ML17309A452

Annual Rept of Facility Changes,Tests & Experiments Conducted W/O Prior Commission Approval, Covering Aug 1989 to Jul 1990. W/901217 Ltr

ML17309A452
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	07/31/1990
From:	MECREDY R C ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
NUDOCS 9101020002
Download: ML17309A452 (902)

Text

>ACQELERATEDDIS.RIBUTIONDEMONSTRATIONSYSTEMREGULATORYINFORMATIONDISTRIBUTIONSYSTEM(RIDS)ACCESSIONNBR:9101020002DOC.DATE:90/07/31NOTARIZED:NODOCKETFACIL:50-244RobertEmmetGinnaNuclearPlant,Unit1,RochesterG05000244AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATIONMECREDY,R.C.RochesterGas&ElectricCorp.RECIP.NAMERECIPIENTAFFILIATIONR

SUBJECT:

"AnnualReptofFacilityChanges,Tests&ExperimentsIConductedW/0PriorCommissionApproval,"coveringAug1989toJul1990."W/901217ltr.DDISTRIBUTIONCODE:IE47DCOPIESRECEIVED:LTRENCLSIZE:TITLE:50.59AnnUalReportofChanges,TestsorxperimentsMadeW/outApprovNOTES:LicenseExpdateinaccordancewith10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72).05000244~ARECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEPD1-3LAJOHNSON,AINTERNAL:AEOD/DOALHFBllREGFILE02EXTERNAL:NRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL101011111111RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEPD1-3PDAEOD/DSP/TPABNRR/DOEA/OEAB11RGN1FILE01NSICCOPIESLTTRENCL5511111111DDDNOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE!CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK,ROOMPl-37(EXT.20079)TOELIMINATEYOURNAMEFROMDISTRIBUTIONLISTSFORDOCUMENTSYOUDON'TNEED!TOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:LTTR15ENCL13DD a-~.ROCHESTERGASANDELECTRICCORPORATION~89EASTAVENUE,ROCHESTERN.Y.14649-0001ROBERTCMECREDYVicePresidentGinnaNuclearProductionTELEPHONEAREACODETie646'2700December17,1990U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionDocumentControlDeskWashington,D.C.20555

Subject:

AnnualReportofFacilityChanges,Tests,andExperimentsConductedWithoutPriorCommissionApprovalR.E.Gi.nnaNuclearPowerPlantDocketNo.50-244Gentlemen:Thesubjectreporti.sherebysubmittedasrequiredby10CFR50.59(b).Enclosedaretheoriginalandonecopyofthereportcontainingdescriptionsandsummariesofthesafetyevaluationsconductedinsupportofchangestothefacilityandproceduresdescribedi.ntheUFSARandspeci.altests,fromAugust1989throughJuly1990.Verytrulyyours,RES/jdwEnc.RobertC.MecredyVicePresident,GinnaNuclearProductionxc:USNRCRegionIOfficeUSNRCResidentXnspector9101020002900731PDRADOCK05000244RPDR1 1990REPORTOFFACILITYCHANGESgTESTSANDEXPERIMENTSCONDUCTEDWITHOUTPRIORAPPROVALFORAUGUST1989THROUGHJULY1990SECTIONASECTIONBSECTIONCSECTIONDSECTIONESECTIONFCOMPLETEDENGINEERINGWORKREQUESTS(EWR)ANDTECHNICALSTAFFREQUESTS(TSR)COMPLETEDSTATIONMODIFICATIONS(SM)TECHNICALSTAFFENGINEERINGEVALUA-TIONS(TSEE)TEMPORARYBYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTION,STRUCTUREFEATURES'HIELDING'NDFLUIDSYSTEMFEATURESPROCEDURECHANGESCOMPLETEDSPECIALTESTS(ST)ANDEXPERIMENTSR.E.GINNANUCLEARPOWERPLANTDOCKETNO.'50-244ROCHESTERGASANDELECTRICCORPORATIONDATEDDECEMBER,1990CLOSLOZOOOp/

SECTIONA-COMPLETEDENGINEERINGWORKREQUESTS(EWRs)ANDTECHNICALSTAFFREQUESTS(TSRs)Thissectioncontainsadescriptionofmodificationsinthefacilityasdescribedinthesafetyanalysisreport,andasummaryofthesafetyevaluationforthosechanges,pursuanttotherequirementsof10CFR50.59(b).Thebasisforinclusionof'anEWRorTSRinthissectionisclosureofthecompletedmodificationpackageintheDocumentControlDepartment.

EWR-1483STEAMGENERATORSNUBBERREPLACEMENTTHISENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSESTHEREPLACEMENTOFSZXOFTHEEIGHTHYDRAULICSNUBBERPERSTEAMGENERATOR.REVISION1TOTHISDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISINCORPORATESCHANGESFROMREVISION0TOCORRECTTHEFOLLOWING:1)TYPOGRAPHICALERRORS2)ADDADDITIONALREFERENCE-ANSIB31~13)PIPINGANALYSISANDPRIMARYEQUIPMENTSUPPORTSWILLBEEVALUATEDPERTABLES1,2&3(ATTACHMENTSTOD.C.)ANDNOTINACCORDANCEWITHEWR-2512.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.70EVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONAREASFOLLOWS:1~2~3~4~5~POSTULATEDPIPINGFAILUREINFLUIDSYSTEMSINSIDECONTAINMENT.DECREASEINHEATREMOVALBYSECONDARYSYSTEM.DECREASEZNREACTORCOOLANTSYSTEMFLOWRATE.DECREASEINREACTORCOOLANTINVENTORY.INTERNALANDEXTERNALEVENTSSUCHASMAJORANDMINORFIRES'LOODS'TORMS'REARTHQUAKES'HEINSTALLATIONOFMECHANICALBUMPERSWILLNOTCHANGETHEEFFECTOFASEISMICEVENTONTHEFUNCTIONANDDESIGNREQUIREMENTSOFEXISTINGSTEAMGENERATORRINGGIRDER,REACTORCOOLANTLOOPS'AINSTEAMLINES'EEDWATERANDSECONDARYSHIELDWALL.'ZHZSMODIFICATIONNEITHERINCREASESTHECONSEQUENCES,NORDOESITREDUCETHEMARGINSOFSAFETYFORTHEFOLLOWINGEVENTS:1~2~3~4~5.6~7~LOSSOFNORMALFEEDWATERFLOWFEEDWATERSYSTEMPIPEBREAKSRCSFLOWCOASTDOWNACCIDENTSSTEAMGENERATORTUBERUPTUREPRIMARYSYSTEMPIPERUPTUREMAJORANDMINORFIRESFLOODS/STORMS'NDEARTHQUAKESTHISMODIFICATIONNEITHEREFFECTSNORZSEFFECTEDBYANYFLOODORSTORMPREVIOUSLYEVALUATED.THEMATERIALSUTILIZEDINTHISMODIFICATIONWILLMEETAPPENDIXiiRitREQUIREMENTSBASEDUPON10CFR50APPENDIXRANDENGINEERINGPROCEDUREANDWILLNOTINCREASEATTHEPROBABILITYOFMAJORORMINORFIRE.MODIFICATIONOFADDITIONOFSUPPORTSWILLNOTDEGRADEPERFORMANCEORFUNCTIONOFANYPLANTEQUIPMENTORSYSTEM.

BASEDUPONTHEABOVEANALYSIS:1)STRUCTURESiSYSTEMSgANDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSAREADEQUATE.2)MARGINOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATINGANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHESTATIONARENOTREDUCED.BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTHEREQUIREMENTSOFGINNASTATIONTECHNICALSPECIFICATZONSiZTHASBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENT'ONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURESiSYSTEMS'NDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODIFICATION.EWR-1832ACIRCUITSEPARATIONSANALYSISELECTRICALMODIFICATIONSTHISEWR(ENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST)ADDRESSESTHEMODIFICATIONWHICHWILLIMPROVETHEELECTRICALSEPARATIONBETWEENREDUNDANTSAFETYRELATEDEQUIPMENT.REVISION1OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISWASPRESENTEDANDAPPROVEDBYPORCON2/27/85ITEMNUMBER6.1.0-85-021-001.THECHANGESTOTHEDESIGNCRITERIAFORREVISION2AREDESCRIBEDBELOW:SECTION1~1.3SECTIONDESCRIPTIONADDEDTOSPECIALNOTE).iiDCFUSECOORDINATIONREQUIREMENTSAREDELETEDFROMREVISION2OFTHISDESIGNCRITERIA.DCFUSECOORDINATIONZSZNTHESCOPEOFEWR3341."DELETEDFUSECOORDINATIONREQUIREMENTS.DESCRIPTION2DELETEDANALYSIS51(FUSECOORDINATIONREQUIREMENTS).2.1.4DELETEDANALYSIS:113REQUIREMENTS).(FUSECOORDINATION16.1~216.2.1DELETEDFUSETYPEREQUIREMENT.THISISZNTHESCOPE.OFEWR3341.DELETEDFUSECOORDINATIONREQUIREMENTS.

SECTIONDESCRIPTION16.2.2DELETEDFUSECOORDINATIONREQUIREMENTS.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYTHEUSNRCREGULATORYGUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONAREMAJORANDMINORFIRESANDSEISMICEVENTS.BASEDUPONTHEANALYSESDESCRIBEDUNDERPARAGRAPH3.1TO4.4OFTHESAFETYANALYSIS,ITHASBEENDETERMINEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHESTATIONAREUNCHANGED'HEADEQUACIESOFSTRUCTURESJSYSTEMS'NDCOMPONENTSPROVIDED'FORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSAREUNCHANGED.EWR-1832BFIRESIGNALINGSYSTEMTHISEWR(ENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST)ADDRESSESTHEMODIFICATIONWHICHWILLUPGRADETHEFIRESIGNALINGSYSTEM.REVISION6OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISWEREPRESENTEDANDAPPROVEDBYPORCON12-12-84ITEMNUMBER6.1.0-84-144-003.THECHANGESTOTHEDESIGNCRITERIAFORREVISION7AREDESCRIBEDBELOW:SECTION11.42223'26.2'3DESCRIPTIONADD>>INSTALLINGULAPPROVEDRELEASEMODULESFORTHEHALONSYSTEMSINTHERELAYANDCOMPUTER(MUX)ROOMSWILLBEACCOMPLISHEDUNDEREWR4064CHANGE>>ENGINEER>>TO>>ENGINEERINGADD:>>ANUMBEROFELECTRICALMODULESWILLBECHANGEDOUTUNDEREWR4064TOFACILITATEMAINTENANCE.THISISNECESSITATEDBYTHEFACTTHATCERTAINELECTRICALMODULESWEREFURTHERDEVELOPEDBYGAMEWELLAFTERTHEINSTALLATIONOFTHEINITIAL-DESIGNMODULES.MODULESOFCURRENT-DESIGNWEREUSEDWHENNEEDEDFORMAINTENANCEREPLACEMENTRESULTINGINAMIXTUREOFOLDANDNEWMODULEDESIGNS.THISZNTURNCREATEDAMAINTENANCEPROBLEM,SINCETHELATESTWIRINGDIAGRAMZSNOTAPPLICABLETOOLDERMODULES"~CHANGE>>ALOW>>TO<<ALLOW

'1 AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFTHEEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNAFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORYGUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONARETHEFIRESANALYZEDING.A.Z.REPORT41936ANDTHESEISMICEVENT.BASEDUPONTHEANALYSESDESCRIBEDUNDERPARAGRAPH3.1TO4.4OFTHESAFETYANALYSIS,ITHASBEENDETERMINEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHESTATIONAREUNCHANGED'HEADEQUACIES'FSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS'NDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSAREUNCHANGED.EWR-2606POSTACCIDENTSAMPLINGSYSTEMIMPLEMENTATIONTHISEWR(ENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST)ADDRESSESTHISDESIGNMODIFICATION.ASARESULTOFTHEINABILITYATTHREEMILEISLANDTORAPIDLYOBTAINREACTORCOOLANTSAMPLESTOASCERTAINTHEEXTENTOFCOREDAMAGE,THENRCISREQUIRINGTHATALLLICENSEESEVALUATEANDiIFREQUIREDiUPGRADETHEIRPLANTSTOENABLEACQUISITIONOFAPPROPRIATEEXPEDITIOUSSAMPLESAFTERANACCIDENT.ABILITYTOASSESSTHECONDITIONSOFTHECOREEARLYINANACCIDENTCANRESULTINTAKINGREMEDIALACTIONSWHICHCOULDLIMITOREVENPRECLUDECOREDAMAGETHESAMPLINGSYSTEMATGINNAHASBEENEVALUATEDTOBEMARGINALLYADEQUATEFORPOST-ACCIDENTCONDITIONSANDCONSEQUENTLYREMEDIALMODIFICATIONSAREPLANNED.ANEWPOSTACCIDENTSAMPLINGSYSTEM(PASS)WILLBEINSTALLEDWHICHWILLENABLETHESTATIONTOOBTAINANDANALYZEREACTORCOOLANT,,CONTAINMENTAIR,ANDCONTAINMENTSUMPSAMPLESWITHIN3HOURSOFTHEDECISIONTOSAMPLERSTHEPASSWILLALSOENABLESAMPLINGOFTHESESTREAMSDURINGNORMALOPERATION.IN-L1NECHEMICALZNSTRUMENTATZONWILLBEPROVIDEDINANEWLIQUIDANDGASSAMPLEPANEL(LGSP)WHICHWILLREMOTELYDETERMINEIMPORTANTCHEMICALPARAMETERSOFREACTORCOOLANT,CONTAINMENTAIR,ANDCONTAINMENTSUMP.THELGSPWILLENABLEACQUISITIONOFDILUTEDANDUNDILUTEDGRABSAMPLESOFBOTHREACTORCOOLANTANDCONTAINMENTAZRFORZOPZCANALYSISINTHEEXISTING,COUNTINGLAB.THELGSPWILLBECONTROLLEDFROMANEWELECTRICCONTROLPANEL(ECP)ANDINSTRUMENTPANEL(IP)TOBELOCATEDINTHEHOTSHOP.REMOTELYOPERATEDVALVESANDINSTRUMENTSEXTERNALTOTHELGSPWILLALSOBECONTROLLEDFROMTHEECP.THELGSPWILLBELOCATEDONTHE253'>>ELEVATIONOFTHECONTROLLEDPORTIONOFTHEINTERMEDIATEBUILDING.

FL THEPASSISDESIGNEDTOMEETTHEREQUIREMENTSOFNUREG0578ANDNUREG0737(SECTIONZI.B.3).FURTHERMORE,THEPASSINSTALLATIONATGZNNAISTOHAVEADEQUATEPROVISIONSTOALLOWCOMPLIANCEWITHTHECONTAINMENTSUMPSAMPLING'HANDOXYGENANALYSISREQUIREMENTSNOWINVOKEDBYREGULATORYGUIDE1'7(REV.2)DATEDDECEMBER1980'AMPLELINESASSOCIATEDWITHTHEPASSWILLBEINSTALLEDZNSUCHAMANNERTHATTHEPOSTACCIDENTDOSECRITERIAWILLBEMETFORSAMPLINGANDACCESSTOVITALAREAS.THENECESSARYMODIFICATIONSARESHOWNSCHEMATICALLYONTHEATTACHEDFIGURE1.THEGENERALAEGVQTGEMENTOFEQUIPMENTISSHOWNONFIGURE2.STEAMGENERATORBLOWDOWNSAMPLELINESFROMCONTAINMENTPENETRATZONS206AND207TOTHEEXISTINGSAMPLEROOMARETOBEREROUTED(FORALARACONSIDERATIONS)USINGTHESAMEDESIGNCRITERIADISCUSSEDHEREIN.THESETWOLINESAREBEINGREROUTEDTOREDUCEOPERATOREXPOSUREFORROUTINESAMPLINGANDARENOTREQUIREDASAPARTOFNUREG-0737ORREG.GUIDE1.97(REV.2).AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYNRCREGULATORYGUIDE1.70ANDTHEGINNASTATIONFSAR.THEEVENTSRELATINGTOTHISMODIFICATIONARE:(1)EARTHQUAKEAND(2)RADIOACTIVERELEASEFROMASUBSYSTEMORCOMPONENTALLEQUIPMENTANDPIPINGSUPPORTSINTHECONTAINMENTgAUXILIARYANDINTERMEDIATEBUILDINGSARESEISMICCATEGORYZ.THEIRDESIGNWILLASSUREOTHEREQUIPMENTWILLNOTBESTRUCTURALLYDAMAGEDASARESULTOFFAILUREDURINGANEARTHQUAKE.THECONSEQUENCESOFANEARTHQUAKEARENOTCHANGEDASARESULTOFTHISMODIFICA'TION.FAILUREOFANYPASSCOMPONENTAFTERANACCIDENTSHALLNOTRESULTIN10CFRPART100DOSESTOBEEXCEEDEDANDONTHISBASISTHESYSTEMZSCLASSIFIEDASNON-SAFETYRELATED.THISHASBEENCONFIRMEDBYANALYSIS.INTHEEVENTOFALOSSOFCOOLANTACCIDENTTHENEWPASSWILLPROVIDEAMEANSTOOBTAINANDANALYZEREACTORCOOLANT,CONTAINMENTAIR,ANDCONTAINMENTSUMPSAMPLES.THEPASSWILLHAVEPROVISIONSTOBEPRESSURIZEDWITHNITROGENORAIRPRIORTOPOSTACCIDENTOPERATIONTOASSURELEAKTIGHTNESS.THEMAJORSYSTEMVALVESANDINSTRUMENTSARECONTAINEDZNANENCLOSED,SEALEDPANELWHICHISCONNECTEDTOACHARCOALFILTEREDSTATIONHVACSYSTEM.THUSCOMPONENTLEAKAGEWILLBEPREVENTEDFROMUNCONTROLLEDAREAS.

THEREFOREiTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED'HEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES,SYSTEMS,ANDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDFORTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESHAVENOTBEENAFFECTED.~EWR-279REACTORLEVELMONITORINGSYSTEMTHISEWR(ENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST)ADDRESSESTHEMODIFICATIONWHICHWILLPROVIDEAREACTORVESSELLEVELMONITORINGSYSTEM.THESYSTEMWILLCONSISTOFTWOREDUNDANTDIFFERENTIALPRESSURETRENDINGCHANNELS.EACHCHANNELWILLDRIVEASEPARATEINDICATORINTHEMAINCONTROLROOMSHOWINGREACTORVESSELLEVELTOTHEPLANTOPERATORSUNDERALLPLANTCONDITIONS.REVISION2OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDREVISION1OFTHESAFETYANALYSISWEREPRESENTEDANDAPPROVEDBYPORCONMARCH20,1985,PORCNUMBER6.1.0-85-037-002.UNDERREVISION3OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDREVISION2OFTHESAFETYANALYSIS,THEFOLLOWINGPARAGRAPHSAREAFFECTED:DESIGNCRXTERIASTEP4.1REVISEDFROM:THEATTACHMENTTOTHEEXISTINGHEADVENTSYSTEMINCLUDINGTHERESTRICTINGDEVICESHALLBEQUALITYGROUPA.REMAININGFLUIDSYSTEMSANDCOMPONENTSSHALLBEQUALITYGROUPB.TOREADTHEATTACHMENTSTOTHEGUIDETUBEANDTHEHEADVENTSYSTEMiINCLUDINGTHERESTRICTINGDEVICE,SHALLBEQUALITYGROUPA.REMAININGFLUIDSYSTEMSANDCOMPONENTSSHALLBEQUALITYGROUPB.STEP5.1REVISEDFROM:THEATTACHMENTTOTHEEXISTINGHEADVENTSYSTEMSHALLCONSISTOFARESTRICTINGDEVICEANDSHALLBEASMECODECLASSl.CONSISTENTWITHREFERENCE6.2.2.7THECOMPONENTSDOWNSTREAMOFTHERESTRICTINGDEVICESHALLBEASMECODECLASS2.THECOUPLINGTHATATTACHESTOTHEREACTORINSTRUMENTATIONGUIDETUBESHALLBEASMECODECLASS2~TOREAD:THEATTACHMENTSTOTHEEXISTINGHEADVENTSYSTEMANDGUIDETUBESHALLCONSISTOFARESTRICTINGDEVICEANDSHALLBEASMECODECLASS1.CONSISTENTWITHREFERENCES6.2.2.7THECOMPONENTSDOWNSTREAMOFTHERESTRXCTINGDEVICESHALLBEA'SMECODECLASS2.

STEP7.1REVISEDFROM:THESYSTEMMECHANICALDESIGNCONDITIONSWILLBEOVERARANGEOF0TO3000PSI,AND50TO697F.THESYSTEMSHALLA/SOPROVIDEINVENTORYZNDZCATXONSFORTEMPERATUREOQER697F,ASSUMINGSATURATEDFLUIDCONDITIONS'PTO2200FgZNTHECORE.TOREAD:TH)SYSTEMMECHANICALDESIGNCONDITIONSARE0TO2500PSIGAND50TO680F.THEMOSTSEVEREACCIDENTCONDITIONZS3015PSZGAT697F.THESYSTEMSHALLA/SOPROVIDEINVENTORYINDICATIONSFORTEMPERATUREOVEQ697FgASSUMINGSATURATEDFLUIDCONDITIONSgUPTO2200FgINTHECORE~STEP7~6HASBEENADDEDTHEADDITIONOFTHEATTACHMENTTOTHEGUIDETUBESHALLNOTCAUSETHEGUIDETUBETOEXCEEDWESTINGHOUSEALLOWABLELOADSFORTHEATTACHMENTTOTHEREACTORVESSELORSEALTABLE.STEP8.1REVISEDFROM:THEINSTRUMENTTUBINGSHALLBESUPPORTEDSUCHTHATITREMAINSFUNCTIONALFOLLOWINGANSSEEVENTASWELLASDURINGNORMALOPERATION.TOREAD:THEINSTRUMENTTUBINGSHALLBESUPPORTEDSUCHTHATITREMAINSFUNCTIONALFOLLOWINGANSSEEVENTASWELLASDURINGNORMALOPERATIONANDALLPOSTULATEDACCIDENTCONDITIONS.STEP8.3REVISEDFROM:THEMOSTSEVEREOPERATINGCONDITIONSCONSXDEREDFORTHECONNECTIONTOTHEHEADVENTSYSTEMISTHECONTROLRODEJECTIONANDTHECORRESPONDINGPRESSUREANDTEMPERATUREIS3015PSIGAND697F.TOREAD:THEMOSTSEVEREACCIDENTCONDITIONCONSIDEREDFORTHECONNECTIONSTOTHEREACTORCOOLANTSYSTEMXSTHECONTROLRODEJECTION.THECORRESPONDINGPRESSUREANDTEMPERATUREARE3015PSIGAND697F.STEP10.1REVISEDFROM:3.)PRIMARYREACTORCOOLANTLOOP,INCLUDINGTHEREACTORVESSELHEADVENTSYSTEM.

TOREAD:3.)PRIMARYREACTORCOOLANTLOOP,INCLUDINGTHEREACTORVESSELHEADVENTSYSTEMANDTHEREACTORVESSELBOTTOMMOUNTEDINSTRUMENTATION.STEP31.0REVISEDFROM:nNOTAPPLICABLETOREAD:CONSTRUCTIONPROCEDURESFORATTACHMENTTOTHISGUIDETUBEWILLBEDEVELOPEDTHATENSURETHATNOFOREIGNMATERIALENTERTHEGUIDETUBE.ATTACHEDFIGURE1TOTHEDESIGNCRITERIAHASBEENREVISEDSTATINGTHATINPUTSTOTHEFOXBORORACKARE3INSTEADOF4LINETHERMOCOUPLES.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDZNTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORYGUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION.ARE:1)MAJORANDMINORFIRES,2)SEISMICEVENTSAND3)THESPECTRUMOFLOSSOFCOOLANTACCIDENTSINSIDEOFCONTAINMENT.BASEDUPONTHEANALYSESDESCRIBEDUNDERPARAGRAPHS3.1TO4'OFTHESAFETYANALYSIS'THASTHEREFORE'EENDETERMINEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ZTHASALSOBEENDETERMINEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES,SYSTEMS,ANDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTIONOFTHISMODIFICATION.EWR-2846BBLOCKWALLMODIFICATIONRESTRAINTSEUIPMENTINTERMEDIATEBUILDINGPROTECTIONTHISEWR(ENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST)ADDRESSESTHEMODIFICATIONSTOPROVIDEPROTECTIONOFAUXILIARYFEEDWATERCHECKVALVES,AANDBMAINSTEAMISOLATIONVALVE(MSZV)OPERATORSANDAANDBMSZVSOLENOIDVALVES.\THEPURPOSEOFTHISMODIFICATIONZSTOPROVIDE1)UPGRADEDPROTECTIONFORTHEAANDBMSIVOPERATORSANDAIRSOLENOIDVALVESSUCHTHATMSIVCLOSUREISENSUREDFORSCENARIOSINVOLVINGSSE(SAFESHUTDOWNEARTHQUAKE),TORNADOMISSILES/WINDLOADSANDHELB(H1GHENERGYLINEBREAKS)OUTSIDECONTAINMENTi2)PROTECTIONFORTHEiiAiiANDiiBAUXILIARYFEEDWATERCHECKVALVESFORSCENARIOSINVOLVINGTORNADOWINDLOADSANDSSESEISMICEVENTS.

REVISION1TOTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISWILLALLOWREMOVALOFVENTVALVE3516A.THISVALVE,ANDASSOCIATEDPIPING'ILLBEREMOVEDFROMTHE"B"MSIVANDNOTREPLACED.THESCOPEOFTHEPIPINGMODIFICATIONWILLBETOPLACEAPLUGINTHEEXISTINGCOVERFORTHE"B"MSIV.PRE-PORCCOMMENTSAREADDRESSEDZNINTEROFFICECORRESPONDENCE13N1-RR-L2275ANDWILLBEINCORPORATEDINTOTHENEXTREVISION.THESECHANGESINCLUDETYPOGRAPHICALCORRECTIONSTOTHEDESIGNCRITERIA,PARAGRAPHS1.2AND23.0.TOFURTHERCLARIFYTHETESTREQUIREMENTSiASENTENCEWILLBEADDEDTOTHEDESIGNCRITERIAPARAGRAPH23.0STATING"INLIEUOFAHYDROSTATICTEST,ALEAKCHECKMAYBEPERFORMEDATNORMALOPERATINGCONDZTZONSit~AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDZNTHEGZNNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.70.EVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONAREEARTHQUAKESiPIPEBREAKSOUTSIDETHECONTAINMENTBUILDINGiTORNADOES'IRES'NDTORNADOMISSILES'LLPROPOSEDPROTECTIVEDEVICESARETOBEMOUNTEDASSEISMICCATEGORY.IINACCORDANCEWITHTHESTRUCTURALRE-ANALYSISPROGRAM(SRP).REMOVABLEPANELSWILLBEUTILIZEDTOPROVIDEMAINTENANCE/TESTINGACCESSASREQUIRED.PLACEMENTOFPASSIVEPROTECTIVEDEVICESAROUNDTHEMSIVOPERATORS/SOLENOIDVALVESAND"B"AFWCHECKVALVESENSURESFUNCTIONALOPERATIONDURINGANDFOLLOWINGHELBSCENARIOSOUTSIDECONTAINMENT.FIRESYSTEMSANDFIREBARRIERSDISCUSSEDINTHEUFSARARECOVEREDUNDERPLANTADMINISTRATIVECONTROLS,ENSURINGTHATDEGRADATIONOFPROTECTION/DETECTIONFEATURESNECESSARYTOCOMPLYWITH10CFR50APPENDIXRWILLNOTOCCUR.TORNADOLOADSiSUCHASDIRECTWINDiDIFFERENTZALPRESSUREiANDTORNADOMISSILESHAVEBEENINCORPORATEDINTHEUFSARUNDER'SEPRE-EVALUATIONDESIGNANDANALYSIS.THUSiTHISMODIFICATIONNEITHERINCREASESTHECONSEQUENCESiNORDOESITREDUCETHEMARGINSOFSAFETYFOR:1)EQUIPMENTREQUIREDTOFUNCTIONDURINGANDFOLLOWINGSSEANDTORNADOEVENTS.2)OPERATIONDURINGAHELBSCENARIOOUTSIDECONTAINMENT.3)FIREPROTECTIONFEATURES.

BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTHESTRUCTURALRE-ANALYSISPLAN(SRP),ITHASBEENDETERMINEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENDETERMINEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS'NDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCXDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODIFICATION.EWR-3072RCP1SEALLEAKOFFTHISEWR(ENGXNEERZNGWORKREQUEST)ADDRESSESTHEMODIFICATIONWHICHWILLINSTALLCHECKVALVESONTHENUMBERONESEALLEAKOFFLINESFROMTHEREACTORCOOLANTPUMPS(RCP)AANDB.THENEWCHECKVALVESWILLBEASMEN-STAMPEDSEISMICALLYQUALIFIED.THENEWCHECKVALVESWILLBELOCATEDINCONTAINMENTINSIDETHERCPSHIELDWALLS.THEMODIFIEDPIPESYSTEM,INCLUDINGSUPPORTS,WILLBESEISMICALLYQUALIFIED.THISMODIFICATIONISSCHEDULEDFORINSTALLATIONDURINGTHE1987REFUELINGOUTAGE.REVISION0OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISWASPRESENTEDANDAPPROVEDBYPORCONJUNE16,1986PORCNUMBER6.1.0-86-081-001.THEPURPOSEOFREVISION1OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISXSTOINCLUDEREFERENCETOTHEASMEZZICLASS2STANDARDS'REVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDZNTHEGZNNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORYGUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODZFXCA-TIONARE1)PRIMARYSYSTEMPIPERUPTUREg2)INTERNALANDEXTERNALEVENTS'IRES'LOOD~STORMOREARTHQUAKE~AND3)LOSSOFAREACTORCOOLANT.PUMP.BASEDUPONTHEANALYSESDESCRIBEDUNDERPARAGRAPHS3.1TO4.4OFTHESAFETYANALYSIS'THASTHEREFORE~BEENDETERMINEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENDETERMINEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS'NDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODIFICATION.10

EWR-3092BORICACIDPIPINGTHISENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSESTHEUPGRADEOFBORICACIDPIPINGFROMSCHEDULE10TOSCHEDULE40PIPE.INCLUDEDINTHISMODIFICATIONISTHERE-ROUTINGOFTHEPIPETOAVOIDHIGHRADIATIONAREAS'NSTALLATIONOFANEWHEATTRACINGSYSTEM,UPGRADINGOFPIPESUPPORTSANDADDITIONOFAONEINCH(ln)ISOLATIONVALVEZNTHEMOV825A/BBYPASSLINEAREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGZNNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORYGUIDE1.70.REVISION0IDENTIFIEDTHEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONASFIRE~SEISMIC'OSSOFOFFSZTEPOWERSCVCSCONTROLSYSTEMMALFUNCTIONS'TEAMLINEBREAKANDLOCA.ALLEXISTINGFIREPROTECTIONFEATURESREQUIREDTOASSURECOMPLIANCEWITH10CFR50~APPENDIXRJORTOMAINTAINEQUIVALENTLEVELSOFPROTECTIONFROMFIRESWILLBEMAINTAINEDDURING'ANDFOLLOWINGTHISMODIFICATION.SEISMICEVENTSHAVEBEENANALYZEDUNDERTHESEPRE-EVALUATIONDESIGNANALYSIS.PIPINGANDPIPESUPPORTANALYSESSHALL'EPERFORMEDINACCORDANCEWITHEWR-2512DESIGNCRITERIAUSINGANSIB31.1ANDASMESECTIONZIZ.SUBSECTIONNFASABASIS.STRUCTURALWORKREQUIREDSHALLBEBASEDUPONTHEAISCCODE,EIGHTHEDITION.THEDESIGNANDOPERATINGCONDITIONSTOWHICHTHEPIPINGSYSTEMSWILLBEANALYZEDAREDEFINEDINTHEOPERATINGTRANSIENTSDOCUMENTGENERATEDFOREWR2512.SYSTEMTHERMALANALYSESSHALLEVALUATETHENORMAL100%POWERCONDITION,ASWELLASOTHERABNORMALOPERATINGTRANSIENTCONDITIONS.THELOADINGCOMBINATIONSANDSTRESSLIMITSOFTHEEWR2512DESIGNCRITERIASHALLBEMETFORALLNORMALANDACCIDENTCONDITIONS.ALLMODIFICATIONSORADDITIONSTOTHEEXISTINGPIPINGORPIPESUPPORTSWILLBEREQUIREDTOINTERFACEWITHTHEEXISTINGPIPE,PIPESUPPORTS,AND/ORSTRUCTURESANDSHALLNOTDEGRADETHEABILITYOFTHESEITEMSTOFUNCTIONACCORDINGTOTHEIRORIGINALDESIGNREQUIREMENTS.THISMODIFICATIONWILLNOTDEGRADEPLANTSYSTEMSONALOSSOFOFFSZTEPOWER.THEHEATTRACECIRCUITSSHALLNOTDEGRADETHEPLANTNORMALOREMERGENCYPOWERDISTRIBUTIONSYSTEM.REDUNDANTPOWERTRAINSSHALLBEMAINTAINEDANDSTRUCTURESANDELECTRICALEQUIPMENTWITHINTHESCOPEOFTHISWORKSHALLREMAINFUNCTIONALFOLLOWINGASAFESHUTDOWNEARTHQUAKE(SSE).THEHEATTRACINGSYSTEMSHALLBESUPPLIEDWITHPOWERFROMTHEEMERGENCYDIESELGENERATORSFOLLOWINGALOSSOFOFFSITEPOWER.THEEFFECTOFTHENEWSYSTEMONTHEDIESELGENERATORLOADSSHALLBEEVALUATED.

THEMODIFICATIONPERFORMEDSHALLNOTINHIBITTHEAFFECTEDSYSTEMSFROMPERFORMINGTHEIRFUNCTIONSDURINGALLNORMALANDPOSTULATEDACCIDENTCONDITIONS.THEBORICACIDSYSTEMSHALLBEOPERABLEDURINGALLNORMAL'ESIGNTRANSIENTSUPSETANDFAULTEDCONDITIONS.THEBORICACIDPIPINGCHANGESSHALLNOTAFFECT,THECONTROLOFANYPLANTSYSTEM.INREVISION1TOTHISDESIGNCRITERIATHESOLUBILITYTEMPERATURELIMITFOR12-13WEIGHTPERCENTBORICACIDSOLUTIONISREVISEDFROM140FTO145FTOCOMPLYWITHTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONSANDADMINISTRATIVECONTROLSESTABLISHEDATGINNASTATION.THUSgTHISMODIFICATIONNEITHERINCREASESTHECONSEQUENCESgNORDOESITREDUCETHEMARGINSOFSAFETYFOR:1)2)3)FIREPROTECTIONFEATURESEQUIPMENTREQUIREDTOFUNCTIONDURINGANDFOLLOWINGSEISMICANDTORNADOEVENTS.EQUIPMENTREQUIREDTOFUNCTIONFOLLOWINGALOSSOFOFFSITEPOWER,STEAMBREAKORLOSSOFCOOLANTACCIDENT(LOCA).BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONS,ITHASBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ZTHASALSOBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS'NDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODIFICATION.EWR-3199VITALBATTERYLOADFLOWMONITORTHISEWR(ENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST)ADDRESSESTHEDESIGNMODIFICATIONWHICHWILLPROVIDEAMEANSTOMONITORCURRENTMAGNITUDESANDDIRECTIONOFBOTHSAFEGUARDSD.C.BATTERYSYSTEMSASWELLASTHETECHNICALSUPPORTCENTER(TSC)BATTERY.THESYSTEMWILLCONSISTOFTHENECESSARYEQUIPMENTTODISPLAYTHE.DIRECTIONANDMAGNITUDEOFCURRENTGOINGINTOOROUTOFEACHBATTERY.THESYSTEMWILLALSOBECAPABLEOFANNUNCIATINGABNORMALBATTERYCONDITIONSANDLOSSOFCONTINUITYOFBATTERYCIRCUITS'HEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODIFICATIONWILLSATISFYTHEREQUIREMENTSOFSEPTOPICVIII-3.B.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORYGUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISADDITIONARE(1)MAJORANDMINORFIRES,AND(2)SEISMICEVENT.ITHASgTHEREFOREJBEENDETERMINEDTHAT'THEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENT.CONDZTZONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHESTATIONHAVENOTBEENAFFECTED.12

EWR-3272SASPPCSCOMPUTERSYSTEMTHISEWR(ENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST)ADDRESSESTHEINSTALLATIONOFASAFETYASSESSMENTSYSTEM(SAS)ANDTHEREPLACEMENTOFTHEP-250PLANTPROCESSCOMPUTERSYSTEM(PPCS).DEDICATEDCRTsANDLINEPRINTERSWILLBECONNECTEDTOTHESASANDPPCSCPUs.THESASSYSTEMISDESIGNEDTOPROVIDEANINTEGRATEDDISPLAYOFCRITICALPLANTSAFETYP2QV&IETERSANDPERFORMREFERENCEDIAGNOSTICSDURINGEMERGENCIES.THE(SAS)SYSTEMWILLPROVIDETHEOPERATORSINTHECONTROLROOM,ANDPERSONNELINTHETSC~THEEOFANDTHEENGINEERINGCENTERWITH1)ANINDICATIONOFTHESAFETYSTATUSOFTHEPLANT,2)ACCIDENTDIAGNOSTICDISPLAYS'ND3)POSTACCIDENTMONITORING'HENEWPPCSWILLINITIALLYPERFORMTHESAMEFUNCTIONSTHATTHEP-250PRESENTLYPERFORMS.REVISION0OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISWASPRESENTEDANDAPPROVEDBYPORCON5/23/84'ORCNUMBER6.1.0-84-082-002.UNDERREVISION1OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIA,PARAGRAPH3.2FIRSTSENTENCESTATING,"THEREMAININGEQUIPMENT"HASBEENCHANGEDTOREADitTHEEQUIPMENTASSOCIATEDn.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGZNNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORYGUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONARE1)MAJORANDMINORFIRES')SEISMICEVENTSBASEDUPONTHEANALYSESDESCRIBEDUNDERPARAGRAPHS3.1TO4.4OFTHESAFETYANALYSIS'THASTHEREFORE'EENDETERMINEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENDETERMINEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES~SYSTEMS'NDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODIFICATION.EWR-3296ASTRUCTURALUPGRADEPROGRAMTHISEWR(ENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST)ADDRESSESTHEGZNNASTATIONSTRUCTURALUPGRADEPROGRAMWHICHISINRESPONSETOTHESYSTEMATICEVALUATIONPROGRAM(SEP)BEGUNBYTHEUSNRCIN1977.THEPURPOSEOFTHISMODIFICATIONISTOUPGRADETHOSEMEMBERS,CONNECTIONSANDANCHORAGESFOUNDTOBEOVERSTRESSEDWHENSUBJECTEDTOTHEDESIGNLOADSSETFORTHZNTHEVARIOUSSEPTOPICS.13

REVISION0TOTHISDESIGNCRITERIA/SAFETYANALYSISCOVEREDMODIFICATIONSINCLUDEDZNTHESEPTOPICSLOCATEDINTHEAUXILIARYBUILDING,CONTROLBUILDING,INTERMEDIATEBUILDING,TURBINEBUILDINGSANDTHEFACADESTRUCTUREREVISION1OFTHISDESIGNCRITERIA/SAFETYANALYSIS:1.ADDRESSESTHEDESIGNANDINSTALLATION'FBACKDRAFTDAMPERSREQUIREDONLYZNTHEAUXILIARYBUILDING.THESEDAMPERSgWHENINSTALLED'ILLELIMZNATEgTHEEFFECTSOFTHEDIFFERENTIALPRESSURESASSOCIATEDWITHTHEDESIGNBASISTORNADOS2.INCORPORATESCHANGESIN,FORMATANDCONTENTOFVARIOUSSUB-SECTIONSOFTHEDESIGNCRITERIA.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGZNNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREGGUIDE1.70.EVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONARE:WINDAND=TORNADOLOADING,FIRESANDTHESAFESHUTDOWNEARTHQUAKE(SEISMICEVENTS).THEDESIGNFORWINDANDTORNADOLOADINGSHAVEBEENANALYZEDUNDERTHESEPRE-EVALUATIONDESIGNANALYSIS.MODIFICATIONSTOSTRUCTURALMEMBERSANDATTACHMENTSWILLNOTALTEREITHERTHESEISMICQUALIFICATIONOFEXISTINGSTRUCTURESORSAFETYRELATEDEQUIPMENTLOCATEDWITHINTHESESTRUCTURES.THEINCLUSIONOFBACKDRAFTDAMPERSUNDERTHISMODIFICATIONINSURESTHATTHEAUXILIARYBUILDINGWILLNOTBEADVERSELYAFFECTEDBYTORNADOWINDS.ALLEXISTINGFIREPROTECTIONFEATURESREQUIREDTOASSURECOMPLIANCEWITH10CFR50gAPPENDIXRgORTOMAINTAINEQUIVALENTLEVELSOFPROTECTIONFROMFIRESWILLBEMAINTAINEDDURINGANDFOLLOWINGTHESTRUCTURALUPGRADEMODIFICATIONS.THUS,THISMODIFICATIONNEITHERINCREASETHECONSEQUENCES,NORDOESITREDUCETHEMARGINSOFSAFETYFOR:1)EQUIPMENTREQUIREDTOFUNCTIONDURINGANDFOLLOWINGSSE,WINDANDTORNADOEVENTS2)FIREPROTECTIONFEATURESBASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTHESTRUCTURALRE-ANAL-YSISPLANT(SRP)gITHASBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ZTHASALSOBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES,SYSTEMS,ANDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVEN-TIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODIFICATION.14

EWR-3595CONTROLROOMHAB1TABILITYTHISENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSESTHEMODIFICATIONOFTHECONTROLROOMHABITABILITYSYSTEM.INORDER,TOIMPROVERELIABILITYANDMAINTAINABILITYOFTHERADIATIONANDTOXICGASMONITORSEWR-3595PHASEBWASESTABLISHED.REVISION5OFTHISDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISINCORPORATESTHEFOLLOWINGCHANGESFROMREVIEWOFDCANDSAREVISION4PREVIOUSLYNOTPORCAPPROVED.,MODIFICATIONSAPPLICABLETOEWR-3595PHASEBAREASFOLLOWS:1)REPLACE2EXISTINGTOXICGASSAMPLEPUMPSWITHTWOPUMPS,EACHWITH1004CAPACITY.ONEPUMPWILLBEINOPERATINGMODE,THEOTHERWILLBEINSTANDBYMODE.THREEPOSITIONTOXICGASSAMPLEPUMPSWITCHSHALLALSOBEINSTALLED.2)REPLACEEXISTINGRADIATIONMONITORFLOWSWITCH.3)ADDITIONOFCONTROLROOMDAMPERSMANUALACTUATIONSWITCHATTHEHVACPANEL.4)ADDITIONOFRADIATIONfAMMONIAgANDCHLORINELOWSAMPLEAIRFLOWSIGNALSFORCONTROLROOMDAMPERSISOLATIONANDINDICATIONTOTHEPLANTPROCESSCOMPUTER.5)REPLACEEXISTINGCHLORINEFLOWMETERWITHONETHATHASCFM.UNITINDICATION.6)INSTALLCLEARPOLYCARBONATE"LEXAN"COVERFORCHECKINGPARTICULATEMONITORPAPERONTHERADIATIONMONITORCABINET.7)REPLACERADIATIONMONITORPUMPMOTORFUSEWITHAMOTORSTARTER.THEPROBABILITYOFOCCURRENCEOFANACCIDENTEVALUATEDPREVIOUSLYINTHEUPDATEDFINALSAFETYANALYSISREPORT(UFSAR)ISNOTINCREASED.THEREZSNOREDUCTIONINSYSTEMRELIABILITYORPERFORMANCE.THECONTROLROOMTOXICGASANDRADIATIONMONITORSWILLREMAINWITHINREMAINWITHINTHEIRDESIGNLIMITSANDWILLHAVENOIMPACTONPLANTABILITYTOWITHSTANDFIRE.THECONSEQUENCESOFANACCIDENTPREVIOUSLYEVALUATEDINTHEUFSARARENOTINCREASED.THEMODIFICATIONDOESNOTIMPACTORINCREASETHECALCULATEDRADIOLOGICALDOSETOTHEGENERALPUBLICFORANYEVENTEVALUATEDINTHEUFSAR.THEFUNCTIONANDCAPABIL1TYOFTHETOXICGASANDRADIATIONMONITORSREMAINTHESAME,ANDNOFISSIONPRODUCTBARRIERSAREAFFECTED.15

'I THEPROBABILITYOFOCCURRENCEOFAMALFUNCTIONOFEQUIPMENTIMPORTANTTOSAFETYPREVIOUSLY.EVALUATEDZNTHEUFSARISNOTINCREASED.THEMODIFICATIONDOESNOTDEGRADETHEPERFORMANCEOFANYSYSTEMFUNCTIONS~ANDINFACT~UPGRADESTHEINSTRUMENTATZONANDCONTROLOFTHEMONITORS.THECONSEQUENCESOFAMALFUNCTIONOFEQUIPMENTIMPORTANTTOSAFETYPREVIOUSLYEVALUATEDZNTHEUFSARARENOTINCREASED.THEMODIFICATIONDOESNOTIMPACTORINCREASETHECALCULATEDRADIOLOGICALDOESTOTHEGENERALPUBLICFORANYEVENTEVALUATEDINTHEUFSAR.THEFUNCTIONANDCAPABILITYOFTHEMONITORSTODETECTANDALARM/ISOLATIONREMAINSTHESAMEgANDNOFISSIONPRODUCTBARRIERSAREAFFECTED.THEPOSSIBILITYOFANACCIDENTOFADIFFERENTTYPETHANANYPREVIOUSLYEVALUATEDZNTHEUFSARISNOTCREATED.NOOTHERSYSTEMSAREAFFECTED,NORANYNEWFAILUREMODEINDUCED.THEPOSSIBILITYOFADIFFERENTTYPEOFMALFUNCTIONOFEQUIPMENTIMPORTANTTOSAFETYTHANANYPREVIOUSLYEVALUATEDZNTHEUFSARISNOTCREATED.THEADDITIONOFTHESWITCHES,REMOTEINDICATION,ANDCLEARLEXANCOVERDOESNOTADVERSELYAFFECTTHESUBJECTSYSTEM.THEMARGINOFSAFETYASDEFINEDZNTHEBASISFORANYTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONZSNOTREDUCED.THEFUNCTIONSANDPERFORMANCECHARACTERISTICSOFTHEMONITORS(EDG~~DETECTION~ZSOLATIONSgETC.)REMAINUNCHANGED.BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTHEREQUIREMENTSOFGINNASTATIONTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONS,ZTHASBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES~SYSTEMS'NDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODIFICATION.EWR-3645AGINNASTATIONGROUNDWATERLEVELSTHISEWR(ENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST)ADDRESSESANANALYSESOFBELOWGRADESTRUCTURESATGINNATOEVALUATETHEEFFECTSOFTHEINCREASEDGROUNDWATERLEVEL(GWL).THISEWRCOVERSONLYTHEEVALUATIONOFEFFECTSOFTHENEWDESIGNBASISGROUNDWATERLEVEL(DBGWL)ONSAFETYRELATEDSTRUCTURESBELOWGRADE.THENEWDBGWLISDEFINEDAS265.0FTMSL.THISEVALUATIONCOMPRISESAPORTIONOFACONTINUINGCOMMITMENTTOTHEUSNRCRELATIVETOSEPTOPICZII-3.A,IIEFFECTSOFHIGHWATERLEVELONSTRUCTURES-R.E.GZNNA".16

PRE-PORCCOMMENTSLISTEDBELOWWEREFORWARDEDTOTHERESPON-SIBLEENGINEER(RE)VZALETTER13Nl-RR-L50391.ANSWERSAREPROVIDEDFORCLARIFICATION(SEELETTER13Nl-RR-L1650).Q.DOTHERESULTSOFTHISEVALUATIONHAVEANYPOTENTIALTOIMPACTANYASSUMPTIONSMADEINOURPASTANALYSISOFTHECONTAINMENTVESSELTENDONSORTHEIRROCKANCHORS?A.ENGINEERINGREVIEWHASASCERTAINEDTHATEVALUATIONOFGROUNDWATERLEVELWILLHAVENOPOTENTIALTOIMPACTANYASSUMPTIONSPREVIOUSLYMADECONCERNINGCONTAINMENTVESSELTENDONSORROCKANCHORS.Q.1)2)THEUFSARISNOTREFERENCEDINSECTION2.0OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIABUTISSPECIFICALLYCALLEDOUTZNPARAGRAPH7AFETYANALYSISSTEP3.2DOESNOTADDRESSOPERATINGBASISEARTHQUAKES(OBE'S).A.ENGINEERING'WILLINCORPORATETHESECOMMENTSASCHANGESATTHENEXTREVISIONOFTHEDESIGNCRITERIA/SAFETYANALYSIS'REVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDZNTHEGZNNASTATIONUFSARAND,THEEVENTSREQUIRING'ANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.70.EVENTSRELATEDTOTHISANALYSISAREINTERNALANDEXTERNALEVENTSSUCHASFZREgFLOODSJSTORMS'NDEARTHQUAKES,INCORPORATINGBOTHOPERATINGBASISANDSAFESHUTDOWNEARTHQUAKES'HISANALYSISWILLNOTDEGRADEANYEXISTINGFIREPROTECTIONSYSTEMSORCOMPONENTS'HEREFORE'LLEXISTINGFIREPROTECTZONFEATURESREQUIREDTOASSURECOMPLIANCEWITH10CFR50APPENDIXR,ORTOMAINTAINEQUIVALENTLEVELSOFPROTECTIONWILLBEMAINTAINEDDURINGANDFOLLOWINGTHISANALYSIS.THEPRESENTDESIGNFORFLOODINGg'TORMSgOPERATINGBASISEARTHQUAKEANDSAFESHUTDOWNEARTHQUAKE(SEISMICEVENTS)HASBEENANALYZED.UNDERTHESEPRE-EVALUATIONDESIGNANALYSES.EVALUATIONOFTHEEFFECTSOFINCREASEDGROUNDWATERLEVELONSAFETYRELATEDSTRUCTURESBELOWGRADEWILLINSURETHATTHESESTRUCTURESAREADEQUATETORESISTLOADCOMBINATIONSREFERENCEDINTHEDESIGNCRITERIA(BASEDUPONUSNRCSTANDARDREVIEWPLANGUIDELINES).THUSgTHISANALYSISWILLNEITHERINCREASETHECONSEQUENCESgNORREDUCETHEMARGINSOFSAFETYFORINTERNALANDEXTERNALEVENTSINVOLVING:1)EQUIPMENTREQUIREDTOFUNCTIONDURINGANDFOLLOWINGOBE~SSEgFLOODINGANDSTORMSgINCLUDINGTORNADOEVENTS~2)FIREPROTECTIONFEATURES17

BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARAND,THEREQUIREMENTSOFGINNASTATIONTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONS,ZTHASBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTWILLNOTBEREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES,SYSTEMS,ANDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVEN-TIONOFACCXDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSWILLNOTBEAFFECTEDBYTHISANALYSIS.EWR-3698DIVERSETRIPMODIFICATIONONREACTORTRIPBREAKERSTHISEWR(ENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST)ADDRESSESTHEMODIFICATIONWHICHMODIFIEDTHECONTROLCIRCUITRYONTHESHUNTTRIPATTACHMENT(STA)TOTHEREACTORTRIPBREAKERS.PRESENTLY,THE'STAISENERGIZEDTHROUGHTWOMANUALREACTORTRIPSWITCHES.ONLYTHEUNDERVOLTAGECOXL(UVTA)AUTOMATICALLYCAUSESAREACTORTRIPWHENASCRAMISREQUIRED.THEUVTAWOULDALSOCAUSEAREACTORTRIPONLOSSOFD.C.CONTROLPOWER.THISMODIFICATIONZSREQUIREDTOCOMPLYWITHUSNRC83-28.854OFTHISMODIFICATIONHASBEENCOMPLETEDUNDERTHEPREVIOUSREVISIONS.THISPROJECTISSCHEDULEDFORCOMPLETIONDURXNGTHE1987OUTAGE.REVISION1OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISWASPRESENTEDANDAPPROVEDBYPORCONFEBRUARY5,1986PORCNUMBER61.0-86-015-001.THEPURPOSEOFREVISION2OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISISTOINCLUDE:A)NEWINDICATORLIGHTTOVERIFYTHATTHESTAISOPERATIONAL.(PARAGRAPH7.3.1)B)NEWTRIPTESTREQUIREMENTSFORBOTHUVTAANDSTA.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGZNNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORYGUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONARE:1)ALLPOSTULATEDACCIDENTSREQUIRINGAREACTORTRIP.2)LOSSOFD.C.CONTROLPOWER.3)NATURALEVENT/FIRE,ANDEARTHQUAKE.BASEDUPONTHEANALYSESDESCRIBEDUNDERPARAGRAPHS3.1TO4.4OFTHESAFETYANALYSIS'THASQHEREFORE~BEENDETERMINEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ZTHASALSOBEENDETERMINEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS/ANDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODIFICATION.18 i4 EWR-3755PORVBLOCKVALVESREPLACEMENTTHISENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSESTHEREPLACEMENTOFPRESSURIZERMOTOR-OPERATEDBLOCKVALVES515AND516WITHNEWSEISMICALLYANDENVIRONMENTALLYQUALIFIEDGATEVALVES.THEREPLACEMENTZSREQUIREDBECAUSETHEEXZST1NGBLOCKVALVESEATRINGSAREAPPROACHINGTHEMAXIMUMALLOWABLELIMITSFORREMACHINING.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDES1.29AND1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONAREASFOLLOWS:1)INCREASEZNHEATREMOVALBYSECONDARYSYSTEM.2)DECREASEZNHEATREMOVALBYSECONDARYSYSTEM.3)DECREASEZNREACTORCOOLANTSYSTEMFLOWRATE.4)REACTIVITYANDPOWERDISTRIBUTIONANOMALIES.5)INCREASEINREACTORCOOLANTINVENTORY.6)DECREASEINREACTORCOOLANTINVENTORY.7)INTERNALANDEXTERNALEVENTSSUCHASMAJORANDMINORFIRES~FLOODSJSTORMS'REARTHQUAKES'HEFOLLOWINGACCIDENTSAPPLICABLETOTHISMODIFICATIONAREASFOLLOWS:INCREASEZNHEATREMOVALBYSECONDARYSYSTEMTHEFOLLOWINGACCIDENTS,APPLICABLETOTHISEVENT,WEREANALYZED:A)B)C)D)E)DECREASEINFEEDWATERTEMPERATUREINCREASEZNFEEDWATERFLOWEXCESSIVELOADINCREASEINCIDENTZNADVERTANTOPENINGOFASTEAMGENERATORRELIEF/S-AFETYVALVESPECTRUMOFSTEAMSYSTEMPIPINGFAILURESINSIDEANDOUTSIDEOFCONTAINMENT2~DECREASEINHEATREMOVALBYSECONDARYSYSTEMTHEFOLLOWINGACCIDENTS,APPLICABLETOTHISEVENT,WEREANALYZED:A)B)C)D)E)F)G)STEAMPRESSUREREGULATORMALFUNCTIONORFAILURETHATRESULTSINDECREASINGSTEAMFLOWLOSSOFEXTERNALELECTRICALLOADTURBINETRIPLOSSOFCONDENSERVACUUMLOSSOFOFFSZTEALTERNATINGCURRENTPOWERTOTHESTATION'UXILIARIESLOSSOFNORMALFEEDWATERFLOWFEEDWATERSYSTEMPIPEBREAKS19

3.REACTIVITYANDPOWERDISTRIBUTIONANOMALIESTHEFOLLOWINGACCIDENTSiAPPLICABLETOTHISEVENTiWEREANALYZED:A)B)C)D)E)F)UNCONTROLLEDRODCLUSTERCONTROLASSEMBLYWITHDRAWALFROMASUBCRITZCALCONDITIONUNCONTROLLEDRODCLUSTERCONTROLASSEMBLYWITHDRAWALATPOWERSTARTUPOFANINACTIVEREACTORCOOLANTPUMPCHEMICALANDVOLUMECONTROLSYSTEMMALFUNCTIONRUPTUREOFACONTROLRODDRIVEMECHANISMHOUSINGRODCLUSTERCONTROLASSEMBLYDROP4.INCREASEZNREACTORCOOLANTINVENTORY5.DECREASEINREACTORCOOLANTSYSTEMFLOWRATETHEFOLLOWINGACCIDENTSgAPPLICABLETOTHISEVENTiWERANALYZED:A)FLOWCOASTDOWNACCIDENTSB)LOCKEDROTORACCIDENTS6.DECREASE.ZNREACTORCOOLANTINVENTORYTHEFOLLOWINGACCIDENTSiAPPLICABLETOTHISEVENTiWEREANALYZED:A)ZNADVERTANTOPENINGOFAPRESSURIZERSAFETYORRELIEFVALVEB)PRIMARYSYSTEMPIPERUPTURESTHISMODIFICATIONWILLNOTDEGRADETHEDESIGN,CAPABILITYORPERFORMANCEOFTHEEXISTINGPRESSURIZERRELIEFSYSTEMANDiTHEREFORE,THECONSEQUENCESOFTHEABOVEEVENTSWILLNOTBEINCREASEDBYTHEMODIFICATION.THISMODIFICATIONANDTHEMATERIALSUTILIZEDWILLMEETAPPENDIXR10CFR50CRITERIAASDEFINEDINENGINEERINGPROCEDUREQE-326.THEMODIFICATIONNEITHERAFFECTS,NORZSAFFECTEDBYANYFLOODORSTORMPREVIOUSLYEVALUATED.THEMODIFICATIONZSDECLAREDASHAVINGTOMEETSEISMICCATEGORY1CRITERIAOFUSNRC'REG.GUIDE1.29ANDCONDITIONSSPECIFIEDINTHEUFSARSECTION3.11.3TITLED"IDENTIFICATIONOFLIMITINGENVIRONMENTALCONDITIONS20

BASEDUPONALLTHEABOVEANALYSES:1)STRUCTURESpSYSTEMSgANDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSAREADEQUATE.2)MARGINOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATINGANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOF.THESTATIONARENOTREDUCED.BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTHEREQUIREMENTSOFGINNASTATIONTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONS,ITHASBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES~SYSTEMS~ANDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODIFICATION.EWR-3768CONTAINMENTPENETRATIONCOOLINGTHISENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSESTHEUPGRADEOFTHEPENETRATIONCOOLINGSYSTEMTOENSURETHATTHEUNMONZTOREDPATHFORAIRBORNERADIATIONFROMTHEAUXILIARYBUILDINGTOUNCONTROLLEDAREASWILLBEELIMINATED.REVISION1TOTHISDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISINCORPORATEDCOMMENTSTOREVISION0,ANDINCLUDEDINSTALLINGNEWDUCTWORKTOANOUTSIDEAZRSOURCESABACKDRAFTDAMPEROROTHERMEANSOFBACKFLOWPREVENTION,TOPREVENTUNMONITOREDRELEASESOFRADIOACTIVITY,CHANGESTOTHEEXISTINGPENETRATIONCOOLINGFANSYSTEMINLETAEGRNGEMENTBOXTOACCEPTTHENEWDUCTWORK,INSTALLINGANEWSTEAMHEATINGCOIL,INSTALLING'ASSOCIATEDSTEAMSUPPLYANDSTEAMCONDENSATERETURNPIPING,INSTALLINGANEWCONDENSATEDRAINPANANDPIPING,ANDINSTALLINGNEWPNEUMATICAND/ORELECTRICTEMPERATURECONTROLDEVICESINTHEMODIFIEDSYSTEM.ZNADDITIONTOTHE'ESIGNWORKREQUIREDTOMODIFY"THEEXISTINGCONTAINMENTPENETRATIONCOOLINGSYSTEMANANALYSISWASPERFORMEDTODETERMINETHEACTUALBULKCONCRETETEMPERATURESOFTHEPENETRATIONSWITHOUTTHEOPERATIONOFTHECONTAINMENTPENETRATIONCOOLINGSYSTEM.BULKCONCRETETEMPERATURELIMITATIONSHAVEBEENRELAXEDZNRECENTYEARSFROMTHEORIGINALDESIGNLIMITOF150oFTO200oFPERASMEBOILERANDPRESSUREVESSELCODE~SECTIONIII/DIVISION2~1986EDITION.THEANALYSISDEMONSTRATESTHATTHEBULKCONCRETETEMPERATURESDURINGTHEWORSTCASESCENARIOCOULDEXCEED200oFTHEREFORETHISSYSTEMWILLBEMAINTAINEDOPERABLEABOVEAPRIMARYSYSTEMTEMPERATUREOF200F.21

REVISION2OFTHISDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISUPDATESTHEREFERENCESECTIONSOFBOTHTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISANDINCORPORATES1)AVERIFICATIONTHATASTEAMCOILFAILURE(LOSSOFSTEAMHEATING)WILLNOTADVERSELYAFFECTSYSTEMOPERATIONDURINGCOLDWEATHERSAND2)APUSHTOTESTSWITCHONTHEEQUIPMENTHATCHTEMPERATUREALARMPANELTOGIVEPOSITIVEASSESSMENTOFLAMPFUNCTIONDURINGOPERATION.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONAREPIPINGFAILURESINFLUIDSYSTEMSOUTSIDECONTAINMENTgSEISMICEVENTSgFIRESJANDPLANTBUILDINGSECURITY~SEISMICEVENTSHAVEBEENANALYZEDUNDERTHESEPRE-EVALUATIONDESIGNANALYSES.MODIFICATIONOFTHEPENETRATIONCOOLINGSYSTEMREQUIRESSEISMICDESIGNFORSUPPORTSTOENSURETHATMODIFIEDPIPING/DUCTWORKWILLNOTCOLLAPSEDURINGASEISMICEVENT.THISMODIFICATIONWILLNOTALTEREITHERTHESEISMICQUALIFICATIONOFEXISTINGSTRUCTURESORSAFETYRELATEDEQUIPMENTLOCATEDWITHINTHEEXISTINGAUXILIARYBUILDINGSTRUCTUREALLEXISTINGFIREPROTECTIONFEATURESREQUIREDTOASSURECOMPLIANCEWITH10CFR50gAPPENDIXRgORTOMAINTAINEQUIVALENTLEVELSOFPROTECTIONFROMFIRESWILLBEMAINTAINEDDURINGANDFOLLOWINGTHISMODIFICATION.ABREAKZNTHEHOUSEHEATINGSTEAMLINETOBEINSTALLEDUNDERTHISMODIFICATION(PIPEBREAKOUTSIDECONTAINMENT)WILLNOTHAVEADVERSEEFFECTSONSAFESHUTDOWNOFTHEPLANT.THETURBINEDRIVENAUXILIARYFEEDWATERPUMPASSURESDELIVERYOFAUXILIARYFEEDWATERTOTHESTEAMGENERATORSTOMAINTAINSAFESHUTDOWN.INVENTORYFORTHEPRIMARYSYSTEMZSASSUREDVZACHARGINGPUMPSLOCATEDZNAROOMSEPARATEDFROMTHEAUXILIARYBUILDINGBYCONCRETEWALLSANDSEALEDFIREBARRIERS.APPROPRIATEPROVISIONSWILLBEINSTALLEDTOPRECLUDE.,UNMONZTOREDACCESSTOTHEAUXILIARYBUILDINGVZATHENEWINLETPENETRATIONZNACCORDANCEWITHGINNASTATIONSECURITYREQUIREMENTS.THUS/THISMODZFICATIONNEITHERINCREASESTHECONSEQUENCESgNORDOESZTREDUCETHEMARGINSOFSAFETYFOR!1)EQUIPMENTREQUIREDTOFUNCTIONDURINGANDFOLLOWINGSEISMICEVENTSINCLUDINGPIPEBREAKSOUTSIDECONTAINMENT.2)FIREPROTECTIONFEATURES3)PLANTSECURITY22

BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTHESTRUCTURALRE-ANALYSISPLAN(SRP),ZTHASBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTZCZPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURESgSYSTEMSgANDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODIFICATION.EWR-3817CATALYTICOXYGENREMOVALSYSTEMTHISEWR(ENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST)ADDRESSESTHEMODIFICATIONWHICHWILLPROVIDEAMEANSOFREDUCINGOXYGENCONCENTRATIONSTOLESSTHAN100PPBINTHECONDENSATESTORAGESYSTEM.AWESTINGHOUSECATALYTICOXYGENREMOVALSYSTEM(CORS)HASBEENEVALUATEDTOBETHEBESTMETHODAVAILABLETOREDUCEDISSOLVEDOXYGENTOACCEPTABLELEVELS.THEPRINCIPLEISTOMIXHYDROGENWITHTHECONDENSATEANDREDUCETHEFREEOXYGENTOWATERTHROUGHEXPOSUREOFTHEMIXTURETOAMETALCATALYSTSURFACE.REVISION0OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISWASPRESENTEDANDAPPROVEDBYPORCONNOVEMBER6g1985PORCNUMBER6.1.0-85-114-002.DUETOPRE-PORCCOMMENTS,REVISION1OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSIS,WERENOTPRESENTEDTOPORC.THEPURPOSEOFREVISION2OFTHEDESIGN.CRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISISTOINCLUDECOMMENTS.ASARESULTOFPRE-PORCOFREVISIONl.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGZNNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORYGUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONAREALOSSOFNORMALFEEDWATERANDFIRES.BASEDUPONTHEANALYSESDESCRIBEDUNDERPARAGRAPHS3.1TO4.4OFTHESAFETYANALYSIS'THASTHEREFORE'EENDETERMINEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENDETERMINEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES,SYSTEMS,ANDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODIFICATION.23

EWR-4037CT-1TERMINALREPLACEMENTTHISEWR(ENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST)ADDRESSESTHEMODIFICATIONOFTHEEXISTINGEBERLZNECT-1EFFLUENTMONITORCONTROLTERMINALSATGZNNASTATIONWITHUPGRADED'>>BnVERSIONEQUIPMENT.THEPURPOSEOFTHEnBnVERSIONUPGRADEZSTOIMPROVETHEOPERABILITYANDRELIABILITYOFTHEEXISTINGCONTROLTERMINALSINTHECONTROLROOMANDTECHNICALSUPPORTCENTER.ALSOPROPOSEDISTHEINSTALLATIONOFAREPORTGENERATORINTERFACE(RGZF)WHICHWOULDENABLETHECT-1ZNTHETSCTOCOMMUNICATEWITHTHENEWPLANTCOMPUTERPLANNEDFORINSTALLATIONIN1986.IFTHECONTROLROOMOPERATORSHAVEACCESSTODATAFROMTHEEFFLUENTMONITORSVIATHEPLANTCOMPUTER,THECT-1ZNTHECONTROLROOMWOULDNOLONGERBEREQUIRED,ANDCOULDBEREMOVEDTODECREASESOMEOFTHECONGESTIONZNTHECONTROLROOMANDELIMINATETHENEEDFORDUPLICATINGATCT-1FORTHEGINNASIMULATORPROJECT.ITISPROPOSEDTHATBOTHTHECONTROLROOMANDTHETSCCONTROLTERMINALSBEUPGRADEDWITHTHEnB"VERSIONEQUIPMENTZN1985.WHENTHENEWPLANTCOMPUTERISOPERATIONAL,THERGIFWOULDBEINSTALLEDBETWEENTHETSCCT-1ANDTHEPLANTCOMPUTERSANDTHECONTROLROOMCT1WOULDBEREMOVED'REVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONFSARANDEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONARE(1)MAJORANDMINORFIRES,(2)ASEISMICEVENT.BASEDUPONTHEANALYSISDESCRIBEDUNDERPARAGRAPH3.1TO4.4OFTHE,SAFETYANALYSIS,ITHASBEENDETERMINEDTHATTHEPROBABILITYOFOCCURRENCEORTHECONSEQUENCESOFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTIONOFEQUIPMENTIMPORTANTTOSAFETY,PREVIOUSLYEVALUATEDINTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORTWILLNOTBEINCREASEDBYTHEPROPOSEDADDITION.EWR-4070NO.1AND2FEEDWATERHEATERREPLACEMENTTHISEWR(ENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST)ADDRESSESTHEREPLACEMENTOFNUMBER1AND2FEEDWATERHEATER.THEPURPOSEOFTHISMODIFICATIONISTOSPECIFY,"PROCURE,ANDINSTALLNEWFEEDWATERHEATERTUBEBUNDLESANDSHELLMODIFICATIONSATTHEFIRSTANDSECONDEXTRACTIONPOINTS.THEPRIMARYGOALISTOELIMINATETHECOPPERALLOYTUBES.STAINLESSSTEELTUBESARERECOMMENDED.REVISION1TOTHESAFETYAN/LYSISINCORPORATESACHANGERESULTINGFROMPRE-PORCCOMMENTOFREVISION0TOCLARIFYASTEPTOSTATETHATTHEPROBABILITYOFUNINTENDEDOPENINGOFTHECONDENSATEBYPASSVALVEWILLNOTINCREASEDUETOTHEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIREMENTTOLIMIT.TUBESZDEPRESSUREDROPTO45PSI.AREVIEWHASBEENPERFORMEDOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHE24

GINNASTATIONUFSAR,THEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.70'NDAlOCFR50.59SAFETYEVALUATION.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONAREADECREASEZNFEEDWATERTEMPERATUREANDALOSSOFNORMALFEEDWATERFLOW.THEDECREASEZNFEEDWATERTEMPERATUREEVENTISANALYZEDINTHEUFSARASANACCIDENTALOPENINGOFTHECONDENSATEBYPASSVALVE,WHICHRESULTEDINASUDDENREDUCTIONINLETFEEDWATERTEMPERATURETOTHESTEAMGENERATORS.THISMODIFICATIONHASNOBEARINGONCONDENSATEBYPASSVALVEOPERATIONORPLANTRESPONSETOTHISEVENT.AREDUCTIONINFEEDWATERTEMPERATUREWHICHRESULTEDFROMALOSSOFONEFEEDWATERHEATERHASBEENANALYZEDINUFSAR.THEANALYSISSHOWEDTHATFORAFEEDWATERENTHALPYDECREASECORRESPONDINGTOTHELOSSOFONEFEEDWATERHEATERATFULLPOWERMINIMUMDNBRDOESNOTFALLBELOWTHELIMITVALUE.ATZEROPOWERTHERESULTSARELESSLIMITINGTHANTHOSEPRESENTEDINUFSARSECTION15.4.1,UNCONTROLLEDRODCLUSTERCONTROLASSEMBLYWITHDRAWALFROMASUBCRITICALCONDITION.THELOSSOFNORMALFEEDWATERFLOWZSANALYZEDINTHEUFSARASADISRUPTIONOFSECONDARYSYSTEMHEATREMOVALCAPABILITY.THISMODIFICATIONWILLNOTINCREASETHEPROBABILITYOFTHEDISRUPTIONASARESULTOFCONDENSATELINEBREAKSINCETHEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESPROPERINSPECTIONANDTESTINGOFNEWWELDS.THISMODIFICATIONISNON-SEISMICSINCEITDOESNOTEFFECTTHESAFE.SHUTDOWNOFTHEREACTOR.THISMODIFICATIONDOESNOTINCREASETHEFIRELOADINGINFIREAREASCONTAININGSAFESHUTDOWNEQUIPMENTORDEGRADEEXISTINGFIREPROTECTIONBECAUSEOFREQUIREMENTSINSECTION27.0OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIA.BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTHEREQUIREMENTSOFGZNNASTATIONTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONS,ITHASBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES,SYSTEMS,ANDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODIFICATION.25

EWR-4075TSCHVACMODIFICATIONSTHISEWR(ENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST)ADDRESSESTHEMODIFICATIONOFTHEGZNNASTATIONTSCHVACSYSTEM.THISMODIFICATIONWILLCONSISTOF:1)ADDINGTWOCOMPUTERTYPEAIRCONDITIONINGUNITSTOTHENEWSASCOMPUTERROOM,2)INSTALLINGNEWZONECONTROLBOXES'ACHWITHZTSOWNTHERMOSTAT')MODIFYINGTHECENTRALSYSTEMCONTROLSOTHATITWILLAUTOMATICALLYCHANGEOVERFROMHEATINGTOCOOLING/ANDBACK~AND4)INSTALLINGAFLOWCONTROLLERTOASSURETHATTHEMAXIMUMDESIGNFLOWRATETHROUGHTHECHARCOALFILTERISNOTEXCEEDED.REVISION1OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISWASPRESENTEDANDAPPROVEDBYPORC.ON11/19/86PORCNUMBER6~1~0-86-135-002.THEPURPOSEOFREVISION2gOFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISISTOINCLUDEINSTALLATIONREFERENCETOSPECIFICATIONEE-29,EE-80ANDZEEE383.NAREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORYGUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODZFXCA-TIONAREINTERNALANDEXTERNALEVENTS'UCHASFIRES~FLOODS,STORMSANDEARTHQUAKES'ASEDUPONTHEANALYSESDESCRIBEDUNDERPARAGRAPHS3.1TO4.4OFTHESAFETYANALYSIS,ITHASTHEREFORE,BEENDETERMINEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENDETERMINEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES~SYSTEMS'NDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODIFICATION'.26

EWR-4118TOTALCHARGINGFLOWINDICATIONTHISENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSESTHEMODIFICATIONTOINSTALLTWOTRANSMITTERSFORREACTORCOOLANTPUMP(RCP)SEALINJECTIONFLOW.EWR4118WASWRITTENINRESPONSETOANUMBEROFHUMANENGINEERINGDISCREPANCIES(HEDS)IDENTIFIEDDURINGTHEDETAILEDCONTROLROOMDESIGNREVIEW.HEDS451AND471STATETHATINDICATIONFORREACTORCOOLANTPUMP(RCP)SEALINJECTIONFLOWANDTOTALCHARGINGFLOWAREREQUIRED'EDS84'5/309'10'ND345ADDRESSTHEPROBLEMTHATTHECHARGINGFLOWCONTROLLERZSLOCATEDONTHEMIDDLESECTIONOFTHEMAINCONTROLBOARD(MCB)gANDTHE'INDICATORZSONTHELEFTSECTIONWHICHISEIGHTTOTENFEET'AWAY.THECOMBINATIONOFTHESEHEDSRESULTEDZNANNRCCOMMITTMENTTOPROVIDEINDICA-TIONFORSEALINJECTIONANDADUPLICATEINDICATORFORCHARGINGFLOWONTHEMIDDLESECTZONOFTHEMCBBYJUNE1988.THISPROJECTINVOLVESTHEINSTALLATIONOFTWOTRANS-MITTERSFORRCP.SEALINJECTIONFLOW(FT115AANDFT116A).THESETWOTRANSMITTERSWOULDBEINSTALLEDZNPARALLELWITHTHEEXISTINGRCPSEALINJECTIONFLOWLOCALINDICATION(FT115ANDFT116).INDICATORSFORSEALINJECTIONFLOWWILLBEINSTALLEDONTHEMIDDLESECTIONOFTHEMCB.THETWOSEALINJECTIONFLOWSWILLBEINPUTTOTHEPLANTPROCESSCOMPUTERSYSTEM(PPCS).INADDITION,ADUPLICATEOFTHEEXISTINGCONTROLBOARDINDICATIONFORCHARGINGFLOW(F0128)WILLBEINSTALLEDONTHEMIDDLESECTIONOFTHEMCB.THERCPSEALZNJECTIONFLOWSgCOUPLEDWITHTHEEXZSTINGCONTROLBOARDINDICATIONFORCHARGINGFLOW,WILLALLOWCONTROLROOMOPERATORSTODETERMINETOTALSYSTEMINFLOW.THENEWINDICATORSFORSEALINJECTIONFLOWANDCHARGINGFLOWWILLBELOCATEDBESIDEEACHOTHERONTHEMIDDLESECTIONOFTHEMCB.THEDUPLICATEINDICATORFORCHARGINGFLOWWILL,INADDITION,BELOCATEDABOVETHECONTROLLERFORCHARGINGFLOW.ANEWPSEUDOANALOGPOINTWILLBECREATEDONTHEPPCSTOCALCULATETOTALCHARGINGFLOWBYCOMBININGCHARGINGFLOW,ANEXISTINGPPCSINPUT,WITHTHENEWRCPSEALINJECTIONFLOWPOINTS.DUETOPRE-PORCCOMMENTS,REVISION0OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISWERENOTPRESENTEDTOPORC.THEPURPOSEOFREVISION1OFTHE'DESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISISTOINCLUDECOMMENTSASARESULTOFPRE-PORCOFREVISION0.27

AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNAFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYTHEUSNRCREGULATORYGUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONARE:1)SEISMICEVENT2)MAJORANDMINORFIRES3)PIPEBREAKSOUTSIDETHECONTAINMENTBUILDINGTHISMODIFICATIONISLIMITEDTOWORKDOWNSTREAMOFTHEROOTVALVESFORTHERCPSEALINJECTIONFLOW.SINCETHEROOTVALVESDEFINETHESAFETYCLASSBOUNDARY'HEEXISTINGRCPSEALINJECTIONFLOWINSTRUMENTATIONZSDESIGNATEDNOTSEISMICCATEGORYI'HEREMAININGWORKSFORTHISMODIFICATIONSWILLBEDESIGNEDTOMEETTHEREQUIREMENTSOFUSNRCREGULATORYGUIDE1.29,REVISIONC.2.THIS'MODIFICATIONINVOLVESTHEINSTALLATIONOFEQUIPMENTINTHEAUXILIARYBUILDINGSFIREAREAABBMZONEABBiANDTHECONTROLBUZLDINGiFIREAREACCZONESCRANDRRTHISMODIFICATIONALSOREQUIRESROUTINGCABLETHROUGHTHECABLETUNNELWHICHISFIREAREACT.AREVIEWWILLBEPERFORMEDTOASSURECONTINUEDCOMPLIANCEWITH10CFR50,APPENDIXR.ALLNEWWIRINGWILLBEQUALIFIEDTOIEEE383-1974FLAMETESTREQUIREMENTS'IREBARRIERPENETRATIONSWILLBEREPAIREDORREPLACEDZNACCORDANCEWITHEXISTINGPLANTPROCEDURES.THEREFOREEXISTINGSEALSWILLNOTBEDEGRADED.THISMODIFICATIONSDOESNOTAFFECTTHESAFESHUTDOWNANALYSISINTHEAPPENDIXRSUBMITTALFORTHEFOLLOWINGREASONS:THEAPPENDIXRREQUIREMENTSFORLOCALINDICATIONOFRCPSEALINJECTIONFLOWWILLBEMAINTAINED.BTHEREISNOEFFECTONSEPARATIONOFEXISTINGCIRCUITSiASSOCIATEDCIRCUITS,ORFIREAREABOUNDARIESASANALYZEDINTHEAPPENDIXRSUBMITTAL.A.THISMODIFICATIONWILLINTERFACEWITHTHEEXISTING3/8INCHRCPSEALINJECTIONFLOWSENSINGLINEINTHESAMEMANNERASDOESTHEEXISTINGLOCALINDICATORS.THEREFORETHISMODIFIC-ATIONDOESNOTINTRODUCEANYNEWFAILUREMODESCONCERNINGPIPEBREAKSOUTSIDEOFTHECONTAINMENTBUILDING.ITHASBEENDETERMINEDTHAT.THEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHESTATIONHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.THEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURESiSYSTEMSiANDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEEN.AFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODIFICATION.28

EWR-4142CONTROLBUILDINGEASTWALLMODIFICATIONTHISENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSESTHESTRUCTURALUPGRADEREQUIREMENTOFTHEEASTWALLOFTHECONTROLBUILDING.THEEASTWALLOFTHECONTROLBUILDINGMUSTBECAPABLEOFWITHSTANDINGTHELOADSASSOCIATEDWITHA.132MPHTORNADO(DIRECTWINDAND~P=0.4PSI)ANDTWOTORNADOMISSILES.THISMODIFICATIONWILLgINEFFECTSUPGRADETHERELAYROOMEASTWALLASPARTOFTHESTRUCTURALUPGRADEPROGRAMTOPROVIDETHENECESSARYADDEDSTRENGTHREQUIREDTORESISTTHEIMPOSESLOADSOFSNOWgTORNADO(DIRECTAND~P)gTORNADOMISSILESAND2)PROVIDEAWATER-TIGHTBARRIERAGAINSTFLOODINGOFDEERCREEK.REVISION2TOTHISDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISINCORPORATESCHANGESFROMREVISION1DELETINGEXTRACONDUITFORFUTURECIRCUITS'DDINGGROUNDINGANDDOORPOSITIONSWITCHESFORBOTHSECURITYANDFIREDOORS.'REVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYSISINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONAREWINDJSNOQANDTORNADOLOADZNGSJFLOODINGANDSEISMIC/FIRES'OSSOFA.C.POWERANDPLANTBUILDINGSECURITY.THEDESIGNFORWIND~SNOWgTORNADOESANDEXTERNALFLOODINGHASBEENEVALUATEDZNTHEUFSARANDWILLBEINACCORDANCEWITHCOMMITMENTSMADETOTHEUSNRCWHICHAREREFERENCEDZNSECTIONS2'g3'g3~4~1AND3'OFTHEUFSARSEISMICEVENTSHAVEBEENANALYZEDUNDERTHESEPRE-EVALUATIONDESIGNANALYSIS.MODIFICATIONOFwTHISEXTERNALWALLOFTHERELAYROOMWILLNOTALTEREITHERTHESEISMICQUALIFICATIONOFEXISTINGSTRUCTURESORSAFETYRELATEDEQUIPMENTLOCATEDWITHINTHEEXISTINGSTRUCTURES.ALLEXISTINGFIREPROTECTIONFEATURESREQUIREDTOASSURECOMPLIANCEWITH10CFR50APPENDIXR,ORTOMAINTAINEQUIVALENTLEVELSOFPROTECTIONFROMFIRESWILLBEMAINTAINEDDURINGANDFOLLOWINGTHESTRUCTURALUPGRADEMODIFICATIONS.THEMODIFICATIONAFFECTSONLYLOADINGOFNON-SAFETYRELATEDBUS15.SINCETHEREISNOCHANGEINTHESAFETY-RELATEDBUSES,THEREISNOCHANGEINTHECONSEQUENCESOFALOSSOFA.C.POWER.THERELOCATIONOFANEXISTINGEXTERIORSECURITYDOORTOTHEOUTSIDEOFTHENEWSTRUCTUREWILLMAINTAINTHELEVELOFPRESENTSECURITYFROMINTRUSIONATGZNNASTATION.1NTERIMMEASURESDURINGCONSTRUCTIONWILLBEADMINISTRATIVELYCONTROLLEDTOPREVENTPOSSIBLEDEGRADATIONOFSECURITYBARRIERS'9

THUSgTHISMODIFICATIONNEITHERINCREASESTHECONSEQUENCESgNORDOESZTREDUCETHEMARGINSOFSAFETYFOR:1)EQUIPMENTREQUIREDTOFUNCTIONDURINGANDFOLLOWINGSSE,FLOODINGANDTORNADOEVENTS2)FIREPROTECTIONFEATURES3)PLANTSECURITYBASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTHESTRUCTURALRE-ANAL-YSISPLAN,(SRP),ITHASBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFTOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ZTHASALSOBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS'NDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODIFICATION.EWR-4176APPENDIXRDETECTIONUPGRADETHISEWR(ENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST)ADDRESSESTHEMODIFICATIONWHICHWILLINSTALLTHREE(3)NEWFIREDETECTIONZONESANDSUPERVISEDBYTHEFIRESIGNALLINGSYSTEM.THESEZONESARE:Z-36(SMOKE)INT.BLDG.SUB-BASEMENTFLOORS.Z-37(SMOKE)ZNT.BLDG.NORTHUPPERELEVATZONS.Z-38(SMOKE)INT.BLDG'OUTHALLELEVATIONS~INCLUDEDINTHISMODIFICATIONISTHEMOUNTINGOFEQUIPMENT,ROUTINGANDMOUNTINGOFCONDUIT,ANDALLWIRINGASSOCIATEDWITHTHENEWZONESANDMODIFICATIONSTOTHEEXISTINGFIRE~SZGNALLINGSYSTEM.THISMODIFICATIONISREQUIREDTOCOMPLYWITHAPPENDIXRALTERNATIVESHUTDOWNSYSTEM,GZNNANUCLEARPOWERPLANTREVISION2.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDZNTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORYGUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONARESEISMICANDFIRE.BASEDUPONTHEANALYSESDESCRIBEDUNDERPARAGRAPH3.1TO4.4OFTHESAFETYANALYSIS'THASTHEREFORE'EENDETERMINEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENDETERMINEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS'NDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODIFICATION.30

EWR-422102~H2ANALYZERREPLACEMENTTHISENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSESTHEDIRECTREPLACEMENTOFTHEEXISTING02/H2ANALYZERSYSTEM.THISMODIFICATIONWILLREPLACETHEINACCURATEANDUNRELIABLEEXISTING02/H2ANALYZERSYSTEMWITHANEWRELIABLEANDACCURATESYSTEM.REVISION1OFTHISDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISINCORPORATESCHANGESFROMREVISION0TOCORRECTTYPOGRAPHICALERRORSANDSUMMARYDESCRIPTIONOFMODIFICATIONBACKGROUNDINFORMATION.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDZNTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDEVENTSREQUIREDBYUSNRCREG.GUIDES1.29,1~60g161'ND170'HEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONAREMAJORANDMINORFIRESANDASEISMICEVENT.ALLEXISTINGANDNEWWIRING,CABLEgANDELECTRICALCOMPONENTSREQUIREDFORTHISMODIFICATIONCOMPLIESWITH10CFR50APPENDIXR.THISMODIFICATIONHASBEENANALYZEDFORSEISMICEVENTSUNDERSECTIONC.2OFREG.GUIDE1.29.THEINSTALLATIONWILLMAINTAINSTRUCTURALINTEGRITYSUCHTHATSURROUNDINGSAFETYRELATEDEQUIPMENTWILLNOTBEAFFECTED.THISMODIFICATIONNEITHERINCREASESTHECONSEQUENCES,NORDOESITREDUCETHEMARGINSOFSAFETYFOR:1)MAJORORMINORFIRES2)SEISMICEVENTBASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDUSNCREG.GUIDE1.29AND1.70,ZTHASBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES~SYSTEMS,ANDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODIFICATION.31

EWR-4235STATUSLIGHTMODIFICATIONTHISEWR(ENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST)ADDRESSESTHEMODIFICATIONWHICHCONSXSTSOFINSTALLINGADROPPINGRESISTORINEACHLIGHTASSEMBLYZNTHEMAINCONTROLBOARD(MCB).INCLUDEDWITHTHISMODIFICATIONISTHEREPLACEMENTOFTHEEXISTING35VOLTBULBSWITH30VOLTBULBS,ANDNEWINDXCATORLIGHTLENSCAP.THISMODIFICATIONWILLPROVIDEGREATERLIGHTOUTPUTINTHEBRIGHTANDDIMMODE,THEREBYELIMINATINGTHEPRESENTVISUALCONTRASTBETWEENBRIGHTANDDIMCONDITIONS.THESESTATUSLIGHTSZNSUBJECT,PROVIDEAVISUALINDICATIONOFSELECTEDVALVEPOSITIONS.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORYGUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICA-TIONARELOSSOFDCORACCONTROLPOWERSNATURALEVENTS/FIRE,ANDEARTHQUAKE.BASEDUPONTHEANALYSESDESCRIBEDUNDERPARAGRAPHS3.1TO4.4OFTHESAFETYANALYSIS'THASTHEREFORE'EENDETERMINEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENDETERMINEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES~SYSTEMS'NDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODIFICATION.32

