponents,affectbothCprimaryandsecondary)systems,andtheirfailureisanoperationalaswellasaotentialsafetconcern.Therefore,ChesteamgeneratormustbeviewedaspartofChetotalsysteminwhichitoperates.Thus,maintainingCheintegrityofChetubesrequiresasystemsapproachthatshouldencompassmechanical,structural,material,andchemicalconsiderations.(page35,emphasisadded)RELIEFREQUESTEDTheSierraClubrequestsChatCheDirectorofNuclearReactorRegulationin1tiateafullreviewbystaffofmatterspertainingCotheabilityofthelicenseetosafelyoperatethereactorsoasCoprotectpublichealthandsafety,inightoftheJanuary25thacci-dent.Suchreviewshouldbemadepartofthereviewnowinprogressbystaffandshouldinclude,butneednotbelimitedCo,thespecificareasdetailedbelow.Pendingcompletionofthisreviewbythestaff,theOperatingLicenseforGinnashouldbesuspended,orinthealter-native,re-startofChereactorshouldnotbepermitted.l.ThecauseoftheCubebreakinitiatingCheJanuary25,1982,accidentshouldbethoroughlyexplainedandcorrectiveactiontakenCopreventsuchbreaksinthefuture.ThemechanicaldamagearisingfromloosepiecesofmetalshouldbestudiedinChecontextofthegenericcorrosionproblemsatGinna.Specifically,corrosionarisingfromAVT(allvolatiletreatment)controlofsecondarywaterchemistryshouldbeaddressedinrelationtodentingoftubes,stress 0EI corrosion,andintergranularattack.ThisshouldincludecorrosioninChefeedwatersystemandcorrosiveimpuritiesintroducedbycondenserleaks.2.TheadequacyofChesteamgeneratorCubetestingprogramshouldbeevaluatedandadeterminationmaderegardingthefollowingissues:a.IsCheroutinemulti-frequencyeddycurrenttestingmethodbeingemployedatGinnaChebestavailablegivencurrentstate-of-Che-art?Ifnot,whatJustificationisCherefornotemployingChebestavailabletechnology,inlightofchronicCubedegredationproblemsatGinnaandatotherPWR'sandCheexistenceoftechniquessuchasfiberopticexamination?c.DoesChecurrenttestingprogram,whichonlytestsasampleofCubesandwhichdoesnottesttheirfulllength,providesufficientinformationtopreventtubefailure?3.ThetechnicalspecificationsdefiningtheextentofallowabletubedegredationforsteamgeneratorCuberejectionsshouldbere-viewedinlightoftheGinnaaccidenttodeterminewhethertheyaresufficientlystringenttopreventaCubebreak.4.TheincreasedriskofsteamgeneratorCubebreaks/leaks,ifRG8EoperatesthereactorwithouthavingproceededwithChepreventa-tivesleevingprogramoriginallyscheduledfortheSpring,1982,refuelingoutage,shouldbeassessedandadeterminationmadeastowhethertheoriginalscheduleshouldbeadheredto.5.ThesafetyimplicationsofcurrentandproposedpluggingandsleevingofsteamgeneratortubesandoffurtherrepairssuchasinsertionofstabilizingcablesshouldbeexaminedinorderCoassessadditionalstress,suchasfromchangesinfluiddynamics,whichmay 1PIUt~N~Cuq4' beinducedintubesremaininginuse.6.AnevaluationshouldbecompletedCodeterminethesafetyimplicationsofoperatoractioncurrentlyrequiredtore-establishtheinstrumentairsystemandCoopenthePORVmanually.7.ThesafetyimplicationsofChefailureofthePORVCocloseshouldbeassessedinlightoftheproblemswhichdevelopedduringtheGinnaaccident,particularlywithregardCothe,creationofasteambubbleinthereactorvesselasaresultofdepressurization.Thepotentialforuncoveringthecore,duetoasteambubbleinChereactorvesselorelsewhereinCheprimarysystemshouldbeaddressed.Adeterminationshouldbemadeastowhethersafetyfunct1onsper-formedbythePORVrequireChatitbedesignatedassafetygradeandberequired'ComeetallNRCregulationsapplicabletosuchsafetygradedesignation,inorderCoassuresafeoperationofthereactor.8.Adeterminationshouldbemade,giventhedemonstratedunreliabilityofChePORV,astowhetherareliablemethodexistsforremovingdecayheatbymeansofChesecondarysystem,withoutproviding,attheveryminimum,onepathwayforremovingdecayheatwhichconsistsofsafetygradeequipment.Suchdeterminat1onshouldalsoincludeanassessmentofChereliabilityofessentialauxiliarysupportsystemssuchasinstrumentair,andshouldconsiderthecon-sequencesoflossofoff-sitepowertodeterminewhetherGeneralDesignCriteria¹17of10CFRPart50AppendixAismet.9.Adeterminationshouldbemadeastowhethertheemergencyoperatorproceduressetforthin"WestinghouseEmergencyOperatorGuidelinesforSteamGeneratorTubeRuptureEvents"areadequatetoprotectChepublichealthandsafety.Operatordelay,orapparenthesitancy,interminatingCheHPI(highpressureinfection)isofparticularconcerninrelationtoCheriskofover-pressurization CW~W~WW~,IV~rrtwcW{'I'WCCC""t~IWCri~e'CCWWCVWII{'C{WWCI5-grec,{CV{If*~v~v"ccIwvecc~CW,WW~CFIIIIc,,=~(ttrWC%"fC{C>Icccrw~WcI~~IC'IClc'iWCCIFcICIICfI,,CMI~WC{~'-yt.CC*II~'~CCI'CI,{F.t~IeqCe'tf{cc$II~lel~Iecjv,-C-$Cc~C,-~-<<-gf~g,',~~CCC~IWWIe'I~~{V~~tCiW~~W,*~WCc~,C',C~I'II-C-'.~I'C,'g,q{'IICCcgI{IC{C~c{wC'~WC'cccrW,c~-'WWWr,~CFWW ofthereactorpressurevesselasreportedinCheSpeismemorandum(seeinfra811)andtotheincreasedrelianceonproperfunctioningIofsteamgeneratorsafetyValves.Further,CheGinnaemergencyproceduresshouldbeconformedtoCheWestinghouseguidelines.10.Theconditionsunderwhichthereactorvesselcanbecomeover-pressurizedinChecourseofoperatoractiontocontralanaccidentshouldbeclearlyspecifiedandadeterminationmadeastowhetheranautomaticresponsesystemwoulddecreaseChechanceofover-pressurizationproblemsfromdevelopingand,whethertheinstal-lationofsuchasystematGinnaisanactionthat"..Millprovidesubstantial,additionalprotectionwhichisrequiredforthepublichealthandsafety...."asprovidedin10CFR50.109.ll.TheconcernsraisedintheSpeismemorandum(ThemisSpeistoRogerNattson,"PreliminaryEvaluationofOperatorActionforGinnaSGTubeRuptureEvent"datedJanuary28,1982,seeinfraAttachmentE)regardingproblemsandpotentialproblemsincoolingthereactorfollowingtheCubebreakshouldbeaddressed;adeter-'inationmadeastotheirsafetysignificance;andnecessarycorrectiveactiontaken.TheseincludeChefollowingproblems:a.theapparentstratificationintheBsteamgeneratoranditseffectonslowingdepressurizationofthefaultedsteamgenerator;b.theconsequenceofanadditionalcoolantsystemfailure,includingaleakintheAsteamgeneratoror'asecondarysidesafety/reliefvalve"stickingopen;c.Chenecessitytoremovedecayheatfrom,.theAsteamgeneratorbysteamingtotheatmospheredueCoimproperfunctioningofChecondensor; II~~~tIIIU