EWR-4269CANDDSTANDBYAUXILIARYFEEDWATERPUMPINTERLOCKTHISENGINEERINGWORKREQUESTADDRESSESTHEMODIFICATIONTOTHEPUMPINTERLOCK.PRESENTLY,THEELECTRICALAUXILIARYFEEDWATERSYSTEMCONFIGURATIONCONSISTSOFTWOMOTORDRIVENAUXILIARYFEEDWATERPUMPS(MDAFWPlAAND1B)ANDTWOSTANDBYAUXILIARYPUMPS1AAND1BSUPPLYCONDENSATEWATERTOAANDBSTEAMGENERATORSRESPECTIVELY.INTHEEVENTTHATEITHERONEORBOTHOFTHESEPUMPSAREINOPERABLETHESTANDBYPUMPSMAYBEUSEDTOPROVIDEANEMERGENCYSOURCEFORCOOLING.THESTANDBYPUMPS(CANDD)AREELECTRICALLYINTERLOCKEDWITHPRIMARYPUMPS(AANDB).THEINTERLOCKSAREINTENDEDTOPREVENTTHESIMULTANEOUSOPERATIONOFTHEPRIMARYPUMPSANDSTANDBYPUMPS'URINGNORMALOPERATIONTHISCONFIGURATIONSATISFIESTHISDESIGNCRITERIA'OWEVERSWHENPRIMARYBREAKERSARERACKEDOUTINTOTHEHELDPOSITION(ORREMOVED)gTHEINTERLOCKSAREALSOREMOVED,MAKINGTHESTANDBYBREAKERSINOPERABLE'HISPROPOSEDMODIFICATIONWILLELIMINATETHISCONDITIONBYINSTALLINGCELLSWITCHESINTHEPRIMARYBREAKERCOMPARTMENTS'HICHWILLCHANGESTATEWHENTHEBREAKERISRACKEDZNOROUT.THECELLSWITCHCONTACTSWILLBEWIREDZNPARALLELWITHTHEEXISTINGINTERLOCKCONTACTSANDWILLPERMITTHEPRIMARYBREAKERSTOBEREMOVEDFROMSERVICEFORMAINTENANCEANDINSURETHATTHESTANDBYBREAKERSWILLBEOPERATIONAL.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGZNNASTATIONFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYNRCREGULATORYGUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATINGTOTHISMODIFIC-ATIONARE:A)LOSSOFAUXILIARYFEEDWATERFLOWB)NATURALEVENTS/FIRE,EARTHQUAKE.THEFIRSTEVENTANALYZEDWILLBETHELOSSOFAUXILIARYFEEDWATERFLOWDUETOTHEPROPOSEDMODIFICATION.THEADDITIONOFACELLSWITCHWILLNOTEFFECTOPERABILITYOFTHEMOTORDRIVENAUXILIARYFEEDWATERPUMPS.THESECELLSWITCHESSERVEASPERMZSSIVESTOTHESTANDBYAUXILIARYFEEDWATERPUMPS,THEREFOREINTHEEVENTOFAFAILUREONLYTHESTARTINGOFTHESTANDBYPUMPSAREAFFECTED.MANUFACTURERINSTALLATIONANDTESTINGPROCEDURESWILLBEPERFORMEDANDAPERIODICTESTINGPROGRAMWILLBEINITIATEDTOASSUREPROPEROPERATIONOFCELLSWITCHES,THEREBYREDUCINGTHEPROBABILITYOFFAILURETOSTARTSTANDBYAUXILIARYFEEDWATERPUMPSTOANACCEPTABLYLOWLEVEL.THEREFORETHISMODIFICATIONWILLHAVEANEGLIGIBLEIMPACTUPONOPERABILITYOFAUXILIARYFEEDWATERSYSTEM.THESECONDEVENTANALYZEDWILLBETHEEFFECTOFASEISMIC'VENTONTHEPLANTDUETOTHISMODIFICATION.THECELLSWITCHESHAVEBEENQUALIFIEDBYTHEMANUFACTURER,THEREFORETHECONSEQUENCESOFAFAILUREDUETOASEISMICEVENTAREMITIGATED.33

THETHIRDEVENTANALYZEDWILLBETHEEFFECTOFAFIREONTHEPLANTDUETOTHISMODIFICATION.THECONTROLWIRINGUSEDFORTHISMODIFICATIONISREQUIREDTOMEETTHEREQUIREMENTSOFIEEESTD.383-1984FLAMETEST.THUSTHEREZSNOSIGNIFICANTINCREASEINTHEFIRELOADINGDUETOTHISMODIFICATION.ANAPPENDIXRCONFORMANCEVERIFICATIONWILLSEPERFORMEDTOENSURETHATTHEPROPOSEDMODIFICATIONDOESNOTADVERSELYIMPACTEXISTINGAPPENDIXRCOMPLIANCEMETHODS.THEREFOREgBASEDUPONTHEABOVEANALYSISgITHASBEENDETERMINEDTHAT:A)THEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHESTATIONARENOTREDUCEDANDB)THESTRUCTURES,SYSTEMS,ANDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSAREADEQUATE.THE'PROBABILITYOFOCCURRENCEANDTHECONSEQUENCESOFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTIONOFEQUIPMENTIMPORTANTTOSAFETYPREVIOUSLYEVALUATEDZNTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORTARENOTINCREASED.THEPOSSIBILITYOFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTIONOFATYPEDIFFERENTFROMANYPREVIOUSLYEVALUATEDINTHESAFETYANALYSISHASNOTBEENCREATED.THEMARGINOFSAFETYASDEFINEDINTHEBASISFORANYTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONZSNOTREDUCED.THEPROPOSEDMODIFICATIONDOESNOTINVOLVEANUNREVIEWEDSAFETYQUESTIONSEWR-4281STEAMGENERATORMANWAYSTUDTENSIONERTHISEWR(ENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST)ADDRESSESTHEMODIFICATIONCOVERINGTHEINSTALLATIONOFSTEAMGENERATORPRIMARYMANWAYSTUDSANDNUTS.INTHEPASTTHEPRIMARYMANWAYCOVERSHAVEBEENATTACHEDWITHBOLTSWHICHARETORQUEDTOOBTAINTHEPROPERGASKETSEATING.THISZSATIMECONSUMINGANDDIFFICULTTASKSINCEZTMUSTBEDONEINAHIGHRADIATIONAREA.THISMODIFICATIONCONSISTSOFREPLACINGTHEEXISTINGBOLTSANDNUTS.INSTEADOFTORQUINGTHENUTSTOINDUCETHEREQUIREDAXIALLOADS,DIRECTHYDRAULICLOADSAREUSEDTOSTRETCHTHESTUDS'EVISION0OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISWASPRESENTEDANDAPPROVEDBYPORCONNOVEMBER'5g1986'ORCNUMBER6.1.0-86-125-001'4

THEPURPOSEOFREVISION1OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISZSTOREVISEPARAGRAPHS2.6.1AND2.6.2TOINCLUDENEWEG&GDRAWINGTITLES.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORYGUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICA-'TIONARESEISMICEVENTS'ECREASEINREACTORCOOLANTSYSTEMINVENTORYANDFIRES.BASEDUPONTHEANALYSESDESCRIBEDUNDERPARAGRAPHS3.1TO4.0DOFTHESAFETYANALYSIS'THASTHEREFOREJBEENDETERMINEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVE'NOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENDETERMINEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES~SYSTEMS'NDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODIFICATION.EWR-4282CVRECIRCFANCONDENSATECOLLECTORLEVELSTHISENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSESTHEMODIFICATIONOFTHECVRECZRCFANCONDENSATECOLLECTORLEVELS'HISMODIFICATIONISFORREPLACEMENTOFEXISTINGOBSOLETEPRESSURETRANSMITTERS,SIGNALPROCESSORSANDMAINCONTROLBOARDINDICATORSWITHINSTRUMENTSCAPABLEOFACCURATELYMONITORINGWATERLEAKAGEWITHINCONTAINMENT.THEEXISTINGTRANSMZTTERSJPOWERSUPPLIES'ZSTABLESANDINDICATORSWILLBEREPLACEDTOPROVIDEMOREACCURATEANDRELIABLECONDENSATELEVELINDICATION.THESCALESZNTHEEXISTINGLEVELINDICATORSHALLBEPLACEDINTHENEWLEVELINDICATORSWITHNOCHANGE.INTHEAPPEARANCEONTHEMCB.NEWREFERENCELEGTUBINGFROMTHETRANSMITTERSTOTHECONDENSATECOLLECTIONSTANDPIPESWILLBEINSTALLED.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGZNNASTATIONUFSARANDEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONARE-(1)MAJORANDMINORFIRES,(2)ASEISMICEVENT,(3)PIPEBREAKSINSIDETHECONTAINMENTBUILDING.NEWWIRINGANDCABLEMAYBEREQUIREDFORTHISMODIFICATIONWHICHCOULDADDTOTHEFIRELOADINGOFTHEPLANTTHEREFORE'HEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATALLSUCHCABLEMEETTHEIEEE-383-1974FLAMETESTREQUIREMENTS.BECAUSEOFTHISTHEREWILLBENOSIGNIFICANTINCREASEOFFIRELOADINGCAUSEDBYTHISMODIFICATION.ANAPPENDIXRCONFORMANCEREVIEWSHALLBEPREPAREDTODEMONSTRATETHATCONTINUEDCOMPLIANCEWITH10CFR50APPENDIXRREQUIREMENTSISMAINTAINED.35

THISMODIFICATIONWILLBEREVIEWEDTOENSURETHATFAILUREOFANYELECTRICALCABLEINSTALLEDASAPARTOFTHISMODIFIC-ATIONWILLNOTRESULTINTHEDISABLINGOFVITALEQUIPMENTNEEDEDTOSAFELYSHUTDOWNTHEPLANTDURINGPOSTULATEDFIRES.THEPRESSUREBOUNDARYPORTIONSOFTHECONDENSATECOLLECTORLEVELINSTRUMENTATIONARENOTDESIGNATEDSEISMICCATEGORYI.HOWEVER,ANYMODIFICATIONTOTHISSYSTEMWHOSEFAILURECOULDCAUSEDAMAGETOSAFETYRELATEDEQUIPMENTWILLBEDESIGNEDTOMEETTHEREQUIREMENTSOFUSNRCREGULATORYGUIDE1.29,POSITIONC.2.THENEWTRANSMITTERSWILLINTERFACEWITHTHEEXISTINGCONDENSATECOLLECTORSTANDPIPESINTHESAMEMANNERASTHEEXISTINGTRANSMITTERSWITHTHEADDITIONOFTHEREFERENCELEGTUBINGPENETRATION.THISMODIFICATIONDOESNOTINTRODUCEANYNEWFAILUREMODESCONCERNINGPIPEBREAKSINSIDETHECONTAINMENTBUILDING.THISMODIFICATIONWILLNOTRESULTINACHANGETOTHECOMMIT-MENTSMADEINTHEUFSAR,SECTIONS3.6.1.3.2.13AND5.4.11.1.2.THESECOMMITMENTSSTATETHATCONDENSATEFLOWSFROMAPPROXIMATELY1GPMTO30GPMARETOBEMEASUREDBYTHECONDENSATEMEASURINGSYSTEM,USFARSECTION5.2.5.4.3.THEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATAHUMANFACTORSREVIEWOFTHISMODIFICATIONBEPERFORMEDPRIORTOISSUANCEOFDESIGNOUTPUTS,TOMINIMIZETHEPROBABILITYOFOPERATORERROR.THEITEMSABOVEENSURETHATTHISMODIFICATIONDOESNOTDEGRADETHECAPABILITYOFANYSAFETYSYSTEMTOPERFORMITSFUNCTION.THEASSUMPTIONSANDCONCLUSIONSOFEXISTINGANALYSESAREUNCHANGED.NONEWTYPESOFEVENTSAREPOSTULATED.THEREFORE,THEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.THEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES,SYSTEMS,ANDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDFORTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTED.INACCORDANCEWITHTHEPROVISIONSOF10CFR50.59THISMODIFICATIONDOESNOTPRESENTANUNREVZEWEDSAFETYQUESTIONFORTHEFOLLOWINGREASONS:1.THEPROBABILITYOFOCCURRENCE,ORTHECONSEQUENCESOFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTIONOFEQUIPMENTIMPORTANTTOSAFETYPREVIOUSLYEVALUATEDZNTHESAFETYANALYSISWILLNOTBEINCREASED.36

THISMODIFICATIONWILLNOTAFFECTTHEPERFORMANCEOFEQUIPMENTIMPORTANTTOSAFETY.THIS.MODIFICATIONWILLCOMPLYWITHTHEREQUIREMENTSOFUSNRCREGSGUIDE1.29POSITIONC.2TOINSUREANYFAILUREWILLNOTAFFECTSEISMICCATEGORYIEQUIPMENT.ANAPPENDIXRCONFORMANCEREVIEWWILLINSURECONTINUEDCOMPLIANCEWITH10CFR50APPENDIXRREQUIREMENTS.2.THEPOSSIBILITYFORANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTIONOFADIFFERENTTYPETHANANYEVALUATEDPREVIOUSLYZNTHESAFETYANALYSISZSNOTCREATED.THISMODIFICATIONDOESNOTADDTO~ORMODIFY~ANYEQUIPMENTIMPORTANTTOSAFETY,OREQUIPMENTWHOSEFAILUREXSADDRESSEDINTHEFINALSAFETYANALYSISREPORT.3~THEMARGINOFSAFETYASDEFINEDINTHEBASISFORANYTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONISNOTREDUCED.ASSTATEDABOVEgTHISMODIFICATIONDOESNOTAFFECTEQUIPMENTIMPORTANTTOSAFETY.THEEFFECTOFTHISMODIFICATIONWILLBETOINCREASETHERELXABZLITYOFONEOFTHEDIVERSEMEANSAVAILABLEFOROPERATORSTODETECTLEAKAGEINSIDECONTAINMENT.EWR-4324STEAMGENERATORBLOWDOWNSYSTEMTHISEWR(ENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST)ADDRESSESTHEMODIFICATIONONSTEAMGENERATORBLOWDOWNSYSTEM.THEPURPOSEOFTHISMODIFICATIONISTOCONVERTTHESTEAMGENERATORBLOWDOWNSYSTEMTOAFLASHTANKBASEDPROCESS'HEPRIMARYGOALISTOIMPROVERELIABILITYBYMOVINGTHEXNHERENTTEMPERATURECHANGESTOTHETANKANDPIPING.NEWPIPINGINSTALLEDTOACCOMPLISHTHISCONVERSIONSHALLBERESIZEDTOREDUCETHEEROSION-CORROSIONPOTENTIAL.REVISION3TOTHISDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISINCORPORATECHANGESTOREVISION2ASARESULTOFTHECOMMENTSFROMTHEREVIEWOFREVISION2OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSIS.THECHANGESAREOPERATIONALCONCERNSANDCLARIFICATION.AREVIEWHASBEENPERFORMEDOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONAREANINCREASEORDECREASEINSECONDARYSYSTEMHEATREMOVAL.ANINCREASEZNSECONDARYSYSTEMHEATREMOVALWOULDOCCURIFABLOWDOWNLINERUPTURED.THISEVENTISENVELOPEDINTHEUFSARBYEXAMINXNGTHEINCREASEINFEEDWATERFLOWEVENTANDTHESPECTRUMOFSTEAMSYSTEMPIPINGFAILURES.BOTHANALYZEDEVENTSAREFARMORESEVERTHANABLOWDOWNLINERUPTURE.37

ADECREASEZNSECONDARYSYSTEMHEATREMOVALWOULDOCCURIFBLOWDOWNWERESUDDENLYISOLATED.THISEVENTZSSIMILARTOATURBINETRIP.THEUFSARDEFINESLOSSESTO50%ATFULLPOWERTOBEWITHINNORMALPLANTDESIGN.SINCETHEDESIGNCRITERIALIMITSBLOWDOWNCAPACITYTO7%ATFULLPOWER;THEREFORE,THESUDDENBLOWDOWNZSOLATXONEVENTANALYSISZSNOTCONSIDERED.THISMODIFICATIONISNON-SEISMICSINCEITDOESNOTEFFECTTHESAFESHUTDOWNOFTHEREACTOR.THISMODIFICATIONDOESNOTINCREASETHEFIRELOADINGZNFIREAREASCONTAININGSAFESHUTDOWNEQUIPMENTORDEGRADEEXISTINGFIREPROTECTIONBECAUSEOFREQUIREMENTINSECTION27.0OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIA.ANALYSISNECESSARYTOASSURECONTINUALCOMPLIANCEWITHlOCFR50gAPPENDIXRHASBEENREQUIRED'HEREFORE,THEPROBABILITYANDCONSEQUENCESOFAFIREAFFECTINGCOLDSHUTDOWNOFTHEPLANTAREUNCHANGED.HIGHENERGYLINEPIPEBREAKSHAVEBEENCONSIDEREDBYREQUIRINGTHATALLEQUIPMENTNECESSARYFORSAFESHUTDOWNOFTHEPLANTWILLBEPROTECTEDCONSISTENTWITHREFERENCE2.2.4OFTHESAFETYANALYSIS.BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTHEREQUIREMENTSOFGINNASTATIONTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONS,ZTHASBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ZTHASALSOBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES~SYSTEMS~ANDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODIFICATION.EWR-4350MFWANDFWBYPASSVALVEINDICATIONTHISENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSESTHEMODIFICATIONTOINSTALLVALVEPOSITIONSENSORSFORTHEMAINFEEDWATERANDFEEDWATERBYPASSVALVES(V4269gV4270gV4271gANDV4272)ANDASSOCIATEDPOSITIONINDICATIONDISPLAYEDONTHEMAINCONTROLBOARD.THISEWRWASISSUEDASARESULTOFHUMANENGINEERINGDIS-CREPANCYHED-65WHICHCITEDANEEDFORACTUALVALVEPOSITIONINDICATIONONTHEMCBRATHERTHANTHECONTROLLERDEMANDSIGNALINDICATION.DUETOPREPORCCOMMENTSgREVISION0OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSXS,WERENOT.PRESENTEDTOPORC.THEPURPOSEOFREVISIONlOFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISZSTOINCLUDECOMMENTSASARESULTOFPRE-PORCOFREVISION0.38

AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORYGUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICA-TIONARE')MAJORANDMINORFIRES2)SEISMICEVENT3)INCREASEZNHEATREMOVALBYTHESECONDARYSYSTEM4)DECREASEINHEATREMOVALBYTHESECONDARYSYSTEMNEWWIRINGANDCABLEWILLBEREQUIREDFORTHISMODIFICATION,WHICHCOULDADDTOTHEFIRELOADINGOFTHEPLANT~THEREFOREgTHEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATALLSUCHCABLEMEETTHEIEEE383-1974FLAMETESTREQUIREMENTS.BECAUSEOFTHIS,THEREWILLBENOSIGNIFICANTINCREASEINFIRELOADINGCAUSEDBYTHISMODIFICATION.REVIEWSAND/ORANALYSESTOASSURECONTINUEDCOMPLIANCEWITHAPPENDIXRHAVEBEENREQUIRED.SAFESHUTDOWNCAPABILITYFOLLOWINGALLPOSTULATEDFIRES'HEREFORE'ILLNOTBEJEOPARDIZEDASARESULTOFTHISMODIFICATION.THEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATNEWINDICATORSINSTALLEDPERTHISMODIFICATIONBEMOUNTEDSOASNOTTODEGRADETHEINTEGRITYOFTHEMAINCONTROLBOARD(MCB).THEREFORE,THISMODIFICATIONWILLNOTAFFECTTHEMAINCONTROLBOARD'SSEISMICQUALIFICATION.THEADDITIONOFLDT'STOTHESTEMOFTHEMAINFEEDWATERANDFEEDWATERBYPASSVALVESWILLNOTDEGRADETHEVALVE'SABILITYTOPERFORMITSINTENDEDFUNCTION.SINCETHESEVALVESARENOTREQUIREDTOFUNCTIONDURINGASEISMICEVENT,THEABILITYTOFUNCTIONDURINGASEISMICEVENTHASNOTBEENDEGRADED.THEADDITIONOFMFWANDFWBYPASSVALVEINDICATIONWILLAIDTHEOPERATORINMONITORINGANYINCREASEORDECREASEZNHEATREMOVALBYTHESECONDARYSYSTEMANDSHALLNOTAFFECTTHEVALVESOPERATINGCHARACTERISTICS.ZTHASBEENDETERMINEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.THEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS'NDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDFORTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODIFICATION.39 i0 EWR-4503TECHNICALSUPPORTCENTERSUPPLEMENTALUNINTERRUPTABLEPOWESUPPLYTHISENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSESTHEINSTALLATIONOFASECONDUNINTERRUPTABLEPOWERSUPPLY(UPS)FORTHET.S.C.ELECTRICALDISTRIBUTIONSYSTEM.ALSOEXISTINGELECTRICALLOADSWILLBERE-DISTRIBUTEDINORDERTOACHIEVEEVENBUSLOADING.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGZNNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDES1.29AND1.70.EVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODZF1CA-TIONAREMAJORANDMINORFIRESANDASEISMICEVENT.MODIFICATIONSREQUIREDBYTHEDESIGNCRITERIAWILLNOTDEGRADEFUNCTIONSORPERFORMANCEOFANYSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS'RCOMPONENTSREQUIREDFORTHEPREVENTIONANDMITIGATIONOFACCIDENTSORANYOTHERNONSAFETYRELATEDSTRUCTURES~SYSTEMSgORCOMPONENTS.THISMODIFICATIONANDTHEMATERIALSUTILIZEDWILLMEETAPPENDIXR10CFR50CRITERIA.EVENTHOUGHTHISMODIFICATIONINVOLVESEQUIPMENTWHICHISNOTIDENTIFIEDASSAFESHUTDOWNEQUIPMENT.NEWEQUIPMENTWILLNOTBELOCATEDINANYAREATHATCONTAINSSAFETYRELATEDEQUIPMENTTHEREFORE,THISMODIFICATIONISDESIGNATEDNON-SEISMIC.MODIFICATIONWILLNOTDEGRADEPERFORMANCEORFUNCTIONOFANYPLANTEQUIPMENTORSYSTEM.BASEDUPONTHEABOVEANALYSIS:1)STRUCTURESgSYSTEMS~ANDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSAREADEQUATE.2)MARGINOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATINGANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHESTATIONARENOTREDUCED.BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTHEREQUIREMENTSOFGINNASTATIONTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONS,ITHASBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES~SYSTEMS'NDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHE.MITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODIFICATION.40

EWR-45544AAND4BFEEDWATERHEATERSREPLACEMENTTHISEWR(ENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST)ADDRESSESTHEREPLACEMENTOF4AAND4BHEATERS.THEPURPOSEOFTHISMODIFICATIONISTOSPECIFY~PROCUREgANDINSTALLNEWFEEDWATERHEATERSATTHEFOURTHEXTRACTIONPOINT.THEPRIMARYGOALISTOELIMINATETHECOPPERALLOYTUBES.STAINLESSSTEELTUBESARERECOMMENDED.REVISION1TOTHISDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISINCORPORATESCHANGESRESULTINGFROMPRE-PORCCOMMENTSOFREVISION0TO:1)CLARIFYTHEPERFORMANCEREQUIREMENTSOFTHE75PSITUBESIDEPRESSUREDROP2)ADDADDITIONALINTERFACEREQUIREMENTSINDESIGNCRITERIA3)CLARIFYREFERENCESANDTESTREQUIREMENTS4)ADDASMECODE5)ADDACCESSZBILITY~MAINTENANCEgREPAIRSANDINSERVICEINSPECTIONREQUIREMENTSINDESIGNCRITERIAAREVIEWHASBEENPERFORMEDOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDZNTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONAREADECREASEINFEEDWATERTEMPERATURE,ANDALOSSOFNORMALFEEDWATERFLOW.THEDECREASEZNFEEDWATERTEMPERATUREEVENTZSANALYZEDINTHEUFSARASANACCIDENTALOPENINGOFTHECONDENSATEBYPASSVALVEgWHICHRESULTEDINASUDDENREDUCTIONININLETFEEDWATERTEMPERATURETOTHESTEAMGENERATORS.THEMODIFICATIONHASNOBEARINGONCONDENSATEBYPASSVALVEOPERATIONORPLANTRESPONSETOTHISEVENT.AREDUCTIONINFEEDWATERTEMPERATUREWHICHRESULTEDFROMALOSSOFONEFEEDWATERHEATERHASBEENANALYZEDINUFSAR.THEANALYSZSSHOWEDTHATFORAFEEDWATERENTHALPYDECREASECORRESPONDINGTOTHELOSSOFONEFEEDWATERHEATERATFULLPOWERMZNZMUMDNBRDOESNOTFALLBELOWTHELIMITVALUE.ATZEROPOWERTHERESULTSARELESSLIMITINGTHANTHOSEPRESENTEDINUFSARSECTION15.4.1,UNCONTROLLEDRODCLUSTERCONTROLASSEMBLYWITHDRAWALFROMASUBCRITICALCONDITION.THELOSSOFNORMALFEEDWATERFLOWZSANALYZEDINTHEUFSARASADISRUPTIONOFSECONDARYSYSTEMHEATREMOVALCAPABILITY.41

THISMODIFICATIONWILLNOTINCREASETHE'ROBABILITYOFTHEDISRUPTIONASARESULTOFCONDENSATELINEBREAKSSINCETHEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESPROPERINSPECTIONANDTESTINGOFNEWWELDS.THEPROBABILITYOFALOSSOFFEEDWATERTHROUGHDEGRADATIONOFHEATERTUBESISREDUCEDBYREMOVINGTHEEXISTINGERODEDCOPPERTUBING.THISMODIFICATIONZSNON-SEISMICSINCEITDOESNOTEFFECTTHESAFESHUTDOWNOFTHEREACTOR.THISMODIFICATIONDOESNOTINCREASETHEFIRELOADINGINFIREAREASCONTAININGSAFESHUTDOWNEQUIPMENTORDEGRADEEXISTINGFIREPROTECTIONBECAUSEOFREQUIREMENTSINSECTION27.0OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIA.BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTHEREQUIREMENTSOFGINNASTATIONTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONS,ITHASBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES~SYSTEMS'NDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODIFICATION.EWR-4638GENERATOR1SURGECAPACITORSANDNEUTRALTRANSFORMERREPLACEMENTTHISENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSESTHEREPLACEMENTOFTHENEUTRALTRANSFORMERANDSURGECAPACITORSCONTAININGPCBs.THESECOMPONENTSWILLBEREPLACEDWITHSIMILARCOMPONENTSNOTCONTAININGPCBs.REVISION2TOTHISDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISINCORPORATESCHANGEFROMREVISION1TOSPECIFYINSTALLATIONTESTSTOBEPERFORMEDONTHECOMPONENTS.REVISION1DIDNOTSPECIFYTHETESTTOBEPERFORMED.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLTHEEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONFSAR'ANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONAREMAJORANDMINORFIRES'OXICGASRELEASES'NDLOSSOFELECTRICALLOAD.NONEWWIRINGORCABLEISREQUIREDFORTHISMODIFICATION.THEREFORE,THEREWILLBENOINCREASEOFFIRELOADINGDUETOTHISMODIFICATION.REVIEWSAND/ORANALYSESTOASSURECONTINUEDCOMPLIANCEWITHAPPENDIXRHAVEBEENREQUIRED'AFESHUTDOWNCAPABILITYFOLLOWINGALLPOSTULATEDFIRES'HEREFORE'ILLNOTBEJEOPARDIZEDASARESULTOFTHISMODIFICATION.THEREFORE,THEPOTENTIALFORALOSSOFELECTRICAL.LOADEVENT.CAUSEDBYCAPACITORFAILUREWILLNOTBEINCREASED.42

THEREFOREgTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.THE'ADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES,SYSTEMS/ANDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDFORTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTED.THEPROBABILITYOFOCCURRENCEORTHECONSEQUENCESOFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTIONOFEQUIPMENTIMPORTANTTOSAFETYPREVIOUSLYEVALUATEDINTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORTWILLNOTBEINCREASEDBYTHEPROPOSEDMODIFICATION.THEPOSSIBILITYOFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTIONOFADIFFERENTTYPETHANANYEVALUATEDPREVIOUSLYINTHESAFETYANALYSISWILLNOTBECREATEDBYTHEPROPOSEDMODIFICATION.THEMARGINOFSAFETYASDEFINEDXNTHEBASISFORANYTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONWILLNOTBEREDUCEDBYTHEPROPOSEDMODIFICA-TION.THEPROPOSEDMODIFICATIONDOESNOTINVOLVEANUNREVIEWEDSAFETYQUESTIONORREQUIREATECHNICALSPECIFICATIONCHANGE.EWR-4651COREEXITTHERMOCOUPLECABLESTHISEWR(ENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST)ADDRESSINGTHEMODIFICATIONOFTHECOREEXITTHERMOCOUPLECABLESTOPROVIDEFORALARAANDPERSONNELSAFETYCONCERNS.EWR4651~COREEXITTHERMOCOUPLE(CET)CABLESgREQUESTSTHEPURCHASEANDINSTALLATIONOFEXTENSIONCABLESATTHEBOUNDARYOFTHEREACTORHEADANDREACTORCAVITYBRIDGECABLETRAYSATGINNASTATIONFORTHE1988REFUELINGOUTAGE.QUICKCONNECTORSINSTALLEDONTHECETCABLESATTHISLOCATIONAREDETACHEDEACHYEARFORREFUELINGTOPERMITLIFTINGTHEREACTORHEADFROMTHEREFUELINGCAVITY.THECABLESINSTALLEDIN1983,WHICHRUNFROMTHEBRIDGECABLETRAYDOWNTOTHETHERMOCOUPLES,FALLAPPROXIMATELYSIXFEETSHORTOFTHEBRIDGECABLETRAY.ASARESULT,THECETQUICKCONNECTORSHANGSEVERALFEETBELOWTHEBRIDGECABLETRAYANDPOSEACCESSIBILITY,ALARA',ANDSAFETYCONCERNS.THEOBJECTIVEOFTHISEWRISTOPLACETHECETQUICKCONNECTORSFORREFUELINGINTOTHEBRIDGECABLETRAYWHERETHEYCANBEACCESSEDCONVENIENTLYANDSAFELY.REVISION2TOTHISDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISINCOR-PORATESCHANGESFROMREVISION1TOCORRECTTHEPOSTINSTALL-ATIONTESTINGREQUIREMENTSFORSYSTEMVERXFICATXON.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.G-UIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONARE(1)MAJORANDMINORFIRES~(2)ASEISMICEVENT~(3)ALOSSOFCOOLANTACCIDENT.(LOCA)~43

NEWCETEXTENSIONCABLEASSEMBLIESWILLBEREQUIREDFORTHISMODIFICATIONWHICHCOULDADDTOTHEFIRELOADINGOFTHEPLANT.THEREFORE'HEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATALLSUCHCABLEASSEMBLIESMEETTHEIEEE-383-1974FLAMETESTREQUIREMENTS.BECAUSEOFTHISTHEREWILLBENOSIGNIFICANTINCREASEOFFIRELOADINGCAUSEDBYTHISMODIFICATION.THISMODIFICATIONHASBEENREVIEWEDTOENSURETHATFAILUREOFANYELECTRICALCABLEINSTALLEDASAPARTOFTHZSMODIFICATIONWILLNOTRESULTZNTHEDISABLINGOFVITALEQUIPMENTNEEDEDTOSAFELYSHUTDOWNTHEPLANTDURINGPOSTULATEDFIRES.THEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATNEWCETEXTENSIONCABLEASSEMBLIESINSTALLEDUNDERTHISMODIFICATIONBEQUALIFIEDPERZEEE3441975'HEREFORE'HISMODIFICATIONWILLREMAINFUNCTIONALDURINGANDAFTERASEISMICEVENT.THEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATTHENEWCETEXTENSIONCABLEASSEMBLIESINSTALLEDUNDERTHISEWRBEQUALIFIEDPERIEEE3231974ANDIEEE3831974FORFLAMEANDLOCALTHEREFORE'HISMODIFICATIONSHALLREMAINFUNCTIONALDURINGANDAFTERALOSSOFCOOLANTACCIDENT.THEREFORE,THEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.THEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES,SYSTEMS'NDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDFORTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTED.EWR-4653STEAMGENERATORWIDERANGELEVELINDICATION'THISENGINEERINGWORKREQUESTADDRESSESTHEADDITIONOFSTEAMGENERATORWIDERANGELEVELINDICATIONONTHEMAINCONTROLBOARD.THISMODIFICATIONWILLINSTALLTWONEWVERTICALSCALEINDICATORSTODISPLAYSTEAMGENERATORWIDERANGEWATERLEVELONTHEMCB.THEEXISTINGCHARTRECORDERLR-460WILLBERETAINEDFORRECORDKEEPINGANDTOSERVEASABACKUPLEVELINDICATOR.THISMODIFICATIONWILLNOTALTERTHEAVAILABILITYOFTHEEXISTINGCHARTRECORDERS.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDZNTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONARE(1)MAJORANDMINORFIRESAND(2)ASEISMICEVENT.NEWWIRINGANDCABLEMAYBEREQUIREDFORTHEMODIFICATIONWHICHCOULDADDTOTHEFIRELOADINGOFTHEPLANT,THEREFORETHEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATALLSUCHCABLEMEETTHEIEEE-383-1974FLAMETESTREQUIREMENTS.BECAUSEOFTHIS,THEREWILLBENOSIGNIFICANTINCREASE.OFFIRELOADINGCAUSEDBYTHISMODIFICATION.44

ANAPPENDIXRCONFORMANCEREVIEWSHALLBEPREPAREDTODEMONSTRATETHATCONTINUEDCOMPLIANCEWITH10CFR50APPENDIXRREQUIREMENTSISMAINTAINED.THISMODIFICATIONHASBEENREVIEWEDTOENSURETHATFAILUREOFANYELECTRICALCABLEINSTALLEDASPARTOFTHISMODIFICATIONWILLNOTRESULTINTHEDISABLINGOFVITALEQUIPMENTNEEDEDTOSAFELYSHUTDOWNTHEPLANTDURINGPOSTULATEDFIRES.THESTEAMGENERATOR(SG)WIDERANGEWATERLEVELINSTRUMENT-ATIONZSDESIGNATEDSEISMICCATEGORY1.THEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESALLNEWSGWIDERANGELEVELINSTRUMENTATIONBEQUALIFIEDANDINSTALLEDPER'ZEEE-344-1975.THEREFORE,ASEISMICEVENTWILLNOTIMPAIRTHEPROPEROPERATIONOFTHESGWIDERANGEWATERLEVELINSTRUMENTATZON.THEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESAHUMANFACTORSREVIEWOFTHISMODIFICATIONBEPERFORMEDPRIORTOISSUANCEOFDESIGNOUTPUTS,TOMINIMIZETHEPROBABILITYOFOPERATORERROR.THEITEMSABOVEENSURETHISMODIFICATIONDOESNOTDEGRADETHECAPABILITYOFANYSAFETYSYSTEMTOPERFORMITSFUNCTION.THEASSUMPTIONSANDCONCLUSIONSOFEXISTINGANALYSESAREUNCHANGED.NONEWTYPESOFEVENTSAREPOSTULATED.THEACCURACYANDREADABILITYOFTHENEWINDICATORSAREASGOODORBETTERTHANTHEEXISTINGRECORDER.THEREFORE,THEINDICATIONUNCERTAINTYZSASGOODORBETTERTHANTHEEXISTINGSYSTEM.THEREFORE,THEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.THEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES,SYSTEMS'NDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOF.ACCIDENTSANDFORTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTED.INACCORDANCEWITHTHEPROVISIONSOF10CFR50.59,THISMODIFICATIONDOESNOTINVOLVEANUNREVZEWEDSAFETYQUESTIONBECAUSE:1)THEPROBABILITYOFOCCURRENCEORTHECONSEQUENCESOFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTIONOFEQUIPMENTIMPORTANTTOSAFETYPREVIOUSLYEVALUATEDZNTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORTZSNOTINCREASED.THEINDICATORSADDEDTOTHEMCBDONOTPROVIDEANYAUTOMATICCONTROLFUNCTION.THEYAREREDUNDANTTOTHEEXISTINGCHARTRECORDERS'UTPROVIDEAMOREREADABLEINDICATIONTOTHEOPERATOR.THESEINDICATORSARESEISMICCLASS1EANDWILLNOTINCREASETHEPROBABILITYOFFAILUREOFTHEMCBORADJACENTINDICATORSDUETOASEISMICEVENT.ANAPPENDIXRCONFORMANCEREVIEWWILLDEMONSTRATECONTINUEDCOMPLIANCEWITHAPPENDIXRREQUIREMENTS.45

2)THEPOSSIBILITYFORANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTIONOFADIFFERENTTYPETHANANYEVALUATEDPREVIOUSLYINTHESAFETYANALYSISISNOTCREATED.ASDISCUSSEDABOVEgTHESEINDICATORSAREINADDITIONTOTHEEXISTINGCHARTRECORDERSANDARECLASSIFIEDlE.THISADDITIONTOTHEMCBWILLNOTCREATETHEPOSSIBILITYOFAFAILURENOTPREVIOUSLYANALYZED.3)THEMARGINOFSAFETYASDEFINEDZNTHEBASISFORANYTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONISNOTREDUCED.THEADDEDINDICATORSPROVIDEAMORECLEARINDICATIONANDINCREASETHEABILITYOFTHEOPERATORTOMONITORWIDERANGELEVEL.THEMARGINOFSAFETYZSNOTAFFECTEDBY.THISMODIFICATION.EWR-4656LOWERINTERNALSSTORAGESTANDMODIFI'CATIONSPHASEIITHISEWR(ENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST)ADDRESSESTHEMODIFICATIONSTOTHEREACTORVESSELLOWERINTERNALSSTORAGESTAND.THISMODIFICATIONINVOLVESANADDITIONALMODIFICATIONTOTHELOWERINTERNALSSTORAGESTANDSUBSEQUENTTOTHECHANGESDESCRIBEDINTHEORIGINALSAFETYANALYSIS.A.THISMODIFICATIONMOVESTHEEASTERNSUPPORTCOLUMN1/2INCHOUTWARD(AWAYFORMTHECENTEROFTHESUPPORTSTAND)INORDERTOPROVIDEMORECLEARANCEFORTHELOWERINTERNALS.THISISACCOMPLISHEDBYADDINGONEADDITIONALHALF-INCHTHICKSPACERPLATEONTHEEASTSIDEOFTHENORTHANDSOUTHSUPPORTCOLUMNS.THESPACERPLATESWILLBEBETWEENTHESUPPORTCOLUMNSANDTHEUPPERANDLOWERCONNECTIONSUPPORTRINGS.THISANALYSISREVIEWSUNDERWHATPLANTOPERATINGCONDITIONTHELOWERINTERNALSSTORAGEHARDWAREWILLBEINUSE'NDDETER-MINESWHATDESIGNBASISEVENTSARERELATEDTOTHEUSEOFTHEMODIFIEDHARDWARE.THEFOLLOWINGDESIGNBASISEVENTSARERELATEDTOTHEPROPOSEDMODIFICATION:SEISMICEVENTSANDFIRES.THELOWERINTERNALSSTORAGESTANDMAYBELEFTINPOSITIONONTHELOWERLEVELOFTHEREACTORCAVITY.THELOCATIONOFTHELOWERINTERNALSSTORAGESTANDISNOTADZACENTTOANYSAFETYRELATEDSYSTEMORCOMPONENT.THELOWERINTERNALSSTORAGESTAND'SLOWCENTEROFGRAVITY,WIDEBASECOMBINEDWITHTHECOEFFICIENTOFFRICTIONARESUFFICIENTTOENSURETHATTHESTANDWILLREMAININPLACEDURINGBOTHTHEOPERATINGBASISANDSAFESHUTDOWNEARTHQUAKES.46

THEMATERIALSTOBEUSEDZNTHISPROPOSEDMODIFICATIONZSSTAINLESSSTEELWHICHZSNON-COMBUSTIBLESITWILLNOTCHANGETHEFREQUENCYORRESULTSOFANYFIRETHATZSPOSTULATED.BASEDONTHEFOREGOING,THEMODIFICATIONSWILLCAUSENOCHANGESTOTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHE.LIFEOFTHESTATION.THEMODIFICATIONSWILLNOTCHANGETHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES,SYSTEMS,ORCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTS.THEPROBABILITYOFOCCURRENCEORTHECONSEQUENCESOFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTIONOFSAFETY-RELATEDEQUIPMENTPREVIOUSLYEVALUATEDZN'HESAFETYANALYSISREPORTARENOTCHANGED.THEPOSSIBILITYOFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTIONOFADIFFERENTTYPETHANANYEVALUATEDPREVIOUSLYZNTHESAFETYANALYSISHASNOTBEENCREATED.THEPROPOSEDMODIFICATIONDOESNOTINVOLVEACHANGETOTHETECHNICALSPECIFICATIONSANDISNOTANUNREVIEWEDSAFETYQUESTION.EWR-4670M-483ZNVERTERREPLACEMENTTHISENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSESTHEREPLACEMENTOFTHEEXISTINGMQ-483INVERTERWITHANEWQUALIFIEDONE.REVISION2OFTHEDESIGNCRXTERIASTATESTHESOLIDSTATECONTROLS,INC.(SCX)INVERTERISPARTNO.EV12004/5ASOPPOSEDTOPART12004ASWELLASQUALIFYINGIEEE383-1974ASTHESTANDARDUSEDFORBOTHTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSIS'REVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNAFSARANDEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYTHEUSNRCREGULATORYGUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONARE:'1)2)3)4)SEISMICEVENTMAJORANDMINORFIRESINCREASE/DECREASEZNHEATREMOVALBYTHESECONDARYSYSTEMPIPEBREAKSINSIDECONTAINMENTSECTION3.0AND9.0OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRETHATTHENEWMQ-483ZNVERTERBESEISMICALLYQUALIFIEDTOGINNASPECIFICSEISMICRESPONSESPECTRA.ZNADDITION,ZTISREQUIREDTHATTHEINVERTERBE.MOUNTEDTOPREVENTSEISMICFAILURE.47

THISMODIFICATIONINVOLVESTHEREPLACEMENTOFEQUIPMENTANDMAYINVOLVETHEINSTALLATIONOFCABLEINTHERELAYROOMFIREAREA.ZFNEWCABLEZSTOBEINSTALLED'REVIEWWILLBEPERFORMEDTOASSURECONTINUEDCOMPLIANCEWITH10CFR50,APPENDIXR.WIRINGANDEQUIPMENTWILLBEINSTALLEDINCOMPLIANCEWITHEE-29.ALLNEWCABLING,IFREQUIRED,WILLBEQUALIFIEDTOIEEE383-1984FLAMETESTREQUIREMENTS'IREBARRIERPENETRATZONSWILLBEREPAIREDANDREPLACEDINACCORDANCEWITHEXISTINGPLANTPROCEDURES'OTDEGRADINGEXISTINGSEALS.THISMODIFICATIONDOESNOTAFFECTTHESAFESHUTDOWNANALYSISINTHEAPPENDIXRSUBMITTALFORTHEFOLLOWINGREASONS:A)THEMODIFICATIONINVOLVESEQUIPMENTWHICHISNOTIDENTIFIEDASSAFESHUTDOWNEQUIPMENTINTABLE3-1OFTHEAPPENDIXRSUBMITTAL.B)THEREISNOEFFECTONSEPARATIONOFEXISTINGCIRCUITS/ASSOCIATEDCIRCUITS,ORFIREAREABOUNDARIESASANALYZEDINTHEAPPENDIXRSUBMITTAL.THISMODIFICATIONWILLNOTEFFECTTHECAPABILITIESOFTHEALTERNATIVESHUTDOWNSYSTEM.THERESHALLBENOEFFECTONEXISTINGPROCEDURESFOROBTAININGANALTERNATESAFESHUTDOWN~THEREBYCOMPLYINGWITH10CFR50APPENDIXR.INSTRUMENTLOOPP479MONITORSSTEAMGENERATORPRESSURE.THISMODIFICATIONDOESNOTMODIFYTHEINSTRUMENTLOOP.SINCETHEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATTHEREPLACEMENTINVERTERADDSNONEWFAILUREMODESBEYONDTHOSEOFTHEEXISTINGINVERTER,THEINTEGRITYOFLOOPP479WILLBEUNAFFECTEDBYTHISMODIFICATION.THEREFORE,NONEWINSTRUMENTERRORSORFAILURESWILLBEINTRODUCEDTHATCOULDLEADTOANINCREASEORDECREASEZNSECONDARYSYSTEMHEATREMOVAL.INSTRUMENTLOOPP950MONITORSCONTAINMENTPRESSURE.THISMODIFICATIONDOESNOTMODIFYTHEINSTRUMENTLOOP.SINCETHEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATTHEREPLACEMENTINVERTERADDSNONEWFAILUREMODESBEYONDTHOSEOFTHEEXISTINGINVERTERgTHEINTEGRITYOFLOOPP950WILLBEUNAFFECTEDBYTHISMODIFICATION.THEREFORE,NONEWINSTRUMENTERRORSORFAILURESWILLBEINTRODUCEDTHATCOULD'.LEADTOAFALSEINDICATIONOFCONTAINMENTPRESSUREDURINGAPIPEBREAK.THISMODIFICATIONDOESNOTDEGRADETHECAPABILITYOFANYSAFETYSYSTEMTOPERFORMITSFUNCTION.THEASSUMPTIONSANDCONCLUSIONSOFEXISTINGANALYSESAREUNCHANGED.NONEWTYPESOFEVENTSAREPOSTULATED.48 0

BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTHEREQUIREMENTSOFGZNNASTATIONTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONS'THASBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHESTATIONHAVENOTBEENAFFECTED.ZTHASALSOBEENDETERMINEDTHATTHE'DEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES~SYSTEMSJANDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTED.EWR-4750CONTAINMENTFANS1B1DDAMPERSOLENOIDISOLATIONFUSESTHISENGXNEERINGWORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSESTHEADDITIONOFISOLATIONFUSESTOTHELOOPENTRYDAMPERSOLENOIDVALVECIRCUITSFORCONTAINMENTRECIRCULATIONFANS1BAND1D.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDZNTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.70.EVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONAREASFOLLOWS:1)2)3)4)SEISMICEVENTMAJORANDMINORFIRESPIPEBREAKSINSIDEANDOUTSIDECONTAINMENTBREAKINRCSPRESSUREBOUNDARYLINESTHATPENETRATECONTAINMENTTHENEWFUSEBLOCKSWILLBESEISMICALLYMOUNTEDANDTHEREFOREWILLENSUREASEISMICEVENTWILLNOTDEGRADETHEINTEGRITYOFBUS16UNIT13CORBUS14UNIT2CENCLOSURESZNWHICHTHEFUSESAREMOUNTED.THEMODIFICATIONZSDESIGNEDTOCOMPLYWITH10CFRAPPENDIXRCRITERIAANDENGINEERINGPROCEDURES.THEREFORE,THEPROBABILITYOFAMAJORORMINORFIREWILLNOTBEINCREASED.THEFOLLOWINGDESIGNBASISEVENTS(DBE)WILLNOTAFFECTORBEAFFECTEDBYTHISMODIFICATION.ANYDBETHATCAUSESALEAD-TO-LEADSHORTINTHEDAMPERSOLENOIDVALVECIRCUITWILLCAUSETHEDAMPER'SOLENOIDVALVECIRCUITFUSESTOFAIL.FUSECOORDINATIONASSURESTHATTHESEFUSESWILLFAILBEFORESHEMAINFANCONTROLFUSES.THEREFORE,LOSSOFFANS1BAND1DgDURINGANYDBEDUETOALEAD-TO-LEADSHORTINTHEDAMPERSOLENOIDVALVECIRCUIT,WILLNOTOCCUR.BASEDUPONTHEABOVEANALYSIS:1)STRUCTURES~SYSTEMSgANDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSAREADEQUATE.2)MARGINOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATINGANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHESTATIONARENOTREDUCED.49

BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTHEREQUIREMENTSOFGZNNASTATIONTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONS,ITHASBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES@SYSTEMS'NDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODIFICATION.EWR-4754CABLERELOCATIONSTHISEWR(ENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST)ADDRESSESTHEUPGRADINGOFSEVERALCIRCUITSPLICESINTHEINTERMEDIATEBUILDINGANDRELOCATIONOFCABLESABOVETHECONTAINMENTFLOODLEVEL.REVISION42ADDSAFIREPROTECTIONREQUIREMENT.CABLESANDSPLICESSHALLMEETTHEREQUIREMENTSOFZEEE383-1974.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDZN,THEGINNAFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYTHEUSNRCREGULATORYGUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONARE:1)SEISMICEVENT2)MAJORANDMINORFIRES3)PIPEBREAKS,INSIDEANDOUTSIDECONTAINMENTTHEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATANYNEWORRELOCATECONDUITBEMOUNTEDTOPREVENTSEISMICFAILURE.THEREFORE,INSTALLEDCABLESHALLREMAINFUNCTIONALAFTERASEISMICEVENT.THISMODIFICATIONINVOLVESTHEADDITIONOFNEWCABLEANDSPLICESINCONTAINMENTANDZNTHEINTERMEDIATEBUILDING.THEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATALL,NEWCABLEANDSPLICESBEQUALIFIEDTOIEEE-383-1974FLAMEANDLOCAREQUIREMENTS.FIREBARRIERPENETRATIONSWILLBEREPAIREDANDREPLACEDZNACCORDANCEWITHEXISTINGPLANTPROCEDURES.THEREFORE,EXISTINGSEALSWILLNOTBEDEGRADED.THISMODIFICATIONDOESNOTAFFECTTHESAFESHUTDOWNANALYSISINTHEAPPENDIXRSUBMITTALSINCETHEREISNOAFFECTONSEPARATIONOFEXISTINGCIRCUITS/ASSOCIATEDCIRCUITS'RFIREAREABOUNDARIESASANALYZEDINTHEAPPENDIXRSUBMITTAL.THEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATANAPPENDIXRCONFORMANCEVERIFICATIONBEPERFORMED.THISMODIFICATIONWILLNOTAFFECTTHECAPABILITIESOFTHEALTERNATIVESHUTDOWNSYSTEM.'URTHERMORE,NONEOFTHEEXISTINGPROCEDURESFOROBTAININGANALTERNATIVESAFE,SHUTDOWNWILLBEEFFECTEDTHISMODIFICATIONSTHEREFORE/COMPLIESWITH10CFR50gAPPENDIXR50

THEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATNEWCABLEANDSPLICES,INSTALLEDASPARTOFTHECABLERELOCATIONS,SHALLNOTAFFECTINSTRUMENTLOOPINTEGRITY'HEREFORE,NONEWFAILUREMODESSHALLBEINTRODUCEDINTOTHEINSTRUMENTLOOPS.THEDESIGNCRITERIACOLLECTIVELYREQUIRESALLCABLESTOBERELOCATED'OUTILIZEMATERIALANDCONFIGURATIONSAPPROVEDUNDERlOCFR50.49'NDCALIBRATIONOFEACHLOOP'OENSURETHATLOOPFUNCTIONZSNOTAFFECTED'HATLOOPACCURACYBEADDRESSED,ANDVERIFIEDASACCEPTABLE,INTHESYSTEMZN>>TEGRATEDPACKAGES.THEREFORE,LOOPACCURACYSHALLNOTBEDEGRADEDBYTHISMODIFICATION.ALLMATERIALANDCONFIGURATIONSUTILIZEDUNDERTHISMODIFICA-TIONSHALLBEAPPROVEDUNDER10CFR50.49.THEREFORE,PIPEBREAKSINSIDEOROUTSIDECONTAINMENT~THATCREATEALOCA,HELBgSLB~ETC'HALLNOTDEGRADETHEINTEGRITYOFSPLICESORCABLESUSEDINTHISMODIFICATION.THEABOVEITEMSENSURETHATTHISMODIFICATIONDOESNOTDEGRADETHECAPABILITYOFANYSAFETYSYSTEMTOPERFORMITSFUNCTION.THEASSUMPTIONSANDCONCLUSIONSOFEXISTINGANALYSISAREUNCHANGED.NONEWTYPESOFEVENTSAREPOSTU-LATED.BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSAR,THESTRUCTURALREANALYSISPLAN(SRP)ANDTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONS,ITHASBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS'NDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODIFICATION.EWR-4761HIGHHEADRECIRCULATIONEVALUATIONTHISENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSESTHEINTERCHANGINGOFTHEPOWERANDCONTROLPOWERWIRINGOFMOVs857AAND857B.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYNRCREGULATORYGUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATINGTOTHISMODIFICATIONAREFZREgSEISMIC'OCALANDLOSSOFPOWEREVENTS'HEFIRSTEVENTANALYZEDZSTHEEFFECTOFASEISMICEVENT.THEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHEMODIFICATIONTOBESEISMICCATEGORY1THEREFORE'HEMODIFICATIONWILLNOTADVERSELYAFFECTTHESYSTEMDURINGASEISMICEVENT.THESECONDEVENTANALYZEDZSTHEEFFECTOFAFIREZNTHEPLANTDUETOTHISMODIFICATION..THECONTROLWIRINGUSEDFORMODIFICATIONIS,REQUIREDTOMEETTHEREQUIREMENTSOFIEEESTD'83-1974FLAMETEST.THUSTHEREISNOSIGNIFICANTINCREASEINTHEFIRELOADINGDUETOTHISMODIFICATION.51.

THEDESIGNCRITERIAPROVIDESREQUIREMENTSTOPRESERVEANYSILZCONEFOAMFIRESTOPORSEALTHATMAYNEEDTOBEPENETRATED.THEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUXRESANAPPENDIXRREVIEW.THEREFORE,THISMODIFICATIONWILLNOTAFFECTEXISTINGCOMPLIANCEMETHODS.THETHIRDEVENTANALYZEDISTHEEFFECTOFALOCA.DURINGTHESUMPRECIRCULATIONPHASEFOLLOWINGALOCA,IFHIGHHEADRECIRCULATIONISNECESSARY(INCURRENTPROCEDURESWHENRHRTOTALISLESSTHAN400GPM)gTHE857AgBgCVALVESMUSTBEOPENED.PRESENTPROCEDUREES-1.3CALLSFORSTARTINGRHRPUMPSALIGNEDTOTHESUMPANDDISCHARGINGTOTHEREACTORTHROUGHTHEMOV852AgBVALVESPRIORTOOPENING857A,B,CIFHIGHHEADRECIRCULATIONISREQUIRED.SINGLEFAILURECRITERIAREQUIRESTHETIMINGOFTHEACTIVEFAILURETOOCCURATTHEBEGINNINGOFTHEHIGHHEADRECIRCULATIONPHASE.,AFAILUREOFD/G1APRIOROPENINGTHE857VALVESWOULDRESULTINBOTHTRAINSLEADINGTOTHESAFETYINJECTION/CONTAINMENTSPRAYPUMPSBEINGBLOCKEDANDPOTENTIALLOSSOFCORECOOLING.THISISTHEPROBLEMWHICHWILLBECORRECTEDTHRUTHISMODIFICATION.THEFOURTHEVENTANALYZEDZSTHEEFFECTOFALOSSOFPOWERONTHEOPERATIONSOFTHEVALVES.ASSTATEDINTHEPREVIOUSPARAGRAPHAFAILUREOFD/GlAPRIORTOOPENINGTHE857VALVESWOULDRESULTINBOTHTRAINSLEADINGTOTHESAFETYINJECTION/CONTAINMENTSPRAYPUMPSBEINGBLOCKEDANDPOTENTIALLOSSOFCORECOOLING.THISWILLBECORRECTEDBY'HISMODIFICATION.THEREFOREBASEDUPONTHEABOVEANALYSIS,ZTHASBEENDETERMINEDTHAT:A)THEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHESTATIONARENOTREDUCEDANDB)THESTRUCTURESgSYSTEMSgANDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSAREADEQUATE.THEPROBABILITYOFOCCURRENCEANDTHECONSEQUENCESOFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTIONOFEQUIPMENTIMPORTANTTOSAFETYPREVIOUSLYEVALUATEDZNTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORTARENOTINCREASED.THEPOSSIBILITYOFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTIONOFATYPEDIFFERENTFROMANYPREVIOUSLYEVALUATEDINTHESAFETYANALYSISHASNOTBEENCREATED.THEMARGINSOFSAFETYASDEFINEDINTHEBASISFORANYTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONZSNOTREDUCED.52

EWR-4769SAFEGUARDSRACKSIRELAYSTHISEWR(ENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST)ADDRESSESTHEREMOVALOFUNUSEDRELAYSFROMTHESAFEGUARDSRACKS.ALLBFDRELAYS,USEDFORSAFEGUARDSINITIATIONLOCATEDINTHERELAYROOMSAFEGUARDSRACKS'REBEINGREPLACEDZNACCORDANCEWITHMAINTENANCE~PROCEDUREM59IXTEENOFTHESERELAYSAREUNUSEDANDREPRESENTANUNNECESSARYEXPOSURETOFAILUREFORTHESAFEGUARDSSYSTEMS.THEEIGHTUNUSEDRELAYCOILSINEACHTRAINARECONTROLLEDBYTHESAMEFUSESCONTROLLINGALLTHEOTHEROPERATINGSAFEGUARDSSYSTEMS.THEREFORE,ACOILFAILUREINANYOFTHESEUNITSCOULDKEEPTHESAFETYINJECTIONSEQUENCEFROMBEINGINITIATED.THERELAYSBEINGREMOVEDSERVENOFUNCTIONALPURPOSE.ONEOFTHETWOCOILLEADSFOR6OFTHESERELAYSWEREDISCONNECTEDASPARTOFEWR2950.THEREMAINING10RELAYSHAVEALLUNUSEDCONTACTS.COILWIRINGISACCOMPLISHEDBYUSEOFJUMPERCONNECTIONSFROMCOILTOCOIL.SOMEOFTHESEWIRESCANBEREMOVEDWHILEPORTIONSOFOTHERSWILLBENEEDEDTOMAKEUPREMAININGCONNECTIONS.AREVXEW..HASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDZNTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORYGUIDE1.70.THEEVENTRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONISFIRE.NEWWIRINGWILLBEREQUXREDFORTHISMODIFICATIONWHICHCOULDADDTOTHEFIRELOADINGOFTHEPLANT,ANDBECAUSEOFTHISPOTENTIALSTHEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESALLSUCHWIREMEETTHEZEEE-383-1974FLAMETESTREQUIREMENTS.THEREFORE,THISMODIFICATIONWILLCAUSENOSIGNIFICANTINCREASEZNFIREPROPAGATIONHAZARD.ASARESULT,THEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTWILLBEUNCHANGED.THEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES,SYSTEMS,ANDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDFORTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTED.THEPROBABILITYOFOCCURRENCEORTHECONSEQUENCEOFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTIONOFEQUIPMENTIMPORTANTTOSAFETY'REVIOUSLYEVALUATEDZNTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORTWILLBEUNCHANGEDBYTHEPROPOSEDMODIFICATION.INFACT,BECAUSEEQUIPMENTCONNECTEDTOSAFETYINJECTIONCIRCUITS(ALTHOUGHITSERVESNOFUNCTIONALPURPOSE)ISBEINGREMOVED,THEPROBABILITYOFMALFUNCTIONINGOFTHESZCIRCUITRYZSREDUCED.THEREFORE,THEPOSSIBILITYOFANACCIDENTORAMALFUNCTIONOFADIFFERENTTYPETHANANYEVALUATEDPREVIOUSLYINTHESAFETYANALYSISWILLNOTBECREATEDBYTHEPROPOSEDMODIFICATION.THISMODIFICATIONISBEINGPERFORMEDTOREMOVEEXCESSRELAYSFROMTHERELAYRACKSTHUSREMOVINGFROMTHECIRCUITSAPIECEOFEQUIPMENTTHATCOULDMALFUNCTION.53

THEMARGINOFSAFETYASDEFINEDINTHEBASISFORANYTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONWILLNOTBEREDUCEDBYTHEPROPOSEDMODIFICATION.~EWR-478TDAFPSTEAMADMISSIONVALVESTHISEWR(ENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST)ADDRESSESTHEMODIFICATIONWHICHREWXRESTHECONTROLCIRCUITTOSEALZNAROUNDTHECONTROLSWITCHSOTHATWHENTHECIRCUITISENERGIZETOOPENTHEVALVEWILLCONTINUETOOPENTOTHEFULLYOPENPOSITION.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORYGUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION(1)FIRESAND(2)SEISMICEVENTS'ND(3)LOSSOFAUXILIARYFEEDWATER.THEMODIFICATIONDOESNOTINCREASETHEPOSSIBILITYORIMPACTONTHELEVELOFFIREPROTECTIONANDALTERNATESHUTDOWNCAPABILITIES,NORTHEFIREPROTECTIONANDALTERNATESHUTDOWNLICENSECONDITIONSANDTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONS.ADDITIONALWIRINGANDCABLEWILLBEADDEDINTHISMODIFICATION,WHICHCOULDADDTOTHEFXRELOADXNGOFTHEPLANT~THEREFORE'HEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATALLSUCHWIRINGANDCABLEMEETTHEXEEE383-1974FLAMETESTREQUIREMENTS.CONSEQUENTLY,THEREWILLBENOSIGNIFICANTINCREASEOFFIRELOADINGCAUSEDBYTHISMODIFICATION.THEMODIFICATIONDOESNOTINCREASETHEIMPACTOFASEISMICEVENT.THEDESIGNOFTHEMODIFICATIONSHALLBESEISMICCATEGORY1INACCORDANCEWITHTHEDESIGNCRITERIA..THEMODIFICATIONDOESNOTINCREASETHEIMPACTOFLOSSOFAUXILIARYFEEDWATER.THEDESIGNOFTHEMODIFICATIONDOESNOTALTERTHEMANUALORAUTOMATICOPERATINGCHARACTERISTICSOFTHEAUXILIARYFEEDWATERSYSTEM.REQUIRINGTHEVALVETOGOFULLOPENONCETHECIRCUITXSENERGIZEDVS.HAVINGZTSTOPWHENTHESWITCHISRELEASEDMAKESMANUALANDAUTOMATICACTUATIONSIMILAR.THISDOESNOTADVERSELYIMPACTTHESYSTEM.THEPROBABILITYOFOCCURRENCEORTHECONSEQUENCESOFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTIONOFEQUIPMENTIMPORTANTTOSAFETY,PREVIOUSLYEVALUATEDINTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORTWILLNOTBEINCREASEDBYTHEPROPOSEDMODIFICATION.THEPOSSIBILITYOFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTIONOFADIFFERENTTYPETHANANYEVALUATEDPREVIOUSLYXNTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORTWILLNOTBECREATEDBYTHISPROPOSEDMODIFICATION.THEMARGIN,OF'SAFETYASDEFINEDZNTHEBASISFORANYTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONWILLNOTBEREDUCEDBYTHEPROPOSEDMODIFICATION.54 t>>

THEPROPOSEDMODIFICATIONDOESNOTINVOLVEANUNREVIEWEDSAFETYQUESTIONORREQUIREATECHNICALSPECIFICATIONCHANGE.EWR-4794SECURITYGATEREPLACEMENTTHISENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSESTHEREPLACEMENTOFFIVE(5)EXISTINGSECURITYGATEOPERATORSANDTHEOUTERCANTILEVERVEHICLEGATEATTHESHIPPINGANDRECEIVINGBUILDINGWITHANOVERHEADSLIDEGATE.SUPPORTSWILLALSOBEADDEDTOEXISTINGGATESTOREDUCEVIBRATIONS.THEPURPOSEOFTHISMODIFICATIONISTOIMPROVESECURITYGATERELIABILITYANDMAINTAINABILITY.EXCESSIVEVIBRATIONINTHESECURITYGATESHASCONTINUALLYBEENTHESOURCEOFPROBLEMSFORTHESECURITYINTRUSIONDETECTORS.DURINGHIGHWINDSTHEEXCESSSECURITYGATEVIBRATIONSTRIPTHESECURITYE-FIELD.THISRESULTSINTHENECESSITYFORSECURITYPERSONNELTOPATROLTHEAREA.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYNRCREGULATORYGUIDE1.70.THEONLYEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONAREINTERNALANDEXTERNALEVENTS,SPECIFICALLYNATURALEVENTSANDLOSSOFAC.FIREALLCABLEANDWIREORDEREDFORTHISMODIFICATIONSHALLMEETTHEREQUIREMENTSOFZEEE383-1974FLAMETEST,THUSMITIGATINGANYPOTENTIALFORPROPAGATINGAFIRE.EARTHQUAKEDURINGASEISMICEVENT,THESECURITYGATEMODIFICATIONWILLHAVENOSAFETYFUNCTION,ANDNEEDNOTREMAINFUNCTIONAL.LOSSOFACTHISMODIFICATIONSHALLBEREVIEWEDSOASTOENSURETHEISOLATIONOFCLASS1EANDNON-CLASSlESYSTEMS.THESECURITYGATESYSTEMSOURCEOFPOWERISFROMANON-SAFEGUARDSBUS,WITHASTANDBYPOWERSOURCEDEDICATEDTOTHESECURITYSYSTEM.THEREFORE,THECLASSlEELECTRICALSYSTEMZSNOTEFFECTEDBYTHISMODIFICATION.BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSAR"ANDTHESTRUCTURALRE-ANALYSISPLAN(SRP),ZTHASBgENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURESgSYSTEMSJANDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODIFICATION.55

'U EWR-4798SOLENOIDUPGRADETHISENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSESTHEINSTALLATIONOFBLOCKINGDIODESONSELECTEDSOLENOIDVALVECOILSTOPROVIDEPROTECTIONAGAINSTVOLTAGETRANSIENTSDUETOANINDUCTIVEKICKBACK.THEDIODESAREARETROFIT'ROVIDED'BYTHEVALVEMANUFACTURERSVALCORgANDWXLLBEINSTALLEDACROSSTHESOLENOIDCOILSOFTHEMAINSTEAMISOLATIONANDREACTORHEADVENTVALVES.REVISION1TOTHISDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISINCLUDESTHEINSTALLATIONOFDIODEASSEMBLIESACROSSTHEHYDROGENMONITORINGSYSTEMSOLENOIDSgV921gV922~V923ANDV924~AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGZNNASTATIONUFSARANDEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONARE(1)MAiTORANDMINORFIRES~(2)ASEISMICEVENT~(3)AMAINSTEAMLINEBREAK.CABLEREQUIREDFORTHISMODIFICATIONCOULDADDTOTHEFIRELOADINGOFTHEPLANT.THEREFORE,THEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATALLSUCHCABLEMEETTHEIEEE-383-1974FLAMETESTREQUIREMENTS.BECAUSEOFTHISTHEREWILLBENOSIGNIFICANTINCREASEOFFIRELOADINGCAUSEDBYTHISMODIFICATION.THISMODIFICATIONHASBEENREVIEWEDTOENSURETHATFAILUREOFANYELECTRICALCABLEINSTALLEDASPARTOFTHISMODIFICATIONWILLNOTRESULTINTHEDISABLINGOFVITALEQUIPMENTNEEDEDTOSAFELYSHUTDOWNTHEPLANTDURINGPOSTULATEDFIRES.THEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATNEWRECTIFIERASSEMBLIESINSTALLEDUNDERTHISMODIFICATIONBEQUALIFIEDPERIEEE344-1975'HEREFORE'HISMODIFICATIONWILLREMAINFUNCTIONALDURINGANDAFTERASEISMXCEVENT.THEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATTHENEWRECTIFIERASSEMBLIESINSTALLEDUNDERTHISEWRBEQUALIFIEDPERIEEE3231974'HEREFORETHISMODIFICATIONSHALLREMAINFUNCTIONALDURINGANDAFTERAMAINSTEAMLINEBREAK.THEREFORE,THEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.THEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES,SYSTEMS,ANDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDFORTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTED.THEPROBABILITYOFOCCURRENCEORTHECONSEQUENCESOFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTIONOFEQUIPMENTIMPORTANTTOSAFETY,PREVIOUSLYEVALUATEDINTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORTWILLNOTBEINCREASEDBYTHEPROPOSEDMODIFICATION.56

THEPOSSIBILITYOFANACCIDENTORAMALFUNCTIONOFADIFFERENTTYPETHANANYEVALUATEDPREVIOUSLYINTHESAFETYANALYSISWILLNOTBECREATEDBYTHEPROPOSEDMODIFICATION.THEMARGINOFSAFETYASDEFINEDINTHEBASISFORANYTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONWILLNOTBEREDUCEDBYTHEPROPOSEDMODIFICATION.THEPROPOSEDMODIFICATIONDOESNOTINVOLVEANUNREVZEWEDSAFETYQUESTIONORREQUIREATECHNICALSPECIFICATIONCHANGE.BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARgIT'HASBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES~SYSTEMS~ANDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODIFICATION.EWR-4862NISTRIPBYPASSTHISENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSESTHEREPLACEMENTOFTHEEXISTING108%OVERPOWERTRIPFUNCTIONTESTRELAYPUSHBUTTONSWITCHESWITHMAINTAINABLETYPESWITCHES.MAINTAINABLETYPESWITCHESARENECESSARYTOMAINTAINENERGIZATZONOFTHETESTRELAYSWHICHDEENERGIZETHEREACTORTRIPBISTABLERELAYSDURINGMAINTENANCEOFTHE108%OVERPOWERNISPOWERRANGECHANNELS.DEENERGIZINGEACHTRAIN'S108%OVERPOWERREACTORTRIPBISTABLERELAYDURINGCHANNELMAINTENANCEPLACESTHECHANNELINTHETRIPMODEWHICHSATISFIESTHEREQUIREMENTSOFGINNATECHNICALSPECIFICATIONS.THEEXISTINGREACTORTRIPRELAYLOGICOFTHE108%OVERPOWERNISPOWERRANGECHANNELSATGINNASTATIONCONSISTSOFTHEFOLLOWING:EACHOFTHEFOUR108%OVERPOWERNISPOWERRANGECHANNELSHAVEATESTRELAYONEACHTRAINUTILIZEDFORDEENERGIZINGTHE108%OVERPOWERREACTORTRIPBISTABLERELAYS.EXISTINGMOMENTARYTYPESWITCHES,LOCATEDZNTHERELAYLOGICTESTRACKS(RLTR1gRLTR2)INTHERELAYROOMpENERGIZETHETESTRELAYSWHICHDEENERGIZETHE108%OVERPOWERREACTORTRIPBISTABLERELAYSPLACINGTHECHANNELINTHETRIPMODE.THEEXISTINGSWITCHESAREPANELMOUNT~SINGLEPOLE~MOMENTARYPUSHBUTTONTYPE.THEFOUREXISTINGMOMENTARYPUQHBUTTONTYPESWITCHESONEACHOFBOTHTRAINS(TOTALOFEIGHT)WILLBEREPLACEDBYMAINTAINABLESELECTORTYPESWITCHES.THISWILLALLOWTHE108%OVERPOWERTRIPFUNCTIONTESTRELAYTOREMAINENERGIZEDANDMAINTAINTHECHANNELINATRIPMODEDURINGMAINTENANCE.57

'I AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONARE(1)MAJORANDMINORFIRES,(2)ASEISMICEVENT,(3)AREACTOROVERPOWERTRANSIENT(1084OVERPOWERREACTORTRIP).NONEWWIRINGgFIELDCABLEfOROTHERWISEFLA1&fABLEMATERIALSWILLBEADDEDTOTHEPLANTUNDERTHISMODIFICATION,THEREFORE/NOINCREASEINFIRELOADINGZSIMPOSED.THENEWSELECTORSWITCHESAREDESIGNATEDSEISMICCATEGORY1.THEREFORE'SEISMICEVENTWILLNOTIMPACTTHEPROPEROPERATIONOFTHESWITCHES.CHANGINGTHESUBJECTSWITCHESFROMMOMENTARYTOMAINTAINABLEDOESNOTAFFECTTHEOPERATIONOFTHENZS1084OVERPOWERREACTORTRIPBECAUSEACTUATIONOFTHESWITCHESWILLPLACETHECHANNELINTHETRIPMODETHEREFORE~THISMODIFICATIONDOESNOTEFFECTTHENISRESPONSETOANOVERPOWERTRANSIENT.THUSgTHISMODIFICATIONNEITHERINCREASESTHECONSEQUENCESgNORDOESITREDUCETHEMARGINSOFSAFETYFOR:1)MAJORANDMINORFIRES2)ASEiSMICEVENT3)AREACTOROVERPOWERTRANSIENT(1084OVERPOWERREACTORTRIP)ITHASBEENDETERMINEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENDETERMINEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES,SYSTEMS,ANDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODIFICATION.EWR-4933SGPRESSURETUBINGRELOCATIONTHISEWR(ENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST)ADDRESSESMODIFICATIONOFTHE<<BnSTEAMGENERATORPRESSURETRANSMITTER(S)TUBINGANDSUPPORTS.THEPURPOSEOFTHEMODIFICATIONISTOMITIGATETHEPOTENTIALFORTHERECURRENCEOFFREEZINGSENSORLINESZNTHEINTERMEDIATEBUILDINGINTHEFOLLOWINGFASHION:1)REROUTINGTUBINGFORSENSORLINESPT-479ANDPT-4832)THEANALYSISONNEWTUBEROUTING.3)PROVIDEINSULATIONZFDEEMEDNECESSARYTOENSURETHATTHETUBINGCONTENTSREMAINABOVE32oF4)PROVIDESEISMICRESTRAINTFORTHEAFFECTEDTUBING.58

THEFOLLOWINGARERESPONSESTOPRE-PORCCOMMENTSONEWR4933DESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISREVISION0.1.COMMENT:WHYNOTELIMINATETHEADDITIONOFTHEFOURVALVESET-UPANDJUSTREPLACETHETUBING.THETUBINGCANBEPRE-RUNANDTHENTHECONNECTIONSMADEINASHORTTIME.RESPONSE:THEPROPOSEDDESIGNREQUIREDTHATTHEVALVESBEINSTALLEDDURINGTHE1989SPRINGOUTAGEANDTHENPERFORMTHEREMAININGMODIFICATIONSPOST-OUTAGE.THEPRIMARYOBJECTIVEFORTHISAPPROACHATTHETIMEWASTOMAKEMODIFICATIONSTOTHE"SYSTEMWITHOUTRENDERINGANYTRAININOPERABLE.BASEDONMYCONVERSATIONWITHYOUON5/2/89,FILLINGANDVENTINGOFTHELINESANDRECALZBRATZONOFTHETRANSMITTERSWILLBEREQUIRED.THISWILLCAUSEONELINEATATIMETOBEINOPERABLE.ONTHEBASISTHATFILLING,VENTING,ANDRECALIBRATZONZSREQUIREDITZSPRUDENTTOELIMINATETHEINSTALLATIONOFTHEVALVES.THEDESIGNCRITERIAWILLBEREVISEDTOREFLECTTHISCHANGE.2.COMMENT:SHOULDINCLUDEINSERVZCELEAKCHECKFORPORTIONSOFTUBINGWHXCHCANNOTBEHYDROED.RESPONSE:THISOPTIONWILLBEINCLUDEDINTHEECNWHENTHEDRAWINGSAREISSUEDFORCONSTRUCTION.3.COMMENT:ISTHEREAMXNIMUMSLOPEREQUIREMENTFORTUBINGINSTALLATION.RESPONSE:YES.THISREQUIREMENTWILLBESPECIFIEDONTHECONSTRUCTIONDRAWINGS.4.COMMENT:WHATXSANAPPROPRIATEAIRSEAL.RESPONSE:THEDETAILSOFANAPPROPRIATEAIRSEALWILLBEEVALUATEDDURINGTHEDESIGNPROCESS.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFTHEDESIGNBASISEVENTSTODETERM1NETHOSE,RELATEDTOTHEMODIFICATION.THEEVENTSASSOCIATEDWITHTHISWORKARE:A)B)C)D)E)FIRESSEISMICEVENTSBELOWFREEZINGAMBIENTTEMPERATUREPOSTULATEDRUPTUREOFSTEAMORFEEDWATERLINESDIFFERENTIALDISPLACEMENTOFCONTAINMENTSTRUCTUREANDINTERMEDIATEBUILDING59

THISMODIFICATIONWILLNOTDEGRADEEXISTINGFIREBARRIERSORAFFECTTHEPERFORMANCEOFANYEXISTINGFIREPROTECTIONEQUIPMENT.ANYNEWMATERIALSUSEDINELECTRICALMODIFICATIONSSHALLMEETTHEREQUIREMENTSOFZEEE-383-1974,THUSMITIGATINGTHEPOTENTIALFORPROPAGATINGAFIRE.ALLEXISTINGFIREPROTECTIONFEATURESREQUIREDTOASSURECOMPLIANCEWITH10CFR50APPENDIXRiORTOMAINTAINEQUIVALENTLEVELSOFPROTECTIONFROMFIRESWILLBEMAINTAINEDDURINGANDFOLLOWINGMODIFICATIONSTOTHETUBINGANDCONTROLSYSTEMS.SEISMICEVENTSHAVEBEENANALYZEDUNDERTHESEPRE-EVALUATIONPROGRAM.THEMODIFICATIONANDSUPPORTSWILLBEEVALUATED,INREGARDTOASEISMICEVENT,TOCRITERIAIDENTICALTOTHESEISMICUPGRADEPROGRAM.THISWILLENSURETHATANYMODIFICATIONSWILLBEDESIGNEDSOASTOEQUALORIMPROVETHESYSTEM'SCAPABILITYTOWITHSTANDASEISMICEVENT.BASEDONTHEABOVEANALYSIS,ITHASBEENDETERMINEDTHAT:A)B)THEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHESTATIONARENOTREDUCED.lTHESTRUCTURESiSYSTEMSiANDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSORPOSTULATEDHIGHENERGYPIPEBREAKANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSORPOSTULATEDHIGHENERGYBREAKSCONTINUETOREMAINADEQUATE.C)ALLINSTRUMENTSENSINGLINEPENETRATZONSSHALLBELOCATEDATAMINIMUMHEIGHTOFSEVENFEET(2.2METERS)ABOVEFLOORLEVEL,ORTHATROUTINGANDSUPPORTOFSENSINGLINESSHALLENSURETHATTHEFUNCTIONOFTHELINESISNOTAFFECTEDBYVIBRATION,ABNORMALHEATiCOLD,ORSTRESS.THUStTHISMODIFICATZONNEITHERINCREASESTHECONSEQUENCESiNORDOESZTREDUCETHEMARGINSOFSAFETYFOR:1)FIREPROTECTIONFEATURES2)EQUIPMENTREQUIREDTOFUNCTIONDURINGANDFOLLOWINGSEISMICANDTORNADOEVENTS3)EQUIPMENTREQUIREDTOFUNCTIONFOLLOWINGAHIGHENERGYLINEBREAK.60

\

BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSAR,THESTRUCTURAL'E-ANALYSISPLAN(SRP)ANDTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONS,ZTHASBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED'THASALSOBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS'NDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODIFICATION.EWR-5053REPAIRHDPUMPBARRELLEATHISEWR(ENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST)ADDRESSESTHEMODIFICATIONONTHEHEATERDRAINTANKPUMPBARRELLEAKREPAIR.THEPURPOSEOFTHISMODIFICATIONISTOINSTALLAPASSIVEVENTSYSTEMONTHEHEATERDRAINPUMPBARREL.THEVENTSSHALLPROVIDEACONTROLLEDPATHFORSTEAMANDDEBRISTOESCAPEFROMTHEANNULARREGIONBETWEENEACHPUMPBARRELANDLINERATTHESAMETIMEPREVENTINGSAFETYAND/OREROSIONPROBLEMS.A"REVIEWHASBEENPERFORMEDOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONISALOSSOFNORMALFEEDWATERFLOW.LOSSOFNORMALFEEDWATERFLOWCANOCCURFROMARUPTUREOFAPUMPBARRELDUETOTHEEROSIVEACTIONOFTHEVENTINGSTEAM.THEANALYZEDEVENTISFARMORESEVERETHANAPUMPBARRELRUPTURE.THISMODIFICATIONWILLNOTINCREASETHEPROBABILITYOFAPUMPBARRELRUPTURESINCETHEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESPROPERINSPECTIONOFTHEPUMPBARREL.THISMODIFICATIONISNON-SEISMICSINCEITDOESNOTEFFECTTHESAFESHUTDOWNOFTHEREACTOR.THISMODIFICATIONDOESNOTINCREASETHEFIRELOADINGINFIREAREASCONTAININGSAFESHUTDOWNEQUIPMENTORDEGRADEEXISTINGFIREPROTECTIONBECAUSEOFREQUIREMENTZNSECTION27'OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIA.ANALYSISNECESSARYTOASSURECONTINUALCOMPLIANCEWITH10CFR50,APPENDIXRHASBEENREQUIRED.THEREFORE,THEPROBABILITYANDCONSEQUENCESOFAFIREAFFECTINGCOLDSHUTDOWNOFTHEPLANTAREUNCHANGED.BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTHEREQUIREMENTSOFGZNNASTATIONTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONS,ITHASBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS'NDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHE.MITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOT'BEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODIFICATION.61

TSR88-07CCWCHECKVALVE743AINTERNALSREMOVALTHISTECHNICALSTAFFREQUESTADDRESSESCHANGESTOCCWCHECKVALVE743A.THISCHANGEINVOLVESREMOVINGCHECKVALVE743A'SINTERNALSTOALLOWCONCLUSIVELEAKRATETESTINGOFCCWCHECKVALVE743.XNTHEORIGINALPLANTDESIGNVALVE743AWASUTILIZEDASTHECONTAINMENTISOLATIONVALVEFORTHECCWLINECOMINGFROMTHEEXCESSLETDOWNHEATEXCHANGER.HOWEVER/DUETOLEAKAGEPROBLEMSWITHVALVE743AgCHECKVALVE743WASINSTALLEDINSERIESWITH743ATOPERFORMTHECONTAINMENTISOLATIONFUNCTION.CONSEQUENTLY'HECKVALVE743ANOLONGERPERFORMSANYSAFETYOROPERATIONALFUNCTION.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGZNNASTATIONUFSARANDEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.70ANDGZNNAPROCEDUREA-303.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONARE(1)SEISMICEVENTS,(2)PIPEBREAKSINSIDETHECONTAINMENTBUILDING,ANDAMAINSTEAMPIPERUPTURE.THISMODIFICATIONWILLBEDESIGNEDSUCHTHATITWILLNOTAFFECTTHECAPABILITYOFCHECKVALVE743AORITSCONNECTEDPIPINGANDSUPPORTSTOWITHSTANDASEISMICEVENT.THISMODIFICATIONWILLNOTAFFECTTHEBODYPRESSUREBOUNDARYFUNCTIONINGOFCHECKVALVE743ATHEREFORETHEASAB31.1PRESSUREDESIGNWILLREMAINVALID.CCWCHECKVALVE743WILLSTILLPROVIDETHECONTAINMENTISOLATIONFUNCTIONSDURINGAPRIMARYSYSTEMPIPERUPTUREORAMAINSTEAMLINERUPTURE.THUS~THISMODIFICATIONNEITHERINCREASESTHECONSEQUENCESgNORDOESZTREDUCETHEMARGINSOFSAFETYFOR:'1)EQUIPMENTREQUIREDTOFUNCTIONDURINGANDFOLLOWINGSEISMIC.2)EQUIPMENTREQUIREDTOFUNCTIONFOLLOWINGAPIPEBREAKINSIDEOROUTSIDECONTAINMENT.'BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONS,ITHASBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS/'NDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODIFICATION.62

TSR89-05RHRSPENTFUELANDCVCSNON-REGENERATZVEHEATEXCHANGERSBOLTINGUPGRADETHISTECHNICALSTAFFREQUESTADDRESSESFLANGEBOLTINGUPGRADESFORTHERHRgSPENTFUELSANDNONREGENERATIVEHEATEXCHANGERS~THESHELLSIDEINLETANDOUTLETFLANGESWEREORIGINALLYSUPPLIEDWITHSA-307GRADEBBOLTS.THESEBOLTSWILLBEREPLACEDWITHSA-193GRADEB7BOLTSFOLLOWINGSTANDARDRG&EBOLTINGPRACTICES.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDZNTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.70ANDGINNAPROCEDUREA-303.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONARE(1)SEISMICEVENTS,(2)PIPEBREAKSINSIDETHECONTAINMENTBUILDING,(3)ANDAMAINSTEAMPIPERUPTURE.THENEWBOLTINGISOFTHESAME'PHYSICALSIZEASTHEORIGINALBOLTINGANDTHECHEMICALANDPHYSICALPROPERTIESOFTHENEWMATERIALSSA193GRB7gISEQUALTOORGREATERTHANTHEOLDMATERIALSA307GRBETHEREFORE'HENEWBOLTINGWILLPERFORMTOTHESAMECAPACITYASTHEOLDBOLTINGFOREACHOFTHEAPPLICABLEEVENTSLISTEDABOVE.THUS/THISMODIFICATIONNEITHERINCREASESTHECONSEQUENCES~NORDOESITREDUCETHEMARGINSOFSAFETYFOR:1)EQUIPMENTREQUIREDTOFUNCTIONDURINGANDFOLLOWINGSEISMIC.2)EQUIPMENTREQUIREDTOFUNCTIONFOLLOWINGAPIPEBREAKINSIDECONTAINMENT.3)EQUIPMENTREQUIREDTOFUNCTIONFOLLOWINGAMAINSTEAMPIPERUPTURE.BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONS,ITHASBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ZT-HASALSOBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS'NDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODIFICATION.TSR89-09MAINFEEDWATERPUMPSUCTIONTRANSMITTERVALVEMANIFOLDTHISTECHNICALSTAFFREQUEST(TSR)ADDRESSESTHEREPLACEMENTOFTHEISOLATIONANDEQUALZZATZONVALVESFORFT-2004ANDFT-2005(FEEDWATERPUMPSUCTIONFLOWTRANSMITTERS)WITHMANIFOLDS.ITWILLALSOREPLACETHEBLOWDOWNVALVESINTHESENSINGLINESWHICHARELEAKING.THENEWAEGVQTGEMENTWILLPROVIDETHESAMEFUNCTIONASTHEPREVIOUSONE.63

THEVALVES,ASSOCIATEDWITHTHISMODIFICATIONSERVETRANSMITTERSFT-2004ANDFT-2005.THESETRANSMITTERSPROVIDE:(1)ANINPUTTOFEEDWATERBYPASSVALVE3959gWHICHOPENSONLOWFEEDWATERNPSH.(2)ASIGNALTOFEEDWATERRECIRCULATIONVALVES4147AND4148,WHICHOPENWHENFEEDWATERFLOWFALLSBELOW254FULLFLOWWITHOUTRECIRCULATION.AFEEDWATERBYPASSVALVEMALFUNCTIONZSDISCUSSEDZNTHEFEEDWATERTEMPERATUREDECREASEACCIDENTSCENARIOOFSECTION15.1.1.1INTHEUFSAR.THISMODIFICATIONWILLNOTINCREASEORDECREASETHELIKELIHOODOFSUCHANACCIDENTSINCETHEFUNCTIONOFTHEVALVESANDPIPINGASSOCIATEDWITHTHETRANSMITTERSWILLNOTCHANGE.THUSgTHEINCORPORATIONOFTHISMODIFICATIONWILLNOTAFFECTANYOFTHEEVENTSLISTEDINTABLESIANDZZOFGZNNAPROCEDUREA-303,INCLUDINGTHEDESIGNBASISEVENTSOFUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.70ANDITWILLNOTCHANGE:1)THEASSUMPTIONSOFANYSAFETYANALYSISINTHEUFSARANDITSSUPPLEMENTS.2)THEPROBABILITYOFANOCCURRENCEOFANACCIDENT.3)THECONSEQUENCESOFANACCIDENT.BASEDUPONTHEEVALUATIONSINSECTION3.1ABOVE,THEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHESTATIONWILLBEUNCHANGEDBYTHEINSTALLATIONOFTHISMODIFICATION;AND,THEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES,SYSTEMSANDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHE.PREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDFORTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSWILLBEUNCHANGEDBYTHEINSTALLATIONOFTHISMODIFICATION.THEPROPOSEDMODIFICATIONDOESNOTINVOLVEANUNREVIEWEDSAFETYQUESTIONSINCE:A)THEPROBABILITYOFOCCURRENCEORTHECONSEQUENCESOFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTIONOFEQUIPMENTIMPORTANTTOSAFETYPREVIOUSLYEVALUATEDZNTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORTWILLNOTBEINCREASED,ORgB)THEPOSSIBILITYOFANACCIDENT.ORMALFUNCTIONOFADIFFERENTTYPETHANANYEVALUATEDPREVIOUSLYINTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORTWILLNOTBECREATED,ORgC)THEMARGINOFSAFETYASDEFINEDINTHEBASISFORANYTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONWILLNOTINVOLVEACHANGEZNTHETECHNICALSPECIFICATIONSINCENONEOFTHELIMITINGCONDITIONSFOROPERATIONOFTHEFEEDANDCONDENSATESYSTEMSWILLBEAFFECTED.64

TSR89-29PRESSZZERLEVELTRANSMITTERMANIFOLDREPLACEMENTTHISTECHNICALSTAFFREQUESTREVISIONWASTOCHANGETHEREFERENCEINTHEDESIGNCRITERIA'EVISION0FROMTHE1986ASMECODEEDITIONTOTHE1983EDITXON.THISWILLBECONSISTENTWXTHTHEINSTALLATIONANDALSOBEINCONFORMANCEWITHASMESECTIONXIgARTICLEIWA7000@REPLACEMENTS'REVIEWWASPERFORMEDOFALLTHEEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORYGUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONARE:CHEMICALANDVOLUMECONTROLSYSTEMMALFUNCTIONPRIMARYSYSTEMPIPERUPTURESEISMICEVENTTHEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATTHENEWMANIFOLDVALVEANDFITTINGSFORTHISMODIFICATIONBESEISMICALLYSUPPORTED,THEREFORE,THISMODIFICATIONWILLNOTBEAFFECTEDBYASEISMICEVENT.THEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATTHENEWMANXFOLDVALVEANDTUBINGBESEISMICALLYMOUNTEDANDFURTHERMORESECTIONS4AND5REQUIRETHENEWTUBINGTOBEASMECODECLASS2,QUALITYGROUPB.THEREFORE,THEPROBABILITYOFALOCAWILLNOTBEINCREASEDBYTHISMODIFICATION.THEREFORE,THEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.THEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES,SYSTEMS,ANDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDFORTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTED.THEPROPOSEDMODIFICATIONDOESNOTINVOLVEANUNREVIEWEDSAFETYQUESTION.THISISBASEDONTHEFOLLOWING:THEPROBABILITYOFOCCURRENCEORTHECONSEQUENCESOFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTIONOFEQUIPMENTIMPORTANTTOSAFETY,PREVIOUSLYEVALUATEDINTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORTWILLNOTBEINCREASEDBYTHEPROPOSEDMODIFICATIONBECAUSETHEINSTALLATIONWILLMEETALLAPPLICABLESEISMICANDASMECODEREQUIREMENTS.THEPOSSIBILITYOFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTIONOFADIFFERENTTYPETHANANYEVALUATEDPREVIOUSLYINTHESAFETYANALYSISWILLNOTBECREATEDBYTHEPROPOSEDMODIFICATIONBECAUSETHEINSTALLATIONWILLMEETALLAPPLICABLESEISMICANDASMECODEREQUIREMENTS.65 0

THEMARGINOFSAFETYASDEFINEDINTHEBASISFORANYTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONWILLNOTBEREDUCEDBYTHEPROPOSEDMODIFICATIONBECAUSETHEINSTALLATIONWILLMEETALLAPPLICABLESEISMICANDASMECODEREQUIREMENTS.66

SECTIONB-COMPLETEDSTATIONMODIFICATIONS(SMs)Thissectioncontainsadescriptionofstationmodificationproceduresperformedinthefacilityasdescribedinthesafetyanalysisreport.StationmodificationproceduresarewrittentocompleteaportionofanEngineeringWorkRequest(EWR)orTechnicalStaffRequest(TSR)identifiedbythesameparentnumber.StationModificationsarereviewedbythePlantOperationsReviewCommitteetoensurethatnounreviewedsafetyquestionsorTechnicalSpecificationchangesareinvolvedwiththeprocedure.ThebasisforinclusionofanSMinthissectionisclosureoftheSMwhereportionsoftheparentEWRorTSR,intheformofotherSMsorotherdocumentation,remaintobecompleted.

8 SM-87-01.1SECONDARYWATERCHEMISTRYMONITORINGPANELSWCMPINTERNALWIRINGFOR7082ANALYZERSTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONOFCOMPONENTSANDW1RINGZNTHENEWSWCMP.SM-87-01.2COMPUTERIZEDSECONDARYWATERCHEMISTRYELECTRICALINSTALLATIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEW,,PROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONOFTHENEWSWCMPANDASSOCIATEDCIRCUITS.SM-87-01.3COMPUTERIZEDSECONDARYWATERCHEMISTRYMODIFICATIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONOFTWELVENEWCONDUCTIVITYCELLSANDTHETESTINGANDTURNOVEROFTHECOMPUTERIZEDSECONDARYWATERCHEMISTRYMODIFICATION.SM-89-08AMMONIUMHYDROXIDESIGHTGLASSINSTALLATIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONiTESTINGSANDTURNOVEROFTHEAMMONIUMHYDROXZ'DETANKSZGHTGLASS.SM-1594.6SPENTFUELPOOLCOOLING-SEISMICSUPPORTSTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONOFSEISMICSUPPORTSREQUIREDFORTHENEWSPENTFUELPOOLPIPING.SM-1594.7SPENTFUELPOOLCOOLING-SERVICEWATERPIPINGANDASSOCIATEDINSTRUMENTATIONINSTALLATIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREZSTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONOFSERVICEWATERPIPINGANDASSOCIATEDINSTRUMENTATIONTOTHENEWSFPHEATEXCHANGER.SM-1594.8SPENTFUELPOOLCOOLING-STAINLESSSTEELANDASSOCIATEDINSTRUMENTATIONPIPINGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONOFSPENTFUELPOOLSTAINLESSSTEELANDASSOCIATEDINSTRUMENTATIONPIPING.

SM-1594.8AINSTALLATIONANDOPERATIONOFSTANDBYS.F-P.COOLINGSYSTEMTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION,OPERATION,ANDDISASSEMBLYOFTHESTANDBYSK1DMOUNTEDSTF.P.COOLINGSYSTEM.FLOORPENETRATIONINSTALLATIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONOFFLOORPENETRATIONSFORTHENEWSPENTFUELPOOLCOOLINGSYSTEM.SM-1594.11SPENTFUELPOOLCOOLING-PUMPANDRADIATIONMONITORINSTALLATIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION'OFPUMPANDRADIATIONMONITORFORTHENEWSPENTFUELPOOLCOOLINGSYSTEM.SM-1594.14SPENTFUEPOOLCOOLINGSYSTEMELECTRICALMODIFICATIONANDCOMPLETIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREZSTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONCOMPLETIONANDTURNOVEROFTHESPENTFUELPOOLCOOLINGELECTRICALMODIFICATION.SM-2504.25CONTAINMENTMINI-PURGEEXHAUSTVALVEELECTRICAL.INSTALLATIONATPENETRATION132V7920-CONTAINMENTBUILDINGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEELECTRICAL.INSTALLATIONANDTURNOVEROFTHECONTAINMENTMINI-PURGEEXHAUSTVALVEV7920ATPENETRATIONP-132INSIDECONTAINMENT.SM-2504.26CONTAINMENTMINI-PURGEEXHAUSTVALVESELECTRICALINSTALLATIONOUTSIDECONTAINMENTTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEELECTRICALINSTALLATIONANDTURNOVEROFTHE,CONTAINMENTMINI-PURGESUPPLYSYSTEMEXHAUSTVALVESCDV-1A'ANDCDV-1BOUTSIDECONTAINMENT.SM-2512.123SMCUPGDEOFPIPESUPPORTS-ANALYSISLINESAFW-400"D"PUMPDISCHARGE-STANDBYAUXILIARYFEEDWATERBUILDINGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREZSTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION~TESTINGSANDTURNOVEROFSTANDBYAUXILIARYFEEDWATERSUPPORTS'B"TRAININTHESAFWBUILDING.

SM-2512.124SEISMCUPGRADEOFPIPESUP0S0ALYSZSLINESW-2200SERVICEWATERAUXLIARYBUILDINGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONANDTURNOVEROF'ODIFICATIONSTOSERVICEWATERSUPPORTSINTHEAUXILIARYBUILDINGASSOCIATEDWITHFEEDTOTHE"C"SAFWPUMPoSEISMICUPGRADEOFPIPESUPPORTS-ANALYSISLINESAFW-800STANDBYAUXILIARYFEEDWATERFROMCONTAINMENTPENETRATION123TO"B"SGFEEDWATERLINETHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONANDTURNOVEROFSAFWSUPPORTSINCONTAINMENTFROMPENETRATION123TOTHE"B"FEEDWATERLINE.SM-2512.126SEISMICUPGRADEOFPIPESUPPORTSANALYSISLINESAFW-900STANDBYAUXILIARYFEEDWATERFROMPENETRATION119TO"A>>STEAMGENERATORFEEDWATERLINETHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONANDTURNOVEROFPIPESUPPORTMODIFICATIONSTOTHESAFWLINEBETWEEN'ENETRATION4119ANDTHE"A"S/GFEEDWATERLINE.SM-2512'31ISTTESTCONNECTIONS-RCDTPUMPSUCTIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEZNSTALLATZONiTESTINGiANDTURNOVEROFTESTCONNECTIONSFORVALVESMOV-1813AANDMOV-1813B.,SM-'2512.132ISTTESTCONNECTIONS-AUXILIARYFEEDWATERDISCHARGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION,TESTING,ANDTURNOVEROFTESTCONNECTIONSFORAUXILIARYFEEDWATERDISCHARGECHECKVALVES4003'004'000CAND4000D.SM-2512.133ZSITESTCONNECTIONS-VALVEV-3506ANDV-3507BYPASSTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONSTESTINGSANDTURNOVEROFTESTCONNECTIONSFORVALVES3506AND3507BYPASSLOOPS(DOWNSTREAMOFV-3506AANDV-3507A)~

SEISMICUPGRADEOFPIPESUPPORTS-ANALYSISLINECVC-200-"B"RCPSEALRETURNTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONANDTURNOVEROFTHESUPPORTMODIFICATIONSFOR"B"RCPSEALRETURNLINECONSISTINGOFSUPPORTSCVU-131ANDCVU-XI'M-3319.48CC-1BBREAKEREPLACEMENTTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREZSTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONANDTURNOVEROFBRKQG"RREPLACEMENTATSPECIFIEDPOSITIONSONMCC-1B.SM-3319.55TESTINGOFBREAKERSATMCC-1BTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREZSTO1)DOCUMENTANAUXILIARYSWITCH'ESTi2)VERIFYPROPERPHASEROTATIONSAND3)TOPERFORMAFUNCTIONALTESTOFBREAKERSPLACEDATMCC-1B.SM-3319'8SETTINGADJUSTMENTANDFUNCTONALTESTINGOFBREAKERSATMCC-HTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREZSTOPROVIDETHEDIRECTIONTOADJUSTANDFUNCTIONALLYTESTBREAKERSATMCC-1H.SM-3319.59UXLIARYSWITTESTINGORSELECTEDBREARSONMCC-1BTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTODOCUMENTANAUXILIARYSWITCHTESTFORTHETURBINEROOMWALLEXHAUSTFANS1F,1Gg1H,AND1J.SM-3319A.2BREAKERCHANGEOUTREMOVAL0MCC-1C1LAND1THEPURPOSEOF.THISPROCEDUREZSTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION,TESTING,ANDTURNOVEROFBREAKERCHANGEOUTS/REMOVAL,TOLHEATERCHANGEOUTS,ANDTRIPSETTINGADJUSTMENTSFORVARIOUSUNITSONMCC1Ci1LiAND1KSM-3319A.3BREAKERCHANGEOUTREMOVALONMCC-1DAND1THEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONSTESTING,ANDTURNOVEROFBREAKERCHANGEOUTS/REMOVALS,TOLHEATERCHANGEOUTS,ANDTRIPSETTINGADJUSTMENTSFORVARIOUSUNITSONMCC-1DAND1M.

SM-3319A.4BREAKERCHANGEOUTREMOVALONMCC-1BlEAND1FTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDUREZSTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION,TESTING,ANDTURNOVEROFBREAKERCHANGEOUTS/REMOVALS,HKATRIPUNITREPLACEMENTS'NDTRIPSETTINGADJUSTMENTSFORVARIOUSUNITSONMCC1Br1EiAND1F~SM-3319A.5REPLACEMENTOFPOWERCABLESPEREWR-3319ATHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION,TESTING,ANDTURNOVEROFTHEREPLACEMENTOFEXISTINGPOWERCABLESFORTHEBORICACIDEVAPORATORPACKAGE,THEAUXILIARYBUILDINGLIGHTINGTRANSFORMER1BgANDTHESERVICEBUILDINGKITCHENEQUIPMENTTRANSFORMER.SM-3319A.6BREAKERREMOVALONMCC-1GANDRESOLUTIONOFSM-3319A.23319A.3AND3319A.4PUNCHLISTITEMSTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREZSTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONSTESTZNGrANDTURNOVEROFBREAKERREMOVALSITOLHEATERCHANGEOUTSiBREAKERHANDLEINSTALLATIONS'NDREMOVEDBREAKERCOVERPLATEINSTALLATIONS.SM-3319A.8BREAKERCHANGEOUTATMCC-1FFORTHELAUNDR'IRCONDITIONERANDTHEPASSWASTETANKEVACUATIONCOMPRESSORTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION,TESTING,ANDTURNOVEROFTHEBREAKERCHANGEOUTATMCC-1FFORTHELAUNDRYAIRCONDITIONERANDTHEPASSWASTETANKEVACUATIONCOMPRESSOR.FUSEINSTALLATIONFORTHEMAINCONTROLBOARDrrArrANDrrBrrBATTERYVOLTMETERSTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREZSTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONANDTURNOVEROFFUSESFORTHEMCBrrArrANDr'BBATTERYVOLTMETERS.SM-3341.2PRE-OPERATIONALTESTINGOFD.C.FUSESXSBFORLOCKOUTRELAY~8611ATHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREZSTOCONTROLTHETESTINGANDTURNOVEROFTHEA2Y(15A)(XSB)125VDCFUSESWHICHFEEDTHEBUSllADIFFERENTIALLOCKOUTRELAY86/llA.

SM-3341.3PRE-OPERATONALTESTINGOFD.C.FUSESXSCFORLOCKOUTRELAY8611BTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHETESTINGANDTURNOVEROFTHEA2Y(15A)(XSC)125VDCFUSESWHICHFEEDTHEBUSllBDIFFERENTIALLOCKOUTRELAY86/11B;SM-3596'DGirAitPRESSUREINSTRUMENTPANELELECTRICALINSTALLATIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONANDTURNOVEROFJUNCTIONBOXESASSOCIATEDWITHTHENEWDIESELGENERATOR"A"INSTRUMENTPANELiINCLUDINGCONDUITANDCONDUITSUPPORTSBETWEENTHEJUNCTIONBOXESANDINSTRUMENTPANEL.ALSO,INCLUDESCABLEBETWEENNEWPRESSUREINSTRUMENTSANDTHENEWTERMINALSTRIPSWITHINTHEJUNCTIONBOXES.SM-3596.4DG"A"PRESSUREINSTRUMENTPANEL-ELECTRICALINSTALLATIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONANDTURNOVEROFJUNCTIONBOXESASSOCIATEDWITHTHENEWDIESELGENERATORBINSTRUMENTPANELiINCLUDINGCONDUITANDCONDUITSUPPORTSBETWEENTHEJUNCTIONBOXESANDINSTRUMENTPANEL.ALSO,INCLUDESCABLEBETWEENNEWPRESSUREINSTRUMENTSANDTHENEWTERMINALSTRIPSWITHINTHEJUNCTIONBOXES.STANDBYAZLIARYFEEDWTERCONTROLCIRCUITRYANDVALVEMOV-9746TESTINGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREZSTO'ONTROLTHETESTINGANDTURNOVEROFTHENEWMOVCONTROLSWITCHRE-ARRANGEMENTSANDTHEIRRESPECTIVECONTROLANDINDICATIONCIRCUITS.THISINCLUDESMOVATSTESTINGOFMOV-9746ANDHYDROTESTINGOFNEWVALVEINSTALLATION.SM-3692.4STANDBYAUXILIARYFEEDWTERVVE-ELECTRICLMODIFICATIONSTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONANDTURNOVERFORTESTINGOFCONDUIT,CONDUITSUPPORTS'ABLEiBREAKERJUMPERSANDREWORKOFTHEMAINCONTROLBOARDSWITCHESANDINDICATION.SM-3692.5SBAFWBUIDINGELECTRICALSUPPORTSTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONANDTURNOVEROFELECTRICALSUPPORTMODIFICATIONSINTHESTANDBYAUXILIARYFEEDWATERBUILDING.

SM-3692.6STANDBYAUXILIARYFEEDWATERFUNCTIONALTESTINGOFCONTROLCIRCUITRYFORMOV-9746THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEFUNCTIONALTESTINGOFMOV-9746LOCATEDZNTHESAFWBUILDING;CONTROLROOM(REAROFMCB)gAUXILIARYBUILDING(MCCAREAS)~HYDROTESTINGOFTHEPRESSUREBOUNDARYZSCOMPLETE.ADDITIONALCOPIESOFTHISPROCEDUREMAYBEPLACEDFORCOORDINATIONANDCONTROLPURPOSES.SM-3797.8MRPIRODDROPRELAYTIMEDELAYREMOVALITHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEREMOVALOFTHETIMEDELAYDEVICESWHICHWEREPREVIOUSLYINSTALLEDONTHECONTROLRODDROPRELAYS,ANDTHESUBSE{}UENTTESTINGOFTHERELAYS'M-3797.9MRPIDATACABINETFANINSTALLATIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREZSTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONOFCOOLINGFANSONTHEMRPZDATACABINETINCONTAINMENT.SM-3797.10PIANNUNCIATORMODIFICATIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION,TESTING,ANDTURNOVEROFAMODIFICATIONTOANNUNCIATORC29FORMRPZFAILURE.SM-3797'11DATACABINETFANREMOVALTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREZSTOCONTROLTHEREMOVALANDTURNOVEROFCOOLINGFANSFORMRP1DATACABINETZNCONTAINMENT.SM-3881.1SIRECIRCULATIONMODFCTONMECHANICALINSTALLATIOREMOVALSTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREZSPROVIDEINSTRUCTIONSFORTHEMECHANICALPORTIONOFTHESIRECIRCULATIONMODIFICATION.SM-3881.2SIRECIRCULATIONMODIFICATION-ELECTRICALINSTALLATIONANDREMOVALSMOV897898THEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONOFELECTRICALINSTALLATIONANDREMOVALSFORMOV897AND898.

SAFETYINJECZONFLOWMETERSF-924ANDI-925RESCALZNGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONOFMETERSCALESFORFZ-924ANDFI-925ANDRECALZBRAT1ONOFSAFETYINJECTIONFLOWTRANSMITTERSFT-924ANDFT-925'ESLGENERAORBUILDINGFODATIONINVESTIGATIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTESTBORINGANDCORESAMPLINGINANDAROUNDTHEDIESELGENERATORBUILDING.SM-3990.2GROUNDWATEREXPLORATIONOFTHEDIESELGENERATORBUILDING'IMPINGEMENTMODIFICATIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREZSTOCONTROLTHEEXPLORATIONANDEXCAVATIONOFTHEDEWATERINGPITSGENERALLYBETWEENTHEDIESELGENERATORBUILDINGANDLAKEONTARIO.THEGENERALPURPOSEOFTHISEXPLORATORY.PHASEOFTHEOVERALLMODIFICATIONZSTOOBTAINSUFFICIENTPERTINENTDATAONTHESUBSURFACEGROUNDWATER.THISDATAWILLPROMULGATENECESSARYENGINEERINGOUTPUTSFORMODIFICATIONERECTIONANDINSTALLATION.SM-3991.2SEISMICUPGRADEOFEXISTINGCONNECTIONSANDANCHORAGES-AUXILIARYBUILDINGSOUTHWALLTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTODIRECT/DOCUMENTSTRUCTURALMODIFICATIONS.SM-4064.5TURBIEBUILDINGSMOKEDETECTIONUPGRADEANDALARMOFFINDICATIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHECHANGEOUTOFTURBINEBUILDINGSMOKEDETECTORSANDSTPs.ALSOINCLUDEDISTHEINSTALLATIONOFCONTROLROOMINDICATIONOFALARMOFFSTATUS.SM-4064.6TSCFIREDETECTIONANDSUPPRESSIONSYSTEMUPGRADETHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONANDTURNOVEROFMODIFICATIONSTOTHETSCFIREDETECTIONANDSUPPRESSIONSYSTEMSPRIORTOFINALTERMZNATZONSANDTESTING.

TURBINEBUIDINGSMOKEDETECTORZONEZ34MODIFICATIONSTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION,TESTING,ANDTURNOVEROFMODIFICATIONSTOTURBINEBUILDINGSMOKEDETECTORZONEZ34-TOREMOVEDETECTORSFROMTHEGENERATORFIELDVOLTAGEREGULATORCABINETSSM-4218'LT-426TUBINGREMOVALTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREZSTOPROVIDETHENECESSARYINSTRUCTIONSFORTHEREMOVALOFTHEEXISTING3/8nTUBINGUSEDFORLT-426SEALEDREFERENCELEG.SM-4230.1TICIPATEDTRANSIENTSWITHOSCRAMATWSMITIGATIONACTUATIONCIRCUITRYAMSACMODIFICATIONINSTALLATIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOINSTALLAREACTORPROTECTIONSYSTEMTHATWILLTRIPTHEMAINSTEAMTURBINEANDSTARTTHEFLOWOFAUXILIARYFEEDWATERAFTERANATWSEVENT.SM-4230.2ANTICIPATEDTRANSIENTSWIOUTSCRAMATWSMITIGATIONSYSTEMACTUATIONCIRCUITRYAMSCMODIFICATIONTESTINGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOTESTAREACTORPROTECTIONSYSTEMTHATWILLTRIPTHEMAINSTEAMTURBINEANDSTARTTHEFLOWOFAUXILIARYFEEDWATERAFTERANATWSEVENT.THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREZSTOINSTALLTHEnAMSACTRIPPED"STATUSLIGHTONTHEMAINCONTROLBOARD,WHILEPROGRAMMINGZNNEWARMINGSETPOINTSANDMODIFYINGTHEFUNCTIONCURVEWHICHGENERATESTHEVARIABLETIMEDELAYFORAMSAC.ZNADDITIONTOCHANGINGTHEDIGITALOUTPUTFORTHEPPCSFROMnAMSACACTUATED"TOnAMSACTRIPPEDn,BECOMINGADIRECTFUNCTIONOFTHERESETSTATUS.SM-4322.1STATIONSERVCTRANSFORMERS3AND15COOLINGFANSTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION,TESTINGANDTURNOVEROFCOOLINGFANSATSTATIONSERVICETRANSFORMERS43.3AND415.SM-4230.3ANTICIPATEDTRANSIENTSWITHOUTSCRAMATWSMITIGATIONSYSTEMACTUATONCICUITRYAMSACTSTATUSMODIFCATION

SM-4324.3ELECTRICALNSTALLATIONFORSTEAMGENERATORBLOWOWNSYSTEMTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREZSTOCONTROLTHEELECTRICALINSTALLATIONFORSTEAMGENERATORBLOWDOWNSYSTEMMODIFICATION.THISPROCEDUREALLOWSPARTIALINSTALLATIONPRIORTOPLANTOUTAGEANDISTOCOMPLETETHEREMAININGDURINGTHEPLANTOUTAGE.TESTINGOFTHEINSTALLATIONWILLBEPERFORMEDUNDERANOTHERPROCEDURE.SM-4324.5SEGENERATORBLOWDOSYSTEODFICATIONFUNCTIOALTESTINGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE1STOPERFORMFUNCTIONALTESTINGOFTHEELECTRICALINSTALLATIONOFS/GBLOWDOWNMODIFICATION.SM-4347'MODIFICATIONOFTHECONTROLROOMPLANTEVACUATIONALARMPLANTATTENTIONALARMANDPLANTFIREALARMTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREZSTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONANDTURNOVEROFTHECONTROLROOMPLANTEVACUATIONALARM,PLANTATTENTIONALAI'NDPLANTFIREALARMMODIFICATIONS.SM-4347.2CONTROLROOMALARMSYSTEMTESTINGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTESTINGANDTURNOVEROFTHEMODIFICATIONSASSOCIATEDWITHTHECONTROLROOMALARMSYSTEMSANDTOCONDUCTACONTROLROOMALARMSURVEY.SM-4375.1BORICACIDFLOWCONTROLPIPINGMODIFICATIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONANDTURNOVEROFTHEMECHANICALPORTIONOF'HEBORICACIDFLOWCONTROLMODIFICATION.SM-4375.2BORICACIDFLOWCONTROLELECTRICALMODIFICATIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEELECTRICALINSTALLATION,TESTING,ANDTURNOVEROF.THEBORICACIDFLOWCONTROLANDHEATTRACEMODIFICATION.SM-4375.3MECHANICALANDELECTRICALTESTING-BORICACIDFLOWCONTROLPIPINGMODIFICATIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHETESTINGANDTURNOVEROFTHEBORICACIDFLOWCONTROLPIPINGMODIFICATION.10

SM-4375.6BORICACXDFLOWCONTROLMECHANICALPHASE2MODIFICATIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONANDTURNOVEROFTHEMECHANXCALPORTIONOFTHEBORICACIDFLOWCONTROLPHASE2MODIFICATION.SM-4375'BORICACILOWCONTROLPHASE2ACCEPTANCETESTTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHETESTINGANDTURNOVEROFTHEBORXCACIDFLOWCONTROLPHASE2MODIFICATION.SM-4375.9REPLACEMENTOFHEATTRACECIRCUITS40AND78THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION~TESTING~ANDTURNOVEROFTHENEWCHEMELEXSELF-REGULATINGHEATTRACECABLEFORCONDUITS440AND478(BORICACIDBLENDERPIPING)gWHICHINCLUDESVALVESV354gV355gFCV110AgV109gANDFT110~SM-4525.2GARSUPPYBUSDUCTFODTONSTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREZSTODIRECT/DOCUMENTINSTALLATIONOFNEWBUSDUCTFOUNDATION.SM-4525.3GAPOWERSUPPLYO.CDB.FIREWALLFOUNDATIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONANDTURNOVEROFTHEGINNAPOWERSUPPLYO.C.B.FIREWALLFOUNDATION.SM-4525.4RACEWAYINSTALLATONFOROFFSITEPOWERRECONFXGURATIONMODIFICTIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONOFRACEWAYFORTHEOFFSZTEPOWERMODIFICATION.THISPROCEDUREINCLUDESINSTALLATIONOFANEWPIPESUPPORTFORTHEEXISTINGTRANSFORMER12BDELUGESYSTEM.SM-4525.5NEWGINNAPOWERSUPPLYBUSDUCTINSTALLATIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLINSTALLATIONOFTHENEWGZNNAPOWERSUPPLYBUS.DUCT.

SM-4525.6OFFSITEPOWERRECONFXGURATION:.P.S.SWITCHGEARTRANSFORMER2BGROUNDINGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDUREZSTOANCHORTHEP.P.S.SWITCHGEARgCOMPLETEINTERNALWIRING'NDPERFORMELECTRICALINSPECTIONOFP.P.S.4160VSWITCHGEAR.THISPROCEDUREALSOCONTROLSTHEINSTALLATIONOFTHETRANSFORMER12BGROUNDINGRESISTOR.SM-4525'OFFSITEPOWERRECONFXGURATION:CABLEINSTALLATIONRELAYPANELS12AAND12BTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREZSTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONOFCABLESFORTHEOFFSZTEPOWERMODIFICATIONANDCOMPLETETHEINSTALLATIONOFRELAYPANELS12AAND12B.SM-4525.8OFFSITEPOWERRECONFIGURATION:MAINCONTROLBOARDSWITCHRELOCATIONBUS12ABUS12BMODIFICATIONANDTESTING'HEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREZSTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION,TESTING,ANDTURNOVEROF:A)B)C)D)SM-4525.952/11BCONTROLSW~SYNCHSWgANDZNDLITES52/11ACONTROLSW,SYNCHSW,ANDZND.LZTES12BBUSRELAYINGANDCIRCUITBREAKERS(86/12B,86B/12Bg52/BTBBJ52/16SSgAND52/17SS12A.BUSRELAYINGANDCIRCUITBREAKERS(86/12A,86B/12Ag52/BTAAt52/14SSg52/18SSAND52/AVP9A)OFFSITEPOWERRECONFZGURATION:MAINCONTROLBOARDMODIFICATIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREZSTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONANDRELOCATIONOFSWITCHES,METERS,ANDRELAYSWHICHMONITORANDCONTROLTHE34.5KVAND4160VELECTRICSYSTEMS'M-4525.10OFFSZTEPOWER'RECONFIGURATION:SWITCHYARDMODIFICATION4160VCUBICLEMODIFICATION480VAND120VBREAKERXNSTALLATIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHXSNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEMODIFICATIONOFTHE34KVBUSANDASSOCIATEDEQUIPMENT,COMPLETEREMOVALSATTHE12BXFMRCABINET,COMPLETEMODIFICATIONOF12AAND12B4160VCUBZCLES,ANDINSTALL480VAND120VBREAKERSFORTHEOFFSXTEPOWERMODIFICATION.12

SM-4525'2OFFSITEPOWERBACKFEEDVIAUNTAUXILIARYTRANSFORMERTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOSUPPLYPOWERFROMTHE115KVGRIDTHROUGHTHEMAINANDUNITAUXILIARYTRANSFORMERSTOTHESTATIONAUXILIARIES,WHILETHESTATIONAUXILIARYTRANSFORMERS412AAND412BAREMODIFIEDPEREWR4525.SM-4525.14OFFSITEPOWERMODIFICATION:4KVAND34KVMCBMETERINGPRE-OPERATIONALTESTINGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOTESTTHEMCB4KVAND34KVMETERING,MODIFIEDUNDEREWR-4525PERSM-4525.9.'SM-452515OFFSITE0RESORATIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSERVZCETESTINGANDTURNOVEROFTHEOFFSITEPOWERMODIFICATIONANDRESTOREOFFSITEPOWERVIASTATIONAUXILIARYTRANSFORMER12B.SM-4526.2DG"A"FUELOILSYSTEMELECTRICALRECONSTRUCTIONANDREMOVALSTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONANDTURNOVEROFTHEELECTRICALPORTIONOFTHED/G"A"FUELOILSYSTEMINCLUDINGINSTALLATIONOFNEWEQUIPMENTANDREMOVALOFOLDEQUIPMENT.SM-4526'G"B"ELOILSYSTEMELECTRICALRECONSTRUCTONEMOVALSTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION'NDTURNOVEROFTHEELECTRICALPORTIONOFTHED/G"B"FUELOZLSYSTEMINCLUDINGINSTALLATIONOFNEWEQUIPMENTANDREMOVALOFOLDEQUIPMENT.SM-4526.8DUPLEXSTRAINERINSTALTIONELECTRICALPORTIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONOFTHEELECTRICALPORTIONOFTHEDUPLEXSTRAINERSZNTHEDIESELGENERATORFUELOILSYSTEM.SM-4526.17DIESELGENERATORFUELOILSYSTEMDISCHARGELINEPIPESUPPORTSUPGRADETHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREZSTOCONTROLINSTALLATIONANDTURNOVEROFPIPESUPPORTSONTHEDIESELGENERATORFUELOZLSYSTEMDISCHARGEPIPING.13

SM-4530.1ACFUSEDANDBREAKERSINTERMEDIATEBUZLDING'SISCELLANEOUSDISTRIBUTIONTRANSFORMERREPLACEMENTTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOREPLACETHEINTERMEDIATEBUILDING'MISCELLANEOUSDISTRIBUTIONTRANSFORMERANDREMOVETHEELECTRICALFEEDFROMMCC1F(UNIT4MM)TOMCC18(UNIT'D)~SM-4534.1.REACTORCOOLANTPUMPMOTOROILLEVELINDICATIONSYSTEMUPGRADETHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREZSTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONOFTHENEWREACTORCOOLANTPUMPMOTOROILLEVELINDICATIONSYSTEMFORTHEA&BREACTORCOOLANTPUMPMOTORS.NOCOMPONENTINSTALLATIONREQUIREDONRCPMOTORS.THEROSEMOUNT710DUINSTRUMENTRACKISCOMMONTOBOTHREACTORCOOLANTPUMPS'M-4538.11BDIESELGENERATORUPGRADETHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONANDTURNOVEROFTHE1BDIESELGENERATORUPGRADE.THISMODIFICATIONINCLUDES,REPLACEMENTOFATHROWOVERRELAY,THERMALOVERLOADRELAYS,REMOVALOFA51BURELAY,ANDREWIRINGOFTERMINALBOXESONTHE"A"AND"B"DIESELSKIDS.SM-4538.3IINSTALLATIONANDTESTING0NEWAUXILIARYRELAY51VXCLAROSTAT200OHMRESISTORANDSLIZNGLINKTERMINALS.FORAIRSTARTVALVEASV-1ANDASV-2FORTHElADIESELGENERATORTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREZSTOCONTROLTHEELECTRICALINSTALL'ATION'ESTINGSANDTURNOVEROFMODIFICATIONSTOTHE1ADIESELGENERATOR.THESEMODIFICATIONSINCLUDEREPLACEMENTOFOVERCURRENTAUXILIARYRELAY51VX,INSTALLATIONNEW200OHMRESISTORSSLIDINGLINKSTERMINALSFORAIRSTARTVALVES~ANDINSTALLATIONOFANEWMOUNTINGPLATEFORRELAYSATR-A,ATR-B,ANDAFUSEBLOCK.THISPROCEDUREWILLALLOWWORKTOBEACCOMPLISHEDINTHEFOLLOWINGGENERALAREASOFTHEPLANT:1ADIESELGENERATOR.SM-4553.1ECORBINGSUPPOTUGRADETHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOSEISMICALLYUPGRADETHEREACTORBOTTOMMOUNTEDINSTRUMENTATIONTUBINGSUPPORTBMI-3.14

FEEDPUMPOOMVENTILATIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONOFTHENEWFEEDPUMPROOMVENTILATIONSYSTEMCOMPONENTS'AnRCSOTLEGRHRFLOWCOECTIONTHEPURPOSE'OFTHISNEWPROCEDUREZSTOCONTROLTHETESTINGASSOCIATEDWITHFIELDDATAVERIFICATIONOFTHEnAnRCSHOTLEGLOOPLEVELCORRECTIONASARESULTOFRHRFLOW.THISTESTISBEINGPERFORMEDINCONJUNCTIONWITHPROCEDURE0-2~3~1.SM-4675.1PnBnRECIRCULATIONPIPINGTE-NSTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOINSTALLTHE8INCHCHECKVALVEAND3INCHPIPINGTIE-INSTOTHEBRHRHXDISCHARGELINE~SM-4675.2RHRRECIRCULATIONMODIFICATIONMCBMODIFICATIONTHEPURPOSE.OFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONOFTHEMAINCONTROLROOMWORKSCOPEOFEWR-4675,RHRRECIRCULATIONMODIFICATION.SM-4675'SYSTEMCLEANLINESSINSPECTIONANDHYDROSTATICTESTTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOPROVIDEINSTRUCTIONSFORPERFORMCLEANLINESSINSPECTIONSANDAHYDROSTATICTESTOFTHERHRRECIRCSYSTEMINSTALLEDBYEWR-4675.SM-4675.5RHRPUMPtAtRECIRCULATIONPIPINGTZEZNSANDBALANCEOFPIPINGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONANDTURNOVEROFTHERHRARECIRCULATIONPIPINGTIEINSgCOMMONTRENCHTIE-INS,ANDTHEREMAINDEROFTHERHRAANDBRECIRCULATIONPIPINGANDSUPPORTS'M-4675.6RHRPUMPttnANnBttRECIRCULATIONINSTRUMENTATIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREZSTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONOFINSTRUMENTATZONASSOCIATEDWITHTHEAANDBRECIRCULATIONPIPINGMODIFICATION.15

SM-4675.7RHRHXnAnOUTLETPIPESUPPORTTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONANDTURNOVEROFTHERHRHXnAnOUTLETPIPESUPPORT.PPSUC0YDROSTATCTESTTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEHYDROSTATICTESTOFTHEINSTALLATIONOFTHETI-680AND681THERMOWELLS~SM-4675.9RHRSYSTEMSHUTDOWNCOOLINGFULLFLOW'ESTTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREZSTOCONTROLTHETESTINGOFTHERHRSYSTEMFULLFLOWTESTDURINGTHESHUTDOWNCOOLINGTEST.SM-4755.1ISTTESTCONNECTIONSFORMOV-1813AB-nAnANDnBnRCDTPUMPSUCTIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREZSTODIRECT/DOCUMENTMODIFICATIONRELOCATIONOFVALVESV-1813C/E.SM-4756.1INSTALLATIONOFMCBEXHAUSTFANSHROUDTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONOFTHESHROUDFORTHEMCBEXHAUSTFAN.SM-.4759.2HIGHSTZGHTINGTOWERBASEPLATEGROUTINGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONANDTURNOVEROFHIGHMASTSECURITYLIGHTINGBASEPLATEGROUTINGANDJAMNUTSFORTHEEIGHTHIGHMASTLIGHTINGTOWERS'M-4764.1FIRESERVICEWATERSYSTEMMODIFICATIONSRELOCATIONSANDSPRINKLERSUPPLYTOSUPPORTTHECONTAMINATIONSTORAGEBUILDINGINSTALLATIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHERELOCATIONINSTALLATIONTESTINGANDTURNOVEROFFIRESERVICEHYDRANTSGATEVALVESANDSPRINKLERSUPPLYTOTHECONTAMINATEDSTORAGEBUILDING.16

SM-4764.3CONTAMINATEDSTORAGEBUILDING-DOORS29ELECTRICALINSTALLATIONTESTINGANDFLOODBARRIERTESTINGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEELECTRICALINSTALLATIONSTESTINGANDTURNOVEROFTHENEWSECURITYDOORS-29ANDTHETESTXNGOFTHEFLOODBARRIERASSOCIATEDWITHDOORS-29.SM-4764.4ELECTRICALPOWERDISTRIBUTIONANDGROUNDGRIDINSTALLATION-CONTAMINATEDSTORAGEBUILDINGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREZSTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONANDTURNOVEROFTHEELECTRICALPOWERDISTRIBUTIONANDGROUNDINGPORTIONOFTHECONTAMINATEDSTORAGEFACILITYMODIFICATION.SM-4764.6FIREPOTECTIONELECTRICALXNSTALLATIONANDFUNCIONLTESTINGWITHINTHECONTAMINATEDSTORAGEBUILDINGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLANDDOCUMENTTHEINSTALLATION,TESTINGANDTURNOVEROFTHEELECTRICALPORTIONOFTHELOCALPREACTIONFIREPROTECTIONSYSTEMINTHECONTAMINATEDSTORAGEBUILDING.SM-4785.1INSTALLATIONANDTESTINGOFNEWTHROWOVERELAYINBUS14UNDERVOLTAGECABINETTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREZSTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION,TESTINGANDTURNOVEROFTHENEWTHROWOVERRELAYINTHEBUS14UNDERVOLTAGECABINET.INSTALLATIONANDTESTIGOFNEWTOWOVERRELAYINBUS16UNDERVOLTAGECABINETTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREZSTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION,TESTINGANDTURNOVEROFTHENEWTHROWOVERRELAYZNTHEBUS16UNDERVOLTAGECABINET.1'M-4785.3INSTALLATIONANDTESTINGOFNEWTHROWOVERRELAYINBUS17UNDERVOLTAGECONTROLCABINETTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREZSTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONSTESTINGSANDTURNOVEROFTHENEWTHROWOVERRELAYINTHEBUS17UNDERVOLTAGECONTROLCABINET.17 fI.I' Rl=.*INSTALLATIONANDTESTINGOFNEWTHROWOVERRELAYINBUS18UNDERVOLTAGECONTROLCABINETTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREZSTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONSTESTINGSANDTURNOVEROFTHENEWTHROWOVERRELAYINTHEBUS18UNDERVOLTAGECONTROLCABINET.SM-4785.5INSTALLATIONANDTESTINGOFNEWTHROWOVERRELAYANDLOSSOFD.C.VOLTAGEALARMFORDIESELGENERATOR1THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONSTESTINGSANDTURNOVEROFTHENEWTHROWOVERRELAYANDLOSSOFD.C.VOLTAGEALARMFORDIESELGENERATOR1A.SM-4785.6INSTALLATIONANDTESTINGOFNEWTHROWOVERRELAYANDLOSSOFD.C.VOLTAGEALARMFORDIESELGENERATOR1BTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREZSTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION~TESTING~ANDTURNOVEROFTHENEWTHROWOVERRELAYANDLOSSOFD.C.VOLTAGEALARMFORDIESELGENERATOR1B.ESELFIREPPBATTERCHARGESUPPORTSTRUCTURESNSTALLATONMODIFICATIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONOFTHEDIESELFIREPUMPBATTERYCHARGERSUPPORTSTRUCTURES.,TDAFWPCHECKVALVEREPLACEMENTTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEREPLACEMENT,TESTINGANDTURNOVEROFTHETURBINEDRIVENAUXILIARYFEEDWATERPUMPDISCHARGECHECKVALVESV-4003ANDV-4004.SM-4933.1T-478PT-479DPT-483SG"B"TUBINGREROUTEANDUGDETHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION~TESTING~ANDTURNOVEROFUPGRADEDSTEAMGENERATORPT478/479/483INSTRUMENTATZONTUBING'UPPORTS'NDBARRIERSZNTHEINTERMEDIATEBUILDING(STEAMHEADERLEVEL)~SM-4937.1REPLACEMENTOFHEATTRACECIRCUTS12&34THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONOFTHENEWCHEMELEXSELFREGULATINGHEATTRACECABLEFORCIRCUITS12AND34.18 k'

SM-4937.2REPLACEMENTOFHEATTRACECIRCUIT29THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEZNSTALLATIONgTESTINGANDTURNOVEROFTHENEWCHEMELEXSELFREGULATINGHEATTRACECABLEFORCIRCUITS.29(BORICACIDBLENDERPIPING)gWHICHINCLUDESVALVESFCV110CgV364~FCV110B,ANDV365A..19

SECTIONC-COMPLETEDTECHNICALSTAFFENGINEERINGEVALUATIONS(TSEEs)Thissectioncontainsadescriptionofchangestothefacilityasdescribedinthesafetyanalysisreportperformedastechnicalevaluations.Thesearetypicallysmallchangesthatdonotrequirethefullcontrolsofamodification.TechnicalStaffEngineeringEvaluationsarereviewedbythePlantOperationsReviewCommitteetoensurethatnounreviewedsafetyquestionsorTechnicalSpecificationchangesareinvolved.ThebasisforinclusionofaTSEEinthissectionispresentationtothePORC,closureoftheassociatedTSR,andsubmittaltotheDocumentControlDepartment.Withinthetimeframeofthisreporttherewerenone.

SECTIOND-TEMPORARYBYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTION,STRUCTUREFEATURES,SHIELDING,ANDFLUIDSYSTEMFEATURESThissectioncontainsdescriptionsandsummariesofsafetyevaluationsoftemporarychangespursuanttotherequirementsofloCFR50.'59(b).

CATEGORYREVIEWEDfAEVREFERENCEPROCEDUREA.t402ROCHESTERGASANDELECTRICGINNASTATIONBYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTIONANDJUMPERCONTROLJOBFOREMAN'UMPERWIRE0FUNCTIONPURPOSELIFTEDWIRElDDATeREQUEST¹:-dAFUSESPULLED0STATESBLOCK0OTHER0LOCATION'AFETYEVALUATIONREQUIRED:PfYESPORCDATE(IFREQUIRED)TECHNICALMANAGERSHIFTSUPERVISORINSTALLATIONDATE8TIMEENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSINSTALLED:INSTALLEDBY:VVERIFIEPBY:E.REVIEW(ASNECESSARY)'E~NO~tOSKETCHAlTACHED.'(4ESPANO.~/9-l7DATe~~>>>REMOVALDATE8TIMeENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG:REMOVEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:iT~".1,lTAI,q'I"t'F~iiCECLIIJ'~QAAttachadditionalpage(s)asnecessaryABlA2AyvETSS

10CFR50.59SafetyEvaluationforliftingwireforThermocoupleD07TheindicationsforTCD07areinconsistentwiththeresponseofotherrelatedcoreparameters(i.e.incorefluxmap&nearbythermocoupleindications).Thermocouplesareusedtosensecoreoutlettemperature,determinerelativefuelassemblypowerandcompensateRVLIS.SinceTCD07isnotconsistentwitheither,incoreorotherthermocouplesjthasbeendeclaredinoperable.XthasbeendeletedfromprocessinginPPCS.Toremoveitfromtheaveragingcircuitatthethermocouplepanelrequiresliftingitslead.ThepanelwillthensenseanopenTCandremoveitfromaveraging.WithTCD07.inoperabletheminimumrequirementperTech.Specs.of4thermocouplesperquadrantismet.TCD07is,notusedtocompensateRVLZS.Thefunctionsofthethermocouplesystemasdesciibedinthe'fSARarefulfilled.Therefore,neithertheprobabilitynortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionevaluatedintheUFSARisincreased.Thepossibilityofanewaccidentormalfunctionisnotcreated.ThemarginofsafetydefinedinTech.Specs.isnotreduced.

References:

Tech.Specs.3.5.3,UFSARSection7.7.4ffreyP.Wand11/30/89PORCApproval:2

CATEGORY33.5REVIEWED'EFERENCEPROCEDUREA-1402C'i~ROCHESTERGASANDELECTRICGINNASTATIONBYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTIONANOJUMPERCONTROLJOBFOREMAN'UMPERWIRE0FUNCTION~t.'8DATEREQUEST¹:ill@A.LIFTEDWIRE0FUSESPULLED0STATESBLOCK0~DOTHER0&auNA4CurrErOOML-ICC6'rKc-MME'uidm>/WELOCATION-IV~)trI~88~~M~uWW~jrd~ryc-PURPOSE+~~AOg&PCggPQ~i"SAFETYEVALUATIONREQUIRED:0YES5NOPORCDATE(IFREQUIRED)'ECHNICALMANAGERSHIFTSUPERVISORINSTALIATIONDATE8TIMEENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSINSTALLED:INSTALLEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:SKETCHATTACHED:0YESll/NODATE2-DATEREMOVALDATE8TIME:ENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSREMOVED:REMOVEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:REVIEW(ASNECESSARY)I""tI"-)Ca7&lh/irllJi"I+TOEIt/IT'2ior.i~F.~0I2.8~ui=Mu~.Midi~8Ac.cevroN0forj-QTKI'3'4T%Erut.r7d~dddt.>Z4ddfarttiilIiZ.Wi/.i=~4IHlsPir2-ilies4vRvsor-rI'guul?)~.~Q22'1iJui~~-grL."PWnJrvr.c.iLI+gir,irPilE/PTAttachadditionalpageos)asnecessaryAOTA24SY.2/88 l

CATEGORYA.ENCEPROCEDUREREVIEWEDJOBFOREMAN'~~<<>~'+OLTEJUMPERWIRE0UFTEDWIRE0FUSESLLED0FUNCTIONOTHERPfSTATESBLOCK0g~,~cROCHESTERGASANDELECTRIQQ4fg9PGINNASTATION(1FBYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTIONAND98QPE$4CCNTROLQADISPOSITION.SYRS.REQUESTS:PURPOSEuIl.5~~LOCATIOSAFETYEVAIUATIONREQUIRED:5YES0NOPORCDATE(IFREQUIRED):/-4'ECHNICALMANAGER:SHIFTSUPERVISOR:INSTALLATIONDATE8TIMEENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSINSALLED:INSTALLEDBYVERIFIEDBY:REVIEW(ASNECESSARY)AHv~cl~C~oIo4v>d,~Xikru~4ICC/'SKETCHATTACHED:0YESj4NOREMOVALDATE4TIMEcAENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSREMOVED:REMOVEDBY:VERIFIEDBY'hltrFv<</CmrotlAg<Cl~~gbl~~WC'C+LCmVic~A(+Evh-i4.+~m,/IIos'.45u)l~4~5~(~iCE'~A~>>'//vsi'//4~uZl~e+l'>>~II>N~K%<8il/>i<4~*r~~,V+Im~OO5/~itsm~v~~h~i~b,u~~.7~~~~v~I,J.PehMAttachaddItionat~ge(s)ysnecessaI)F~i~Z~~~,~.8pi=5rtaC~(I~~w~~+Ao>42Aev2/66

CATEGORYREVIEWEDI.REFERENCEPROCEDUREA-1402ROCHESTERGASANDELECTRICGINNASTATIONtj('tFrBYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTIONANDJUMPERCONTROLJOBFOREMAN+NFLJOA36$JUMPERWIRE/LIFTEDWIRE0FUNCTIONtJIRG"uQFi2oHDATEIX5-9'0REQUESTS:~A'USESPULLED0STATESBLOCK0OTHERI(MRIQ2'ncDFINIAIPau:ee~>leTEIJneaTN'.SFprII,~/0OcuTRoc.JkxozWOFg-3.)tJ6Cp8.'tr&V<0h)IAh3g.+Oh)rTtrpLOCATIO'Ito8scM&rReTGMTro&7rE.VAP8c,SAFETYEVALUATIONREQUIRED:EfYESClNOSKETCHATTACHED:0YESNOPORCDATE(IFREQUIRED)'ECHNICALMANAGER.SHIFTSUPERVISORDATEDATE:PURPOSE7POVrb/>oACPpu)ETD8-eoLIkA4)r4'TrOQHOQrTOJrINSTALLATIONDATEKTIME4I8'f'ZQENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;INSTALLEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:REVIEW(ASNECESSARY)REMOVALDATE8TIMEENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSREMOVED:REMOVEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:Attachadditionalpage(s)asnecessary191eEBee.2/88

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CATEGORYREFERENCEPROCEDUREA.1402ROCHESTERGASANDELECTRICGINNASTATIONBYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTIONANDJUMPERCONTROLJOBFOREMAN'JUMPERWIRE0FUNCTION'rTPURPOSE~4eDATE:B-2)-9OLIFTEDWIRE0FUSESPULLED0DSO~erXDREQUEST¹O-0STATESBLOCK0OTHERg76zASakrENUMBEROFTAGSINSTALLEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:NTALLED:REVIEW(ASNECESSARY)LOCATIOtII:SAFETYEVALUATIONREQUIRED:IEIYES'NOPORCDATE(IFREQUIRED)'ECHNICALMANAGER:SHIFTSUPERVISORINSTALLATIONDATEaTIME3~~<ENTEREDINOFFICIAL~LOG'REMOVALDATE8TIME.333DATEENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSREMOVED:REMOVEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:SKETCHATTACHED:~ES0NOP'cy'+A05POSlTlQN-5YRS.Attachadditionalpage(s)asnecessaryAE.IAEAev2/88

BypassofSafet}tunctionan4Purr!pe~~~f<<rTempera!}'-ColdRecaz4er'incetheT-C'c!dwi!ornnorrr<ordcrforT1-450CTI451hasbeeniinrn1lab!e,itisdesirab!itoprovideaT-Coldrecorderforplnntshutdown.Thiswi!1hen,":>>mpiishedbyinstallinga250Q.precisionresistorinsrrirs>>iththr<<ontrolboard:indicatorforT-Co!d!409044::~P'.Afni!ureoftheririw!y:ristn!!rJtrmporary'ecordercrthetrmpnrarywirrrirwi!1rioteftrittheT-ColdsignalC'romT-409BorT-4108becausethetemporarywiririrrisinstalleddovnstreamofaO'Iisolationnmp!ifier(TY-4098-1LTY-410B-l).'herefore,theinsta!lationofthisrecorderwillnotincreasetheprobabilityortheconsequenceofanace~dentpreviouslyevaluated'iaChapter15oftheUFsAR.sinceafailureofthenevtemporary'ecorderoritswiringwillnoteffectexistingplantinstrumentationusedforsafetysystemcontrols,theprobabilityofcreatinganaccidentnotpreviouslyevaluatedinChapter15oftheUFShRvillnotbeincreased.SinceafailureofthisrecorderwillnotadverselyeffectRVLISinputfromT-Cold4098and410B,themarginofsafetyaedefinedinthebasisofan}'echnicalSpecificationwillnotbereduced.II7MavenT.hdams3/22/90 J

CATEGORYREVIEWEDREFERENCEPROCEDUREA.1402ROCHESTERGASANDELECTRICGINNASTATIONBYPASS.OFSAFETYFUNCTIONANDJUMPERCONTROLJOBFOREMAN'UMPERWIRE0LIFTEDWIRE0FUNCTIONic.17WOa~IC~rP2-io8-)>enT-CccvoPURPOSE~i'dT~C~~9*::FUSESPULLED0STATESBLOCK0OTHERl8IiE17di~Sc:drrL:LOCATION:ISAFETYEVALUATIONREQUIRED:~ES0NOPORCDATE(IF,REQUIRED)'Z-P>TECHNICALMANAGERSHIFTSUPERVISOR:INSTALLATIONDATE8TIME/ENTEREDINOFFICIALL~OG;NUMBEROFTAGSITAINSTALLEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:REVIEW(ASNECESSARY)REINOVALDATE5TIME:DATEDATEENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSREMOVED:REMOVEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:SKETCHATTACHED:YES0NOJUIII4iV~gf+Attachadditionalpage(s)asnecessary4911$Rtv2/86

~~PYVissof.Snlet}lunctionandJumpers'OD~~forTempcrar}T-ColdRecorderSincethe1'-(nldwidernno~>n<.orderforTl-4~0CTI-451hasbeenunreliable,tttsdesirnhlrtoprovidenT-Coldrecorderforplantshutdown.Thiswi1ll~~nccomp1ishe'.!kyinsta11inga250+,precisionresistorinscr:n.:-.tththr.~~t:c1boardindicatorforTCold!40'IBC4lt>P'I.failute0!thenewlyinstn1ledteml'<~mryrecordercr'thetompornryiiringvi11noteflectthe".-~o'.')signnlfromT-4098orT-410Bbecausethetemporatywiring:sinstnlleddownstreamofaV/Iisolationnmplifier(TY-409B-1LTY-4108-1).Therefore,.'.theinstallationofthisrecorderwillnotincreasetheprobability,ortheconsequenceofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedinChapter"15oitheUFshR.Sinceafailureofthenevtemporaryrecorderoritswiringvillnoteffectexistingplantinstrumentationusedforsafetysystemcontrols,theprobabilityofcreatinganaccidentnotpreviouslyevaluatedinChapter15oftheVFSARvill.notbeincreased.1SinceafnilureotthisrecordervillnotadverselyeffectRVLISinputfromT-Cold409Band410B,themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisofanyTechnicalSpecificationwillnotbereduced'.@evenT!Adaas3/22/90

CATEGORVREVIEWEDt(I'dgjjIIg~+KAREN/El~CEDUREaUC:5890A-1402ROCHESTERGASANDELECTRIC(-ENI"~ij-'I:.;-,:,5:GINNASTATIONBYPAS)Pf+F+gFUNCTIONANDJUMPEROI~~OL""~",:"(JOBFOREMAN'ATE:REQUESTgf0l4'UMPERWIRE0FUNCTIONLIFTEDWIRE/FUSESPULLED0ISTATESBLOCK0OTHER0PURPOSELOCATION:rref/WDSAFETYEVALUATIONREQUIRED:PfYES0NOPORCDATE(IFREQUIRED):TECHNICALMANAGER:nSHIFTSUPERVISORINSTALLATIONDATE&TIME55/(ENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSINSTALLED:INSTALLEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:REVIEW(ASNECESSARY}REMOVALDATE&TIME~DATE:ENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSREMOVED:REMOVEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:l~/&@i4'C~3'SO/PI>'7ZgSrVYrC3SKETCHATTACHED:~YES0NOp(sy-@+@<M4/dikikA'ncchnq5'y>.0$t)2loS'QaliamPsgi/AIMr~PrAttachadditionalpage(s}asnecessarya9i42Rtv.2/8S

CATEGORYREVIEWEDREFERENCEPROCEDUREA-1402ROCHESTERGASANDELECTRICGINNASTATIONBYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTIONANDJUMPERCONTROLIJOBFOREMAN'ATEREQUESTS.0-2/FUSESPULLED04vJUMPERWIRE0LIFTEDWIRE0FUNCTION/8,rM~Mck78r'wtrvlp//aZSTATESBLOCK/iVa/7'~e4no'rfryOTHER+PURPOSEIuvol4u.wD~..~Q2i5r~a'oLOCATIONVr2rearOCSAFETYEVALUAT(ONREQUIRED:MES0NOPORCDATE(IFREQUIRED)'7-OTECHNICALMANAGERSHIFTSUPERVISORINSTALLATIONDATEIITTIMEENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSINSTALLED:INSTALLEDBY:&luWh<VERIFIEDBY:REVIEW(ASNECESSARY)Pion~pREMOVALDATE8TIMEDATEDATE:ENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSREMOVED:REMOVEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:5-r7-)SKETCHATI'ACHED:/HAYES0NOCETR'IrU~L.Q.CtrlDISPOSITION~5YRS.Attachadditionalpage(s)asnecessary46142RGY2IM

ROCHESTERGASANDELECTRICCORPORATIONGlNNASTATION:OATE:PAGEOFJOB'AOEBY:~drslsshsnIsrBypnss4Sr&cjFreakqorch.gu~tPCn-~JgrfYdcnr~~IQ5CcJTChmj1.ACvncnyAnsi'~crl/Ikcin&fir/cddie.//6>+goiW/0StrV>~hnC2~prmp/PErnnP&FV/M@4LCVr~r<i+rocA.r.A'r/)acprors4kcdv'r/i4r<5AP/&pPIc<Z~-r~<Sar-Z(i/nr/25<Zvil7).~vr//npsWren<sr<<rrr</cc/SrrCCchrc&r.4rCC~M~/IA4py~cdporn~nor~//>>VJfCsp/s<g.(zecs<pnchcn/5rhrkmfn(sine/s)'Crl<r/Arrrs/byrcssrfSr<ennv"vhccrWinca>>ter/vrAi/inI'rnrmsc<<WP~kwkiA46occvr~ncco$anacerch~d~r2'v/~/+c~s/mWArn~b&J~.PdC~JVw~AA/I/2CICMssnncJpPrlC<nr4AranjV/C/rC/P~>csn4&~4'nllnsLnr/cnrs/qc5rrcscA./srsksh/rr'lcnsiccnsccr/rs+nms/mar/rns'rrsss~is-of~uF'Saf.Jvl/sIPcw&'/4II/hdfIlct~ghr~Cc/f75cfvclfccbDf4?rIcjccgbCc46ir&IP/colC~4444lnW&FAN<,Wrwdirlrpi~fPm/c~ccsc,gA~rFccsA~d6'llrrl'rTcrlkc:zncrc+c<dA/4ctbi'rtu~>iQcncorM>rli5-A<r///cIArl~hsH~WIQpbbsP>4j@crQ-+gci/ISrphrc/7crSo4ca+cpcc/cc(rggg&J4,/rccpsrg/CPlrdhs(<'r'erhPacckc.rS.Cni/62vwp~esnec/@sore>Cc./Acvsse'rr/r4/rnrrrr/nr/rnrrssrcs/2<</srhr6,//rJrfncsrrrncs.norWchuqfwcncclncisvncscyvcpn&nrrn/v</nnccslssan~/prrrnrrsg<rrr/rM<rr~o'FsMsync,c~~rrcnH+ans.4rsscrsaccpasglhnc~c.c.i<'~5"r//A~hc~SIgCAWWSApu'ntp/i~~brlirT4rfvncc'Wtr~l&ycrkhrtsrruccrnnsg<ccr/rncs6s/re4/Svvr/6snr(sr+5rrriscrvs/>>/srrIcs.~J>snrr/+>>4J&/1+i/pvr//rn<2+PjnrAi'vrl2isngy+~JQ/cd+4/nip.r~y~sc+~upcs~IIInut/~~4mp%>v>s/4//PxgrhncPccr&<g)t@<<~kjlccsinvc/vc(vers/uw~cn1%s,1nrcls>>/rrr/gA<<<nls,/vrccsf~~PumP,ISr/LC466'6~C,~~4~~d~W/roc8/cg~~WMryp<-yvccZ,/~//nr/-s~,l<</2C/srshIls,lc(nl6AWenbpc.oF'nnlIsinckrnccI'rivi/ncng<m(/rr/nn/4snrllscnragprcnsrsksrsllnAcliFS/l/LyingIs<<lssss9snSshtisn[hisIlrccislcjl~c<nlrn&.7llir<r//rss'(Jvcn/rcv+c</nt<<r/vcnstnsginccfhn+Zshcs4vllq~hisi'4/ln,~(

GINNASTATION'OB'OCHESTERGASANOELECTRICCORPORATIONDATEMADEBY:~9l695PAGEOF44~L0s4~l3-3+~+zp+p~+~~p~~yp~~per~~<++,p/l9&c~4owrut~i~/mr/vm~~4~E~/1~Žj'iJM~q~~pk+/ps~~45wc>~4.kn~APn4n-,cAl~gpSW~+qi,.~q//canhe~hge~iA~+gsill4rspgk'A~ri

CATEGORYREVIEWEDREFERENCEPROCEDUREA-1402ROCHESTERGASANDELECTRICGINNASTATIONBYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTIONANDJUMPERCONTROLJOBFOREMAN'ATE'*'~JUMPERWIRECILIFTEDWIREQFUSESPULLED0STATESBLOCK0OTHER0FUNCTION8PS~S'oS40arA>H/7dN/4~IS&4~/8'4~MA'P'k,PURPOSEEN7PkSpent.iAdA'PSJTITPLFrIDW57'f6)LOCATION:Df40EMWowi7'AFETYEVALUATIONREQUIRED8YES0NOPORCDATE(IF'REQUIRED)-2>"HJTECHNICALMANAGER:SHIFTSUPERVISORINSTALlATIONDATESTIME2O-ENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSINSINSTALLEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:IUGhTr~YSKETCHATTACHED:0YESSNODATEDATEREMOVALDATEaTIMEENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSREMOVED:REMOVEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:REVIEW(ASNECESSARY)c/W~IIt)e-zo-IS~JSSPCBA'l(J0;ZAttachadditianalpage(s)asnecessaryAS.iiERsvE/66

CATEGORYBYPCgy~NCEPROCEDUREA-tROCHESTERGASANDELECTRICI80GINNASTATIONRgr~...ASSOFSAFETYFUNCTIONANO~PZItOC}NTROLalV.,py~JOBFOREMAN'UMPERWIRE0FUNCTIONLIFTEDWIREDATEFUSESPULLED0C'TATESBLOCK0OTHER0REQUESTgC-8PURPOSELOCATION:SAFETYEVALUATIONREQUIRED:ES0NOPORCDATE(IFREQUIRED)M-2o-TECHNICALMANAGER:SHIFTSUPERVISOINSTALLATIONo-42ENTEREDINOFFICIALLOGŽ~NUMBEROFTAGSINSINSTALLEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:REVIEW(ASNECESSARY)o,~Icar.SKETCHAYIACHED:0YESII(INODATEDATEREMOVALDATEaTiME:<>-O3ENTEREDINOFRCIAL~OG;NUMBEROFTAGSREMOVED:REMOVEDBY:VVERIFIEDBY:IVL(LL-orsorlr(c.rC/4jI4iWuE.4CIIuV@rp(Attachadditionalpags)asnecessaryAE.(424',2/66

jgSGPytr4I/Ij{ENCEPROCEDUREA.t+ROCHESTERGASANDELEC~.630GINNASTATION~tBYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTIONANIIIF@P@KA'OGNTROL~4REauEST>>:>0STATESBLOCK0OTHER0DIC-=-zABC(IJOBFOREMAN'ATEI20JUMPERWIRE0LIFTEDWIREFUSESPULLED0FUNCTIONIIIYIE.'A'.~ELE("Z.'w~U"I'IiCEGCCPURPOSEPain'g=W'~Ig.lIIIAIAL~57~~~5er8-3hS3LOCATION:SAFETYEVALUATIONREQUIRED:8YES0NOPORCDATE(IFREQUIRED)0-Z5'"$'nTECHNICALMANAGER~SHIFTSUPERVISORINSTALLATIONDATE8TIME/aENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGTALLED:SKETCHATTACHED:YESDATEREMOVALDATE8TIMEENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;(NUMBEROFTREMOINSTQLLEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:REVIEW(ASNECESSARY)Dcr7OREMOVEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:E'4zCpronfnAVA',.~r8,.~r~iiz~~lsWr~f?08niAttachadditionalpage(s)asnecessary49142ITev.2/88

CATEGORYREVIEWEDREFERENCEPROCEDUREA.1402ROCHESTERGASANDELECTRICIII,/GINNASTATIONSTPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTIONANDJUIHPERCONTROLJOBFOREMAN'UMPERWIRE0LIFTEDWIREFUNCTION8ERABIES4oIDATE:+/P'-$0REQUESTS0FUSESpULLED0STATESBLOCK0OTHER0A4AMMEiffel~PURPOSEA)LIISrl~cCLOCATIOorIo<4ouWo~rTorSAFETYEVALUATIONREQUIRED:8YES0NOpORCDATE(IFREQUIRED)'sr-4~acvsiTECHNICALMANAGERSHIFTSUPERVISOR.INSTALLATIONDATEaTIME~itr'NTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSINSTALLED:INSTALLEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:REVIEW(ASNECESSARY)SKETCHATIACHED:0YESIINO48wnx'lDATE>,-P'C<gREMOVALDATEKTIME:t>-tX-Gca50ENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;rNUMBEROFTAGSREMOVEDREMOVEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:~v<.>>.;EI+I~'~~".'>~rL<,.'C;.SAttachadditionalpage(s)asnecessary42142$4v.2/65

CATEGORYREVIEWED8'c'j/3.3.5UsiaNCEPROCEDURE44AtROCHESTERGASANDELECTRIC+90GINNASTATIONEA(.g~rBYPAssoFsAFETYFUNCTloNANbgJQI+EIt5%ITRQLJag~~JOBFOREMAN'UMPERWIRE0FUNCTIONDATEhatt)LIFTEDWIREFUSESPULLED0C'.REQUESTS:STATESBLOCK0OTHER0PURPOSELOCATION:SAFETYEVALUATIONREQUIRED:ES0NOPORCDATE(IFREQUIRED):~>4'KETCHATTACHED:0YES8NOTECHNICALMANAGERSHIFTSUPERVISO.'?,i>(t6-C~k~DATEDATEINSTALLATIONDATERTIMEgD52ENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSINSLEINSTALLEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:REVIEW(ASNECESSARY)PhlF4rREMOVALDATE6TIMEENTEREDINOFFICIAL~QG;NUMBEROFTAGSREMOVED:REMOVEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:lIC/VECLCdfsonhc.rC'~r~Icvd4CIIuVAttachadditionalpags)asnecessary-v-$)401~2Rev2/66

CATEGORY3.3.5REVIEWEDROCHESTERGASANDELECTRICGINNASTATIONREFERENCEPROCEDUREA-1402BYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTIONANDJUMPERCONTROLJOBFOREMAN'P4(JUMPERWIRE0LIFTEDWIRE0FUNCTIONC/orJ>>:ri~.>>.rd.DATE:REQUEST>>~3~FUSESPULLED0STATESBLOCK0OTHER%iC~ngcn'~T6vR~4.~l~~~/4q.dFURFOSEn~rnAOC-jofErhh>>,.n;fr~reLOCATION:SAFETYEVALUATIONREQUIRED:PORCDATE(IFREQUIRED):TECHNICALMANAGERSHIFTSUPERVISOR:CAr,n.dIrvl@YES0NO6-=~oSKETCHATTACHED:0YESIINODATE:C~.~h.9hINSTALLATIONDATE&TIMEENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSINTAD'NSTALLEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:REVIEW(ASNECESSARY)REMOVALDATE&TIME:hENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGMOVE.REMOVEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:/'fs>Rlf~f~p,,~tA,rfPttJtyya+A>i',.'u~~>>OISPOStV~~>>PgAttachadditionalpage(s)asnecessary49l~PA>>>>PTAS

BYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTIONANDJUMPERCONTROLANNUNCIATORC-10AnnunciatorC-10isdescribedintheUFSARasamethodofprovidingindicationoflowSWflowtothecontrolroomduringanaccident.Awiringanomalyiscausingspuriousalarms.Withoutthisalarm,theoperatorwillnotknowifadequateSWflowexistsduringanaccident.Bypullingthealarmcard,thecardwillbepreventedfromalarmingspuriouslybutindicationofSWflowwillbelost.ToensuresufficientSWflow,ifanSIsignalisreceived,operationspersonnelwillverifylocallythatgreaterthan900gpmisavailabletoeachfancooler.ThisrequirementwillbepostedontheMCBandoncomingoperatorswillbeinformedduringturnover.Duringnormaloperations,theflowis1000gpm.WhenanSIsignalisreceived,flowwouldgoupsosufficientflowshouldbeavailable.Byverifyinggreaterthan900gpm,theassumptionsoftheUFSARremainvalidandnounreviewedsafetyquestionexists.Post,maintenancetestingwillincludesufficienttestingtoensurethealarmwilloperatewhenactuallowflowissensed.Ref.UFSAR6.2.1.1.1a/8/ro

CATEGORYREVIEWEDROCHESTERGASANDELECTRICGINNASTATIONREFERENCEPROCEDUREjA-1402BYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTIONANDJUMPERCONTROLJOBFOREMAN'ATE:-7-PoREQUESTS:JUMPERWIRE0LIFTEDWIREBFUNCTIONi~7pJAT'uPURPOSEISCWFUSESPULLED0STATESBLOCK0OTHER0V-eaiu~c8coc.wg~AC-3LOCATION'AFETYEYALUATIQNREQUIRED;IrYEBpNpPORCDATE(IFREQUIRED)4-lg-gTECHNICALMANAGERSHIFTSUPERVISOR:SKETCHATTACHED:0YESNODATE+/~0DATE.g-I9-9OINSTALLATIONDATE&TIME4I0ENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSINSTALLED:INSTALLEDBY:.VERIFIEDBY:REVIEW(ASNECESSARY)REMOVALDATE&TIME:ENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSREMOVED:REMOVEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:Attachadditionalpage(s)asnecessary~9\itRev.tlBB 0

/PWg&5)'Sage/7Evg/us*~$)p~sirf&Ah/R.ck~qd3u~p~rCh.l-IIp~Dc~PLP:Csvc'u)I'H&eecrvP6'~iae~~5ure~AvecdeovSWee(<~g5'Wo+~UrCWLC4p<$5~~~ss~i~~oCnupQpopoP4p~~r/'flW/r~J',Mixmg//yvev~4Xw-crnaous4~~W~~cm~pLcg~g/u~l~~~~Kg/~4'm/4'uJW*~D~~0~~/'CcP~~,WkC~r~~o~oMfLcgp4npv~~'/Peg~i~+7<A5faes~i'/I~~o~t4,k'3tgg,4u~l,~%PL(&.+i5~Atll&k(~'~greb<st/gQ~M/~ce,5i4~~cct~/~m~IPv<ckL~pre.vlov5lgc4<luMW,~UPSA-Rwill~+hcpe>~>1hpc+~ace6k~~~lk>>c,h~no//~VI0USIgeblis.kl~~lmWUFSA4~lflen/(cM.~~~qs~$b~~s,4~r~l.epcss.I(KeckpcsschL5>~>4WR35-3

CATEGORYREVIEWEDREFERERCEPRCCEDUREgqA-1402ROCHESTERGASANDELECTRICGINNASTATIONBYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTIONANDJUMPERCONTROLJOBFOREMAN'UMPERWIRE0FUNCTIONLIFTEDWIRE/(FUSESPULLED0e~PreSTATESBLOCK0C.DATE7i~~REQUEST4:OTHER0PURPOSENcII70/~o+/~~/~r7g+~fkgzLOCATION'~'~ZR~L~I-II~3,ZSAFETYEVALUATIONREQUIRED:gYES0NOSKETCHATIACHED:0YESPORCDATE(IFREQUIRED)'7POTECHNICALMANAGER@NOSHIFTSUPERVISOINSTALLATIONDATESTIME-0ENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSITALLED:INSTALLEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:REVIEW(ASNECESSARY)REMOVALDATE8TIME:DATE:ENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSREMOVED:REMOVEDBY:VERIFIEDBYAttachadditionalpage(s)asnecessaryI9lEtREF,g/8S

10CFR50.59SAFETYEVALUATIONforBypassofSafetyFunctionforThermocoupleC-3ThecircuitforthermocoupleC-3isinoperable.Toensureerroneousreadingsarenotgenerated,theleadsfromthisthermo-coupletothethermocouplepanelwillbelifted.Thiswillpreventerroneous,thermocouplereadingsfrombeingincludedintheaveragingcal'culationsinthethermocouplepanel.ThefourthermocouplesperquadrantrequiredbyTechSpecswillbemain-tainedandthermocoupleC-3isnotusedbyRVLIS.'Basedonthisevaluation,theprobabilityandconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionpreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARwillnotbeincreased.ThepossibilityofanaccidentormalfunctionnotpreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARwillnotcreated.And,themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisofTechSpecswillnotbereduced.Therefore,thisbypassofsafetyfunctiondoesnotcreateanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

References:

UFSARSection4.4.5.4&Table7.7-3TechSpecsSection3.5.3&Table3.5-3Preparedby:Date:7-TC.SA

August1,1989SAFETYEVALUATIONFORTEMPORARYSTRUCTUREFEATUREAUTHORIZATIONFORM89-180Thistemporarystructurewillbeplacedunderthereferencelegpipingtosupportthecondensatepotandassociatedtubing.Thereferencelegpipingwillbeliftedbyhandwhilemeasuringandrecordingthemaximumlift'orce.Theliftwillgotcreateanysubstantialdeflectionoftherootvalveandwillthereforenotcreateanunexceptablestressontheweldsinthereferenceleg.Thereferencelegwillnotbeliftedpastthecondensatespot'soriginal'esignelevation.Therefore,thistemporarystructurewillnotendangertheintegrityofthereferencelegpiping.Thistemporarystructurewillberemoved'riortoleavingthehotshutdowncondition.ThistemporarystructurewillnotincreasetheprobabilityofanaccidentortheconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR.ThistemporarystructurewillnoteffectthepressuretransmitterPT-429andthereforewillnoteffecttheresponseofsafetyinjectiontoanaccident.Thisstructurewillnoteffecttheintegrityofthereferencelegandwillonlybeusedtosupportthestaticloadofthepipingwillremainintact.ThistemporarystructurewillnotcreateanaccidentofadifferenttypethenthosespecifiedintheUFSAR.TheSafetyInjectionSystemwillreactasdesignedtoanyaccidentaddressedintheUFSAR.Thistemporarystructurewillnotreduce'hemarginofsafetyasdefinedinanytechnicalspecificationbasis.Thisstructuredoesnotrenderanyplantsysteminoperable,norwillitdegradeanyoperatingsystem.

8/11/89SCREENHOUSENORTHOFMCC-1GPLANTBETTERMENTPAINTSCAFFOLD89-183ScaffoldingisneededforceilingandwallpaintingintheareanorthofMCC-1Gnotcoveredbypreviouslyapprovedscaffolds89-167and89-168.BecauseoftheproximityoftheserviceWaterPumpsinbothtrainsandMCC-1GthescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).Theguidelinesstatement4.0requirementtowireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternativerequirementtousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunctionwithwoodencleats.(AcceptableasnotedperM.K.FitzsimmonsonAuthorizationForm89-167).TheJobSupervisorshallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheguidelinesprovided.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbyanassignedLiaisonEngineer,anditsseismiccapabilityinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebytheLiaisonEngineer.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.TheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisorofconfirmationofseismiccapability.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,anduponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershallaccept.theinstallation.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstoallvalves,instrumentation,panels,andfirefightingprovisions.Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;based.onthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththis'proposedinstallationarethefollowing:SeismicEvents

Therewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapabilitybecausetherewillbenointerferencewithaccessprovidedto'irefightingprovisions.TheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

8/11/89SCREENHOUSESOUTHWALLOVERDIESELFIREPUMPPLANTBETTERMENTPAINTSCAFFOLD89-184ScaffoldingisneededforceilingandwallpaintingintheareaovertheDieselFirePumpbetweentheareascoveredbypreviouslyapprovedscaffolds89-170and89-171.BecauseoftheproximityoftheserviceWaterPumpsandFireServiceWaterPumpsinbothtrainsthescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).Theguidelinesstatement4.0requirementtowireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternativerequirementtousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunctionwithwoodencleats.(AcceptableasnotedperM.K.FitzsimmonsonAuthorizationForm89-167).TheJobSupervisorshallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheguidelinesprovided.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbyanassignedLiaisonEngineer,anditsseismiccapabilityinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebytheLiaisonEngineer.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.TheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisorofconfirmationofseismiccapability.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,anduponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershallaccepttheinstallation.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstoallvalves,instrumentation,panels,andfirefightingprovisions.Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Thedesignbasiseventsanalyzedinthe'SafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:SeismicEvents

Therewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapabilitybecausetherewillbenointerferencewithaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.TheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity..TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

September6,1989AMAINSTEAMARV-3411REPAIRWORKPLATFORM89-190RepairworkonARV-3411willnecessitateaworkplatform,constructedofpolescaffoldandplankssuchastosurroundtheAMainSteamleadandthereliefvalveinletpiping,somewhatbelowtheARVinletflange.ThesmalltubingfortheARVairoperatorwillbedisconnectedduringthevalverepairpreparations.AssuchtheplatformwillhavenopotentialeffectontheARVs,andthestructureswillberestrictedfrommovementinthedirectionofanyothersafetyrelatedequipment.TheMainSteamleadsandthereliefpipingaresufficientlysturdytoprecludeanydamagefromtherelativelylightscaffoldmaterials;however,pipingofsmallerdiameterthanthescaffoldpolematerialisincorporatedastheisolationvalve3507bypass.Thedurationofscaffoldexistenceisprojectedtobe2weeks.Becauseoftheabovefactors,thescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).Theguidelinesstatement4.0requirementtowireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternativerequirementtousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsincon)unctionwithwoodencleats.(AcceptableasnotedperM.B.FitzsimmonsonAuthorizationForm89-167).TheJobSupervisorshallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheguidelinesprovided.Theerectionprocessshallbe;monitoredbyanassignedLiaisonEngineer,anditsseismiccapabilityinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebytheLiaisonEngineer.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.TheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisorofconfirmationofseismiccapability.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,anduponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesamemannerasdescribedabove.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstoallvalves,instrumentation,andfirefightingprovisionsinthearea.

f Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions.intheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:SteamGeneratortuberuptureRuptureofasteampipeSeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapabilitybecausetherewillbenointerferencewithaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.TheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,it,willbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

September7,1989LAUNDRYEXHAUSTFANVIBRATION/EXPANSIONRINGREPLACEMENTWORKPLATFORM89-191RepairisrequiredonductworkattheLaundryExhaustFan,locatedinthevicinityoftheAFeedwaterLine.TheentriesfromtheMotorandTurbineAuxiliaryFeedwaterPumpdischargesarenearby,andthereisahighdensityofsnubbersforthispipinginarea(5mechanicaland1hydraulic).Atemperaturesensor(TE-2096)islocatedatthetopofthefeedwaterlinedownstreamofcheckvalve3003.Becauseoftheexistenceoftheabovefeatureswithinthevicinityoftheproposedscaffold,scaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).Theguidelinesstatement4.0requirementtowireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternativerequirementtousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunctionwithwoodencleats.(Acceptable.asnotedperM.B.FitzsimmonsonAuthorizationForm89-167).TheJobSupervisorshallverifythat.anorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheguidelinesprovided.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbyanassignedLiaisonEngineer,anditsseismiccapabilityinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebytheLiaisonEngineer.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.TheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisorofconfirmationofseismiccapability.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,anduponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationin'hesamemannerasdescribedabove.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstoallvalves,instrumentation,panels,andfirefightingprovisionsinthearea.Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.

TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:LossofNormalFeedwaterLossofallA.C.powertothestationauxiliariesSteamGeneratortuberuptureRuptureofasteampipeSeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapabilitybecausethere,willbenointerferencewithaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.TheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.Theinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluated,intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

September12,1989SIRECIRCFLOWORIFICEFE-916LEAKREPAIRWORKPLATFORM89-192AworkplatformisrequiredtocorrectaleakconditionatSIrecircfloworificeFE-916,locatedbetweentheRefuelingWaterTankand480vBus16.AlsowithinthevicinityareTemperatureIndicatorTI-917,andSIrecircMOVs897and898.TheMOVsarewithintheASMESeismicClass2boundaryasindicatedonP&ID33013-1261ContainmentSpray(SI).Theplatformistobeabout4ft.high,estimatedtobeinexistence2days.BecauseoffactorsgivenabovethescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).Theguidelinesstatement4.0requirementtowireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternativerequirementtousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunctionwithwoodencleats.(AcceptableasnotedperM.B.FitzsimmonsonAuthorizationForm89-167).TheJobSupervisorshallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheguidelinesprovided.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbyanassignedLiaisonEngineer,anditsseismiccapabilityinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebytheLiaisonEngineer.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.TheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisorofconfirmationofseismiccapability.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,anduponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesamemannerasdescribedabove.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstoallvalves,instrumentation,panels,andfirefightingprovisionsinthearea.Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.

TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:DecreaseinReactorCoolantInventorySeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapabilitybecausetherewillbenointerferencewithaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.TheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

AUXILIARYBUILDING,TOPSOUTHWALLWESTFROMCOLUMNLINE8aPLANTBETTERMENTPAINTSCAFFOLD89-1949/26/89AscaffoldisplannedforpaintingthesouthwallattheAuxiliaryBuildingtoplevel,toextendfromtheDeconPittotheMonitorTanks.Becauseofthelargeareatobecovered,includingtheareaimmediatelyadjacenttobothComponentCoolingHeatExchangers,andtherelativelylengthyprojecteddurationofthescaffoldexistence,thescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering'(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).Theguidelinesstatement4.0requirementtowireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternativerequirementtousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunctionwithwoodencleats.(Acceptable-asnotedperM.B.FitzsimmonsonAuthorizationForm89-167).TheZobSupervisorshallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheguidelinesprovided.Inaddition,partoftheorientationshallstresstheimportanceoftakingcarenottobumpanylivesmokedetectors.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbyanassignedLiaisonEngineer.--Inaddition,theJobSupervisorshallnotifytheFireProtectiongroupduringinstallationtoallowforconsultationonanypotentialinterferenceswithfiredetection/sprinklerprovisionsencountered.Duringconstruction,theend-of-shiftseismicstatusshallbe,documentedonanattachmenttothefieldcopyoftheauthorizationformbytheLiaisonEngineer.Inthefinalstageofconstructionpriortouse,theseismiccapabilityofthescaffoldinrelationto,theguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebytheLiaisonEngineer.Thisconfirmationshallincludereviewofattributessuchasconfigurationofthescaffoldframeandsecuringoftheplanks.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.TheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisorofconfirmationofseismiccapability.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,and,uponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesamemannerasdescribedabove.Duringconstruction'ndteardowncareshouldbetakentopreventbumpinganysensitiveequipment'andtubinginthevicinity.

Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testing,andmaintenanceaccesstoallvalves,instrumentation,panels,rotatingequipment,andfirefightingprovisionsinthearea.ThescaffoldshallbeconstructedsoasnottointerferewithAuxiliaryBuildingCraneuseduringfueltransfermechanismworkplanned.Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:DecreaseinReactorCoolantInventoryRuptureofaSteamPipeSeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapabilitybecausetherewillbenointerferencewithaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.TheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

S 1/16/90SERVICEWATERPIPESUPPORTSSWU-625,'WU626'WU623'"ANDSWU624SCREENHOUSEBASEMENTWORKPLATFORMS89-202InordertoperformthepipesupportupgradeworkneartheceilingfortheServiceWaterPumpdischarges,workplatformsareneeded,tobeconstructedofwood,about3ft.abovethefloor.Theindividualpumpdischargesare14in.pipe,andtheheadersare20in.pipe,sufficientlysturdytoprecludeanydamagebytherelativelyshortwoodenplatforms.Nosafetyrelatedinstrumentationwillbeaffectedbythisplatforminstallation.Basedonthefactorsdescribedabovethedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.Theinstal,lationdoesnotresultinachangetothefacilityorproceduresasdescribedintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Materialofconstructionwillbelightenoughsothatitwillhavenoeffectonanycomponentintheeventofaseismicevent.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportassociatedwiththeproposedinstallationarethefollowing:SeismicEventTheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTeqhnicalSpecificationsbecausethelightnessoftheinstallationinrelationtothesturdinessofthepipewillensurethattherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbases.TheinstallationwillnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseitwillnotaffectsafetyrelatedequipmentintheeventofaseismicevent.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseofthesturdinessoftheadjacentpiping.TheinstallationofthistemporarymodificationwillnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecificationbecauseitdoesnotaffectanyTechnicalSpecification.

y 1/16/90SERVICEWATERPIPESUPPORTSSWU-636ANDSWU-638WORKPLATFORMS89-203InordertoperformthepipesupportupgradeworkneartheceilingfortheServiceWaterPumpdischargeportioninthenortheastcorneroftheroom,aworkplatformconstructedofwoodwillbeneeded,about3ft.abovethefloor.Theindividualpumpdischargesare14in.pipe,andtheheadersare20in.pipe,sufficientlysturdytoprecludeanydamagebytherelativelyshortwoodenplatforms.Nosafetyrelatedinstrumentationwillbeaffectedbythisplatforminstallation.Basedonthefactorsdescribedabovethedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetothefacilityorproceduresasdescribedintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Materialofconstructionwillbelightenoughsothatitwillhavenoeffectonanycomponentintheeventofaseismicevent.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportassociatedwiththeproposedinstallationarethefollowing:ISeismicEventTheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecausethelightnessoftheinstallationinrelationtothesturdinessofthepipewillensurethattherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbases.TheinstallationwillnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseitwillnotaffectsafetyrelatedequipmentintheeventofaseismicevent.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseofthesturdinessoftheadjacentpiping.TheinstallationofthistemporarymodificationwillnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecificationbecause.itdoesnotaffectanyTechnicalSpecification.

1/17/90SCREENHOUSEPLANTBETTERMENTPAINTINGSCAFFOLDABOVETHEHOUSEHEATINGBOILER90-01ScaffoldingisrequiredintheScreenhouseforcleaningandpaintingunderthePlantBettermentProject.Thispermit(90-01)isforaseismicscaffoldaboveandaroundthehouseheatingboiler.(Ref.sketchattachedtopermit).Thislocationiswithin11/2timesitsheightofsafetyrelatedservicewaterpumpslAand1B.Thescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththe.attachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).Theguidelinesstatement4.0requirementtowire'llplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternativerequirementtousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunctionwithwoodencleats.(AcceptableasnotedperM.K.FitzsimmonsonAuthorizationForm89-167).TheJobSupervisorshallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheguidelinesprovided.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbyanassignedStationEngineer,anditsseismiccapabilityinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebyaqualifiedindividual.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.ThepersonperformingsuchconfirmationshallnotifytheShiftSupervisorofconfirmationofseismiccapability.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,anduponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershallaccepttheinstallation.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testing.andmaintenanceaccesstotheScreenhouseallvalves,instrumentation,panels,rotatingequipment,andfirefightingprovisions.Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.Theinstallationdoesnot.resultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:SeismicEvents

Therewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapabilitybecausetherewillbenointerferencewithaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.TheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

February7,1990CONDUITANDCABLEINSTALLATIONINAUXILIARYBUILDINGSUB-BASEMENTFORMIDLOOPINSTRUMENTATIONEWR-4892SCAFFOLD90-14Ascaffoldisneededwithaworkplatformabout8feetfromthefloor.Thecornerpolesshallbeextendedtotheceilingandhorizontalpolesshallbeextendedtoatleastonewallandotheranchoragepointsorbumpercontactpointsontheoppositesidetopreventmovement.BecausebothtrainsofResidualHeatRemovalPumpsarewithintheimmediatevicinityofthescaffold,thescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismic.ScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment),incorporatingthefeaturesdescribedabove.Theguidelinesstatement6.0shallbeaugmentedwiththerecpxirementthatthescaffoldshallbecompleteandseismictotheextentinstalledbytheendofeachshift.TheConstructionEngineerorLiaisonEngineershallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheguidelinesprovided.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbytheConstructionEngineerandtheLiaisonEngineer.Duringconstruction,theend-of-shiftseismicstatusshallbedocumentedonanattachmenttothefieldcopyoftheauthorizationformbytheConstructionEngineerortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.Inthefinalstageofconstructionpriortouse,theseismiccapabilityofthescaffoldinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebytheConstructionEngineer,ortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.Thisconfirmationshallincludereviewofattributessuchasconfigurationofthescaffoldframeandsecuringoftheplanks.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.TheConstructionEngineerortheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisorofconfirmationofseismiccapability.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,and,uponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesamemannerasdescribedabove.Thescaffoldshallnotbebuiltuntilimmediatelypriortotheplannedstartoftheconduitinstallationeffort.