d.theproblemsassociatedw9;ththeuseofChePORVforco'olantdischargeduring"feedandbleed"cooling.12.AdeterminationshouldbemadeasCoCheextenttowhichfailuretoimplementtheTMIActionPlanrequirementforinstrumenta-tionCoallowdirectmeasurementofthewaterlevelinthereactorvesselcontributedCooperatorproblemsindeterminingpropertimingforoperatingCheECCSpumpsandindeterminingChesizeofthesteambubble.13.Afullinvestigation.;shouldbemadetodeterminethestateofembrittlemhntoftheGinnareactorpressurevesseltodeterminethelikelihoodChatover-pressurizationwillleadtovesselruptureasaconsequenceofpressurizedthermalshock.14.TheNRCshoulddeterminewhetherChereactorcanoperatesafelywithoutreplacementofChesteamgeneratorandassociatedpartsofChenuclearsteamsupplysystemandwhetherthenewestWestinghousesteamgeneratordesignwillamelioratetheproblems,givenCherecentproblemswhichhavedevelopedwiththisdesignatMcGuireandattEuropeanreactors.15.Thetotalpro)ectedworkerexposureshouldbecalculatedinadvanceofNRCapprovalofRGKE'srepairsandaspecificplandevelopedCokeepworkerexposureaslowasreasonablyachievable(ALARA).Thisshouldincludeadeterminationastowhethertimeshouldbeallowedforradioactivedecay,particularlyofCobalt58,inthesteamgenera-torpriorCorepairs,inordertopreventunnecessaryworkerexposureandstillallowallnecessaryrepairstobemade.16.AnoverallsafetyassessmentshouldbeperformedbeforeChereactorisallowedtore-startinorderthatthecombinedriskofpotentialfailuremodescanbedetermined,inrelationtotheprotectionofpublichealthandsafety.Ataminimumsuchanassessmentshould IUInhIV~~SliIIIfC addressChefollowing:a.ChedegredationoftheGinnasteamgenerators,includingCheplugging,sleevingandotherrepairsrequiredCodateandplanned;b.Cheon-goingcontributiontotubedegredationofcorrosionarisingfromAVTcontrol,fromcondenserleakage,andfromChefeedwatersystem(asopposedtoChesuspecteddamagefromloosepiecesofmetalintheBsteamgenerator);c.ChelackofasafetygradepathwayinthesecondarysystemCoremovedecayheat;d.thechancethatoperatorerrorwillleadCoover-orunder-pressurizationofthereactorvessel;e.thestateofreactorvesselembrittlement.ThefactswhichconstitutethebasisforourrequestaresetforthinAttachmentsA,B,C,DandE.Werespectfullyrequestthatadecisiononourpetitionberenderedforthwith.OnbehalfofCheSierraClub,Respectfullysubmittedby,RuthN.Caplan,ChairSierraClubNationalEnergyCommittee278WashingtonBlvd.Oswego,NewYork13126315-343-2412IherebyaffirmChatthefactsallegedhereinaretrueandcorrectCothebestofmyknowledgeandbelief.DATED:Marchll,1982RutN.Caplan P<<e~ez~rII~II\t)API,~gg,II%I AFFIDAVITOFBEATRICEANDERSSN1.MynameisBeatriceAndersen.Iliveat12SpinetDrive,Rochester,NewYork14625,whichisabout~milesfromtheGinnareactorownedbyRochesterGasandElectric.2.IamamemberoftheSierraClubandIchairtheRochesterQroupoftheSierraClubwhichhas~50membersintheRochesterarea.3.OnbehalfofmyselfandtheRochesterGroup,IauthorizetheSierraClubtorepresentmyinterestsintherequestforshowcauseactionbeforetheU.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommission.Theseinterestsincludethepotentialdangertomy&healthandsafetyiftheGinnareactorisallowedtorestartpriortosuchactionsasarecalledforintheSierraClubshowcauserequest;.Swornandsubscribedtobeforemethisdayof,1982.EDWINR.JEFFRIESJR.otaryPubiicintheStateofNewYorkNotaryPublcMONROECOUNTY,NEWYORKCornrnissionExpiresMarch30,19@ZMycommissionexpires IrrrII,dr,~~rrrJrrIIIIrrlrr'rr4rr~