90-14Duringconstructionandteardowncareshouldbetakentopreventbumpinganysensitiveequipmentandtubinginthevicinity.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstoallvalves,instrumentation,fireprotectionsystems,and'otatingequipmentinthearea.Theaboveconstructionandoperationalrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:AccidentalRelease-WasteGasDecreaseinReactorCoolantInventorySeismicEventsTheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsyst'emsdiscussedinthe.basesofTechnicalSpecifications.

February7,1990CONDUITANDCABLEINSTALLATIONZNAUXILIARYBUILDINGBASEMENTATWESTSTAIRFORMID-LOOPINSTRUMENTATZONEWR-4892SCAFFOLDS90-15InordertoinstallconduitandcableforthisprojectintheAuxiliaryBuildingbasementascaffoldisneededneartheceilingabovetheSpentFuelPoolPumps.TheSFPcoolingsystemisnon-seismicsafetyrelated(1)however,'eismicCategoryIitemsarewithintheimmediatevicinity,givenbelow.AandBResidualHeatRemovalPumpCoolingUnits(2)AResidualHeatRemovalPumpDischargeTemperatureTT-630(3)Otherinstrumentsintheareaforwhichcareshouldbetakentoavoiddisturbingareasfollows:ComponentCoolingReturnfromResidualHeatRemovalPumpsflowFI-651anditsassociatedtubing.(4)AResidualHeatremovalPumpdischargepressurePZC-629andPI-629Aandtheirassociatedtubing.(3)BecauseoftheabovefactorsthescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).Theguidelinesstatement6.0shallbeaugmentedwiththerequirementthatthescaffoldshallbecompleteandseismictotheextentinstalledbytheendofeachshift.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbytheConstructionEngineerandtheLiaisonEngineer.Duringconstruction,theend-of-shiftseismicstatusshallbedocumentedonanattachmentto-thefieldcopyoftheauthorizationformbytheConstructionEngineerortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.Inthefinalstageofconstructionpriortouse,theseismiccapabilityofthescaffoldinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebytheConstructionEngineer,ortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.TheConstructionEngineerortheLiaisonEngineer,shallnotifytheShiftSupervisorofconfirmationofseismiccapability.

90-15Thescaffoldshallnotbebuiltuntilimmediatelypriortotheplannedstartoftheconduitinstallationeffort.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,and,uponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesamemannerasdescribedabove.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstotheAuxiliaryBuildingsub-basement,allvalves,instrumentation,panels,rotatingequipment,andfirefightingprovisionsinthearea.Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:DecreaseinReactorCoolantInventorySeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapabilitybecausetherewillbenointerferencewithaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.TheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.

90-15TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.NOTES:QualityAssuranceManualAppendixAQualityandSafetyRelatedListingandDiagramsSection2.2.4SpentFuelPoolCoolingoutlinedinRG&EDrawing33013-1248(portionattached).2)UFSARSection9.4.9.1EngineeredSafetyFeaturesEquipmentVentilationandCooling.3)UFSARFigure5.4-7ResidualHeatRemovalSystem(portionattached).4)UFSARFigure9.2-4Sheet,1ComponentCoolingWaterSystem(portionattached).

February7,1990CONDUITANDCABLEINSTALLATIONINAUXILIARYBUILDINGINTERMEDIATELEVELATWESTSTAIRFORMID-LOOPINSTRUMENTATIONEWR-4892SCAFFOLD90-16InordertoinstallconduitandcableforthisprojectintheAuxiliaryBuildingIntermediateLevelascaffoldisneededneartheceilingfromthestairwellnorthtoadjacenttotheContainmentwall,overthewestendoftheSpentFuelPoolHeatExchanger.StandbyAuxiliaryFeedwaterSystemContainmentisolationMOVsarelocatedonthenorthsideoftheSFPHX.Thespacebetweentheheatexchangerandcontainmentisverycongestedwithpiping,pipesupportstructures,regulators,valves,instruments,andleadshieldingforaprocessmonitorintheservicewaterpipingfromtheheatexchanger.AmajorportionoftheequipmenthereisassociatedwiththewastegassystemsupportingtheReactorCoolantDrainTankandthePressurizerReliefTank,bothofwhichareinContainment.ImmersedwithinthisspaceisoneoftheContainmentMini-purgedischargeisolationvalves.BecauseofthelocationoftheabovediscussedSAFWContainmentisolationMOVs,thescaffoldshallbeconstructedasseismicusingtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbytheConstructionEngineerandtheLiaisonEngineer.Theguidelinesstatement6.0shallbeaugmentedwiththerequirementthatthescaffoldshallbecompleteandseismictotheextentinstalledbytheendofeachshift.TheConstructionEngineerorLiaisonEngineershallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheguidelinesprovided.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbytheConstructionEngineerandtheLiaisonEngineer.Duringconstruction,theend-of-shiftseismicstatusshallbedocumentedonanattachmenttothefieldcopyoftheauthorizationformbytheConstructionEngineerortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.Thisconfirmationshallincludereviewofattributessuchasconfigurationofthescaffoldframeandsecuringoftheplanks.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.TheConstructionEngineerortheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisorofconfirmationofseismiccapability.

90-16Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,and,uponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesamemannerasdescribedabove.Thescaffoldshallnotbebuiltuntilimmediatelypriorto,theplannedstartoftheconduitinstallationeffort.Duringconstructionandteardowncareshouldbetakentopreventbumpinganysensitiveequipmentandtubinginthevicinity.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstoallvalves,instrumentation,panels,rotatingequipment,firefightingprovisions,andad)oiningroomsinthearea.LockedareaaccesstotheSpentFuelPoolfiltervaultiscontrolledbyalockedgate.Ensurethatthescaffolddoesnotallowanyeasieraccesstothisarea.Theaboveconstructionrecpxirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforinlOCFR50.59aregivenbelow.TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:AccidentalRelease-WasteGasSteamGeneratorTubeRuptureRuptureofaSteamPipePrimarySystemPipeRuptureSeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapabilitybecausetherewillbenointerference,withaccessprovidedto.firefightingprovisions.

'I0 90-16TheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

February7,1990CONDUITANDCABLEINSTALLATIONINCONTROLROOMAIRHANDLINGROOMFORMID-LOOPINSTRUMENTATIONEWR-4892SCAFFOLD90-17Inordertoinstallconduitandcableforthispro)ectintheControlRoomAirHandlingRoomascaffoldisneeded.Theequipmentintheimmediateareais,forthemostpart,dedicatedtocontinuinghabitabilityfortheMainControlRoominthepost-accidentenvironment.Becauseofthis,thescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismic'caffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).Theguidelinesstatement6.0shallbeaugmentedwiththerequirementthatthescaffoldshallbecompleteandseismictotheextentinstalledbytheendofeachshift.TheConstructionEngineerorLiaisonEngineershallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheguidelinesprovided.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbytheConstructionEngineerandtheLiaisonEngineer.Duringconstruction,theend-of-shiftseismicstatusshallbedocumentedonanattachmenttothefieldcopyoftheauthorizationformbytheConstructionEngineerortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.Inthefinalstageofconstructionpriortouse,theseismiccapabilityofthescaffoldinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebytheConstructionEngineer,ortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.Thisconfirmationshallincludereviewofattributessuchasconfigurationofthescaffoldframeandsecuringoftheplanks.Suchdocumentationshall,beattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.TheConstructionEngineerortheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisorofconfirmationofseismiccapability.Ifit,isforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,and,uponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesamemannerasdescribedabove.Thescaffoldshallnotbebuiltuntilimmediatelyprior,totheplannedstartoftheconduitinstallationeffort.Duringconstructionandteardowncareshouldbetakentopreventbumpinganysensitiveequipmentandtubinginthevicinity.Clearanceshallbemaintainedfor.operations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstoallvalves,instrumentation,panels,rotatingequipment,andfirefightingprovisions.

S.'t 90-17Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforinlOCFR50.59aregivenbelow.TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:Decreasein.ReactorCoolantInventorySeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapabilitybecausetherewillbenointerferencewithaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.TheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.Theinstallationdoesnot,increasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunqtionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications..

February13,1990PENETRATIONSEALINSPECTIONOVERCONTROLROOMAIRHANDLINGUNITSCAFFOLD90-23InordertoinspectpenetrationsealsabovetheControlRoomAirHandlingUnit,ascaffoldisneeded.Theequipmentintheimmediateareais,forthemostpart,dedicatedtocontinuinghabitabilityfortheMainControlRoominthepost-accidentenvironment.Becauseofthis,thescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).Theguidelinesstatement4.0requirementtowireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternativerequirementtousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunctionwithwoodencleats.(AcceptableasnotedperM.B.FitzsimmonsonAuthorizationForm89-167).TheJobSupervisorshallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheguidelinesprovided.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbyanassignedLiaisonEngineer,anditsseismiccapabilityinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebyaqualifiedindividual.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.ThepersonperformingsuchconfirmationofseismiccapabilityshallsonotifytheShiftSupervisor..Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,anduponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesamemanneras,describedabove.Duringconstructionandteardowncareshouldbetakentopreventbumpinganysensitiveequipmentandtubinginthevicinity.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstoallvalves,instrumentation,panels,rotatingequipment,andfirefightingprovisions.Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.

90-23TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:DecreaseinReactorCoolantInventorySeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapabilitybecausetherewillbenointerferencewithaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.TheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

tl February15,1990CONDUITANDCABLEINSTALLATIONUNDERINTERMEDIATEBUILDINGNORTHCATWALKEWR-4530SCAFFOLD90-24Inordertoinstallconduitandcableunderthecatwalkaworkplatformneeded.ItwillbelocatedintheimmediatevicinityofcontainmentpenetrationsforheatingsteamandtheILRTventtoroof.ItwillbedirectlyabovetheContainmentCoolerUnitflowindicatorswhichareSeismicCategoryIinstruments.TotheimmediatenorthareControlRodDrivePowerCabinets.BecauseofthecloseinvolvementwiththeSeismicCategoryIitemsthescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).Theguidelinesstatement6.0shallbeaugmentedwiththerequirementthatthescaffoldshallbecomplete.andseismictotheextentinstalledbytheendofeachshift.TheConstructionEngineerorLiaisonEngineershallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheguidelinesprovided.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbytheConstructionEngineerandtheLiaisonEngineer.Duringconstruction,theend-of-shiftseismicstatusshallbedocumentedonanattachmenttothefieldcopyoftheauthorizationformbytheConstructionEngineerortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.Znthefinalstageofconstructionpriortouse-,theseismiccapability.ofthescaffoldinirelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedprior..toscaffoldusebytheConstructionEngineer,ortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.Thisconfirmationshallincludereviewofattributessuchasconfigurationofthescaffoldframeandsecuringoftheplanks.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.TheConstructionEngineerortheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisorofconfirmationofseismiccapability.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,and,uponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructural,Engineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesamemannerasdescribedabove.Thescaffoldshallnotbebuiltuntilimmediatelypriortotheplannedstartoftheconduitinstallationeffort.

90-24Duringconstructionandteardowncareshouldbetakentopreventbumpingcontainmentisolationvalves,theinstrumentsandcabinetsdescribedaboveandanyothersensitiveequipmentandtubinginthevicinity.Clearance'shallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstoallvalves,instrumentation,panels,andfirefightingprovisionsinthearea.Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:SteamLineRuptureDecreaseinReactorCoolantInventorySeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapabilitybecausetherewillbenointerferencewithaccessprovidedtofireSightingprovisions.TheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheS'afetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.7

90-24TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

February16,1990ABATTERYROOMEASTWALLPENETRATIONSEALINGINSPECTIONEWR-4941SCAFFOLD90-26InordertoinspectpenetrationsealsontheABatteryRoomwalladjacenttotheABattery,ascaffoldisneeded,toprovideaworkplatformapproximately9ft.fromthefloor.Itistobeofwoodenconstructiontoeliminatethepotentialforshortcircuitingthebattery.Itshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththe.attachedsketchsothatitwillbeidenticaltothestructureprovidedasRequest86-56,whichwasdeterminedtobeseismicallyacceptable(seeattached10/7/86S.K.Fergusonmemo).TheJobSupervisorshallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheconstructionrequirementsgivenbelow.Pre-planningandprefabricationforthescaffoldshallbedonesuchastoallowcompletionofthestructure,apart.fromthedecking,inonedayofworkwithintheBatteryRoom.Asalternativestothisthefollowingmaybeobserved:Theportioncompletedshallbeadequatelyrestrainedtomakeitseismicwithbracingandinterlockingandcontactwithadjacentstructuralfeatures.Inlieuoftheabove,theBMainBatterySystemshallbemaintainedoperable,withnonon-seismictemporarystructuresintheBBatteryRoom.Duringconstruction,theend-of-shiftseismicstatusshallbedocumentedonanattachmenttothefieldcopyoftheauthorizationformbyaqualifiedindividual.Extremecaremustbeexercisedinworkingadjacenttoorabovethebatteriesduringconstruction,use,andteardownofthescaffold.SufficientclearancesaretobeprovidedforElectricianaccesstothebattery.Priortouse,thestructureshallbeinspectedbytheJobSupervisortoconfirmthatitsconstructionwas.inaccordancewiththesketch.UponsuccessfulconfirmationtheJobSupervisorshalldocumentthisconfirmationfortheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm,andsonotifytheShiftSupervisor.

!

90-26Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveit,willnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.TheaffectsandmethodstocopewithlossofD.C.poweraregiveninthefollowing:UFSARSection8.1.4.4PotentialRiskofStationBlackoutUFSARSection8.3.2.1DescriptionUFSARSection8.3.2.2AnalysisProcedureER-ELEC.2CrosstieTSCBatterytoAorBDCBusIAlsoanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationisthefollowing:SeismicEventsTheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhav'enointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

2/26/90ABATTERYROOMNORTHWESTCORNERPENETRATIONSEALINGINSPECTIONEWR4941SCAFFOLD90-27Aworkplatformisneededtoinspect.penetrationsealsinthenorthwestcorneroftheABatteryRoomadjacenttotheABatteryCharger,tobeabout61/2ft.fromthefloor.Thedurationofexistenceofthisscaffoldisestimatedtobeamonth.InconsiderationofanypossibilityforinoperabilityofDCelectricsystemequipmentintheBBatteryRoomwithinthisfairlylengthydurationthescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).Theguidelinesstatement4.0requirementtowireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternativerequirementtousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunctionwithwoodencleats.(AcceptableasnotedperM.B.FitzsimmonsonAuthorizationForm89-167).ItshallnotbestarteduntilthewoodenscaffoldovertheABatterybankiscompleted;assuch,thatscaffold(90-26)shallserveasabarriertopreventshortcircuitingthebatterywithmetalscaffoldmaterials.Thissubjectscaffoldshallberemovedpriortoremovalofthewoodenscaffold.TheJobSupervisorshallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheguidelinesprovided.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbyanassignedLiaisonEngineer,anditsseismiccapabilityinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebyaqualifiedindividual.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.ThepersonperformingsuchconfirmationofseismiccapabilityshallsonotifytheShiftSupervisor.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,anduponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesamemannerasdescribedabove.Extremecaremustbeexercisedinworkingadjacenttothebatteriesandother.DCelectricequipmentduringconstruction,use,.andteardown'ofthescaffold.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstoallinstrumentationandpanelsinthearea.

90-27Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,.thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.TheaffectsandmethodstocopewithlossofD.C.poweraregiveninthefollowing:UFSARSection8.1.4.4PotentialRiskofStationBlackoutUFSARSection8.3.2.1DescriptionUFSARSection8.3.2.2AnalysisProcedureER-ELEC.2CrosstieTSCBatterytoAorBDCBusAlsoanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationisthefollowing:SeismicEventsTheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithany'xistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

2/26/90ABATTERYROOMNORTHEASTCORNERPENETRATIONSEALINGINSPECTIONEWR4941SCAFFOLD90-28AworkplatformisneededtoinspectpenetrationsealsinthenortheastcorneroftheABatteryRoomadjacenttotheABatteryDisconnectSwitchestobeabout8ft.fromthefloor.Thedurationofexistenceofthisscaffoldisestimatedtobeamonth.InconsiderationofanypossibilityforinoperabilityofDCelectricsystemequipmentintheBBatteryRoomwithinthisfairlylengthydurationthescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).Theguidelinesstatement4.0requirementtowireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternativerequirementtousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunctionwithwoodencleats.(AcceptableasnotedperM.B.FitzsimmonsonAuthorizationForm89-167).ItshallnotbestarteduntilthewoodenscaffoldovertheABatterybankiscompleted;assuch,thatscaffold(90-26)shallserveasabarriertopreventshortcircuitingthebatterywithmetalscaffoldmaterials.Thissubjectscaffoldshallberemovedpriortoremovalofthewoodenscaffold.TheJobSupervisorshallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheguidelinesprovided.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbyanassignedLiaisonEngineer,anditsseismiccapabilityinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebyaqualifiedindividual.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.ThepersonperformingsuchconfirmationofseismiccapabilityshallsonotifytheShiftSupervisor.Ifit.isforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,anduponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesamemannerasdescribedabove.ExtremecaremustbeexercisedinworkingadjacenttothebatteriesandotherDCelectricequipmentduringconstruction,use,andteardownofthescaffold.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstoallinstrumentationandpanelsinthearea.'I

90-28Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.TheaffectsandmethodstocopewithlossofD.C.poweraregiveninthefollowing:UFSARSection8.1.4.4PotentialRiskofStationBlackoutUFSARSection8.3.2.1DescriptionUFSARSection8.3.2.2AnalysisProcedureER-ELEC.2CrosstieTSCBatterytoAorBDCBusAlsoanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportassociatedwiththisproposed.installationisthefollowing:SeismicEventsTheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.V

03/08/90STANDBYSFPCOOLINGCOMPONENTMOUNTING90-40Ithasbeendecidedtoprovidemountingsfor,andtoinstallthestandbySFPPumpintheAuxiliaryBuildingbasement,immedia-telyeastoftheRHRPumpCoolerUnits,bythecontainmentwall,andtodolikewisewiththestandbySFPHeatExchangeronthetopfloorimmediatelywestoftheAComponentCoolingPump.ThemountingsaretobeofseismicdesignasprovidedforTemporaryFluidSystemProvisionForm88-27forEWR1594BanddiscussedinJ.JFerraro'sApril5,1989memoonreviewofthepumpmounting.Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.Theinstallationdoesnotresultina.changetotheassump-tionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismicallyconstructedfeatureitwillnot.haveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:DecreaseinReactorCoolantInventorySeismicEventsTheinstallationdoesnot.involveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystems.inthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwill

90-40havenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

March8,1990TUBINGINSTALLATIONINAUXILIARYBUILDINGSUB-BASEMENTFORMIDLOOPINSTRUMENTATIONENR-4892SCAFFOLD90-41Ascaffoldisneededwithaworkplatformabout5feetfromthefloor.Thecornerpolesshallbeextendedtotheceilingandhorizontalpolesshallbeextendedtoatleastonewallandotheranchoragepointsorbumpercontactpointsontheoppositesidetopreventmovement.Assuchitmaybeintegratedwithscaffold90-14'BecausebothtrainsofResidualHeatRemovalPumpsarewithintheimmediatevicinityofthescaffold,thescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment),incorporatingthefeaturesdescribedabove.Theguidelinesstatement6.0shallbeaugmentedwiththerequirementthatthescaffoldshallbecompleteandseismictotheextentinstalledbytheendofeachshift.TheConstructionEngineerorLiaisonEngineershallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheguidelinesprovided.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbytheConstructionEngineerandtheLiaisonEngineer.Duringconstruction,theend-of-shiftseismicstatusshallbedocumentedonanattachmenttothefieldcopyoftheauthorizationformbytheConstructionEngineerortheXiaisonEngineerinhisstead.Znthefinalstageofconstructionpriortouse,theseismiccapabilityofthescaffoldinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebytheConstructionEngineer,ortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.Thisconfirmationshallincludereviewofattributessuchasconfigurationofthescaffoldframeandsecuringoftheplanks.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.TheConstructionEngineerortheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisorofconfirmationofseismiccapability.Zfitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,and,uponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesamemannerasdescribedabove.Thescaffoldshallnotbebuiltuntilimmediatelypriortotheplannedstartoftheconduitinstallationeffort.

90-41Duringconstructionandteardowncareshouldbetakentopreventbumpinganysensitiveequipmentandtubinginthevicinity.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstoallvalves,instrumentation,fireprotectionsystems,androtatingequipmentinthearea.Theaboveconstructionandoperationalrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:AccidentalRelease-WasteGasDecreaseinReactorCoolantinventorySeismicEventsTheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

S0 03/29/90RHRPUMPSUCTIONMOV'S704A&BSCAFFOLDS90-80InordertoperformmaintenanceonMOV's704AandBascaffoldisneededtoprovideaworkplatformabout10ft.fromthefloor.ThemaintenanceistobeperformedwithallfuelremovedfromReactor.Thescaffoldinstallationistotakeplacepriortothistomaximizethetimeavailableforvalvemaintenance.BecauseoftheneedforoperabilityoftheRHRSystemduringthisperiodthescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovided.fromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).Theguidelinesstatement4.0requirementtowireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternativerequirementtousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunctionwithwoodencleats.(AcceptableasnotedperM.B.FitzsimmonsonAuthorizationForm89-167).TheJobSupervisorshallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheguidelinesprovided.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbyanassignedLiaisonEngineer,anditsseismiccapabilityinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebyaqualifiedindividual.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.ThepersonperformingsuchconfirmationofseismiccapabilityshallsonotifytheShiftSupervisor..Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobserved.duringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,anduponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesamemannerasdescribedabove.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstoallvalves,instrumentation,rotatingequipmentandfirefightingprovisionsinthearea.Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.Theinstallation'oesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverse.effectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedC

90-80intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:DecreaseinReactorCoolantInventorySeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapabilitybecausetherewillbenointerferencewithaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.TheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent,of,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

03/29/90RHRRETURNOUTSIDEMISSILEBARRIERMOV-720SCAFFOLD90-81InordertoperformmaintenanceonMOV-720ascaffoldisneededtoprovidedaworkplatformabout7ft.fromthefloor.ThemaintenanceistobeperformedwithallfuelremovedfromtheReactor.Thescaffoldinstallationistotakeplacepriortothistomaximizethetimeavailableforvalvemaintenance.BecauseoftheneedforoperabilityoftheRHRSystemduringthisperiodthescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).Theguidelinesstatement4.0requirementtowireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternativerequirementtousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunctionwithwoodencleats.(AcceptableasnotedperM.B.FitzsimmonsonAuthorizationForm89-167).TheJobSupervisorshallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheguidelinesprovided.Theerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbyanassigned'iaisonEngineer,anditsseismiccapabilityinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebyacgxalifiedindividual.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.ThepersonperformingsuchconfirmationofseismiccapabilityshallsonotifytheShift,Supervisor.Ifit,isforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,anduponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesamemannerasdescribedabove.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstoallvalvesandinstrumentationinthearea.Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.Theinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgiven-intheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asa.seismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribed 8

90-81IIintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:DecreaseinReactorCoolantInventorySeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapabilitybecausetherewillbenointerferencewithaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.TheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.Theinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportant,tosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

April24,1990BMAINSTEAMARV-3410REPAIRWORKPLATFORM90-151Repair,workonARV-3411willnecessitateaworkplatform,constructedofpolescaffoldandplankssuchastosurroundtheAMainSteamleadandthereliefvalveinletpiping,somewhatbelowtheARVinletflange.AssuchtheplatformwillhavenopotentialeffectontheARVs,andthestructureswillberestrictedfrommovementinthedirectionofanyothersafetyrelatedequipment.TheMainSteamleadsandthereliefpipingaresufficientlysturdytoprecludeanydamagefromtherelativelylightscaffoldmaterials;however,pipingofsmallerdiameterthanthescaffoldpolematerialisincorporatedastheisolationvalve3506bypass.Thedurationofscaffoldexistenceisprojectedtobeapproximately11/2weeks.Becauseoftheabovefactors,thescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).Theguidelinesstatement4.0requirementtowireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternativerequirementtousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunctionwithwoodencleats.'AcceptableasnotedperM.B.FitzsimmonsonAuthorizationForm89-167).TheJobSupervisorshallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedon'theguidelinesprovided.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbyanassignedLiaisonEngineer,anditsseismiccapabilityinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebyaqualifiedindividual.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.ThepersonperformingsuchconfirmationofseismiccapabilityshallsonotifytheShiftSupervisor.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,anduponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesamemannerasdescribedabove.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstoallvalves,instrumentation,andfirefightingprovisionsinthearea.

90-151Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:SteamGeneratortuberuptureRuptureofasteampipeSeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapabilitybecausetherewillbenointerferencewithaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.TheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

5/10/90NaOHTANKROOMPENETRATIONSEALINSPECTIONEWR-4941SCAFFOLD90-156InordertoinspectpenetrationsealsinthesoutheastcorneroftheNaOHTankRoom,ascaffoldisneeded,toprovideaworkplatformapproximately12ft.fromthefloor.InthislocationitwillbedirectlyovertheChargingPumpLeakoffCollectionSystemandwillbeimmediatelysoutheastofthe2trainsofSprayAdditiveTankoutletvalves(HCV-836AandHCV-836B).Theleakoffcollectionsystemisindicatedasnon-seismiconP&ID33013-1265sheet2.DamagetotheleakofftankwhichcouldpresentpotentialforreleasefromtheventheaderisboundedbyanalysisofruptureofaGasDecayTank.BecauseofthepotentialeffectonHCV-836AandHCV-836BthescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).Theguidelinesstatement4.0requirementtowireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternativerequirementtousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunctionwithwoodencleats.(AcceptableasnotedperM.B.FitzsimmonsonAuthorization,Form89-167).TheJobSupervisorshallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheguidelinesprovided.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbyanassignedLiaisonEngineer,anditsseismiccapabilityinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffolduse.byaqualifiedindividual.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.ThepersonperformingsuchconfirmationofseismiccapabilityshallsonotifytheShiftSupervisor.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduring'erection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,anduponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesamemannerasdescribedabove.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstoallvalves,instrumentation,panels,rotatingequipment,firefightingprovisions,andad)oiningroomsinthearea.Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.

90-156TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:AccidentalRelease-WasteGasDecreaseinReactorCoolantInventorySeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapabilitybecausetherewillbenointerferencewithaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.TheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismic,feature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

May9,1990BBATTERYROOMWESTWALLPENETRATIONSEALINGINSPECTIONEWR-4941SCAFFOLD90-157InordertoinspectpenetrationsealsontheBBatteryRoomwalladjacenttotheBBattery,ascaffoldisneeded,toprovideaworkplatformapproximately9ft.fromthefloor.Itistobeofwoodenconstructiontoeliminatethepotentialforshortcircuitingthebattery.ItshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedsketchsothatitwillbeidenticaltothestructureprovidedasRequest86-56,whichwasdeterminedtobeseismicallyacceptable(seeattached10/7/86S.K.Fergusonmemo).TheJobSupervisorshallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheconstructionrequirementsgivenbelow.Pre-planningandprefabricationforthescaffoldshallbedonesuchastoallowcompletionofthestructure,apartfromthedecking,inonedayofworkwithintheBatteryRoom.Asalternativestothisthefollowingmaybeobserved:Theportioncompletedshallbeadequatelyrestrainedtomakeitseismicwithbracingandinterlockingandcontactwithadjacentstructuralfeatures.Inlieuoftheabove,theAMainBatterySystemshallbemaintainedoperable,withnonon-seismictemporarystructuresintheABatteryRoom.Duringconstruction,theend-of-shiftseismicstatusshallbedocumentedonanattachmenttothefieldcopyoftheauthorizationformbyaqualifiedindividual.Extremecaremustbeexercisedinworkingadjacenttoorabovethebatteriesduringconstruction,use,andteardownofthescaffold.SufficientclearancesaretobeprovidedforElectricianaccesstothebattery.Priortouse,thestructure.shallbeinspectedbytheJobSupervisortoconfirmthatitsconstructionwasinaccordancewiththesketch.UponsuccessfulconfirmationtheJobSupervisorshalldocumentthisconfirmationfortheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm,andsonotifytheShiftSupervisor.

90-157Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.TheaffectsandmethodstocopewithlossofD.C.poweraregiveninthefollowing:UFSARSection8.1.4.4PotentialRiskofStationBlackoutUFSARSection8.3.2.1DescriptionUFSARSection8.3.2.2AnalysisProcedureER-ELEC.2CrosstieTSCBatterytoAorBDCBusAlsoanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationisthefollowing:SeismicEventsTheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,it.willremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

5/9/90BBATTERYROOMSOUTHWESTCORNERPENETRATIONSEALINGINSPECTIONEWR4941SCAFFOLD90-158AworkplatformisneededtoinspectpenetrationsealsinthesouthwestcorneroftheBBatteryRoomad)acenttotheBBatterytobeabout8ft.fromthefloor.Thedurationofexistenceofthisscaffoldisestimatedtobeamonth.InconsiderationofanypossibilityforinoperabilityofDCelectricsystemequipmentintheABatteryRoomwithinthisfairlylengthydurationthescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).Theguidelinesstatement4.0requirementtowireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternativerequirementtousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsincon)unctionwithwoodencleats.(AcceptableasnotedperM.B.FitzsimmonsonAuthorizationForm89-167).ItshallnotbestarteduntilthewoodenscaffoldovertheBBatterybankiscompleted;assuch,thatscaffold(90-157)shallserveasabarriertopreventshortcircuitingthebatterywithmetalscaffoldmaterials.Thissub)ectscaffoldshallberemovedpriortoremovalofthewoodenscaffold.TheJobSupervisorshallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheguidelinesprovided.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbyanassignedLiaisonEngineer,anditsseismiccapabilityinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebyaqualifiedindividual.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.ThepersonperformingsuchconfirmationofseismiccapabilityshallsonotifytheShiftSupervisor.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,anduponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesamemannerasdescribedabove.ExtremecaremustbeexercisedinworkingadjacenttothebatteriesandotherDCelectricequipmentduringconstruction,use,andteardownofthescaffold.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstoallinstrumentationandpanelsinthearea.\

90-158Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.TheaffectsandmethodstocopewithlossofD.C.poweraregiveninthefollowing:UFSARSection8.1.4.4PotentialRiskofStationBlackoutUFSARSection8.3.2.1DescriptionUFSARSection8.3.2.2AnalysisProcedureER-ELEC.2CrosstieTSCBatterytoAorBDCBusAlsoanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationisthefollowing:SeismicEventsTheinstallation,doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewill~benoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnical&pecif~cations.

2/26/90BBATTERYROOMNORTHENDPENETRATIONSEALINGINSPECTIONEWR4941SCAFFOLD90-159WorkplatformsareneededtoinspectpenetrationsealsinthenorthendoftheBBatteryRoomadjacenttotheBBatteryChargerandBBatteryDisconnectSwitchestobeabout8ft.fromthefloor.Thedurationofexistenceofthisscaffoldingisestimated.tobeamonth.InconsiderationofanypossibilityforinoperabilityofDCelectricsystemequipmentintheABatteryRoomwithinthisfairlylengthydurationthescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering,.(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).Theguidelinesstatement4.0requirementtowireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternativerequirementtousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunctionwithwoodencleats.(AcceptableasnotedperM.B.FitzsimmonsonAuthorizationForm89-167).ItshallnotbestarteduntilthewoodenscaffoldovertheBBatterybankiscompleted;assuch,thatscaffold(90-157)shallserveasabarriertopreventshortcircuitingthebatterywithmetalscaffoldmaterials.Thissubjectscaffoldshallberemovedpriortoremovalofthewoodenscaffold.TheJobSupervisorshallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheguidelinesprovided.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbyanassignedLiaisonEngineer,anditsseismiccapabilityinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebyaqualifiedindividual.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.ThepersonperformingsuchconfirmationofseismiccapabilityshallsonotifytheShiftSupervisor.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,anduponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesamemannerasdescribedabove.ExtremecaremustbeexercisedinworkingadjacenttothebatteriesandotherDCelectricequip'mentduringconstruction,use,'ndteardownofthescaffold.

90-159Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstoallinstrumentationandpanelsinthearea.Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccesses.describedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.TheaffectsandmethodstocopewithlossofD.C.poweraregiveninthefollowing:UFSARSection8.1.4.4PotentialRiskofStationBlackoutUFSARSection8.3.2.1DescriptionUFSARSection8.3.2.2AnalysisProcedureER-ELEC.2CrosstieTSCBatterytoAorBDCBusAlsoanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationisthefollowing:SeismicEventsTheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysis.Report,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.Theinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasis'oranyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismic"'fd&ure,it.willbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

8

~May15,1990BUS16SOUTHPORTIONAREAPENETRATIONSEALINGINSPECTIONEWR-4941SCAFFOLD90-160InordertoinspectpenetrationsealsabovethesouthportionofBus16ascaffoldisneeded,toprovideaworkplatformapproximately15ft.fromthefloor.InordertopreventanyinterferencewithactivitiesinvolvingthealternatetrainBus14andMCC-lC,itisplannedtoconstructthescaffoldasaseismicinstallation.ThescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).Theguidelinesstatement4.0requirementtowireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternativerequirementtousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsincon)unctionwithwoodencleats.(AcceptableasnotedperM.B.FitzsimmonsonAuthorizationForm89-167).TheJobSupervisorshallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheguidelinesprovided.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbyanassignedLiaisonEngineer,anditsseismiccapabilityinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebyaqualifiedindividual.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.ThepersonperformingsuchconfirmationofseismiccapabilityshallsonotifytheShiftSupervisor.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,anduponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesamemannerasdescribedabove.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testing,andmaintenanceaccesstoallelectricalpanelsontheBus16andMCC-lD,toincludeclearancetorackoutbreakers.Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.

Cl 90-160Theinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalyses,givenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:DecreaseinReactorCoolantInventorySeismicEventsTheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangetothePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.Theinsta'llationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

May15,1990BUS16NORTHENDAREAPENETRATIONSEALINGINSPECTIONEWR-4941SCAFFOLD90-161InordertoinspectpenetrationsealsabovethenorthendofBus16ascaffoldisneeded,toprovideaworkplatformapproximately15ft.fromthefloor.InordertopreventanyinterferencewithactivitiesinvolvingthealternatetrainBus14andMCC-1C,itisplannedtoconstructthescaffoldasaseismicinstallation.ThescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).Theguidelinesstatement4.0requirementtowireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternativerequirementtousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunctionwithwoodencleats.(AcceptableasnotedperM.B.FitzsimmonsonAuthorizationForm89-167).TheJobSupervisorshallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheguidelinesprovided.Theerection,processshallbemonitoredbyanassignedLiaisonEngineer,anditsseismiccapabilityinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebyaqualifiedindividual.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.ThepersonperformingsuchconfirmationofseismiccapabilityshallsonotifytheShiftSupervisor.Zfitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,anduponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesamemannerasdescribedabove.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testing,"andmaintenanceaccesstoallelectricalpanelsontheBus16andMCC-1D,toincludeclearancetorackoutbreakers.Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.

i TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:DecreaseinReactorCoolantInventorySeismicEventsTheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangetothePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

5/16/90TURBINEDRIVENAUXILIARYFEEDWATERPUMPAREAPENETRATIONSEALINSPECTIONEWR-4941SCAFFOLD90-162InordertoinspectpenetrationsealsatthenorthwallbytheTurbineAuxiliaryFeedwaterPumparea,ascaffoldisneededtoprovideaworkplatformapproximately10ft.highadjacenttotheTurbineDrivenAuxiliaryFeedwaterPump.ConcurrentwiththisaretwoothersitesofscaffoldsforinspectionsinthevicinitiesoftheAandBMotorDrivenAuxiliaryFeedwaterPumps.BecauseoftheconcurrentactivitywhichcouldpotentiallyaffectbothtrainsofAuxiliaryFeedwaterSystemcomponents,construction,andteardownactivitiesshalltakeplaceatonlyonesiteatatime.Inaddition,thescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).Theguidelinesstatement4.0requirementtowireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternativerequirementtousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunctionwithwoodencleats.(AcceptableasnotedperM.B.Fitzsimmonson'AuthorizationForm89-167).TheJobSupervisorshallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheguidelinesprovided.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbyanassignedLiaisonEngineer,anditsseismiccapabilityinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebyaqualifiedindividual.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.ThepersonperformingsuchconfirmationofseismiccapabilityshallsonotifytheShiftSupervisor.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,anduponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesamemannerasdescribedabove.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstoallvalves,instrumentation,panels,rotatingequipment,andfirefightingprovisionsinthearea.Theaboveconstructionrequirementsare'tobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.

TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:SteamLineRuptureDecreaseinReactorCoolantInventorySeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapabilitybecausetherewillbenointerferencewithaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.TheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.Theinstallation-doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithany,equipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

5/16/90~BMOTORDRIVENAUXILIARYFEEDWATERPUMPAREAPENETRATIONSEALINSPECTIONEWR-4941SCAFFOLD90-163InordertoinspectpenetrationsealsatthesouthwestcorneroftheAuxiliaryFeedwaterPumparea,ascaffoldisneededtoprovideaworkplatformapproximately17ft.highadjacenttotheBMotorDrivenAuxiliaryFeedwaterPump.Concurrentwiththisaretwoothersitesofscaffoldsforinspectionsinthe-vicinitiesoftheAMotorDrivenAuxiliaryFeedwaterPumpandtheTurbineDrivenAuxiliaryFeedwaterPump.BecauseoftheconcurrentactivitywhichcouldpotentiallyaffectbothtrainsofAuxiliaryFeedwaterSystemcomponents,construction,andteardownactivitiesshalltakeplaceatonlyonesiteat.atime.Inaddition,thescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordance.withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).Theguidelinesstatement4.0requirementto.wireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternativerequirementtousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunctionwithwoodencleats.(AcceptableasnotedperM.B.FitzsimmonsonAuthorizationForm89-167).TheJobSupervisorshallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheguidelinesprovided.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbyanassignedLiaisonEngineer,anditsseismiccapabilityinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebyaqualifiedindividual.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.ThepersonperformingsuchconfirmationofseismiccapabilityshallsonotifytheShiftSupervisor.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,anduponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesamemannerasdescribedabove.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstoallvalves,instrumentation,panels,rotatingequipment,andfirefightingprovisionsinthearea.Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;based.onthese,thedeterminationscalled.forin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.

90-163TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:SteamLineRuptureDecreaseinReactorCoolantInventorySeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapabilitybecausetherewillbenointerferencewithaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.TheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.Theinstallationdoesnotcreatethe.possibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedin'thebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

5/16/90AHOUSEHEATINGBOILERFEEDPUMPAREAPENETRATIONSEALINSPECTIONEWR-4941SCAFFOLD90-164InordertoinspectpenetrationsealsatthewestandnorthwallsoftheAuxiliaryFeedwaterPumparea,ascaffoldisneededtoprovideaworkplatformapproximately20ft.highadjacenttotheAMotorDrivenAuxiliaryFeedwaterPump.Concurrentwiththis.aretwoothersitesofscaffoldsforinspectionsinthevicinitiesoftheBMotorDrivenAuxiliaryFeedwaterPumpandtheTurbineDrivenAuxiliaryFeedwaterPump.BecauseoftheconcurrentactivitywhichcouldpotentiallyaffectbothtrainsofAuxiliaryFeedwaterSystemcomponents,construction,andteardownactivitiesshalltakeplaceatonlyonesiteatatime.Inaddition,thescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).Theguidelinesstatement4.0requirementtowireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternativerequirementtousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunctionwithwoodencleats.(AcceptableasnotedperM.B.FitzsimmonsonAuthorizationForm89-167).TheJobSupervisorshallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheguidelinesprovided.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbyanassignedLiaisonEngineer,anditsseismiccapabilityinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebyaqualifiedindividual.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.ThepersonperformingsuchconfirmationofseismiccapabilityshallsonotifytheShiftSupervisor.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,anduponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesamemannerasdescribedabove.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstoallvalves,instrumentation,panels,rotatingequipment,andfirefightingprovisionsinthearea./heaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.

90-164TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,whichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:SteamLineRuptureDecreaseinReactorCoolantInventory,SeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapabilitybecausetherewillbenointerferencewithaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.TheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

6/11/90AANDBDIESELGENERATORROOMSEWR-3990OVEEGGWDCOVERREMOVALSCAFFOLDS90-3.68ScaffoldsareneededjustinsidetheDieselGeneratorRoomoverheaddoorstoriseapproximately10'romthefloor.Theworkisplannedtobedoneineachroomsimultaneously.BecauseofthisthescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).Theguidelinestatement6.0shallbeaugmentedwiththerequirementthatthescaffoldsshallbecompleteandseismictotheextentinstalledbytheendofeachshift.AnadditionalrequirementshallbethatthescaffoldsaretobeerectedinoneDieselGeneratorRoomatatime.Uponcompletionofthefirstinstallation,priortobeginningerectionofthescaffoldinthesecondDieselGeneratorRoom,theConstructionEngineer,ortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead,shallconfirmanddocumenttheseismiccapabilityinrelationtotheguidelines.Thisconfirmationshallincludereviewofattributessuchasconfigurationofthescaffoldframesandsecuringoftheplanks.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.TheConstructionEngineerorLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisorofthisconfirmationpriortoproceedingwiththeinstallationinthesecondDieselGeneratorRoom.Aftersuchconfirmation,erectionofthesecondscaffoldmaybegin,accompaniedbymonitoring,confirmation,notificationanddocumentationaswiththefirstscaffold.TheConstructionEngineerorLiaisonEngineershallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheguidelinesprovided.Duringconstruction,theend-of-shiftseismicstatusshallbedocumentedonanattachmenttothefieldcopyoftheauthorizationformbytheConstructionEngineerortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,and,uponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesamemannerasdescribedabove.

Duringconstructionandteardowncareshouldbetakentopreventbumpinganysensitiveequipmentandtubinginthevicinity.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstoallvalves,instrumentation,panels,rotatingequipment,firefightingprovisions,andadjoiningroomsinthearea.Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved.Basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforinlOCFR50.59aregivenbelow.TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetothefacilityorproceduresasdescribedintheSafetyAnalysisReportAs.aseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:LossofallA.C.powertothestationauxiliariesDecreaseinheatremovalbythesecondarysystemwithcoincidentlossofon-siteandexternal(off-site)A.C.powertothestationSteamGeneratortuberuptureRuptureofasteampipePrimarysystempiperuptureAnticipatedtransientswithoutSCRAMwithalossofA.C.powerSeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapabilitybecausetherewillbenointerferencewithaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.TheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.

Theinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviously'evaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

June21,1990AUXILIARYBUILDINGINTERMEDIATELEVELWESTSTAIRWELLPENETRATIONFIRESEALINSPECTIONEWR-4941SCAFFOLD90-173AworkplatformisneededtoinspectfirebarrierpenetrationsealsneartheceilingfromthestairwellnorthtoadjacenttotheContainmentwall,overthewestendoftheSpentFuelPoolHeatExchanger.StandbyAuxiliaryFeedwaterSystemContainmentisolationMOVsarelocatedonthenorthsideoftheSFPHX.Thespacebetweentheheatexchangerandcontainmentisverycongestedwithpiping,pipesupportstructures,regulators,valves,instruments,andleadshieldingforaprocessmonitorintheservicewaterpipingfromtheheatexchanger.AmayorportionoftheequipmenthereisassociatedwiththewastegassystemsupportingtheReactorCoolantDrainTankandthePressurizerReliefTank,bothofwhichareinContainment.ImmersedwithinthisspaceisoneoftheContainmentMini-purgedischargeisolationvalves.BecauseofthelocationoftheabovediscussedSAFWContainmentisolationMOVs,thescaffoldshallbeconstructedasseismicusingtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.,FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).Theguidelinesstatement4.0requirementtowireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternativerequirementtousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsincongunctionwithwooden'leats.(AcceptableasnotedperM.B.FitzsimmonsonAuthorization'Form89-167).TheJobSupervisorshallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheguidelinesprovided.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbyanassignedLiaisonEngineer,anditsseismiccapabilityinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebyaqualifiedindividual.Suchdocumentationshall.beattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.ThepersonperformingsuchconfirmationofseismiccapabilityshallsonotifytheShiftSupervisor.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,anduponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesamemannerasdescribedabove.

Al 90-173Duringconstructionandteardowncareshouldbetakentopreventbumpinganysensitiveequipmentandtubinginthevicinity.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstoallvalves,instrumentation,panels,rotatingequipment,firefightingprovisions,andadjoiningroomsinthearea.LockedareaaccesstotheSpentFuelPoolfiltervaultiscontrolledbyalockedgate.Ensurethatthescaffolddoesnotallowanyeasieraccesstothisarea.Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:AccidentalRelease-WasteGasSteamGeneratorTubeRuptureRuptureofaSteamPipePrimarySystemPipeRuptureSeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapabilitybecausetherewillbenointerferencewithaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.TheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.Theinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesof'anaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.

90-173TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlant.TechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

July2,1990CONTROLROOMAIRHANDLINGROOMNORTHWALLPENETRATIONFIRESEALINSPECTIONEWR-4941SCAFFOLD90-177InordertoperformfiresealsinspectionintheControlRoomAirHandlingRoomascaffoldisneeded.Theequipmentintheimmediateareais,forthemostpart,dedicatedtocontinuinghabitabilityfortheMainControlRoominthepost-accidentenvironment.Becauseofthis,thescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).Theguidelinesstatement6.0shallbeaugmentedwiththerequirementthatthescaffoldshallbecompleteandseismictotheextentinstalledbytheendofeachshift.Theguidelinesstatement4.0requirementtowireallplankdeckinginplagemaybereplacedwiththealternativerequirement.tousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunctionwithwoodencleats.(AcceptableasnotedperM.B.FitzsimmonsonAuthorizationForm89-167).TheJobSupervisorshallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheguidelinesprovided.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbyanassignedLiaisonEngineer,anditsseismiccapabilityinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebyaqualifiedindividual.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.Thepersonperformingsuchconfirmationofseismiccapabilityshallso,notifytheShiftSupervisor.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,anduponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesamemannerasdescribedabove.Duringconstructionandteardowncareshouldbetakentopreventbumpinganysensitiveequipmentandtubinginthevicinity.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstoallvalves,instrumentation,panels,rotatingequipment,andfirefightingprovisions.Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;based.onthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.

90-177TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:DecreaseinReactorCoolantInventorySeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapabilitybecausetherewillbenointerferencewithaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.TheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseas,aseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

7/11/90PRESSURIZERLIQUIDSAMPLECONTAINMENTISOLATIONAOV-966BLEAKREPAIRSCAFFOLD90-183AworkplatformisneededforrepairofthevalveinsidetheNuclearSampleSystemisolationvalvehoodenclosure,tobeabout6ft.abovethefloor.Thisistoaccomodateworkingwiththevalvebodyataboutwaistlevel.Withinthevicinityare,likethevalvetoberepaired,otherSeismicCategoryIContainmentisolationvalveswhicharedirectlyconnectedwiththeReactorCoolantSystemandtheSteamGeneratorBlowdowns.Becauseofthis,thescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).Theguidelinesstatement4.0requirementtowireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternativerequirementtousescaffoldpolesashold,downbarsincon)unctionwithwoodencleats.(AcceptableasnotedperM.'B.FitzsimmonsonAuthorizationForm89-167).TheJobSupervisorshallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheguidelinesprovided.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbyanassignedLiaisonEngineer,anditsseismiccapabilityinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebyaqualifiedindividual.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.ThepersonperformingsuchconfirmationofseismiccapabilityshallsonotifytheShiftSupervisor.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,anduponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesamemannerasdescribedabove.Duringconstructionandteardowncareshouldbetakentopreventbumpinganysensitiveequipmentandtubinginthevicinity.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccess,toallvalves;andinstrumentationinthearea.Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobe.observed;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.

90-183Theinstallationdoesnotresult'nachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:SteamGeneratortuberuptureRuptiureofasteampipePrimarysystempiperuptureSeismicEventsTheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavezointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebases'ofTechnicalSpecifications.

7/23/90SERVICEBUILDINGBASEMENTgPRIMARYWATERTREATMENTROOMEASTWALLFIRESEALINSPECTIONEWR-4941SCAFFOLD90-186AworkplatformisneededtoinspectfirebarrierpenetrationsealsontheeastwallbehindtheCondensateStorageTanks.DuetotheproximityofthescaffoldtotheCST's,thescaffoldshallbeconstructedasseismic,ThescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).Theguidelinesstatement4.0requirementtowireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternativerequirementtousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunctionwithwoodencleats.(AcceptableasnotedperM.B.FitzsimmonsonAuthorizationForm89-167).TheJobSupervisorshallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheguidelinesprovided.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbyanassignedZobSupervisor,anditsseismiccapabilityinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebyaqualifiedindividual.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.ThepersonperformingsuchconfirmationofseismiccapabilityshallsonotifytheShiftSupervisor.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswill.benecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,anduponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesamemannerasdescribedabove.Duringconstructionandteardown,careshouldbetakentopreventbumpinganysensitiveequipmentandtubinginthevicinity.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstoallvalves,instrumentation,panels,rotatingequipment,firefightingprovisions,andadjoiningroomsinthearea.Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.

IS 90-186Theinstallationdoesnotresultina-changetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:LossofNormalFeedwaterSeismicEventsRuptureofSteamPipeTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapabilitybecausetherewillbenointerferencewithaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.TheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases;TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated..TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

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RELAYROOMNORTHWALLWESTOFDOORTOTURBINEBUILDINGPENETRATIONFIRESEALINSPECTIONEWR-4941SCAFFOLD90-188AworkplatformisneededtoinspectfirebarrierpenetrationsealsintheRelayRoomontheNorthWall.ThescaffoldwillbelocatedneartheAMSACandEHPanels.Asaresult,itshallbeconstructedasseismic.AMSACitselfisnotaSafetyRelatedSystem.TheimportanceoftheAMSACSystemandothermodificationsthathavebeeninstalledinthiscabinetmakeitdesirableforthisscaffoldtobeseismic.Duringconstructionandtear-down,extracareshouldbetakentopreventbumpinganypanelsorconduitinthearea.ThescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).Theguidelinesstatement4.0requirementtowireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternativerequirementtousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsincon)unctionwithwoodencleats.(AcceptableasnotedperM.B.FitzsimmonsonAuthorizationForm89-167).TheJobSupervisorshallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheguidelinesprovided.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbyanassignedLiaisonEngineer,anditsseismiccapabilityinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebyaqualifiedindividual.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm..ThepersonperformingsuchconfirmationofseismiccapabilityshallsonotifytheShift.Supervisor.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.Inthisinstance,theStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,andupon,beingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesanemannerasdescribedabove.

Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstoallinstrumentation,panels,andadjoiningroomsinthearea.Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforinlOCFR50.59aregivenbelow.TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:SeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapabilitybecausetherewillbenointerferencewithaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.TheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.Theinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportant,tosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.Theinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeother.,thanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.Theinstallationdoesnot,reducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.'

July26,1989TEMPORARYOXYGENMONITORTEMPORARYFLUIDPROVISIONREQUEST489-28AFFECTEDDRAWING:AFFECTEDPROCEDURES:33013-1274,WasteDisposal-GasH2andN2andGasAnalyzer(WD)P&ID09lgS4~212'Pll13'Pll~6INSTRUCTIONSTOOPERATIONS:TheHPproceduresreferencedshallbeconductedbylabpersonnel;TECH.SPEC.REF:Sect.3.9.2.5,Table3.5-5,Table4'-5TheMSAGasAnalyzerisoutofserviceforoxygenmonitoring.Inordertocontinuetomonitor02perTech.Spec.'requirementsofTable3.5-5attemporaryconnectionwillbeutilized.ThetemporarymonitorwilltieintotheGasDecayTanksample3/8in.tubingwithpolytubingconnectedwithtubingnuts.Thetemporarytubingwillbeoperatedbylabpersonnelatpressuressuitableforthesampler;however,thetubingtobeusedismorethancapableofwithstandingfullGasDecayTankPressure.TheoutletofthemonitoristobetiedtotheventheaderasdoesthepresentGasAnalyzer.PressurereductionfromGasDecayTankpressureisaccomplishedataninstalledreducerupstreamoftheGasAnalyzerandthetemporaryconnection.Tubingassociatedwiththismodificationisdesignatedasnon-codeclass(ANSIB31.1)perRG&EDrawing33013-1273.Itshallbeinstalledsothatsafetyrelatedequipmentisnotpotentiallyaffectedbyadesignbasisaccident(seismicevent).TheeventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththeproposedinstallationarethefollowing:RadioactiveGasWasteSystemFailureSeismicEventTheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecausethefunctionofthesystemwillbemaintained,pressureretainingcapabilityiswithindesignlimitsandthereisnopotentialimpacttosafetyrelatedequipmentduringaseismicevent.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysis.Reportbecauseitcanbereadilyisolatedintheeventofa'failureandbecausetheoveral'1functionofthesystemisbeingmaintained.

I TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecificationbecausethe~~capabilitytomonitor02willberetained.

SAFETYANALYSISFORTEMPORARYRADWASTDEMINERALIZERSYSTE1.0SCOPEOFANALYSIS1.2Thepurposeofthisanalysisistoevaluatethesafetyaspectsofinstallingatemporarydemineralizingsystemforprocessingtheexcessiveliquidradwastefromthe1989outage.Theevaporatorandrecyclesystemshavenotbeenabletoeffectivelyprocesstheaddedwasteduetoreducedcapacityoftheevaporatorpackage.Asaresult,theon-sitestoragecapabilityisnearcapacityseverelylimitingoperationflexibility.Thetemporaryliquidwasteprocessingsystemisafluidizedtransferdemineralizationsystemconsistingof5to6resinvessels,boosterpump,mechanicalfilter,dewateringpumpandprocesscontrolunit.Theentiresystemisinterconnectedwithflexiblereinforcednon-collapsiblebutylrubberhosesdesignedfortemperaturesbetween-20Fand180Fandpressurefrom0to300psig.Thesuppliedsystemisdesignedandoperatedinaccordancewiththefollowingstandardsandoperatingparameters.a)b)c)d)e).f)g)h)Reg.Guide1.143ANSI55.2ANSI/ASHE831.1ASMEB&PVCodeSectionVIII&IXPressure0-150psigTemperature50-135F(Resinlimited)Flow15-200gpmHydrotestedto225psigI1~3Theshut-offheadoftheboosterpumpandthemonitortanktransferpumpis100and115psigrespectively.Thisiswellbelowthedesignofallthetemporarysystemcomponents.ThetemporarysystemwillreprocesswastefromtheWasteHoldupTankusingoneofmonitoringtanksasabatchtank.Theprocesscyclewillconsistofcyclingthewastefromthemonitoringtankthrutheresinbeds5to6timesuntiltheactivitylevelisacceptablefordischargetothelake.Thespentresinwillthenbesluicedtoashippingcask.Thepipingarrangementwillconsistofatemporaryhoseconnectedfromthedischargeofthewasteevaporatorfeedpump.atvalve1762Atothedischargeofthemonitoringtankpumpatvalve1279.Thishose.willbeusedtotransferradwastefromthewasteholduptankviatheevaporatorfeedpumptotheAorBmonitortank.Asecondhosewillthenbeconnectedfromthedischargeofthemonitoringtankpumpwithateeatvalve1279totheinletofthetemporarywasteprocessingsystem.Thishosewillbeusedtocycletheradwastefrom

themonitortanktothewasteprocessingsystemviathemonitortankpump.AthirdhosewillbeconnectedfromtheoutletofthewasteprocessingsystemtotheAandBmonitortankreturnlineatvalve1291Aand/or1234dependingonflowrequirements.Thishosewillbeusedtocyclethewastebacktothemonitortanks.1.41~51~6TheentiretemporarysystemwillbelocatedinthedrummingareaoftheAuxiliaryBuildingoperatingfloorelv.271ft.Theallowablefloorloadingforthisareais300lb/ft.Eachofthedemineralizertankshasaminimumbasediameterof24inchesandweighs2,200lbs.full.Consequently,inordertoadheretothemaximumfloorloading,aminimumclearanceof6inchesmustbemaintainedaroundeachvessel.Thetemporarysystemwillalsorequired440Vpower,serviceair,andDZwaterconnections.Electricalpowerwillbesuppliedwithatemporarycablefromthe440Vweldingoutletlocatedoutsidethedrummingstationonthetruckbaywall.TheDZwaterandserviceairwillbeconnectedwithflexiblerubberhosesfromconnectionsalreadyexistingwithinthedrummingarea.TheDZwaterandserviceairarerequiredforsluicingandvesselflushing.TheDZwaterconnectionalsoservesasabackupwatersourceforcoolingresinsifaleakinthesystemdevelopsduringprocessdowntime.

2.0REFERENCES

2.'1'G&ER.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReportSection15.7.22'RG&EGinnaP&ID33013-12682'RG&EGinnaP&ID33013-12703'SAFETYANALYSIS3'3'AAreviewhasbeenperformedofalltheeventsanalyzedintheGinnaStationFSARandtheeventsrequiringanalysisbyNRCRegulatoryGuide1.70.Theonlyeventsrelatedtothistemporarymodificationarearadioactiveliquidwastesystemfailureandaseismicevent.ThedrummingareaandmonitoringtankareasaredesignedsuchthatanypipingortankleakagewillbecollectedthroughthedrainagesystemintheAu'xiliaryBuildingsumptobepumpedbackintotheliquidwastesystem.ThebuildingsumpandbasementvolumeissufficienttoholdthefullvolumeofaCVCSliquidholduptank(33,000gallons)withoutoverflowingtoareasoutsidethebuilding.Thevolumeofa At 3'monitoringtankanddemineralizertankis7,500gallonsand115gallonsrespectively.Sinceeithertankislessthanthevolumeofaholduptank,thesumpstillhassufficientcapacitytohandlethemonitortankordemineralizertank.4inchdrainsarelocatedwithslopingfloorsinfrontofthedrummingareadoorwayandinthemonitoringtankarea.Intheeventtheprocesswaterislostfromthespentresinsinthedemineralizertanks,theresinscanbecooledbythebackupDIwaterconnection.Basedontheanalysispresentedinsection15.7.2fortheprimarywaterCVCSspentresinstoragetank,itwilltake4daysfordecayheattogenerateenoughheattoreachtheresin140Ftemperaturelimit.Thisisbasedona1%fuelfailure.Wastefromthewasteholduptankiscollectedfromfloordrainsandisnotexpectedtocontainhighactivitylevels.HoweverAdmini-strativecontrolswillbeestablishedtoensureresintanksaremaintainedwithproperwaterlevelwhenconcentratedresinsaretobestoredformorethan24hours.3'Thedrummingareaisenclosedbyseismicallydesignedwalls.Nosafetyrelatedequipmentexistswithinthewallsgfdrummingarea.Consequently,thedemineralizersystemwillnotaffectsafetyrelatedsystemsduringaseismiceventshoulditfail.Theflexiblehosesrunningoutsidethedrummingareawillberestrainedandlocatedtopreventinterferencewithanysafetyrelatedequipmentoperation.3.5Basedupontheevaluationsinsections3.1thru3.4above,themarginsofsafetyduringnormaloperationsandtransientconditionsanticipatedduringthelifeofthestationwillremainunchangedbytheinstallationofthistemporarymodification;and,theadequacyofstructures,systems,andcomponentsprovidedforthepreventionofaccidentsandforthemitigationoftheconsequencesofaccidentswillbeunchangedbytheinstallationofthistemporarymodification.4.0PRELIMINARYSAFETYEVALUATION"4.1Theproposedtemporarymodificationdoesnotinvolvean'unreviewedsafetyquestionsince:a)theprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportwillnotbeincreasedsincethewastetankvolumesarelessthanpreviouslyconsidered,or;b)thepossibilityofanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportwillnot.becreatedsinceacceptedcodesandstandardsarefollowed,or; r

c)themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationisnotreducedsincewastetankvolumesarelessthanpreviouslyassumed.

March9,1990p/JLOSSOFDECAYHEATREMOVALEXPEDITIOUSACTION-INTERIM"A"HOTLEGLEVELTRANSMITTER90-03Genericletter88-17recommendedexpeditiousactionsincludinginstallingtwoindependentRCSwaterlevelindicationswiththecapabilitytoprovidewaterlevelinformationtoControlRoomoperators.Onesuchprovision,apressuretransmitter(PT-432A)withindicationattheMainControlBoardhasbeeninpermanentexistence;'however,asimilarprovisionistobeinstalledpriortoenteringthenextreducedreactorcoolantinventoryoperation.ThiswillbeinstalledatatestconnectiondownstreamoftheLoopAHotLegSampletapmanualrootvalve504,usingtubingofmaterialidenticaltothepermanentinstallationforPT-432AintheBLoopSampletapexceptthat3/8"tubingmaybeusedinplaceof1/4".Thetubingisratedforpressuregreaterthan5,000psig.Atransmitter,similartoPT-432A,istobeinstalled,designatedLIT-432Aatthetestpointdiscussedabove,tobemountedsecurelytotheadjacentwalloronastandwhichwillbefabricatedandinstalledsuchastoinsureagainsttopplingbyuseofstruts,bumpersortie-downs.Incaseofabreakinthe3/8"tubingtheleakagewillbeslow,andthelevelchangewillbemonitoredontheotherchannel.ThesignalcablewillbeinstalledunderthecontrolsofprocedureA-1405installationandremovaloftemporarycables.Theexistingprocedure0-2.3.1,DrainingtheReactorCoolantSystem,istoberevisedtoaddresstheindicationstobemqnitored,includingthesubjectprovision.Regardinglevelindicationdifferencebetweenmeasurementpoints,thedifferencecalculatedfromWestinghouseESBU/WOG-88-173datedOctober14,1988willbeprovidedtooperatorsforguidance.Theaboveconstructionandoperationalrequirementsaretobeobserved.Basedonthese,the.determinationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.Theinstallationdoesnot'esultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseofthesubstantialtubinginstallationandtheadequatesupportsystemtoprovidedasdiscussedabove,itwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonthesafety-relatedequipmentinthevicinity,orresultinadecreaseinreactorcoolantinventory.ThedesignbaseseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:DecreaseinReactorCoolantInventoryTheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecausethesubstantialtubinginstallationandtheadequacyofthesupportsystemissuchastoensuretherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.

90-03TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecausethesubstantialtubinginstallationandtheadequacyofthesupportsystemtobeutilizedensuretherewillbenoadverseeffectonsafety-relatedequipment.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecausethesubstantialtubinginstallationandthesupportsystemadequacy,asdescribedabove,ensuretherewillbenoadverseeffectonsafetyrelatedequipmentwithinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecificationbecauseofthesubstantialtubinginstallationandtheadequacyofthesupportsystemwhichensureagainstanyadverseeffectonequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications..

3/20/90SAFETYANALYSISFORTEMPORARYRADWASTEDEMINERALIZERSYSTEMINSTALLATION90-041.0SCOPEOFANALYSIS1.1The.purposeofthisanalysisistoevaluatethesafetyaspectsofinstallingatemporarydemineralizingsystemforprocessingtheexcessiveliquidradwastefromthe1989outage.Theevaporatorandrecyclesystemshavenotbeenabletoeffectivelyprocesstheaddedwasteduetoreducedcapacityoftheevaporatorpackage.Asaresult,theon-sitestoragecapabilityisnearcapacityseverelylimitingoperationflexibility.1.2Thetemporaryliquidwasteprocessingsystemisafluidizedtransferdemineralizationsystemconsistingof5to6resinvessels,boosterpump,mechanicalfilter,dewateringpumpandprocesscontrolunit.Theentiresystemisinterconnectedwithflexiblereinforcednon-collapsiblebutylrubberhosesdesignedfortemperaturesbetween-20Fand180Fandpressurefrom0to300psig.Thesuppliedsystemisdesignedandoperatedinaccordancewiththefollowingstandardsandoperatingparameters..a)b)c)d)e)f)g)h)Reg.Guide1.143ANSI55.2ANSI/ASMEB31.1ASMEB&PVCodeSectionVIII&IXPressure0-150psigTemperature50-135F(Resinlimited)Flow15-200gpmHydrotestedto225psigTheshut-offheadoftheboosterpumpandthemonitortanktransferpumpis100and115psigrespectively.Thisiswellbelowthedesignofallthetemporarysystemcomponents.

ThetemporarysystemwillprocesswastefromtheWasteHoldupTankusingoneofmonitoringtanksasabatchtank.Theprocesscyclewillconsistofcyclingthewastefromthemonitoringtankthrutheresinbeds5to6timesuntiltheactivitylevelisacceptablefordischargetothelake.Thespentresinwillthenbesluicedtoashippingcask.Thepipingarrangementwillconsistofatemporaryhoseconnectedfromthedischargeofthewasteevaporatorfeedpumpatvalve1762Atothedischargeofthemonitoringtankpumpatvalve1279.ThishosewillbeusedtotransferradwastefromthewasteholduptankviatheevaporatorfeedpumptotheAorBmonitortankorthetemporarydemineralizerskid.Asecondhosewillthenbeconnectedfromthedischargeofthemonitoringtankpumpwithateeatvalve1279to.theinletofthetemporarywasteprocessingsystem.Thishosewillbeusedtocycletheradwastefromthemonitortanktothewasteprocessingsystemviathemonitortankpump.AthirdhosewillbeconnectedfromtheoutletofthewasteprocessingsystemtotheAandBmonitortankreturnlineatvalve1291Aand/or1234dependingonflowrequirements.Thishosewillbeusedtocyclethewastebacktothemonitortanks.TheentiretemporarysystemwillbelocatedinthedrummingareaoftheAux.Bldg.operatingfloorelv.271ft.Theallowablelivefloorloadingforthisareais300lbs/ft2.Eachofthesixdemin.tankshasaminimumbasedia.of24in.andweighs2200lbs.full.Thetankswillbelocatedontopofthe4ft.wideby19ft.longby2.5ft.thickconcreteslabinthedrummingstation.Thereinforcedslabwilldistributethetankloadsovertheentireslabarea.Usingtheweightofsixtanksand200lbs.ofleadshieldingpertank,thefloorloadingwillbeapprox.190lbs/ft2.fortheraisedslabarea.Theremainingequipmenthasthefollowingweights:ProcessControlUnitSystemboosterpumps(2)9300/pumpFiltervessels(3)9180/filterDewateringpumpSluicepumpShielding120/filtertotal20006005401001003603700lbs.,Becauseoftheequipmentsphysicaldimensions,theirweightsmaybeconsidereddistrubutedoverthelower6ft.x19ft.floorarea.Thiswillproduceafloorloadingof32lbs/ft2.Allloadsarewithinthe300lbs/ft2loadinglimit.

1.51.6Thetemporarysystemwillalsorequired440Vpower,serviceair,andDIwaterconnections.Electricalpowerwillbesuppliedwithatemporarycablefromthe440Vweldingoutletlocatedoutsidethedrummingstationonthetruckbaywall.TheDIwaterandserviceairwillbeconnectedwithflexiblerubberhosesfromconnectionsalreadyexistingwithinthedrummingarea.TheDIwaterandserviceairarerequiredforsluicingandvesselflushing.TheDIwaterconnectionalsoservesasabackupwatersourceforcoolingresinsifaleakinthesystemdevelopsduringprocessdowntime.

2.0REFERENCES

2.12'RG&ER.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReportSection15.7.2RG&EGinnaP&ID.33013-12682'RG&EGinnaP&ID33013-12702'CHEM-NUCLEARSYSTEMS,INC.,AproposaltoRochesterGasandElectricforLiquidWasteProcessingattheRobertE.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant,Section2.0,TechnicalApproach.N-89-0020-P02,July19,19892.5GAIDwg.D-422-0223.'0SAFETYANALYSIS3~1AreviewhasbeenperformedofalltheeventsanalyzedintheGinnaStationFSARandtheeventsrequiringanalysisbyNRCRegulatoryGuide1.70.Theonlyeventsrelatedtothistemporarymodificationarearadioactiveliquidwastesystemfailureandaseismicevent.3~2ThedrummingareaandmonitoringtankareasaredesignedsuchthatanypipingortankleakagewillbecollectedthroughthedrainagesystemintheAuxiliaryBuildingsumptobepumpedbackintotheliquidwastesystem.ThebuildingsumpandbasementvolumeissufficienttoholdthefullvolumeofaCVCSliquidholduptank(33,000gallons)withoutoverflowingtoareasoutsidethebuilding.Thevolumeofamonitoringtankanddemineralizertankis7,500gallonsand115gallonsrespectively.Sinceeithertankislessthanthevolumeofaholduptank,thesumpstillhassufficientcapacitytohandlethemonitortankordemineralizertank..4inchdrainsarelocatedwithslopingfloorsinfrontofthedrummingareadoorwayandinthemonitoringtankarea.

s.sIntheeventtheprocesswaterislostfromthespentresinsinthedemineralizertanks,theresinscanbecooledbythebackupDIwaterconnection.Basedontheanalysispresentedinsection15.7.2fortheprimarywaterCVCSspentresinstoragetank,itwilltake4daysfordecayheattogenerateenoughheattoreachtheresin140Ftemperaturelimit.Thisisbasedona1%fuelfailure.Wastefromthewasteholduptankiscollectedfromfloordrainsandisnotexpectedtocontainhighactivitylevels.HoweverAdmini-strativecontrolswillbeestablishedtoensureresintanksaremaintainedwithproperwaterlevelwhenconcentratedresinsaretobestoredformorethan24hours.3.4Thedrummingareaisenclosedbyseismicallydesignedwalls.Nosafetyrelatedequipmentexistswithinthewallsofdrummingarea.Consequently,thedemineralizersystemwillnotaffectsafetyrelatedsystemsduringaseismiceventshoulditfail.Theflexiblehosesrunningoutsidethedrummingareawillberestrainedandlocatedtopreventinterferencewithanysafetyrelatedequipmentoperation.3.5Basedupontheevaluationsinsections3.1thru3.4above,themarginsofsafetyduringnormaloperationsandtransientconditionsanticipatedduringthelifeofthestationwillremainunchangedbytheinstallationofthistemporarymodification;and,theadequacyofstructures,systems,andcomponentsprovidedforthepreventionofaccidentsandforthemitigationoftheconsequencesofaccidentswillbeunchangedbytheinstallationofthistemporarymodification.4.0PRELIMINARYSAFETYEVALUATION4.1Theproposedtemporarymodificationdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionsince:a)theprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportwillnotbeincreasedsincethewastetankvolumesarelessthanpreviouslyconsidered,or;b)thepossibilityofanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportwillnotbecreatedsinceacceptedcodesandstandardsarefollowed,or;c)themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationisnot'reducedsincewastetankvolumesare'lessthanpreviouslyassumed.

SECTIONE-PROCEDURECHANGESThissectionistocontainadescriptionofthechangestoproceduresasdescribedintheUFSARandasummaryofthesafetyevaluationpursuanttotherequirementsof10CFR50.59(b).Therewerenonewithinthistimeperiod.1

SECTIONF-COMPLETEDSPECIALTESTS(ST)ANDEXPERIMENTSThissectionistocontainadescriptionofspecialtestsandexperimentsperformedinthefacility,pursuanttotherequire-mentsof10CFR50.59(b).Withinthetimeframeofthisreport,thereweretwoconducted.

SAFETYANALYSISGINNASTATIONTEMPERATURESTRATIFICATIONMONITORINGTEMPORARYMODIFICATIONREVISION1MAY12,1989PREPAREDBY:ElectricalEngineerDateREVIEWEDBY:ReactorEngineerDateAPPROVEDBY:Manager,TechnicalEngineeringDate "l,f RevisionStatusSheetPageLatestRev.PageLatestRev.PageLatestRev.SafetyAnalysisPageiiRevision1

SAFETYANALYSIS1.0SCOPEOFANALYSIS:NRCBulletinNo.88-11,"PressurizerSurgeLineThermalStratification",requestsalladdresseestoestablishandimplementaprogramtoconfirmpressurizersurgelineintegrityinviewoftheoccurrenceofthermalstratification,andrequiresthemtoinformthestaffoftheactionstakentoresolvethisissue.PursuanttosatisfyingtherequirementandscheduleofBulletin88-11,RochesterGasandElectricCorporationisparticipatinginaprogramforpartialresolutionofthisissuethroughtheWestinghouseOwner'sGroup(WOG).TheWOGprogramisdesignedtobenefitfromtheexperiencegainedintheperformanceofseveralplant-specificanalysesonWestinghousePWRsurgelines.Thesedetailedanalysesincludeddefinitionofrevisedthermaltransients(includingstratification).TheoverallanalyticalapproachusedinalloftheseanalyseshasbeenreviewedbytheNRCstaff.Asignificantamountofpressurizersurgelinethermalmonitoringdatahasbeenobtainedinsupportoftheseplant-specificanalyses.AdditionalpressurizersurgelinethermalmonitoringandplantsystemdatacontinuestobemadeavailablewithintheWOG,-resultinginasteadilyincreasingdatabase.PressurizersurgelinetemperaturestratificationdatawillbecollectedatGinnaforinclusionintheWOGdatabase.le2ThermalstratificationandcyclingphenomenawerealsodiscoveredinauxiliarypipingconnectedtotheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS).Thesephenomenamaycausepipecracksintheunisolablesectionsofauxiliarypipingsystems.USNRCissuedBulletin88-08andsubsequentsupplementstoaddressthisphenomena.Asaresult,electricutilitiesarerequiredtoprovideresponsetotheNRCregardingthereviewandidentificationofauxiliarypipesectionsconnectedtotheRCSthatmaybesubjectedtothermalstratificationnotconsideredinthedesignoftheplant.Westinghousehasidentifiedthreepipingsectionsthatmaybesubjectedtothermalstratification.Theseare:SafetyAnalysisPage3.Revision1Date~51289

a)charginglinetoLoopBhotlegbetweencheckvalve393andtheRCSnozzleb)alternatecharginglinetoLoopAcoldlegbetweencheckvalve383AandtheRCSnozzle1.3c)auxiliaryspraylinebetweencheckvalve297andthemainpressurizerspraylineThisanalysisaddressestheconsequencesofinstallingtemporarythermocouplesonthepressurizersurgeline,LoopBchargingline,LoopAalternatechargingline,andauxiliarysprayline.Thermocoupleextensionwireshallbetemporarilyroutedtoadataacquisitioncontroller.Thecontrollershallprovideadigitaloutputtoaremotepersonalcomputer.Thedataoutputlineshallutilizetemporarycableandexistingsparecircuitstoexitcontainment.1.4Inadditiontothethermocouples,fourtemporarydisplacementtransducersaretobeinstalledonthepressurizersurgeline.Thetransducerswillmonitorlinemovementduringheat-up,cool-down,andduringtemperaturestratificationconditions.'~12~22.3REFERENCEDOCUMENTS:GinnaStationProcedure,A-303,"Preparation,Review,andApprovalofSafetyAnalysisforMinorModificationsorSpecialTests".GinnaStationProcedure,A-1405,"InstallationandRemovalofTemporaryCables".GinnaStationprocedure,"A-1406,"ControlofTemporaryModifications".2.4R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantUpdatedSafetyAnalysisReport.2.5USNRCRegulatoryGuide1.70,StandardFormatandContentofSafetyAnalysisReportsforNuclearPowerPlants,LNREdition,Revision3,November1978.2.6AppendixRAlternativeShutdownSystem,"GinnaNuclearPowerPlant,Revision4,January1987.SafetyAnalysisPage2Revision1Date5..:2.i89

'AI,"FireProtectionEvaluation"ReportNo.1936,March1977.2.8Letter,EliasztoWrobel,"852-A&BLimitorque-AluminumCovers",dated3/7/86.3.0SAFETYANALYSIS'.1AreviewhasbeenmadeofalleventsanalyzedintheGinnaFSARandtheeventsrequiringanalysisbytheUSNRCRegulatoryGuide1.70.Theeventsrelatedtothismodificationare:3.1.13~1~23.1.31)seismicevent2)majorandminorfiresAlltemporaryinstrumentcableinstalledshallberoutedtofollowtherespectivelinetobemonitoredandthendropverticallytocontainmentfloorelevation235'.Thetemporarycablewillthenberoutedalongthefloor,followingtheshieldwalltothefreestandingdataacquisitioncontroller.Noseismicimpactisanticipatedsinceinstrumentcableweightisnegligiblecomparedtopipe/insulationweight.Instrumentcableroutedonthefloorandthefreestandingcontroller(approx.10"Hx12"Wx24"D)willnotaffectseismicstructuresintheimmediatevicinity.Thedataacquisitioncontrollerwillbeplacedoutsideoftheshieldwallnearthelowerendofthepressurizer.Temporarycableusedforthedatalinkshallfollowtheshieldwallatelevation235',risetoelevation253'iasouth-eaststairs,andfollowtheshieldwalltoIncoreReferenceJunctionBox1B.Noseismicimpactisanticipatedsincethiscablewillfollowafloor/stairrouting.CableseparationinIncoreReferenceJunctionBox1Bshallbemaintained.ThetemporarydatalinkcableshallbesplicedtosparecircuitA780.CableandconductorinsulationshallberestoredusingRaychemWCSFsleeves.ThesplicedcablesshallbedressedinIncoreBoxlBsothatdistancebetweenA780andIncoreThermocouplecablesismaximized.SafetyAnalysisPage3Revision1Date~512/89

3.1.4Thistemporarymodificationwillnotpropagateamajororminorfire.CablesusedforthermocouplesandthermocoupleextensionsareindividuallysheathedinInconelOverbraid(thermocouples)orTinnedCopperOverbraid(extensions).Noadditionalfireloadingisanticipatedbytheoverbraidedcable.TemporarycableusedforthedatalinkisratedandqualifiedtoIEEE-383flamerequirementsasaminimum.Totalestimatedcontainmentfireloadingforthistemporarydatalinkcableis200000BTUs.3.1.5TemporarycableusedforthedatalinkwillbesplicedtoexistingsparecableA779intheAirHandlingRoom.RoutingisthroughafloorpenetrationtotheMux.Room.TotalfireloadingforthetemporarycableintheAirHandlingRoomisnegligible.TotalfireloadingforthetemporarycableintheMux.Roomisestimatedat2000BTUs.3~1.63~1.73~1.83.1.9Firebarrierpenetrationswillberepairedandreplacedinaccordancewithexistingplantprocedures.Thereforeexistingsealswillnotbedegraded.ThismodificationdoesnotaffectthesafeshutdownanalysisintheAppendixRsubmittalsincethereisnoeffectonseparationofexistingcircuits,associatedcircuits,orfireareaboundariesasanalyzedintheAppendixRsubmittal.ThismodificationwillnoteffectthecapabilitiesoftheAlternativeShutdownSystem.Furthermore,noneoftheexistingproceduresforobtaininganAlternativeSafeShutdownwillbeeffected.Thismodification,therefore,complieswith10CFR50,AppendixR.Table6.1-3oftheGinnaUFSARgivestheAluminuminventoryinContainment.Thetotalexposedareais2197Ft.Thistemporarymodificationwilladdatotalof10FtofexposedAluminum.ThetotalweightofAluminuminequipmentisestimatedtobe40lbs.ThisincludesAluminumindata.acquisitionequipment,displacementtransducers,andpowersupply.The40additionalpoundsofaluminumaddedtocontainmentwilladdapproximately800scfofhydrogenduringanaccident.Thisamountofhydrogengenerationisnegligblecomparedwith30,000scfoftotalhydrogenproductionduringanaccident.(SeeReference2.8)sSafetyAnalysisPage4Revision.1Date5+12@89

,ThismodificationdoesnotdegradethecapabilityofanySafetySystemtoperformitsfunction.Theassumptionsandconclusionsofexistinganalysesareunchanged.Nonewtypesofeventsarepostulated.3.2.1Therefore,ithasbeendeterminedthatthemarginsofsafetyduringnormaloperationsandtransientconditionsanticipatedduringthelifeofthestationhavenotbeenaffected.Ithasalsobeendeterminedthattheadequacyofstructures,systems,andcomponentsprovidedfortheconsequencesofaccidentshavenotbeenaffected.4e0PRELIMINARYSAFETYEVALUATION:4.1Theprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetywillnotbeincreasedbytheproposedmodification.4.24'Thepossibilityofanaccidentoramalfunctionofadifferenttype"otherthananyevaluatedpreviouslywillnotbecreatedbytheproposedmodification.ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationwillnotbereducedbytheproposedmodification.4'TheproposedmodificationdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionorrequireaTechnicalSpecificationchange.SafetyAnalysisPage5RevisionDate51289

ThismodificationdoesnotdegradethecapabilityofanySafetySystemtoperformitsfunction.Theassumptionsandconclusionsofexistinganalysesareunchanged.Nonewtypesofeventsarepostulated.3'.1Therefore,ithasbeendeterminedthatthemarginsofsafetyduringnormaloperationsandtransientconditionsanticipatedduringthelifeofthestationhavenotbeenaffected.Ithasalsobeendeterminedthattheadequacyofstructures,systems,andcomponentsprovidedfortheconsequencesofaccidentshavenotbeenaffected.4e0PRELIMINARYSAFETYEVALUATION:4.1Theprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetywillnotbeincreasedbytheproposedmodification.4.24.3Thepossibilityofanaccidentoramalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthananyevaluatedpreviouslywillnotbecreatedbytheproposedmodification.ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationwillnotbereducedbytheproposedmodification.4'TheproposedmodificationdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionorrequireaTechnicalSpecificationchange.SafetyAnalysisPage5Revision1

ThismodificationdoesnotdegradethecapabilityofanySafetySystemtoperformitsfunction.Theassumptionsandconclusionsofexistinganalysesareunchanged.Nonewtypesofeventsarepostulated.3.2'Therefore,ithasbeendeterminedthatthemarginsofsafetyduringnormaloperationsandtransientconditionsanticipatedduringthelifeofthestationhavenotbeenaffected.Ithasalsobeendeterminedthattheadequacyofstructures,systems,andcomponentsprovidedfortheconsequencesofaccidentshavenotbeenaffected.4.0PRELIMINARYSAFETYEVALUATION4.1Theprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetywillnotbeincreasedbytheproposedmodification.4.24.3Thepossibilityofanaccidentoramalfunctionofadifferent.typeotherthananyevaluatedpreviouslywillnotbecreatedbytheproposedmodification.ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationwillnotbereducedbytheproposedmodification.4~4TheproposedmodificationdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionorrequireaTechnicalSpecificationchange.SafetyAnalysisPage5Revision1Date5/12~89

3.2~1ThismodificationdoesnotdegradethecapabilityofanySafetySystemtoperformitsfunction.Theassumptionsandconclusionsofexistinganalysesareunchanged.Nonewtypesofeventsarepostulated.Therefore,ithasbeendeterminedthatthemarginsofsafetyduringnormaloperationsandtransientconditionsanticipatedduringthelifeofthestationhavenotbeenaffected.Ithasalsobeendeterminedthattheadequacyofstructures,systems,andcomponentsprovidedfortheconsequencesofaccidentshavenotbeenaffected.4.0PRELIMINARYSAFETYEVALUATION:4.1Theprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetywillnotbeincreasedbytheproposedmodification.4.2F4Thepossibilityofanaccidentoramalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthananyevaluatedpreviouslywillnotbecreatedbytheproposedmodification.ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationwillnotbereducedbytheproposedmodification.TheproposedmodificationdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionorrequireaTechnicalSpecificationchange.SafetyAnalysisPage5RevisionDate5~1~289

PThismodificationdoesnotdegradethecapabilityofanySafetySystemtoperformitsfunction.,Theassumptionsandconclusionsofexistinganalysesare-unchanged.Nonewtypesofeventsarepostulated.3~2~lTherefore,ithasbeendeterminedthatthemarginsofsafetyduringnormaloperationsandtransientconditionsanticipatedduringthelifeofthestationhavenotbeenaffected.Ithasalsobeendeterminedthattheadequacyofstructures,systems,andcomponentsprovidedfortheconsequencesofaccidentshavenotbeenaffected.4e0PRELIMINARYSAFETYEVALUATION:4~lTheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetywillnotbeincreasedbytheproposedmodification.4'4.3Thepossibilityofanaccidentoramalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthananyevaluatedpreviouslywillnotbecreatedbytheproposedmodification.AThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationwillnotbereducedbytheproposedmodification.4'TheproposedmodificationdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionorrequireaTechnicalSpecificationchange.SafetyAnalysisPage5Revision1Date5~1289

fetyAnalysisFor.SpecialTest~~TSRINSpecialTostST-09.02ControlBuildingHeatGenerationRateOrigina3.Rev.1Rev.2PreparedBy:NuclearEngineerICClsgpDateInitialDateInitialDateReviewedBy:.orEnneerInitialDateInitia'ateApprovedBy:Technicalldanagerk9DateInitialDateInitialDate1.0ISco~eofAnalysisThepurposeofSpecialTetST-89.02istoobtaintheinformationnecessarytodeterminetheheatgeneratedinvariousareasof.theControlBuildingduringnormaloperation.ThisinformationwillthenbeusedtoanalyzethethermalenvironmentoftheControlBuildingduringDesignBasisA'ccident(DBA),stationblackout(SBO),andnormaloperatingconditions.1.2TheheatgenerationrateintheControlBuildingi"tobedeterminedbymeasuringandrecordingareawallandairtemperaturesoveraminimumtwenty-four(24)hourperiodtoadequate3.yaccountforroomheatfluctuations.1s3ThefollowingareasoftheControlBuildingaretob;to".ted:a.b.cd.e.ControlRoomRelayRoomComputerRoomBatteryRoom3.ABatteryRoom1B2.0RefesencesENR4529,"VentilationSystemRequirements".SafetyAnalysisSpecialTestST-89.02Page1Revision

GinnaStationUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport,1989.2.2.1Section3.8.4.1.2,"DesignofSeismicCategoryIStructuresControlBuilding".2.2.2Section3.10.2,"SeismicQualificationofElectricalEquipmentandInstrumentation".2.2.3Section3.11.3.5,"IdentificationofLimitingEnvironmentalConditions-ControlBuilding".2.2.42.2.52.2.6Section6.4,"HabitabilitySystems".Section9.4.3,"ControlRoomAreaVentilationSystem".Section9.4.9.2,"EngineeredSafetyFeaturesVentilationSystems-RelayRoom".'.2.7Section9.4.9.3,"EngineeredSafetyFeaturesVentilationSystems-BatteryRooms".2.3GinnaStationTechnicalSpecifications,datedMay30,1989.SpecialTestProcedureST-89.02,"ControlBuildingHeatGenerationRateTesting".3.0SafetAnalsis3.13.2AreviewhasbeenperformedofalleventsanalyzedintheGinnaStationUFSAR.Thetopicsrelatedtothisspecialtestarefires,circuitseparation,andseismicevents.hThisspecialtestinvolvesplacingelectricalwire(usedasthermocouples),temperaturerecorders,anddigitaltemperaturereadoutsinvariouslocationsthroughouttheControlBuildingandTurbineBuilding(Section6ofReference2.4).Thisequipmentisinplaceonatemporarybasisonly(approximately24hourspereachofthefiveareas)andwillberemovedattheconclusionofthespecialtest.3.3Atnotimewillanyequipment'usedduringnormaloperationorpotentiallyrequiredduringabnormaloremergencyconditionsberemovedfromservice.Allventilationsystemsbeingtestedorbeingusedbythespecialtestarenon-safety-related(emergencyventilationsystemsarenotaffectedbythetest).NoControlBuildingpenetrationsareaffectedbythespecialtest.afetyAnalysisSpecialTestST-89.02Page2Revision0 Cl

'heequipmentisintheTurbineBuildingandControlBuildingonatemporarybasisonly,isofminimaladditionalfireloading,andwillberemovedattheconclusionofthetest;therefore,therearenosignificantfire'loadingconcerns.Also,theareassubjecttothetestareeitherpermanentlystaffedorfrequentlywalkeddownonanormalbasisbyoperationsandsecuritypersonnel.Inaddition,Section6ofReference2.4requiresawalkdownofthetestequipmentatleastoncepershifttoensurethatitisfunctioningproperly.Theseprecautionsassistintheearlydetectionofanyfirehazardswhetherinducedbythespecialtestequipmentornot.3.5Atnotimewillanywiringberoutedthroughorovercabletrays,etc.allowingpotentialcircuitcross-connection(Section5.4ofReference2').Therefore,circuitseparationwillbemaintainedthroughoutthedurationofthespecialtest.3.6Thisspecialtestincludestheuseofnon-seismicequipment(i.e.,thermocouplesandtheirassociatedleadwires)onseismic'structures(e.g.,ControlRoomwallsaridfloors).However,thethermocouplesand,leadwiresarenotofsufficientweighttocauseconcernwithrespecttoloadingonseismicstructures.Also,thethermocouplesandleadwiresarebeingusedonatemporarybasisandwillberemovedattheconclusionofthetest.Section5.0ofReference2.4alsorequiresthatthewiringbeplacedawayfromnormal/emergencypathwaysandworklocations.NowiringwillbeplacedontheSeismicCategoryIControlRoomceiling.4.0.PreliminarSafetEvaluation4.1Theprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafety,previouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwillnotbeincreasedbytheproposedspecialtest.4.2ThepossibilityofanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyintheSafetyAnalysisReportwillnotbecreatedbytheproposedspecialtest.4.3ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationwillnotberedu'cedbytheproposedsp~".ialtest.4.4Theproposedspecialtestdoesnotinvolveanunrevi>".'edsafetyquestionorrequireaTechnicalSpecificationchanel.SafetyAnalysisSpecialTestST-89.02Page3Revis

AlloftheabovewerereviewedbythePORCcommitteewithrespecttotheTechnicalSpecificationsandthecommitteehasdeterminedthatnoTechnicalSpecificationchangesorviolationswereinvolved.Additionally,thesechangeswerereviewedincommitteetodetermineiftheypresentedanUnreviewedSafetyQuestionandthegeneralsummationsofthesereviewsareasfollows:1.Thesechangesdonotincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrence,ortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyaspreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR,because:Thesechangesweremadetoensurecontinuedoperability/availabilityofplantequipmentandwillnotresultinanyequipmentbeingoperatedoutsideofitsnormaloperatingrange.Thisresultsincontinuedoperability/availabi1ityofequipment.importanttosafety,Thesechangesadditionallywillnotresultinachangeofoperatingcharacteristicsofequipmentusedintransient:/accidentmitigationwhichprecludesanincreaseintheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccident.Becausethesechangesensurecontinuedavailabilityofplantequipment,thelimitsshownintheTechnicalSpecifications,andtheassumptionsofthesafetyanalysesoftheUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReportcontinuetobemet.Asaresultthereisnoincreaseintheconsequencesofanypresentlypostulatedaccident.2.Thesechangesdonotcreatethepossibilityforanewordifferentkindofaccident,oramalfunctionofadifferenttypefromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR.because:Thesechangesdonotpresentnewfailuremechanismsoutsideofthosepresentlyanticipated,andareboundedbytheeventscontainedintheUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport.I3.Thesechangesdonotreducethemarginofsafetybecause:PresentmarginsascontainedintheTechnicalSpecificationsarevalid,andtheseprocedurechangesaremadewithinthose~limits.Theseprocedurechangeswillnotresultinviolatingthebaselineassumptionsmadeforequipment,availabilityintheTechnicalSpecifications,andtheUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport.

1990REPORTOFFACILITYCHANGESiTESTSANDEXPERIMENTSCONDUCTEDWITHOUTPRIORAPPROVALFORAUGUST1989THROUGHJULY1990SECTIONASECTIONBSECTIONCSECTIONDSECTIONESECTIONFCOMPLETEDENGINEERINGWORKREQUESTS(EWR)ANDTECHNICALSTAFFREQUESTS(TSR)COMPLETEDSTATIONMODIFICATIONS(SM)TECHNICALSTAFFENGINEERINGEVALUA-TIONS(TSEE)TEMPORARYBYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTION,STRUCTUREFEATURESiSHIELDING'NDFLUIDSYSTEMFEATURESPROCEDURECHANGESCOMPLETEDSPECIALTESTS(ST)ANDEXPERIMENTSR.EDGINNANUCLEARPOWERPLANTDOCKETNO.50-244ROCHESTERGASANDELECTRICCORPORATIONDATEDDECEMBER,1990

SECTIONA-COMPLETEDENGINEERINGWORKREQUESTS(EWRs)ANDTECHNICALSTAFFREQUESTS(TSRs)Thissectioncontainsadescriptionofmodificationsinthefacilityasdescribedinthesafetyanalysisreport,andasummaryofthesafetyevaluationforthosechanges,pursuantto,therequirementsof10CFR50.59(b).ThebasisforinclusionofanEWRorTSRinthissectionisclosureofthecompletedmodificationpackageintheDocumentControlDepartment.

EWR-1483STEAMGENERATORSNUBBERREPLACEMENTTHISENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSESTHEREPLACEMENTOFSIXOFTHEEIGHTHYDRAULICSNUBBERPERSTEAMGENERATOR.REVISION1TOTHISDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISINCORPORATESCHANGESFROMREVISION0TOCORRECTTHEFOLLOWING:1)TYPOGRAPHICALERRORS2)ADDADDITIONALREFERENCE-ANSIB31.13)PIPINGANALYSISANDPRIMARYEQUIPMENTSUPPORTSWILLBEEVALUATEDPERTABLESli263(ATTACHMENTSTODAC)ANDNOTINACCORDANCEWITHEWR-2512.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDE1'.70EVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONAREASFOLLOWS:2~3.4~5.POSTULATEDPIPINGFAILUREINFLUIDSYSTEMSINSIDECONTAINMENT.DECREASEINHEATREMOVALBYSECONDARYSYSTEM.DECREASEINREACTORCOOLANTSYSTEMFLOWRATE.DECREASEINREACTORCOOLANTINVENTORY.INTERNALANDEXTERNALEVENTSSUCHASMAJORANDMINORFIRES'LOODS'TORMS'REARTHQUAKES'HEINSTALLATIONOFMECHANICALBUMPERSWILLNOTCHANGETHEEFFECTOFASEISMICEVENTONTHEFUNCTIONANDDESIGNREQUIREMENTSOFEXISTINGSTEAMGENERATORRINGGIRDERiREACTORCOOLANTLOOPS,MAINSTEAMLINES,FEEDWATERANDSECONDARYSHIELDWALL.THISDOES1~2.3~4~5.6.7~MODIFICATIONNEITHERINCREASESTHECONSEQUENCES,NORITREDUCETHEMARGINSOFSAFETYFORTHEFOLLOWINGEVENTS:LOSSOFNORMALFEEDWATERFLOWFEEDWATERSYSTEMPIPEBREAKSRCSFLOWCOASTDOWNACCIDENTSSTEAMGENERATORTUBERUPTUREPRIMARYSYSTEMPIPERUPTUREMAJORANDMINORFIRESFLOODSiSTORMS'NDEARTHQUAKESTHISMODIFICATIONNEITHEREFFECTSNORISEFFECTEDBYANYFLOODORSTORMPREVIOUSLYEVALUATED.THEMATERIALSUTILIZEDINTHISMODIFICATIONWILLMEETAPPENDIX"R"REQUIREMENTSBASEDUPON10CFR50APPENDIXRANDENGINEERINGPROCEDUREANDWILLNOTINCREASEATTHEPROBABILITYOFMAJORORMINORFIRE.MODIFICATIONOFADDITIONOFSUPPORTSWILLNOTDEGRADEPERFORMANCEORFUNCTIONOFANYPLANTEQUIPMENTORSYSTEM.

BASEDUPONTHEABOVEANALYSIS:1)STRUCTURES,SYSTEMS,ANDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSAREADEQUATE.2)MARGINOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATINGANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHESTATIONARENOTREDUCED.BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTHEREQUIREMENTSOFGZNNASTATIONTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONS,ITHASBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ZTHASALSOBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS'NDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODIFICATION.EWR-1832ACIRCUITSEPARATIONSANALYSISELECTRICALMODIFICATIONSTHISEWR(ENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST)ADDRESSESTHEMODIFICATIONWHICHWILLIMPROVETHEELECTRICALSEPARATIONBETWEENREDUNDANTSAFETYRELATEDEQUIPMENT.REVISION1OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISWASPRESENTEDANDAPPROVEDBYPORCON2/27/85ITEMNUMBER6.1.0-85-021-001.THECHANGESTOTHEDESIGNCRITERIAFORREVISION2AREDESCRIBEDBELOW:SECTIONDESCRIPTION(ADDEDTOSPECIALNOTE).rrDCFUSECOORDINATIONREQUIREMENTSAREDELETEDFROMREVISION2OFTHISDESIGNCRITERIA.DC'USECOORDINATIONISINTHESCOPEOFEWR3341rr1~1.3SECTIONDELETEDFUSECOORDINATIONREQUIREMENTS.DESCRIPTION2.1.22.1.4DELETEDANALYSIS51REQUIREMENTS).DELETEDANALYSIS113REQUIREMENTS).(FUSE(FUSECOORDINATIONCOORDINATION16'.216.2'DELETEDFUSETYPEREQUIREMENT.THISZSINTHESCOPEOFEWR3341.DELETEDFUSECOORDINATIONREQUIREMENTS.

SECTIONDESCRIPTION16.2.2DELETEDFUSECOORDINATIONREQUIREMENTS.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYTHEUSNRCREGULATORYGUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONAREMAJORANDMINORFIRESANDSEISMICEVENTS.BASEDUPONTHEANALYSESDESCRIBEDUNDERPARAGRAPH3.1TO4.4OFTHESAFETYANALYSIS,ITHASBEENDETERMINEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHESTATIONAREUNCHANGED'HEADEQUACIESOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS'NDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSAREUNCHANGED.EWR-1832BFIRESIGNALINGSYSTEMTHISEWR(ENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST)ADDRESSESTHEMODIFICATIONWHICHWILLUPGRADETHEFIRESIGNALINGSYSTEM.REVISION6OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISWEREPRESENTEDANDAPPROVEDBYPORCON12-12-84ITEMNUMBER6.1.0-84-144-003.THECHANGESTOTHEDESIGNCRITERIAFORREVISION7AREDESCRIBEDBELOW:SECTIONDESCRIPTION11.4ADD:"INSTALLINGULAPPROVEDRELEASEMODULESFORTHEHALONSYSTEMSINTHERELAYANDCOMPUTER(MUX)ROOMSWILLBEACCOMPLISHEDUNDEREWR4064".22.4.423.6263CHANGEt'ENGINEER"TO'tENGZNEERZNGADD:"ANUMBEROFELECTRICALMODULESWILLBECHANGEDOUTUNDEREWR4064TOFACILITATEMAINTENANCE.THISISNECESSITATEDBYTHEFACTTHATCERTAINELECTRICALMODULESWEREFURTHERDEVELOPEDBYGAMEWELLAFTERTHEINSTALLATIONOFTHEINITIAL-DESIGNMODULES.MODULESOFCURRENT-DESIGNWEREUSEDWHENNEEDEDFORMAINTENANCEREPLACEMENTRESULTINGINAMIXTUREOFOLDANDNEWMODULEDESIGNS.THISINTURNCREATEDAMAINTENANCEPROBLEMSSINCETHELATESTWIRINGDIAGRAMISNOTAPPLICABLETOOLDERMODULES"~CHANGE"ALOW"TO"ALLOW".

AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFTHEEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNAFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORYGUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONARETHEFIRESANALYZEDING.A.I.REPORT$1936ANDTHESEISMICEVENT.BASEDUPONTHEANALYSESDESCRIBEDUNDERPARAGRAPH3.1TO4.4OFTHESAFETYANALYSIS'THASBEENDETERMINEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHESTATIONAREUNCHANGED'HEADEQUACIES'FSTRUCTURESiSYSTEMSiANDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFOR,THEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSAREUNCHANGED.EWR-2606POSTACCIDENTSAMPLINGSYSTEMIMPLEMENTATIONTHIS-EWR(ENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST)ADDRESSESTHISDESIGNMODIFICATION.ASARESULTOFTHEINABILITYATTHREEMILEISLANDTORAPIDLYOBTAINREACTORCOOLANTSAMPLESTOASCERTAINTHEEXTENTOFCOREDAMAGEiTHENRCISREQUIRINGTHATALLLICENSEESEVALUATEANDiIFREQUIREDiUPGRADETHEZRPLANTSTOENABLEACQUISITIONOFAPPROPRIATEEXPEDITIOUSSAMPLESAFTERANACCIDENT.ABILITYTOASSESSTHECONDITIONSOFTHECOREEARLYINANACCIDENTCANRESULTINTAKINGREMEDIALACTIONSWHICHCOULDLIMITOREVENPRECLUDECOREDAMAGE.THESAMPLINGSYSTEMATGINNAHASBEENEVALUATEDTOBEMARGINALLYADEQUATEFORPOST-ACCIDENTCONDITIONSANDCONSEQUENTLYREMEDIALMODIFICATIONSAREPLANNED.ANEWPOSTACCIDENTSAMPLINGSYSTEM(PASS)WILLBEINSTALLEDWHICHWILLENABLETHESTATIONTOOBTAINANDANALYZEREACTORCOOLANT'ONTAINMENTAIRiANDCONTAINMENTSUMPSAMPLESWITHIN3HOURSOFTHEDECISIONTOSAMPLE.THEPASSWILLALSOENABLESAMPLINGOFTHESESTREAMSDURINGNORMALOPERATION.IN-LINECHEMICALINSTRUMENTATIONWILLBEPROVIDEDINANEWLIQUIDANDGASSAMPLEPANEL(LGSP)WHICHWILLREMOTELYDETERMINEIMPORTANTCHEMICALPARAMETERSOFREACTORCOOLANT,CONTAINMENTAIR,ANDCONTAINMENTSUMP.THELGSPWILLENABLEACQUISITIONOFDILUTEDANDUNDILUTEDGRABSAMPLESOFBOTHREACTORCOOLANTANDCONTAINMENTAIRFORIOPICANALYSISINTHEEXISTINGCOUNTINGLAB.THELGSPWILLBECONTROLLEDFROMANEWELECTRICCONTROLPANEL(ECP)ANDINSTRUMENTPANEL(IP)TOBELOCATEDINTHEHOTSHOP.REMOTELYOPERATEDVALVESANDINSTRUMENTSEXTERNALTOTHELGSPWILLALSOBECONTROLLEDFROMTHEECP.THELGSPWILLBELOCATEDONTHE253'-6"ELEVATIONOFTHECONTROLLEDPORTIONOFTHEINTERMEDIATEBUILDING.

3' THEPASSISDESIGNEDTOMEETTHEREQUIREMENTSOFNUREG0578ANDNUREG0737(SECTIONII.B.3).FURTHERMORE,THEPASSINSTALLATIONATGINNAISTOHAVEADEQUATEPROVISIONSTOALLOWCOMPLIANCEWITHTHECONTAINMENTSUMPSAMPLING,pHANDOXYGENANALYSISREQUIREMENTSNOWINVOKEDBYREGULATORYGUIDE1.97(REV.2)DATEDDECEMBER1980.SAMPLELINESASSOCIATEDWITHTHEPASSWILLBEINSTALLEDINSUCHAMANNERTHATTHEPOSTACCIDENTDOSECRITERIAWILLBEMETFORSAMPLINGANDACCESSTOVITALAREAS.THENECESSARYMODIFICATIONSARESHOWNSCHEMATICALLYONTHEATTACHEDFIGURE1.THEGENERALARRANGEMENTOFEQUIPMENTISSHOWNONFIGURE2.STEAM.GENERATORBLOWDOWNSAMPLELINESFROMCONTAINMENTPENETRATIONS206AND207TOTHEEXISTINGSAMPLEROOMARETOBEREROUTED(FORALARACONSIDERATIONS)USINGTHESAMEDESIGNCRITERIADISCUSSEDHEREIN.THESETWOLINESAREBEINGREROUTEDTOREDUCEOPERATOREXPOSUREFORROUTINESAMPLINGANDARENOTREQUIREDASAPARTOFNUREG-0737ORREG.GUIDE1.97(REV.2)~AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYNRCREGULATORYGUIDE1.70ANDTHEGINNASTATIONFSAR.THEEVENTSRELATINGTOTHISMODIFICATIONARE:(1)EARTHQUAKEAND(2)RADIOACTIVERELEASEFROMASUBSYSTEMORCOMPONENTALLEQUIPMENTANDPIPINGSUPPORTSZNTHECONTAINMENTgAUXILIARYANDINTERMEDIATEBUILDINGSARESEISMICCATEGORYI.THEIRDESIGNWILLASSUREOTHEREQUIPMENTWILLNOTBESTRUCTURALLYDAMAGEDASARESULTOFFAILUREDURINGANEARTHQUAKE.THECONSEQUENCESOFANEARTHQUAKEARENOTCHANGEDASARESULTOFTHISMODIFICATION.FAILUREOFANYPASSCOMPONENTAFTERANACCIDENTSHALLNOTRESULTZN10CFRPART100DOSESTOBEEXCEEDEDANDONTHISBASISTHESYSTEMISCLASSIFIEDASNON-SAFETYRELATED.THISHASBEENCONFIRMEDBYANALYSIS.INTHEEVENTOFALOSS'FCOOLANTACCIDENTTHENEWPASSWILLPROVIDEAMEANSTOOBTAINANDANALYZEREACTORCOOLANT,CONTAINMENTAIR,ANDCONTAINMENTSUMPSAMPLES.THEPASSWILLHAVEPROVISIONSTOBEPRESSURIZEDWITHNITROGENORAIRPRIORTOPOSTACCIDENTOPERATIONTOASSURELEAKTZGHTNESS.THEMAZORSYSTEMVALVESANDINSTRUMENTSARECONTAINEDINANENCLOSED,SEALEDPANELWHICHISCONNECTEDTOACHARCOALFILTEREDSTATIONHVACSYSTEM.THUSCOMPONENTLEAKAGEWILLBEPREVENTEDFROMUNCONTROLLEDAREAS.

THEREFOREiTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.THEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES,SYSTEMS,ANDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDFORTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESHAVENOTBEENAFFECTED.EWR-2799REACTORLEVELMONITORINGSYSTEMTHISEWR(ENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST)ADDRESSESTHEMODIFICATIONWHICHWILLPROVIDEAREACTORVESSELLEVELMONITORINGSYSTEM.THESYSTEMWILLCONSISTOFTWOREDUNDANTDIFFERENTIALPRESSURETRENDINGCHANNELS.EACHCHANNELWILLDRIVEASEPARATEINDICATORINTHEMAINCONTROLROOMSHOWINGREACTORVESSELLEVELTOTHEPLANTOPERATORSUNDERALLPLANTCONDITIONS.REVISION2OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDREVISION1OFTHESAFETYANALYSISWEREPRESENTEDANDAPPROVEDBYPORCONMARCH20i1985,PORCNUMBER6.1.0-85-037-002.UNDERREVISION3OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDREVISION2OFTHESAFETYANALYSIS'HEFOLLOWINGPARAGRAPHSAREAFFECTEDDESIGNCRITERIASTEP4.1REVISEDFROM:THEATTACHMENTTOTHEEXISTINGHEADVENTSYSTEMINCLUDINGTHERESTRICTINGDEVICESHALLBEQUALITYGROUPA.REMAININGFLUIDSYSTEMSANDCOMPONENTSSHALLBEQUALITYGROUPB.TOREAD:THEATTACHMENTSTOTHEGUIDETUBEANDTHEHEADVENTSYSTEM,INCLUDINGTHERESTRICTINGDEVICEiSHALLBEQUALITYGROUPAREMAININGFLUIDSYSTEMSANDCOMPONENTSSHALLBEQUALITYGROUPB.STEP5.1REVISEDFROM:THEATTACHMENTTOTHEEXISTINGHEADVENTSYSTEMSHALLCONSISTOFARESTRICTINGDEVICEANDSHALLBEASMECODECLASS1.CONSISTENTWITHREFERENCE6.2.2.7THECOMPONENTSDOWNSTREAMOFTHERESTRICTINGDEVICESHALLBEASMECODECLASS2.THECOUPLINGTHATATTACHESTOTHEREACTORINSTRUMENTATIONGUIDETUBESHALLBEASMECODECLASS2.TOREAD:THEATTACHMENTSTOTHEEXISTINGHEADVENTSYSTEMANDGUIDETUBESHALLCONSISTOFARESTRICTINGDEVICEANDSHALLBEASMECODECLASS1.CONSISTENTWITHREFERENCES6.2.2.7THECOMPONENTSDOWNSTREAMOFTHERESTRICTINGDEVICESHALLBEASMECODECLASS2.

STEP7.1REVISEDFROM:THESYSTEMMECHANICALDES/GNCONDITIONSWILLBEOVERARANGEOF0TO3000PSI,AND50TO697F.THESYSTEMSHALLA/SOPROVIDEINVENTORYINDICATIONSFORTEMPERATUREOgER697F,ASSUMINGSATURATEDFLUIDCONDITIONS'PTO2200FiZNTHECORE.TOREAD:TH)SYSTEMMECHANICALDESIGNCONDITIONSARE0TO2500PSIGAND50TO680F.THEMOSTSEVEREACCIDENTCONDITIONIS3015PSIGAT697F.THESYSTEMSHALLA%SOPROVIDEINVENTORYINDICATIONSFORTEMPERATUREOVEQ697F,ASSUMINGSATURATEDFLUIDCONDITIONSiUPTO2200FiINTHECORES'TEP7.6HASBEENADDEDTHEADDITIONOFTHEATTACHMENTTOTHEGUIDETUBESHALLNOTCAUSETHEGUIDETUBETOEXCEEDWESTINGHOUSEALLOWABLELOADSFORTHEATTACHMENTTOTHEREACTORVESSELORSEALTABLE.STEP8.1REVISEDFROM:THEINSTRUMENTTUBINGSHALLBESUPPORTEDSUCHTHATITREMAINSFUNCTIONALFOLLOWINGANSSEEVENTASWELLASDURINGNORMALOPERATION.TOREAD:THEINSTRUMENTTUBINGSHALLBESUPPORTEDSUCHTHATITREMAINSFUNCTIONALFOLLOWINGANSSEEVENTASWELLASDURINGNORMALOPERATIONANDALLPOSTULATEDACCIDENTCONDITIONS.STEP8.3REVISEDFROM:THEMOSTSEVEREOPERATINGCONDITIONSCONSIDEREDFORTHECONNECTIONTOTHEHEADVENTSYSTEMISTHECONTROLRODEJECTIONANDTHECORRESPONDINGPRESSUREANDTEMPERATUREIS3015PSIGAND697F.TOREAD'HEMOSTSEVEREACCIDENTCONDITIONCONSIDEREDFORTHECONNECTIONSTOTHEREACTORCOOLANTSYSTEMISTHECONTROLRODEJECTION.THECORRESPONDINGPRESSUREANDTEMPERATUREARE3015PSIGAND697F.STEP10.1REVISEDFROM:3'PRIMARYREACTORCOOLANTLOOP,INCLUDINGTHEREACTORVESSELHEADVENTSYSTEM.

TOREAD:3)PRIMARYREACTORCOOLANTLOOP~INCLUDINGTHEREACTORVESSELHEADVENTSYSTEMANDTHEREACTORVESSELBOTTOMMOUNTEDINSTRUMENTATION.STEP31.0REVISEDFROM:nNOTAPPLICABLE'OREAD:CONSTRUCTIONPROCEDURESFORATTACHMENTTOTHISGUIDETUBEWILLBEDEVELOPEDTHATENSURETHATNOFOREIGNMATERIALENTERTHEGUIDETUBE.ATTACHEDFIGURE1TOTHEDESIGNCRITERIAHASBEENREVISEDSTATINGTHATINPUTSTOTHEFOXBORORACKARE3INSTEADOF4LINETHERMOCOUPLES.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDZNTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORYGUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONARE:1)MAJORANDMINORFIRES,2)SEISMICEVENT,AND3)THESPECTRUMOFLOSSOFCOOLANTACCIDENTSINSIDEOFCONTAINMENT.BASEDUPONTHEANALYSESDESCRIBEDUNDERPARAGRAPHS3.1TO4.4OFTHESAFETYANALYSIS,ITHASTHEREFORE,BEENDETERMINEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENDETERMINEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'/SYSTEMS'NDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEZMPLEMENTZONOFTHISMODIFICATION.EWR-2846BBLOCKWALLMODIFICATIONRESTRAINTSEUIPMENTPROTECTIONINTERMEDIATEBUILDINGTHISEWR(ENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST)ADDRESSESTHEMODIFICATIONSTOPROVIDEPROTECTIONOFAUXILIARYFEEDWATERCHECKVALVES,AANDBMAINSTEAMISOLATIONVALVE(MSIV)OPERATORSANDAANDBMSIVSOLENOIDVALVES.THEPURPOSEOFTHISMODIFICATIONISTOPROVIDE1)UPGRADEDPROTECTIONFORTHEAANDBMSZVOPERATORSANDAZRSOLENOIDVALVESSUCHTHATMSZVCLOSUREZSENSUREDFORSCENARIOSINVOLVINGSSE(SAFESHUTDOWNEARTHQUAKE),TORNADOMISSILES/WINDLOADSANDHELB(HIGHENERGYLINEBREAKS)OUTSIDECONTAINMENT~2)PROTECTIONFORTHEitAiiAND<<B'UXILIARYFEEDWATERCHECKVALVESFORSCENARIOSINVOLVINGTORNADOWINDLOADSANDSSESEISMICEVENTS.

REVISION1TOTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISWILLALLOWREMOVALOFVENTVALVE3516A.THISVALVE,ANDASSOCIATEDPIPINGiWILLBEREMOVEDFROMTHEBMSIVANDNOTREPLACED'HESCOPEOFTHEPIPINGMODIFICATIONWILLBETOPLACEAPLUGZNTHEEXISTINGCOVERFORTHE>>B"MSIVPRE-PORCCOMMENTSAREADDRESSEDININTEROFFICECORRESPONDENCE13N1-RR-L2275ANDWILLBEINCORPORATEDINTOTHENEXTREVISION.THESECHANGESINCLUDETYPOGRAPHICALCORRECTIONSTOTHEDESIGNCRITERIA,PARAGRAPHS1.2AND23.0.TOFURTHERCLARIFYTHETESTREQUIREMENTSiASENTENCEWILLBEADDEDTOTHEDESIGNCRITERIAPARAGRAPH23.0STATING"ZNLIEUOFAHYDROSTATICTEST,ALEAKCHECKMAYBEPERFORMEDATNORMALOPERATINGCONDITIONSAREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.70.EVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONAREEARTHQUAKESiPIPEBREAKSOUTSIDETHECONTAINMENTBUILDING/TORNADOES'IRESiANDTORNADOMISSILES'LLPROPOSEDPROTECTIVEDEVICESARETOBEMOUNTEDASSEISMICCATEGORYIINACCORDANCEWITHTHESTRUCTURALRE-ANALYSISPROGRAM(SRP).REMOVABLEPANELSWILLBEUTILIZEDTOPROVIDEMAINTENANCE/TESTINGACCESSASREQUIRED.PLACEMENTOFPASSIVEPROTECTIVEDEVICESAROUNDTHEMSXVOPERATORS/SOLENOIDVALVESANDiiBttAFWCHECKVALVESENSURESFUNCTIONALOPERATIONDURINGANDFOLLOWINGHELBSCENARIOSOUTSIDECONTAINMENT.FIRESYSTEMSANDFIREBARRIERSDISCUSSEDZNTHEUFSARARECOVEREDUNDERPLANTADMINISTRATIVECONTROLS,ENSURINGTHATDEGRADATIONOFPROTECTION/DETECTIONFEATURESNECESSARYTOCOMPLYWITH10CFR50APPENDIXRWILLNOTOCCUR.TORNADOLOADSiSUCHASDIRECTWINDiDIFFERENTIALPRESSUREiANDTORNADOMISSILESHAVEBEENINCORPORATEDINTHEUFSARUNDERSEPRE-EVALUATIONDESIGNANDANALYSIS.THUSiTHISMODIFICATIONNEITHERINCREASESTHECONSEQUENCESiNORDOESITREDUCETHEMARGINSOFSAFETYFOR:1)EQUIPMENTREQUIREDTOFUNCTIONDURINGANDFOLLOWINGSSEANDTORNADOEVENTS.2)OPERATIONDURINGAHELBSCENARIOOUTSIDECONTAINMENT.3)FIREPROTECTIONFEATURES.

BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTHESTRUCTURALRE-ANALYSISPLAN(SRP)gITHASBEENDETERMINEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENDETERMINEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURESJSYSTEMS'NDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODIFICATION.EWR-3072RCP1SEALLEAKOFFTHISEWR(ENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST)ADDRESSESTHEMODIFICATIONWHICHWILLINSTALLCHECKVALVESONTHENUMBERONESEALLEAKOFFLINESFROMTHEREACTORCOOLANTPUMPS(RCP)AANDB.THENEWCHECKVALVESWILLBEASMEN-STAMPEDSEISMICALLYQUALXFIED.THENEWCHECKVALVESWILLBELOCATEDINCONTAINMENTINSIDETHERCPSHIELDWALLS.THEMODIFIEDPIPESYSTEM,INCLUDINGSUPPORTS,WILLBESEISMICALLYQUALIFIED.THIS,MODIFICATIONISSCHEDULEDFORINSTALLATIONDURINGTHE1987REFUELINGOUTAGE.REVISION0OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISWASPRESENTEDANDAPPROVEDBYPORCONJUNE16,1986PORCNUMBER6~1~0-86-081-001.THEPURPOSEOFREVISXON1OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISISTOINCLUDEREFERENCETOTHEASMEIIICLASS2STANDARDS'REVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGZNNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORYGUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICA-TIONARE:')PRIMARYSYSTEMPIPERUPTURE,2)INTERNALANDEXTERNALEVENTS'IRES'LOOD/STORMOREARTHQUAKESAND3)LOSSOFAREACTORCOOLANTPUMP.BASEDUPONTHEANALYSESDESCRIBEDUNDERPARAGRAPHS3.1TO4.4OFTHESAFETYANALYSIS~ITHASTHEREFORE'EENDETERMINEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDXTIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENDETERMINEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS'NDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODIFICATION.10

EWR-3092BORICACIDPIPINGTHISENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSESTHEUPGRADEOFBORICACIDPIPINGFROMSCHEDULE10TOSCHEDULE40PIPE.INCLUDEDINTHISMODIFICATIONZSTHERE-ROUTINGOFTHEPIPETOAVOIDHIGHRADIATIONAREAS'NSTALLATIONOFANEWHEATTRACINGSYSTEMSUPGRADINGOFPIPESUPPORTSANDADDITIONOFAONEINCH(1>>)ISOLATIONVALVEINTHEMOV825A/BBYPASSLINEAREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORYGUIDE1.70.REVISION0IDENTIFIEDTHEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONASFIREgSEISMIC'OSSOFOFFSITEPOWERSCVCSCONTROLSYSTEMMALFUNCTIONS'TEAMLINEBREAKANDLOCA.ALLEXISTINGFIREPROTECTIONFEATURESREQUIREDTOASSURECOMPLIANCEWITH10CFR50gAPPENDIXRfORTOMAINTAINEQUIVALENTLEVELSOFPROTECTIONFROMFIRESWILLBEMAINTAINEDDURINGANDFOLLOWINGTHISMODIFICATION.SEISMICEVENTSHAVEBEENANALYZEDUNDERTHESEPRE-EVALUATIONDESIGNANALYSIS.PIPINGANDPIPESUPPORTANALYSESSHALLBEPERFORMEDINACCORDANCEWITHEWR-2512DESIGNCRITERIAUSINGANSIB31.1ANDASMESECTIONIII.SUBSECTIONNFASABASIS.STRUCTURALWORKREQUIREDSHALLBEBASEDUPONTHEAISCCODE,EIGHTHEDITION.THEDESIGNANDOPERATINGCONDITIONSTOWHICHTHEPIPINGSYSTEMSWILLBEANALYZEDAREDEFINEDZNTHEOPERATINGTRANSIENTSDOCUMENTGENERATEDFOREWR2512.SYSTEMTHERMALANALYSESSHALLEVALUATETHENORMAL100%POWERCONDITION,ASWELLASOTHERABNORMALOPERATINGTRANSIENTCONDITIONS.THELOADINGCOMBINATIONSANDSTRESSLIMITSOFTHEEWR2512DESIGNCRITERIASHALLBEMETFORALLNORMALANDACCIDENTCONDITIONS.ALLMODIFICATIONSORADDITIONSTOTHEEXISTINGPIPINGORPIPESUPPORTSWILLBEREQUIREDTOINTERFACEWITHTHEEXISTINGPIPEgPIPESUPPORTS'ND/ORSTRUCTURESANDSHALLNOTDEGRADETHEABILITYOFTHESEITEMSTOFUNCTIONACCORDINGTOTHEIRORIGINALDESIGNREQUIREMENTS.THISMODIFICATIONWILLNOTDEGRADEPLANTSYSTEMSONALOSSOFOFFSITEPOWER.THEHEATTRACECIRCUITSSHALLNOTDEGRADETHEPLANTNORMALOREMERGENCYPOWERDISTRIBUTIONSYSTEM.REDUNDANTPOWERTRAINSSHALLBEMAINTAINEDANDSTRUCTURESANDELECTRICALEQUIPMENTWITHINTHESCOPEOFTHISWORKSHALLREMAINFUNCTIONALFOLLOWINGASAFESHUTDOWNEARTHQUAKE(SSE).THEHEATTRACINGSYSTEMSHALLBESUPPLIEDWITHPOWERFROMTHEEMERGENCYDIESELGENERATORSFOLLOWINGALOSSOFOFFSITEPOWER.THEEFFECTOFTHENEWSYSTEMONTHEDIESELGENERATORLOADSSHALLBEEVALUATED.

THEMODIFICATIONPERFORMEDSHALLNOTINHIBITTHEAFFECTEDSYSTEMSFROMPERFORMINGTHEIRFUNCTIONSDURINGALLNORMALANDPOSTULATEDACCIDENTCONDITIONS.THEBORICACIDSYSTEMSHALLBEOPERABLEDURINGALLNORMAL'ESIGNTRANSIENT/UPSETANDFAULTEDCONDITIONS.THEBORICACIDPIPINGCHANGESSHALLNOTAFFECTTHECONTROLOFANYPLANTSYSTEM.INREVISION1TOTHISDESIGNCRITERIATHESOLUBILITYTEMPERATURELIMITFOR12-13WEIGHTPERCENTBORICACIDSOLUTIONISREVISEDFROM140oFTO145oFTOCOMPLYWITHTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONSANDADMINISTRATIVECONTROLSESTABLISHEDATGXNNASTATION.THUSgTHISMODIFICATIONNEITHERINCREASESTHECONSEQUENCESgNORDOESITREDUCETHEMARGINSOFSAFETYFOR:1)2)3)FIREPROTECTIONFEATURESEQUIPMENTREQUIREDTOFUNCTIONDURINGANDFOLLOWINGSEISMICANDTORNADOEVENTS.EQUIPMENTREQUIREDTOFUNCTIONFOLLOWINGALOSSOFOFFSITEPOWERSSTEAMBREAKORLOSSOFCOOLANTACCIDENT(LOCA).BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONS,ZTHASBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS'NDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODXFICATION.EWR-3199VITALBATTERYLOADFLOWMONITORTHISEWR(ENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST)ADDRESSESTHEDESIGNMODIFICATIONWHICHWILLPROVIDEAMEANSTOMONITORCURRENTMAGNITUDESANDDIRECTIONOFBOTHSAFEGUARDSD.C.BATTERYSYSTEMSASWELLASTHETECHNICALSUPPORTCENTER(TSC)BATTERY.THESYSTEMWILLCONSISTOFTHENECESSARYEQUIPMENTTODISPLAYTHEDIRECTIONANDMAGNITUDEOFCURRENTGOINGINTOOROUTOFEACHBATTERY.THESYSTEMWILLALSOBECAPABLEOFANNUNCIATINGABNORMALBATTERYCONDITIONSANDLOSSOFCONTINUXTYOFBATTERYCIRCUITS.THEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODIFICATIONWILLSATISFYTHEREQUIREMENTSOFSEPTOPICVIII-3.B.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORYGUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISADDITIONARE(1)MAJORANDMINORFIRES'ND(2)SEISMICEVENTSZTHASgTHEREFORE/BEENDETERMINEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHESTATIONHAVENOTBEENAFFECTED.12

EWR-3272SASPPCSCOMPUTERSYSTEMTHISEWR(ENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST)ADDRESSESTHEINSTALLATIONOFASAFETYASSESSMENTSYSTEM(SAS)ANDTHEREPLACEMENTOFTHEP-250PLANTPROCESSCOMPUTERSYSTEM(PPCS).DEDICATEDCRTsANDLINEPRINTERSWILLBECONNECTEDTOTHESASANDPPCSCPUs.THESASSYSTEMISDESIGNEDTOPROVIDEANINTEGRATEDDISPLAYOFCRITICALPLANTSAFETYPARAMETERSANDPERFORMREFERENCEDIAGNOSTICSDURINGEMERGENCIES.THE(SAS)SYSTEMWILLPROVIDETHEOPERATORSINTHECONTROLROOM,ANDPERSONNELINTHETSC~THEEOFANDTHEENGXNEERINGCENTERWITH1)ANINDICATIONOFTHESAFETYSTATUSOFTHEPLANTg2)ACCIDENTDIAGNOSTICDXSPLAYSgAND3)POSTACCIDENTMONITORXNG~THENEWPPCSWILLINITIALLYPERFORMTHESAMEFUNCTIONSTHATTHEP-250PRESENTLYPERFORMS.REVISION0OFTHEDESIGNCRXTERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISWASPRESENTEDANDAPPROVEDBYPORCON5/23/84'ORCNUMBER6.1.0-84-082-002.UNDERREVISION1OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIA,PARAGRAPH3.2FIRSTSENTENCESTATING~i>THEREMAININGEQUIPMENT<<HASBEENCHANGEDTOREAD"THEEQUIPMENTASSOCIATEDAREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORYGUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATXONARE1)MAJORANDMINORFIRES,2)SEISMICEVENT.BASEDUPONTHEANALYSESDESCRIBEDUNDERPARAGRAPHS3.1TO4.4OFTHESAFETYANALYSIS'THASTHEREFORE/BEENDETERMINEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURXNGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENDETERMINEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS'NDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOF'THISMODIFICATION.EWR-3296ASTRUCTURALUPGRADEPROGRAMTHISEWR(ENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST)ADDRESSESTHEGINNASTATIONSTRUCTURALUPGRADEPROGRAMWHICHISINRESPONSETOTHESYSTEMATICEVALUATIONPROGRAM(SEP)BEGUNBYTHEUSNRCIN1977.THEPURPOSEOFTHISMODIFICATIONISTOUPGRADETHOSEMEMBERS,CONNECTIONSANDANCHORAGESFOUNDTOBEOVERSTRESSEDWHENSUBJECTEDTO.THEDESIGNLOADSSETFORTHINTHEVARIOUSSEPTOPICS.13

REVISION0TOTHISDESIGNCRITERIA/SAFETYANALYSISCOVEREDMODIFICATIONSINCLUDEDINTHESEPTOPICSLOCATEDZNTHEAUXILIARYBUILDINGSCONTROLBUILDING~INTERMEDIATEBUILDINGSTURBINEBUILDINGSANDTHEFACADESTRUCTUREREVISION1OFTHISDESIGNCRITERIA/SAFETYANALYSIS:l.ADDRESSESTHEDESIGNANDINSTALLATIONOFBACKDRAFTDAMPERSREQUIREDONLYZNTHEAUXILIARYBUILDING.THESEDAMPERSgWHENINSTALLED'ILLELIMINATE~THEEFFECTSOFTHEDIFFERENTIALPRESSURESASSOCIATEDWITHTHEDESIGNBASISTORNADO.2.INCORPORATESCHANGESINFORMATANDCONTENTOFVARIOUSSUB-SECTIONSOFTHEDESIGNCRITERIA.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREGGUIDE1.70.EVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONARE:WINDANDTORNADOLOADING,FIRESANDTHESAFESHUTDOWNEARTHQUAKE(SEISMICEVENTS).THEDESIGNFORWINDANDTORNADOLOADINGSHAVEBEENANALYZEDUNDERTHESEPRE-EVALUATIONDESIGNANALYSIS.MODIFICATIONSTOSTRUCTURALMEMBERSANDATTACHMENTSWILLNOTALTEREITHERTHESEISMICQUALIFICATIONOFEXISTINGSTRUCTURESORSAFETYRELATEDEQUIPMENTLOCATEDWITHINTHESESTRUCTURES.THEINCLUSIONOFBACKDRAFTDAMPERSUNDERTHISMODIFICATIONINSURESTHATTHEAUXILIARYBUILDINGWILLNOTBEADVERSELYAFFECTEDBYTORNADOWINDS.ALLEXISTINGFIREPROTECTIONFEATURESREQUIREDTOASSURECOMPLIANCEWITH10CFR50,APPENDIXR,ORTOMAINTAINEQUIVALENTLEVELSOFPROTECTIONFROMFIRESWILLBEMAINTAINEDDURINGANDFOLLOWINGTHESTRUCTURALUPGRADEMODIFICATIONS.THUSgTHISMODIFICATIONNEITHERINCREASETHECONSEQUENCES/NORDOESITREDUCETHEMARGINSOFSAFETYFOR:1)EQUIPMENTREQUIREDTOFUNCTIONDURINGANDFOLLOWINGSSE,WINDANDTORNADOEVENTS2)FIREPROTECTIONFEATURESBASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTHESTRUCTURALRE-ANAL-YSISPLANT(SRP)gITHASBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES~SYSTEMS~ANDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODIFICATION.14

EWR-3595CONTROLROOMHABITABILITYTHISENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSESTHEMODIFICATIONOFTHECONTROLROOMHABITABILITYSYSTEM.INORDER,TOIMPROVERELIABILITYANDMAINTAINABILITYOFTHERADIATIONANDTOXICGASMONITORSEWR-3595PHASEBWASESTABLISHED.REVISION5OFTHISDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISINCORPORATESTHEFOLLOWINGCHANGESFROMREVIEWOFDCANDSAREVISION4PREVIOUSLYNOTPORCAPPROVED.MODIFICATIONSAPPLICABLETOEWR-3595PHASEBAREASFOLLOWS:1)REPLACE2EXISTINGTOXICGASSAMPLEPUMPSWITHTWOPUMPS'ACHWITH1004CAPACITY'NEPUMPWILLBEZNOPERATINGMODE,THEOTHERWILLBEINSTANDBYMODE.THREEPOSITIONTOXICGASSAMPLEPUMPSWITCHSHALLALSOBEINSTALLED.2)REPLACEEXISTINGRADIATIONMONITORFLOWSWITCH.3)ADDITIONOFCONTROLROOM'DAMPERSMANUALACTUATIONSWITCHATTHEHVACPANEL.4)ADDITIONOFRADIATION~AMMONIA'NDCHLORINELOWSAMPLEAIRFLOWSIGNALSFORCONTROLROOMDAMPERSISOLATIONANDINDICATIONTOTHEPLANTPROCESSCOMPUTER.5)REPLACEEXISTINGCHLORINEFLOWMETERWITHONETHATHASCFMUNITINDICATION.6)INSTALLCLEARPOLYCARBONATE"LEXAN>>COVERFORCHECKINGPARTICULATEMONITORPAPERONTHERADIATIONMONITORCABINET.7)REPLACERADIATIONMONITORPUMPMOTORFUSEWITHAMOTORSTARTER.THEPROBABILITYOFOCCURRENCEOFANACCIDENTEVALUATEDPREVIOUSLYINTHEUPDATEDFINALSAFETYANALYSISREPORT(UFSAR)ISNOTINCREASED.THEREISNOREDUCTIONINSYSTEMRELIABILITYORPERFORMANCE.THECONTROLROOMTOXICGASANDRADIATIONMONITORSWILLREMAINWITHINREMAINWITHINTHEIRDESIGNLIMITSANDWILLHAVENOIMPACTONPLANTABILITYTOWITHSTANDFIRE.THECONSEQUENCESOFANACCIDENTPREVIOUSLYEVALUATEDINTHEUFSARARENOTINCREASED.THEMODIFICATIONDOESNOTIMPACTORINCREASETHECALCULATEDRADIOLOGICALDOSETOTHEGENERALPUBLICFORANYEVENTEVALUATEDINTHEUFSAR.THEFUNCTIONANDCAPABILITYOFTHETOXICGASANDRADIATIONMONITORSREMAINTHESAME,ANDNOFISSIONPRODUCTBARRIERSAREAFFECTED.15

THEPROBABILITYOFOCCURRENCEOFAMALFUNCTIONOFEQUIPMENTIMPORTANTTOSAFETYPREVIOUSLYEVALUATEDINTHEUFSARISNOTINCREASED.THEMODIFICATIONDOESNOTDEGRADETHEPERFORMANCEOFANYSYSTEMFUNCTIONS'NDINFACTgUPGRADESTHEINSTRUMENTATIONANDCONTROLOFTHEMONITORS.THECONSEQUENCESOFAMALFUNCTIONOFEQUIPMENTIMPORTANTTOSAFETYPREVIOUSLYEVALUATEDZNTHEUFSARARENOTINCREASED.'HEMODIFICATIONDOESNOTIMPACTORINCREASETHECALCULATEDRADIOLOGICALDOESTOTHEGENERALPUBLICFORANYEVENTEVALUATEDINTHEUFSAR.THEFUNCTIONANDCAPABILITYOFTHEMONITORSTODETECTANDALARM/ISOLATIONREMAINSTHESAMEgANDNOFISSIONPRODUCT=BARRIERSAREAFFECTED.THE.POSSIBILITYOFANACCIDENTOFADIFFERENTTYPETHANANYPREVIOUSLYEVALUATEDINTHEUFSARZSNOTCREATED.NOOTHERSYSTEMSAREAFFECTED'ORANYNEWFAILUREMODEZNDUCED~THEPOSSIBILITYOFADIFFERENTTYPEOFMALFUNCTIONOFEQUIPMENTIMPORTANTTOSAFETYTHANANYPREVIOUSLYEVALUATEDZNTHEUFSARISNOTCREATED.THEADDITIONOFTHESWITCHES,REMOTEINDICATION,ANDCLEARLEXANCOVERDOESNOTADVERSELYAFFECTTHESUBJECTSYSTEM.THEMARGINOFSAFETYASDEFINEDINTHEBASISFORANYTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONZSNOTREDUCED.THEFUNCTIONSANDPERFORMANCECHARACTERISTICSOFTHEMONITORS(EDGagDETECTION'SOLATIONSgETC.)REMAINUNCHANGED.BASED-UPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTHEREQUIREMENTSOFGINNASTATIONTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONS,ITHASBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURING-NORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATED'URINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS'NDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODIFICATION.EWR-3645AGZNNASTATIONGROUNDWATERLEVELSTHISEWR(ENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST)ADDRESSESANANALYSISOFBELOWGRADESTRUCTURESATGINNATOEVALUATETHEEFFECTSOFTHEINCREASEDGROUNDWATERLEVEL(GWL).THISEWRCOVERSONLYTHEEVALUATIONOFEFFECTSOFTHENEWDESIGNBASISGROUNDWATERLEVEL(DBGWL)ONSAFETYRELATEDSTRUCTURESBELOWGRADE.THENEWDBGWLISDEFINEDAS265.0FTMSL.THISEVALUATIONCOMPRISESAPORTIONOFACONTINUINGCOMMITMENTTOTHEUSNRCRELATIVETOSEPTOPICIII-3.A,nEFFECTSOFHIGHWATERLEVELONSTRUCTURES-R.E.GINNA16 i

PRE-PORCCOMMENTSLZSTEDBELOWWEREFORWARDEDTOTHERESPON-SIBLEENGINEER(RE)VIALETTER13N1-RR-L50391~ANSWERSAREPROVIDEDFORCLARIFICATION(SEELETTER13Nl-RR-L1650).Q.DOTHERESULTSOFTHISEVALUATIONHAVEANYPOTENTIALTOIMPACTANYASSUMPTIONSMADEINOURPASTANALYSISOFTHECONTAINMENTVESSELTENDONSORTHEIRROCKANCHORS'.ENGINEERINGREVIEWHASASCERTAINEDTHATEVALUATIONOFGROUNDWATERLEVELWILLHAVENOPOTENTIALTOIMPACTANYASSUMPTIONSPREVIOUSLYMADECONCERNINGCONTAINMENTVESSELTENDONSORROCKANCHORS.Q.A.1)THEUFSARZSNOTREFERENCEDINSECTION2.0OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIABUTISSPECIFICALLYCALLEDOUTINPARAGRAPH7.4~2)SAFETYANALYSISSTEP3.2DOESNOTADDRESSOPERATINGBASISEARTHQUAKES(OBE'S).ENGINEERINGWILLINCORPORATETHESECOMMENTSASCHANGESATTHENEXTREVISIONOFTHEDESIGNCRITERIA/SAFETYANALYSIS..AREVIEW,HASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDZNTHEGZNNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.70.EVENTSRELATEDTOTHISANALYSISAREINTERNALANDEXTERNALEVENTSSUCHASFIREgFLOODS'TORMS'NDEARTHQUAKES'NCORPORATINGBOTHOPERATINGBASISANDSAFESHUTDOWNEARTHQUAKES'HISANALYSISWILLNOTDEGRADEANYEXISTINGFIREPROTECTIONSYSTEMSORCOMPONENTS'HEREFORE'LLEXISTINGFIREPROTECTIONFEATURESREQUIREDTOASSURECOMPLIANCEWITH10CFR50APPENDIXRgORTOMAINTAINEQUIVALENTLEVELSOFPROTECTIONWILLBEMAINTAINEDDURINGANDFOLLOWINGTHISANALYSIS.THEPRESENTDESIGNFORFLOODING~STORMSgOPERATINGBASISEARTHQUAKEANDSAFESHUTDOWNEARTHQUAKE(SEISMICEVENTS)HASBEENANALYZEDUNDERTHESEPRE-EVALUATIONDESIGNANALYSIS.EVALUATIONOFTHEEFFECTSOFINCREASEDGROUNDWATERLEVELONSAFETYRELATEDSTRUCTURESBELOWGRADEWILLINSURETHATTHESESTRUCTURESAREADEQUATETORESISTLOADCOMBINATIONSREFERENCEDZNTHEDESIGNCRITERIA(BASEDUPONUSNRCSTANDARDREVIEWPLANGUIDELINES).THUSgTHISANALYSISWILLNEITHERINCREASETHECONSEQUENCESgNORREDUCETHEMARGINSOFSAFETYFORINTERNALANDEXTERNALEVENTSINVOLVING:1)EQUIPMENTREQUIREDTOFUNCTIONDURINGANDFOLLOWINGOBEgSSE~FLOODINGANDSTORMSgZNCLUDINGTORNADOEVENTS~2)FIREPROTECTIONFEATURES17

BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTHEREQUIREMENTSOFGINNASTATIONTECHNICALSPECIFZCATZONSiITHASBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTWILLNOTBEREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURESiSYSTEMSiANDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSWILLNOTBEAFFECTEDBYTHISANALYSIS.EWR-3698DIVERSETRIPMODIFICATIONONREACTORTRIPBREAKERSTHISEWR(ENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST)ADDRESSESTHEMODIFICATIONWHICHMODIFIEDTHECONTROLCIRCUITRYONTHESHUNTTRIPATTACHMENT(STA)TOTHEREACTORTRIPBREAKERS.PRESENTLY,THESTAISENERGIZEDTHROUGHTWOMANUALREACTORTRIPSWITCHES.ONLYTHEUNDERVOLTAGECOIL(UVTA)AUTOMATICALLYCAUSESAREACTORTRIPWHENASCRAMISREQUIRED.THEUVTAWOULDALSOCAUSEAREACTORTRIPONLOSSOFD.C.CONTROLPOWER.THISMODIFICATIONISREQUIREDTOCOMPLYWITHUSNRC83-28.854OFTHISMODIFICATIONHASBEENCOMPLETEDUNDERTHEPREVIOUSREVISIONS.THISPROJECTISSCHEDULEDFORCOMPLETIONDURINGTHE1987OUTAGE.REVISION1OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISWASPRESENTEDANDAPPROVEDBYPORCONFEBRUARY5,1986PORCNUMBER6.1.0-86-015-001.THEPURPOSEOFREVISION2OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISISTOINCLUDE:A)NEWINDICATORLIGHTTOVERIFYTHATTHESTAISOPERATIONAL.(PARAGRAPH7.3.1)B)NEWTRIPTESTREQUIREMENTSFORBOTHUVTAANDSTA.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORYGUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONARE:1)ALLPOSTULATEDACCIDENTSREQUIRINGAREACTORTRIP.2)LOSSOFD.C.CONTROLPOWER.3)NATURALEVENT/FIREiANDEARTHQUAKE~BASEDUPONTHEANALYSESDESCRIBEDUNDERPARAGRAPHS3.1TO4.4OFTHESAFETYANALYSIS,ZTHASTHEREFORE,BEENDETERMINEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENDETERMINEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURESiSYSTEMSiANDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODIFICATION.18 I4 EWR-3755PORVBLOCKVALVESREPLACEMENTTHISENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSESTHEREPLACEMENTOFPRESSURIZERMOTOR-OPERATEDBLOCKVALVES515AND516WITHNEWSEISMICALLYANDENVIRONMENTALLYQUALIFIEDGATEVALVES.THEREPLACEMENTISREQUIREDBECAUSETHEEXISTINGBLOCKVALVESEATRINGSAREAPPROACHINGTHEMAXIMUMALLOWABLELIMITSFORREMACHINZNG.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDES1.29AND1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONAREASFOLLOWS:1)2)3)4)5)6)7)INCREASEINHEATREMOVALBYSECONDARYSYSTEM.DECREASEINHEATREMOVALBYSECONDARYSYSTEM.DECREASEINREACTORCOOLANTSYSTEMFLOWRATE.REACTIVITYANDPOWERDISTRIBUTIONANOMALIES.INCREASEINREACTORCOOLANTINVENTORY.DECREASEINREACTORCOOLANTINVENTORY.INTERNALANDEXTERNALEVENTSSUCHASMAJORANDMINORFIRES,FLOODS,STORMS,OREARTHQUAKES.THEFOLLOWINGACCIDENTSAPPLICABLETOTHISMODIFICATIONAREASFOLLOWS:INCREASEINHEATREMOVALBYSECONDARYSYSTEMTHEFOLLOWINGACCIDENTSgAPPLICABLETOTHISEVENTgWEREANALYZED:A)B)C)D)E)DECREASEINFEEDWATERTEMPERATUREINCREASEINFEEDWATERFLOWEXCESSIVELOADINCREASEINCIDENTINADVERTANTOPENINGOFASTEAMGENERATORRELIEF/S-AFETYVALVESPECTRUMOFSTEAMSYSTEMPIPINGFAILURESINSIDEANDOUTSIDEOFCONTAINMENT2~DECREASEINHEATREMOVALBYSECONDARYSYSTEMTHEFOLLOWINGACCIDENTSgAPPLZCABLETOTHISEVENTgWEREANALYZED:A)B)C)D)E)F)G)STEAMPRESSUREREGULATORMALFUNCTIONORFAILURETHATRESULTSZNDECREASINGSTEAMFLOWLOSSOFEXTERNALELECTRICALLOADTURBINETRIPLOSSOFCONDENSERVACUUMLOSSOFOFFSZTEALTERNATINGCURRENTPOWERTOTHESTATIONAUXILIARIESLOSSOFNORMALFEEDWATERFLOWFEEDWATERSYSTEMPIPEBREAKS19

3.REACTIVITYANDPOWERDISTRIBUTIONANOMALIESTHEFOLLOWINGACCIDENTSiAPPLICABLETOTHISEVENTiWEREANALYZED:A)B)C)D)E)F)UNCONTROLLEDRODCLUSTERCONTROLASSEMBLYWITHDRAWALFROMASUBCRITICALCONDITIONUNCONTROLLEDRODCLUSTERCONTROLASSEMBLYWXTHDRAWALATPOWERSTARTUPOFANINACTIVEREACTORCOOLANTPUMPCHEMICALANDVOLUMECONTROLSYSTEMMALFUNCTIONRUPTUREOFACONTROLRODDRIVEMECHANISMHOUSINGRODCLUSTERCONTROLASSEMBLYDROP4.INCREASEINREACTORCOOLANTINVENTORY5.DECREASEINREACTORCOOLANTSYSTEMFLOWRATETHEFOLLOWINGACCIDENTSiAPPLICABLETOTHISEVENTiWERANALYZED:A)FLOWCOASTDOWNACCIDENTSB)LOCKEDROTORACCIDENTS6.DECREASE.INREACTORCOOLANTINVENTORYTHEFOLLOWINGACCIDENTSiAPPLICABLETOTHISEVENTiWEREANALYZED:A)INADVERTANTOPENINGOFAPRESSURIZERSAFETYORRELIEFVALVEB)PRIMARYSYSTEMPIPERUPTURESTHISMODIFICATIONWILLNOTDEGRADETHEDESIGN,CAPABILITYORPERFORMANCEOFTHEEXISTINGPRESSURIZERRELIEFSYSTEMANDiTHEREFORE,THECONSEQUENCESOFTHEABOVEEVENTSWILLNOTBEINCREASEDBYTHEMODIFICATION.THISMODIFICATIONANDTHEMATERIALSUTILIZEDWILLMEETAPPENDIXR10CFR50CRITERIAASDEFINEDINENGINEERINGPROCEDUREQE-326.THEMODIFICATIONNEXTHERAFFECTS,NORISAFFECTEDBYANYFLOODORSTORMPREVIOUSLYEVALUATED.THEMODIFICATIONISDECLAREDASHAVINGTOMEET,SEISMICCATEGORY1CRITERIAOFUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.29ANDCONDITIONSSPECIFIEDINTHEUFSARSECTION3.11.3TITLED"IDENTIFICATIONOFLIMITINGENVIRONMENTALCONDXTIONS20

$L BASEDUPONALLTHEABOVEANALYSES:1)STRUCTURESgSYSTEMSgANDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSAREADEQUATE.2)MARGINOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATINGANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHESTATIONARENOTREDUCED.BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTHEREQUIREMENTSOFGINNASTATIONTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONS'THASBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS'NDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODIFICATION.EWR-3768CONTAINMENTPENETRATIONCOOLINGTHISENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSESTHEUPGRADEOFTHEPENETRATIONCOOLINGSYSTEMTOENSURETHATTHEUNMONITOREDPATHFORAIRBORNERADIATIONFROMTHEAUXILIARYBUILDINGTOUNCONTROLLEDAREASWILLBEELIMINATED.REVISION1TOTHISDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISINCORPORATEDCOMMENTSTOREVISION0,ANDINCLUDEDINSTALLINGNEWDUCTWORKTOANOUTSIDEAZRSOURCESABACKDRAFTDAMPEROROTHERMEANSOFBACKFLOWPREVENTION'OPREVENTUNMONITOREDRELEASESOFRADIOACTIVITY,CHANGESTOTHEEXISTINGPENETRATIONCOOLINGFANSYSTEMINLETAEG&NGEMENTBOXTOACCEPTTHENEWDUCTWORK/INSTALLINGANEWSTEAMHEATINGCOILSINSTALLINGASSOCIATEDSTEAMSUPPLYANDSTEAMCONDENSATERETURNPIPING,INSTALLINGANEWCONDENSATEDRAINPANANDPIPING,ANDINSTALLINGNEWPNEUMATICAND/ORELECTRICTEMPERATURECONTROLDEVICESINTHEMODIFIEDSYSTEM.INADDITIONTOTHEDESIGNWORKREQUIREDTOMODIFYTHEEXISTINGCONTAINMENTPENETRATIONCOOLINGSYSTEMANANALYSISWASPERFORMEDTODETERMINETHEACTUALBULKCONCRETETEMPERATURESOFTHEPENETRATIONSWITHOUTTHEOPERATIONOFTHECONTAINMENTPENETRATIONCOOLINGSYSTEM.BULKCONCRETETEMPERATURELIMITATIONSHAVEBEENRELAXEDINRECENTYEARSFROMTHEORIGINALDESIGNLIMITOF150oFTO200oFPERASMEBOILERANDPRESSUREVESSELCODEX'ECTIONIII/DIVISION2g1986EDITION.THEANALYSIS.DEMONSTRATESTHATTHEBULKCONCRETETEMPERATURESDURINGTHEWORSTCASESCENARIOCOULDEXCEED200oFTHEREFORETHISSYSTEMWILLBEMAINTAINEDOPERABLEABOVEAPRIMARYSYSTEMTEMPERATUREOF200oF21

REVISION2OFTHISDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISUPDATESTHEREFERENCESECTIONSOFBOTHTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISANDINCORPORATES1)AVERIFICATIONTHATASTEAMCOILFAILURE(LOSSOFSTEAMHEATING)WILLNOTADVERSELYAFFECTSYSTEMOPERATIONDURINGCOLDWEATHER~AND2)APUSHTOTESTSWITCHONTHEEQUIPMENTHATCHTEMPERATUREALARMPANELTOGIVEPOSITIVEASSESSMENTOFLAMPFUNCTIONDURINGOPERATION.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONAREPIPINGFAILURESZNFLUIDSYSTEMSOUTSIDECONTAINMENT,SEISMICEVENTS'IRES'NDPLANTBUILDINGSECURITY'EISMICEVENTSHAVEBEENANALYZEDUNDERTHESEPRE-EVALUATIONDESIGNANALYSIS.MODIFICATIONOFTHEPENETRATIONCOOLINGSYSTEMREQUIRESSEISMICDESIGNFORSUPPORTSTOENSURETHATMODIFIEDPIPING/DUCTWORKWILLNOTCOLLAPSEDURINGASEISMICEVENT.THISMODIFICATIONWILLNOTALTEREITHERTHESEISMICQUALIFICATIONOFEXISTINGSTRUCTURESORSAFETYRELATEDEQUIPMENTLOCATEDWITHINTHEEXISTINGAUXILIARYBUILDINGSTRUCTURE.ALLEXISTINGFIREPROTECTIONFEATURESREQUIREDTOASSURECOMPLIANCEWITH10CFR50gAPPENDIXRJORTOMAINTAINEQUIVALENTLEVELSOFPROTECTIONFROMFIRESWILLBEMAINTAINEDDURINGANDFOLLOWINGTHISMODIFICATION.ABREAKINTHEHOUSEHEATINGSTEAMLINETOBEINSTALLEDUNDERTHISMODIFICATION(PIPEBREAKOUTSIDECONTAINMENT)WILLNOTHAVEADVERSEEFFECTSONSAFESHUTDOWNOFTHEPLANT.THETURBINEDRIVENAUXILIARYFEEDWATERPUMPASSURESDELIVERYOFAUXILIARYFEEDWATERTOTHESTEAMGENERATORSTOMAINTAINSAFESHUTDOWN.INVENTORYFORTHEPRIMARYSYSTEMISASSUREDVIACHARGINGPUMPSLOCATEDINAROOMSEPARATEDFROMTHEAUXILIARYBUILDINGBYCONCRETEWALLSANDSEALEDFIREBARRIERS.APPROPRIATEPROVISIONSWILLBEINSTALLEDTOPRECLUDEUNMONITOREDACCESSTOTHEAUXILIARYBUILDINGVIATHENEWINLETPENETRATIONZNACCORDANCEWITHGINNASTATIONSECURITYREQUIREMENTS.THUSgTHISMODZFZCATIONNEITHERINCREASESTHECONSEQUENCES/NORDOES.,ZTREDUCETHEMARGINSOFSAFETYFOR:1)EQUIPMENTREQUIREDTOFUNCTIONDURINGANDFOLLOWINGSEISMICEVENTSINCLUDINGPIPEBREAKSOUTSIDECONTAINMENT.2)FIREPROTECTIONFEATURES3)PLANTSECURITY22

BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTHESTRUCTURALRE-ANALYSISPLAN(SRP)gITHASBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED'THASALSOBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES/SYSTEMS~ANDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODIFICATION.EWR-3817CATALYTICOXYGENREMOVALSYSTEMTHISEWR(ENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST)ADDRESSESTHEMODIFICATIONWHICHWILLPROVIDEAMEANSOFREDUCINGOXYGENCONCENTRATIONSTOLESSTHAN100PPBINTHECONDENSATESTORAGESYSTEM.AWESTINGHOUSECATALYTICOXYGENREMOVALSYSTEM(CORS)HASBEENEVALUATEDTOBETHEBESTMETHODAVAILABLETOREDUCEDISSOLVEDOXYGENTOACCEPTABLELEVELS.THEPRINCIPLEISTOMIXHYDROGENWITHTHECONDENSATEANDREDUCETHEFREEOXYGENTOWATERTHROUGHEXPOSUREOFTHEMIXTURETOAMETALCATALYSTSURFACE.REVISION0OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISWASPRESENTEDANDAPPROVEDBYPORCONNOVEMBER6,1985PORCNUMBER6.1~0-85-114-002.DUETOPRE-PORCCOMMENTS,REVISION1OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSIS,WERENOTPRESENTEDTOPORC.THEPURPOSEOFREVISION2OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISISTOINCLUDECOMMENTSASARESULTOFPRE-PORCOFREVISIONl.,AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORYGUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONAREALOSSOFNORMALFEEDWATERANDFIRES.BASEDUPONTHEANALYSESDESCRIBEDUNDERPARAGRAPHS3.1TO4.4OFTHESAFETYANALYSIS,ITHASTHEREFORE,BEENDETERMINEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENDETERMINEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS'NDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODIFICATION.23

EWR-4037CT-1TERMINALREPLACEMENTTHISEWR(ENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST)ADDRESSESTHEMODIFICATIONOFTHEEXISTINGEBERLINECT-1EFFLUENTMONITORCONTROLTERMINALSATGINNASTATIONWITHUPGRADED'rBr'ERSIONEQUIPMENTTHEPURPOSEOFTHErrBrrVERSIONUPGRADEISTOIMPROVETHEOPERABILITYANDRELIABILITYOFTHEEXISTINGCONTROLTERMINALSINTHECONTROLROOMANDTECHNICALSUPPORTCENTER.ALSOPROPOSEDZSTHEINSTALLATIONOFAREPORTGENERATORINTERFACE(RGIF)WHICHWOULDENABLETHECT-1INTHETSCTOCOMMUNICATEWITHTHENEWPLANTCOMPUTERPLANNEDFORINSTALLATIONIN1986.IFTHECONTROLROOMOPERATORSHAVEACCESSTODATAFROMTHEEFFLUENTMONITORSVIATHEPLANTCOMPUTER,THECT-1INTHECONTROLROOMWOULDNOLONGERBEREQUZREDrANDCOULDBEREMOVEDTODECREASESOMEOFTHECONGESTIONINTHECONTROLROOMANDELIMINATETHENEEDFORDUPLICATINGATCT-1FORTHEGINNASIMULATORPROJECT.ITISPROPOSEDTHATBOTHTHECONTROLROOMANDTHETSCCONTROLTERMINALSBEUPGRADEDWITHTHE>>B"VERSIONEQUIPMENTIN1985'HENTHENEWPLANTCOMPUTERISOPERATIONAL'HERGIFWOULDBEINSTALLEDBETWEENTHETSCCT-1ANDTHEPLANTCOMPUTER,ANDTHECONTROLROOMCT-1WOULDBEREMOVED.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGZNNASTATIONFSARANDEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONARE(1)MAJORANDMINORFIRES,(2)ASEISMICEVENT.BASEDUPONTHEANALYSISDESCRIBEDUNDERPARAGRAPH3.1TO4.4OFTHESAFETYANALYSIS'THASBEENDETERMINEDTHATTHEPROBABILITYOFOCCURRENCEORTHECONSEQUENCESOFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTIONOFEQUIPMENTIMPORTANTTOSAFETY,PREVIOUSLYEVALUATEDINTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORTWILLNOTBEINCREASEDBYTHEPROPOSEDADDITION.EWR-4070NO.1AND2FEEDWATERHEATERREPLACEMENTTHISEWR(ENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST)ADDRESSESTHEREPLACEMENTOFNUMBER1AND2FEEDWATERHEATER.THEPURPOSEOFTHISMODIFICATIONISTOSPECIFYgPROCURErANDINSTALLNEWFEEDWATERHEATERTUBEBUNDLESANDSHELLMODIFICATIONSATTHEFIRSTANDSECONDEXTRACTIONPOINTS.THEPRIMARYGOALISTOELIMINATETHECOPPERALLOYTUBES.STAINLESSSTEELTUBESARERECOMMENDED.REVISION1TOTHESAFETYANALYSISINCORPORATESACHANGERESULTINGFROMPRE-PORCCOMMENTOFREVISION0TOCLARIFYASTEPTOSTATETHATTHEPROBABILITYOFUNINTENDEDOPENINGOFTHECONDENSATEBYPASSVALVEWILLNOTINCREASEDUETOTHEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIREMENTTOLIMITTUBESIDEPRESSUREDROPTO45PSI.AREVIEWHASBEENPERFORMEDOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHE24

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EWR-4075TSCHVACMODIFICATIONSTHISEWR(ENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST)ADDRESSESTHEMODIFICATIONOFTHEGZNNASTATIONTSCHVACSYSTEM.THISMODIFICATIONWILLCONSISTOF:1)ADDINGTWOCOMPUTERTYPEAIRCONDITIONINGUNITSTOTHENEWSASCOMPUTERROOM,2)INSTALLINGNEWZONECONTROLBOXES'ACHWITHZTSOWNTHERMOSTAT')MODIFYINGTHECENTRALSYSTEMCONTROLSOTHATITWILLAUTOMATICALLYCHANGEOVERFROMHEATINGTOCOOLING'NDBACKSAND4)INSTALLINGAFLOWCONTROLLERTOASSURETHATTHEMAXIMUMDESIGNFLOWRATETHROUGHTHECHARCOALFILTERZSNOTEXCEEDED.REVISION1OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISWASPRESENTEDANDAPPROVEDBYPORCON11/19/86PORCNUMBER6~1~0-86-135-002.THEPURPOSEOFREVISION2,OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISZSTOINCLUDEINSTALLATIONREFERENCETOSPECIFICATIONEE-29,EE-80ANDIEEE383.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDZNTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORYGUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICA-TIONAREINTERNALANDEXTERNALEVENTS'UCHASFIRES'LOODS,STORMSANDEARTHQUAKES'ASEDUPONTHEANALYSESDESCRIBEDUNDERPARAGRAPHS3.1TO4.4OFTHESAFETYANALYSIS,ZTHASTHEREFORE,BEENDETERMINEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENDETERMINEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS'NDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODIFICATION.26

EWR-4118TOTALCHARGINGFLOWINDICATIONTHISENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSESTHEMODIFICATIONTOINSTALLTWOTRANSMITTERSFORREACTORCOOLANTPUMP(RCP)SEALINJECTIONFLOW.EWR4118WASWRITTENINRESPONSETOANUMBEROFHUMANENGINEERINGDISCREPANCIES(HEDS)IDENTIFIEDDURINGTHEDETAILEDCONTROLROOMDESIGNREVIEW.HEDS451AND471STATETHATINDICATIONFORREACTORCOOLANTPUMP(RCP)SEALINJECTIONFLOWANDTOTALCHARGINGFLOWAREREQUIRED'EDS84'5'09'10'ND345ADDRESSTHEPROBLEMTHATTHECHARGINGFLOWCONTROLLERISLOCATEDONTHEMIDDLESECTIONOFTHEMAINCONTROLBOARD(MCB)gANDTHEINDICATORISONTHELEFTSECTIONWHICHZSEIGHTTOTENFEETAWAY.THECOMBINATIONOFTHESEHEDSRESULTEDINANNRCCOMMZTTMENTTOPROVIDEINDICA-TIONFORSEALINJECTIONANDADUPLICATEINDICATORFORCHARGINGFLOWONTHEMIDDLESECTIONOFTHEMCBBYJUNE1988.THISPROJECTINVOLVESTHEINSTALLATIONOFTWOTRANS-MITTERSFORRCPSEALINJECTIONFLOW(FT115AANDFT116A).THESETWOTRANSMITTERSWOULDBEINSTALLEDINPARALLELWITHTHEEXISTINGRCPSEALINJECTIONFLOWLOCALINDICATION(FT115ANDFT116).INDICATORSFORSEALINJECTIONFLOWWILLBEINSTALLEDONTHEMIDDLESECTIONOFTHEMCB.THETWOSEALINJECTIONFLOWSWILLBEINPUTTOTHEPLANTPROCESSCOMPUTERSYSTEM(PPCS).INADDITION,ADUPLICATEOFTHEEXISTINGCONTROLBOARDINDICATIONFORCHARGINGFLOW(F0128)WILLBEINSTALLEDONTHEMIDDLESECTIONOFTHEMCB.THERCPSEALINJECTIONFLOWS,COUPLEDWITHTHEEXISTINGCONTROLBOARDINDICATIONFORCHARGINGFLOW,WILLALLOWCONTROLROOMOPERATORSTODETERMINETOTALSYSTEMINFLOW.THENEWINDICATORSFORSEALINJECTIONFLOWANDCHARGINGFLOWWILLBELOCATEDBESIDEEACHOTHERONTHEMIDDLESECTIONOFTHEMCB~THEDUPLICATEINDICATORFORCHARGINGFLOWWZLLgINADDITION,BELOCATEDABOVETHECONTROLLERFORCHARGINGFLOW.ANEWPSEUDOANALOGPOINTWILLBECREATEDONTHEPPCSTOCALCULATETOTALCHARGINGFLOWBYCOMBININGCHARGINGFLOW,ANEXISTINGPPCSINPUT,WITHTHENEWRCPSEALINJECTIONFLOWPOINTS.DUETOPRE-PORCCOMMENTS,REVISION0OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISWERENOTPRESENTEDTOPORC.THEPURPOSEOFREVISION1OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISISTOINCLUDECOMMENTSASARESULTOFPRE-PORCOFREVISION0.27

AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDZNTHEGINNAFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYTHEUSNRCREGULATORYGUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONARE:1)SEISMICEVENT2)MAJORANDMINORFIRES3)PIPEBREAKSOUTSIDETHECONTAINMENTBUILDINGTHISMODIFICATIONISLIMITEDTOWORKDOWNSTREAMOFTHEROOTVALVESFORTHERCPSEALINJECTIONFLOW.SINCETHEROOTVALVESDEFINETHESAFETYCLASSBOUNDARYiTHEEXISTINGRCPSEALINJECTIONFLOWINSTRUMENTATIONISDESIGNATEDNOTSEISMICCATEGORYI'HEREMAININGWORKiFORTHISMODIFICATIONSWILLBEDESIGNEDTOMEETTHEREQUIREMENTSOFUSNRCREGULATORYGUIDE1.29,REVISIONC.2.THISMODIFICATIONINVOLVESTHEINSTALLATIONOFEQUIPMENTINTHEAUXILIARYBUILDINGSFIREAREAABBMZONEABBiANDTHECONTROLBUILDING,FIREAREA-CCZONESCRANDRR.THISMODIFICATIONALSOREQUIRESROUTINGCABLETHROUGHTHECABLETUNNELWHICHISFIREAREACT.AREVIEWWILLBEPERFORMEDTOASSURECONTINUEDCOMPLIANCEWITH10CFR50iAPPENDIXRALLNEWWIRINGWILLBEQUALIFIEDTOIEEE383-1974FLAMETESTREQUIREMENTS.FIREBARRIERPENETRATIONSWILLBEREPAIREDORREPLACEDINACCORDANCEWITHEXZSTINGPLANTPROCEDURES.THEREFOREEXISTINGSEALSWILLNOTBEDEGRADED.THISMODIFICATIONSDOESNOTAFFECTTHESAFESHUTDOWNANALYSISINTHEAPPENDIXRSUBMITTALFORTHEFOLLOWINGREASONS:A.THEAPPENDIXRREQUIREMENTSFORLOCALINDICATIONOFRCPSEALINJECTIONFLOWWILLBEMAINTAINED.B.THEREISNOEFFECTONSEPARATIONOFEXISTINGCIRCUITS,ASSOCIATEDCIRCUITS,ORFIREAREABOUNDARIESASANALYZEDINTHEAPPENDIXRSUBMITTAL.THISMODIFICATIONWILLINTERFACEWITHTHEEXISTING3/8INCHRCPSEALINJECTIONFLOWSENSINGLINEINTHESAMEMANNERASDOESTHEEXISTINGLOCALINDICATORS.THEREFORETHISMODIFIC-ATIONDOESNOTINTRODUCEANYNEWFAILUREMODESCONCERNINGPIPEBREAKSOUTSIDEOFTHECONTAINMENTBUILDING.ZTHASBEENDETERMINEDTHAT'/HEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHESTATIONHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.THEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURESiSYSTEMSiANDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODIFICATION.28

EWR-4142CONTROLBUILDINGEASTWALLMODIFICATIONTHISENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSESTHESTRUCTURALUPGRADEREQUIREMENTOFTHEEASTWALLOFTHECONTROLBUILDING.THEEASTWALLOFTHECONTROLBUILDINGMUSTBECAPABLEOFWITHSTANDINGTHELOADSASSOCIATEDWITHA132MPHTORNADO(DIRECTWINDAND~P=0.4PSZ)ANDTWOTORNADOMISSILES.THISMODIFICATIONWILLgINEFFECT~UPGRADETHERELAYROOMEASTWALLASPARTOFTHESTRUCTURALUPGRADEPROGRAMTOPROVIDETHENECESSARYADDEDSTRENGTHREQUIREDTORESISTTHEIMPOSESLOADSOFSNOW,TORNADO(DIRECTAND~P),TORNADOMISSILESAND2)PROVIDEAWATER-TIGHTBARRIERAGAINSTFLOODINGOFDEERCREEK.REVISION2TOTHISDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISINCORPORATESCHANGESFROMREVISION1DELETINGEXTRACONDUITFORFUTURECIRCUITS'DDINGGROUNDINGANDDOORPOSITIONSWITCHESFORBOTHSECURITYANDFIREDOORS.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYSISINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONAREWINDJSNOWANDTORNADOLOADINGS~FLOODINGANDSEISMIC'IRES/LOSSOFA.C.POWERANDPLANTBUILDINGSECURITY.THEDESIGNFORWINDgSNOWgTORNADOESANDEXTERNALFLOODINGHASBEENEVALUATEDINTHEUFSARANDWILLBEINACCORDANCEWITHCOMMITMENTSMADETOTHEUSNRCWHICHAREREFERENCEDZNSECTIONS2'g3'~3'1AND3'OFTHEUFSARSEISMICEVENTSHAVEBEENANALYZEDUNDERTHESEPRE-EVALUATIONDESIGNANALYSIS.MODIFICATIONOFTHISEXTERNALWALLOFTHERELAYROOMWILLNOTALTEREITHERTHESEISMICQUALIFICATIONOFEXISTINGSTRUCTURESORSAFETYRELATEDEQUIPMENTLOCATEDWITHINTHEEXISTINGSTRUCTURES.ALLEXISTINGFIREPROTECTIONFEATURESREQUIREDTOASSURECOMPLIANCEWITH10CFR50APPENDIXR,ORTOMAINTAINEQUIVALENTLEVELSOFPROTECTIONFROMFIRESWILLBEMAINTAINEDDURINGANDFOLLOWINGTHESTRUCTURALUPGRADEMODIFICATIONS.THEMODIFICATIONAFFECTSONLYLOADINGOFNON-SAFETYRELATEDBUS15.SINCETHEREZSNOCHANGEINTHESAFETY-RELATEDBUSES,THEREISNOCHANGEINTHECONSEQUENCESOFALOSSOFA.C.POWER.THERELOCATIONOFANEXISTINGEXTERIORSECURITYDOORTOTHEOUTSIDEOFTHENEWSTRUCTURE.WILLMAINTAINTHELEVELOFPRESENTSECURITYFROMINTRUSIONATGINNASTATION.INTERIMMEASURESDURINGCONSTRUCTIONWILLBEADMINISTRATIVELYCONTROLLEDTOPREVENTPOSSIBLEDEGRADATIONOFSECURITYBARRIERS'9

THUS~THISMODIFZCATIONNEITHERINCREASESTHECONSEQUENCES/NORDOESITREDUCETHEMARGINSOFSAFETYFOR:1)EQUIPMENTREQUIREDTOFUNCTIONDURINGANDFOLLOWINGSSE,FLOODINGANDTORNADOEVENTS2)FIRE"PROTECTIONFEATURES3)PLANTSECURITYBASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTHESTRUCTURALRE-ANAL-YSISPLAN(SRP),ZTHASBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFTOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES/SYSTEMS'NDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODIFICATION.EWR-4176APPENDIXRDETECTIONUPGRADETHISEWR(ENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST)ADDRESSESTHEMODIFICATIONWHICHWILLINSTALLTHREE(3)NEWFIREDETECTIONZONESANDSUPERVISEDBYTHEFIRESIGNALLINGSYSTEM.THESEZONESARE:Z-36(SMOKE)INT.BLDG.SUB-BASEMENTFLOORS.Z-37(SMOKE)INT.BLDG.NORTHUPPERELEVATZONS.Z-38(SMOKE)ZNT.BLDG.SOUTHALLELEVATIONS~INCLUDEDINTHISMODIFICATIONISTHEMOUNTINGOFEQUIPMENT,ROUTINGANDMOUNTINGOFCONDUIT,ANDALLWIRINGASSOCIATEDWITHTHENEWZONESANDMODIFICATIONSTOTHEEXISTINGFIRESIGNALLINGSYSTEM.THISMODIFICATIONZSREQUIREDTOCOMPLYWITHAPPENDIXRALTERNATIVESHUTDOWNSYSTEM,GINNANUCLEARPOWERPLANTREVISION2.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORYGUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONARESEISMICANDFIRE.BASEDUPONTHEANALYSESDESCRIBEDUNDERPARAGRAPH3.1TO4.4OFTHESAFETYANALYSIS'THASTHEREFORE~BEENDETERMINEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENDETERMINEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES,SYSTEMS,ANDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODIFICATION.30

EWR-422102/H2ANALYZERREPLACEMENTTHISENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSESTHEDIRECTREPLACEMENTOFTHEEXISTING02/H2ANALYZERSYSTEM'HISMODIFICATIONWILLREPLACETHEINACCURATEANDUNRELIABLEEXISTING02/H2ANALYZERSYSTEMWITHANEWRELIABLEANDACCURATESYSTEM.REVISION1OFTHISDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISINCORPORATESCHANGESFROMREVISION0TOCORRECTTYPOGRAPHICALERRORSANDSUMIG&YDESCRIPTIONOFMODIFICATIONBACKGROUNDINFORMATION.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDZNTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDEVENTSREQUIREDBYUSNRCREG.GUIDES1.29,160'61'ND170'HEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONAREMAJORANDMINORFIRESANDASEISMICEVENT.ALLEXISTINGANDNEWWIRING~CABLEgANDELECTRICALCOMPONENTSREQUIREDFORTHISMODIFICATIONCOMPLIESWITH10CFR50APPENDIXR.THISMODIFICATIONHASBEENANALYZEDFORSEISMICEVENTSUNDERSECTIONC.2OFREG.GUIDE1.29'HEINSTALLATIONWILLMAINTAINSTRUCTURALINTEGRITYSUCHTHATSURROUNDINGSAFETYRELATEDEQUIPMENTWILLNOTBEAFFECTED.THISMODIFICATIONNEITHERINCREASESTHECONSEQUENCES,NORDOESITREDUCETHEMARGINSOFSAFETYFOR:1)MAJORORMINORFIRES2)SEISMICEVENTBASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDUSNCREG.GUIDE1~29AND1.70,ITHASBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMSJANDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODIFICATION.31

EWR-4235STATUSLIGHTMODIFICATIONTHISEWR(ENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST)ADDRESSESTHEMODIFICATIONWHICHCONSISTSOFINSTALLINGADROPPINGRESISTORINEACHLIGHTASSEMBLYINTHEMAINCONTROLBOARD(MCB).INCLUDEDWITHTHISMODIFICATIONISTHEREPLACEMENTOFTHEEXISTING35VOLTBULBSWITH30VOLTBULBS,ANDNEWINDICATORLIGHTLENSCAP.THISMODIFICATIONWILLPROVIDEGREATERLIGHTOUTPUTINTHEBRIGHTANDDIMMODE,THEREBYELIMINATINGTHEPRESENTVISUALCONTRASTBETWEENBRIGHTANDDIMCONDITIONS.THESESTATUSLIGHTSINSUEUECT,PROVIDEAVISUALINDICATIONOFSELECTEDVALVEPOSITIONS.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANAL'YSISBYUSNRCREGULATORYGUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICA-TIONARELOSSOFDCORACCONTROLPOWER/NATURALEVENTS'IRE,ANDEARTHQUAKE.BASED'PONTHEANALYSESDESCRIBEDUNDERPARAGRAPHS3.1TO4.4OFTHESAFETYANALYSIS,ZTHASTHEREFORE,BEENDETERMINEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENDETERMINEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS~ANDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODIFICATION.32

EWR-4269CANDDSTANDBYAUXILIARYFEEDWATERPUMPINTERLOCKTHISENGINEERINGWORKREQUESTADDRESSESTHEMODIFICATIONTOTHEPUMPINTERLOCK.PRESENTLY,THEELECTRICALAUXILIARYFEEDWATERSYSTEMCONFIGURATIONCONSISTSOFTWOMOTORDRIVENAUXILIARYFEEDWATERPUMPS(MDAFWPlAAND1B)ANDTWOSTANDBYAUXILIARYPUMPSlAAND1BSUPPLYCONDENSATEWATERTOAANDBSTEAMGENERATORSRESPECTIVELY.INTHEEVENTTHATEITHERONEORBOTHOFTHESEPUMPSAREINOPERABLETHESTANDBYPUMPSMAYBEUSEDTOPROVIDEANEMERGENCYSOURCEFORCOOLING.THESTANDBYPUMPS(CANDD)AREELECTRICALLYINTERLOCKEDWITHPRIMARYPUMPS(AANDB).THEINTERLOCKSAREINTENDEDTOPREVENTTHESIMULTANEOUSOPERATIONOFTHEPRIMARYPUMPSANDSTANDBYPUMPS.DURINGNORMALOPERATIONTHISCONFIGURATIONSATISFIESTHISDESIGNCRITERIA~HOWEVERSWHENPRIMARYBREAKERSARERACKEDOUTINTOTHEHELDPOSITION(ORREMOVED),THEINTERLOCKSAREALSOREMOVED,MAKINGTHESTANDBYBREAKERSINOPERABLE.THISPROPOSEDMODIFICATIONWILLELIMINATETHISCONDITIONBYINSTALLINGCELLSWITCHESINTHEPRIMARYBREAKERCOMPARTMENTS,WHICHWILLCHANGESTATEWHENTHEBREAKERISRACKEDINOROUT.THECELLSWITCHCONTACTSWILLBEWIREDINPARALLELWITHTHEEXISTINGINTERLOCKCONTACTSANDWILLPERMITTHEPRIMARYBREAKERSTOBEREMOVEDFROMSERVICEFORMAINTENANCEANDINSURETHATTHESTANDBYBREAKERSWILLBEOPERATIONAL.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDZNTHEGINNASTATIONFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYNRCREGULATORYGUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATINGTOTHISMODIFIC-ATIONARE:A)LOSSOFAUXILIARYFEEDWATERFLOWB)NATURALEVENTS/FIRE,EARTHQUAKE.THEFIRSTEVENTANALYZEDWILLBETHELOSSOFAUXILIARYFEEDWATERFLOWDUETOTHEPROPOSEDMODIFICATION.THEADDITIONOFACELLSWITCHWILLNOTEFFECTOPERABILITYOFTHEMOTORDRIVENAUXILIARYFEEDWATERPUMPS.THESECELLSWITCHESSERVEASPERMISSIVESTOTHESTANDBYAUXILIARYFEEDWATERPUMPS'HEREFOREINTHEEVENTOFAFAILUREONLYTHESTARTINGOFTHESTANDBYPUMPSAREAFFECTED.MANUFACTURERINSTALLATIONANDTESTINGPROCEDURESWILLBEPERFORMEDANDAPERIODICTESTINGPROGRAMWILLBEINITIATEDTOASSUREPROPEROPERATIONOFCELLSWITCHES,THEREBYREDUCINGTHEPROBABILITYOFFAILURETOSTARTSTANDBYAUXILIARYFEEDWATERPUMPSTOANACCEPTABLYLOWLEVEL.THEREFORETHISMODIFICATIONWILLHAVEANEGLIGIBLEIMPACTUPONOPERABILITYOFAUXILIARYFEEDWATERSYSTEM.THESECONDEVENTANALYZEDWILLBETHEEFFECTOFASEISMICEVENTONTHEPLANTDUETOTHISMODIFICATION.THECELLSWITCHESHAVEBEENQUALIFIEDBYTHEMANUFACTURER,THEREFORETHECONSEQUENCESOFAFAILUREDUETOASEISMICEVENTAREMITIGATED.33