ATTACHMENT.FACTUALBASISFORSHOWSEPETITION1.OnJanuary25,1982,asteamgeneratortuberuptureatCheGinnanuclearplantinOntario,NewYork,occurred.TheruptureoccurredinaCubewhichwaslastinspectedinMay,1981,atwhichtimetheCubeshowedlessChan20$was'~ofChetubewall,accordingto"WeeklyInformationReport,February18,1982,fromT.A.Rehn,AssistantforOperationsOfficeofCheEDOCoCheCommissioners",includedhereinasAttachmentB.2.ItisourunderstandingthatRG&EhasnotyetbeenabletoprovideasatisfactoryexplanationfortheruptureofthesteamgeneratorCube.Uponinformationandbelief,aclearrelationshiphasnotbeenestab-lishedbetweenloosepiecesofmetaldiscoveredin';thesteamgenerator,thedamagedperipheraltubes,andCherupturedtube.Analternateexplanation,linkingtherupturetostresscorrosionhasbeenadvancedbyRG&E.(SeeRehmmemo,page2ofEnclosureB)3.Uponinformationandbelief,theGinnaCubetestingprogramhasbeenbasedonmulti-frequencyeddycurrenttestingatChetimeofrefueling.SuchtestinghasincludedonlyasampleofCubesandonlypartofthetubelengthhasbeenexamined..AccordingtoNuclearSafet"mosttubesweretestedtothefirstsupportplate,someCothesixthsupportplate,andafewovertheU-bend."(NuclearSafetpVS22'5pSept.-Oct.,1981.IncludedinfraasAttachmentC.4.Uponinformationandbelief,the"QualityAssuranceManual,GinnaStation-InserviceInspectionProgramforthe1980-1989Interval"allowsthetubeinspectionintervaltobeextendedtoonceevery40monthsundercertainconditions.Section2.5ofthisdocumentstates:Theinserviceinspectionintervalsfortheexaminationofsteamgeneratortubesshallnotbemorethan24months.However,ifoveranominaltwoyearperiod(e.g.,Cwonormalfuelcycles)atleasttwoexaminationsoftheseparatelegsresultinlessChan10$ofChetubeswithdetectablewallpenetration(Othan20$)andnosignificant(O,than10$)furtherpenetrationoftubeswithpreviousindications,theinspectionintervaloftheindividuallegsmaybeextendedCoonceevery40months.(page5of22)5.Uponinformationandbelief,RGREreportedCotheNRCstaffonFebruary10,1982,ChattestsaftertheaccidentdidnotrevealseriousproblemswithChesteamgeneratorCubeswhichwouldpreventRG&Efromre-startingthereactor.YetAfterfiberopticexaminationwasrequiredbystaff,seriousproblemswerefoundintubespreviouslyplugged.JohnMaier,RGREVice-presidentforElectricandSteamGeneration,commentedtothepressthenextday:"Thepicturesareverydramatic....Itlookslikesomebodywentinwithahacksaw.SomeoftheCubesshowseveredentingandexternaldegredation."(APquot;edinPalladium-Times,Feb.12,1982)FurtherexaminationrevealedCwopiecesofmetalweighing"'acoupleofpounds'...withoneofChemaslargeas6.5x4inchesandseven-sixteenthsinchesthick."(NucleonicsWeekFeb.18,1982AsreportedinNucleonicsWeek,Feb.25,1872,oneRGREsourcestated:"'Somearecorroded,someareimploded,somearegustsheared.'"
4'As~~f~44-Fs~I'4rhrh,ee4I'IL4fhtIe>>IvsstF'I\I~-t4=A~~I'll*IAFlt4Frt~~I~l,hes~F(4eheVIF-)I'F'I~e44"4r4I'IH4~~e4IHh4~I~~Ve~I~h~~I'l~IehSVfht'>>=r4~I=4~Iqr~,44Ar((",'4+Ifl'4~"Yehe4VVHrs~ISVI~h~Hp*hhrr~(~~'4S,(Sht4~'4~Ie(~4"E4Hrrl,ieS\~~llFIet~~~*'ISSHIts(',~'I'44FhtI(SSt~Ilte5'4'hI"hit'e(~evr~I~~4h'ehre'4't~tChIh~A~4s,'Itt*II'th4AvV~F4 AttachmentA.page2I6.Uponinformationandbelief,RG&EwasplanninganextensivesleevingprogramCoremedycorrosionproblemsregardingChesteamgeneratortubes.InaletterfromJohnMaierCoDennisCrutchfield,January15,1982,RG8Erequestedpermissionto"deleteChe25sleevelimitation"soChatmoresleevescouldbeinstalledduringeachsteamgeneratorinspection.(Seeinfra,AttachmentD.)7.AsrecentlyasSeptember21,1981,Ginnawasnotlistedasoneofthe11unitswiththemostserioussteamgeneratorproblems(NewYorkTimes,Sept.21,1981,B-10).ItisouropinionChatthisfactemphasizestheunpredictablenatureofCheruptureandreinforcesCheneedformuchmorestringenttestprocedures.8.Uponinformationandbelief,CheintroductionofAVTcontrolofsecondarywaterchemistryatGinnahasledCoproblemsofintergranularattackandtubecorrosion,requiringChepluggingofsteamgeneratortubes.(NuclearSafet,Ibid.)9.AsindicatedinthePointBeachproceedings,AVTcontroldoesnotfunctiontoprecipitateoutsolidimpuritiesthatleakintoChegeneratoranddoesnotpreventbuild-upofhardnessscaleontheheattransfersurfaces.Bothconditionsdegradesteamgeneratortubes.(Docket6630,ER-10,Exhibit16Eat14-15)10.AsobservedbyNRCstaff,"denting"ofsteamgeneratortubesoacur-redinseveralPWRfacilities,includingTurkeyPoint,Units3and4,andSurry,Units1and2,after4Co14monthsofoperation,followingCheconversionfromasodiumphophatetreatmentCoAVTchemistryforthesteamgeneratorsecondarycoolant.("InformationReport-SteamGeneratorTubeExperience,November24,1981,SECY81-664,"'AppendixB,page3.)Wenotehtereport'sobservationChat:"TubedentingismostsevereinCherigidregionsorso-called'hardspots'nChetubesupportplates.Thesehardspotsarelocated...aroundCheperipherallocationsofChesupportplatewhereCheplateiswedgedtoChewrapperandshell."(Ibid.,page3)Uponinformationandbelief,thestaffhasalreadyrequestedChatRGREhaveWestinghouseprepareareportregardingthismatter.11.TheNRC"InformationReport-SteamGeneratorTubeExperience"con-cludes:"copperalloysshouldbeeliminatedfromallareasofChecondensate/feedwater/steamcondensationcycle.SubstantialevidenceexistsChatcopperoxidesinChesteamgeneratorsareanimportantcatalystinacceleratingtherateofcorrosionprocesseswithinthesteamgenerators."(Ibid-.,p.42)12.Condens'erleakageisalsorelevantCotheactionathand.Staffstates:"WiththeexceptionofafewreactorswhicharesitedwherenoacidproducingspeciesexistsinChecondensercoolingwater,allcurrentlyoperatingplantsaresusceptibletodenting,ifsufficientcondenserleakageoccurs.Becausecopperoxidehasbeendemonstratedtobeacatalyst,thoseplantswithcopperin"Chbirsecondarycyclesareevenmoresusceptible."(Ibid.,AppendixA,page6)13.SteamgeneratorproblemsarenotautomaticallysolvedbyinstallingnewsteamgeneratorsasevidencedbyCheproblemsfacedbyPrairieIsland2andbyNorthAnna1.Brookhav~NationalLaboratorycommented PlI1~~Tlv('IIVv','p~'gj~~IItpfI~hl'.ff~pI11~ii>>VT~Jt~I~V)/1',gh'I1'I~\b>><<~1<<h,1IIhfl'>>t=;g~tq~hhf,r~~II-Jkrfl/f~gI,ct1.I~h~P~w"'f~IIww.bl.~T~Iht'<<~Ihb'~k.v>>ltg'TPVPCb~,f',,Pthrl'~IrtII-C>>~~,lhtI~I<<Ivthlf't~~~h~~It,lh~b*t'l1~vklk,IvtphtfV/VPhl/Q$fvtllbttPW()IlTPt'IP'khf'1~PVIyr,~Plh~tI'p<<tr~'ffI>>Pk>>hhgt,I.Vlkf<<1>>e,V'-'Il~1Wl~~'<<~~PITl'P'I111-tt'VVI'hhIttrIe>>I'I't~1"r1blIbfIb>>~I'~hbP'1>>'gtP~>>>>h$~PI~'J AttachmentA,page3'~~lastyearasfollows:ItseemsironicalthatPrairieIsland2,whichhasno'icopperinthesystem,stainlesssteelcondensers,andmeticulousmonitoringofwaterchemistry,shouldbetheoneunitCohavesufferedfromthisparticularphenomenon(ofCubecorrosion):ChePrairieIslandUnitshavetodatebeena~.ihind.ng~<examp3.eofwhatwethoughtwasCheproperwayCoavoidcorrosionproblems;-'-',I,-(Docket6630,CE-20,Exhibit40,.p.3)SuchexperiencesmakeitallChemoreimperativetohaveastringenttestingschedulefortubesandstrictstandardsforremovingtubesfromservice.14.Uponinformationandbelief,ChesequenceofeventsduringtheJanuary25accidentclearlyindicateCheinterdependencyofthenuclearsteamsupplysystemandthereactorsafetysystem.ReactortripinresponseCoChetubebreakinitiatedcontainmentisolationwhichresultedinlossofinstrumentair.ThisrequiredoperatoractiontoopenChePORVmanually,whenChevalvewasrequiredCorelieveover-pressurization.Thereactorvesselbecameunder-pressurizedwhenthePORVstuckopenandtheblockvalvehadtobeclosed.LoweredpressureproducedasteambubbleinthetopofChereactorvesselwhenwaterflashedtosteam.Aseconddropinpressureabout30min-uteslateragainledCowaterinChereactorvesselflashingCosteam.(Source:"PreliminaryEvaluationofOperatorActionsforGinnaSGTubeRuptureEvent"byThemisSpeis.SeeinfraAttachmentE.)15.Uponinformationandbelief,CheSpeismemo.alsoindicatesChatover-pressurizationofthereactorvesselwasofconcernduringthesequenceofeventsduringwhichoperatorsCriedtostabilizeChereactor.First,chargingpumpswererestartedbeforeCheBsteamgeneratorwasisolated,leadingCoabuild-upofreactorpressure.Second,CheSIpumpwasrestartedwithoutapparentneedCodoso,whichhaselicitedconcernregardingoperatorhesitancetoterminateHPIandCheconsequenceforpressurizedthermalshock.16.AccordingCothe"InformationReport-SteamGeneratorTubeExper-ience,"thetotalman-remsexposurecanbequitesignificant.Thereportstates:"Wherema)orrepairorreplacementeffortsarere-quired,doseexpendituresmayrangefrom2000Co3500man-rems."(Ibid,page51)ThelargestdosagereportedresultsfromsteamgeneratorrepairatSanOnofreUnit1,where3493man-remsexposureisreportedforthe273-dayoutageduring1980-3.981.(Ibid,Table6)ThisismorethanChe1759man-remsforsteamgeneratorreplacementatSurry,Unit1orthe2140man-remsforSurry,Unit2replacement.(Ibid.,AppendixB,page13andTable6)ItisourbeliefChatthesedoselevelspointCoCheneedtoevaluatetotalman-remsexposureindeterminingthebestcourseofactiontobefollowedatGinna.
141fV'r,IPr~Ivl1'IS,1'4~1",I~1'i4vg1>>III>>IItlI~1I4etc41>>r'1I~K+r~ttv+if~1I4~'h>>~vC14I~.~Ct'r>>"~t-Il11,4~~4,g'rVIf"~".4t'I>>I4r,'cCK~'4I~'Cg4rI'4ItI1~tf~h5~~4I"'ft>>~>>V44s>>4v.VIrYVt1~>>4I'tv4~1I~I'I'-~ISt~4Vt~Il,~~~4,rrIf>>=>>>>Ietcn,c*IfKl>>t44-AIV,I~~'~~~4~4g~-.1Kv4~IIf't4>>,(41~I4~1h~1II,IKJvII~,I,4rh~V4I>>~I~
ACHNENTBFebruar18,1982For:TheCommissionersFrom:T.A.Rehm,AssistantforOperations,OfficeoftheEDO~Sub'ett:WEEKLYINFORMATIONREPORT-MEEKENDINGFEBRUARY12,1992Asu+naryofkeyeventsisincludedasaconveniencetothoseCommissionerswhomaypreferacondensedversionofthisreport.ContentsAdministrationNuclearReactorRegulationNuclearMaterialSafetyandSafeguardsInspectionandEnforcementNuclearRegulatoryResearch.ExecutivelegalDirectorInternationalProgramsStateProgramsManagementandProgramAnalysisControllerEnclosureAGAnalysisandEvaluationofOperationalDataKSmallS.DisadvantagedBusinessUtilizationLRegionsItemsApprovedbytheCommission*Noinputthisweek.Contact:T..A.Rehm,OEDO49-27781~~T.A.Rehm,AssistantforOperationsOfficeoftheExecutiveDirectorforOperationsfORSUBSCRIBERSONLY R.E.GINNATherupturedtubeintheGinnasteamgeneratorwasinspectedinMay1981.TheECTresultsshowedthattherewas20Kpenetration(anODsignal)3to.,6in.abovethetubesheet.Thefailedtubeisinrow42,column55whichisneartheperipheryofsteamgenerator.Itislocatedinthe"wedgearea"ofthesteamgenerator.Thisisthesectionofthesupportplates'..that,doesnothavefloeholes.Threeofthesixprevioussmallleaks.thathavebeenexperiencedhavebeeninthat'rea:Thereisnosludgepi1einthatarea.2.TherupturedtubeintheGinnasteamgeneratorhasbeeninspected.usingfiberoptics.Therupturehasbeendeterminedtostartapproximately2,to3inchesabovethetubesheetandisapproximately5incheslong.Theruptureis-kite-shapedwithamaximumwidthof3/4to7/8inch.'G&Eostulatesthattheruturewasduetostresscorrosionliestodifferentialexansionbetweenthetubeandthetubewraperintheedereion(aregion.wherethetubesupportplateisfastenedtothewrapper.Profilometry,todeterminebulgingorunusualshapeofthe'tubes,showedsomebowingofthetubesintheareaoftherupture,thusaddingcredancetothistheory.Therupturedtubeisbeingpluggedandremovalofthetubeisnotanticipated'duetoitslocationinthetubebundle.'GEEisplanningtousefiberopticstoinspecttherupturedtubefromthesecondaryside.~Eddycurrenttesting(ECT)ofthe"B"steamgeneratorhasbeencompleted.'nadditiontotherupture'dtube,twentyotherhotlegtubesarescheduledtobeplugged..Threeofthetubesareadjacenttotherupturedtubewhiletheothersaretubesnonrelatedtotheaccidentthatindicateintergranularattack(IGA)or>405degradation.;Noplugging,otherthantherupturedtube,isplannedforthecoldlegofthe"B"steamgenerator.'GEEhascommitedtoECT100%ofthe"A".steat'eneratorhotlegtubesplusallperipherytubesandarandomsampleofthesludgeareatubesinthecoldlegofthe"A"steamgenerator.ENCLOSUREB R.E.GIHHACont'd3.OnWednesday,February10,1982,membersoftheHRCstaffmetwithrepresentativesofRochesterGasandElectricCorporation(RGB)todiscusstherequirementstobemetpriortorestartoftheR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant.RGAEhadscheduledthestartupofGinnaforMonday,February15,1982,andproposedoperationuntilthescheduledMay15,1982refuelingoutage,atwhichtimetheplantwouldbeshut.downandeddycurrenttests(ECT)'of'hesteamgenerators(S/G)wouldbeperformed.RGEEpresentedinformationonthecauseandcorrectiveactionforthetubelocatedinthewedgeareathatruptured.Inaddi-.tion,therewasadescriptionofPowerOperatedReliefYalve(PORY)modificationsanddiscussionofemergencyprocedures.'-RGhE'hasperformedextensiveECTofbothS/Gs.Therupturedtubehasbeeninspectedusing.fiberopticequipmentandavideotapeoftherupturewassho~natthemeeting.Fiberopticinspectionofthesecondarysideofthe"B"S/Gisinprogress.'naddition.tothefailedtube,the.licenseehasplugged20additionaltubesinthe"B"S/Gbecauseofinter-granularattackorwastageindications.Thestaffhasconcludedthattherewasnotsufficienttechnicalbasis~~~resentedatthistimetopermittheGinnaplanttoreturntooperation.pecifically,thestafffeltthatpriortorestartRGAEshould:'1.Finishthefiberopticinspectionofthesecondarysideof"B"5/Gincludinginspectionforlooseparts;'Z.ObtaintheS/Gdesigner'sopinionontheeffectsofplugginginthewedgearea;and3.Provideamorecompletebasisforoperatingfortheproposed3months..Ameetingtodiscusstheremaining'areaswillbesetupwhenRGBhaspreparedtheirresponse.IEHCLOSUREB l
Fariey1,USAATTACHMENTCOneleahngtubewaspluggedatFarley1.ThcdefectwaslocatedattheU.bend,butthecauseoffailurewasnotdetermined.Eddyeurrentinspectionwasperformedon153tubesinsteamgcncratorAand306tubesinstcamgeneratorC,wheretheleakingtubewaslocated.Remotetelevisioninspectionwasusedtoaugmentaeddyeurrenttesting,IndianPoint2and3,USATwenty-sixsteamgeneratortubeswerepluggedatIndianPoint2becauseofreducedtubediameteratthesupportplates.Thcscdefectswerefoundbycddy-currentinspectionof1519hot-legtubes.Ginna,USANineteentubes,allinsteamgeneratorB,wercpluggedatGinnaduring1979.Tlurtecnofthetubeshadindicationsofintergranularattackinthetubesheetcrevice;twotubesshowedwallthinningjustabovethetubesheet.TubecorrosionbyintergranularcausticSCCistypicalofsteamgeneratorswithalongtubesheetcrevice.AtGinna,thesefailureshaveoccurredeveryyearsince1975,theyearafterintro.ductionofAVTcontrolofsecondary-waterchemistry.Thewallthinningatsupportplates1and2wasthoughttobecausedbywaterflashingtosteamintheannulusduringtheearlyyearsofoperation.Theseannuliarenowpackedwithcorrosionproducts.Othertubeshavethistypeofdefect,butthethinningis<20%ofthetubewallthickness.Thewastagedefectsarethoughttobecausedbyahydraulic-mechanicalmechanismratherthancorrosionbecauseallaffectedtubesareintheperipheryoftheburidlewheresludgedoesnotnormallyaccumulate.aTubeinspectionwasperformedbymtdttfrequen~ceddy.currenttesting,asin1977aridtpyg.Theinspectionpatternwassim11artothatoft97g:mosttubesweretestedto.thefirstsupportplate,sometothesixthsupportplate,andafewoverthe.Upend..About2000tubesweretestedineachsteamgenerator,witha5:1ratiobetweenthestotandcoldlegs.GinnawasthefirstPNRstationwithrecirculatingsteamgeneratorstouseMl-flowdeep-bedcondensatedemineralizationintheUnitedStates.vVerygoodexperiencehasbeenreportedwithsteamgeneratorwaterchemistrycontrolandwiththeoperationofthedemineralizersystem.\Denting,aphenomenoncausedbyingressofcltlorideleadingtoacid.formingconditions,resultsinnonprotcctivccorrosionproductdepositionintube-to-tubc.supportannuliinstcamgeneratorswithdrilled-holecarbonsteelsupportplates.Ithasbeenpostulatedthattheadditionofboricacidtosecondarywatermitigatesdentingbyformingstable,protectiveironborates.ThistreatmentisnowbeingusedatIndianPoint2.Ofthe437tubespluggedinthcfoursteamgeneratorsatIndianPoint3,dentingdefectswereobserved'in69tubesatsupportplateintersections.Becausedentingcausesinwarddistortionatthesup-portplate,givingrisetothepotentialforSCCatthcsmall-radiusU-bends,alltubesinrowIwereplugged(368tubes).ThestcamgeneratorsatIndianPoint3wereinspectedbytechniquescommonlyusedatplantswithsignificantdenting.Thisincludesusingeddywurrentprobesofdifferentdiameterandphotographingthcsecondarysidetomeasuredistortionofflowslots.Thcsludgedepositonthetubesheetwasfoundtobesoft,and'itwasestimatedthatM2%couldberemovedbylancingwithwater.Boricacidisaddedtosteamgeneratorsduringcondenserleakage.JoseCabrera,SpainThreetubeswerepluggedbecauseoffrettingattheantivibrationbars,andonewaspluggedbecauseofphosphatewastagejustabovethetubesheet.OnlyseventubeshavebeenpluggedintheJoseCabrerasteamgeneratorin2915EFPDofoperationwithphosphatetreatmentofsecondarywater,andsixofthesefailureswerecausedbyfrettingattheantivibra-tionbars.Multifrequencyeddyeurrenttestingwasusedtoinspect80tubesattheU-bendandalmostalltubestothefirstsupportplate.Phosphatewastageof40to49%ofthetubewallwasdetectedinsixtubes(including1thatwasplugged),andwastageof30to39%wasdetectedin46tubes.ThisisthefirstreportedinstanceofphosphatewastageatJosdCabrera.KKSStade,FederalRepublicofGermanyeEddy<urrent.Inspection.of574tubesinsteamgeneratorIand1262tubesinsteamgenerator2showedthatthreetubesinsteamgenerator1and56insteamgenerator2hadphosphatewastageof<25%ofthetubewall.Twotubeswereremovedformetallur-gicalexamination.Stade,likeBorssele,hasIncoloy800tubesandhasusedlow-phosphatetreatment(2to6mgNUCLEARSAFETY,Vol.22,No.5,September-October1981