THETHIRDEVENTANALYZEDWXLLBETHEEFFECTOFAFIREONTHEPLANTDUETOTHISMODIFICATION.THECONTROLWIRINGUSEDFORTHISMODIFICATIONISREQUIREDTOMEETTHEREQUIREMENTSOFZEEESTD.383-1984FLAMETEST.THUSTHEREISNOSIGNIFICANTINCREASEZNTHEFIRELOADINGDUETOTHISMODIFICATION.ANAPPENDIXRCONFORMANCEVERIFICATIONWILLBEPERFORMEDTOENSURETHATTHEPROPOSEDMODIFICATIONDOESNOTADVERSELYIMPACTEXISTINGAPPENDIXRCOMPLIANCEMETHODS.THEREFOREJBASEDUPONTHEABOVEANALYSISgITHASBEENDETERMINEDTHAT:A)THEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHESTATIONARENOTREDUCED'ANDB)THESTRUCTURES/SYSTEMSgANDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFOR'HEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSAREADEQUATE.THEPROBABILITYOFOCCURRENCEANDTHECONSEQUENCESOFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTIONOFEQUIPMENTIMPORTANTTOSAFETYPREVIOUSLYEVALUATEDINTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORTARENOTINCREASED.THEPOSSIBILITYOFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTIONOFATYPEDIFFERENTFROMANYPREVIOUSLYEVALUATEDINTHESAFETYANALYSISHASNOTBEENCREATED.THEMARGINOFSAFETYASDEFINEDINTHEBASISFORANYTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONISNOTREDUCED.THEPROPOSEDMODIFICATIONDOESNOTINVOLVEANUNREVIEWEDSAFETYQUESTION.1EWR-4281STEAMGENERATORMANWAYSTUDTENSIONERTHISEWR(ENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST)ADDRESSESTHEMODIFICATIONCOVERINGTHEINSTALLATIONOFSTEAMGENERATORPRIMARYMANWAYSTUDSANDNUTS'NTHEPASTTHEPRIMARYMANWAYCOVERSHAVEBEENATTACHEDWITHBOLTSWHICHARETORQUEDTOOBTAINTHEPROPERGASKETSEATING.THISISATIMECONSUMINGANDDIFFICULTTASKSINCEZTMUSTBEDONEINAHIGHRADIATIONAREA.THISMODIFICATIONCONSISTSOFREPLACINGTHEEXISTINGBOLTSANDNUTS.INSTEADOFTORQUINGTHENUTSTOINDUCETHEREQUIREDAXIALLOADS~DIRECTHYDRAULICLOADSAREUSEDTOSTRETCHTHESTUDS.REVISION0OFTHEDESIGNCRXTERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISWASPRESENTEDANDAPPROVEDBYPORCONNOVEMBER5~1986'ORCNUMBER6.1'.0-86-125-001.34

THEPURPOSEOFREVISION1OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISISTOREVISEPARAGRAPHS2.6.1AND2.6'TOINCLUDENEWEGE(GDRAWINGTITLES.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDIN-THEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORYGUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICA-TIONARESEISMICEVENTS'ECREASEINREACTORCOOLANTSYSTEMINVENTORYANDFIRES.BASEDUPONTHEANALYSESDESCRIBEDUNDERPARAGRAPHS3.1TO4.0DOFTHESAFETYANALYSIS'THASTHEREFORE'EENDETERMINEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENDETERMINEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS'NDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODIFICATION.EWR-4282CVRECZRCFANCONDENSATECOLLECTORLEVELSTHISENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSESTHEMODIFICATIONOFTHECVRECIRCFANCONDENSATECOLLECTORLEVELS'HISMODIFICATIONISFORREPLACEMENTOFEXISTINGOBSOLETEPRESSURETRANSMITTERS,SIGNALPROCESSORSANDMAINCONTROLBOARDINDICATORSWITHINSTRUMENTSCAPABLEOFACCURATELYMONITORINGWATERLEAKAGEWITHINCONTAINMENT.THEEXISTINGTRANSMITTERS~POWERSUPPLIES'ISTABLESANDINDICATORSWILLBEREPLACEDTOPROVIDEMOREACCURATEANDRELIABLECONDENSATELEVELINDICATION.THESCALESINTHEEXISTINGLEVELINDICATORSHALLBEPLACEDINTHENEWLEVELINDICATORSWITHNOCHANGEZNTHEAPPEARANCEONTHEMCB.NEWREFERENCELEGTUBINGFROMTHETRANSMITTERSTOTHECONDENSATECOLLECTIONSTANDPIPESWILLBEINSTALLED.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONARE(1)MAZORANDMINORFIRES'2)ASEISMICEVENTS(3)PIPEBREAKSINSIDETHECONTAINMENTBUILDING.NEWWIRINGANDCABLEMAYBEREQUIREDFORTHISMODIFICATIONWHICHCOULDADDTOTHEFIRELOADINGOFTHEPLANT~THEREFORE'HEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATALLSUCHCABLEMEETTHEIEEE-383-1974FLAMETESTREQUIREMENTS.BECAUSEOFTHISTHEREWILLBENOSIGNIFICANTINCREASEOFFIRELOADINGCAUSEDBYTHISMODIFICATION.ANAPPENDIXRCONFORMANCEREVIEWSHALLBEPREPAREDTODEMONSTRATETHATCONTINUEDCOMPLIANCEWITH10CFR50APPENDIXRREQUIREMENTSISMAINTAINED.35

THISMODIFICATIONWILLBEREVIEWEDTOENSURETHATFAILUREOFANYELECTRICALCABLEINSTALLEDASAPARTOFTHISMODIFIC-ATIONWILLNOTRESULTINTHEDISABLINGOFVITALEQUIPMENTNEEDEDTOSAFELYSHUTDOWNTHEPLANTDURINGPOSTULATEDFIRES.THEPRESSUREBOUNDARYPORTIONSOFTHECONDENSATECOLLECTORLEVELINSTRUMENTATIONARENOTDESIGNATEDSEISMICCATEGORYI.HOWEVERSANYMODIFICATIONTOTHISSYSTEMWHOSEFAILURECOULDCAUSEDAMAGETOSAFETYRELATEDEQUIPMENTWILLBEDESIGNEDTOMEETTHEREQUIREMENTSOFUSNRCREGULATORYGUIDE1.29,POSITIONC.2.THENEWTRANSMITTERSWILLINTERFACEWITHTHEEXISTINGCONDENSATECOLLECTORSTANDPIPESINTHESAMEMANNERASTHEEXISTINGTRANSMITTERSWITHTHEADDITIONOFTHEREFERENCELEGTUBINGPENETRATION.THISMODIFICATIONDOESNOTINTRODUCEANYNEWFAILUREMODESCONCERNINGPIPEBREAKSINSIDETHECONTAINMENTBUILDING.THISMODIFICATIONWILLNOTRESULTINACHANGETOTHECOMMIT-MENTSMADEINTHEUFSAR~SECTIONS3~6~1~3~213AND5'1112~THESECOMMITMENTSSTATETHATCONDENSATEFLOWSFROMAPPROXIMATELY1GPMTO30GPMARETOBEMEASUREDBYTHECONDENSATEMEASURINGSYSTEM,USFARSECTION5.2.5.4HEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATAHUMANFACTORSREVIEWOFTHISMODIFICATIONBEPERFORMEDPRIORTOISSUANCEOFDESIGNOUTPUTS'OMINIMIZETHEPROBABILITYOFOPERATORERRORTHEITEMSABOVEENSURETHATTHISMODIFICATIONDOESNOTDEGRADETHECAPABILITYOFANYSAFETYSYSTEMTOPERFORMITSFUNCTION.THEASSUMPTIONSANDCONCLUSIONSOFEXISTINGANALYSESAREUNCHANGED.NONEWTYPESOFEVENTSAREPOSTULATED.THEREFORE,THEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.THEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES,SYSTEMS,ANDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDFORTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTED.INACCORDANCEWITHTHEPROVISIONSOF10CFR50.59THISMODIFICATIONDOESNOTPRESENTANUNREVZEWEDSAFETYQUESTIONFORTHEFOLLOWINGREASONS:1.THEPROBABILITYOFOCCURRENCE,ORTHECONSEQUENCESOFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTIONOFEQUIPMENTIMPORTANTTOSAFETYPREVIOUSLYEVALUATEDINTHESAFETYANALYSISWILLNOTBEINCREASED.36

THISMODIFICATIONWILLNOTAFFECTTHEPERFORMANCEOFEQUIPMENTIMPORTANTTOSAFETY.THISMODIFICATIONWILLCOMPLYWITHTHEREQUIREMENTSOFUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.29POSITIONC.2TOINSUREANYFAILUREWILLNOTAFFECTSEISMICCATEGORYIEQUIPMENT.ANAPPENDIXRCONFORMANCEREVIEWWILLINSURECONTINUEDCOMPLIANCEWITH10CFR50APPENDIXRREQUIREMENTS.2.THEPOSSIBILITYFORANACCXDENTORMALFUNCTIONOFADIFFERENTTYPETHANANYEVALUATEDPREVIOUSLYINTHESAFETYANALYSISISNOTCREATED.THISMODIFICATIONDOESNOTADDTOgORMODIFYgANYEQUIPMENTIMPORTANTTOSAFETYgOREQUIPMENTWHOSEFAILUREISADDRESSEDXNTHEFINALSAFETYANALYSISREPORT.3.THEMARGINOFSAFETYASDEFINEDINTHEBASISFORANYTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONISNOTREDUCED.ASSTATEDABOVEgTHISMODIFICATIONDOESNOTAFFECTEQUIPMENTIMPORTANTTOSAFETY.THEEFFECTOFTHISMODIFICATIONWILLBETOINCREASETHERELIABILITYOFONEOFTHEDIVERSEMEANSAVAILABLEFOROPERATORSTODETECTLEAKAGEINSIDECONTAXNMENT.EWR-4324STEAMGENERATORBLOWDOWNSYSTEMTHISEWR(ENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST)ADDRESSESTHEMODIFICATIONONSTEAMGENERATORBLOWDOWNSYSTEM.THEPURPOSEOFTHISMODIFICATIONISTOCONVERTTHESTEAMGENERATORBLOWDOWNSYSTEMTOAFLASHTANKBASEDPROCESS.THEPRIMARYGOALZSTOIMPROVERELIABZLXTYBYMOVINGTHEINHERENTTEMPERATURECHANGESTOTHETANKANDPIPING.NEWPIPINGINSTALLEDTOACCOMPLISHTHISCONVERSIONSHALLBERESIZEDTOREDUCETHEEROSION-CORROSIONPOTENTIAL.REVISION3TOTHISDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISINCORPORATECHANGESTOREVISION2ASARESULTOFTHECOMMENTSFROMTHEREVIEWOFREVISION2OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSIS.THECHANGESAREOPERATIONALCONCERNSANDCLARIFICATION.AREVIEWHASBEENPERFORMEDOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONAREANINCREASEORDECREASEINSECONDARYSYSTEMHEATREMOVAL.ANINCREASEINSECONDARYSYSTEMHEATREMOVALWOULDOCCURIFABLOWDOWNLINERUPTURED.THISEVENTISENVELOPEDINTHEUFSARBYEXAMININGTHEINCREASEINFEEDWATERFLOWEVENTANDTHESPECTRUMOFSTEAMSYSTEMPIPINGFAILURES.BOTHANALYZEDEVENTSAREFARMORESEVERTHANABLOWDOWNLINERUPTURE.37

ADECREASEINSECONDARYSYSTEMHEATREMOVALWOULDOCCURIFBLOWDOWNWERESUDDENLYISOLATED.THISEVENTISSIMILARTOATURBINETRIP.THEUFSARDEFINESLOSSESTO50%ATFULLPOWERTOBEWITHINNORMALPLANTDESIGN.SINCETHEDESIGNCRITERIALIMITSBLOWDOWNCAPACITYTO7%ATFULLPOWER;THEREFORE,THESUDDENBLOWDOWNISOLATIONEVENTANALYSISISNOTCONSIDERED.THISMODIFICATIONISNON-SEISMICSINCEITDOESNOTEFFECTTHESAFESHUTDOWNOFTHEREACTOR.THISMODIFICATIONDOESNOTINCREASETHEFIRELOADINGINFIREAREASCONTAININGSAFESHUTDOWNEQUIPMENTORDEGRADEEXISTINGFIREPROTECTIONBECAUSEOFREQUIREMENTINSECTION27.0OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIA.ANALYSISNECESSARYTOASSURECONTINUALCOMPLIANCEWITH10CFR50,APPENDIXRHASBEENREQUIRED.THEREFORE,THEPROBABILITYANDCONSEQUENCESOFAFIREAFFECTINGCOLDSHUTDOWNOFTHEPLANTAREUNCHANGED.HIGHENERGYLINEPIPEBREAKSHAVEBEENCONSIDEREDBYREQUIRINGTHATALLEQUIPMENTNECESSARYFORSAFESHUTDOWNOFTHEPLANTWILLBEPROTECTEDCONSISTENTWITHREFERENCE2.2.4OFTHESAFETYANALYSIS.BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTHEREQUIREMENTSOFGINNASTATIONTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONS,ITHASBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ZTHASALSOBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS'NDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODIFICATION.EWR-4350MFWANDFWBYPASSVALVEINDICATIONTHISENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSESTHEMODIFICATIONTOINSTALLVALVEPOSITIONSENSORSFORTHEMAINFEEDWATERANDFEEDWATERBYPASSVALVES(V4269iV4270iV4271iANDV4272)ANDASSOCIATEDPOSITIONINDICATIONDISPLAYEDONTHEMAINCONTROLBOARD.THISEWRWASISSUEDASARESULTOFHUMANENGINEERINGDIS-CREPANCYHED-65WHICHCITEDANEEDFORACTUALVALVEPOSITIONINDICATIONONTHEMCBRATHERTHANTHECONTROLLERDEMANDSIGNALINDICATION.DUETOPRE-PORCCOMMENTS,REVISION0OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSIS,WERENOTPRESENTEDTOPORC.THEPURPOSEOFREVISION1OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISISTOINCLUDECOMMENTSASARESULTOFPRE-PORCOFREVISION0~38 i

AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORYGUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICA-TIONARE:1)MAJORANDMINORFIRES2)SEISMICEVENT3)INCREASEINHEATREMOVALBYTHESECONDARYSYSTEM4)DECREASEINHEATREMOVALBYTHESECONDARYSYSTEMNEWWIRINGANDCABLEWILLBEREQUIREDFORTHISMODIFICATION~WHICHCOULDADDTOTHEFIRELOADINGOFTHEPLANTTHEREFORE~THEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATALLSUCHCABLEMEETTHEIEEE383-1974FLAMETESTREQUIREMENTS.BECAUSEOFTHIS,THEREWILLBENOSIGNIFICANTINCREASEINFIRELOADINGCAUSEDBYTHISMODXFICATXON.REVIEWSAND/ORANALYSESTOASSURECONTINUEDCOMPLIANCEWITHAPPENDIXRHAVEBEENREQUIRED.SAFESHUTDOWNCAPABILITYFOLLOWINGALLPOSTULATEDFIRES~THEREFORE'ILLNOTBEJEOPARDIZEDASARESULTOFTHISMODIFICATION.THEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATNEWINDICATORSINSTALLEDPERTHISMODIFICATIONBEMOUNTEDSOASNOTTODEGRADETHEINTEGRITYOFTHEMAINCONTROLBOARD(MCB).THEREFORE,THISMODIFICATIONWILLNOTAFFECTTHEMAINCONTROLBOARD,'SSEISMICQUALIFICATION.THEADDITIONOFLDT'STOTHESTEMOFTHEMAINFEEDWATERANDFEEDWATERBYPASSVALVESWILLNOTDEGRADETHEVALVE'SABILITYTOPERFORMITSINTENDEDFUNCTION.SINCETHESEVALVESARENOTREQUIREDTOFUNCTIONDURXNGASEISMICEVENT,THEABILITYTOFUNCTIONDURINGASEISMICEVENTHASNOTBEENDEGRADED.THEADDITIONOFMFWANDFWBYPASSVALVEINDICATIONWILLAIDTHEOPERATORZNMONITORINGANYINCREASEORDECREASEINHEATREMOVALBYTHESECONDARYSYSTEMANDSHALLNOTAFFECTTHEVALVESOPERATINGCHARACTERISTICS.ZTHASBEENDETERMINEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.THEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS'NDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDFORTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODIFICATION.39

EWR-4503TECHNICALSUPPORTCENTERSUPPLEMENTALUNZNTERRUPTABLEPOWERSUPPLYTHISENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSESTHEINSTALLATIONOFASECONDUNINTERRUPTABLEPOWERSUPPLY(UPS)FORTHET.S.C.ELECTRICALDISTRIBUTIONSYSTEM.ALSOEXISTINGELECTRICALLOADSWILLBERE-DISTRIBUTEDINORDERTOACHIEVEEVENBUSLOADING.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDES1.29AND1.70.EVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICA-TIONAREMAJORANDMINORFIRESANDASEISMICEVENT.MODIFICATIONSREQUIREDBYTHEDESIGNCRITERIAWILLNOTDEGRADEFUNCTIONSORPERFORMANCEOFANYSTRUCTURES~SYSTEMS'RCOMPONENTSREQUIREDFORTHEPREVENTIONANDMITIGATIONOFACCIDENTSORANYOTHERNONSAFETYRELATEDSTRUCTURES~SYSTEMS'RCOMPONENTS.THISMODIFICATIONANDTHEMATERIALSUTILIZEDWILLMEETAPPENDIXR10CFR50CRITERIA.EVENTHOUGHTHISMODIFICATIONINVOLVESEQUIPMENTWHICHISNOTIDENTXFIEDASSAFESHUTDOWNEQUIPMENT.NEWEQUIPMENTWILLNOTBELOCATEDINANYAREATHATCONTAINSSAFETYRELATEDEQUIPMENTTHEREFORE,THISMODIFICATIONISDESIGNATEDNON-SEISMIC.-MODIFICATIONWILLNOTDEGRADEPERFORMANCEORFUNCTIONOFANYPLANTEQUIPMENTORSYSTEM.BASEDUPONTHEABOVEANALYSIS:1)STRUCTURES,SYSTEMS,ANDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSAREADEQUATE.2)MARGINOFSAFETYDURINGNORMAL'OPERATINGANDTRANSIENTCONDITXONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHESTATIONARENOTREDUCED.BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTHEREQUIREMENTSOFGINNASTATIONTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONS'THASBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS/ANDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODIFICATION.40 i

EWR-45544AAND4BFEEDWATERHEATERSREPLACEMENTTHISEWR(ENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST)ADDRESSESTHEREPLACEMENTOF4AAND4BHEATERS.THEPURPOSEOFTHISMODIFICATIONISTOSPECIFY,PROCURE,ANDINSTALLNEWFEEDWATERHEATERSATTHEFOURTHEXTRACTIONPOINT.THEPRIMARYGOALISTOELIMINATETHECOPPERALLOYTUBES.STAINLESSSTEELTUBESARERECOMMENDED.REVISION1TOTHISDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISINCORPORATESCHANGESRESULTINGFROMPRE-PORCCOMMENTSOFREVISION0TO:1)CLARIFYTHEPERFORMANCEREQUIREMENTSOFTHE75PSITUBESIDEPRESSUREDROP2)ADDADDITIONALINTERFACEREQUIREMENTSINDESIGNCRITERIA3)CLARIFYREFERENCESANDTESTREQUIREMENTS4)ADDASMECODE5)ADDACCESSIBILITYIMAINTENANCE'IREPAIRIANDINSERVICEINSPECTIONREQUIREMENTSINDESIGNCRITERIAAREVIEWHASBEENPERFORMEDOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONAREADECREASEINFEEDWATERTEMPERATURE,ANDALOSSOFNORMALFEEDWATERFLOW.THEDECREASEINFEEDWATERTEMPERATUREEVENTISANALYZEDINTHEUFSARASANACCIDENTALOPENINGOFTHECONDENSATEBYPASSVALVE,WHICHRESULTEDINASUDDENREDUCTIONZNINLETFEEDWATERTEMPERATURETOTHESTEAMGENERATORS.THEMODIFICATIONHASNOBEARINGONCONDENSATEBYPASSVALVEOPERATIONORPLANTRESPONSETOTHISEVENT.AREDUCTIONINFEEDWATERTEMPERATUREWHICHRESULTEDFROMALOSSOFONEFEEDWATERHEATERHASBEENANALYZEDINUFSAR.THEANALYSISSHOWEDTHATFORAFEEDWATERENTHALPYDECREASECORRESPONDINGTOTHELOSSOFONEFEEDWATERHEATERATFULLPOWERMINIMUMDNBRDOESNOTFALLBELOWTHELXMITVALUE.ATZEROPOWERTHERESULTSARELESSLIMITINGTHANTHOSEPRESENTEDZN,UFSARSECTION15.4.1,UNCONTROLLEDRODCLUSTERCONTROLASSEMBLYWITHDRAWALFROMASUBCRITICALCONDITION.THELOSSOFNORMALFEEDWATERFLOWISANALYZEDINTHEUFSARASADISRUPTIONOFSECONDARYSYSTEMHEATREMOVALCAPABILITY.41

THISMODIFICATIONWILLNOTINCREASETHEPROBABILITYOFTHEDISRUPTIONASARESULTOFCONDENSATELINEBREAKSSINCETHEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESPROPERINSPECTIONANDTESTINGOFNEWWELDS.THEPROBABILITYOFALOSSOFFEEDWATERTHROUGHDEGRADATZONOFHEATERTUBESISREDUCEDBYREMOVINGTHEEXISTINGERODEDCOPPERTUBING.THISMODXFICATZONISNON-SEISMICSINCEITDOESNOTEFFECTTHESAFESHUTDOWNOFTHEREACTOR.THISMODIFICATIONDOESNOTINCREASETHEFIRELOADINGINFIREAREASCONTAININGSAFESHUTDOWNEQUIPMENTORDEGRADEEXISTINGFIREPROTECTIONBECAUSEOFREQUIREMENTSZNSECTION27.0OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIA.BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTHEREQUIREMENTSOFGINNASTATIONTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONS,ZTHASBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOF'"STRUCTURES'YSTEMS'NDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODIFICATION.EWR-4638GENERATOR1SURGECAPACXTORSANDNEUTRALTRANSFORMERREPLACEMENTTHISENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSESTHEREPLACEMENTOFTHENEUTRALTRANSFORMERANDSURGECAPACITORSCONTAININGPCBs.THESECOMPONENTSWILLBEREPLACEDWITHSIMILARCOMPONENTSNOTCONTAININGPCBs.REVISION2TOTHISDESIGNCRXTERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISINCORPORATESCHANGEFROMREVISION1TOSPECIFYINSTALLATIONTESTSTOBEPERFORMEDONTHECOMPONENTS.REVISION1DIDNOTSPECIFYTHETESTTOBEPERFORMED.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLTHEEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONAREMAJORANDMINORFIRES'OXICGASRELEASES'NDLOSSOFELECTRICALLOAD.NONEWWIRINGORCABLEISREQUIREDFORTHISMODIFICATION.THEREFORE,THEREWILLBENOINCREASEOFFIRELOADINGDUETOTHISMODIFICATION.REVIEWSAND/ORANALYSESTOASSURECONTINUEDCOMPLIANCEWITHAPPENDIXRHAVEBEENREQUIRED.SAFESHUTDOWNCAPABILITYFOLLOWINGALLPOSTULATEDFIRES'HEREFORE'ILLNOTBEJEOPARDIZEDASARESULTOFTHISMODIFICATION.THEREFORE,THEPOTENTIALFORALOSSOFELECTRICALLOADEVENTCAUSEDBYCAPACITORFAILUREWILLNOTBEINCREASED.42

THEREFORE,THEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED'HEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS/ANDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDFORTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTED.THEPROBABILITYOFOCCURRENCEORTHECONSEQUENCESOFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTIONOFEQUIPMENTIMPORTANTTOSAFETYPREVIOUSLYEVALUATEDZNTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORTWILLNOTBEINCREASEDBYTHEPROPOSEDMODIFICATION.THEPOSSIBILITYOFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTIONOFADIFFERENTTYPETHANANYEVALUATEDPREVIOUSLYINTHESAFETYANALYSISWILLNOTBECREATEDBYTHEPROPOSEDMODIFICATION.THEMARGINOFSAFETYASDEFINEDINTHEBASISFORANYTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONWILLNOTBEREDUCEDBYTHEPROPOSEDMODIFICA-TION.THEPROPOSEDMODIFICATIONDOESNOTINVOLVEANUNREVIEWEDSAFETYQUESTIONORREQUIREATECHNICALSPECIFICATIONCHANGE.EWR-4651COREEXITTHERMOCOUPLECABLESTHISEWR(ENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST)ADDRESSINGTHEMODIFICATIONOFTHECOREEXITTHERMOCOUPLECABLESTOPROVIDEFORALARAANDPERSONNELSAFETYCONCERNS.EWR4651~COREEXITTHERMOCOUPLE(CET)CABLESgREQUESTSTHEPURCHASEANDINSTALLATIONOFEXTENSIONCABLESATTHEBOUNDARYOFTHEREACTORHEADANDREACTORCAVITYBRIDGECABLETRAYSATGINNASTATIONFORTHE1988REFUELINGOUTAGE.QUICKCONNECTORSINSTALLEDONTHECETCABLESATTHISLOCATIONAREDETACHEDEACHYEARFORREFUELINGTOPERMITLIFTINGTHEREACTORHEADFROMTHEREFUELINGCAVITY'HECABLESINSTALLEDZN1983'HICHRUNFROMTHEBRIDGECABLETRAYDOWNTOTHETHERMOCOUPLES,FALLAPPROXIMATELYSIXFEETSHORTOFTHEBRIDGECABLETRAY.ASARESULT,THECETQUICKCONNECTORSHANGSEVERALFEETBELOWTHEBRIDGECABLETRAYANDPOSEACCESSIBILITY'LARAgANDSAFETYCONCERNS.THEOBJECTIVEOFTHISEWRZSTOPLACETHECETQUICKCONNECTORSFORREFUELINGINTOTHEBRIDGECABLETRAYWHERETHEYCANBEACCESSEDCONVENIENTLYANDSAFELY.REVISION2TOTHISDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISINCOR-PORATESCHANGESFROMREVISION1TOCORRECTTHEPOSTINSTALL-ATIONTESTINGREQUIREMENTSFORSYSTEMVERIFICATION.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALL,EVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGZNNASTATIONUFSARANDEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.G-UIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONARE(1)MAJORANDMINORFIRES~(2)ASEISMICEVENT~(3)ALOSSOFCOOLANTACCIDENT(LOCA).43

NEWCETEXTENSIONCABLEASSEMBLIESWILLBEREQUIREDFORTHISMODIFICATIONWHICHCOULDADDTOTHEFIRELOADINGOFTHEPLANT.THEREFORE,THEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATALLSUCHCABLEASSEMBLIESMEETTHEIEEE-383-1974FLASKTESTREQUIREMENTS.BECAUSEOFTHISTHEREWILLBENOSIGNIFICANTINCREASEOFFIRELOADINGCAUSEDBYTHISMODIFICATION.THISMODIFICATIONHASBEENREVIEWEDTOENSURETHATFAILUREOFANYELECTRICALCABLEINSTALLEDASAPARTOFTHISMODIFICATIONWILLNOTRESULTINTHE,DISABLINGOFVITALEQUIPMENTNEEDEDTOSAFELYSHUTDOWNTHEPLANTDURINGPOSTULATEDFIRES.THEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATNEWCETEXTENSIONCABLEASSEMBLIESINSTALLEDUNDERTHISMODIFICATIONBEQUALIFIEDPERIEEE3441975'HEREFORE'HISMODIFICATIONWILLREMAINFUNCTIONALDURINGANDAFTERASEISMICEVENT.THEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATTHENEWCETEXTENSIONCABLEASSEMBLIESINSTALLEDUNDERTHISEWRBEQUALIFIEDPERIEEE3231974ANDIEEE3831974FORFLAMEANDLOCALTHEREFOREJTHISMODIFICATIONSHALLREMAINFUNCTIONALDURINGANDAFTERALOSSOFCOOLANTACCIDENT.THEREFORE,THEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED'HEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS'NDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDFORTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTED.EWR-4653STEAMGENERATORWIDERANGELEVELINDICATIONTHISENGINEERINGWORKREQUESTADDRESSESTHEADDITIONOFSTEAMGENERATORWIDERANGELEVELINDICATIONONTHEMAINCONTROLBOARD.THIS-MODIFICATIONWILLINSTALLTWONEWVERTICALSCALEINDICATORSTODISPLAYSTEAMGENERATORWIDERANGEWATERLEVELONTHEMCB.THEEXISTINGCHARTRECORDERLR-460WILLBERETAINEDFORRECORDKEEPINGANDTOSERVEASABACKUPLEVELINDICATOR.THISMODIFICATIONWILLNOTALTERTHEAVAILABILITYOFTHEEXISTINGCHARTRECORDERS.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGZNNASTATIONUFSARANDEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONARE(1)MAJORANDMINORFIRESAND(2)ASEISMICEVENT.NEWWIRINGANDCABLEMAYBEREQUIREDFORTHEMODIFICATIONWHICHCOULDADDTOTHEFIRELOADINGOFTHEPLANT,THEREFORETHEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATALLSUCHCABLEMEETTHEZEEE-383-1974FLAMETESTREQUIREMENTS.BECAUSEOFTHIS,THEREWILLBENOSIGNIFICANTINCREASEOFFIRELOADINGCAUSEDBYTHISMODIFICATION.44

ANAPPENDIXRCONFORMANCEREVIEWSHALLBEPREPAREDTODEMONSTRATETHATCONTINUEDCOMPLIANCEWITH10CFR50APPENDIXRREQUIREMENTSISMAINTAINED.THISMODIFICATIONHASBEENREVIEWEDTOENSURETHATFAILUREOFANYELECTRICALCABLEINSTALLEDASPARTOFTHISMODIFICATION'ILLNOTRESULTINTHEDISABLINGOFVITALEQUIPMENTNEEDEDTOSAFELYSHUTDOWNTHEPLANTDURINGPOSTULATEDFIRES.THESTEAMGENERATOR(SG)WIDERANGEWATERLEVELINSTRUMENT-ATIONISDESIGNATEDSEISMICCATEGORY1.THEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESALLNEWSGWIDERANGELEVELINSTRUMENTATIONBEQUALIFIEDANDINSTALLEDPERIEEE-344-1975.THEREFORE,ASEISMICEVENTWILLNOTIMPAIRTHEPROPEROPERATIONOFTHESGWIDERANGEWATERLEVELINSTRUMENTATION.THEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESAHUMANFACTORSREVIEWOFTHISMODIFICATIONBEPERFORMEDPRIORTOISSUANCEOFDESIGNOUTPUTS'OMINIMIZETHEPROBABILITYOFOPERATORERRORTHEITEMSABOVEENSURETHISMODIFICATIONDOESNOTDEGRADETHECAPABILITYOFANYSAFETYSYSTEMTOPERFORMZTSFUNCTION.THEASSUMPTIONSANDCONCLUSIONSOFEXISTINGANALYSESAREUNCHANGED.NONEWTYPESOFEVENTSAREPOSTULATED.THEACCURACYANDREADABILITYOFTHENEWINDICATORSAREASGOODORBETTERTHANTHEEXISTINGRECORDER.THEREFORE,THEINDICATIONUNCERTAINTYISASGOODORBETTERTHANTHEEXISTINGSYSTEM.THEREFORE,THEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.THEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES,SYSTEMS,ANDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDFORTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTED.INACCORDANCEWITHTHEPROVISIONSOF10CFR50.59,THISMODIFICATIONDOESNOTINVOLVEANUNREVIEWEDSAFETYQUESTIONBECAUSE:1)THEPROBABILITYOFOCCURRENCEORTHECONSEQUENCESOFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTIONOFEQUIPMENTIMPORTANTTOSAFETYPREVIOUSLYEVALUATEDINTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORTISNOTINCREASED.THEINDICATORSADDEDTOTHEMCBDONOTPROVIDEANYAUTOMATICCONTROLFUNCTION.THEYAREREDUNDANTTOTHEEXISTINGCHARTRECORDERS,.BUTPROVIDEAMOREREADABLEINDICATIONTOTHEOPERATOR.THESEINDICATORSARESEISMICCLASS1EANDWILLNOTINCREASETHEPROBABILITYOFFAILUREOFTHEMCBORADJACENTINDICATORSDUETOASEISMICEVENT.ANAPPENDIXRCONFORMANCEREVIEWWILLDEMONSTRATECONTINUEDCOMPLIANCEWITHAPPENDIXRREQUIREMENTS.45

2)THEPOSSIBILITYFORANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTIONOFADIFFERENTTYPETHANANYEVALUATEDPREVIOUSLYINTHESAFETYANALYSISISNOTCREATED.ASDISCUSSEDABOVEgTHESEINDICATORSAREINADDITIONTOTHEEXISTINGCHARTRECORDERSANDARECLASSIFIED1E.THISADDITIONTOTHEMCBWILLNOTCREATETHEPOSSIBILITYOFAFAILURENOTPREVIOUSLYANALYZED.3)THEMARGINOFSAFETYASDEFINEDINTHEBASISFORANYTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONISNOTREDUCED.THEADDEDINDICATORSPROVIDEAMORECLEARINDICATIONANDINCREASETHEABILITYOFTHEOPERATORTOMONITORWIDERANGELEVEL.THEMARGINOFSAFETYZSNOTAFFECTEDBYTHISMODIFICATION.EWR-4656LOWERINTERNALSSTORAGESTANDMODIFICATIONSPHASEIITHISEWR(ENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST)ADDRESSESTHEMODIFICATIONSTOTHEREACTORVESSELLOWERINTERNALSSTORAGESTAND.THISMODIFICATIONINVOLVESANADDITIONALMODIFICATIONTOTHELOWERINTERNALSSTORAGESTANDSUBSEQUENTTOTHECHANGESDESCRIBEDINTHEORIGINALSAFETYANALYSIS.A.THISMODIFICATIONMOVESTHEEASTERNSUPPORTCOLUMN1/2INCHOUTWARD(AWAYFORMTHECENTEROFTHESUPPORTSTAND)ZNORDERTOPROVIDEMORECLEARANCEFORTHELOWERINTERNALS.THISISACCOMPLISHEDBYADDINGONEADDITIONALHALF-INCHTHICKSPACERPLATEONTHEEASTSIDEOFTHENORTHANDSOUTHSUPPORTCOLUMNS.THESPACERPLATESWILLBEBETWEENTHESUPPORTCOLUMNSANDTHEUPPERANDLOWERCONNECTIONSUPPORTRINGS.THISANALYSISREVIEWSUNDERWHATPLANTOPERATINGCONDITIONTHELOWERINTERNALSSTORAGEHARDWAREWILLBEZNUSE'NDDETER-MINESWHATDESIGNBASISEVENTSARERELATEDTOTHEUSEOFTHEMODIFIEDHARDWARE.THEFOLLOWINGDESIGNBASISEVENTSARERELATEDTOTHEPROPOSEDMODIFICATION:SEISMICEVENTSANDFIRES.THELOWERINTERNALSSTORAGESTANDMAYBELEFTINPOSITIONONTHELOWERLEVELOFTHEREACTORCAVITY.THELOCATIONOFTHELOWERINTERNALSSTORAGESTANDISNOTADJACENTTOANYSAFETYRELATEDSYSTEMORCOMPONENT.THELOWERINTERNALSSTORAGESTANDSLOWCENTEROFGRAVITY'IDEBASECOMBINEDWITHTHECOEFFICIENTOFFRICTIONARESUFFICIENTTOENSURETHATTHESTANDWILLREMAININPLACEDURINGBOTHTHEOPERATINGBASISANDSAFESHUTDOWNEARTHQUAKES.46

THEMATERIALSTOBEUSEDXNTHISPROPOSEDMODIFICATIONISSTAINLESSSTEELWHICHISNON-COMBUSTIBLE.XTWILLNOTCHANGETHEFREQUENCYORRESULTSOFANYFIRETHATISPOSTULATED.BASEDONTHEFOREGOING,THEMODIFICATIONSWILLCAUSENOCHANGESTOTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHESTATION.THEMODIFICATIONSWZLLNOTCHANGETHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES~SYSTEMSgORCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTS.THEPROBABILITYOFOCCURRENCEORTHECONSEQUENCESOFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTIONOFSAFETY-RELATEDEQUIPMENTPREVIOUSLYEVALUA'TEDINTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORTARENOTCHANGED.THEPOSSIBILITYOFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTIONOFADIFFERENTTYPETHANANYEVALUATEDPREVIOUSLYINTHESAFETYANALYSISHASNOTBEENCREATED.THEPROPOSEDMODIFICATIONDOESNOTINVOLVEACHANGETOTHETECHNICALSPECIFICATIONSANDISNOTANUNREVIEWEDSAFETYQUESTION.EWR-4670M-483INVERTERREPLACEMENTTHISENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSESTHEREPLACEMENTOFTHEEXISTINGMQ-483INVERTERWITHANEWQUALIFIEDONE.REVISION2OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIASTATESTHESOLIDSTATECONTROLS,ZNC.(SCI)ZNVERTERISPARTNO.EV12004/5ASOPPOSEDTOPART12004ASWELLASQUALIFYINGIEEE383-1974ASTHESTANDARDUSEDFORBOTHTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSIS.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNAFSARANDEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYTHEUSNRCREGULATORYGUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONARE:1)2)3)4)SEISMICEVENTMAJORANDMINORFIRESINCREASE/DECREASEZNHEATREMOVALBYTHESECONDARYSYSTEMPIPEBREAKSINSIDECONTAINMENTSECTION3.0AND9.0OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRETHATTHENEWMQ-483XNVERTERBESEISMICALLYQUALIFIEDTOGINNASPECIFICSEISMICRESPONSESPECTRA.ZNADDITION,ITZSREQUIREDTHATTHEINVERTERBEMOUNTEDTOPREVENTSEISMICFAILURE.47

THISMODIFICATIONINVOLVESTHEREPLACEMENTOFEQUIPMENTANDMAYINVOLVETHEINSTALLATIONOFCABLEINTHERELAYROOMFIREAREA.IFNEWCABLEZSTOBEINSTALLED,AREVIEWWILLBEPERFORMEDTOASSURECONTINUEDCOMPLIANCEWITH10CFR50iAPPENDIXR.WIRINGANDEQUIPMENTWILLBEINSTALLEDINCOMPLIANCEWITHEE-29.ALLNEWCABLINGiIFREQUIREDiWILLBEQUALIFIEDTOZEEE3831984FLAMETESTREQUIREMENTS.FIREBARRIERPENETRATIONSWILLBEREPAIREDANDREPLACEDZNACCORDANCEWITHEXISTINGPLANTPROCEDURES,NOTDEGRADINGEXISTINGSEALS.THISMODIFICATIONDOESNOTAFFECTTHESAFESHUTDOWNANALYSISINTHEAPPENDIXRSUBMITTALFORTHEFOLLOWINGREASONS:A)THEMODIFICATIONINVOLVESEQUIPMENTWHICHISNOTIDENTIFIEDASSAFESHUTDOWNEQUIPMENTINTABLE3-1OFTHEAPPENDIXRSUBMITTAL.B)THEREZSNOEFFECTONSEPARATIONOFEXISTINGCIRCUITS,ASSOCIATEDCZRCUITSiORFIREAREABOUNDARIESASANALYZEDINTHEAPPENDIXRSUBMITTAL.THISMODIFICATIONWILLNOTEFFECTTHECAPABILITIESOFTHEALTERNATIVESHUTDOWNSYSTEM.THERESHALLBENOEFFECTONEXISTINGPROCEDURESFOROBTAININGANALTERNATESAFESHUTDOWNiTHEREBYCOMPLYINGWITH10CFR50APPENDIXR.INSTRUMENTLOOPP479MONITORSSTEAMGENERATORPRESSURE.THISMODIFICATIONDOESNOTMODIFYTHEINSTRUMENTLOOP.SINCETHEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATTHEREPLACEMENTZNVERTERADDSNONEWFAILUREMODESBEYONDTHOSEOFTHEEXISTINGINVERTERiTHEINTEGRITYOFLOOPP479WILLBEUNAFFECTEDBYTHISMODIFICATION.THEREFORE,NONEWINSTRUMENTERRORSORFAILURESWILLBEINTRODUCEDTHATCOULDLEADTOANINCREASEORDECREASEINSECONDARYSYSTEMHEATREMOVAL.INSTRUMENTLOOPP950MONITORSCONTAINMENTPRESSURE.THISMODIFICATIONDOESNOTMODIFYTHEINSTRUMENTLOOP.SINCETHEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATTHEREPLACEMENTINVERTERADDSNONEWFAILUREMODESBEYONDTHOSEOFTHEEXISTINGINVERTER,THEINTEGRITYOFLOOPP950WILLBEUNAFFECTEDBYTHISMODIFICATIONTHEREFOREiNONEWINSTRUMENTERRORSORFAILURESWILLBEINTRODUCEDTHATCOULDLEADTOAFALSEINDICATIONOFCONTAINMENTPRESSUREDURINGAPIPEBREAK.THISMODIFICATIONDOESNOTDEGRADETHECAPABILITYOFANYSAFETYSYSTEMTOPERFORMITSFUNCTION.THEASSUMPTIONSANDCONCLUSIONSOFEXISTINGANALYSESAREUNCHANGED.NONEWTYPESOFEVENTSAREPOSTULATED.48

/'

BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTHEREQUIREMENTSOFGXNNASTATIONTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONS,ITHASBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHESTATIONHAVENOTBEENAFFECTED.ITHASALSOBEENDETERMINEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS'NDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTED.EWR-4750CONTAINMENTFANS1B1DDAMPERSOLENOIDISOLATIONFUSESTHISENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSESTHEADDITIONOFISOLATIONFUSESTOTHELOOPENTRYDAMPERSOLENOIDVALVECIRCUITSFORCONTAINMENTRECIRCULATIONFANS1BAND1D.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.70.EVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONAREASFOLLOWS:1)2)3)4)SEISMICEVENTMAJORANDMINORFIRESPIPEBREAKSINSIDEANDOUTSIDECONTAINMENTBREAKINRCSPRESSUREBOUNDARYLINESTHATPENETRATECONTAINMENTTHENEWFUSEBLOCKSWILLBESEISMICALLYMOUNTEDANDTHEREFOREWILLENSUREASEISMICEVENTWILLNOTDEGRADETHEINTEGRITYOFBUS16UNIT13CORBUS14UNIT2CENCLOSURESINWHICHTHEFUSESAREMOUNTED.THEMODIFICATIONZSDESIGNEDTOCOMPLYWITH10CFRAPPENDIXRCRITERIAANDENGINEERINGPROCEDURES.THEREFORE,THEPROBABILITYOFAMAJORORMINORFIREWILLNOTBEINCREASED.THEFOLLOWINGDESIGNBASISEVENTS(DBE)WILLNOTAFFECTORBEAFFECTEDBYTHISMODIFICATION.ANYDBETHATCAUSESALEAD-TO-LEADSHORTZNTHEDAMPERSOLENOIDVALVECIRCUITWILLCAUSETHEDAMPERSOLENOIDVALVECIRCUITFUSESTOFAIL.FUSECOORDINATIONASSURESTHATTHESEFUSESWILLFAILBEFORETHEMAINFANCONTROLFUSES.THEREFORE,LOSSOFFANS1BAND1DgDURINGANYDBEDUETOALEAD-TO-LEADSHORTINTHEDAMPERSOLENOIDVALVECIRCUIT,WILLNOTOCCUR.BASEDUPONTHEABOVEANALYSIS:1)STRUCTURESgSYSTEMSgANDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTS.ANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSAREADEQUATE.2)MARGINOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATINGANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHESTATIONARENOTREDUCED.49 0

BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTHEREQUIREMENTSOFGZNNASTATIONTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONS'THASBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ZTHASALSOBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES/SYSTEMS'NDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODIFICATION.EWR-4754CABLERELOCATIONSTHISEWR(ENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST)ADDRESSESTHEUPGRADINGOFSEVERALCIRCUITSPLICESINTHEINTERMEDIATEBUILDINGANDRELOCATIONOFCABLESABOVETHECONTAINMENTFLOODLEVEL.REVISIONg2ADDSAFIREPROTECTIONREQUIREMENT.CABLESANDSPLICESSHALLMEETTHEREQUIREMENTSOFIEEE383-1974.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNAFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYTHEUSNRCREGULATORYGUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONARE:1)SEISMICEVENT2)MAJORANDMINORFIRES3)'PIPEBREAKS'NSIDEANDOUTSIDECONTAINMENTTHEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATANYNEWORRELOCATECONDUITBEMOUNTEDTOPREVENTSEISMICFAILURESTHEREFORE'NSTALLEDCABLESHALLREMAINFUNCTIONALAFTERASEISMICEVENT.THISMODIFICATIONINVOLVESTHEADDITIONOFNEWCABLEANDSPLICESINCONTAINMENTANDINTHEINTERMEDIATEBUILDING.THEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATALLNEWCABLEANDSPLICESBEQUALIFIEDTOIEEE-383-1974FLAMEANDLOCAREQUIREMENTS.FIREBARRIERPENETRATIONSWILLBEREPAIREDANDREPLACEDZNACCORDANCEWITHEXISTINGPLANTPROCEDURES.THEREFORE,EXISTINGSEALSWILLNOTBEDEGRADED.THISMODIFICATIONDOESNOTAFFECTTHESAFESHUTDOWNANALYSISINTHEAPPENDIXRSUBMITTALSINCETHEREISNOAFFECTONSEPARATIONOFEXISTINGCIRCUITS~ASSOCIATED'CIRCUITS'RFIREAREABOUNDARIESASANALYZEDINTHEAPPENDIXRSUBMITTAL.THEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATANAPPENDIXRCONFORMANCEVERIFICATIONBEPERFORMED.THISMODIFICATIONWILLNOTAFFECTTHECAPABILITIESOFTHEALTERNATIVESHUTDOWNSYSTEM.FURTHERMORE,NONEOFTHEEXISTINGPROCEDURESFOROBTAININGANALTERNATIVESAFESHUTDOWNWILLBEEFFECTED'HISMODIFICATIONSTHEREFORE'OMPLZESWITH10CFR50,APPENDIXR.50 0

THEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATNEWCABLEANDSPLICES,INSTALLEDASPARTOFTHECABLERELOCATIONS,SHALLNOTAFFECTINSTRUMENTLOOPINTEGRITY.THEREFORE,NONEWFAILUREMODESSHALLBEINTRODUCEDINTOTHEINSTRUMENTLOOPS.THEDESIGNCRITERIACOLLECTIVELYREQUIRESALLCABLESTOBERELOCATED,TOUTILIZEMATERIALANDCONFIGURATIONSAPPROVEDUNDER10CFR50.49;ANDCALIBRATIONOFEACHLOOPTOENSURETHATLOOPFUNCTIONISNOTAFFECTED;THATLOOPACCURACYBEADDRESSED'NDVERIFIEDASACCEPTABLE'NTHESYSTEMINTEGRATEDPACKAGES'HEREFORE~LOOPACCURACYSHALLNOTBEDEGRADEDBYTHISMODIFICATION.ALLMATERIALANDCONFIGURATIONSUTILIZEDUNDERTHISMODIFICA-TIONSHALLBEAPPROVEDUNDER10CFR50~49'HEREFORE'IPEBREAKSINSIDEOROUTSIDECONTAINMENT/THATCREATEALOCA~HELB/SLB~ETC'HALLNOTDEGRADETHEINTEGRITYOFSPLICESORCABLESUSEDINTHISMODIFICATION.THEABOVEITEMSENSURETHATTHISMODIFICATIONDOESNOTDEGRADETHECAPABILITYOFANYSAFETYSYSTEMTOPERFORMITSFUNCTION.THEASSUMPTIONSANDCONCLUSIONSOFEXISTINGANALYSISAREUNCHANGED.NONEWTYPESOFEVENTSAREPOSTU-LATED.BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARgTHESTRUCTURALREANALYSISPLAN(SRP)ANDTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONS,ITHASBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ZTHASALSOBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS~ANDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODIFICATION.EWR-4761HIGHHEADRECIRCULATIONEVALUATIONTHISENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSESTHEINTERCHANGINGOFTHEPOWERANDCONTROLPOWERWIRINGOFMOVs857AAND857B.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYNRCREGULATORYGUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATING-TOTHISMODIFICATIONAREFIREgSEISMIC'OCALANDLOSSOFPOWEREVENTS.THEFIRSTEVENTANALYZEDISTHEEFFECTOFASEISMICEVENT.THEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHEMODIFICATIONTOBESEISMICCATEGORY1THEREFORE'HEMODIFICATIONWILLNOTADVERSELYAFFECTTHESYSTEMDURINGASEISMICEVENT.THESECONDEVENTANALYZEDISTHEEFFECTOFAFIREINTHEPLANTDUETOTHISMODIFICATION.THECONTROLWIRINGUSEDFORMODIFICATIONIS'EQUIREDTOMEETTHEREQUIREMENTSOFZEEESTD.383-1974FLAMETEST.THUSTHEREISNOSIGNIFICANTINCREASEINTHEFIRELOADINGDUETOTHISMODIFICATION.51

THEDESIGNCRITERIAPROVIDESREQUIREMENTSTOPRESERVEANYSILICONEFOAMFIRESTOPORSEALTHATMAYNEEDTOBEPENETRATED.THEDESZGNCRITERIAREQUIRESANAPPENDIXRREVIEWTHEREFOREiTHISMODIFICATIONWILLNOTAFFECTEXISTINGCOMPLIANCEMETHODS.THETHIRDEVENTANALYZEDISTHEEFFECTOFALOCA.DURINGTHESUMPRECIRCULATIONPHASEFOLLOWINGALOCA,IFHIGHHEADRECIRCULATIONISNECESSARY(INCURRENTPROCEDURESWHENRHRTOTALISLESSTHAN400GPM)iTHE857AiBiCVALVESMUSTBEOPENED.PRESENTPROCEDUREES-1.3CALLSFORSTARTINGRHRPUMPSALIGNEDTOTHESUMPANDDISCHARGINGTOTHEREACTORTHROUGHTHEMOV852A,BVALVESPRIORTOOPENING857A,B,CIFHIGHHEADRECIRCULATIONISREQUIRED.SINGLEFAILURECRITERIAREQUIRESTHETIMINGOFTHEACTIVEFAILURETOOCCURATTHEBEGINNINGOFTHEHIGHHEADRECIRCULATIONPHASE.AFA1LUREOFD/G1APRIOROPENINGTHE857VALVESWOULDRESULTINBOTHTRAINSLEADINGTOTHESAFETYINJECTION/CONTAINMENTSPRAYPUMPSBEINGBLOCKEDANDPOTENTIALLOSSOFCORECOOLING.THISZSTHEPROBLEMWHICHWILLBECORRECTEDTHRUTHISMODIFICATION.THEFOURTHEVENTANALYZEDISTHEEFFECTOFALOSSOFPOWERONTHEOPERATIONSOFTHEVALVES.ASSTATEDINTHEPREVIOUSPARAGRAPHAFAILUREOFD/GlAPRIORTOOPENINGTHE857VALVESWOULDRESULTINBOTHTRAINSLEADINGTOTHESAFETYINJECTION/CONTAINMENTSPRAYPUMPSBEINGBLOCKEDANDPOTENTIALLOSSOFCORECOOLING.THISWILLBECORRECTEDBYTHISMODIFICATION.THEREFOREBASEDUPONTHEABOVEANALYSIS,ITHASBEENDETERMINEDTHAT:A)THEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHESTATIONARENOTREDUCEDANDB)THESTRUCTURESiSYSTEMSiANDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSAREADEQUATE.THEPROBABILITYOFOCCURRENCEANDTHECONSEQUENCESOFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTIONOFEQUIPMENTIMPORTANTTOSAFETYPREVIOUSLYEVALUATEDINTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORTARENOTINCREASED.THEPOSSIBILITYOFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTIONOFATYPEDIFFERENTFROMANYPREVIOUSLYEVALUATEDINTHESAFETYANALYSISHASNOTBEENCREATED.THEMARGINSOFSAFETYASDEFINEDINTHEBASISFORANYTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONISNOTREDUCED.52

EWR-4769SAFEGUARDSRACKSIRELAYSTHISEWR(ENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST)ADDRESSESTHEREMOVALOFUNUSEDRELAYSFROMTHESAFEGUARDSRACKS.ALLBFDRELAYS,USEDFORSAFEGUARDSINITIATIONLOCATEDINTHERELAYROOMSAFEGUARDSRACKS,AREBEINGREPLACEDZNACCORDANCEWITHMAINTENANCE,PROCEDUREM-59.9.SIXTEENOFTHESERELAYSAREUNUSEDANDREPRESENTANUNNECESSARYEXPOSURETOFAILUREFORTHESAFEGUARDSSYSTEMS.THEEIGHTUNUSEDRELAYCOILSINEACHTRAINARECONTROLLEDBYTHESAMEFUSESCONTROLLINGALLTHEOTHEROPERATINGSAFEGUARDSSYSTEMS.THEREFORE,ACOILFAILUREINANYOFTHESEUNITSCOULDKEEPTHESAFETYINJECTIONSEQUENCEFROMBEINGINITIATED.THERELAYSBEINGREMOVEDSERVENOFUNCTIONALPURPOSE.ONEOFTHETWOCOILLEADSFOR6OFTHESERELAYSWEREDISCONNECTEDASPARTOFEWR2950.THEREMAINING10RELAYSHAVEALLUNUSEDCONTACTS.COILWIRINGISACCOMPLISHEDBYUSEOFJUMPERCONNECTIONSFROMCOILTOCOIL.SOMEOFTHESEWIRESCANBEREMOVEDWHILEPORTIONSOFOTHERSWILLBENEEDEDTOMAKEUPREMAININGCONNECTIONS.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORYGUIDE1.70.THEEVENTRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONZSFIRE.NEWWIRINGWILLBEREQUIREDFORTHISMODIFICATIONWHICHCOULDADDTOTHEFIRELOADINGOFTHEPLANT,ANDBECAUSEOFTHISPOTENTIALSTHEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESALLSUCHWIREMEETTHEIEEE-383-1974FLAMETESTREQUIREMENTS.THEREFORE,THISMODIFICATIONWILLCAUSENOSIGNIFICANTINCREASEINFIREPROPAGATIONHAZARD.IASARESULT,THEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTWILLBEUNCHANGED.THEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES,SYSTEMS'NDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDFORTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTED.THEPROBABILITYOFOCCURRENCEORTHECONSEQUENCEOFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTIONOFEQUIPMENTIMPORTANTTOSAFETY,PREVIOUSLYEVALUATEDINTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORTWILLBEUNCHANGEDBYTHEPROPOSEDMODIFICATION.INFACT,BECAUSEEQUIPMENTCONNECTEDTOSAFETYINJECTIONCIRCUITS(ALTHOUGHITSERVESNOFUNCTIONALPURPOSE)ISBEINGREMOVED'HEPROBABILITYOFMALFUNCTIONINGOFTHESICIRCUITRYISREDUCED.THEREFORE,THEPOSSIBILITYOFANACCIDENTORAMALFUNCTIONOFADIFFERENTTYPETHANANYEVALUATEDPREVIOUSLYZNTHESAFETYANALYSISWILLNOTBECREATEDBYTHEPROPOSEDMODIFICATION.THISMODIFICATIONISBEINGPERFORMEDTOREMOVEEXCESSRELAYSFROMTHERELAYRACKSTHUSREMOVINGFROMTHECIRCUITSAPIECEOFEQUIPMENTTHATCOULDMALFUNCTION.53

THEMARGINOFSAFETYASDEFINEDINTHEBASISFORANYTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONWILLNOTBEREDUCEDBYTHEPROPOSEDMODIFICATION.EWR-4789TDAFPSTEAMADMISSIONVALVESTHISEWR(ENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST)ADDRESSESTHEMODIFICATIONWHICHREWIRESTHECONTROLCIRCUITTOSEALZNAROUNDTHECONTROLSWITCHSOTHATWHENTHECIRCUITISENERGIZETOOPENTHEVALVEWILLCONTINUETOOPENTOTHEFULLYOPENPOSITION.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDZNTHEGINNASTATIONFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORYGUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION(1)FIRESAND(2)SEISMICEVENTS,AND(3)LOSSOFAUXILIARYFEEDWATER.THEMODIFICATIONDOESNOTINCREASETHEPOSSIBILITYORIMPACTONTHELEVELOFFIREPROTECTIONANDALTERNATESHUTDOWNCAPABILITIES,NORTHEFIREPROTECTIONANDALTERNATESHUTDOWNLICENSECONDITIONSANDTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONS.ADDITIONALWIRINGANDCABLEWILLBEADDEDZNTHISMODIFICATIONSWHICHCOULDADDTOTHEFIRELOADINGOFTHEPLANT.THEREFORE,'THEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATALLSUCHWIRINGANDCABLEMEETTHEIEEE383-1974FLAMETESTREQUIREMENTS.CONSEQUENTLY,THEREWILLBENOSIGNIFICANTINCREASEOFFIRELOADINGCAUSEDBYTHISMODIFICATION.THEMODIFICATIONDOESNOTINCREASETHEIMPACTOFASEISMICEVENT.THEDESIGNOFTHEMODIFICATIONSHALLBESEISMICCATEGORY1INACCORDANCEWITHTHEDESIGNCRITERIA.THEMODIFICATIONDOESNOTINCREASETHEIMPACTOFLOSSOFAUXILIARYFEEDWATER.THEDESIGNOFTHEMODIFICATIONDOESNOTALTERTHEMANUALORAUTOMATICOPERATINGCHARACTERISTICSOFTHEAUXILIARYFEEDWATERSYSTEM.REQUIRINGTHEVALVETOGOFULLOPENONCETHECIRCUITISENERGIZEDVS.HAVINGITSTOPWHENTHESWITCHISRELEASEDMAKESMANUALANDAUTOMATICACTUATIONSIMILAR.THISDOESNOTADVERSELYIMPACTTHESYSTEM.THEPROBABILITYOFOCCURRENCEORTHECONSEQUENCESOFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTIONOFEQUIPMENTIMPORTANTTOSAFETY,PREVIOUSLYEVALUATEDINTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORTWILLNOTBEINCREASEDBYTHEPROPOSEDMODIFICATION.THEPOSSIBILITYOFANACCIDENT.ORMALFUNCTIONOFADIFFERENTTYPETHANANYEVALUATEDPREVIOUSLYINTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORTWILLNOTBECREATEDBYTHISPROPOSEDMODIFICATION.THEMARGINOFSAFETYASDEFINEDINTHEBASISFORANYTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONWILLNOTBEREDUCEDBYTHEPROPOSEDMODIFICATION.54 0

THEPROPOSEDMODIFICATIONDOESNOTINVOLVEANUNREVIEWEDSAFETYQUESTIONORREQUIREATECHNICALSPECIFICATIONCHANGE.EWR-4794SECURITYGATEREPLACEMENTTHISENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSESTHEREPLACEMENTOFFIVE(5)EXISTINGSECURITYGATEOPERATORSANDTHEOUTERCANTILEVERVEHICLEGATEATTHESHIPPINGANDRECEIVINGBUILDINGWITHANOVERHEADSLIDEGATE.SUPPORTSWILLALSOBEADDEDTOEXISTINGGATESTOREDUCEVIBRATIONS.THEPURPOSEOFTHISMODIFICATIONZSTOIMPROVESECURITYGATERELIABILITYANDMAINTAINABILITY.EXCESSIVEVIBRATIONINTHESECURITYGATESHASCONTINUALLYBEENTHESOURCEOFPROBLEMSFORTHESECURITYINTRUSIONDETECTORS.DURINGHIGHWINDSTHEEXCESSSECURITYGATEVIBRATIONSTRIPTHESECURITYE-FIELD.THISRESULTSINTHENECESSITYFORSECURITYPERSONNELTOPATROLTHEAREA.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGZNNASTATIONFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYNRCREGULATORYGUIDE1.70.THEONLYEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONAREINTERNALANDEXTERNALEVENTS,SPECIFICALLYNATURALEVENTSANDLOSSOFAC~FIREALLCABLEANDWIREORDEREDFORTHISMODIFICATIONSHALLMEETTHEREQUIREMENTSOFIEEE383-1974FLAMETEST,THUSMITIGATINGANYPOTENTIALFORPROPAGATINGAFIRE.EARTHQUAKEDURINGASEISMICEVENT,THESECURITYGATEMODIFICATIONWILLHAVENOSAFETYFUNCTION,ANDNEEDNOTREMAINFUNCTIONAL.LOSSOFACTHISMODIFICATIONSHALLBEREVIEWEDSOASTOENSURETHEISOLATIONOFCLASS1EANDNON-CLASS1ESYSTEMS.THESECURITYGATESYSTEMSOURCEOFPOWERISFROMANONSAFEGUARDSBUSgWITHASTANDBYPOWERSOURCEDEDICATEDTOTHESECURITYSYSTEM.THEREFORE,THECLASS1EELECTRICALSYSTEMISNOTEFFECTEDBYTHISMODIFICATION.BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTHESTRUCTURALRE-ANALYSISPLAN(SRP)gZTHASBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS'NDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODIFICATION.55

EWR-4798SOLENOIDUPGRADETHISENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSESTHEINSTALLATIONOFBLOCKINGDIODESONSELECTEDSOLENOIDVALVECOILSTOPROVIDEPROTECTIONAGAINSTVOLTAGETRANSIENTSDUETOANINDUCTIVEKICKBACK.THEDIODESAREARETROFITPROVIDEDBYTHEVALVEMANUFACTURERSVALCOR/ANDWILLBEINSTALLEDACROSSTHESOLENOIDCOILSOFTHEMAINSTEAMISOLATIONANDREACTORHEADVENTVALVES.REVISION1TOTHISDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISINCLUDESTHEINSTALLATIONOFDIODEASSEMBLIESACROSSTHEHYDROGENMONITORINGSYSTEMSOLENOIDS~V921gV922gV923ANDV924.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONARE(1)MAJORANDMINORFIRES,(2)ASEISMICEVENT,(3)AMAINSTEAMLINEBREAK.CABLEREQUIREDFORTHISMODIFICATIONCOULDADDTOTHEFIRELOADINGOFTHEPLANT.THEREFORE,THEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATALLSUCHCABLEMEETTHEZEEE-383-1974FLAMETESTREQUIREMENTS.BECAUSEOFTHISTHEREWILLBENOSIGNIFICANTINCREASEOFFIRELOADINGCAUSEDBYTHISMODIFICATION.THISMODIFICATIONHASBEENREVIEWEDTOENSURETHATFAILUREOFANYELECTRICALCABLEINSTALLEDASPARTOFTHISMODIFICATIONWILLNOTRESULTZNTHEDISABLINGOFVITALEQUIPMENTNEEDEDTOSAFELYSHUTDOWNTHEPLANTDURINGPOSTULATEDFIRES.THEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATNEWRECTIFIERASSEMBLIESINSTALLEDUNDERTHISMODIFICATIONBEQUALIFIEDPERIEEE344-1975'HEREFORE'HISMODIFICATIONWILLREMAINFUNCTIONALDURINGANDAFTERASEISMICEVENT.THEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATTHENEWRECTIFIERASSEMBLIESINSTALLEDUNDERTHISEWRBEQUALIFIEDPERIEEE323-1974,THEREFORETHISMODIFICATIONSHALLREMAINFUNCTIONALDURINGANDAFTERAMAINSTEAMLINEBREAK.THEREFOREgTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED'HEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS'NDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDFORTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTED.THEPROBABILITYOFOCCURRENCEORTHECONSEQUENCESOFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTIONOFEQUIPMENTIMPORTANTTOSAFETY,PREVIOUSLYEVALUATEDZNTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORTWILLNOTBEINCREASEDBYTHEPROPOSEDMODIFICATION.56

THEPOSSIBILITYOFANACCIDENTORAMALFUNCTIONOFADIFFERENTTYPETHANANYEVALUATEDPREVIOUSLYINTHESAFETYANALYSISWILLNOTBECREATEDBYTHEPROPOSEDMODIFICATION.THEMARGINOFSAFETYASDEFINEDINTHEBASISFORANYTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONWILLNOTBEREDUCEDBYTHEPROPOSEDMODIFICATION.THEPROPOSEDMODIFICATIONDOESNOTINVOLVEANUNREVIEWEDSAFETYQUESTIONORREQUIREATECHNICALSPECIFICATIONCHANGE.BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSAR,ZTHASBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHEL1FEOFTHEPLANT'AVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS'NDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODIFICATION.EWR-4862NZSTRIPBYPASSTHISENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSESTHEREPLACEMENTOFTHEEXISTING1084OVERPOWERTRIPFUNCTIONTESTRELAYPUSHBUTTONSWITCHESWITHMAINTAINABLETYPESWITCHES.MAINTAINABLETYPESWITCHESARENECESSARYTOMAINTAINENERGZZATIONOFTHETESTRELAYSWHICHDEENERGIZETHEREACTORTRIPBISTABLERELAYSDURINGMAINTENANCEOFTHE1084OVERPOWERNISPOWERRANGECHANNELS.DEENERGIZINGEACHTRAIN'S108OVERPOWERREACTORTRIPBISTABLERELAYDURINGCHANNELMAINTENANCEPLACESTHECHANNELINTHETRIPMODEWHICHSATISFIESTHEREQUIREMENTSOFGZNNATECHNICALSPECIFICATIONS.THEEXISTINGREACTORTRIPRELAYLOGICOFTHE108%OVERPOWERNISPOWERRANGECHANNELSATGINNASTATIONCONSISTSOFTHEFOLLOWING:EACHOFTHEFOUR1084OVERPOWERNISPOWERRANGECHANNELSHAVEATESTRELAYONEACHTRAINUTILIZEDFORDEENERGZZINGTHE108%OVERPOWERREACTORTRIPBISTABLERELAYS.EXISTINGMOMENTARYTYPESWITCHES,LOCATEDZNTHERELAYLOGICTESTRACKS(RLTRlgRLTR2)INTHEREL'AYROOMgENERGIZETHETESTRELAYSWHICHDEENERGZZETHE1084OVERPOWERREACTORTRIPBISTABLERELAYSPLACINGTHECHANNELINTHETRIPMODE.THEEXISTINGSWITCHESAREPANELMOUNTSSINGLEPOLEgMOMENTARYPUSHBUTTONTYPE.THEFOUREXISTINGMOMENTARYPUSHBUTTONTYPESWITCHESONEACHOFBOTHTRAINS(TOTALOFEIGHT)WILLBEREPLACEDBYMAINTAINABLESELECTORTYPESWITCHES.THISWILLALLOWTHE1084OVERPOWERTRIPFUNCTIONTESTRELAYTOREMAINENERGIZEDANDMAINTAINTHECHANNELZNATRIPMODEDURINGMAINTENANCE.57 i

AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATION'UFSARANDEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONARE(1)MAJORANDMINORFIRES'2)ASEISMICEVENTS(3)AREACTOROVERPOWERTRANSIENT(108%OVERPOWERREACTORTRIP).NONEWWIRING,FIELDCABLE,OROTHERWISEFLAMMABLEMATERIALSWILLBEADDEDTOTHEPLANTUNDERTHISMODIFICATION,THEREFORE/NOINCREASEINFIRELOADINGZSIMPOSED.THENEWSELECTORSWITCHESAREDESIGNATEDSEISMICCATEGORY1.THEREFORE'SEISMICEVENTWILLNOTIMPACTTHEPROPEROPERATIONOFTHESWITCHES.CHANGINGTHESUBJECTSWITCHESFROMMOMENTARYTOMAINTAINABLEDOESNOTAFFECTTHEOPERATIONOFTHENIS1084OVERPOWERREACTORTRIPBECAUSEACTUATIONOFTHESWITCHESWILLPLACETHECHANNELZNTHETRIPMODE.THEREFORE,THISMODIFICATIONDOESNOTEFFECTTHENISRESPONSETOANOVERPOWERTRANSIENT.THUS,THISMODIFICATIONNEITHERINCREASESTHECONSEQUENCES/NORDOESITREDUCETHEMARGINSOFSAFETYFOR:1)2)3)MAJORANDMINORFIRESASEISMICEVENTAREACTOROVERPOWERTRANSIENT(108%OVERPOWERREACTORTRIP)ITHASBEENDETERMINEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ZTHASALSOBEENDETERMINEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS,ANDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODIFICATION.EWR-4933SGPRESSURETUBINGRELOCATIONTHISEWR(ENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST)ADDRESSESMODIFICATIONOFTHEitBttSTEAMGENERATORPRESSURETRANSMITTER(S)TUBINGANDSUPPORTS.THEPURPOSEOFTHEMODIFICATIONISTOMITIGATETHEPOTENTIALFORTHERECURRENCEOFFREEZINGSENSORLINESZNTHEINTERMEDIATEBUILDINGINTHEFOLLOWINGFASHION:1)REROUTINGTUBINGFORSENSORLINESPT-479ANDPT-4832)THEANALYSISONNEWTUBEROUTING.3)PROVIDEINSULATIONIFDEEMEDNECESSARYTOENSURETHATTHETUBINGCONTENTSREMAINABOVE32F.4)PROVIDESEISMICRESTRAINTFORTHEAFFECTEDTUBING.58 10 THEFOLLOWINGARERESPONSESTOPRE-PORCCOMMENTSONEWR4933DESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISREVISION0'.1.COMMENT:WHYNOTELIMINATETHEADDITIONOFTHEFOURVALVESET-UPANDJUSTREPLACETHETUBING.THETUBINGCANBEPRE-RUNANDTHENTHECONNECTIONSMADEINASHORTTIME.RESPONSE:THEPROPOSEDDESIGNREQUIREDTHATTHEVALVESBEINSTALLEDDURINGTHE1989SPRINGOUTAGEANDTHENPERFORMTHEREMAININGMODIFICATIONSPOST-OUTAGE.THEPRIMARYOBJECTIVEFORTHISAPPROACHATTHETIMEWASTOMAKEMODIFICATIONSTOTHESYSTEMWITHOUTRENDERINGANYTRAININOPERABLE.BASEDONMYCONVERSATIONWITHYOUON5/2/89'ILLINGANDVENTINGOFTHELINESANDRECALZBRATZONOFTHETRANSMITTERSWILLBEREQUIRED.THISWILLCAUSEONELINEATATIMETOBEINOPERABLE.ONTHEBASISTHATFILLING~VENTINGgANDRECALZBRATIONISREQUIREDITZSPRUDENTTOELIMINATETHEINSTALLATIONOFTHEVALVES.THEDESIGNCRITERIAWILLBEREVISEDTOREFLECTTHISCHANGE.2.COMMENT:SHOULDINCLUDEINSERVICELEAKCHECKFORPORTIONSOFTUBINGWHICHCANNOTBEHYDROED.RESPONSE:THISOPTIONWILLBEINCLUDEDINTHEECNWHENTHEDRAWINGSAREISSUEDFORCONSTRUCTION.3.COMMENT:ISTHEREAMINIMUMSLOPEREQUIREMENTFORTUBINGINSTALLATION.RESPONSE:YES.THISREQUIREMENTWILLBESPECIFIEDONTHECONSTRUCTIONDRAWINGS.4.COMMENT:WHATISANAPPROPRIATEAIRSEAL.RESPONSE:THEDETAILSOFANAPPROPRIATEAIRSEALWILLBEEVALUATEDDURINGTHEDESIGNPROCESS.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFTHEDESIGNBASISEVENTSTODETERMINETHOSERELATEDTOTHEMODIFICATION.THEEVENTSASSOCIATEDWITHTHISWORKARE:A)B)C)D)E)FIRESSEISMICEVENTSBELOWFREEZINGAMBIENTTEMPERATUREPOSTULATEDRUPTUREOFSTEAMORFEEDWATERLINESDIFFERENTIALDISPLACEMENTOFCONTAINMENTSTRUCTUREANDINTERMEDIATEBUILDING59 0

THISMODIFICATIONWILLNOTDEGRADEEXISTINGFZREBARRIERSORAFFECTTHEPERFORMANCEOFANYEXISTINGFIREPROTECTIONEQUIPMENT.ANYNEWMATERIALSUSEDINELECTRICALMODIFICATIONSSHALLMEETTHEREQUIREMENTSOFIEEE-383-1974,THUSMITIGATINGTHEPOTENTIALFORPROPAGATINGAFIRE.ALLEXISTINGFIREPROTECTIONFEATURESREQUIREDTOASSURECOMPLIANCEWITHlOCFR50APPENDIXR,ORTOMAINTAINEQUIVALENTLEVELSOFPROTECTIONFROMFIRESWILLBEMAINTAINEDDURINGANDFOLLOWINGMODIFICATIONSTOTHETUBINGANDCONTROLSYSTEMS.SEISMICEVENTSHAVEBEENANALYZEDUNDERTHESEPRE-EVALUATIONPROGRAM.THEMODIFICATIONANDSUPPORTSWILLBEEVALUATED,INREGARDTOASEISMICEVENTiTOCRITERIAIDENTICALTOTHESEISMICUPGRADEPROGRAM.THISWILLENSURETHATANYMODIFICATIONSWILLBEDESIGNEDSOASTOEQUALORIMPROVETHESYSTEM'SCAPABILITYTOWZTHSTANDASEISMICEVENT.BASEDONTHEABOVEANALYSISiZTHASBEENDETERMINEDTHATA)THEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHESTATIONARENOTREDUCED.B)THESTRUCTURESiSYSTEMSiANDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSORPOSTULATEDHIGHENERGYPIPEBREAKANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSORPOSTULATEDHIGHENERGYBREAKSCONTINUETOREMAINADEQUATE.C)ALLINSTRUMENTSENSINGLINEPENETRATIONSSHALLBELOCATEDATAMINIMUMHEIGHTOFSEVENFEET(2.2METERS)ABOVEFLOORLEVEL,ORTHATROUTINGANDSUPPORTOFSENSINGLINESSHALLENSURETHATTHEFUNCTIONOFTHELINESXSNOTAFFECTEDBYVIBRATIONSABNORMALHEATiCOLD,ORSTRESS.THUS,THISMODXFICATIONNEITHERINCREASESTHECONSEQUENCES/NORDOESZTREDUCETHEMARGINSOFSAFETYFOR:1)FIREPROTECTIONFEATURES2)EQUIPMENTREQUIREDTOFUNCTIONDURINGANDFOLLOWINGSEISMICANDTORNADOEVENTS3)EQUIPMENTREQUIREDTOFUNCTIONFOLLOWINGAHIGHENERGYLINEBREAK.60 0

BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARgTHESTRUCTURALREANALYSISPLAN(SRP)ANDTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONS,ITHASBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ZTHASALSOBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS'NDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODIFICATION.EWR-5053REPAIRHDPUMPBARRELLEAKTHISEWR(ENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST)ADDRESSESTHEMODIFXCATIONONTHEHEATERDRAINTANKPUMPBARRELLEAKREPAIR.THEPURPOSEOFTHISMODIFICATIONISTOINSTALLAPASSIVEVENTSYSTEMONTHEHEATERDRAINPUMPBARREL.THEVENTSSHALLPROVIDEACONTROLLEDPATHFORSTEAMANDDEBRXSTOESCAPEFROMTHEANNULARREGIONBETWEENEACHPUMPBARRELANDLINERATTHESAMETIMEPREVENTINGSAFETYAND/OREROSIONPROBLEMS.AREVIEWHASBEENPERFORMEDOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGZNNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONISALOSSOFNORMALFEEDWATERFLOW.LOSSOFNORMALFEEDWATERFLOWCANOCCURFROMARUPTUREOFAPUMPBARRELDUETOTHEEROSIVEACTIONOFTHEVENTINGSTEAM.THEANALYZEDEVENTISFARMORESEVERETHANAPUMPBARRELRUPTURE.THISMODIFICATIONWILLNOTINCREASETHEPROBABILITYOFAPUMPBARRELRUPTURESINCETHEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESPROPERINSPECTIONOFTHEPUMPBARREL.THISMODIFICATIONISNON-SEISMICSINCEITDOESNOTEFFECTTHESAFESHUTDOWNOFTHEREACTOR.THISMODIFICATIONDOESNOTINCREASETHEFIRELOADINGZNFIREAREASCONTAININGSAFESHUTDOWNEQUIPMENTORDEGRADEEXISTINGFIREPROTECTIONBECAUSEOFREQUIREMENTINSECTXON27.0OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIA.ANALYSISNECESSARYTOASSURECONTINUALCOMPLIANCEWITH10CFR50gAPPENDIXRHASBEENREQUIRED'HEREFORE,THEPROBABILITYANDCONSEQUENCESOFAFIREAFFECTINGCOLDSHUTDOWNOFTHEPLANTAREUNCHANGED.BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTHEREQUIREMENTSOFGINNASTATIONTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONS,ITHASBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES,SYSTEMS,ANDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODIFICATION.61 0

TSRCCW88-07CHECKVALVE743AINTERNALSREMOVALTHISTECHNICALSTAFFREQUESTADDRESSESCHANGESTOCCWCHECKVALVE743A.THISCHANGEINVOLVESREMOVINGCHECKVALVE743A'S,INTERNALSTOALLOWCONCLUSIVELEAKRATETESTINGOFCCWCHECKVALVE743.INTHEORIGINALPLANTDESIGNVALVE743AWASUTILIZEDASTHECONTAINMENTISOLATIONVALVEFORTHECCWLINECOMINGFROMTHEEXCESSLETDOWNHEATEXCHANGER.HOWEVERSDUETOLEAKAGEPROBLEMSWITHVALVE743AgCHECKVALVE743WASINSTALLEDINSERIESWITH743ATOPERFORMTHECONTAINMENTISOLATIONFUNCTION.CONSEQUENTLY,CHECKVALVE743ANOLONGERPERFORMSANYSAFETYOROPERATIONALFUNCTION.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGZNNASTATIONUFSARANDEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.70ANDGINNAPROCEDUREA-303.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONARE(1)SEISMICEVENTS'2)PIPEBREAKSINSIDETHECONTAINMENTBUILDING,ANDAMAINSTEAMPIPERUPTURE.THISMODIFICATIONWILLBEDESIGNEDSUCHTHATITWILLNOTAFFECTTHECAPABILITYOFCHECKVALVE743AORITSCONNECTEDPIPINGANDSUPPORTSTOWITHSTANDASEISMICEVENT.THISMODIFICATIONWILLNOTAFFECTTHEBODYPRESSUREBOUNDARYFUNCTIONINGOFCHECKVALVE743ATHEREFORETHEASAB31.1PRESSUREDESIGNWILLREMAINVALID.CCWCHECKVALVE743WILL'TILLPROVIDETHECONTAINMENTISOLATIONFUNCTIONSDURINGAPRIMARYSYSTEMPIPERUPTUREORAMAINSTEAMLINERUPTURE.THUSgTHISMODIFICATIONNEITHERINCREASESTHECONSEQUENCESgNORDOESITREDUCETHEMARGINSOFSAFETYFOR:1)EQUIPMENTREQUIREDTOFUNCTIONDURINGANDFOLLOWINGSEISMIC.2)EQUIPMENTREQUIREDTOFUNCTXONFOLLOWINGAPIPEBREAKINSIDEOROUTSIDECONTAINMENT.BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONS,ITHASBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS/ANDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODIFICATION.62

TSR89-05RHRSPENTFUELANDCVCSNON-REGENERATIVEHEATEXCHANGERSBOLTINGUPGRADETHISTECHNICALSTAFFREQUESTADDRESSESFLANGEBOLTINGUPGRADESFORTHERHRgSPENTFUELSANDNONREGENERATIVEHEATEXCHANGERS.THESHELLSIDEINLETANDOUTLETFLANGESWEREORIGINALLYSUPPLIEDWITHSA-307GRADEBBOLTS.THESEBOLTSWILLBEREPLACEDWITHSA-193GRADEB7BOLTSFOLLOWINGSTANDARDRG&EBOLTINGPRACTICES.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.70ANDGINNAPROCEDUREA-303.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONARE(1)SEISMICEVENTS~(2)PIPEBREAKSINSIDETHECONTAINMENTBUILDING,(3)ANDAMAINSTEAMPIPERUPTURE.THENEWBOLTINGISOFTHESAMEPHYSICALSIZEASTHEORIGINALBOLTINGANDTHECHEMICALANDPHYSICALPROPERTIESOFTHENEWMATERIALSSA193GRB7gISEQUALTOORGREATERTHANTHEOLDMATERIALSA307GRB.THEREFORE,THENEWBOLTINGWILLPERFORMTOTHESAMECAPACITYASTHEOLDBOLTINGFOREACHOFTHEAPPLICABLEEVENTSLISTEDABOVE.THUSgTHISMODIFICATIONNEITHERINCREASESTHECONSEQUENCESgNORDOESITREDUCETHEMARGINSOFSAFETYFOR:1)EQUIPMENTREQUIREDTOFUNCTIONDURINGANDFOLLOWINGSEISMIC.2)EQUIPMENTREQUIREDTOFUNCTIONFOLLOWINGAPIPEBREAKINSIDECONTAINMENT.3)EQUIPMENTREQUIREDTOFUNCTIONFOLLOWINGAMAINSTEAMPIPERUPTURE.BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONS,ITHASBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES~SYSTEMS'NDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODIFICATION.TSR89-09MAINFEEDWATERPUMPSUCTIONTRANSMITTERVALVEMANIFOLDTHISTECHNICALSTAFFREQUEST(TSR)ADDRESSESTHEREPLACEMENTOFTHEISOLATIONANDEQUALIZATIONVALVESFORFT-2004ANDFT-2005(FEEDWATERPUMPSUCTIONFLOWTRANSMITTERS)WITHMANIFOLDS.ITWILLALSOREPLACETHEBLOWDOWNVALVESINTHESENSINGLINESWHICHARELEAKING.THENEWARRANGEMENTWILLPROVIDETHESAMEFUNCTIONASTHEPREVIOUSONE.63

THEVALVESTRANSMITTERSPROVIDE:ASSOCIATEDWITHTHISMODIFICATIONSERVEFT-2004ANDFT-2005.THESETRANSMITTERS(1)ANINPUTTOFEEDWATERBYPASSVALVE3959,WHICHOPENSONLOWFEEDWATERNPSH.(2)ASIGNALTOFEEDWATERRECIRCULATIONVALVES4147AND4148,WHICHOPENWHENFEEDWATERFLOWFALLSBELOW25%'ULLFLOWWITHOUTRECIRCULATION.AFEEDWATERBYPASSVALVEMALFUNCTIONISDISCUSSEDINTHEFEEDWATERTEMPERATUREDECREASEACCIDENTSCENARIOOFSECTION15.1.1.1INTHEUFSAR.THISMODIFICATIONWILLNOTINCREASEORDECREASETHELIKELIHOODOFSUCHANACCIDENTSINCETHEFUNCTIONOFTHEVALVESANDPIPINGASSOCIATEDWITHTHETRANSMITTERSWILLNOTCHANGE.THUS,THEINCORPORATIONOFTHISMODIFICATIONWILLNOTAFFECTANYOFTHEEVENTSLISTEDINTABLESIANDIZOFGINNAPROCEDUREA-303,INCLUDINGTHEDESIGNBASISEVENTSOFUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.70ANDITWILLNOTCHANGE:1)THEASSUMPTIONSOFANYSAFETYANALYSISINTHEUFSARANDITSSUPPLEMENTS.2)THEPROBABILITYOFANOCCURRENCEOFANACCIDENT.3)THECONSEQUENCESOFANACCIDENT.BASEDUPONTHEEVALUATIONSINSECTION3.1ABOVE,THEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHESTATIONWILLBEUNCHANGEDBYTHEINSTALLATIONOFTHISMODIFICATIONSANDgTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES~SYSTEMSANDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSAND,FORTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSWILLBEUNCHANGEDBYTHEINSTALLATIONOFTHISMODIFICATION.THEPROPOSEDMODIFICATIONDOESNOTINVOLVEANUNREVIEWEDSAFETYQUESTIONSINCE:A)THEPROBABILITYOFOCCURRENCEORTHECONSEQUENCESOFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTIONOFEQUIPMENTIMPORTANTTOSAFETYPREVIOUSLYEVALUATEDINTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORTWILLNOTBEINCREASED,ORgB)THEPOSSIBILITYOFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTIONOFADIFFERENTTYPETHANANY.EVALUATEDPREVIOUSLYINTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORTWILLNOTBECREATED'RC)THEMARGINOFSAFETYASDEFINEDINTHEBASISFORANYTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONWILLNOTINVOLVEACHANGEZNTHETECHNICALSPECIFICATIONSINCENONEOFTHELIMITINGCONDITIONSFOROPERATIONOFTHEFEEDANDCONDENSATESYSTEMSWILLBEAFFECTED.64 0

TSR89-29PRESSURIZERLEVELTRANSMITTERMANIFOLDREPLACEMENTTHISTECHNICALSTAFFREQUESTREVISIONWASTOCHANGETHEREFERENCEINTHEDESIGNCRITERIA,REVISION0FROMTHE1986ASMECODEEDITIONTOTHE1983EDITION.THISWILLBECONSISTENTWITHTHEINSTALLATIONANDALSOBEINCONFORMANCEWITHASMESECTIONXIgARTICLEIWA7000/REPLACEMENTS'REVIEWWASPERFORMEDOFALLTHEEVENTSANALYZEDZNTHEGZNNASTATIONFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORYGUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHZSMODIFICATIONARE:CHEMICALANDVOLUMECONTROLSYSTEMMALFUNCTIONPRIMARYSYSTEMPIPERUPTURESEISMXCEVENTTHEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATTHENEWMANIFOLDVALVEANDFITTINGSFORTHISMODIFICATIONBESEISMICALLYSUPPORTED,THEREFORE,THISMODIFICATIONWILLNOTBEAFFECTEDBYASEISMICEVENT.THEDESIGNCRXTERIAREQUIRESTHATTHENEWMANIFOLDVALVEANDTUBINGBESEISMICALLYMOUNTEDANDFURTHERMORESECTIONS4AND5REQUIRETHENEWTUBINGTOBEASMECODECLASS2,QUALITYGROUPB.THEREFORE,THEPROBABILITYOFALOCAWILLNOTBEINCREASEDBYTHISMODIFICATION.THEREFORE,THEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.THEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES,SYSTEMS'NDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDFORTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTED.THEPROPOSEDMODIFICATIONDOESNOTINVOLVEANUNREVIEWEDSAFETYQUESTION.THISISBASEDONTHEFOLLOWING:THEPROBABILITYOFOCCURRENCEORTHECONSEQUENCESOFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTIONOFEQUIPMENTIMPORTANTTOSAFETY,PREVIOUSLYEVALUATEDINTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORTWILLNOTBEINCREASEDBYTHEPROPOSEDMODIFICATIONBECAUSETHEINSTALLATIONWILLMEETALLAPPLICABLESEISMICANDASMECODEREQUIREMENTS.THEPOSSIBILITYOFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTIONOFADIFFERENTTYPETHANANYEVALUATEDPREVIOUSLYZNTHESAFETYANALYSISWILLNOTBECREATEDBYTHEPROPOSEDMODIFICATIONBECAUSETHEINSTALLATIONWILLMEETALLAPPLICABLESEISMICANDASMECODEREQUIREMENTS.65

THEMARGINOFSAFETYASDEFINEDINTHEBASISFORANYTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONWILLNOTBEREDUCEDBYTHEPROPOSEDMODIFICATIONBECAUSETHEINSTALLATIONWILLMEETALLAPPLICABLESEISMICANDASMECODEREQUIREMENTS.66 0

SECTIONB-COMPLETEDSTATIONMODIFICATIONS(SMs)Thissectioncontainsadescriptionofstationmodificationproceduresperformedinthefacilityasdescribedinthesafetyanalysisreport.StationmodificationproceduresarewrittentocompleteaportionofanEngineeringWorkRequest(EWR)orTechnicalStaffRequest(TSR)identifiedbythesameparentnumber.StationModificationsarereviewedbythePlantOperationsReviewCommitteetoensurethatnounreviewedsafetyquestionsorTechnicalSpecificationchangesareinvolvedwiththeprocedure.ThebasisforinclusionofanSMinthissectionisclosureoftheSMwhereportionsoftheparentEWRorTSR,intheformofotherSMsorotherdocumentation,remaintobecompleted.

SM-87-01.1SECONDARYWATERCHEMISTRYMONITORINGPANELSWCMPINTERNALWIRINGFOR7082ANALYZERSTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDUREZSTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONOFCOMPONENTSANDWIRINGINTHENEWSWCMP.SM-87-01.2COMPUTERIZEDSECONDARYWATERCHEMISTRYELECTRICALINSTALLATIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONOFTHENEWSWCMPANDASSOCIATEDCIRCUITS.SM-87-01.3COMPUTERIZEDSECONDARYWATERCHEMISTRYMODIFICATIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONOFTWELVENEWCONDUCTIVITYCELLSANDTHETESTINGANDTURNOVEROFTHECOMPUTERIZEDSECONDARYWATERCHEMISTRYMODIFICATION.SM-89-08AMMONIUMHYDROXIDESIGHTGLASSINSTALLATIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREZSTOCONTROLTHEZNSTALLATIONiTESTINGiANDTURNOVEROFTHEAMMONIUMHYDROXIDETANKSZGHTGLASS.SM-1594.6SPENTFUELPOOLCOOLING-SEISMICSUPPORTSTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONOFSEISMICSUPPORTSREQUIREDFORTHENEWSPENTFUELPOOLPIPING.SM-1594.7SPENTFUELPOOLCOOLING-SERVICEWATERPIPINGANDASSOCIATEDINSTRUMENTATIONINSTALLATIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONOFSERVICEWATERPIPINGANDASSOCIATEDINSTRUMENTATIONTOTHENEWSFPHEATEXCHANGER.SM-1594.8ISPENTFUELPOOLCOOLING-STAINLESSSTEELANDASSOCIATEDINSTRUMENTATIONPIPINGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONOFSPENTFUELPOOQSTAINLESSSTEELANDASSOCIATEDINSTRUMENTATIONPIPING.

SM-1594.8AINSTALLATIONANDOPERATIONOFSTANDBYS.F.P.COOLINGSYSTEMTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONSOPERATIONSANDDISASSEMBLYOFTHESTANDBYSKIDMOUNTEDS.F.P.COOLINGSYSTEM.SM-1594.9AFLOORPENETRATIONINSTALLATIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONOFFLOORPENETRATIONSFORTHENEWSPENTFUELPOOLCOOLINGSYSTEM.SM-1594.11SPENTFUELPOOLCOOLING-PUMPANDRADIATIONMONITORINSTALLATIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREZSTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONOFPUMPANDRADIATIONMONITORFORTHENEWSPENTFUELPOOLCOOLINGSYSTEM.SM-1594.14SPENTFUELPOOLCOOLINGSYSTEMELECTRICALMODIFICATIONANDCOMPLETIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONCOMPLETIONANDTURNOVEROFTHESPENTFUELPOOLCOOLINGELECTRICALMODIFICATION.SM-2504.25CONTAINMENTMINI-PURGEEXHAUSTVALVEELECTRICAL.INSTALLATIONATPENETRATION132V7920-CONTAINMENTBUILDINGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEELECTRICALINSTALLATIONANDTURNOVEROFTHECONTAINMENTMINI-PURGEEXHAUSTVALVEV7920ATPENETRATIONP-132INSIDECONTAINMENT.SM-2504.26CONTAINMENTMINI-PURGEEXHAUSTVALVESELECTRICALINSTALLATIONOUTSIDECONTAINMENTTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEELECTRICALINSTALLATIONANDTURNOVEROFTHECONTAINMENTMINI-PURGESUPPLYSYSTEMEXHAUSTVALVESCDV-1AANDCDV-1BOUTSIDECONTAINMENT.SM-2512.123SEISMICUPGRADEOFPIPESUPPORTS-ANALYSISLINESAFW-400nD"PUMPDISCHARGE-STANDBYAUXILIARYFEEDWATERBUILDINGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONSTESTINGSAND,TURNOVEROFSTANDBYAUXILIARYFEEDWATERSUPPORTS,"B"TRAININTHESAFWBUILDING.

SM-2512.124SEISMICUPGRADEOFPIPESUPPORTS'NANALYSISLINESW-2200SERVICEWATERAUXILIARYBUILDING'HEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONANDTURNOVEROFMODIFICATIONSTOSERVICEWATERSUPPORTSINTHEAUXILIARYBUILDINGASSOCIATEDWITHFEEDTOTHE'tCttSAFWPUMP.SM-2512.125SEISMICUPGRADEOFPIPESUPPORTS-ANALYSISLINESAFW-800STANDBYAUXILIARYFEEDWATERFROMCONTAINMENTPENETRATION123TO"B"SGFEEDWATERLINETHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREZSTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONANDTURNOVEROFSAFWSUPPORTSZNCONTAINMENTFROMPENETRATION123TOTHE"B"FEEDWATERLINE.SM-2512.126SEISMICUPGRADEOFPIPESUPPORTSANALYSISLINESAFW-900STANDBYAUXILIARYFEEDWATERFROMPENETRATION119TO"A"STEAMGENERATORFEEDWATERLINETHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONANDTURNOVEROFPIPESUPPORTMODIFICATIONSTOTHESAFWLINEBETWEENPENETRATIONyll9ANDTHEnAttS/GFEEDWATERLINE.SM-2512.131ISTTESTCONNECTIONS-RCDTPUMPSUCTIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONSTESTINGSANDTURNOVEROFTESTCONNECTIONSFORVALVESMOV-1813AANDMOV-1813B.SM-2512.132ISTTESTCONNECTIONS-AUXILIARYFEEDWATERDISCHARGETHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONSTESTINGiANDTURNOVEROFTESTCONNECTIONSFORAUXILIARYFEEDWATERDISCHARGECHECKVALVES4003'004'000CAND4000D.SM-2512.133ISITESTCONNECTIONS-VALVEV-3506ANDV-3507BYPASSTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE-ZSTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATZONiTESTINGSANDTURNOVEROFTESTCONNECTIONSFORVALVES3506AND3507BYPASSLOOPS(DOWNSTREAMOFV-3506AANDV-3507A)~

SM-2512.134SEISMICUPGRADEOFPIPESUPPORTS-ANALYSISLINECVC200nBnRCPSEALRETURNTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONANDTURNOVEROFTHESUPPORTMODIFICATIONSFORnBnRCPSEALRETURNLINECONSISTINGOFSUPPORTSCVU131ANDCVU-XI'M-3319'8MCC-1BBREAKERREPLACEMENTTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONANDTURNOVEROFBREAKERREPLACEMENTATSPECIFIEDPOSITIONSONMCC-1B.SM-3319.55TESTINGOFBREAKERSATMCC-1BTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREZSTO1)DOCUMENTANAUXILIARYSWITCHTEST,2)VERIFYPROPERPHASEROTATION,AND3)TOPERFORMAFUNCTIONALTESTOFBREAKERSPLACEDATMCC-lB.SM-3319.58SETTINGADJUSTMENTANDFUNCTIONALTESTINGOFBREAKERSATMCC-1HTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREZSTOPROVIDETHEDIRECTIONTOAZkTUSTANDFUNCTIONALLYTESTBREAKERSATMCC-lH.SM-3319.59AUXILIARYSWITCHTESTINGFORSELECTEDBREAKERSONMCC-1BTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTODOCUMENTANAUXILIARYSWITCHTESTFORTHETURBINEROOMWALLEXHAUSTFANS1FJ1Gg1H,AND1Z.SM-3319A.2BREAKERCHANGEOUTREMOVALONMCC-1C1LAND1KTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDUREZSTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION,TESTINGSANDTURNOVEROFBREAKERCHANGEOUTS/REMOVALSTOLHEATERCHANGEOUTS,ANDTRIPSETTINGAKhTUSTMENTSFORVARIOUSUNITSONMCC-lC,1L,AND1K.SM-3319A.3BREAKERCHANGEOUTREMOVALONMCC-1DAND1MTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION,TESTINGSANDTURNOVEROFBREAKERCHANGEOUTS/REMOVALS'OLHEATERCHANGEOUTS,ANDTRIPSETTINGAMUSTMENTSFORVARIOUSUNITSONMCC-1DAND1M.

SM-3319A.4BREAKERCHANGEOUTREMOVALONMCC-1BlEAND1FTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION,TESTINGiANDTURNOVEROFBREAKERCHANGEOUTS/REMOVALSiHKATRIPUNITREPLACEMENTS,ANDTRIPSETTINGAMUSTMENTSFORVARIOUSUNITSONMCC-1B,1E,AND1F.SM-3319A.5REPLACEMENTOFPOWERCABLESPEREWR-3319ATHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION,TESTING,ANDTURNOVEROFTHEREPLACEMENTOFEXISTINGPOWERCABLESFORTHEBORICACIDEVAPORATORPACKAGE,THEAUXILIARYBUILDINGLIGHTINGTRANSFORMER1B,ANDTHESERVICEBUILDINGKITCHENEQUIPMENTTRANSFORMER.SM-3319A.6BREAKERREMOVALONMCC-1GANDRESOLUTIONOFSM-3319A.23319A.3AND3319A.4PUNCHLISTITEMSTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONiTESTINGSANDTURNOVEROFBREAKERREMOVALSiTOLHEATERCHANGEOUTS,BREAKERHANDLEINSTALLATIONS,ANDREMOVEDBREAKERCOVERPLATEINSTALLATIONS'M-3319A.8BREAKERCHANGEOUTATMCC-1FFORTHELAUNDRYAZR'CONDITIONERANDTHEPASSWASTETANKEVACUATIONCOMPRESSORTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION,TESTING,ANDTURNOVEROFTHEBREAKERCHANGEOUTATMCC-1FFORTHELAUNDRYAIRCONDITIONERANDTHEPASSWASTETANKEVACUATIONCOMPRESSOR.SM-3341.1FUSEINSTALLATIONFORTHE'MAINCONTROLBOARD"A"AND"B"BATTERYVOLTMETERSTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREZSTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONANDTURNOVEROFFUSESFORTHEMCB>>AtiANDiiBnBATTERYVOLTMETERS.SM-3341.2PRE-OPERATIONALTESTINGOFD.C.FUSESXSBFORLOCKOUTRELAY86llATHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHETESTINGANDTURNOVEROFTHEA2Y(15A)(gSB)125VDCFUSESWHICHFEEDTHEBUS11ADIFFERENTIALLOCKOUTRELAY86/llA.

SM-3341.3PRE-OPERATIONALTESTINGOFD.C.FUSESXSCFORLOCKOUTRELAY8611BTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHETESTINGANDTURNOVEROFTHEA2Y(15A)(XSC)125VDCFUSESWHICHFEEDTHEBUS11BDIFFERENTIALLOCKOUTRELAY86/11B.SM-3596.2DG"AnPRESSUREINSTRUMENTPANEL-ELECTRICALINSTALLATIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONANDTURNOVEROFJUNCTIONBOXESASSOCIATEDWITHTHENEWDIESELGENERATORnAnINSTRUMENTPANEL,INCLUDINGCONDUITANDCONDUITSUPPORTSBETWEENTHEJUNCTIONBOXESANDINSTRUMENTPANEL.ALSO,INCLUDESCABLEBETWEENNEWPRESSUREINSTRUMENTSANDTHENEWTERMINALSTRIPSWITHINTHEJUNCTIONBOXES.SM-3596.4DG"AnPRESSUREINSTRUMENTPANEL-ELECTRICALINSTALLATIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONANDTURNOVEROFJUNCTIONBOXESASSOCIATEDWITHTHENEWDIESELGENERATORnBnINSTRUMENTPANELSINCLUDINGCONDUITANDCONDUITSUPPORTSBETWEENTHEJUNCTIONBOXESANDINSTRUMENTPANEL.ALSO,INCLUDESCABLEBETWEENNEWPRESSUREINSTRUMENTSANDTHENEWTERMINALSTRIPSWITHINTHEJUNCTIONBOXES.SM-3692.2STANDBYAUXILIARYFEEDWATERCONTROLCIRCUITRYANDVALVEMOV-9746TESTINGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHETESTINGANDTURNOVEROFTHENEWMOVCONTROLSWITCHRE-AEQUNGEMENTSANDTHEIRRESPECTIVECONTROLANDINDICATIONCIRCUITS.THISINCLUDESMOVATSTESTINGOFMOV-9746ANDHYDROTESTINGOFNEWVALVEINSTALLATION.SM-3692.4STANDBYAUXILIARYFEEDWATERVALVE-ELECTRICALMODIFICATIONSTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONANDTURNOVERFORTESTINGOFCONDUIT,CONDUITSUPPORTS'ABLEgBREAKERJUMPERSANDREWORKOFTHEMAINCONTROLBOARDSWITCHESANDINDICATION.SM-3692.5SBAFWBUILDINGELECTRICALSUPPORTSTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONANDTURNOVEROFELECTRICALSUPPORTMODIFICATIONSINTHESTANDBYAUXILIARYFEEDWATERBUILDING.

SM-3692.6STANDBYAUXILIARYFEEDWATERFUNCTIONALTESTINGOFCONTROLCIRCUITRYFORMOV-9746THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEFUNCTIONALTESTINGOFMOV-9746LOCATEDINTHESAFWBUILDING;CONTROLROOM(REAROFMCB)gAUXILIARYBUILDING(MCCAREAS).HYDROTESTINGOFTHEPRESSUREBOUNDARYISCOMPLETE.ADDITIONALCOPIESOFTHISPROCEDUREMAYBEPLACEDFORCOORDINATIONANDCONTROLPURPOSES.SM-3797.8MRPIRODDROPRELAYTIMEDELAYREMOVALTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEREMOVALOFTHETIMEDELAYDEVICESWHICHWEREPREVIOUSLYINSTALLEDONTHECONTROLRODDROPRELAYS,ANDTHESUBSEQUENTTESTINGOFTHERELAYS'M-3797.9MRPIDATACABINETFANINSTALLATIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONOFCOOLINGFANSONTHEMRPIDATACABINETINCONTAINMENT.SM-3797.10MRPIANNUNCIATORMODIFICATIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION,TESTING,ANDTURNOVEROFAMODIFICATIONTOANNUNCIATORC29FORMRPIFAILURE.SM-3797.11MRP1DATACABINETFANREMOVALTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEREMOVALANDTURNOVEROFCOOLINGFANSFORMRP1DATACABINETZNCONTAINMENT.SM-3881.1SIRECIRCULATIONMODIFICATIONMECHANICALINSTALLATIONANDREMOVALSTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISPROVIDEINSTRUCTIONSFORTHEMECHANICALPORTIONOFTHESIRECIRCULATIONMODIFICATION.SM-3881.2SIRECIRCULATIONMODIFICATION-ELECTRICALINSTALLATIONANDREMOVALSMOV897898THEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONOFELECTRICALINSTALLATIONANDREMOVALSFORMOV897AND898.

SM-3881.7SAFETYINJECTIONFLOWMETERSFI-924ANDFI-925RESCALINGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONOFMETERSCALESFORFI-924ANDFI-925ANDRECALIBRATZONOFSAFETYINJECTIONFLOWTRANSMITTERSFT-924ANDFT-925.SM-3990.1DIESELGENERATORBUILDINGFOUNDATIONINVESTIGATIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREZSTOCONTROLTESTBORINGANDCORESAMPLINGINANDAROUNDTHEDIESELGENERATORBUILDING.SM-3990.2GROUNDWATEREXPLORATIONOFTHEDIESELGENERATORBUILDINGIMPINGEMENTMODIFICATIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEEXPLORATIONANDEXCAVATIONOFTHEDEWATERINGPITSGENERALLYBETWEENTHEDIESELGENERATORBUILDINGANDLAKEONTARIO.THEGENERALPURPOSEOFTHISEXPLORATORYPHASEOFTHEOVERALLMODIFICATIONISTOOBTAINSUFFICIENTPERTINENTDATAONTHESUBSURFACEGROUNDWATER.THISDATAWILLPROMULGATENECESSARYENGINEERINGOUTPUTSFORMODIFICATIONERECTIONANDINSTALLATION.SM-3991.2SEISMICUPGRADEOFEXISTINGCONNECTIONSANDANCHORAGES-AUXILIARYBUILDINGSOUTHWALLTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTODIRECT/DOCUMENTSTRUCTURALMODIFICATIONS.SM-4064.5TURBINEBUILDINGSMOKEDETECTIONUPGRADEANDALARMOFFINDICATIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHECHANGEOUTOFTURBINEBUILDINGSMOKEDETECTORSANDSTPs.ALSOINCLUDEDZSTHEINSTALLATIONOFCONTROLROOMINDICATIONOFALARMOFFSTATUS.SM-4064.6TSCFIREDETECTIONANDSUPPRESSIONSYSTEMUPGRADETHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONANDTURNOVEROFMODIFICATIONSTOTHETSCFIREDETECTIONANDSUPPRESSIONSYSTEMSPRIORTOFINALTERMINATIONSANDTESTING.

SM-4064.9TURBINEBUILDINGSMOKEDETECTORZONE234MODIFICATIONSTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION,TESTING,ANDTURNOVEROFMODIFICATIONSTOTURBINEBUILDINGSMOKEDETECTORZONEZ34-TOREMOVEDETECTORSFROMTHEGENERATORFIELDVOLTAGEREGULATORCABINET.SM-4218.3LT-426TUBINGREMOVALTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOPROVIDETHENECESSARYINSTRUCTIONSFORTHEREMOVALOFTHEEXISTING3/8nTUBINGUSEDFORLT-426SEALEDREFERENCELEG.SM-4230.1ANTICIPATEDTRANSIENTSWITHOUTSCRAMATWSMITIGATIONACTUATIONCIRCUITRYAMSACMODIFICATIONINSTALLATIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOINSTALLAREACTORPROTECTIONSYSTEMTHATWILLTRIPTHEMAINSTEAMTURBINEANDSTARTTHEFLOWOFAUXILIARYFEEDWATERAFTERANATWSEVENT.SM-4230.2ANTICIPATEDTRANSIENTSWITHOUTSCRAMATWSMITIGATIONSYSTEMACTUATIONCIRCUITRYAMSACMODIFICATIONTESTINGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOTESTAREACTORPROTECTIONSYSTEMTHATWILLTRIPTHEMAINSTEAMTURBINEANDSTARTTHEFLOWOFAUXILIARYFEEDWATERAFTERANATWSEVENT.SM-4230.3ANTICIPATEDTRANSIENTSWITHOUTSCRAMATWSMITIGATIONSYSTEMACTUATIONCIRCUITRYAMSACTRIPSTATUSMODIFICATIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOINSTALLTHEnAMSACTRIPPEDnSTATUSLIGHTONTHEMAINCONTROLBOARDSWHILEPROGRAMMINGINNEWARMINGSETPOINTSANDMODIFYINGTHEFUNCTIONCURVEWHICHGENERATESTHEVARIABLETIMEDELAYFORAMSAC.ZNADDITIONTOCHANGINGTHEDIGITALOUTPUTFORTHEPPCSFROMnAMSACACTUATEDnTOnAMSACTRIPPEDniBECOMINGADIRECTFUNCTIONOFTHERESETSTATUS.SM-4322.1STATIONSERVICETRANSFORMERS13AND15COOLINGFANSTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION,TESTINGANDTURNOVEROFCOOLINGFANSATSTATIONSERVICETRANSFORMERS413ANDgl5.

SM-4324.3ELECTRICALINSTALLATIONFORSTEAMGENERATORBLOWDOWNSYSTEMMODIFICATIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEELECTRICALINSTALLATIONFORSTEAMGENERATORBLOWDOWNSYSTEMMODIFICATION.THISPROCEDUREALLOWSPARTIALINSTALLATIONPRIORTOPLANTOUTAGEANDISTOCOMPLETETHEREMAININGDURINGTHEPLANTOUTAGE.TESTINGOFTHEINSTALLATIONWILLBEPERFORMEDUNDERANOTHERPROCEDURE.SM-4324.5STEAMGENERATORBLOWDOWNSYSTEMMODIFICATIONFUNCTIONALTESTINGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOPERFORMFUNCTIONALTESTINGOFTHEELECTRICALINSTALLATIONOFS/GBLOWDOWNMODIFICATION.SM-4347.1MODIFICATIONOFTHECONTROLROOMPLANTEVACUATIONALARMPLANTATTENTIONALARMANDPLANTFIREALARMTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREZSTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONANDTURNOVEROFTHECONTROLROOMPLANTEVACUATIONALARM,PLANTATTENTIONALARMANDPLANTFIREALARMMODIFICATIONS.SM-4347.2CONTROLROOMALARMSYSTEMTESTINGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTESTINGANDTURNOVEROFTHEMODIFICATIONSASSOCIATEDWITHTHECONTROLROOMALARMSYSTEMSANDTOCONDUCTACONTROLROOMALARMSURVEY.SM-4375.1BORICACIDFLOWCONTROLPIPINGMODIFICATIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONANDTURNOVEROFTHEMECHANICALPORTIONOF'HEBORICACIDFLOWCONTROLMODIFICATION.SM-4375.2BORICACIDFLOWCONTROLELECTRICALMODIFICATIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEELECTRICALINSTALLATION,TESTING,ANDTURNOVEROF.THEBORICACIDFLOWCONTROLANDHEATTRACEMODIFICATION.SM-4375.3MECHANICALANDELECTRICALTESTING-BORICACIDFLOWCONTROLPIPINGMODIFICATIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHETESTINGANDTURNOVEROFTHEBORICACIDFLOWCONTROLPIPINGMODIFICATION.10

SM-4375.6BORICACIDFLOWCONTROLMECHANICALPHASE2MODIFICATIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONANDTURNOVEROFTHEMECHANICALPORTIONOFTHEBORICACIDFLOWCONTROLPHASE2MODIFICATION.SM-4375.8BORICACIDFLOWCONTROLPHASE2ACCEPTANCETESTTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREZSTOCONTROLTHETESTINGANDTURNOVEROFTHEBORICACIDFLOWCONTROLPHASE2MODIFICATION.'SM-4375.9REPLACEMENTOFHEATTRACECIRCUITS40AND78THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREZSTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONSTESTINGSANDTURNOVEROFTHENEWCHEMELEXSELF-REGULATINGHEATTRACECABLEFORCONDUITS440AND578(BORICACIDBLENDERPIPING)~WHICHINCLUDESVALVESV354~V355gFCV110AgV109fANDFTl10~SM-4525.2GINNAPOWERSUPPLYBUSDUCTFOUNDATIONSTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREZSTODIRECT/DOCUMENTINSTALLATIONOFNEWBUSDUCTFOUNDATION.SM-4525.3GINNAPOWERSUPPLYO.C.B.FIREWALLFOUNDATIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONANDTURNOVEROFTHEGINNAPOWERSUPPLYO.C.B.FIREWALLFOUNDATION.SM-4525.4RACEWAYINSTALLATIONFOROFFSITEPOWERRECONFIGURATIONMODIFICATIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONOFRACEWAYFORTHEOFFSITEPOWERMODIFICATION.THISPROCEDUREINCLUDESINSTALLATIONOFANEWPIPESUPPORTFORTHEEXISTINGTRANSFORMER12BDELUGESYSTEM.SM-4525.5NEWGINNAPOWERSUPPLYBUSDUCTINSTALLATIONTHEPURPOSEOF-THISPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLINSTALLATIONOFTHENEWGINNAPOWERSUPPLYBUS.DUCTS

SM-4525.6OFFSITEPOWERRECONFIGURATION:P.P.S.SWITCHGEARTRANSFORMER12BGROUNDINGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDUREISTOANCHORTHEP.P.S.SWITCHGEARgCOMPLETEINTERNALWIRING~ANDPERFORMELECTRICALINSPECTIONOFP.P.S.4160VSWZTCHGEAR.THISPROCEDUREALSOCONTROLSTHEINSTALLATIONOFTHETRANSFORMER12BGROUNDINGRESISTOR.SM-4525.7OFFSITEPOWERRECONFIGURATION:CABLEINSTALLATIONRELAYPANELS12AAND12BTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREZSTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONOFCABLESFORTHEOFFSITEPOWERMODIFICATIONANDCOMPLETETHEINSTALLATIONOFRELAYPANELS12AAND12B.SM-4525.8OFFSITEPOWERRECONFIGURATION:MAINCONTROLBOARDSWITCHRELOCATIONBUS12ABUS12BMODIFICATIONANDTESTINGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION,TESTING,ANDTURNOVEROF:A)B)C)D)SM-4525.952/11BCONTROLSW,SYNCHSW,ANDIND.LITES52/11ACONTROLSW,SYNCHSW,ANDIND.LITES12BBUSRELAYINGANDCIRCUITBREAKERS(86/12Bg86B/12Bg52/BTBBg52/16SS~AND52/17SS12ABUSRELAYINGANDCIRCUITBREAKERS(86/12Ag86B/12Ag52/BTA-A,52/14SS,52/18SSAND52/AVP-9A)OFFSITEPOWERRECONFIGURATION:MAINCONTROLBOARDMODIFICATIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONANDRELOCATIONOFSWITCHES'ETERS'NDRELAYSWHICHMONITORANDCONTROLTHE34.5KVAND4160VELECTRICSYSTEMS.SM-4525.10OFFSITEPOWERRECONFIGURATION:SWITCHYARDMODIFICATION4160VCUBICLEMODIFICATION480VAND120VBREAKERINSTALLATIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEMODIFICATIONOFTHE34KVBUSANDASSOCIATEDEQUIPMENT,COMPLETEREMOVALSATTHE12BXFMRCABINETSCOMPLETEMODIFICATIONOF12AAND12B4160VCUBICLES,ANDINSTALL480VAND120VBREAKERSFORTHEOFFSITEPOWERMODIFICATION.12

SM-4525.12OFFSITEPOWERBACKFEEDVIAUNITAUXILIARYTRANSFORMERTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREZSTOSUPPLYPOWERFROMTHE115KVGRIDTHROUGHTHEMAINANDUNITAUXILIARYTRANSFORMERSTOTHESTATIONAUXILIARIES,WHILETHESTATIONAUXILIARYTRANSFORMERS012AAND012BAREMODIFIEDPEREWR4525.SM-4525.14OFFSITEPOWERMODIFICATION:4KVAND34KVMCBMETERINGPRE-OPERATIONALTESTINGTHEPURPOSE.OFTHISNEWPROCEDUREZSTOTESTTHEMCB4KVAND34KVMETERING,MODIFIEDUNDEREWR-4525PERSM-4525M-4525.15OFFSITEPOWERRESTORATIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSERVICETESTINGANDTURNOVEROFTHEOFFSITEPOWERMODIFICATIONANDRESTOREOFFSITEPOWERVIASTATIONAUXILIARYTRANSFORMER12B.SM-4526.2DG<<AttFUELOILSYSTEMELECTRICALRECONSTRUCTIONANDREMOVALSTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONANDTURNOVEROFTHEELECTRICALPORTIONOFTHED/G<<At'UELOZLSYSTEMINCLUDINGINSTALLATIONOFNEWEQUIPMENTANDREMOVALOFOLDEQUIPMENT.SM-4526.4DG<<B<<FUELOILSYSTEMELECTRICALRECONSTRUCTIONANDREMOVALSTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONANDTURNOVEROFTHEELECTRICALPORTIONOFTHED/G<<B<<FUELOILSYSTEMINCLUDINGINSTALLATIONOFNEWEQUIPMENTANDREMOVALOFOLDEQUIPMENT.SM-4526.8DUPLEXSTRAINERINSTALLATIONELECTRICALPORTIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONOFTHEELECTRICALPORTIONOFTHEDUPLEXSTRAINERSINTHEDIESELGENERATORFUELOZLSYSTEM.SM-4526.17DIESELGENERATORFUELOILSYSTEMDISCHARGELINEPIPESUPPORTSUPGRADETHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLINSTALLATIONANDTURNOVEROFPIPESUPPORTSONTHEDIESELGENERATORFUELOILSYSTEMDISCHARGEPIPING.13

SM-4530.1ACFUSEDANDBREAKERSINTERMEDIATEBUILDING'SMISCELLANEOUSDISTRIBUTIONTRANSFORMERREPLACEMENTTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREZSTOREPLACETHEINTERMEDIATEBUILDING'MISCELLANEOUSDISTRIBUTIONTRANSFORMERANDREMOVETHEELECTRICALFEEDFROMMCC1F(UNIT4MM)TOMCC18(UNIT8D).SM-4534.1REACTORCOOLANTPUMPMOTOROILLEVELINDICATIONSYSTEMUPGRADETHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONOFTHENEWREACTORCOOLANTPUMPMOTOROILLEVELINDICATIONSYSTEMFORTHEA6BREACTORCOOLANTPUMPMOTORS.NOCOMPONENTINSTALLATIONREQUIREDONRCPMOTORS.THEROSEMOUNT710DUINSTRUMENTRACKZSCOMMONTOBOTHREACTORCOOLANTPUMPS'M-4538.11BDIESELGENERATORUPGRADETHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONANDTURNOVEROFTHE1BDIESELGENERATORUPGRADE.THISMODIFICATIONINCLUDESREPLACEMENTOFATHROWOVERRELAY,THERMALOVERLOADRELAYS'EMOVALOFA51BURELAYSANDREWIRINGOFTERMINALBOXESONTHE>>AnANDnBnDIESELSKIDSSM-4538.3INSTALLATIONANDTESTINGOFNEWAUXILIARYRELAY51VXCLAROSTAT200OHMRESISTORANDSLIDINGLINKTERMINALSFORAIRSTARTVALVEASV-1ANDASV-2FORTHE1ADIESELGENERATORTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEELECTRICALINSTALLATIONSTESTINGSANDTURNOVEROFMODIFICATIONSTOTHE1ADIESELGENERATOR.THESEMODIFICATIONSINCLUDEREPLACEMENTOFOVER%JRRENTAUXILIARYRELAY51VXgINSTALLATIONNEW200OHMRESISTORgSLIDINGLINKSTERMINALSFORAIRSTARTVALVESgANDINSTALLATIONOFANEWMOUNTINGPLATEFORRELAYSATR-A,ATR-B,ANDAFUSEBLOCK.THISPROCEDUREWILLALLOWWORKTOBEACCOMPLISHEDINTHEFOLLOWINGGENERALAREASOFTHEPLANT:1ADIESELGENERATOR.SM-4553.1REACTORBMITUBINGSUPPORTUPGRADETHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOSEISMICALLYUPGRADETHEREACTORBOTTOMMOUNTEDINSTRUMENTATIONTUBINGSUPPORTBMI-3.14

SM-4618.1FEEDPUMPROOMVENTILATIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONOFTHENEWFEEDPUMPROOMVENTILATIONSYSTEMCOMPONENTS.SM-4671.6AnRCSHOTLEGRHRFLOWCORRECTIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHETESTINGASSOCIATEDWITHFIELDDATAVERIFICATIONOFTHEnAnRCSHOTLEGLOOPLEVELCORRECTIONASARESULTOFRHRFLOW.THISTESTISBEINGPERFORMEDINCONJUNCTIONWITHPROCEDURE0-2.F1'M-4675.1RHRPUMPnBnRECIRCULATIONPIPINGTIE-INSTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREZSTOINSTALLTHE8INCHCHECKVALVEAND3INCHPIPINGTIE-INSTOTHEBRHRHXDISCHARGELINE~SM-4675.2RHRRECIRCULATIONMODIFICATIONMCBMODIFICATIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEW:PROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONOFTHEMAINCONTROLROOMWORKSCOPEOFEWR-4675RHRRECIRCULATIONMODIFICATION.SM-4675.3RHRSYSTEMCLEANLINESSINSPECTIONANDHYDROSTATICTESTTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOPROVIDEINSTRUCTIONSFORPERFORMCLEANLINESSINSPECTIONSANDAHYDROSTATICTESTOFTHERHRRECIRCSYSTEMINSTALLEDBYEWR-4675.SM-4675.5RHRPUMP'A'ECIRCULATIONPIPINGTIE-INSANDBALANCEOFPIPINGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONANDTURNOVEROFTHERHRARECIRCULATIONPIPINGTIEINSgCOMMONTRENCHTZE-INSANDTHEREMAINDEROFTHERHRAANDBRECIRCULATIONPIPINGANDSUPPORTS.SM-4675.6RHRPUMPnArrANDnBnRECIRCULATIONINSTRUMENTATIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONOFINSTRUMENTATIONASSOCIATEDWITHTHEAANDBRECIRCULATIONPIPINGMODIFICATION.15 1

SM-4675.7RHRHX"A"OUTLETPIPESUPPORTTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONANDTURNOVEROFTHERHRHXtiAnOUTLETPIPESUPPORT.SM-4675.8RHRPUMPSUCTIONHYDROSTATICTESTTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEHYDROSTATICTESTOFTHEINSTALLATIONOFTHETI-680AND681THERMOWELLS.SM-4675.9RHRSYSTEMSHUTDOWNCOOLINGFULLFLOWTESTTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHETESTINGOFTHERHRSYSTEMFULLFLOWTESTDURINGTHESHUTDOWNCOOLINGTEST.SM-4755.1ISTTESTCONNECTIONSFORMOV-1813AB-"A"AND"B"RCDTPUMPSUCTIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTODIRECT/DOCUMENTMODIFICATIONRELOCATIONOFVALVESV-1813C/E.SM-4756.1INSTALLATIONOFMCBEXHAUSTFANSHROUDTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONOFTHESHROUDFORTHEMCBEXHAUSTFAN.SM-4759.2HIGHMASTLIGHTINGTOWERBASEPLATEGROUTINGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHE.INSTALLATIONANDTURNOVEROFHIGHMASTSECURITYLIGHTINGBASEPLATEGROUTZNGANDJAMNUTSFORTHEEIGHTHIGHMASTLIGHTINGTOWERS.SM-4764.1FIRESERVICEWATERSYSTEMMODIFICATIONSRELOCATIONSANDSPRINKLERSUPPLYTOSUPPORTTHECONTAMINATIONSTORAGEBUILDINGINSTALLATIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREZSTOCONTROLTHERELOCATIONINSTALLATIONTESTINGANDTURNOVEROFFIRESERVICEHYDRANTSGATEVALVESANDSPRINKLERSUPPLYTOTHECONTAMINATEDSTORAGEBUILDING.16

'

SM-4764.3CONTAMINATEDSTORAGEBUILDING-DOORS29ELECTRICALINSTALLATIONTESTINGANDFLOODBARRIERTESTINGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREZSTOCONTROLTHEELECTRICALINSTALLATION,TESTINGANDTURNOVEROFTHENEWSECURITYDOORS-29ANDTHETESTINGOFTHEFLOODBARRIERASSOCIATEDWITHDOORS-29.SM-4764.4ELECTRICALPOWERDISTRIBUTIONANDGROUNDGRIDINSTALLATION-CONTAMINATEDSTORAGEBUILDINGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONANDTURNOVEROFTHEELECTRICALPOWERDISTRIBUTIONANDGROUNDINGPORTIONOFTHECONTAMINATEDSTORAGEFACILITYMODIFICATION.SM-4764.6FIREPROTECTIONELECTRICALINSTALLATIONANDFUNCTIONALTESTINGWITHINTHECONTAMINATEDSTORAGEBUILDINGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLANDDOCUMENTTHEINSTALLATION,TESTINGANDTURNOVEROFTHEELECTRICALPORTIONOFTHELOCALPREACTIONFIREPROTECTIONSYSTEMZNTHECONTAMINATEDSTORAGEBUILDING.SM-4785.1'NSTALLATIONANDTESTINGOFNEWTHROWOVERRELAYINBUS14UNDERVOLTAGECABINETTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREZSTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONSTESTINGANDTURNOVEROFTHENEWTHROWOVERRELAYZNTHEBUS14UNDERVOLTAGECABINET.SM-4785.2INSTALLATIONANDTESTINGOFNEWTHROWOVERRELAYINBUS16UNDERVOLTAGECABINETTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION,TESTINGANDTURNOVEROFTHENEWTHROWOVERRELAYINTHEBUS16UNDERVOLTAGECABINET.SM-4785.3INSTALLATIONANDTESTINGOFNEWTHROWOVERRELAYINBUS17UNDERVOLTAGECONTROLCABINETTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONSTESTINGSANDTURNOVEROFTHENEWTHROWOVERRELAYINTHEBUS17UNDERVOLTAGECONTROLCABINET.17

~SM-4785o4INSTALLATIONANDTESTINGOFNEWTHROWOVERRELAYINBUS18UNDERVOLTAGECONTROLCABINETTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONSTESTINGSANDTURNOVEROFTHENEWTHROWOVERRELAYINTHEBUS18UNDERVOLTAGECONTROLCABINET.SM-4785.5INSTALLATIONANDTESTINGOFNEWTHROWOVERRELAYANDLOSSOFD.C.VOLTAGEALARMFORDIESELGENERATOR1ATHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONSTESTINGSANDTURNOVEROFTHENEWTHROWOVERRELAYANDLOSSOFD.C.VOLTAGEALARMFORDIESELGENERATORlA.SM-4785.6INSTALLATIONANDTESTINGOFNEWTHROWOVERRELAYANDLOSSOFD.C.VOLTAGEALARMFORDIESELGENERATOR1BTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREZSTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION,TESTING,ANDTURNOVEROFTHENEWTHROWOVERRELAYANDLOSSOFD.C.VOLTAGEALARMFORDIESELGENERATOR1B.SM-4809.1DIESELFIREPUMPBATTERYCHARGERSUPPORTSTRUCTURESINSTALLATIONMODIFICATIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONOFTHEDIESELFIREPUMPBATTERYCHARGERSUPPORTSTRUCTURES'M-4931.1TDAFWPCHECKVALVEREPLACEMENTTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEREPLACEMENTSTESTINGANDTURNOVEROFTHETURBINEDRIVENAUXILIARYFEEDWATERPUMPDISCHARGECHECKVALVESV-4003ANDV-4004.SM-4933.1PT-478PT-479ANDPT-483SG"B"TUBINGREROUTEANDUPGRADETHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONSTESTING/ANDTURNOVEROFUPGRADEDSTEAMGENERATORPT-478/479/483INSTRUMENTATIONTUBING,SUPPORTS/ANDBARRIERSINTHEINTERMEDIATEBUILDING(STEAMHEADERLEVEL).SM-4937.1REPLACEMENTOFHEATTRACECIRCUITS12&34THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONOFTHENEWCHEMELEXSELFREGULATINGHEATTRACECABLEFORCIRCUITS12AND34.18

SM-4937.2REPLACEMENTOFHEATTRACECIRCUIT29THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONSTESTINGANDTURNOVEROFTHENEWCHEMELEXSELFREGULATINGHEATTRACECABLEFORCIRCUITS29(BORICACIDBLENDERPIPING)iWHICHINCLUDESVALVESFCV110CiV364iFCVllOB,ANDV365A..19

SECTIONC-COMPLETEDTECHNICALSTAFFENGINEERINGEVALUATIONS(TSEEs)Thissectioncontainsadescriptionofchangestothefacilityasdescribedinthesafetyanalysisreportperformedastechnicalevaluations.Thesearetypicallysmallchangesthatdonotrequirethefullcontrolsofamodification.TechnicalStaffEngineeringEvaluationsarereviewedbythePlantOperationsReviewCommitteetoensurethatnounreviewedsafetyquestionsorTechnicalSpecificationchangesareinvolved.ThebasisforinclusionofaTSEEinthissectionispresentationtothePORC,closureoftheassociatedTSR,andsubmittaltotheDocumentControlDepartment.Withinthetimeframeofthisreporttherewerenone.

SECTIOND-TEMPORARYBYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTION,STRUCTUREFEATURES~SHIELDING'NDFLUIDSYSTEMFEATURESThissectioncontainsdescriptionsandsummariesofsafetyevaluationsoftemporarychangespursuanttotherequirementsof10CFR50.59(b)~

0 CATEGORYREVIEWEDI>"4REFERENCEPROCEDUREA.1402ROCHESTERGASANDELECTRICGINNASTATIONBYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTiONANDJUMPERCONTROLJOBFOREMAN'UMPERWIRE0FUNCTIONDATE:LIFTEDWIREFUSESPULLED0STATESBLOCK0In/0OTHER0PURPOSELOCATION:SAFETYEVALUATIONREQUIRED:PfYESPORCDATE(IFREQUiRED)'ECHNICALMANAGERSHIFTSUPERVISORINSTALLATIONDATE8TIMEENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSINSTALLED:INSTALLEDBY:~VVERIFIEDBY:REVIEW(ASNECESSARY)~NOg4A'CPr-SKETCHATTACHED~ESPANO~!I-l1DATE:REMOVALDATE8TIMEENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;REMOVEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:QjzrLrfI)Igl'4i.BiCUPJ~QAC'ttachadditionalpage(s)asnecessary40TAN4evE/SS

10CFR50.59SafetyEvaluationforliftingwireforThermocoupleD074TheindicationsforTCD07axeinconsistentwiththeresponseofotherrelatedcoreparameters(i.e.incorefluxmap&nearbythermocoupleindications).Thermocouplesareusedtosensecoreoutlettemperature,determinerelativefuelassemblypowerandcompensateRVLIS.SinceTCD07isnotconsistentwitheitherincoreorotherthermocouplesithasbeendeclaredinoperable.1thasbeendeletedfromprocessinginPPCS.Toremoveitfromtheaveragingcircuitatthethermocouplepanelrequiresliftingitslead.ThepanelwillthensenseanopenTCandremoveitfromaveraging.WithTCD07inoperabletheminimumrequirementperTech.Specs.of4thexmocouplespexquadrantismet.TCD07isnotusedtocompensateRVLIS.Thefunctionsofthethermocouplesystemasdescribedinthe'fSARarefulfilled.Therefore,neithertheprobabilitynortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionevaluatedintheUFSARisincreased.'Thepossibilityofanewaccidentormalfunctionisnotcreated.ThemarginofsafetydefinedinTech.Specs.isnotreduced.Refexences:Tech.Specs.3.5.3,UFSARSection7.7.4ffreyP.Wand11/30/89PORCApproval:2

CATEGORYREVIEWEDROCHESTERGASANDELECTRICGINNASTATIONREFERENCEPROCEDUREA.1402jr~BYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTIONANDJUMPERCONTROLJOBFOREMAN'UMPERWIRE0FUNCTION+~~DATE:REQUEST4':u~/1/A.LIFTEDWIRE0FUSESPULLED0STATESBLOCK0~CPOTHERCl/I/Nfl/I/C/AGO/~OOurfrfDf-QM+W~5Wg~C&dMg/rr//'~dC,4dAd&PTGPURPOSE0FMrOA&tgagE~iM~c-Qd/rtmXi4MCLOCATION'AFETYEVALUATIONREQUIRED:0YESINOPORCDATE(IFREQUIRED):TECHNICALMANAGERSHIFTSUPERVISOR8-Md'afkcPmlfdOur4C-SKETCHATTACHED:E3YESECHODATE:DATE:INSTALLATIONDATE&TIME'ENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSINSTALLED:INSTALIEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:REVIEW(ASNECESSARY)4'h/d"/@van)r-REMOVALDATE&TIME:ENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSREMOVED:REMOVEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:Df/E'2JDr/<1.R.Z%l2.8Cref/ET/Ih/'/Serr.~-2U~u~r=MJn.M/r'Z8'g.~O4OP.0MR8$2'4refilesdu<v17~V<Ic'lAIQ~JZ/L-~<+r>PP/julQ;7FTV5Of-ACRAfjAJAOV4WC~4I~~lV~E/P7rJrJrV't.C.oPROAJr~ulaLjXLJfry/C.HJfMAttachadditionalpage(s)asnecessary49$42Rev.2/8S

CATEGORYENCEPROCEDUREREVIEWEDROCHESTERGASANDELECTRIqj@4j)90GINNASTATIONBYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTIONANDQQQPERRCNTROLQADISPOSIT(ON-5YRS.qC(j,'JOBFOREMAR'UMPERWIRE0FUNCTIONLIFTEDWIRE0-0FUSESPLLED0REQUESTS:STATESBLOCK0g~.~cOTHERPL.PURPOSEu//.Su~LOCATION:skSAFETYEVALUATIONREQUIRED:gYES0NOPORCDATE(IFREQUIRED):/--oTECHNICALMANAGERSHIFTSUPERVISOR:INSTALLATIONDATE&TIMEENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSINSALLED:INSTALLEDBY'ERIFIEDBY:REVIEW(ASNECESSARY)OkVId/l/galJ</0C/c-/ccMSKETCHATTACHED;0YESgNODATE:DATEREMOVALDATE&TIMEc.III/i/ENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSREMOVED:REMOVEDBY:VERIFIEDBY'~~dmStCC/C'%CaI0IrtAInCIu~.svKc~A/A~~C,+L~~~I~~/II4~k~/~mC/'egb+IIIIlos<.Mo+5Vl~4~5MCIEI~A~0//VIId//4~ODQI5rC~~~ll~5+~~~c5~si(/Aw~'r~,+lm~M/~~CA~u~hi.745'~I~9E+~~vuht~JM+hAttachadditionalgyge(s)psnecessary~y~<+~~<>,p'(g/5rt/(.Qg/~/~/((~~IA/~OtC~AB.IE2A.2/8S/5PA 0

CATEGORYREVIEWEDI.REFERENCEPROCEDUREA-1402ROCHESTERGASANDELECTRICGINNASTATIONI/rpBYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTlONANDJUMPERCONTROLJOEFOREMAN%CAFJOA3CSDATE.IJ590REQUEST¹:9004JUMPERWIREJjfLIFTEDWIRE0FUSESPULLED0STATESBLOCKC3OTHERQFUNCTIONIJIRELICPS'RIOWATCOIJNIMP¹u'e¹TOZ<>CuTMMTN-SKPqM7(0o~mOPP-alQrs~PURPosEwPovre/~oAcPong~o3-4Igg~Iq~/oaHod/7o+Pe.T/~~i//A/@urnQD<r~p.LOCATION:SC.JOIAI8SE'l7)EM(RST¹~iroW7KCRUELSAFETYEVALUATIONREQUIREDIEYES0NOSKETCHATTACHED:0YESNOPORCDATE{IFREQUIRED)'ECHNICALMANAGER:.SHIFTSUPERVISORINSTALLATIONDATE&TIMEENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSINSTALLED:INSTALLEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:REVIEW{ASNECESSARY)DATE:DATE'EMOVALDATE&TIMEENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSREMOVED:REMOVEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:'ttachadditionalpage{s)asnecessary~9.1¹2Rsv.2/88

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CATEGORYREVIEWEDREFERENCEPROCEDUREA.1402ROCHESTERGASANDELECTRICGINNASTATIONBYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTIONANDJUMPERCONTROLJOBFOREMAN'UMPERWIRE0FUNCTION'JT~jva3iPURPOSETdePATE,g0)-OREQUEST¹:O-0LIFTEDWIRE0FUSESPULLED0STATESBLOCK0OTHERgADWO~eIr.FJ~iE.LOCATION:SAFETYEVALUATIONREQUIRED:li8YES0NOPORCDATE(IFREQUIRED):~~4TECHNICALMANAGEFtSHIFTSUPERVISOFLSKETCHATIACHED;~ES0NO-333-DATEINSTALLATIONDATEaTIMEENTEREDINOFFICIAL~LOG'REMOVALDATE8TIME.ENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSINSTALLEDBY:VERIFIEDBY.REVIEW(ASNECESSARY)NTALLED:NUMBEROFTAGSREMOVED:REMOVEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:PITPIR,Ij.'05POSlT(ON-5VRS.Attachadditionalpage(s)asnecessaryAE142Reu*2/88

BypassofSafet}t'unctionand,Purr?ye~~~.fcrTemporatyI-ColdReCOXCeX"~~~I1S'.rr<<etheT-Cn?dwiderang~rr<<ordcrforTI-4504TI-451hasbeenunrc1table,it1sdesirablitoprovideaT<<ColdrecorderforI1~ntshutdown.Thiswi1lh~~<<<<iimPlishedbyinstallinga250':c<<isionresistorinsharirartlrth~controlboard.'.indicatorforT-cold(409B44?0P'A!nrlirr.eoftherrr~wlylns..i1!rJtemporary'ecorder"crthetemporarywirirrqwi11rrotef!rittireT-ColdsignalfromT"409BorT-4108becausethetemporarywirirrqisinstalled.dovnstreamofaV'Iisolationamplifier(TY-409B-1rTY-410B-1).Therefore,theinstallationofthisrecordervillnotincreasethe'probabilityortheconsequenceofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated'inChapter15oftheUFShR.Sinceafailureofthenevtemporary'ecorderoritswiringwillnoteffectexistingplantinstrumentationusedforsafetysystemcontrols,theprobabilityofcreatinganaccidentnotpreviouslyevaluatedinChapter15oftheUFSARvillnotbeincreased.SinceafailureofthisrecordervillnotadverselyeffectRVLISinputfromT-Cold4098and410B,themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisofanyTechnicalSpecificationvillnotbe.reduced.~P~c~~elevenT.Adams3/22/90

CATEGORYREVIEWEDREFERENCEPROCEDUREA.1402ROCHESTERGASANDELECTRICGINNASTATIONBYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCT)ONANDJUMPERCONTROLJUMPERWIRE0FUNCTIONLIFTEDWIRE0JOBFOREMAN'I@CA~9REQUEST4:FUSESPULLED0STATESBLOCK0OTHERK,CPrr57d/WSe'Br5PURPOSEToTwca'77T-/~8-r70/H~A~rip.T~C/-CpaLOCATION:ISAFETYEVALUATIONREQUIRED:~YES0NOPORCDATE(IFREQUIRED):ZZTECHNICALMANAGER:SHIFTSUPERVISOFLINSTALLATIONDATE&TIME/ENTEREDINOFFICIALL~OG;NUMBEROFTAGSITALED:IINSTALLEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:REVIEW(ASNECESSARY)SKETCHATTACHED:YES0NODATE5-Z~DDATE:REMOVALDATE&TIME:~QdKENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSREMOVED:REMOVEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:~wL~<<AL~J~QAIV-5y~Attachadditionalpage(s)asnecessary49142Aev.2/88

PYV'rssofSntetyfunctionnndJumperCgl)gg+'orTemporaty7-ColdRecorderi*~SincetheT-(oldwidernngrrrr.orderforT1-460CTI-451hasbeenunreliable,itisdesirnblctoprovidenT-Coldrecorder.forplantshutdovn.Thisvi1l(i~nccomplis/ic,'.byinstallinga250Il,precisionrcsistorinsar.rrviththecr>>tre~)boardindicator,"[orT-Coldf40'r844108).Afailure0!thenevlyirrstniledt~m)or'hiyrecordercr'thetemporaryv)ri>>gvi}1noteffeettheI-Co!dsignalfromT-40QBorT-4108becausethetemporaryviring'.siristnlleddovnstreampfatr/IiSOlatiOnnmplifier(TY-4098-16TY-4108-1).TherefOre,.'.the',installationofthisrecordervillnotincreasetheprobability.ortheconsequenceofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedinChapter"15oftheUFSAR.Sincenfailureofthenevtemporaryrecorderoritsviringvillnoteffectexistingplantinstruaentat'ionusedforsafetysystemcontrols,theprobabilityofcreatingan'accidentnotpreviouslyevaluatedinChapter15oftheUFSARvill,not.beincreased.SinceafnilureofthisrecordervillnotadverselyeffectRVLIS'nputfromT-Cold4098and4108,themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisofanyTechnicalSpecificationvillnotbe.reduced.~i~76evenT.Adams,3/22/90

CATEGORYREV>>EWEOREQUESTS:JOBFOREMANDATE:I>>Kl'U>>gpj's>>+KAREN)EtggCEOUREal'.:51%0A-1402ROCHESTERGASANDELECTRIC',t'~'t..>>'QbGINNASTATIONBYPAssPfqlmI)F@PFUNCTloNANDJUMPER06N>>BURGLE"~JUMPERWIREQFUNCTIONLIFTEDWIRE/FUSESPULLED0ISTATESBLOCK0OTHER0'URPOSEc,~~~"'(LOCATION:rre//WDSAFETYEVALUATIONREQUIRED:PfYES0NOPORCDATE(IFREQUIRED):-gb0TECHNICALMANAGER:SHIFTSUPERVISORgFE>>~I3'g~/P/'7'72~SAT,3'~Ir3SKETCHATTACHED:~YES0NOE2>>~-wvlI8ELFcdABTvgtMEAE'.rtog5&F>0,55&odp~lbDATE:INSTALLATIONDATELTIME5/ENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSINSTALLED:INSTALLEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:REVIEW(ASNECESSARY)roerrREMOVALGATEETIME7/0ENTEREOINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSREMOVED:REMOVEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:l~lW/l~fWFnCi>>C2i~+J~Z/~Ps'C~Attachadditionalpage(s)asnecessaryEOT42Rev.2/88

CATEGORYREVIEWEDREFERENCEPROCEDUREA-1402ROCHESTERGASANDELECTRICGINNASTATIONBYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTfONANDJUMPERCONTROLrJOBFOREMAN'UMPERWIRE0LIFTEDWIRE0FUNCTIONHf/8.rm.Dr.'Ck'8mwaI/gpoFUSESPULLED0/jaZREQUEST¹'-/STATESBLOCK/KI/oly~p~/~OroOTHER+(PURPOSE(7~t"ANOL/uvol4~uD~-.~02/5SKETCHATIACHED:gVYES0NOLOCATION:4r2IeavuC~12P..2ISAFETYEVALUATIONREQUIRED:MES0NOPORCDATE(IFREQUIRED):4"7-QTECHNICALMANAGEFI:SHIFTSUPERVISORINSTALLATIONDATE&TIMEREMOVALDATE&TIMEDATE:DATE:ENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSINSTALLED:INSTALLEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:~REVIEW(ASNECESSARY)2bo~pENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSREMOVED:REMOVEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:lPQP~4LI'~~k~~llCF%'R.~LX(:IDISPOSITION-5YRS.Attachadditionalpage(s)asnecessary49r42Rev.2/8S

ROCHESTERGASANDELECTRICCORPORATIONGINNASTATION:JOB:DATE:MADEBY'AGEOF~E~(<nNW~p~4SgSm~oA)v<Io~~I4r~~~~IQStJPvm)d.8rr.'cn.any'nal~oil/kc.in&/LIDc~g</c~rogoFM5A'v)K~~ppgrwpPngsooPWArM*ct\<c~u4.r.AA/AgcQnsAocrWilrkrngg/QPpo7PgI'+7'-Z(onn"Z5rSosI7).~vrl&~sMnsMv~vmalalsrnrCCCorC4r.WnC~~re//lb'p~cVCgW~gorkiiPbVi&C7oonsvspris>g.(SrssrrnerrsilSPMfWein).Cirro/lrfrsr8ppesosrSag>en&enes>>CiirnrervBeJrvJrirJJnirnrrreen~+~JI<kfrgCEbcdurrenccosorIaccrA~Z'n'vrcurcqc'~wrmk/rnWbFSW.Poo+mrsp~~willgyc'mmepr~*lryjvP//gf~r"and+w4nccI/II>6caJ~rplqc.-~~gro$hbi/rpHAgcSC<so'<8is-of~@YMCA.JuioIpc~oolrtx<o2>/tcr~gc./4c&r754$sicllcc5oof4w4ccrcLt&/~III><<lfC~<lmkcLrnWoft<.Mr~diup~picerrIr~~u~~gc,go~~~A8oil!~n~A4.rrrcrc+I~Zsvr4caO'Ilute.bi6cre~W~por+IJJah~rf~of<AfOSQton+(cqov~~drirIsrgcsncrSo4crr74worr~d69<rn4~J~4P<u+~I~/p+pH>~~b~S.Wyo~g~+myu~~~Aa.ni>server@(rnrp(jftenlernriel/nvt.insrcsees+rovhrSliprioccurrence./orM@sacs~~ski'cenrelkncAo<oPQireenf'en//vrlnnrroin~~prr'virrsglrvetverevCJn~Pwca~since.~~rmq++ors4r~ca~gagster~~vIc'WIrrr"nwdZ~slgcAA~SAfIrriI/Ovs~A6/fi+A4i/crocP~W0'ul&pcP>rtsriivmwresellineors,lv~@floevri-rnsesv4r+wrnccreeercvtvvrroJuris.<baal~8'J~Ay/gpVjPM+8gAIVibriongptP~/Q$U/vinous,7k/ry'rscd~ir~pmrorffIIsircowqg+fu>srdifrggrswAmA<E4ctieteCcres~)persincciocIver.ivI-usr6cgssercv-irv/gricnela,lurenfSWPamP,JggQ+II~bfa~~~drrnp/riedlSgrrrrtm~ry<ms'<liillnrkseinedrii.psssikilign4aA(frenchyKnfinngnciisndfcsioi/ninginerorilnnregos>>Mnnn)seri>>s$tosslnrocVFdllrLgwegIik.icosoIone~g~en[he~prsneolgcoolroAsI.12rrr~pice)In>,llnyvvsrvccng~+~gp+goiris&'V/iI~h+si$+ciAIVI

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~L~I\~s+Es5A)A'ACATEGORYREFERENCEPROCEDUREA-1402ROCHESTERGASANDELECTRICGINNASTATIONBYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTIONANDJUMPERCONTROLJOBFOREMAN'ATEdJUMPERWIRECILIFTEPWIRE+RUSESPULLEPCISTATESBLOCKOOTHEROFUNCTION>B'4~>4o54ocv<n~grya/4~a%%dd7PPJ./EAN~'URPOSE&f7P4'PJc,grfLrtrcr8$gszr/0WG37$V)LOCATION:D40rAJWowIMgSAFETYEVALUATIONREQUIRED:8YESDNOPORCDATE(IFREQUIRED):"Zv"HJTECHNICALMANAGER:SHIFTSUPERVISOR:INSTALLATIONDATE&TIMEENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSINSINSTALLEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:REVIEW(ASNECESSARY)IPgavrWxaV-SKETCHA%I'ACHED:DYESECNODATE'0"DATEREMOVALDATE&TIME:ENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG'UMBEROFTAGSREMOVED:REMOVEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:CEM'RAAttachadditIonalpage(s)asnecessary49142ASV.E/N 0

CATEGORYREVIEWEDBYPCgyty~NCEPROCEDUREA-1ROCHESTERGASANDELECTRICt~~0GINNASTATIONASSOFSAFETYFUNCTIONANhgggPZA'58iNTROLIPN~yJOBFOREMAN'UMPERWIRE0FUNCTIONDATF'IFTEDWIREFUSESPULLED0UrREQUEST¹:CSTATESBLOCK0OTHER0PURPOSELOCATION:SAFETYEVALUATIONREQUIRED:ES0NOPORCDATE(IFREQUIRED)M-ZO-SKETCHATI'ACHED;0YESSNOTECHNICALMANAGEFI:SHIFTSUPERVISO.,i~Yi:W<.DATEDATEINSTALLATIONDATE&TIME-CO-02ENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSINSINSTALLEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:REVIEW(ASNECESSARY)Iar"REMOVALDATE&TIME:3ENTEREDINOFFICIALWOG'UMBEROFTAGSREMOVED:REMOVEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:vuLc-4/So/Ihc.u/AJS/(jIcue4rAttachadditionalpags)asnecessary491i2Rov.2/88

CATEGORYEVIEWEDJOBFOREMAN'~DATE:I>0JUMPERWIRE0LIFTEDWIREFUSESPULLED0FUNCTION<I~E'N'-TtTlICe.Gc'.c.PURPOSE2fWTAira=aMOr.-IE~iltirJAL~P@typg,-3.51IENCEPRDCEDURE<Vj'.tgg'OCHESTERGASANDELEC~,180GINNASTATIONBYPAssQFsAFETYFUNcTIQNAM@P@EACGNTRoLV-Syo~4REQUESTR:STATESBLOCK0OTHER0D/C~~=-zABCLOCATION:SAFETYEVALUATIONREQUIRED:EYES0NOPORCDATE(IFREQUIRED):0Z5&TECHNICALMANAGER:~SHIFTSUPERVISOR:INSTALLATIONDATE&TIMEENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGTALLED:INSTALLEDBY:XVERIFIEDBY:SKETCHAlTACHEDDYESQNQX~+>+DATE:~2REMOVALDATE&TIME:ENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;'UMBEROFTREMOVREMOVEDBY:IVERIFIEDBY:REVIEW(ASNECESSARY)Oc(7rAv'A4/num~r'~~ZNWr~n4Attachadditionalpage(s)asnecessary49.142Rsv.2/88

CATEGORYREVIEWEDRFFERENCEPROCEDUREA.1402ROCHESTERGASANDELECTRIC5fGINNASTATIONBYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTIONANDJUMPERCONTROLJOBFOREMAN'UMPERWIRE0LIFTEDWIREFUNCTION5ERHI&$4eF'l.oIDATE;~/P'OREQUESTS:FUSESPULLED0STATESBLOCK0OTHER0dr1Jr?QrALAN~PURPOSEh3LrISd~ccA'W4wKLOCATION:SAFETYEVALUATIONREQUIRED:RIES0NOPORCDATE(IFREQUIRED)S>rn'wcIsi.TECHNICALMANAGER:(SHIFTSUPERVISOR.rINSTALLATIONDATE&TIME~j&OENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSINSTALLED:INSTALLEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:REVIEW(ASNECESSARY)/gj?ggyz~-/fECSKETCHATIACHED:0YESItNO08Ãe'PDATE:REMOVALDATE&TIME:lat3"0cI50ENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSREMOVED:REMOVEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:<~A',".~,<L,i'V;.SD~\Attachadditionalpage(s)asnecessary49.1l2Rev.2/8S

CATEGORYREVIEWEDNCEPROCEDUREJQf4A.tROCHESTERGASANDELEC'PICtl~0GINNASTATIONWggr~,.BYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTIONANREIIQIPI2Elt'~TROLION-sy~'OBFOREMAN'ATE:Gt0REQUEST4:CJUMPERWIRE0FUNCTIONLIFTEDWIREFUSESPULLED00'TATESBLOCK0OTHER0PURPOSELOCATIOSAFETYEVALUATIONREQUIRED:ES0NOPORCDATE(IFREQUIRED):~>4'KETCHATTACHED:0YESI2INOTECHNICALMANAGERSHIFTSUPERVISO.-?.i~~t6.G~h.-DATE'+DATEREVIEW(ASNECESSARY)Ia(INSTALIATIONDATEItTIME-2>42ENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSINSLEINSTALLEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:REMOVEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:/4/REMOVALDATE8TIME:ENTEREDINOFFICIAL~DE;NUMBEROFTAGSREMOVED:IVECLCT2f50ClhCcrm'zsoFr~IWAa//vWAttachadditionalpags)asnecessaryEQ-1E2Aev,2/8S (I

CATEGORYREVIEWED-3.3.5REFERENCEPROCEDUREA.1402ROCHESTERGASANDELECTRICGINNASTATION9'pBYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTlONANDJUMPERCONTROLJOBFOREMAN'"l'UMPERWIRE0LIFTEDWIRE0FUNCTIONC-/0~/I".<-io.wrAREQUEST¹:FUSESPULLED0STATESBLOCK0OTHEREf-~Cv-ngCATTivyltA/it//~4PURPOSE.r0A/c,n~t@ADC-I0/'eeiI/'nCC.rC8ItLOCATION:~~(Wt'n,4rtMSAFETYEVALUATIONREQUIRED:gYES0NOPORCDATE(IFREQUIRED):6-=~oTECHNICALMANAGER:SHIFTSUPERVISOR:SKETCHATTACHES:0YESItNO~F-1~:~k.9>-INSTALLATIONDATE&TIMEENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSINTAD'NSTALLEDBY:)VERIFIEDBY:REMOVALDATE&TIME:3'VS0-~ENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGMOVE.REMOVEDBY:a&VERIFIEDBY:REVIEW(ASNECESSARY)ElE'jj;Aj,~DtSPOSIt)9PAttachadditionalpage(s)asnecessarySStirtTPaSS

BYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTIONANDJUMPERCONTROLANNUNCIATORC-10AnnunciatorC-10isdescribedintheUFSARasamethodofprovidingindicationoflowSWflowtothecontrolroomduringanaccident.Awiringanomalyiscausingspuriousalarms.Withoutthisalarm,theoperatorwillnotknowifadequateSWflowexistsduringanaccident.Bypullingthealarmcard,thecardwillbepreventedfromalarmingspuriouslybutindicationofSWflowwillbelost.ToensuresufficientSWflow,ifanSIsignalisreceived,operationspersonnelwillverifylocallythatgreaterthan900gpmisavailabletoeachfancooler.ThisrequirementwillbepostedontheMCBandoncomingoperatorswillbeinformedduringturnover.Duringnormaloperations,theflowis1000gpm.WhenanSIsignalisreceived,flowwouldgoupsosufficientflowshouldbeavailable.Byverifyinggreaterthan900gpm,theassumptionsoftheUFSARremainvalidandnounreviewedsafetyquestionexists.Postmaintenancetestingwillincludesufficienttestingtoensurethealarmwilloperatewhenactuallowflowissensed.Ref.UFSAR6.2.1.1.1c/z/go

"CATEGORYGAGREVIEWEDREFERENCEPROCEDUREA-1402$0REQUESTS:ROCHESTERGASANDELECTRICGINNASTATIONJOBFOREMAN'ATEBYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTIONANDJUMPERCONTROLJUMPERWIRE0LIFTEDWIRERFUNCTIONar2uPURPOSEFUSESPULLED0STATESBLOCK0VPZM/AC84OC.k'THER0IS7LOCATION'AFETYEVAI.DATIONREQUIRED:)TYES0NOPORCDATE(IFREQUIRED)'4lg0TECHNICALMANAGERSHIFTSUPERVISOR:INSTALLATIONDATE&TIME4I0ENTEREDINOFFICIAL'OG;NUMBEROFTAGSINSTALLED:INSTALLEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:REMOVALDATE.6/0-0DATEg-Ig-PoDATE&TIME:ENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSREMOVED:REMOVEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:SKETCHATTACHED:0YESjh(NOREVIEW(ASNECESSARY)'Attachadditionalpage(s)asnecessary49.1A2Rev.2/SS

/PC<@NS.fSage/Evg/us*~5If"l55.f.SAPID6-'col~terdDu~pky.Cent-.I~bc~pLpk-3Clvculi+%&woe'M+6+5rgo~~~guse~~M~crneovS~mcfc~~5'Le&<$5~~~iS~i~ro<ocr'o<~P6p~~'rflW/r~d,Wismr//Pcev~WArv~anu>4~~W~~cm~p4gngr'u~rn~~~~yr~Crc/4uJ<*rhea~~0CcnJf'O'~M,WG~w~~ocoerg45pep~~~d~y~i~+7~A5~os~i'lr6~~~~A.~t4k3is<.4v~gpKyL(~.~~I~ak(~~p~h~I~li~~Sup~~y4~~c-.c<~/yv-m~lPenc,h~prcVlovS~pChlglV+XWg~~gF'SAgacrlllwoPprob<<IAp0&~~caMH~m~l&>>cpm,nor./7mvlocsslyeblis.M~~c~'UF'5A4AaJlb~ss,4gr~kSpcs~,ll,hkeDF5APScc.g'.g.Z.~gW~O<.7918c4+assech~5>~>4WM3.S-'5 0

CATEGORYREVIEWEDROCHESTERGASANDELECTRICGINNASTATIONREFERENCEPROCEDUREgA-1402BYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTIONANDJUMPERCONTROLJOBFOREMAN'UMPERWIRE0FUNCTIONLIFTEDWIREj2fFUSESPULLED0e-~sicSTATESBLOCK0CDATE:7~~~REQUEST4:OTHER0PURPOSEAe/~OA./~~/Mr7g+7rrV/W'ILOCATION'~~~~~ERt-"rr-4~I-II~3ZSAFETYEVALUATIONREQUIRED:j8YES0NOSKETCHATTACHED:0YESPORCDATE(IFREQUIRED):-0TECHNICALMANAGEFI:@NOSHIFTSUPERVISOINSTALLATIONDATE8TIME-0ENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSITALLED:INSTALLEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:DATEREMOVALDATE8TIME:ENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSREMOVED:REMOVEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:REVIEW(ASNECESSARY)Attachadditionalpage(s)asnecessary40142Rev,2/88

10CFR50.59SAFETYEVALUATIONforBypassofSafetyFunctionforThermocoupleC-3ThecircuitforthermocoupleC-3isinoperable.Toensureerroneousreadingsarenotgenerated,theleadsfromthisthermo-coupletothethermocouplepanelwillbelifted.Thiswillpreventerroneousthermocouplereadingsfrombeingincludedintheaveragingcalculationsinthethermocouplepanel.Thefourthermocouplesperquadrant.requiredbyTechSpecswillbemain-tainedandthermocoupleC-3isnotusedbyRVLIS.Basedonthisevaluation,theprobabilityandconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionpreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARwillnotbeincreased.ThepossibilityofanaccidentormalfunctionnotpreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARwillnotcreated.And,themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisofTechSpecswillnotbereduced.Therefore,thisbypassofsafetyfunctiondoesnotcreateanunreviewedsafetyquestion.-

References:

UFSARSection4.4.5.4&Table7.7-3'TechSpecsSection3.5.3&Table3.5-3Preparedby:Date:7"TC.SA iW0 August1,1989SAFETYEVALUATIONFORTEMPORARYSTRUCTUREFEATUREAUTHORIZATIONFORM89-180Thistemporarystructurewillbeplacedunderthereferencelegpipingtosupportthecondensatepotandassociatedtubing.Thereferencelegpipingwillbeliftedbyhandwhilemeasuringandrecordingthemaximumliftforce.Theliftwillnotcreateanysubstantialdeflectionoftherootvalveandwillthereforenotcreateanunexceptablestressontheweldsinthereferenceleg.Thereferencelegwillnotbeliftedpastthecondensatespot'soriginaldesignelevation.Therefore,thistemporarystructurewillnotendangertheintegrityofthereferencelegpiping.Thistemporarystructurewillberemovedpriortoleavingthehotshutdowncondition.Thistemporarystructurewillnotincr'easetheprobabilityofanaccidentortheconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR.ThistemporarystructurewillnoteffectthepressuretransmitterPT-429andthereforewillnot.effecttheresponseofsafetyinjectiontoanaccident.Thisstructurewillnoteffecttheintegrityofthereferencelegandwillonlybeusedtosupportthestaticloadofthepipingwillremainintact.ThistemporarystructurewillnotcreateanaccidentofadifferenttypethenthosespecifiedintheUFSAR.TheSafetyInjectionSystemwillreactasdesignedtoanyaccident.addressedintheUFSAR.Thistemporarystructurewillnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinanytechnicalspecificationbasis.Thisstructuredoesnotrenderanyplantsysteminoperable,norwillitdegradeanyoperatingsystem.

U0 SCREENHOUSENORTHOFMCC-1GPLANTBETTERMENTPAINTSCAFFOLD89-1838/11/89ScaffoldingisneededforceilingandwallpaintingintheareanorthofMCC-1Gnotcoveredbypreviouslyapprovedscaffolds89-167and89-168.BecauseoftheproximityoftheserviceWaterPumpsinbothtrainsandMCC-1GthescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).Theguidelinesstatement4.0requirementtowireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternativerequirementtousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunctionwithwoodencleats.(AcceptableasnotedperM.K.FitzsimmonsonAuthorizationForm89-167).TheJobSupervisorshallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheguidelinesprovided.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbyanassignedLiaisonEngineer,anditsseismiccapabilityinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebytheLiaisonEngineer.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.TheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisorofconfirmationofseismiccapability.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,anduponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershallaccepttheinstallation.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstoallvalves,instrumentation,panels,andfirefightingprovisions.Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedon,these,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:SeismicEvents

Therewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapabilitybecausetherewillbenointerferencewithaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.TheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.Theinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurr'enceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.,

SCREENHOUSESOUTHWALLOVERDIESELFIREPUMPPLANTBETTERMENTPAINTSCAFFOLD89-1848/11/89ScaffoldingisneededforceilingandwallpaintingintheareaovertheDieselFirePumpbetweentheareascoveredbypreviouslyapprovedscaffolds89-170and89-171.BecauseoftheproximityoftheserviceWaterPumpsandFireServiceWaterPumpsinbothtrainsthescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).Theguidelinesstatement4.0requirementtowireallplank'deckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternativerequirementtousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunctionwithwoodencleats.(AcceptableasnotedperM.K.FitzsimmonsonAuthorizationForm89-167).TheJobSupervisorshallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheguidelinesprovided.Theerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbyanassigned'LiaisonEngineer,anditsseismiccapabilityinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebytheLiaisonEngineer.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.TheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisorofconfirmationofseismiccapability.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,anduponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershallaccepttheinstallation.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstoallvalves,instrumentation,panels,andfirefightingprovisions.Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:SeismicEvents i

Therewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapabilitybecausetherewillbenointerferencewithaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.TheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

AMAINSTEAMARV-3411REPAIRWORKPLATFORM89-190September6,1989RepairworkonARV-3411willnecessitateaworkplatform/constructedofpolescaffoldandplankssuchastosurroundtheAMainSteamleadandthereliefvalveinletpiping,somewhatbelowtheARVinletflange.ThesmalltubingfortheARVairoperatorwillbedisconnectedduringthevalverepairpreparations.AssuchtheplatformwillhavenopotentialeffectontheARVs,andthestructureswillberestrictedfrommovementinthedirectionofanyothersafetyrelatedequipment.TheMainSteamleadsandthereliefpipingaresufficientlysturdytoprecludeanydamagefromtherelativelylightscaffoldmaterials;however,pipingofsmallerdiameterthanthescaffoldpolematerialisincorporatedastheisolationvalve3507bypass.Thedurationofscaffoldexistenceisprojectedtobe2weeks.Becauseoftheabovefactors,thescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).Theguidelinesstatement4.0requirementtowireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternativerequirementtousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunctionwithwoodencleats.(AcceptableasnotedperM.B.FitzsimmonsonAuthorizationForm89-167).TheJobSupervisorshallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheguidelinesprovided.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbyanassignedLiaisonEngineer,anditsseismiccapabilityinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebytheLiaisonEngineer.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.TheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisorofconfirmationofseismiccapability.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,anduponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesamemannerasdescribedabove.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstoallvalves,instrumentation,andfirefightingprovisionsinthearea.

Theabove'constructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:SteamGeneratortuberuptureRuptureofasteampipeSeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapabilitybecausetherewillbenointerferencewithaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.TheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

September7,1989LAUNDRYEXHAUSTFANVIBRATION/EXPANSIONRINGREPLACEMENTWORKPLATFORM89-191RepairisrequiredonductworkattheLaundryExhaustFan,locatedinthevicinityoftheAFeedwaterLine.TheentriesfromtheMotorandTurbineAuxiliaryFeedwaterPumpdischargesarenearby,andthereisahighdensityofsnubbersforthispipinginarea(5mechanicaland1hydraulic).Atemperaturesensor(TE-2096)islocatedatthetopofthefeedwaterlinedownstreamofcheckvalve3003.Becauseoftheexistenceoftheabovefeatureswithinthevicinityoftheproposedscaffold,scaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).Theguidelinesstatement4.0requirementtowireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternativerequirementtousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunctionwithwoodencleats.(AcceptableasnotedperM.B.FitzsimmonsonAuthorizationForm89-167).TheJobSupervisorshallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheguidelinesprovided.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbyanassignedLiaisonEngineer,anditsseismiccapabilityinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebytheLiaisonEngineer.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.TheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisorofconfirmationofseismiccapability.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,anduponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesamemannerasdescribedabove.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstoallvalves,instrumentation,panels,andfirefightingprovisionsinthearea.Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.

TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:LossofNormalFeedwaterLossofallA.C.powertothestationauxiliariesSteamGeneratortuberuptureRuptureofasteampipeSeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapabilitybecausetherewillbenointerferencewithaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.TheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

September12,1989SIRECIRCFLOWORIFICEFE-916LEAKREPAIRWORKPLATFORM89-192eAworkplatformisrequiredtocorrectaleakconditionatSIrecircfloworificeFE-916,locatedbetweentheRefuelingWaterTankand480vBus16.AlsowithinthevicinityareTemperatureIndicatorTI-917,andSIrecircMOVs897and898.TheMOVsarewithintheASMESeismicClass2boundaryasindicatedonP&ID33013-1261ContainmentSpray(SI).Theplatformistobeabout4ft.high,estimatedtobeinexistence2days.BecauseoffactorsgivenabovethescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).Theguidelinesstatement4.0requirementtowireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternativerequirementtousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunctionwithwoodencleats.(AcceptableasnotedperM.B.FitzsimmonsonAuthorizationForm89-167).TheJobSupervisorshallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheguidelinesprovided.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbyanassignedLiaisonEngineer,anditsseismiccapabilityinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebytheLiaisonEngineer.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.TheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisorofconfirmationofseismiccapability.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,anduponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallation'inthesamemannerasdescribedabove.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstoallvalves,instrumentation,panels,andfirefightingprovisionsinthearea.Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.

TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnot.haveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:'ecreaseinReactorCoolantInventorySeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapabilitybecausetherewillbenointerferencewithaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.TheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismic'feature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

9/26/89AUXILIARYBUILDINGTOPSOUTHWALLWESTFROMCOLUMNLINE8aPLANTBETTERMENTPAINTSCAFFOLD89-194AscaffoldisplannedforpaintingthesouthwallattheAuxiliaryBuildingtoplevel,toextendfromtheDeconPittotheMonitorTanks.Becauseofthelargeareatobecovered,includingtheareaimmediatelyadjacenttobothComponentCoolingHeatExchangers,andtherelativelylengthyprojecteddurationofthescaffoldexistence,thescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines'rovidedfromStructuralEngineering'(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).Theguidelinesstatement4.0requirementtowireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternativerequirementtousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunctionwithwoodencleats.(AcceptableasnotedperM.B.FitzsimmonsonAuthorizationForm89-167).TheJobSupervisorshallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheguidelinesprovided.Inaddition,partoftheorientationshallstresstheimportanceoftakingcarenottobumpanylivesmokedetectors.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbyanassignedLiaisonEngineer.Inaddition,theJobSupervisorshallnotifytheFireProtectiongroupduringinstallationtoallowforconsultationonanypotentialinterferenceswithfiredetection/sprinklerprovisionsencountered.Duringconstruction,theend-of-shiftseismicstatusshallbedocumentedonanattachmenttothefieldcopyoftheauthorizationformbytheLiaisonEngineer.Inthefinalstageofconstructionpriortouse,theseismiccapabilityofthescaffoldinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebytheLiaisonEngineer.Thisconfirmationshallincludereviewofattributessuchasconfigurationofthescaffoldframeandsecuringoftheplanks.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.TheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisorofconfirmationofseismiccapability.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,and,uponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesamemannerasdescribedabove.Duringconstructionandteardowncareshouldbetakentopreventbumpinganysensitiveequipmentandtubinginthevicinity.

Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testing,andmaintenanceaccesstoallvalves,instrumentation,panels,rotatingequipme'nt,andfirefightingprovisionsinthearea.ThescaffoldshallbeconstructedsoasnottointerferewithAuxiliaryBuildingCraneuseduringfueltransfermechanismworkplanned.Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:DecreaseinReactorCoolantInventoryRuptureofaSteamPipeSeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapabilitybecausetherewillbenointerferencewithaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.TheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

1/16/90SERVICEWATERPIPESUPPORTSSWU625gSWU626gSWU623g'NDSWU624SCREENHOUSEBASEMENTWORKPLATFORMS89-202InordertoperformthepipesupportupgradeworkneartheceilingfortheServiceWaterPumpdischarges,workplatformsareneeded,tobeconstructedofwood,about3ft.abovethefloor.Theindividualpumpdischargesare14in.pipe,andtheheadersare20in.pipe,sufficientlysturdytoprecludeanydamagebytherelativelyshortwoodenplatforms.Nosafetyrelatedinstrumentationwillbeaffectedbythisplatforminstallation.Basedonthefactorsdescribedabovethedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetothefacilityorproceduresasdescribedintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Materialofconstructionwillbelightenoughsothatitwillhavenoeffectonanycomponentintheeventofaseismicevent.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportassociatedwiththeproposedinstallationarethefollowing:SeismicEventTheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecausethelightnessoftheinstallationinrelationtothesturdinessofthepipewillensurethattherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbases.TheinstallationwillnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseitwillnotaffectsafetyrelatedequipmentintheeventofaseismicevent.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseofthesturdinessoftheadjacentpiping.TheinstallationofthistemporarymodificationwillnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecificationbecauseitdoesnotaffectanyTechnicalSpecification.

1/16/90SERVICEWATERPIPESUPPORTSSWU-636ANDSWU-638WORKPLATFORMS89-203InordertoperformthepipesupportupgradeworkneartheceilingfortheServiceWaterPumpdischargeportioninthenortheastcorneroftheroom,aworkplatformconstructedofwoodwillbeneeded,about.3ft.abovethefloor.Theindividualpumpdischargesare14in.pipe,andtheheadersare20in.pipe,sufficientlysturdytoprecludeanydamagebytherelativelyshortwoodenplatforms.Nosafetyrelatedinstrumentationwillbeaffectedbythisplatforminstallation.Basedonthefactorsdescribedabovethedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetothefacilityorproceduresasdescribedintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Materialofconstructionwillbelightenoughsothatitwillhavenoeffectonanycomponentintheeventofaseismicevent.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportassociatedwiththeproposedinstallationarethefollowing:SeismicEventTheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecausethelightnessoftheinstallationinrelationtothesturdinessofthepipewillensurethattherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbases.TheinstallationwillnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseitwillnotaffectsafetyrelatedequipmentintheeventofaseismicevent.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseofthesturdinessoftheadjacentpiping.TheinstallationofthistemporarymodificationwillnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecificationbecauseitdoesnotaffectanyTechnicalSpecification.

1/17/90SCREENHOUSEPLANTBETTERMENTPAINTINGSCAFFOLDABOVETHEHOUSEHEATINGBOILER90-01ScaffoldingisrequiredintheScreenhouseforcleaningandpaintingunderthePlantBettermentProject.Thispermit(90-01),isforaseismicscaffoldaboveandaroundthehouseheatingboiler.(Ref.sketchattachedtopermit).Thislocationiswithin11/2timesitsheightofsafetyrelatedservicewaterpumpslAand1B.ThescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).Theguidelinesstatement4.0requirementtowire'llplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternativerequirementtousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunctionwithwoodencleats.(AcceptableasnotedperM.K.FitzsimmonsonAuthorizationForm89-167).TheJobSupervisorshallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheguidelinesprovided.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbyanassignedStationEngineer,anditsseismiccapabilityinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebyaqualifiedindividual.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.ThepersonperformingsuchconfirmationshallnotifytheShiftSupervisorofconfirmationofseismiccapability.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,and'ponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershallaccepttheinstallation.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstotheScreenhouseallvalves,instrumentation,panels,rotatingequipment,andfirefightingprovisions.ITheaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:SeismicEvents

Therewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapabilitybecausetherewillbenointerferencewithaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.TheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

Ih February7,1990CONDUITANDCABLEINSTALLATIONINAUXILIARYBUILDINGSUB-BASEMENTFORMIDLOOPINSTRUMENTATIONEWR-4892SCAFFOLD90-14Ascaffoldisneededwithaworkplatformabout8feetfromthefloor.ThecornerpolesshallbeextendedtotheceilingandhorizontalpolesshallbeextendedtoatleastonewallandotheranchoragepointsorbumpercontactpointsontheoppositesidetopreventmoVement.BecausebothtrainsofResidualHeatRemovalPumpsarewithintheimmediatevicinityofthescaffold,thescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment),incorporatingthefeaturesdescribedabove.Theguidelinesstatement6.0shallbeaugmentedwiththerequirementthatthescaffoldshallbecompleteandseismictotheextentinstalledbytheendofeachshift.TheConstructionEngineerorLiaisonEngineershallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheguidelinesprovided.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbytheConstructionEngineerandtheLiaisonEngineer.Duringconstruction,theend-of-shiftseismicstatusshallbedocumentedonanattachmenttothefieldcopyoftheauthorizationformbytheConstructionEngineerortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.Inthefinalstageofconstructionpriortouse,theseismiccapabilityofthescaffoldinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebytheConstructionEngineer,ortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.Thisconfirmationshallincludereviewofattributessuchasconfigurationofthescaffoldframeandsecuringoftheplanks.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.TheConstructionEngineerortheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisorofconfirmationofseismiccapability.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,and,uponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesamemannerasdescribedabove.Thescaffoldshallnotbebuiltuntilimmediatelypriortotheplannedstartoftheconduitinstallationeffort.

l/

90-14Duringconstructionandteardowncareshouldbetakentopreventbumpinganysensitiveequipmentandtubinginthevicinity.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstoallvalves,instrumentation,fireprotectionsystems,androtatingequipmentinthearea.Theaboveconstructionandoperationalrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:AccidentalRelease-WasteGasDecreaseinReactorCoolantInventorySeismicEventsTheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedin'hePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

0 February7,1990CONDUITANDCABLEINSTALLATIONINAUXILIARYBUILDINGBASEMENTATWESTSTAIRFORMID-LOOPINSTRUMENTATIONEWR-4892SCAFFOLDS90-15InordertoinstallconduitandcableforthisprojectintheAuxiliaryBuildingbasementascaffoldisneededneartheceilingabovetheSpentFuelPoolPumps.TheSFPcoolingsystemisnon-seismicsafetyrelated(1)however,SeismicCategoryIitemsarewithintheimmediatevicinity,givenbelow.AandBResidualHeatRemovalPumpCoolingUnits(2)AResidualHeatRemovalPumpDischargeTemperatureTT-630(3)Otherinstrumentsintheareaforwhichcareshouldbetakentoavoiddisturbingareasfollows:ComponentCoolingReturnfromResidualHeatRemovalPumpsflowFI-651anditsassociatedtubing.(4)AResidualHeatremovalPumpdischargepressurePIC-629andPI-629Aandtheirassociatedtubing.(3)BecauseoftheabovefactorsthescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).Theguidelinesstatement6.0shallbeaugmentedwiththerequirementthatthescaffoldshallbecompleteandseismictotheextentinstalledbytheendofeachshift.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbytheConstructionEngineerandtheLiaisonEngineer.Duringconstruction,theend-of-shiftseismicstatusshallbedocumentedonanattachmenttothefieldcopyoftheauthorizationformbytheConstructionEngineerortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.Inthefinalstageofconstructionpriortouse,theseismiccapabilityofthescaffoldinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebytheConstructionEngineer,ortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.TheConstructionEngineerortheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisorofconfirmationofseismiccapability.

90-15Thescaffoldshallnotbebuiltuntilimmediatelypriortotheplannedstartoftheconduitinstallationeffort.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orobservedduringerection,that.adeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,and,uponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesamemannerasdescribedabove.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstotheAuxiliaryBuildingsub-basement,allvalves,instrumentation,panels,rotatingequipment,andfirefightingprovisionsinthearea.Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveit,willnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:DecreaseinReactorCoolantInventorySeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapabilitybecausetherewillbenointerferencewithaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.TheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.

90-15TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseas'aseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipment,orsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.NOTES:1)QualityAssuranceManualAppendixAQualityandSafetyRelatedListingandDiagramsSection2.2.4SpentFuelPoolCoolingoutlinedinRG&EDrawing33013-1248(portionattached).2)UFSARSection9.4.9.1EngineeredSafetyFeaturesEquipmentVentilationandCooling.3)UFSARFigure5.4-7ResidualHeatRemovalSystem(portionattached).UFSARFigure9.2-4Sheet1ComponentCoolingWaterSystem(portionattached).

February7,1990CONDUITANDCABLEINSTALLATIONINAUXILIARYBUILDINGINTERMEDIATELEVELATWESTSTAIRFORMID-LOOPINSTRUMENTATIONEWR-4892SCAFFOLD90-16InordertoinstallconduitandcableforthisprojectintheAuxiliaryBuildingIntermediateLevelascaffoldisneededneartheceilingfromthestairwellnorthtoadj'acenttotheContainmentwall,overthewestendoftheSpentFuelPoolHeatExchanger.StandbyAuxiliaryFeedwaterSystemContainmentisolationMOVsarelocatedonthenorthsideoftheSFPHX.Thespacebetweentheheatexchangerandcontainmentisverycongestedwithpiping,pipesupportstructures,regulators,valves,instruments,andleadshieldingforaprocessmonitorintheservicewaterpiping.fromtheheatexchanger.AmajorportionoftheequipmenthereisassociatedwiththewastegassystemsupportingtheReactorCoolantDrainTankandthePressurizerReliefTank,bothofwhichareinContainment.ImmersedwithinthisspaceisoneoftheContainmentMini-purgedischargeisolationvalves.BecauseofthelocationoftheabovediscussedSAFWContainmentisolationMOVs,thescaffoldshallbeconstructedasseismicusingtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbytheConstructionEngineerandtheLiaisonEngineer.Theguidelinesstatement6.0shallbeaugmentedwiththerequirementthatthescaffoldshallbecompleteandseismictotheextentinstalledbytheendofeachshift.TheConstructionEngineerorLiaisonEngineershallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheguidelinesprovided.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbytheConstructionEngineerandtheLiaisonEngineer.Duringconstruction,theend-of-shiftseismicstatusshallbedocumentedonanattachmenttothefieldcopyoftheauthorizationformbytheConstructionEngineerortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.Thisconfirmationshallincludereviewofattributessuchasconfigurationofthescaffoldframeandsecuringoftheplanks.Suchdocumentationshall,beattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.TheConstructionEngineerortheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisorofconfirmationofseismiccapability.

0 Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,and,uponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesamemannerasdescribedabove.Thescaffoldshallnotbebuiltuntilimmediatelypriortotheplannedstartoftheconduitinstallationeffort.Duringconstructionandteardowncareshouldbetakentopreventbumpinganysensitiveequipmentandtubinginthevicinity.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstoallvalves,instrumentation,panels,rotatingequipment,firefightingprovisions,andadjoiningroomsinthearea.LockedareaaccesstotheSpentFuelPoolfiltervaultiscontrolledbyalockedgate.Ensurethatthescaffolddoesnotallowanyeasieraccesstothisarea.Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.The-installationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReport.whichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:,AccidentalRelease-WasteGasSteamGeneratorTubeRuptureRuptureofaSteamPipePrimarySystemPipeRuptureSeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapabilitybecausetherewillbenointerferencewithaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.

90-16TheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.Theinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccident.ormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipment.orsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

February7,1990CONDUITANDCABLEINSTALLATIONIN*CONTROLROOMAIRHANDLINGROOMFORMID-LOOPINSTRUMENTATIONEWR-4892SCAFFOLD90-17InordertoinstallconduitandcableforthisprojectintheControlRoomAirHandlingRoomascaffoldisneeded.Theequipmentintheimmediateareais,forthemostpart,dedicatedtocontinuinghabitabilityfortheMainControlRoominthepost-accidentenvironment.Becauseofthis,thescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).Theguidelinesstatement6.0shallbeaugmentedwiththerequirementthatthescaffoldshallbecompleteandseismictotheextentinstalledbytheend.ofeachshift.TheConstructionEngineerorLiaisonEngineershallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheguidelinesprovided.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbytheConstructionEngineerandtheLiaisonEngineer.Duringconstruction,theend-of-shiftseismicstatusshallbedocumentedonanattachmenttothefieldcopyoftheauthorizationformbytheConstructionEngineerortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.Inthefinalstageofconstructionpriortouse,theseismiccapabilityofthescaffoldinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebytheConstructionEngineer,ortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.Thisconfirmationshallincludereviewofattributessuchasconfigurationofthescaffoldframeandsecuringoftheplanks.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.TheConstructionEngineerortheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisorofconfirmationofseismiccapability.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,and,uponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesamemannerasdescribedabove.Thescaffoldshallnotbebuiltuntilimmediatelypriortotheplannedstartoftheconduitinstallationeffort.Duringconstructionandteardowncareshouldbetakentopreventbumpinganysensitiveequipmentandtubinginthevicinity.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstoallvalves,instrumentation,panels,rotatingequipment,andfirefightingprovisions.

90-17Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforinlOCFR50.59aregivenbelow.TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwi;ththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:DecreaseinReactorCoolantinventorySeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapabilitybecausetherewillbenointerferencewithaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.Theinstallationdoesnotinvolve.achangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.~~~Theznstallatz.ondoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

February13,1990PENETRATIONSEALINSPECTIONOVERCONTROLROOMAIRHANDLINGUNITSCAFFOLD90-23IInordertoinspectpenetrationsealsabovetheControlRoomAirHandlingUnit,ascaffoldisneeded.Theequipmentintheimmediateareais,forthemostpart,dedicatedtocontinuinghabitabilityfortheMainControlRoominthepost-accidentenvironment.Becauseofthis,thescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).Theguidelinesstatement4.0requirementtowireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternativerequirementtousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunctionwithwoodencleats.(AcceptableasnotedperM.B.FitzsimmonsonAuthorizationForm89-167).TheJobSupervisorshallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheguidelinesprovided.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbyanassignedLiaisonEngineer,anditsseismiccapabilityinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebyaqualifiedindividual.Suchdocumentationshallbeattachedtothe,originalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.ThepersonperformingsuchconfirmationofseismiccapabilityshallsonotifytheShiftSupervisor.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,anduponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesamemannerasdescribedabove.Duringconstructionandteardowncareshouldbetakentopreventbumpinganysensitiveequipmentandtubinginthevicinity.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstoallvalves,instrumentation,panels,rotatingequipment,andfirefightingprovisions.Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.

90-23Theinstallationdoesnotresultina,changetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:DecreaseinReactorCoolantInventorySeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapabilitybecausetherewillbenointerferencewithaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.TheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

February15,1990CONDUITANDCABLEINSTALLATIONUNDERINTERMEDIATEBUILDINGNORTHCATWALKEWR-4530SCAFFOLD90-24Inordertoinstallconduitandcableunderthecatwalkaworkplatformneeded.ItwillbelocatedintheimmediatevicinityofcontainmentpenetrationsforheatingsteamandtheILRTventtoroof.ItwillbedirectlyabovetheContainmentCoolerUnitflowindicatorswhichareSeismicCategoryIinstruments.TotheimmediatenorthareControlRodDrivePowerCabinets.BecauseofthecloseinvolvementwiththeSeismicCategoryIitemsthescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).Theguidelinesstatement6.0shallbeaugmentedwiththerecpxirementthatthescaffoldshallbecompleteandseismictotheextentinstalledbytheendofeachshift.TheConstructionEngineerorLiaisonEngineershallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheguidelinesprovided.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbytheConstructionEngineerandtheLiaisonEngineer.Duringconstruction,theend-of-shiftseismicstatusshallbedocumentedonanattachmenttothefieldcopyoftheauthorizationformbytheConstructionEngineerortheLiaisonEngineerin'hisstead.Inthefinalstageofconstructionpriortouse,theseismiccapabilityofthescaffoldinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebytheConstructionEngineer,ortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.Thisconfirmationshallincludereviewofattributessuchasconfigurationofthescaffoldframeandsecuringoftheplanks.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.TheConstructionEngineerortheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisorofconfirmationofseismiccapability.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,and,uponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesamemannerasdescribedabove.Thescaffoldshallnotbebuiltuntilimmediatelypriortotheplannedstartoftheconduitinstallationeffort.

90-24Duringconstructionandteardowncareshouldbetakentopreventbumpingcontainmentisolationvalves,theinstrumentsandcabinetsdescribedaboveandanyothersensitiveequipmentandtubinginthevicinity.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstoallvalves,instrumentation,panels,andfirefightingprovisionsinthearea.Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheir'unctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:SteamLineRuptureDecreaseinReactorCoolantInventorySeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapabilitybecausetherewillbenointerferencewithaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.TheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasas'eismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent,of,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipment,orsystemsinthevicinity.

90-24TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

February16,1990ABATTERYROOMEASTWALLPENETRATIONSEALINGINSPECTIONEWR-4941SCAFFOLD90-26InordertoinspectpenetrationsealsontheABatteryRoomwalladjacenttotheABattery,ascaffoldisneeded,toprovideaworkplatformapproximately9ft.fromthefloor.Itistobeofwoodenconstructiontoeliminatethepotentialforshortcircuitingthebattery.ItshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedsketchsothatitwillbeidenticaltothestructureprovidedasRequest86-56,whichwasdeterminedtobeseismicallyacceptable(seeattached10/7/86S.K.Fergusonmemo).TheJobSupervisorshallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheconstructionrequirementsgivenbelow.Pre-planningandprefabricationforthescaffoldshallbedonesuchastoallowcompletionofthestructure,apartfromthedecking,inonedayofworkwithintheBatteryRoom.Asalternativestothisthefollowingmaybeobserved:Theportioncompletedshallbeadequatelyrestrainedtomakeitseismicwithbracingandinterlockingandcontactwithadjacentstructuralfeatures.Inlieuoftheabove,theBMainBatterySystemshallbemaintainedoperable,withnonon-seismictemporarystructuresintheBBatteryRoom.Duringconstruction,theend-of-shiftseismicstatusshallbedocumentedonanattachmenttothefieldcopyoftheauthorizationformbyaqualifiedindividual.Extremecaremustbeexercisedinworkingadjacenttoorabovethebatteriesduringconstruction,use,andteardownofthescaffold.SufficientclearancesaretobeprovidedforElectricianaccesstothebattery.Priortouse,thestructureshallbeinspectedbytheJobSupervisortoconfirmthatitsconstructionwasinaccordancewiththesketch.UponsuccessfulconfirmationtheJobSupervisorshalldocument-thisconfirmationfortheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm,andsonotifytheShiftSupervisor.

90-26Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.TheaffectsandmethodstocopewithlossofD.C.poweraregiveninthefollowing:UFSARSection8.1.4.4PotentialRiskofStationBlackoutUFSARSection8.3.2.1DescriptionUFSARSection8.3.2.2AnalysisProcedureER-ELEC.2CrosstieTSCBatterytoAorBDCBusAlsoanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationisthefollowing:SeismicEventsTheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhave.nointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

2/26/90ABATTERYROOMNORTHWESTCORNERPENETRATIONSEALINGINSPECTIONEWR4941SCAFFOLD90-27AworkplatformisneededtoinspectpenetrationsealsinthenorthwestcorneroftheABatteryRoomadjacenttotheABatteryCharger,tobeabout61/2ft.fromthefloor.Thedurationofexistenceofthisscaffoldisestimatedtobeamonth.InconsiderationofanypossibilityforinoperabilityofDCelectricsystemequipmentintheBBatteryRoomwithinthisfairlylengthydurationthescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismic'ScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).Theguidelinesstatement4.0requirementtowireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternativerequirementtousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunctionwithwoodencleats.(AcceptableasnotedperM.B.FitzsimmonsonAuthorizationForm89-167).ItshallnotbestarteduntilthewoodenscaffoldovertheABatterybankiscompleted;assuch,thatscaffold(90-26)shallserveasabarriertopreventshortcircuitingthebatterywithmetalscaffoldmaterials.Thissubjectscaffoldshallberemovedpriortoremovalofthewoodenscaffold.TheJobSupervisorshallverifythatanorientationsessionhas,beenconductedontheguidelinesprovided.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbyanassignedLiaisonEngineer,anditsseismiccapabilityinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebyaqualifiedindividual.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.ThepersonperformingsuchconfirmationofseismiccapabilityshallsonotifytheShiftSupervisor.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshall,beobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,anduponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesamemannerasdescribedabove.ExtremecaremustbeexercisedinworkingadjacenttothebatteriesandotherDCelectricequipmentduringconstruction,use,andteardownofthescaffold.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstoallinstrumentationandpanelsinthearea.

Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforinlOCFR50.59aregivenbelow.TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.TheaffectsandmethodstocopewithlossofD.C.poweraregiveninthefollowing:UFSARSection8.1.4.4PotentialRiskofStationBlackoutUFSARSection8.3.2.1DescriptionUFSARSection8.3.2.2AnalysisProcedureER-ELEC.2CrosstieTSCBatterytoAorBDCBusAlsoanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationisthefollowing:SeismicEventsTheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

2/26/90ABATTERYROOMNORTHEASTCORNERPENETRATIONSEALINGINSPECTIONEWR4941SCAFFOLD90-28AworkplatformisneededtoinspectpenetrationsealsinthenortheastcorneroftheABatteryRoomadjacenttotheABatteryDisconnectSwitchestobeabout8ft.fromthefloor.Thedurationofexistenceofthisscaffoldisestimatedtobeamonth.InconsiderationofanypossibilityforinoperabilityofDCelectricsystemequipmentintheBBatteryRoomwithinthisfairlylengthydurationthescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).Theguidelinesstatement4.0requirementtowireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternativerequirementtousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunctionwithwoodencleats.(AcceptableasnotedperM.B.FitzsimmonsonAuthorizationForm89-167).ItshallnotbestarteduntilthewoodenscaffoldovertheABatterybankiscompleted;assuch,thatscaffold(90-26)shallserveasabarriertopreventshortcircuitingthebatterywithmetalscaffoldmaterials.Thissubjectscaffoldshallberemovedpriortoremovalofthewoodenscaffold.TheJobSupervisorshallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheguidelinesprovided.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbyanassignedLiaisonEngineer,anditsseismiccapabilityinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebyaqualifiedindividual.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.ThepersonperformingsuchconfirmationofseismiccapabilityshallsonotifytheShiftSupervisor.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,anduponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesamemannerasdescribedabove.ExtremecaremustbeexercisedinworkingadjacenttothebatteriesandotherDCelectricequipmentduringconstruction,use,andteardownofthescaffold.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstoallinstrumentationandpanelsinthearea.

90-28Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.TheaffectsandmethodstocopewithlossofD.C.poweraregiveninthefollowing:UFSARSection8.1.4.4PotentialRiskofStationBlackoutUFSARSection8.3.2.1DescriptionUFSARSection8.3.2.2AnalysisProcedureER-ELEC.2CrosstieTSCBatterytoAorBDCBusAlsoanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationisthefollowing:SeismicEventsTheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.Theinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionof,equipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

03/08/90STANDBYSFPCOOLINGCOMPONENTMOUNTING90-40Ithasbeendecidedtoprovidemountingsfor,andtoinstallthestandbySFPPumpintheAuxiliaryBuildingbasement,immedia-telyeastoftheRHRPumpCooler,Units,bythecontainmentwall,andtodolikewisewiththestandbySFPHeatExchangeronthetopfloorimmediatelywestoftheAComponentCoolingPump.ThemountingsaretobeofseismicdesignasprovidedforTemporaryFluidSystemProvisionForm88-27forEWR1594BanddiscussedinJ.JFerraro'sApril5,1989memoonreviewofthepumpmounting.Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.Theinstallationdoesnotresultina,changetotheassump-tionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeatureitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:DecreaseinReactorCoolantInventorySeismicEventsTheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,~~~~~~~~~~~~becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwill i

90-40havenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

March8,1990TUBINGINSTALLATIONINAUXILIARYBUILDINGSUB-BASEMENTFORMIDLOOPINSTRUMENTATIONEWR-4892SCAFFOLD90-41Ascaffoldisneededwithaworkplatformabout5feetfromthefloor.Thecornerpolesshallbeextendedtotheceilingandhorizontalpolesshallbeextendedtoatleastonewallandotheranchoragepointsorbumpercontactpointsontheoppositesidetopreventmovement.Assuchitmaybeintegratedwithscaffold90-14.BecausebothtrainsofResidualHeatRemovalPumpsarewithintheimmediatevicinityofthescaffold,thescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment),incorporatingthefeaturesdescribedabove.Theguidelinesstatement6.0shallbeaugmentedwiththerequirementthatthescaffoldshallbecompleteandseismictotheextentinstalledbytheendofeachshift.TheConstructionEngineerorLiaisonEngineershallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheguidelinesprovided.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbytheConstructionEngineerandtheLiaisonEngineer.Duringconstruction,theend-of-shiftseismicstatusshallbedocumentedonanattachmenttothefieldcopyoftheauthorizationformbytheConstructionEngineerortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.Inthefinalstageofconstructionpriortouse,theseismiccapabilityofthescaffoldinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebytheConstructionEngineer,ortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.Thisconfirmationshallincludereviewofattributessuchasconfigurationofthescaffoldframeandsecuringoftheplanks.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.TheConstructionEngineerortheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisorofconfirmationofseismiccapability.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,and,uponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesamemannerasdescribedabove.Thescaffoldshallnotbebuiltuntilimmediatelypriortotheplannedstartoftheconduitinstallationeffort.

90-41Duringconstructionandteardowncareshouldbetakentopreventbumpinganysensitiveequipmentandtubinginthevicinity.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstoallvalves,instrumentation,fireprotectionsystems,androtatingequipmentinthearea.Theaboveconstructionandoperationalrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:AccidentalRelease-WasteGasDecreaseinReactorCoolantInventorySeismicEventsTheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.Theinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccident.ormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

03/29/90RHRPUMPSUCTIONMOV'S704A6BSCAFFOLDS90-80InordertoperformmaintenanceonMOV's704AandBascaffoldisneededtoprovideaworkplatformabout10ft.fromthefloor.ThemaintenanceistobeperformedwithallfuelremovedfromReactor.Thescaffoldinstallationistotakeplacepriortothistomaximizethetimeavailableforvalvemaintenance.BecauseoftheneedforoperabilityoftheRHRSystemduringthisperiodthescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).Theguidelinesstatement4.0requirementtowireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternativerequirementtousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunctionwithwoodencleats.(AcceptableasnotedperM.B.FitzsimmonsonAuthorizationForm89-167).TheJobSupervisorshallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheguidelinesprovided.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbyanassignedLiaisonEngineer,anditsseismiccapabilityinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebyaqualifiedindividual.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.ThepersonperformingsuchconfirmationofseismiccapabilityshallsonotifytheShiftSupervisor.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,anduponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesamemannerasdescribedabove.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstoallvalves,instrumentation,rotatingequipmentandfirefightingprovisionsinthearea.Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunct'ionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribed

90-80intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:DecreaseinReactorCoolantInventorySeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapabilitybecausetherewillbenointerferencewithaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.TheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

03/29/90RHRRETURNOUTSIDEMISSILEBARRIERMOV-720SCAFFOLD90-81InordertoperformmaintenanceonMOV-720ascaffoldisneededtoprovidedaworkplatformabout7ft.fromthefloor.ThemaintenanceistobeperformedwithallfuelremovedfromtheReactor.Thescaffoldinstallationistotakeplacepriortothistomaximizethetimeavailableforvalvemaintenance.BecauseoftheneedforoperabilityoftheRHRSystemduringthisperiodthescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).Theguidelinesstatement4.0requirementtowireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternativerequirementtousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunctionwithwoodencleats.(AcceptableasnotedperM.B.FitzsimmonsonAuthorizationForm89-167).TheJobSupervisorshallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheguidelinesprovided.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbyanassignedLiaisonEngineer,anditsseismiccapabilityinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebyaqualifiedindividual.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.ThepersonperformingsuchconfirmationofseismiccapabilityshallsonotifytheShiftSupervisor.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection,that,adeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,anduponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesamemannerasdescribedabove.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstoallvalvesandinstrumentationinthearea.Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribed

90-81intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:DecreaseinReactorCoolant:InventorySeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapabilitybecausetherewillbenointerferencewithaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.TheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

0 April24,1990BMAINSTEAMARV-3410REPAIRWORKPLATFORM90-151Repair.workonARV-3411willnecessitateaworkplatform,constructedofpolescaffoldandplankssuchastosurroundtheAMainSteamleadandthereliefvalveinletpiping,somewhatbelowtheARVinletflange.AssuchtheplatformwillhavenopotentialeffectontheARVs,andthestructureswillberestrictedfrommovementinthedirectionofanyothersafetyrelatedequipment.TheMainSteamleadsandthereliefpipingaresufficientlysturdytoprecludeanydamagefromtherelativelylightscaffoldmaterials;however,pipingofsmallerdiameterthanthescaffoldpolematerialisincorporatedastheisolationvalve3506bypass.Thedurationofscaffoldexistenceisprojectedtobeapproximately11/2weeks.Becauseoftheabovefactors,thescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).Theguidelinesstatement4.0requirementtowireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternativerequirementtousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunctionwithwoodencleats.(AcceptableasnotedperM.B.FitzsimmonsonAuthori'zationForm89-167).TheJobSupervisorshallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheguidelinesprovided.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbyanassignedLiaisonEngineer,anditsseismiccapabilityinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebyaqualifiedindividual.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.ThepersonperformingsuchconfirmationofseismiccapabilityshallsonotifytheShiftSupervisor.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,anduponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesamemannerasdescribedabove.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstoallvalves,instrumentation,andfirefightingprovisionsinthearea.

90-151Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:SteamGeneratortuberuptureRuptureofasteampipeSeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapabilitybecausetherewillbenointerferencewithaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.TheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,it,willbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

5/10/90NaOHTANKROOMPENETRATIONSEALINSPECTIONEWR-4941SCAFFOLD90-156InordertoinspectpenetrationsealsinthesoutheastcorneroftheNaOHTankRoom,ascaffoldisneeded,toprovideaworkplatformapproximately12ft.fromthefloor.InthislocationitwillbedirectlyovertheChargingPumpLeakoffCollectionSystemandwillbeimmediatelysoutheastofthe2trainsofSprayAdditiveTankoutletvalves(HCV-836AandHCV-836B).Theleakoffcollectionsystemisindicatedasnon-seismiconP&ID33013-1265sheet2.DamagetotheleakofftankwhichcouldpresentpotentialforreleasefromtheventheaderisboundedbyanalysisofruptureofaGasDecayTank.BecauseofthepotentialeffectonHCV-836AandHCV-836BthescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).Theguidelinesstatement4.0requirementtowireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternativerequirementtousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunctionwithwoodencleats.(AcceptableasnotedperM.B.FitzsimmonsonAuthorizationForm89-167).TheJobSupervisorshallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheguidelinesprovided.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbyanassignedLiaisonEngineer,anditsseismiccapabilityinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebyaqualifiedindividual.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.ThepersonperformingsuchconfirmationofseismiccapabilityshallsonotifytheShiftSupervisor.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,anduponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesamemannerasdescribedabove.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstoallvalves,instrumentation,panels,rotatingequipment,firefightingprovisions,andadjoiningroomsinthearea.Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.

'k0 90-156TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:AccidentalRelease-WasteGasDecreaseinReactorCoolantInventorySeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapabilitybecausetherewillbenointerferencewithaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.TheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

May9,1990BBATTERYROOMWESTWALLPENETRATIONSEALINGINSPECTIONEWR-4941SCAFFOLD90-157InordertoinspectpenetrationsealsontheBBatteryRoomwalladjacenttotheBBattery,ascaffoldisneeded,toprovideaworkplatformapproximately9ft.fromthefloor.Itistobeofwoodenconstructionto,eliminatethepotentialforshortcircuitingthebattery.ItshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedsketchsothatitwillbeidenticaltothestructureprovidedasRequest86-56,whichwasdeterminedtobeseismicallyacceptable(seeattached10/7/86S.K.Fergusonmemo).TheJobSupervisorshallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheconstructionrequirementsgivenbelow.Pre-planningandprefabricationforthescaffoldshallbedonesuchastoallowcompletionofthestructure,apartfromthedecking,inonedayofworkwithintheBatteryRoom.Asalternativestothisthefollowingmaybeobserved:Theportioncompletedshallbeadequatelyrestrainedtomakeitseismicwithbracingandinterlockingandcontactwithadjacentstructuralfeatures.-Inlieuoftheabove,theAMainBatterySystemshallbemaintainedoperable,withnonon-seismictemporarystructuresintheABatteryRoom.Duringconstruction,theend-of-shiftseismicstatusshallbedocumentedonanattachmenttothefieldcopyoftheauthorizationformbyaqualifiedindividual.Extremecaremustbeexercisedinworkingadjacent,toorabovethebatteriesduringconstruction,use,andteardownofthescaffold.SufficientclearancesaretobeprovidedforElectricianaccesstothebattery.Priortouse,thestructureshallbeinspectedbytheJobSupervisortoconfirmthatitsco'nstructionwasin-accordancewiththesketch.UponsuccessfulconfirmationtheJobSupervisorshalldocumentthisconfirmationfortheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm,andsonotifytheShiftSupervisor.

90-157Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.TheaffectsandmethodstocopewithlossofD.C.poweraregiveninthefollowing:UFSARSection8.1.4.4PotentialRiskofStationBlackoutUFSARSection8.3.2.1DescriptionUFSARSection8.3.2.2AnalysisProcedureER-ELEC.2CrosstieTSCBatterytoAorBDCBusAlsoanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationisthefollowing:SeismicEventsTheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

5/9/90BBATTERYROOMSOUTHWESTCORNERPENETRATIONSEALINGINSPECTIONEWR4941SCAFFOLD90-158AworkplatformisneededtoinspectpenetrationsealsinthesouthwestcorneroftheBBatteryRoomadjacenttotheBBatterytobeabout8ft.fromthefloor.Thedurationofexistenceofthisscaffoldisestimatedtobeamonth.InconsiderationofanypossibilityforinoperabilityofDCelectricsystemequipmentintheABatteryRoomwithinthisfairlylengthydurationthescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).Theguidelinesstatement4.0requirementtowireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternativerequirementtousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunctionwithwoodencleats.(AcceptableasnotedperM.B.FitzsimmonsonAuthorizationForm89-167).ItshallnotbestarteduntilthewoodenscaffoldovertheBBatterybankiscompleted;assuch,thatscaffold(90-157)shallserveasabarriertopreventshortcircuitingthebatterywithmetalscaffoldmaterials.Thissubjectscaffoldshallberemovedpriortoremovalofthewoodenscaffold.TheZobSupervisorshallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheguidelinesprovided.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbyanassignedLiaisonEngineer,anditsseismiccapabilityinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebyaqualifiedindividual.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.ThepersonperformingsuchconfirmationofseismiccapabilityshallsonotifytheShiftSupervisor.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,anduponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesamemannerasdescribedabove.Extremecaremust.beexercisedinworkingadjacenttothebatteriesandotherDCelectricequipmentduringconstruction,use,andteardownofthescaffold.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstoallinstrumentationandpanelsinthearea.

90-158Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.TheaffectsandmethodstocopewithlossofD.C.poweraregiveninthefollowing:UFSARSection8.1.4.4PotentialRiskofStationBlackoutUFSARSection8.3.2.1DescriptionUFSARSection8.3.2.2AnalysisProcedureER-ELEC.2CrosstieTSCBatterytoAorBDCBusAlsoanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationisthefollowing:SeismicEventsTheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecif~cations.

2/26/90BBATTERYROOMNORTHENDPENETRATIONSEALINGINSPECTIONEWR4941SCAFFOLD90-159WorkplatformsareneededtoinspectpenetrationsealsinthenorthendoftheBBatteryRoomadjacenttotheBBatteryChargerandBBatteryDisconnectSwitchestobeabout8ft.fromthefloor.Thedurationofexistenceofthisscaffoldingisestimatedtobeamonth.InconsiderationofanypossibilityforinoperabilityofDCelectricsystemequipmentintheABatteryRoomwithinthisfairlylengthydurationthescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).Theguidelinesstatement4.0requirementtowireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternativerequirementtousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunctionwithwoodencleats.(AcceptableasnotedperM.B.FitzsimmonsonAuthorizationForm89-167).ItshallnotbestarteduntilthewoodenscaffoldovertheBBatterybankiscompleted;assuch,thatscaffold(90-157)shallserveasabarriertopreventshortcircuitingthebatterywithmetalscaffoldmaterials.Thissubjectscaffoldshallberemovedpriortoremovalofthewoodenscaffold.TheJobSupervisorshallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheguidelinesprovided.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbyanassignedLiaisonEngineer,anditsseismiccapabilityinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebyaqualifiedindividual.Suchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopy,oftheAuthorizationForm.ThepersonperformingsuchconfirmationofseismiccapabilityshallsonotifytheShiftSupervisor.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,'risobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,anduponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesamemannerasdescribedabove.ExtremecaremustbeexercisedinworkingadjacenttothebatteriesandotherDCelectricequipmentduringconstruction,use,andteardownofthescaffold.

90-159Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenance.accesstoallinstrumentationandpanelsinthearea.Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.TheaffectsandmethodstocopewithlossofD.C.poweraregiveninthefollowing:UFSARSection8.1.4.4PotentialRiskofStationBlackoutUFSARSection8.3.2.1DescriptionUFSARSection8.3.2.2AnalysisProcedureER-ELEC.2CrosstieTSCBatterytoAorBDCBusAlsoanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationisthefollowing:SeismicEventsTheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport.becauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismi6"fea6xre,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesof'echnicalSpecifications.

May15,1990BUS16SOUTHPORTIONAREAPENETRATIONSEALINGINSPECTIONEWR-4941SCAFFOLD90-160InordertoinspectpenetrationsealsabovethesouthportionofBus16ascaffoldisneeded,toprovideaworkplatformapproximately15ft.fromthefloor.InordertopreventanyinterferencewithactivitiesinvolvingthealternatetrainBus14andMCC-1C,itisplannedtoconstructthescaffoldasaseismicinstallation.ThescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).Theguidelinesstatement4.0requirementtowire'allplankdeckinginplace.maybereplacedwiththealternativerequirementtousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunctionwithwoodencleats.(AcceptableasnotedperM.B.FitzsimmonsonAuthorizationForm89-167).TheJobSupervisorshallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheguidelinesprovided.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbyanassignedLiaisonEngineer,anditsseismiccapabilityinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebyaqualifiedindividual.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.ThepersonperformingsuchconfirmationofseismiccapabilityshallsonotifytheShiftSupervisor.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,anduponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesamemannerasdescribedabove.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testing,andmaintenanceaccesstoallelectricalpanelsontheBus16andMCC-lD,toincludeclearancetorackoutbreakers.Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.

90-160TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:DecreaseinReactorCoolantInventorySeismicEventsTheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangetothePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,it,willremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

May15,1990BUS16NORTHENDAREAPENETRATIONSEALINGINSPECTIONEWR-4941SCAFFOLD90-161,InordertoinspectpenetrationsealsabovethenorthendofBus16ascaffoldisneeded,toprovideaworkplatformapproximately15ft.fromthefloor.InordertopreventanyinterferencewithactivitiesinvolvingthealternatetrainBus14andMCC-lC,itisplannedtoconstructthescaffoldasaseismicinstallation.ThescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).Theguidelinesstatement4.0requirementtowireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternativerequirementtousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunctionwithwoodencleats.(AcceptableasnotedperM.B.FitzsimmonsonAuthorizationForm89-167).TheJobSupervisorshallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheguidelinesprovided.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbyanassignedLiaisonEngineer,anditsseismiccapabilityinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebyaqualifiedindividual.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.ThepersonperformingsuchconfirmationofseismiccapabilityshallsonotifytheShiftSupervisor.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,anduponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesamemannerasdescribedabove.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testing,andmaintenanceaccesstoallelectricalpanelsontheBus16andMCC-lD,toincludeclearancetorackoutbreakers.Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.

i0 TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswith'ccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Thedesignbasis'ventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:DecreaseinReactorCoolantInventorySeismicEventsTheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangetothePlantTechnical'pecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.Theinstallationdoesnot.createthepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipment,orsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

5/16/90TURBINEDRIVENAUXILIARYFEEDWATERPUMPAREAPENETRATIONSEALINSPECTIONEWR-4941SCAFFOLD90-162InordertoinspectpenetrationsealsatthenorthwallbytheTurbineAuxiliaryFeedwaterPumparea,ascaffoldisneededtoprovideaworkplatformapproximately10ft.highadjacenttotheTurbineDrivenAuxiliaryFeedwaterPump.ConcurrentwiththisaretwoothersitesofscaffoldsforinspectionsinthevicinitiesoftheAandBMotorDrivenAuxiliaryFeedwaterPumps.BecauseoftheconcurrentactivitywhichcouldpotentiallyaffectbothtrainsofAuxiliaryFeedwaterSystemcomponents,construction,andteardownactivitiesshalltakeplaceatonlyonesiteatatime.Inaddition,thescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).Theguidelinesstatement4.0requirementtowireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternativerequirementtousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunctionwithwoodencleats.(AcceptableasnotedperM.B.FitzsimmonsonAuthorizationForm89-167).TheJobSupervisorshallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheguidelinesprovided.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbyanassignedLiaisonEngineer,anditsseismiccapabilityinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebyaqualifiedindividual.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.ThepersonperformingsuchconfirmationofseismiccapabilityshallsonotifytheShiftSupervisor.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,anduponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesamemannerasdescribedabove.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstoallvalves,instrumentation,panels,rotatingequipment,andfirefightingprovisionsinthearea.Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.

Theinstallationdoesnotresult,inachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:SteamLineRuptureDecreaseinReactorCoolantInventorySeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapabilitybecausetherewillbenointerferencewithaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.TheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

5/16/90BMOTORDRIVENAUXILIARYFEEDWATERPUMPAREAPENETRATIONSEALINSPECTIONEWR-4941SCAFFOLD90-163InordertoinspectpenetrationsealsatthesouthwestcorneroftheAuxiliaryFeedwaterPumparea,ascaffoldisneededtoprovideaworkplatformapproximately17ft.highadjacenttotheBMotorDrivenAuxiliaryFeedwaterPump.ConcurrentwiththisaretwoothersitesofscaffoldsforinspectionsinthevicinitiesoftheAMotorDrivenAuxiliaryFeedwaterPumpandtheTurbineDrivenAuxiliaryFeedwaterPump.Becauseoftheconcurrentactivitywhichcouldpotentially.affectbothtrainsofAuxiliaryFeedwaterSystemcomponents,construction,andteardownactivitiesshalltakeplaceatonlyonesiteatatime.Inaddition,thescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).Theguidelinesstatement4.0requirementtowireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternativerequirementtousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunctionwithwoodencleats.(AcceptableasnotedperM.B.FitzsimmonsonAuthorizationForm89-167).TheJobSupervisorshallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheguidelinesprovided.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbyanassignedLiaisonEngineer,anditsseismiccapabilityinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebyaqualifiedindividual.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.ThepersonperformingsuchconfirmationofseismiccapabilityshallsonotifytheShiftSupervisor.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswill.benecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,anduponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesamemannerasdescribedabove.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstoallvalves,instrumentation,panels,rotatingequipment,andfirefightingprovisionsinthearea.Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.

0 90-163TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:SteamLineRuptureDecreaseinReactorCoolantInventorySeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapabilitybecausetherewillbenointerferencewithaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.TheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerface.withanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.-TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

5/16/90AHOUSEHEATINGBOILERFEEDPUMPAREAPENETRATIONSEALINSPECTIONEWR-4941SCAFFOLD90-164InordertoinspectpenetrationsealsatthewestandnorthwallsoftheAuxiliaryFeedwaterPumparea,ascaffoldisneededtoprovideaworkplatformapproximately20ft.highadjacenttotheAMotorDrivenAuxiliaryFeedwaterPump.ConcurrentwiththisaretwoothersitesofscaffoldsforinspectionsinthevicinitiesoftheBMotorDrivenAuxiliaryFeedwaterPumpandtheTurbineDrivenAuxiliaryFeedwaterPump.BecauseoftheconcurrentactivitywhichcouldpotentiallyaffectbothtrainsofAuxiliaryFeedwaterSystemcomponents,construction,andteardownactivitiesshalltakeplaceatonlyonesiteatatime.Inaddition,thescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).Theguidelinesstatement4.0requirementtowireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternativerequirementtousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunctionwithwoodencleats.(AcceptableasnotedperM.B.FitzsimmonsonAuthorizationForm89-167).TheJobSupervisorshall.verifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheguidelinesprovided.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbyanassignedLiaisonEngineer,anditsseismiccapabilityinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebyaqualifiedindividual.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.ThepersonperformingsuchconfirmationofseismiccapabilityshallsonotifytheShiftSupervisor.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,anduponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismic-capability,theStructuralEngineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesamemannerasdescribedabove.Clearanceshallbemaintained.foroperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstoallvalves,instrumentation,panels,rotatingequipment,andfirefightingprovisionsinthearea.Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.

tA0 90-164TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Thedesignbasisevents'analyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:SteamLineRuptureDecreaseinReactorCoolantInventorySeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapabilitybecausetherewillbenointerferencewithaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.TheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.Theinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportant'osafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

6/11/90AANDBDIESELGENERATORROOMSEWR-3990OVERHEADCOVERREMOVALSCAFFOLDS90-3.68ScaffoldsareneededjustinsidetheDieselGeneratorRoomoverheaddoorstoriseapproximately10'romthefloor.Theworkisplannedtobedoneineachroomsimultaneously.BecauseofthisthescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).Theguidelinestatement6.0shallbeaugmentedwiththerequirementthatthescaffoldsshallbecompleteandseismictotheextentinstalledbytheendofeachshift.Anadditionalrequirementshallbethat,thescaffoldsaretobeerectedinoneDieselGeneratorRoomatatime.Uponcompletionofthefirstinstallation,priortobeginningerectionofthescaffoldinthesecondDieselGeneratorRoom,theConstructionEngineer,ortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead,shallconfirmand,documenttheseismiccapabilityinrelationtotheguidelines.Thisconfirmationshallincludereviewofattributessuchasconfigurationofthescaffoldframesandsecuringoftheplanks.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.TheConstructionEngineerorLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisorofthisconfirmationpriortoproceedingwiththeinstallationinthesecondDieselGeneratorRoom.Aftersuchconfirmation,erectionofthesecondscaffoldmaybegin,accompaniedbymonitoring,confirmation,notificationanddocumentationaswiththefirstscaffold.TheConstructionEngineerorLiaisonEngineershallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheguidelinesprovided.Duringconstruction,theend-of-shiftseismicstatusshallbedocumentedonanattachmenttothefieldcopyoftheauthorizationformbytheConstructionEngineerortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,and,uponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesamemannerasdescribedabove.

Duringconstructionandteardowncareshouldbetakentopreventbumpinganysensitiveequipmentandtubinginthevicinity.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstoallvalves,instrumentation,panels,rotatingequipment,firefightingprovisions,andadjoiningroomsinthearea.Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved.Basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforinlOCFR50.59aregivenbelow.Theinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetothefacilityorproceduresasdescribedinthe,SafetyAnalysisReportAsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:LossofallA.C.powertothestationauxiliariesDecreaseinheatremovalbythesecondarysystemwithcoincidentlossofon-siteandexternal(off-site)A.C.powertothestationSteamGeneratortuberuptureRuptureofasteampipePrimarysystempiperuptureAnticipatedtransientswithoutSCRAMwithalossofA.C.powerSeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapabilitybecausetherewillbenointerferencewithaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.TheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.

TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

AUXILIARYBUILDINGINTERMEDIATELEVELWESTSTAIRWELLPENETRATIONFIRESEALINSPECTIONEWR-4941SCAFFOLD90-173June21,1990AworkplatformisneededtoinspectfirebarrierpenetrationsealsneartheceilingfromthestairwellnorthtoadjacenttotheContainmentwall,overthewestendoftheSpentFuelPoolHeatExchanger.StandbyAuxiliaryFeedwaterSystemContainmentisolationMOVsarelocatedonthenorthsideoftheSFPHX.Thespacebetweentheheatexchangerandcontainmentisverycongestedwithpiping,pipesupportstructures,regulators,valves,instruments,andleadshieldingforaprocessmonitorintheservicewaterpipingfromtheheatexchanger.Amajorportionoftheequipment,hereisassociatedwiththewastegassystemsupportingtheReactorCoolantDrainTankandthePressurizerReliefTank,bothofwhichareinContainment.Immersedwithin-thisspaceisoneoftheContainmentMini-purgedischargeisolationvalves.BecauseofthelocationoftheabovediscussedSAFWContainmentisolationMOVs,thescaffoldshallbeconstructedasseismicusingtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.Fitzsimmons.October31,1988memoattachment).Theguidelinesstatement4.0requirementtowireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternativerequirementtousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunctionwithwoodencleats.(AcceptableasnotedperM.B.FitzsimmonsonAuthorizationForm89-167).TheJobSupervisorshallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheguidelinesprovided.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbyanassignedLiaisonEngineer,anditsseismiccapabilityinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedand,documentedpriortoscaffoldusebyaqualifiedindividual.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.ThepersonperformingsuchconfirmationofseismiccapabilityshallsonotifytheShiftSupervisor.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffold'lanningstage,orisobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural,Engineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,,anduponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesamemannerasdescribedabove.

90-173Duringconstructionandteardowncareshouldbetakentopreventbumpinganysensitiveequipmentandtubinginthevicinity.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstoallvalves,instrumentation,panels,rotatingequipment,firefightingprovisions,andadjoiningroomsinthearea.LockedareaaccesstotheSpentFuelPoolfiltervaultiscontrolledbyalockedgate.Ensurethatthescaffolddoesnot,allowanyeasieraccesstothisarea.Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:AccidentalRelease-WasteGasSteamGeneratorTubeRuptureRuptureofaSteamPipePrimarySystemPipeRuptureSeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapabilitybecausetherewillbenointerferencewithaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.TheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.Theinstallationdoesnot,increasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.

90-173TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

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July2,1990.CONTROLROOMAIRHANDLINGROOMNORTHWALLPENETRATIONFIRESEALINSPECTIONEWR-4941SCAFFOLD90-177InordertoperformfiresealsinspectionintheControlRoomAirHandlingRoomascaffoldisneeded.Theequipmentintheimmediateareais,forthemostpart,dedicatedtocontinuinghabitabilityfortheMainControlRoominthepost-accidentenvironment.Becauseofthis,thescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).Theguidelinesstatement6.0shallbeaugmentedwiththerequirementthatthescaffoldshallbecompleteandseismictotheextentinstalledbytheendofeachshift.Theguidelinesstatement.4.0requirementtowireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternativerequirementtousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunctionwithwoodencleats.(AcceptableasnotedperM.B.FitzsimmonsonAuthorizationForm89-167).TheJobSupervisorshallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheguidelinesprovided.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbyanassignedLiaisonEngineer,anditsseismiccapabilityinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebyaqualifiedindividual.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.ThepersonperformingsuchconfirmationofseismiccapabilityshallsonotifytheShiftSupervisor.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,anduponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesamemannerasdescribedabove.Duringconstructionandteardowncareshouldbetakentopreventbumpinganysensitiveequipmentandtubinginthevicinity.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstoallvalves,instrumentation,panels,rotatingequipment,andfirefightingprovisions.Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.

90-l77TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:DecreaseinReactorCoolantInventorySeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapabilitybecausetherewillbenointerferencewithaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.TheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

7/11/90PRESSURIZERLIQUIDSAMPLECONTAINMENTISOLATIONAOV-966BLEAKREPAIRSCAFFOLD90-183AworkplatformisneededforrepairofthevalveinsidetheNuclearSampleSystemisolationvalvehoodenclosure,tobeabout6ft.abovethefloor.Thisistoaccomodateworkingwiththevalvebodyataboutwaistlevel.Withinthevicinityare,likethevalvetoberepaired,otherSeismicCategoryIContainmentisolationvalveswhicharedirectlyconnectedwiththeReactorCoolantSystemandtheSteamGeneratorBlowdowns.Becauseofthis,thescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).Theguidelinesstatement4.0requirementtowireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternativerequirementtousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunctionwithwoodencleats.(AcceptableasnotedperM.B.FitzsimmonsonAuthorizationForm89-167).TheJobSupervisorshallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheguidelines.provided.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbyanassignedLiaisonEngineer,anditsseismiccapabilityinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebyaqualifiedindividual.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.ThepersonperformingsuchconfirmationofseismiccapabilityshallsonotifytheShiftSupervisor.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,anduponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesamemannerasdescribedabove.Duringconstructionandteardowncareshouldbetakentopreventbumpinganysensitiveequipmentandtubinginthevicinity.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstoallvalves,andinstrumentationinthearea.Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.

90-183TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafety.AnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:SteamGeneratortuberuptureRuptiureofasteampipePrimarysystempiperuptureSeismicEventsTheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafety-AnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent.of,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

7/23/90SERVICEBUILDINGBASEMENT,PRIMARYWATERTREATMENTROOMEASTWALLFIRESEALINSPECTIONEWR-4941SCAFFOLD90-186AworkplatformisneededtoinspectfirebarrierpenetrationsealsontheeastwallbehindtheCondensateStorageTanks.DuetotheproximityofthescaffoldtotheCST's,thescaffoldshallbeconstructedasseismic.TheScaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).Theguidelinesstatement4.0requirementtowireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternativerequirementtousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunctionwithwoodencleats.(AcceptableasnotedperM.B.FitzsimmonsonAuthorizationForm89-167).TheJobSupervisorshallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheguidelinesprovided.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbyanassignedJobSupervisor,anditsseismiccapabilityinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebyaqualifiedindividual.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.ThepersonperformingsuchconfirmationofseismiccapabilityshallsonotifytheShiftSupervisor.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,anduponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesamemannerasdescribedabove.Duringconstructionandteardown,careshouldbetakentopreventbumpinganysensitiveequipmentandtubinginthevicinity.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstoallvalves,instrumentation,panels,rotatingequipment,firefightingprovisions,andadjoiningroomsinthearea.Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.

TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:LossofNormalFeedwaterSeismicEventsRuptureofSteamPipeTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapabilitybecausetherewillbenointerferencewithaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.TheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.Theinstallation'doesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.Theinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedinthe'afetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

RELAYROOMNORTHWALLWESTOFDOORTOTURB1NEBUILDINGPENETRATIONFIRESEALINSPECTIONEWR-4941SCAFFOLD90-188AworkplatformisneededtoinspectfirebarrierpenetrationsealsintheRelayRoomontheNorthWall.ThescaffoldwillbelocatedneartheAMSACandEHPanels.Asaresult,itshallbeconstructedasseismic.AMSACitselfisnotaSafetyRelatedSystem.TheimportanceoftheAMSACSystemandothermodificationsthathavebeeninstalledinthiscabinetmakeitdesirableforthisscaffoldtobeseismic.Duringconstructionandtear-down,extracareshouldbetakentopreventbumpinganypanelsorconduitinthearea.ThescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).Theguidelinesstatement4.0requirementtowireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternativerequirementtousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunctionwithwoodencleats.(AcceptableasnotedperM.B.FitzsimmonsonAuthorizationForm89-167).TheJobSupervisorshallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheguidelinesprovided.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbyanassignedLiaisonEngineer,anditsseismiccapabilityinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebyaqualifiedindividual.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm..ThepersonperformingsuchconfirmationofseismiccapabilityshallsonotifytheShiftSupervisor.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.Inthisinstance,theStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,anduponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesanemannerasdescribedabove.

Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstoallinstrumentation,panels,andadjoiningroomsinthearea.Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforinlOCFR50.59aregivenbelow.TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:SeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapabilitybecausetherewillbenointerferencewithaccessprovided,tofirefightingprovisions.TheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

July26,1989TEMPORARYOXYGENMONITORTEMPORARYFLUIDPROVISIONREQUEST589-28AFFECTEDDRAWING:AFFECTEDPROCEDURES:33013-1274,WasteDisposal-GasH2and,N2andGasAnalyzer(WD)P&ID09l~S4~2~12'P11~13'P116INSTRUCTIONSTOOPERATIONS:TheHPproceduresreferencedshallbeconductedbylabpersonnel.TECH.SPEC.REF:Sect.3.9.2.5,Table3.5-5,Table4'-5TheMSAGasAnalyzerisoutofserviceforoxygenmonitoring.Inordertocontinuetomonitor02perTech.Spec.requirementsofTable3.5-5attemporaryconnectionwillbeutilized.ThetemporarymonitorwilltieintotheGasDecayTanksample3/8in.tubingwithpolytubingconnectedwithtubingnuts.Thetemporarytubingwillbeoperatedbylabpersonnelatpressuressuitableforthesampler;however,thetubingtobeusedismorethancapableofwithstandingfullGasDecayTankPressure.TheoutletofthemonitoristobetiedtotheventheaderasdoesthepresentGasAnalyzer.PressurereductionfromGasDecayTankpressureisaccomplishedataninstalledreducerupstreamoftheGasAnalyzerandthetemporaryconnection.Tubingassociatedwiththismodificationisdesignatedasnon-codeclass(ANSIB31.1)perRG&EDrawing33013-1273.Itshallbeinstalledsothatsafetyrelatedequipmentisnotpotentiallyaffectedbyadesignbasisaccident(seismicevent).TheeventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththeproposedinstallationarethefollowing:RadioactiveGasWasteSystemFailureSeismicEventTheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecausethefunctionofthesystemwillbemaintained,pressureretainingcapabilityiswithindesignlimitsandthereisnopotentialimpacttosafetyrelatedequipmentduringaseismicevent.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseitcanbereadilyisolatedintheevent,ofafailureandbecausetheoverallfunctionofthesystemisbeingmaintained.

TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecificationbecausethe~~~~~capabilitytomonitor02willberetained.

S'AFETYANALYSISFORTEMPORARYRADWASTDEMINERALIZERSYSTEM1~01~11.2SCOPEOFANALYSISThepurposeofthisanalysisistoevaluatethesafetyaspectsofinstallingatemporarydemineralizingsystemforprocessingtheexcessiveliquidradwastefromthe1989outage.Theevaporatorandrecyclesystemshavenotbeenabletoeffectivelyprocesstheaddedwasteduetoreducedcapacityoftheevaporatorpackage.Asaresult,theon-sitestoragecapabilityisnearcapacityseverelylimitingoperationflexibility.Thetemporaryliquidwasteprocessingsystemisafluidizedtransferdemineralizationsystemconsistingof5to6resinvessels,boosterpump,mechanicalfilter,dewateringpumpandprocesscontrolunit.Theentiresystemisinterconnectedwithflexiblereinforcednon-collapsiblebutylrubberhosesdesignedfortemperaturesbetween-20Fand180Fandpressurefrom0to300psig.Thesuppliedsystemisdesignedandoperatedinaccordancewiththefollowingstandardsandoperatingparameters.a)b)c)d)e)f)g)h)Reg.Guide1.143ANSI55.2ANSI/ASMEB31~1ASMEB&PVCodeSectionVIII&IXPressure0-150psigTemperature50-135F(Resinlimited)Flow15-200gpmHydrotestedto225psig1~3Theshut-offheadoftheboosterpumpandthemonitortanktransferpumpis100and115psigrespectively.Thisiswellbelowthedesignofallthetemporarysystemcomponents.Thetemporarysystemwill~processwastefromtheWasteHoldupTankusingoneofmonitoringtanksasabatchtank.Theprocesscyclewillconsistofcyclingthewastefromthemonitoringtankthrutheresinbeds5to6timesuntiltheactivitylevelisacceptablefordischargetothelake.Thespentresinwillthenbesluicedtoashippingcask.Thepipingarrangementwillconsistofatemporaryhoseconnectedfromthedischargeofthewasteevaporatorfeedpump.atvalve1762Atothedischargeofthemonitoringtankpumpatvalve1279.ThishosewillbeusedtotransferradwastefromthewasteholduptankviatheevaporatorfeedpumptotheAorBmonitortank.Asecondhosewillthenbeconnectedfromthedischargeofthemonitoringtankpumpwithateeatvalve1279totheinletofthetemporarywasteprocessingsystem.Thishosewillbeusedtocycletheradwastefrom

themonit'ortanktothewasteprocessingsystemviathemonitortankpump.AthirdhosewillbeconnectedfromtheoutletofthewasteprocessingsystemtotheAandBmonitortankreturnlineatvalve1291Aand/or1234dependingonflowrequirements.Thishosewillbeusedtocyclethewastebacktothemonitortanks.1~4TheentiretemporarysystemwillbelocatedinthedrummingareaoftheAuxiliaryBuildingoperatingfloorelv.271ft.Theallowablefloorloadingfor'thisareais300lb/ftEachofthedemineralizertankshasaminimumbasediameterof24inchesandweighs2,200lbs.full.Consequently,inordertoadheretothemaximumfloorloading,aminimumclearanceof6inchesmustbemaintainedaroundeachvessel.1~5Thetemporarysystemwillalsorequired440Vpower,serviceair,andDIwaterconnections.Electricalpowerwillbesuppliedwithatemporarycablefromthe440Vweldingoutletlocatedoutsidethedrummingstationonthetruckbaywall.TheDIwaterandserviceairwillbeconnectedwithflexiblerubberhosesfromconnectionsalreadyexistingwithinthedrummingarea.1.6'heDIwaterandserviceairarerequiredforsluicingandvesselflushing.TheDIwaterconnectionalsoservesasabackupwater.sourceforcoolingresinsifaleakinthesystemdevelopsduringprocessdowntime.2'REFERENCES2'2'RG&ER.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReportSection15.7.2RG&EGinnaP&ID33013-12682'RG&EGinnaP&ID33013-12703'SAFETYANALYSIS3~1AreviewhasbeenperformedofalltheeventsanalyzedintheGinnaStationFSARandtheeventsrequiringanalysisbyNRCRegulatoryGuide1.70.Theonlyeventsrelatedtothistemporarymodificationarea.radioactiveliquidwastesystemfailureandaseismicevent.3~2ThedrummingareaandmonitoringtankareasaredesignedsuchthatanypipingortankleakagewillbecollectedthroughthedrainagesystemintheAuxiliaryBuildingsumptobepumpedbackintotheliquidwastesystem.ThebuildingsumpandbasementvolumeissufficienttoholdthefullvolumeofaCVCSliquidholduptank(33,000gallons)withoutoverflowingtoareasoutsidethebuilding.Thevolumeofa p

3'monitoringtankanddemineralizertankis7,500gallonsand115gallonsrespectively.Sinceeithertankislessthanthevolumeofaholduptank,thesumpstillhassufficientcapacitytohandlethemonitortankordemineralizertank.4inchdrainsarelocatedwithslopingfloorsinfrontofthedrummingareadoorwayandinthemonitoringtankarea.Intheeventtheprocesswaterislostfromthespentresinsinthedemineralizertanks,theresinscanbecooledbythebackupDIwaterconnection.Basedontheanalysispresentedinsection15.7.2fortheprimarywaterCVCSspentresinstoragetank,it.willtake4daysfordecayheattogenerateenoughheattoreachtheresin140Ftemperaturelimit.Thisisbasedona14fuelfailure.Wastefromthewasteholduptankiscollectedfromfloordrainsandisnotexpectedtocontainhighactivitylevels.HoweverAdmini-strativecontrolswillbeestablishedtoensureresintanksaremaintainedwithproperwaterlevelwhenconcentratedresinsaretobestoredformorethan24hours.3~43.5Thedrummingareaisenclosedbyseismicallydesignedwalls.Nosafetyrelatedequipmentexistswithinthewallsgfdrummingarea.Consequently,thedemineralizersystem.willnotaffectsafetyrelatedsystemsduringaseismiceventshoulditfail.Theflexiblehosesrunningoutsidethedrummingareawillberestrainedandlocatedtopreventinterferencewithanysafetyrelatedecplipmentoperation.IBasedupontheevaluationsinsections3.1thru3.4above,themarginsofsafetyduringnormaloperationsandtransientconditionsanticipatedduringthelifeofthestationwillremainunchangedbytheinstallationofthistemporarymodification;and,theadequacyofstructures,systems,andcomponentsprovidedforthepreventionofaccidentsandforthemitigationoftheconsequencesofaccidentswillbeunchangedbytheinstallationofthistemporarymodification.4.04.1PRELIMINARYSAFETYEVALUATION"LTheproposedtemporarymodificationdoesnotinvolvean'unreviewedsafetyquestionsince:a)theprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportant.tosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportwillnotbeincreasedsincethewastetankvolumesarelessthanpreviouslyconsidered,or;b)thepossibilityofanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportwillnotbecreatedsinceacceptedcodesandstandardsarefollowed,org

c)themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationisnotreducedsincewastetankvolumesarelessthanpreviouslyassumed.

March9,1990ply'OSSOFDECAYHEATREMOVALEXPEDITIOUSACTION--INTERIMnAnHOTLEGLEVELTRANSMITTER90-03Genericletter88-17recommendedexpeditiousactionsincludinginstallingtwoindependentRCSwaterlevelindicationswiththecapabilitytoprovidewaterlevelinformationtoControlRoomoperators.Onesuchprovision,apressure"transmitter(PT-432A)withindicationattheMainControlBoardhasbeeninpermanentexistence;however,asimilarprovisionistobeinstalledpriortoenteringthenextreducedreactorcoolantinventoryoperation.ThiswillbeinstalledatatestconnectiondownstreamoftheLoopAHotLegSampletapmanualrootvalve504,usingtubingofmaterialidenticaltothepermanentinstallationforPT-432AintheBLoopSampletapexceptthat3/8"tubingmaybeusedinplaceof1/4".Thetubingisratedforpressuregreaterthan5,000psig.Atransmitter,similartoPT-432A,istobeinstalled,designatedLIT-432Aatthetestpointdiscussedabove,tobemountedsecurelytotheadjacentwalloronastandwhichwillbefabricatedandinstalledsuchastoinsureagainsttopplingbyuseofstruts,bumpersortie-downs.Incaseofabreakinthe3/8"tubingtheleakagewillbeslow,andthelevelchangewillbemonitoredontheotherchannel.ThesignalcablewillbeinstalledunderthecontrolsofprocedureA-1405installationandremovaloftemporarycables.Theexistingprocedure0-2.3.1,DrainingtheReactorCoolantSystem,istoberevisedtoaddresstheindicationstobemonitored,includingthesubjectprovision.Regardinglevelindicationdifferencebetweenmeasurementpoints,thedifferencecalculatedfromWestinghouseESBU/WOG-88-173datedOctober14,1988willbeprovidedtooperatorsforguidance.Theaboveconstructionandoperationalrequirementsaretobeobserved.Basedonthese,the.determinationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.Theinstallationdoesnot'esultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseofthesubstantialtubinginstallationandtheadequatesupportsystemtoprovidedasdiscussedabove,itwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonthesafety-relatedequipmentinthevicinity,orresultinadecreaseinreactorcoolantinventory.ThedesignbaseseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:DecreaseinReactorCoolantInventoryTheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecausethesubstantialtubinginstallationandtheadequacyofthesupportsystemissuchastoensuretherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.

90-03The.installationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecausethesubstantialtubinginstallationandtheadequacyofthesupportsystemtobeutilizedensuretherewillbenoadverseeffectonsafety-relatedequipment.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecausethesubstantialtubinginstallationandthesupportsystemadequacy,asdescribedabove,ensuretherewillbenoadverseeffectonsafetyrelatedequipmentwithinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecificationbecauseofthesubstantialtubinginstallationandtheadequacyofthesupportsystemwhichensureagainstanyadverseeffectonequipmentor.systemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

3/20/90SAFETYANALYSISFORTEMPORARYRADWASTEDEMINERALIZERSYSTEMINSTALLATION90-041.0SCOPEOFANALYSIS1.1Thepurposeofthisanalysisistoevaluatethesafetyaspectsofinstallingatemporarydemineralizingsystemforprocessingtheexcessiveliquidradwastefromth'e1989outage.Theevaporatorandrecyclesystemshavenotbeenabletoeffectivelyprocesstheaddedwasteduetoreducedcapacityoftheevaporatorpackage.Asaresult,theon-sitestoragecapabilityisnearcapacityseverelylimitingoperationflexibility.1.2Thetemporaryliquidwasteprocessingsystemisafluidizedtransferdemineralizationsystemconsistingof5to6resinvessels,boosterpump,mechanicalfilter,dewateringpumpandprocesscontrolunit.Theentiresystemisinterconnectedwithflexiblereinforcednon-collapsiblebutylrubberhosesdesignedfortemperaturesbetween-20Fand180oFandpressurefrom0to300psig.Thesuppliedsystemisdesignedandoperatedinaccordancewiththefollowingstandardsandoperatingparameters.a)b)c)d)e)f)g)h)Reg.Guide1.143ANSI55.2ANSI/ASMEB31~1ASMEB&PVCodeSectionVIII&IXPressure0-150psigTemperature50-135F(Resinlimited)Flow15-200gpmHydrotestedto225psigTheshut-offheadoftheboosterpumpandthemonitortanktransferpumpis100and115psigrespectively.Thisiswellbelowthedesignofallthetemporarysystemcomponents.

ThetemporarysystemwillprocesswastefromtheWasteHoldupTankusingoneofmonitoringtanksasabatchtank.Theprocesscyclewillconsistofcyclingthewastefromthemonitoringtankthrutheresinbeds5to6timesuntilthe,activitylevelisacceptablefordischargetothelake.Thespentresinwillthenbesluicedtoashippingcask.Thepipingarrangementwillconsistofatemporaryhoseconnectedfromthedischargeofthewasteevaporatorfeedpumpatvalve1762Atothedischargeofthemonitoringtankpumpatvalve1279.ThishosewillbeusedtotransferradwastefromthewasteholduptankviatheevaporatorfeedpumptotheAorBmonitortankorthetemporarydemineralizerskid.Asecondhosewillthenbeconnectedfromthedischargeofthemonitoringtankpumpwithateeatvalve1279totheinletofthetemporarywasteprocessingsystem.Thishosewillbeusedtocycletheradwastefromthemonitortanktothewasteprocessingsystemviathemonitortankpump.AthirdhosewillbeconnectedfromtheoutletofthewasteprocessingsystemtotheAandBmonitortankreturnlineatvalve1291Aand/or1234dependingonflowrequirements.Thishosewillbeusedtocyclethewastebacktothemonitortanks.TheentiretemporarysystemwillbelocatedinthedrummingareaoftheAux.Bldg.operatingfloorelv.271ft.Theallowablelivefloorloadingforthisareais300lbs/ft2.Eachofthesixdemin.tankshasaminimumbasedia.of24in.andweighs2200lbs.full.Thetankswillbelocatedontopofthe4ft.wideby19ft.longby2.5ft.thickconcreteslabinthedrummingstation.Thereinforcedslabwilldistributethetankloadsovertheentireslabarea.Usingtheweightofsixtanksand200lbs.ofleadshieldingpertank,thefloorloadingwillbeapprox.190lbs/ft2.fortheraisedslabarea.Theremainingequipmenthasthefollowingweights:ProcessControlUnitSystemboosterpumps(2)9300/pumpFiltervessels(3)9180/filterDewateringpumpSluicepumpShielding120/filtertotal20006005401001003603700lbs.Becauseoftheequipmentsphysicaldimensions,theirweightsmaybeconsidereddistrubutedoverthelower6ft.x19ft.floorarea.Thiswillproduceafloorloadingof32lbs/ft2.Allloadsarewithinthe300lbs/ft2loadinglimit.

1.5Thetemporarysystemwillalsorequired440Vpower,serviceair,andDIwaterconnections.Electricalpowerwillbesuppliedwithatemporarycablefromthe440Vweldingoutletlocatedoutsidethedrummingstationonthetruckbaywall.TheDIwaterandserviceairwillbeconnectedwithflexiblerubberhosesfromconnectionsalreadyexistingwithinthedrummingarea.1.6TheDIwaterandserviceairarerequiredforsluicingandvesselflushing.TheDIwaterconnectionalsoservesasabackupwatersourceforcoolingresinsifaleakinthesystemdevelopsduringprocessdowntime.

2.0REFERENCES

2.12'RG&ER.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReportSection15.7.2RG&EGinnaP&ID33013-12682'RG&EGinnaP&ID33013-1270CHEM-NUCLEARSYSTEMS,INC.,AproposaltoRochesterGasandElectricforLiquidWasteProcessingattheRobertE.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant,Section2.0,TechnicalApproach.N-89-0020-P02,July19,1989GAIDwg.D-422-0223.0SAFETYANALYSIS3.1AreviewhasbeenperformedofalltheeventsanalyzedintheGinnaStationFSARandtheeventsrequiringanalysisbyNRCRegulatoryGuide1.70.Theonlyeventsrelatedtothistemporarymodificationarearadioactiveliquidwastesystemfailureandaseismicevent.3'ThedrummingareaandmonitoringtankareasaredesignedsuchthatanypipingortankleakagewillbecollectedthroughthedrainagesystemintheAuxiliaryBuildingsumptobepumpedbackintotheliquidwastesystem.ThebuildingsumpandbasementvolumeissufficienttoholdthefullvolumeofaCVCSliquidholduptank(33,000gallons)withoutoverflowingtoareasoutsidethebuilding.Thevolumeofamonitoringtankanddemineralizertankis7,500gallonsand115gallonsrespectively.Sinceeithertankislessthanthevolumeofaholduptank,thesumpstillhassufficientcapacitytohandlethemonitortankordemineralizertank.4inchdrainsarelocatedwithslopingfloorsinfrontofthedrummingareadoorwayandinthemonitoringtankarea.

3.3Intheeventtheprocesswaterislostfromthespentresinsinthedemineralizertanks,theresinscanbecooledbythebackupDIwaterconnection.Basedontheanalysispresentedinsection15.7.2fortheprimarywaterCVCSspentresinstoragetank,itwilltake4daysfordecayheattogenerateenoughheattoreachtheresin140Ftemperaturelimit.Thisisbasedona14fuelfailure.Wastefromthewasteholduptankiscollectedfromfloordrainsandisnotexpectedtocontainhighactivitylevels.HoweverAdmini-strativecontrolswillbeestablishedtoensureresintanksaremaintainedwithproperwaterlevelwhenconcentratedresinsaretobestoredformorethan24hours.3.4Thedrummingareaisenclosedbyseismicallydesignedwalls.Nosafetyrelatedequipmentexistswithinthewallsofdrummingarea.Consequently,thedemineralizersystemwillnotaffectsafetyrelatedsystemsduringaseismiceventshoulditfail.Theflexiblehosesrunningoutsidethedrummingareawillberestrainedandlocatedtopreventinterferencewithanysafetyrelatedequipmentoperation.3.5Basedupontheevaluationsinsections3.1thru3.'4above,themarginsofsafetyduringnormaloperationsandtransientconditionsanticipatedduringthelifeofthestationwillremainunchangedbytheinstallationofthistemporarymodification;and,theadequacyofstructures,systems,andcomponentsprovidedforthepreventionofaccidentsandforthemitigationoftheconsequencesofaccidentswillbeunchangedbytheinstallationofthistemporarymodification.4.0PRELIMINARYSAFETYEVALUATION4.1Theproposedtemporarymodificationdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionsince:a)theprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportwillnot,beincreasedsincethewastetankvolumesarelessthanpreviouslyconsidered,or;b)thepossibilityofanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisreportwillnotbecreatedsinceacceptedcodesandstandardsarefollowed,or;c)themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationisnotreducedsincewastetankvolumesarelessthanpreviouslyassumed.

SECTIONE-PROCEDURECHANGESThissectionistocontainadescriptionofthechangestoproceduresasdescribedintheUFSARandasummaryofthesafetyevaluationpursuanttotherecgxirementsof10CFR50.59(b).Therewerenonewithinthistimeperiod.

SECTIONF-COMPLETEDSPECIALTESTS(ST)ANDEXPERIMENTSThissectionistocontainadescriptionofspecialtestsandexperimentsperformedinthefacility,pursuanttotherequire-mentsofl0CFR50.59(b).Withinthetimeframeofthisreport,thereweretwoconducted.

SAFETYANALYSISGINNASTATIONTEMPERATURESTRATIFICATIONMONITORINGTEMPORARYMODIFICATIONREVISION1MAY12,19890PREPAREDBY:ElectricalEngineerDateREVIEWEDBY:ReactorEngineer5=~2.-DateAPPROVEDBY:Manager,TechnicalEngineeringDate

RevisionStatusSheetPageLatestRev.PageLatestRev.PageLatestRev.SafetyAnalysisPageiiRevision1Date51289 0

SAFETYANALYSIS1.0SCOPEOFANALYSIS:NRCBulletinNo.88-11,"PressurizerSurgeLineThermalStratification",requestsalladdresseestoestablishandimplementaprogramtoconfirmpressurizersurgelineintegrityinviewoftheoccurrenceofthermalstratification,andrequiresthemtoinformthestaffoftheactionstakentoresolvethisissue.PursuanttosatisfyingtherequirementandscheduleofBulletin88-11,RochesterGasandElectricCorporationisparticipatinginaprogramforpartialresolutionofthisissuethroughtheWestinghouseOwner'sGroup(WOG).TheWOGprogramisdesignedtobenefitfromtheexperiencegainedintheperformanceofseveralplant-specificanalysesonWestinghousePWRsurgelines.Thesedetailedanalysesincludeddefinitionofrevisedthermaltransients(includingstratification).TheoverallanalyticalapproachusedinalloftheseanalyseshasbeenreviewedbytheNRCstaff.Asignificantamountofpressurizersurgelinethermalmonitoringdatahasbeenobtainedinsupportoftheseplant-specificanalyses.AdditionalpressurizersurgelinethermalmonitoringandplantsystemdatacontinuestobemadeavailablewithintheWOG,resultinginasteadilyincreasingdatabase.PressurizersurgelinetemperaturestratificationdatawillbecollectedatGinnaforinclusionintheWOGdatabase.1.2ThermalstratificationandcyclingphenomenawerealsodiscoveredinauxiliarypipingconnectedtotheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS).Thesephenomenamaycausepipecracksintheunisolablesectionsofauxiliarypipingsystems.USNRCissuedBulletin88-08andsubsequentsupplementstoaddressthisphenomena.Asaresult,electricutilitiesarerequiredtoprovideresponsetotheNRCregardingthereviewandidentificationofauxiliarypipesectionsconnectedtotheRCSthatmaybesubjectedtothermalstratificationnotconsideredinthedesignoftheplant.Westinghousehasidentifiedthreepipingsectionsthatmaybesubjectedtothermalstratification.Theseare:SafetyAnalysisPage1Revision1Date51289

a)charginglinetoLoopBhotlegbetweencheckvalve393andtheRCSnozzleb)alternatecharginglinetoLoopAcoldlegbetweencheckvalve383AandtheRCSnozzle1.3c)auxiliaryspraylinebetweencheckvalve297andthemainpressurizerspraylineThisanalysisaddressestheconsequencesofinstallingtemporarythermocouplesonthepressurizersurgeline,LoopBchargingline,LoopAalternatechargingline,andauxiliarysprayline.Thermocoupleextensionwireshallbetemporarilyroutedtoadataacquisitioncontroller.Thecontrollershallprovideadigitaloutputtoaremotepersonalcomputer.Thedataoutputlineshallutilizetemporarycableandexistingsparecircuitstoexitcontainment.1.4Inadditiontothethermocouples,fourtemporarydisplacementtransducersaretobeinstalledonthepressurizersurgeline.Thetransducerswillmonitorlinemovementduringheat-up,cool-down,andduringtemperaturestratificationconditions.2.02.12~22~3REFERENCEDOCUMENTSGinnaStationProcedure,A-303,"Preparation,Review,andApprovalofSafetyAnalysisforMinorModificationsorSpecialTests".GinnaStationProcedure,A-1405,"InstallationandRemovalofTemporaryCables".GinnaStationProcedure,"A-1406,"ControlofTemporaryModifications".2.4R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantUpdatedSafetyAnalysisReport.2.5USNRCRegulatoryGuide1.70,StandardFormatandContentofSafetyAnalysisReportsforNuclearPowerPlants,LWREdition,Revision3,November1978.2.6AppendixRAlternativeShutdownSystem,"GinnaNuclearPowerPlant,Revision4,January1987.SafetyAnalysisPage2Revision1Date51289

GAI,"FireProtectionEvaluation"ReportNo.1936,March1977.2.8Letter,EliasztoWrobel,"852-A&BLimitorque-AluminumCovers",dated3/7/86.3.0SAFETYANALYSIS3.1AreviewhasbeenmadeofalleventsanalyzedintheGinnaFSARandtheeventsrequiringanalysisbytheUSNRCRegulatoryGuide1.70.The'ventsrelatedtothismodificationare:3.1.13.1.23.1.31)seismicevent,2)majorandminorfiresAlltemporaryinstrumentcableinstalledshallberoutedtofollowtherespectivelinetobemonitoredandthendropverticallytocontainmentfloorelevation235'.Thetemporarycablewillthenberoutedalongthefloor,followingtheshieldwalltothefreestandingdataacquisitioncontroller.Noseismicimpactisanticipatedsinceinstrumentcableweightisnegligiblecomparedtopipe/insulationweight.Instrumentcableroutedonthefloorandthefreestandingcontroller(approx.10"Hx12"Wx24"D)willnotaffectseismicstructuresintheimmediatevicinity.Thedataacquisitioncontrollerwillbeplacedoutsideoftheshieldwallnearthelowerendofthepressurizer.Temporarycableusedforthedatalinkshallfollowtheshieldwallatelevation235',risetoelevation253'iasouth-eaststairs,andfollowtheshieldwalltoIncoreReferenceJunctionBox1B.Noseismicimpactisanticipatedsincethiscablewillfollowafloor/stairrouting.CableseparationinIncoreReferenceJunctionBox1Bshallbemaintained.ThetemporarydatalinkcableshallbesplicedtosparecircuitA780.CableandconductorinsulationshallberestoredusingRaychemWCSFsleeves.ThesplicedcablesshallbedressedinIncoreBox1BsothatdistancebetweenA780andIncoreThermocouplecablesismaximized.SafetyAnalysisPage3Revision1

Thistemporarymodificationwillnotpropagateamajoror.minorfire.CablesusedforthermocouplesandthermocoupleextensionsareindividuallysheathedinInconelOverbraid(thermocouples)orTinnedCopperOverbraid(extensions).Noadditionalfireloadingisanticipatedbytheoverbraidedcable.TemporarycableusedforthedatalinkisratedandqualifiedtoIEEE-383flamerequirementsasaminimum.Totalestimatedcontainmentfireloadingforthistemporarydatalinkcableis200000BTUs.Temporarycableusedforthedata'inkwillbesplicedtoexistingsparecableA779intheAirHandlingRoom.RoutingisthroughafloorpenetrationtotheMux.Room.TotalfireloadingforthetemporarycableintheAirHandlingRoomisnegligible.TotalfireloadingforthetemporarycableintheMux.Roomisestimatedat2000BTUs.Firebarrierpenetrationswillberepairedandreplacedinaccordancewithexistingplantprocedures.Thereforeexistingsealswillnotbedegraded.ThismodificationdoesnotaffectthesafeshutdownanalysisintheAppendixRsubmittalsincethereisnoeffectonseparationofexistingcircuits,associatedcircuits,orfireareaboundariesasanalyzedintheAppendixRsubmittal.ThismodificationwillnoteffectthecapabilitiesoftheAlternativeShutdownSystem.Furthermore,noneoftheexistingproceduresforobtaininganAlternativeSafeShutdownwillbeeffected.Thismodification,therefore,complieswith10CFR50,AppendixR.Table6.1-3oftheGinnaUFSARgivestheAluminuminventoryinContainment.Thetotalexposedareais2197Ft.Thistemporarymodificationwilladdatotalof10"FtofexposedAluminum..ThetotalweightofAluminuminequipmentisestimatedtobe40lbs.ThisincludesAluminumindataacquisitionequipment,displacementtransducers,andpowersupply.The40additionalpoundsofaluminumaddedtocontainmentwilladdapproximately800scfofhydrogenduringanaccident.Thisamountofhydrogengenerationisnegligblecomparedwith30,000scfoftotalhydrogenproductionduringanaccident.(SeeReference2.8)SafetyAnalysisPage4Revision1

3'.1.ThismodificationdoesnotdegradethecapabilityofanySafetySystemtoperformitsfunction.Theassumptionsandconclusionsofexistinganalysesareunchanged.Nonewtypesofeventsarepostulated.Therefore,ithasbeendeterminedthatthemarginsofsafetyduringnormaloperationsandtransientconditionsanticipatedduringthelifeofthestationhavenotbeenaffected.Ithasalsobeendeterminedthattheadequacyofstructures,systems,andcomponentsprovidedfortheconsequencesofaccidentshavenotbeenaffected.4.0PRELIMINARYSAFETYEVALUATION:4.1Theprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetywillnotbeincreasedbytheproposedmodification.4.24,4Thepossibilityofanaccidentoramalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthananyevaluatedpreviouslywillnotbecreatedbytheproposedmodification.ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationwillnotbereducedbytheproposedmodification.TheproposedmodificationdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionorrequireaTechnicalSpecificationchange.SafetyAnalysisPage5Revision10Date51289

ThismodificationdoesnotdegradethecapabilityofanySafetySystemtoperformitsfunction.Theassumptionsandconclusionsofexistinganalysesareunchanged.Nonewtypesofeventsarepostulated.3.2.1Therefore,ithasbeendeterminedthatthemarginsofsafetyduringnormaloperationsandtransientconditionsanticipatedduringthelifeofthestationhavenotbeenaffected.Ithasalsobeendeterminedthattheadequacyofstructures,systems,andcomponentsprovidedfortheconsequencesofaccidentshavenotbeenaffected.4.0PRELIMINARYSAFETYEVALUATION4.1Theprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetywillnotbeincreasedbytheproposedmodification.4.2Thepossibilityofanaccidentoramalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthananyevaluatedpreviouslywillnotbecreatedbytheproposedmodification.ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationwillnotbereducedbytheproposedmodification.TheproposedmodificationdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionorrequireaTechnicalSpecificationchange.SafetyAnalysisPage5Revision1i'

3~2~1ThismodificationdoesnotdegradethecapabilityofanySafetySystemtoperformitsfunction.Theassumptionsandconclusionsofexistinganalysesareunchanged.Nonewtypesofeventsarepostulated.Therefore,ithasbeendeterminedthatthemarginsofsafetyduringnormaloperationsandtransientconditionsanticipatedduringthelifeofthestationhavenotbeenaffected.Ithasalsobeendeterminedthattheadequacyofstructures,systems,andcomponentsprovidedfortheconsequencesofaccidentshavenotbeenaffected.4.0PRELIMINARYSAFETYEVALUATIONTheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetywillnotbeincreasedbytheproposedmodification.4.24'Thepossibilityofanaccidentoramalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthananyevaluatedpreviouslywillnotbecreatedbytheproposedmodification.ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationwillnotbereducedbytheproposedmodification.TheproposedmodificationdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionorrequireaTechnicalSpecificationchange.SafetyAnalysisPage5Revision1(

3~2~lThismodificationdoesnotdegradethecapabilityofanySafetySystemtoperformitsfunction.Theassumptionsandconclusionsofexistinganalysesareunchanged.Nonewtypesofeventsarepostulated.Therefore,ithasbeendeterminedthatthemarginsofsafetyduringnormaloperationsandtransientconditionsanticipatedduringthelifeofthestationhavenotbeenaffected.Ithasalsobeendeterminedthattheadequacyofstructures,systems,andcomponentsprovidedfortheconsequencesofaccidentshavenotbeenaffected.4.0PRELIMINARYSAFETYEVALUATION:4.lTheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunction'fequipmentimportanttosafetywillnotbeincreasedbytheproposedmodification.4~24'Thepossibilityofanaccidentoramalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthananyevaluatedpreviouslywillnotbecreatedbytheproposedmodification.ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationwillnotbereducedbytheproposedmodification.TheproposedmodificationdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionorrequireaTechnicalSpecificationchange.SafetyAnalysisPage5Revision1(

ThismodificationdoesnotdegradethecapabilityofanySafetySystemtoperformitsfunction.Theassumptionsandconclusionsofexistinganalysesareunchanged.Nonewtypesofeventsarepostulated.3.F1Therefore,ithasbeendeterminedthatthemarginsofsafetyduringnormaloperationsandtransientconditionsanticipatedduringthelifeofthestationhavenotbeenaffected.Ithasalsobeendeterminedthattheadequacyofstructures,systems,andcomponentsprovidedfortheconsequencesofaccidentshavenotbeenaffected.4.0PRELIMINARYSAFETYEVALUATION:4~lTheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetywillnotbeincreasedbytheproposedmodification.4.2"Thepossibilityofanaccidentoramalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthananyevaluatedpreviouslywillnotbecreatedbytheproposedmodification.ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationwillnotbereducedbytheproposedmodification.4'TheproposedmodificationdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionorrequireaTechnicalSpecificationchange.SafetyAnalysisPage5Revision1

~fetyAnalysisFor,SpecialTest.RISpeci-1TostsT-09.02Contro1Bui1dingHeatGena=ationRate'riginalRev.1Rev.2NuclearEngineerDateInitialDateInitialDateReviewedBy:.orEnneerInitialDateInitia'ateApprovedBy:TechnicalManagerS9DateInitialDateInitialDate1.0Sco~sofAl'lBl~si8ThepurposeofSpecialTestST-89.02istoobtaintheinformationnecessarytodeterminetheheatgeneratedinvariousareasof.theControlBuildingduringnormaloperation.Thisinformationwillthenbeusedtoanalyzethethermalenvironment,oftheControlBuildingduringDesignBasisAccident(DBA),stationblackout(SBO),andnormaloperatingconditions.1.2TheheatgenerationrateintheControlBuildingitobedeterminedbymeasuringandrecordingareawallandairtemperaturesoveraminimumtwenty-four(24)hourperiodtoadequatelyaccountforroomheatfluctuations.1.3ThefollowingareasoftheControlBuildingaretobete.ted:a~b.C.d.e.ControlRoomRelayRoomComputerRoomBatteryRoomIABatteryRoomlB2.0References2.1EWR4529,"VentilationSystemRequirements".fetyAnalysisSpecialTestST-89.02Page1.Revision0 i

GinnaStationUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport,1989.2.2.1Section3.8.4.1.2,"DesignofSeismicCategoryIStructures-ControlBuilding".2.2.2Section3.10.2,"SeismicQualificationofElectricalEquipmentandInstrumentation".2.2.3Section3.11.3.5,"IdentificationofLimitingEnvironmentalConditions-ControlBuilding".2.2.42.2.5Section6.4,"HabitabilitySystems".Section9.4.3,"Control.RoomAreaVentilationSystem".2.2.6Section9.4.9.2,"EngineeredSafetyFeaturesVentilationSystems-RelayRoom".2.2.7Section9.4.9.3,"EngineeredSafetyFeaturesVentilationSystems-BatteryRooms".2.3GinnaStationTechnicalSpecifications,datedMay30,1989.SpecialTestProcedureST-89.02,"ControlBuildingHeatGenerationRateTesting".3.0SafetAnalsis3.1AreviewhasbeenperformedofalleventsanalyzedintheGinnaStationUFSAR.Thetopicsrelatedtothisspecialtestarefires,circuitseparation,andseismicevents.3.23.3Thisspecialtestinvolvesplacingelectricalwire(usedasthermocouples),temperaturerecorders,anddigitaltemperaturereadoutsinvariouslocationsthroughouttheControlBuildingandTurbineBuilding(Section6ofReference2.4).Thisequipmentisinplaceonatemporarybasisonly(approximately24hourspereachofthefiveareas)andwillberemovedattheconclusionofthespecialtest.Atnotimewillanyequipmentusedduringnormaloperationorpotentiallyrequiredduringabnormaloremergencyconditionsberemovedfromservice.Allventilationsystemsbeingtestedorbeingusedbythespecialtestarenon-safety-related(emergencyventilationsystemsarenotaffectedbythetest).NoControlBuildingpenetrationsareaffectedbythespecialtest.fetyAnalysisSpecialTestST-89.02Page2Revision0Date102389

.43.5TheequipmentisintheTurbineBuildingandControlBuildingonatemporarybasisonly,isofminimaladditionalfireloading,andwillberemovedattheconclusionofthetest;therefore,thereare'osignificantfireloadingconcerns.Also,theareassubjecttothetestareeitherpermanentlystaffedorfrequentlywalkeddownonanormalbasisbyoperationsandsecuritypersonnel.lnaddition,Section6ofReference2.4requiresawalkdownofthetestequipmentatleastoncepershifttoensurethatitisfunctioningproperly.Theseprecautionsassistintheearlydetectionofanyfirehazardswhetherinducedbythespecialtestequipmentornot.Atnotimewillanywiringberoutedthroughorovercabletrays,etc.allowingpotentialcircuitcross'-connection(Section5.4ofReference2.4).Therefore,circuitseparationwillbemaintainedthroughoutthedurationofthespecialtest.3.6Thisspecialtestincludestheuseofnon-seismicequipment(i.e.,thermocouplesandtheirassociatedleadwires)onseismicstructures(e.g.,ControlRoomwallsandfloors).However,thethermocouplesandleadwiresarenotofsufficientweighttocauseconcernwithrespecttoloadingonseismicstructures.Also,thethermocouplesandleadwiresarebeingusedonatemporarybasisandwillberemovedattheconclusionofthetest.Section5.0ofReference2.4alsorequiresthatthewiringbeplacedawayfromnormal/emergencypathwaysandworklocations.NowiringwillbeplacedontheSeismicCategoryIControlRoomceiling.4.0PreliminarSafetEvaluation4.1Theprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafety,previouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwillnotbeincreasedbytheproposedspecialtest.4.2Thepossibilityofanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferent'ypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyintheSafetyAnalysisReportwillnotbecreatedbytheproposedspecialtest.4.3ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationwillnotbereducedbytheproposedspecialtest.4.4TheproposedspecialtestdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionorrequireaTechnicalSpecificationchange.fetyAnalysisSpecialTestST-89.02Page3Revision0

AlloftheabovewerereviewedbythePORCcommitteewithrespecttotheTechnica'lSpecificationsandthecommitteehasdeterminedthatnoTechnicalSpecificationchangesorviolationswereinvolved.Additionally,thesechangeswerereviewedincommitteetodetermineiftheypresentedanUnreviewedSafetyQuestionandthegeneralsummationsofthesereviewsareasfollows:Thesechangesdonotincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrence,ortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyaspreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR,because:Thesechangesweremadetoensurecontinuedoperability/availabilityofplantequipmentandwillnotresultinanyequipmentbeingoperatedoutsideofitsnormaloperatingrange.Thisresultsincontinuedoperability/availabilityofequipmentimportanttosafety.Thesechangesadditionallywillnotresultinachangeofoperatingcharacteristicsofequipmentusedintransient/accidentmitigationwhichprecludesanincreaseintheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccident.Becausethesechangesensurecontinuedavailabilityofplantequipment,thelimitsshownintheTechnicalSpecifications,andtheassumptionsofthesafetyanalysesoftheUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReportcontinuetobemet.Asaresultthereisnoincreaseintheconsequencesofanypresentlypostulatedaccident.2~3~Thesechangesdonotcreatethepossibilityforanewordifferentkindofaccident,oramalfunctionofadifferenttypefromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARbecause:Thesechangesdonotpresentnewfailuremechanismsoutsideofthosepresentlyanticipated,andareboundedbytheeventscontainedintheUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport,IThesechangesdonotreducethemarginofsafetybecause:PresentmarginsascontainedintheTechnicalSpecificationsarevalid,andtheseprocedurechangesaremadewithinthoselimits.Theseprocedurechangeswillnot,resultinviolatingthebaselineassumptionsmadeforequipmentavailabilityintheTechnicalSpecifications,andtheUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport.