ML17309A434

1989 Rept of Facility Changes,Tests & Experiments Conducted W/O Prior Approval for Aug 1988 - Jul 1989. W/891219 Ltr

ML17309A434
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	07/31/1989
From:	MECREDY R C ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
NUDOCS 9001020174
Download: ML17309A434 (366)

Text

jACCELERATEDDISIBUTIONDEMON~ONSYSTEMrREGULATORYINFORMATIONDISTRXBUTXONSYSTEM(RIDS)DOCKETFACIL:50-244RobertEmmetGinnaNuclearPlant,Unit1,RochesterG05000244AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATIONMECREDY,R.C.RochesterGas&ElectricCorp.RECIP.NAMERECIPIENTAFFILIATIONRCOPIES'TTRENCL10'10

SUBJECT:

"1989ReptofFacilityChanges,Tests&ExperimeductedIw/oPriorApprovalforAug1988-Jul1989."W91219ltr.DISTRIBUTIONCODEIE47DCOPIESRECEIVED:LTRENCLJ'IZE:ETITLE:50.59AnnualReportofChanges,TestsorExperimntsMadeW/otApprovNOTES:LicenseExpdateinaccordancewith10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72).'5000244RECIPIENTRECXPIENTCOPIESIDCODE/NAMEIDCODE/NAMELTTRENCLPDl-3LAPD1-3PDEJOHNSON,AINTERNAL:AEOD/DOANRR/DLPQ/LHFB11NR8/JEEP/PRPB11G-F02EXTERNAL:LPDRNSIC1111.2'2111111AEOD/DSP/TPABNRR/DOEA/OEAB11NUDOCS-ABSTRACTRGN1FILE01NRCPDR1111111111NOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIERIS:PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASIXICONI'ACI'HEDOCUMENTCORIROLDESK,ROOMP1-37(EXT.20079)TOELIMINATEYOURNAMEPROMDISHUBUTIONTOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:LTTR19ENCLADDS

<<g~yeas$1>IfROCHESTERGASANDELECTRICCORPORATION~89EAS(Av'ENUE,HOCHESTER,N.Y.14649.0001TfLCP~OhCL+tAcoDf7lc5462700December19,1989U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionDocumentControlDesk,Washington,D.C.20555

Subject:

AnnualReportofFacilityChanges,Tests,andExperimentsConductedWithoutPriorCommissionApprovalR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDocketNo.50-244Gentlemen:Thesubjectreportisherebysubmittedasrequiredby10CFR50.59(b).EnclosedaretheoriginalandonecopyofthereportcontainingdescriptionsandsummariesofthesafetyevaluationsconductedinsupportofchangestothefacilityandproceduresdescribedintheUFSARandspecialtests,fromAugust1988throughJuly1989.Verytrulyyours,RES/jdwEnc.RobertC.MecdyGeneralManager,NuclearProductionxc:USNRCRegionIOfficeUSNRCResidentInspector9'001020i7485'0731PDRADOCK05000244RPDC 1989REPORTOFFACILITYCHANGESgTESTSANDEXPERIMENTSCONDUCTEDWITHOUTPRIORAPPROVALFORAUGUST1988THROUGHJULY1989SECTIONASECTIONBSECTIONCSECTIONDSECTIONECOMPLETEDENGINEERINGWORKREQUESTS(EWR)COMPLETEDSTATIONMODIFICATIONS(SM)TEMPORARYBYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTION,STRUCTUREFEATURES'HIELDING'NDFLUIDSYSTEMFEATURESPROCEDURECHANGESCOMPLETEDSPECIALTESTS(ST)ANDEXPERIMENTSR.E.GINNANUCLEARPOWER=PLANTDOCKETNO.50-244ROCHESTERGASANDELECTRICCORPORATIONDATEDDECEMBER19g19899001020174 e

SECTIONA-COMPLETEDENGINEERINGWORKREQUESTS(EWRs)Thissectioncontainsadescriptionofmodificationsinthefacilityasdescribedinthesafetyanalysisreport,andasummaryofthesafetyevaluationforthosechanges,pursuanttotherequirementsofl0CFR50.59(b).ThebasisforinclusionofanEWRinthissectionisclosureofthecompletedmodificationpackageintheDocumentControlDepartment.

EWR-1660RCSOVERPRESSUREPROTECTIONTHISEWR(ENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST)ADDRESSESTHEMODIFICATIONWHICHWILLPROVIDEAUTOMATICPRESSURERELIEFDURINGLOWTEMPERATUREREACTORCOOLANTSYSTEMOPERATION.THEDESIGNPROVIDESREDUNDANTTRAINSOFPRESSURESENSINGINSTRUMENTATIONANDRELIEVXNGCAPACITY.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORYGUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONARESMALLBREAKLOCA,ANDRCSOVERPRESSURIZATIONTRANSIENT.BASEDUPONTHEANALYSESDESCRIBEDUNDERPARAGRAPHF1TO4'OFTHESAFETYANALYSIS'THASTHEREFORE/BEENDETERMINEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENDETERMINEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES,SYSTEMS,ANDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODIFICATION.EWR-2602PRESSURIZERSAFETYANDRELIEFVALVEPIPINGTHISEWR(ENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST)ADDRESSESTHEVERIFICATIONOFTHEFUNCTIONABILITYANDTHESTRUCTURALINTEGRITYOFTHEPRESSURIZERRELIEFANDSAFETYVALVEPIPING.THISWORKWILLINCLUDEDYNAMICANALYSISOFTHEPIPINGINCLUDINGEFFECTSDUETOSEISMICEVENTSASWELLASSYSTEMOPERATION.THEPIPESUPPORTSWILLBEEVALUATEDFORTHERESULTINGLOADSANDMODXFIEDASNECESSARY.THISWORKALSOINCLUDESTHERMALANALYSIS,DESIGNANDINSTALLATIONOFAREFLECTIVEINSULATIONSYSTEMONTHEPRESSURIZERHEADANDSAFETYVALVELOOPSEALS.THISVERIFICATIONANDMODIFICATIONXSNECESSARYTOCOMPLYWITHNUREG0737'ECTIONIIELD1gPERFORMANCETESTINGOFBWRANDPWRRELIEFANDSAFETYVALVESAREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDZNTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORYGUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICA-TIONARESEISMICEVENTANDTHEOCCUEGUNCEOFASMALLLOCA.

BASEDUPONTHEANALYSESDESCRIBEDUNDERPARAGRAPHS3.1TO4.4OFTHESAFETYANALYSISgITHASTHEREFOREgBEENDETERMINEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENDETERMINEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES/SYSTEMS'NDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCES'FACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODIFICATION.EWR3059CONTROLOFHEAVYLOADSMODIFICATIONSTHISEWR(ENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST)ADDRESSESTHEUPGRADINGOFSAFETY-RELATEDOVERHEADLOADHANDLINGSYSTEMS.THEMAJORADDITIONISTHEINSTALLATIONOFAMECHANISMBYWHICHTHEPRESSURIZERHATCHBLOCKSWILLBEPHYSICALLYPROHIBITEDFROMFALLINGINTOTHEPRESSURIZERCAVITYDURINGREMOVALANDREPLACEMENT.THISWILLBEACHIEVEDTHROUGHINSTALLATIONOFSTRONGBACKSONTHEHATCHCOVERBLOCKS.OTHERMODIFICATIONS,ORIGINALLYCONSIDEREDINREVISION0OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIA/SAFETYANALYSISWEREINCLUDEDTOFULLYCOMPLYWITHTHEORIGINALINTERPRETATIONOFNUREG-0612.REVISION1TOTHISDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISDELETESTHEMODIFICATIONOFMONORAILSNOTEDINREVISION0.BASEDUPONFURTHERENGINEERINGREVIEWSTHESEMONORAILSYSTEMSWEREDETERMINEDTOALREADYBEINCOMPLIANCEWITHANSIB30.11-1980.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSAR~ANDTHEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHXSMODIFICATIONARE>DECONTROLOFHEAVYLOADSiiGUIDELINES(NUREG0612)ANDSEISMICEVENTS.THEDESIGNFORUPGRADINGOFTHEPRESSURIZERHATCHBLOCKSWILLENHANCETHECAPABILITYOFTHEPRESSURIZERCUBICLETOWITHSTANDSEISMICEVENTS.XTWILLALSOENSURETHATDURINGMOVEMENTOFTHEHATCHBLOCKS,ACCIDENTALDROPPINGOFABLOCKFROMTHEJIBCRANEWILLNOTCAUSEDAMAGETOTHEPRESSURIZER,ITSINSTRUMENTATIONANDASSOCIATEDVALVESLOCATEDATTHETOPOFTHEPRESSURIZER.THUS~THISMODIFICATIONNEITHERINCREASESTHECONSEQUENCESgNORDOESITREDUCETHEMARGINSOFSAFETYFOR,1)EQUIPMENTREQUIREDTOFUNCTIONDURINGANDFOLLOWINGASEISMXCEVENT,2)POSEATHREATTOTHEREACTORCOOLANTSYSTEMBOUNDARY.

BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONS,ITHASBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELXFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDEDTHATADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS'NDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODIFICATION.EWR-3175CONTROLRODDROPTESTCABLETHISMODIFICATIONINVOLVESTHEINSTALLATIONOFANINSTRUMEN-TATIONCABLEFROMTHECONTROLRODDRIVECABINETSINTHEINTERMEDIATEBUILDINGTOTHERODPOSITIONINDICATIONRACKSINTHERELAYROOM.THESENEWCABLESAREREQUIREDTOTESTTHECONTROLRODDROPRATE.PRESENTLY,I&CRUNSATEMPORARYCABLEFORTHISPURPOSEANDTHENREMOVESITWHENTESTINGZSCOMPLETED.TOCONSERVETIMEANDMANPOWERDURINGSHUTDOWNPERIODS'TZSPROPOSEDTHATAPERMANENTCABLEANDASPAREBEINSTALLEDFORCONTROLRODDROPTESTING.THISMODIFICATIONISDESIGNATEDNOTSEISMICCATEGORYI,HOWEVERTHEDESIGNSHALLMEETSECTIONC.2OFUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.29.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDZNTHEGINNASTATIONFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORYGUIDE.1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONARE(1)MAJORANDMINORFIRES(2)ASEISMICEVENT.THEMODIFICATIONDOESNOTINCREASETHEPOSSIBILITYORIMPACTOFAFIRE~ADDITIONALWIRINGANDCABLEWILLBEADDEDINTHISMODXFICATION,WHICHCOULDADDTOTHEFIRELOADINGOFTHEPLANT.THEREFORE,THEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATALLSUCHCABLEMEETTHEIEEE383-1974FLAMETEST,REQUIREMENTS.BECAUSEOFTHISTHEREWILLBENOSXGNIFICANTINCREASEOFFIRELOADINGCAUSEDBYTHISMODIFICATION.THISMODIFICATIONISDESXGNATEDNOTSEISMICCATEGORYIgHOWEVERSANYNEWCABLEANDCONDUITSHALLBEINSTALLEDSUCHTHATITWILLNOTIMPACTANYSAFETYRELATEDSYSTEMSDURINGASEISMICEVENT.THISMODIFICATIONHASBEENREVIEWEDTOENSURETHATFAILUREOFTHEELECTRICALCABLEINSTALLEDWILLNOTRESULTZNDISABLINGOFVITALEQUIPMENTNEEDEDTOSAFELYSHUTDOWNTHEPLANTDURINGPOSTULATEDFIRESORASEISMICEVENT.

EWR-3258ASERVICEWATERCONTAINMENTISOLATIONVALVESTHISEWR(ENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST)ADDRESSESTHEMODIFICATIONWHICHWILLPROVIDEMECHANICALMANUALREMOTEOPERATORSTOCONTAINMENTISOLATIONVALVES4629'630'643AND4644'HEFUNCTIONOFTHEREMOTEMANUALOPERATORSISTOFACILITATEOPERATINGTHEASSOCIATEDVALVESWHEREACCESSBYPERSONNELISRESTRICTEDDUETONEARBYPIPINGANDEQUIPMENT.ALLNEWVALVESWEREINSTALLEDUNDERTHEPREVIOUSREVISION.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZED,INTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORY'GUIDE1.70.THE.EVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONARE')PRIMARYSYSTEMPIPERUPTURESB)RUPTUREOFTHESTEAMANDFEEDWATERPIPESINSIDEANDOUTSIDECONTAINMENTC)FIREOREARTHQUAKEBASEDUPONTHEANALYSESDESCRIBEDUNDERPARAGRAPHS3.1TO4.4OFTHESAFETYANALYSIS'THASTHEREFOREJBEENDETERMINEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED..ITHASALSOBEENDETERMINEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES,SYSTEMS,ANDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODIFICATION.

EWR-3645GROUNDWATERLEVELTHISEWR(ENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST)ADDRESSESTHEINSTALLATIONOFTHREEPERMANENTGROUNDWATERMONITORINGWELLS.THEDESIGNBASESFORTHEHIGHESTSTILLGROUNDWATERLEVELFORTHER.E.GINNANUCLEARPOWERPLANTASSUMEDFORTHEDESIGNOFTHEPLANTSTRUCTURESWAS250.0MSL.ASARESULTOFSEPTOPICII-3.5"FLOODINGPOTENTIALPROTECTIONREQUIREMENTSITISNECESSARYTODETERMINEIFTHEORIGINALDESIGNBASISGROUNDWATERLEVEL(DBGWL)ISANACCEPTABLEUPPERLIMITTOBEUSEDTOCALCULATETHELOADINGCAPABILITYOFTHEPLANTSTRUCTURES.TOASCERTAINTHECORRECTDBGWL,THREEGROUNDWATERMONITORINGWELLSWILLBEINSTALLEDONTHER.E.GINNAPLANTSITE.THISINSTALLATIONWILLCONSISTOFTHREEFULL-ENCASEDBORINGSDRILLEDINTOTHEGROUNDWATERTABLE.ALIQUIDLEVELDETECTIONANDINDICATIONUNITWILLBEINSTALLEDONONEWELLTOCONSTANTLYMONITORANDRECORDTHEGROUNDWATERLEVEL.REFERTORGGEDRAWINGNUMBER33013-1384FORTHELOCATIONOFTHETHREEBORINGS.IFMOREDATATOESTABLISHADBGWLISNEEDED'HEOTHERTWOWELLSWILLBEAVAILABLETOMONITORTHISINSTALLATIONWILLINCLUDETHREEFULL-CASEDBORINGSDRILLEDINTOTHEWATERTABLE~ONEFULLYELECTRONICLIQUIDLEVELSENSINGMONITOREDTHREEFLANGECAPSFORTHEWELLHEADS'NEALL-WEATHERENCLOSUREFORTHETRANSMITTERANDARUNOFELECTRICCABLECONNECTEDTOANEXISTINGCHARTRECORDERINSIDETHEPLANT.INTHEUNLIKELYEVENTOFFAILUREOFANYCOMPONENTOFTHISMODIFICATION,NONEOFTHECLASSIEEQUIPMENTINTHEPLANTWILLBEPREVENTEDFROMPERFORMINGITSSAFETYFUNCTION.THEACCIDENTEVENTSANALYZEDBYTHEFSARHAVEBEENREVIEWEDANDNONEWILLBEAFFECTEDBYTHISMODIFICATION.

EWR-3678OVEREXCITATION.RELAYTHISEWR(ENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST)ADDRESSESTHEMODIFICATIONCONSISTINGOFINSTALLATIONOFANOVEREXCITATIONRELAYONTHEMAINCONTROLBOARD.OVEREXCITATIONOFTHEGSUANDNO.11TRANSFORMERSCANMOSTCOMMONLYOCCURDURINGPLANTSTARTUP.ASTHETURBINEGENERATORISBEINGBROUGHTUPTORATEDVOLTAGEANDSPEEDgTHEEXCITATIONLEVEL(VOLTS/HERTZ),MUSTNOTEXCEEDTHETRANSFORMERSCAPABILITIES.IFTHESECAPABILITIESAREEXCEEDED,THERMALDAMAGETOTHEUNITSWILLOCCUR.DEPENDINGUPONTHEMAGNITUDEANDDURATIONOFOVEREXCZTATIONgTRANSFORMERFAILUREWILLOCCUREITHERIMMEDIATEL'YORAFTERREPEATEDLESSSEVEREEVENTS.THEEXISTINGOVEREXCITATIONRELAYATGINNAgWHICHOPERATES'THECONTROLROOMANNUNCIATOR,ISANELECTROMECHANICALDEVICE~ITSOPERATINGCHARACTERISTICDOESNOTACCURATELYMATCHTHETRANSFORMER'OVEREXCITATIONCAPABILITIES~THERELAYPROPOSEDZNTHEMODIFICATIONgHOWEVER~CANBESETTODUPLICATETHETRANSFORMER'SCAPABILITIESFORVERYACCURATEALARMANDTRIPOPERATION.THISRELAY,WHICH'NCORPORATESMICROPROCESSORTECHNOLOGY,WILLINITIALLYBEINSTALLEDWITHITSOUTPUTSCONNECTEDTOTHEPLANTPROCESSCOMPUTERFORALARMINGANDDATARETENTION.AREVIEWHAS-.BEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGZNNASTATIONFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORYGUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONARE(1)MAJORANDMINORFIRES,(2)-ASEISMICEVENT,-(3)ALOSSOFLOAD.BASEDUPONTHEANALYSESDESCRIBEDUNDERPARAGRAPHS3.1TO4.4OFTHESAFETYANALYSIS'THASTHEREFOREJBEENDETERMINEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMAL.OPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHESTATIONHAVENOTBEENAFFECTED.ITHASALSOBEENDETERMINEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURESANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTED.

EWR-3728WASTEEVAPORATORLINETHISENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST(EWR).ADDRESSESTHEMODIFICATIONWHICHINVOLVESREPLACINGANDREROUTINGTHEPIPINGBETWEENV1799EAND1654AOUTSIDETHEHIGHRADIATIONAREA.AREVIEWHASBEENPERFORMEDOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGZNNASTATIONUPDATEDFINALSAFETYANALYSISREPORTANDNRCIECIRCULARNO.80-18.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHEMODXFZCATIONARE:A)RADIOACTIVELIQUIDWASTESYSTEMLEAKORFAILUREB)FIRESC)SEISMICEVENTSTHEFOLLOWINGASSESSMENTISMADE:THEPROBABILITYOFRADIOACTIVELIQUIDWASTESYSTEMLEAKORFAILUREWILLNOTBEINCREASEDSINCETHEMODIFICATIONWILLMEETOREXCEEDPRESENTLYESTABLXSHEDCRITERIA.BASEDONTHEREQUIREMENTSSPECIFIEDZNSECTION27.0OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIA,THEMODIFICATIONWILLNOTINCREASETHEPROBABILITYOFORTHEEFFECTSOFAFXRESINCETHEMATERIALSUSEDWILLMEETCRITERIAEQUALTOORGREATERTHANTHOSEPRESENTLYINSTALLED.THISMODIFICATIONISNON-SAFETYRELATEDBUTWILLBESEISMIC-ALLYSUPPORTEDSOTHATITDOESNOTAFFECTSAFETYRELATEDEQUIPMENT.BASEDONNRCZECIRCULARNO.80-18ANDNRCREG.GUIDE1.143THENON-SEISMICCLASSIFICATIONISACCEPTABLE.BASEDUPONALLTHEABOVEANALYSES:1)STRUCTURESfSYSTEMSgANDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCES'FACCIDENTSAREADEQUATE.2).MARGINOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATINGANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHESTATIONARENOTREDUCED.BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTHEREQUIREMENTSOFGINNASTATIONTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONS'THASBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATXONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES,SYSTEMS,ANDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODIFICATION.(7)

EWR-3882SIMULATORBUILDINGANDTRAININGCENTERALARMPANELTHISEWR(ENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST)ADDRESSESTHEMODIFICATIONWHICHCONSISTSOFINSTALLZNGANALARMPANELZNTHEGUARDHOUSE'~ANDINSTALLINGCONDUITANDCABLEIN'THEGUARDHOUSEANDTHESIMULATORBUILDING.THEALARMCIRCUITSWILLCONSISTOFEXISTINGDIRECTBURIALCABLEBETWEENTHEGUARDHOUSEAND,TRAININGCENTER,NEWCABLEWILLBEINSTALLEDBETWEENTHETRAININGBUILDINGSECURITYPANELANDTHESIMULATORBUILDINGALARMPANEL.POWERTOTHEGUARDHOUSEALARMPANELWILLBEFROMTHEEXISTINGLIGHTINGPANELINTHEGUARDHOUSEWHICHISFEDFROMNON-CLASS1EBUS15.THEADDITIONALLOADOFAPPROXIMATELY1-AMPWILLNOTDEGRADEBUS15'AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORYGUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHIS.MODIFICATIONARE:LOSSOFA.C.,POWER,SEISMICANDFIRE.BASEDUPONTHEANALYSESDESCRIBEDUNDERPARAGRAPHS3.1TO4.5OFTHESAFETYANALYSIS'THASTHEREFORE'EENDETERMINEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENDETERMINEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES~SYSTEMS'NDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODIFICATION.EWR-3895INSTALLSTATESBLOCKSTHISEWR(ENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST)ADDRESSESTHEMODIFICATIONWHICHWILLPROVIDENEWSLIDINGLINKTERMINALBLOCKSTOSEVERALAGASTAT"TIMERELAYS'HEPURPOSEOFTHESENEWTERMINALBLOCKSISTOFACILITATETESTINGOFTIMERELAYSWITHOUTDISCON-NECTINGWIRES.THISWILLELIMINATETHEPOSSIBILITYOFRECONNECTINGWIRESINCORRECTLYAFTERRELAYTESTING.DEVICESAFFECTEDBYTHISMODIFICATIONARE:1)2)3)4)5)EMERGENCYDIESELGENERATOR1AAND1BCIRCULATINGWATERPUMP1AAND1BFEEDWATERPUMPlAAND1B4160VACBUS11AAND11BNO.1GENERATORBACKUPRELAYS

AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSAR,ANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSXSBYUSNRCREGULATORYGUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONAREINTERNALANDEXTERNALEVENTS,SPECIFICALLYFIREANDEARTHQUAKE.BASEDUPONTHEANALYSESDESCRIBEDUNDERPARAGRAPH3.1TO4.4'FTHESAFETYANALYSIS'THASTHEREFORE'EENDETERMINEDTHATTHEMARGINS'FSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHE'IFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENDETERMINEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES,SYSTEMS,ANDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODIFICATION.EWR-3983INSTRUMENTATIONREROUTEFORTORNADOESANDHELBTHISEWR(ENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST)ADDRESSESTHEREROUTINGOFREQUIREDINSTRUMENTATIONCABLEWHICHMAYBEAFFECTEDBYTORNADOESORHIGHENERGYLINEBREAKS.INTHENRC'SREVIEWOFPIPEBREAKSINSIDECONTAINMENTZTWASNOTEDTHATSAFETYRELATEDINSTRUMENTATIONCABLETRAYSANDCONDUIT'ASSEDWITHINTHEZONEOFINFLUENCEOFBREAKSONTHECVCS~CHARGINGANDLETDOWNLINESANDACCUMULATOR"A"LEVELTAP.INTHEEVENTOFAPOSTULATEDFAILUREOFTHESELINES,<HOTORCOLDSAFESHUTDOWNANDAPPROPRIATEACCIDENTMITIGATIONINSTRUMENTATIONSHOULDREMAINAVAILABLE.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYTHEUSNRCREGULATORYGUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONARE1)MAJORANDMINORFIRES,2)ASEISMICEVENTS3)AHIGHENERGYLINEBREAK(HELB)g4)ATORNADOS5)ALOSSOFCOOLANTACCIDENT(LOCA).BASEDUPONTHEANALYSISDESCRIBEDUNDERPARAGRAPH3.1TO4.4OFTHESAFETYANALYSISITHAS~THEREFORE'EENDETERMINEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHESTATIONHAVENOTBEENAFFECTED.ITHASALSOBEENDETERMINEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS~ANDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESHAVENOTBEENAFFECTED.

EWR-3989TURBINEBUILDINGPRESSURIZATIONTHESCOPEOFEWR-3989COVERSTHEDETAILEDANALYSISOFTHETURBINEBUILDING'SSTRUCTURALINTEGRITYASWELLASDESIGNANDINSTALLATIONOFMODIFICATIONSTHATAREREQUIREDASARESULTOFTHISANALYSIS.TWOSPECIFICDOUBLEENDEDPIPERUPTURES,WILLBECONSIDEREDZNTHEANALYSIS:A)ABREAKINTHE20"FEEDWATERLINEDOWNSTREAMOFTHENUMBER5FEEDWATERHEATER~ANDB)BREAKINTHE12<>MAINSTEAMDUMPLINEDOWNSTREAMOFTHE36"HEADER.THEENERGYANDPRESSURERELEASEASARESULTOFAPIPERUPTUREINONEORBOTHLOCATIONSLISTEDABOVEWILLEXCEEDTHEPRESENTSTRUCTURALINTEGRITYOFTHETURBINEBUILDING.THEPROBLEMANDEFFECTOFHIGHENERGYLINEBREAKSOUTSIDEOFTHECONTAINMENTBUILDINGWEREORIGINALLYREVIEWEDIN1973UNDEREWR-1836'TTHATTIMETHERESULTSOFTHEANALYSISWERE1)THECONTROLBUILDINGANDTHEDIESELGENERATORBUILDINGTHATCOULD-BESEVERELYDAMAGEDBYAPIPERUPTUREANDINSTALLATIONOFPRESSUREWALLSATTHEINTERFACESBETWEENTHESEBUILDINGSANDTHETURBINEBUILDINGWOULDBEREQUIRED;2)ITWASRECOGNIZEDTHATOTHERPORTIONSOFTHETURBINEBUILDING,SUCHASATTHEWALLCOMMONTOTHETURBINEANDINTERMEDIATEBUILDINGSCOULDREQUIREFURTHERANALYSIS;AND3)AMOREDETAILEDANALYSISOFTHESTRUCTURALINTEGRITYOFTHETURBINEBUILDING,WITHREGARDSTOTHEENERGYLINEBREAKSWASCALLEDFORgASFAILUREOFTHETURBINEBUILDINGCOULDIMPACTTHEINTER-CONNECTEDSAFETYRELATEDSTRUCTURES.INSTALLATIONOFTHETWOPRESSUREWALLSWASACCOMPLISHEDUNDERTHEORIGINALEWR-1836.ANALYSISANDMODIFICATIONOFTHEWALLCOMMONTOTHEINTERMEDIATEBUILDINGANDTURBINEBUILDINGISBEINGACCOMPLISHEDUNDEREWR-2846B.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORYGUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONARE,PIPEBREAKINTHETURBINEBUILDINGSANDOPERATINGBASISANDSAFESHUTDOWNEARTHQUAKES.BASEDUPONTHEANALYSESDESCRIBEDUNDERPARAGRAPHS3.1TO4.4OFTHESAFETYANALYSISgITHASTHEREFOREgBEENDETERMINEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ZTHASALSOBEENDETERMINEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS~ANDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODIFICATION.

EWR-3992VITALAREAANALYSISSECURITYMODIFICATIONSTHEMODIFICATIONCONSISTSOFINSTALLINGASECURITYALARMSWITCHONTHEDOOROFTHETURBINEBUILDINGDCDISTRIBUTIONPANELLOCATEDATELEVATION253'.6"OFTHETURBINEBUILDINGTHEREASONFORTHISMODIFICATIONISTOCOMPLYWITHANRG&ECOMMITMENTTOMODIFYTHEPHYSICALSECURITYPLANPERTHELOSALAMOSNATIONALLABORATORYVITALAREAANALYSIS.AREVIEWHAS'BEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORYGUIDE1.70.EVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONARESEISMIC.BASEDUPONTHEANALYSESDESCRIBEDUNDERPARAGRAPH3.1.TO4.5OFTHESAFETYANALYSIS'THASBEENDETERMINEDTHATTHISMODIFICATIONISNOTREQUIREDTOBSEISMICANDITSFAILUREWILLNOTAFFECTSAFETYRELATEDEQUIPMENTORSAFETYRELATEDSTRUCTURES.EWR4040DIESELGENERATORVAULTHUMIDITYTHEPURPOSEOFTHISMODIFICATIONISTOREDUCETHEEXISTINGHUMIDITYLEVELSINTHEAANDBDIESELGENERATORVAULTS.THESTRUCTURAL/ELECTRICALCOMPONENTSWITHINTHEVAULTAREASAREDETERIORATINGDUETOHIGHHUMIDITYLEVELS.THISMODIFICATIONISREQUIREDINORDERTOREDUCETHEADVERSEEFFECTSOFTHEEXISTINGSPACECONDITIONS.THISMODIFICATIONWILLHENCEIMPROVEEXISTINGCONDITIONS.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYNRCREGULATORYGUIDE1.70.THEONLYEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONAREINTERNALANDEXTERNALEVENTS'UCHASFIRE~FLOODS~STORMS'NDEARTHQUAKES'HEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATANAPPENDIXRCONFORMANCEVERIFICATIONBEPERFORMEDTOVERIFYTHATTHISMODIFICATIONWILLNOTADVERSELYAFFECTTHEREQUIREMENTSOFAPPENDIXR.THISMODIFICATIONWILLNOTAFFECTANYPREVIOUSANALYSISCONCERNINGFLOODSORSTORMS.THISISAREQUIREMENTOFTHEDESIGNCRITERIA.

0 THEDEHUMIDIFICATIONSYSTEMSWHICHAREREQUIREDTOBEINSTALLEDUNDERTHISMODIFICATIONARECLASSIFIEDASNON-SAFETYRELATED.THEEQUIPMENTISNOTREQUIREDTOMAINTAINFUNCTIONALINTEGRITYFOLLOWINGASEISMICEVENT.HOWEVER,THEEQUIPMENTWILLBEDESIGNEDANDINSTALLEDSUCHASTONOTADVERSELYAFFECTANYSAFETY-RELATEDCOMPONENTSORSTRUCTURES.THISZSAREQUIREMENTOFTHEDESIGNCRITERIA.THEREFOREgTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED'HEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURESJSYSTEMS'NDCOMPONENTS.PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDFORTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTED.EWR-4057FEEDWATERFLOWMEASUREMENTSYSTEMTHISEWR(ENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST)ADDRESSESTHEMODIFICATIONCONSISTINGOFTHEINSTALLATIONOFAFEEDWATERFLOWMEASUREMENTSYSTEMFORMEASUREMENTOFABSOLUTEFEEDWATERFLOWRATE.THENEWFEEDWATERFLOWMEASUREMENTSYSTEMWILLMEASURETHERATEOFFLOWTHROUGHTHEUSEOFANULTRASONICTECHNIQUEUTILIZINGPULSESOFHIGHFREQUENCYSOUNDACROSSTHEFLUIDFROMONE-TRANSDUCERTOANOTHER.THEPURPOSEOFTHISMODIFICATIONWILLIMPROVETHERELIABILITYOFTHEFEEDWATERFLOWMEASUREMENT.EAREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDZNTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORYGUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONARE:A)B)C)D)LOSSOFNORMALFEEDWATEREXCESSIVEHEATREMOVALDUETOFEEDWATERTEMPERATUREDECREASEFEEDWATERPIPINGBREAKERSEISMICANDFIRESBASEDUPONTHEANALYSESDESCRIBEDUNDERPARAGRAPH3.1TO4.4OFTHESAFETYANALYSIS'THASTHEREFORE~BEENDETERMINEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMAL.OPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENDETERMINEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS'NDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODIFICATION.(12)

EWR-4072ADDITIONOFDYNAMICDATAMANAGERTORCPVIBRATIONMONITORINGSYSTEMTHISEWR(ENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST)ADDRESSESTHEMODIFICATIONOFTHEEXISTINGRCPVIBRATIONMONITOR.PRESENTLYTHEEXISTINGTCPVIBRATIONMONITORPROVIDESINDICATIONOFROTORVIBRATIONAMPLITUDEONLY.ZNORDERTOTAKEADVANCEOFANALYTICALMETHODSFORPREDICTINGFAILUREANDDIAGNOSINGDEGRADATIONINROTATINGMACHINERY.THEMONITORMODULESWILLBEMODIFIEDTODIGITIZED,STORE~ANDTRANSMITDIAGNOSTICVIRATIONDATATOTHEHEWLETT-PACKARD9816SCOMPUTER.THISDIAGNOSTICDATAINCLUDESR5OTATZONALSPEEDAMPLITUDEANDPHASEANGLE~MAXIMUMANDMINIMUMVALUES'NDDYNAMICWAVEFORMS.THEEXISTINGCOMPUTERSHOFTWAREWILLPERMITDYNAMICANDSTATIC.VIBRATIONDATATOBEDISPLAYEDINTHEFORMOFGRAPHICPLOTS'LARMLIGHTS'EPORTS~ANDLOGS'REVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONFSARANDTHEEVENTSRREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORYGUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONAREMAJORANDMINORFIRES.BASEDUPONTHEANALYSESDESCRIBEDUNDERPARAGRAPH3.1TO4.4OFTHESAFETYANALYSIS'THASgTHEREFORE'EENDETERMINEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHESTATIONHAVENOTBEENAFFECTED.hEWR-4135TDAFPD.C.LUBEOZLPUMPLOCALCONTROLTHISEWR(ENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST)ADDRESSESTHEMODIFICATIONOFMANUALSTARTCIRCUITRYFORTHETURBINEDRIVENAUXILIARYFEEDWATERPUMP(TDAFP)DCLUBEOILPUMP.THEPURPOSEOFTHISMODIFICATIONISTOPROVIDEMANUALSTART/STOPCAPABILITYOFTHEDCLUBEOIL'UMPSHOULDAFIREOCCURINANYAREAOFTHEPLANTREQUIRINGLOCALCONTROLOFTHETDAFP.THISMODIFICATIONISREQUIREDTOCOMPLY,TOTHEFIREPROTECTIONREQUIREMENTSOFTHEAPPENDIXRALTERNATIVESHUTDOWNREPORT.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORYGUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHZS-MODIFICATIONARE:1)MAJORANDMINORFIRES,AND2)ASEISMICEVENT.

BASEDUPONTHEANALYSESDESCRIBED,UNDERPARAGRAPH3.1TO4.4OFTHESAFETYANALYSIS'THASTHEREFORE'EENDETERMINEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENT.CONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHE,LIFEOFTHESTATIONHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENDETERMINEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS'ND,COMPONENTSPROVIDED"FORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDFORTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTED.EWR-4136'A'IESELGENERATOREMERGENCYCONTROLPANELTHISEWR(ENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST)ADDRESSESTHEMODIFICATIONWHICHPROVIDESISOLATIONOFCONTROLCIRCUITSINTHE'A'IESELGENERATORROOMANDSECONDLY,TOPROVIDESUFFICIENTCONTROLFEATURESSOAS'OALLOWLOCALCONTROLOF-THE'A'IESELGENERATORWHICHWILLSATISFYTHEREQUIREMENTSESTABLISHEDBY.THEAPPENDIXRALTERNATIVESAFESHUTDOWNSYSTEMREPORTREVISION2.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHE.GINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHE,EVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORYGUIDE1.70."THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONARE:1)LOSSOFACPOWERTOSTATIONAUXILIARYDURINGNORMAL,CONDITIONSINCLUDINGTHOSECONDITIONSINTHEAPPENDIXRANALYSIS,2)LOSSOFDCCONTROLPOWER,3)MAJORANDMINORFIRE,AND4)EVENTSOFFLOOD,STORM,OREARTHQUAKE.BASEDUPONTHEANALYSESDESCRIBEDUNDERPARAGRAPH3'TO4'OFTHESAFETYANALYSIS,ITHASTHEREFORE,BEENDETERMINEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.IT'HASALSOBEENDETERMINEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMSJANDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODIFICATION.

EWR-4138APPENDIXRCHARGINGPUMPD.C.FEEDTHISEWRADDRESSESTHE,MODIFICATIONWHICHWILLPROVIDEABACKUPD.C.FEEDFORTHECHARGINGPUMPlAASPARTOFRG&ECOMPLIANCEWITHAPPENDIXROF10-CFR-50ZTISNECESSARYTOADDANALTERNATIVED.C.FEEDTOTHECHARGINGPUMP1A.THENEWBACKUPD.C.FEEDWILLINSURETHATCHARGINGPUMPAlISAVAILABLEFORSERVICEAFTERFIREINTHECONTROLCOMPLEX.ANEWTRANSFERSWITCHWILLALSOBEPROVIDEDWHICHWILLISOLATETHENORMALD.C.FEEDTOTHECHARGINGPUMPlAPRIORTOAPPLYINGTHEBACKUPFEED.EWR-41394139AAPPENDIXRSPRINKLERANDFIREDAMPERMODSTHISENGINEERINGWORKREQUESTADDRESSESTHEINSTALLATIONOFCLOSEDHEAD,CLOSE-SPACEDSPRINKLERSAROUNDTHEPERIMETERSOFTHETWOSTAIRWELLSANDTHEEQUIPMENTHATCHATTHECEILINGLEVELOFTHEMEZZANINEFLOOR.INADDITION,DUCTPENETRATIONSOFFIREBARRIERSNEEDTOBEPROTECTEDANDTHREEHOURRATEDDAMPERSWILLBEINSTALLEDINTHEDUCTATTHEBARRIERFOREACHOFTHESEPENETRATIONSBETWEENFIREZONESAMO,ABMgABBM,ANDCHG.THEDAMPERSWILLCLOSEAUTOMATICALLYATAFIXEDTEMPERATURE,PROVIDEDTHATSYSTEMDIFFERENTIALPRESSUREDOESNOTPRECLUDEDAMPERFUNCTIONALITY.THISMODIFICATIONISNECESSARYINORDERTOCOMPLYWITHTHEREQUIREMENTSOF10CFR50APPENDIXR~SECTIONIIIG2gANDAPPENDIXRALTERNATIVESHUTDOWNSYSTEMREPORTSREVISION2gDATEDJANUARY1985'REVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUPDATEUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYNRCREGULATORYGUIDE1.70.THEONLYEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONAREINTERNALANDEXTERNAL'EVENTS~SUCHASFIREgFLOODS'TORMS~ANDEARTHQUAKES'HEEFFECTSOFAMAJORFIRE(S)ONTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYAREADDRESSEDINTHEUSNRCFIREPROTECTIONSAFETYEVALUATIONREPORT.THISMODIFICATIONWILLNOTDEGRADEANYEXISTINGFIREBARRIERSNORWILLITDEGRADEANYEXISTINGFIREPROTECTIONSYSTEMSORCOMPONENTS.THEMODIFICATIONCONFORMSTOCOMMITMENTSMADE,ANDARETHOSENECESSARYTOACHIEVECOMPLIANCEWITHAPPENDIXRANDTHEREBYASSURESAFESHUTDOWNFOLLOWINGALLPOSTULATEDFIRES.THISMODIFICATIONWILLNOTAFFECTANYPREVIOUSANALYSESCONCERNINGFLOODSORSTORMS.POTENTIALFLOODINGOFTHERHRPUMPSSHALLNOTBEGREATERTHANEXISTINGASSPECIFIEDINTHEDESIGNCRITERIA.

THEFIRESUPPRESSIONSYSTEMISCLASSIFIEDASNON-NUCLEARSAFETYCLASSBUTTHEPIPINGTOBEINSTALLEDWILLBEDESIGNEDSOTHATTHEFAILUREDURINGASEISMICEVENTWILLNOTCAUSEDAMAGETOANYSAFETYRELATEDEQUIPMENT.THISMODIFICATIONWILLNOTDEGRADEEXISTINGSEISMICSYSTEMSORSTRUCTURES.THEVENTILATIONSYSTEMISCLASSIFIEDASANON-NUCLEARSAFETYCLASSBUTTHEFIREDAMPERINSTALLATIONWILLBEDESIGNEDSOTHATFAILUREDURINGASEISMICEVENTWILLNOTCAUSEDAMAGETOANYSAFETYRELATEDEQUIPMENT.THISMODIFICATIONWILLNOTDEGRADEEXISTINGSEISMICSYSTEMSORSTRUCTURES.RELOCATEDELECTRICALCIRCUITSSHALLBEREINSTALLEDSEISMICCATEGORYI,HENCETHISMODIFICATIONWILLNOTDEGRADEEXISTINGSEISMICSYSTEMSORSTRUCTURES.THEREFORE,THEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED'HEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS~ANDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDFORTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTED.THEPROBABILITYOFOCCURRENCEANDTHECONSEQUENCESOFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTIONOFEQUIPMENTIMPORTANTTOSAFETYPREVIOUSLYEVALUATEDINTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORTARENOTINCREASED.THEPOSSIBILITYOFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTIONOFATYPEDIFFERENTFROMANYPREVIOUSLYEVALUATEDZNTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORTHASNOTBEENCREATED.THEMARGINOFSAFETYASDEFINEDINTHEBASISFORANYTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONISNOTREDUCED.THEREFORE,THEPROPOSEDMODIFICATIONDOESNOTINVOLVEANUNREVIEWEDSAFETYQUESTION.NOCHANGESTOTHETECHNICALSPECIFICATIONSAREREQUIREDASTHERESULTOFTHEMODIFICATIONTOMAINTAINTHEPRESENTMARGINSOFSAFETY.

EWR-4276FLUXMAPPINGSEISMICRESTRAINTTHISEWR(ENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST)ADDRESSESTHEWORKINVOLVESSEISMICALLYANALYZINGGINNA'SRESTRAINTOFTHEFLUXMAPPINGSYSTEM,ANDPERFORMINGMODIFICATIONSWHERENECESSARYTOUPGRADETHEEXISTINGSTRUCTURE.THISRESTRAINSUPPORTSTHE10PATHTRANSFERDEVXCESANDISOLATIONVALVESWHICHISLOCATEDDIRECTLYABOVETHESEALTABLE.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORYGUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICA-TIONARE')DECREASEINREACTORCOOLANTINVENTORYDUETOASMALLLOCAB)FIRESC)SEISMICEVENTSBASEDUPONTHEANALYSESDESCRIBEDUNDERPARAGRAPH3.1TO4'OFTHESAFETYANALYSIS'THASTHEREFORE'EENDETERMINEDTHATTHEMARGINOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHESTATIONARENOTREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENDETERMINEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES,SYSTEMANDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSAREADEQUATE.EWR4330FEEDWATERPUMPRECIRCULATIONSYSTEMTHEPURPOSEOFTHISMODIFICATIONISTOIDENTIFYANDRESOLVETHECAUSEOFDEGRADATIONINTHEFEEDWATERPUMPRECIRCULATIONSYSTEM.DEGRADATIONHASBEENIDENTIFIEDINTHERECIRCULATIONVALVES4253(CV-19),4262(CV-18)ANDIN,THEPIPINGDOWNSTREAMOFTHESEVALVES.DEGRADATIONHASALSOBEENFOUNDINSUPPORTSONTHEMAINFEEDWATERRECIRCULATIONANDFEEDWATERCLEANUPLINESENCOREDIN-CONCRETE.EXCESSIVEIMPELLERWEARINTHEMAINFEEDPUMPSHASOCCURREDCONSISTENTLY.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORYGUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICA-TIONARE:LOSSOFNORMALFEEDWATERANDHIGHENERGYLINEBREAKSOUTSIDECONTAINMENT.MODIFICATIONREQUIREDBYDESIGNCRXTERIAWILLNOTINCREASETHEPROBABILITYOFALOSSOFNORMALFEEDWATERANDHIGHENERGYLINEBREAKSOUTSIDEOFCONTAINMENT-'

THEDESIGNANDMATERIALSUSEDINTHISMODIFICATIONWILLMEETAPPENDIX>>R>>REQUIREMENTSBASEDUPON10CFR50APPENDIXRANDENGINEERINGPROCEDUREANDWILLNOTINCREASETHEPROBABILITYOFA,FIRE.MODIFICATIONTOTHEFEEDWATERSYSTEMSWILLNOTDEGRADEPERFORMANCEORFUNCTIONOFANYPLANTEQUIPMENTORSYSTEM.BASEDUPONTHEABOVEANALYSIS:1)STRUCTURES,SYSTEMS,ANDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSAREADEQUATE.2)MARGINOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATING'NDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHE'LIFEOFTHESTATIONARENOTREDUCED.BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTHEREQUIREMENTSOFGZNNASTATIONTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONS,ITHASBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES~SYSTEMS'NDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODIFICATION..EWR-4346WIDERANGEPRTPRESSUREINSTRUMENTATIONTHISENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSESTHEMODIFICATIONTOTHEWIDERANGEPRESSURIZERRELIEFTANK(PRT)PRESSUREINSTRUMENTATIONANDTOTHERCSWIDERANGEPRESSUREINSTRUMENTATION.EWR-4346WILLREPLACETHEEXISTINGP440PRESSURETRANSMITTER,SIGNALPROCESSING,ANDMAINCONTROLBOARD(MCB)INDICATORSWITHMODERNINSTRUMENTSTHATARECAPABLEOFMONITORINGPRTPRESSUREUPTOTHERATINGOFTHEPRTRUPTUREDISC(100PSIG)."EWR-4346WASWRITTENINRESPONSETOHUMANENGINEERINGDISCREPANCIES(HED)f0056AND40407.THEHEDSREQUIRETHEINSTALLATIONOFANEWWIDERANGEPRTPRESSUREINDICATORONTHEMCBBYJUNE1988.

THEEXISTINGPRTPRESSURETRANSMITTERSINDICATORSgPOWERSUPPLYgANDBISTABLESWILLBEREPLACEDANDSCALEDTOACHIEVETHENEWREQUIREDRANGE.SINCETHEPRTRUPTUREDISCRATINGIS100PSIGgTHENEWPRTPRESSUREINSTRUMENTATIONRANGEWILLBE0TO150PSIGTOENSURETHATTHEPRTRUPTUREDISCRATINGPLUSANYASSOCIATEDUNCERTAINTIESARECOMPLETELYENVELOPED.ONEOFTHEINDICATORSWILLBERE-SCALEDTOTHENEWWIDERANGESPANANDTHEOTHERWILLREMAINANARROWRANGEINSTRUMENTFORMONITORINGPRTPRESSUREUNDERNORMALOPERATINGCONDI-TIONS.THISMODIFICATIONWILLREQUIRETHEINSTALLATIONOFNEWSCALINGMODULESINTOANINSTRUMENTRACKINTHERELAYROOM.THEPI-440ADISABLESWITCHSHALLBEDELETEDFROMTHEPRTPRESSUREINSTRUMENTATION.ALSOINCLUDEDINTHESCOPEOFTHISEWRISTHEINSTALLATIONOFTWONEWVERTICALSCALEINDICATORSTODISPLAYRCSWIDERANGEPRESSUREONTHEMCB.PRESENTLY,RCSWIDERANGEPRESSUREISDISPLAYEDONSTRIPCHARTRECORDERS'PR-420ANDPR-429ONTHEMCBFRONT,ANDAVERTICALSCALEINDICATORONTHEREAROFTHEMCB.READABILITYOFTHEEXISTINGCHARTRECORDERSISPOOR/THEREFORE'ERTICALSCALEINDICATORSFORDISPLAYOFRCSWIDERANGEPRESSUREWILLBEADDEDTOTHEFRONTOFTHEMCB.THEINDICATORONTHEMCBREARWASINSTALLEDUNDEREWR-3067(MINORMOD)FORUSEWITHTHEOVERPRESSURZZATZONSYSTEMANDTHEREACTORHEADVENTVALVES,ANDSHALLREMAINTOPERFORMTHATFUNCTION.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.G-UIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONARE1)MAJORANDMINORFIRES~2)ASEISMICEVENTS3)PIPEBREAKSINSIDETHECONTAINMENTBUILDING.THEFIRSTEVENTCONSIDEREDIS"MAJORANDMINORFIRES".NEWWIRINGANDCABLEMAYBEREQUIREDFORTHISMODIFICATIONWHICHCOULDADDTOTHEFIRELOADINGOFTHEPLANTgTHEREFORE/THEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATALLSUCHCABLEMEETTHEIEEE-383-1974FLAMETESTREQUIREMENTS.BECAUSEOFTHISTHEREWILLBENOSIGNIFICANTINCREASEOFFIRELOADINGCAUSEDBYTHISMODIFICATION.THISMODIFICATIONHASBEENREVIEWEDTOENSURETHATFAILUREOFANYELECTRICALCABLEINSTALLEDASAPARTOFTHISMODIFICATIONWILLNOTRESULTINTHEDISABLINGOFVITALEQUIPMENTNEEDEDTOSAFELYSHUTDOWNTHEPLANTDURINGPOSTULATEDFIRES'HUSgTHEMODIFICATION-NEITHERINCREASESTHECONSEQUENCES/NORDOESITREDUCETHEMARGINSOFSAFETYFOR"MAJORANDMINORFIRES".

THESECONDEVENTCONSIDEREDIS"ASEISMICEVENTTHEPRESSUREBOUNDARYPORTIONSOFTHEPRTPRESSUREINSTRU-MENTATIONAREDESIGNATEDNONSEISMICCATEGORYI"/HOWEVER~ANYMODIFICATIONTOTHISSYSTEMWHOSEFAILURECOULDCAUSEDAMAGETOSAFETYRELATED'QUIPMENTWILLBEDESIGNEDTOMEETTHEREQUIREMENTS.OFUSNRCREGULATORYGUIDE1.29,REVISIONC.2.THERCSWIDERANGEPRESSUREINSTRUMENTATIONISDESIGNATEDSEISMICCATEGORYI'HEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUXRESTHATALLNEWRCSWIDERANGEPRESSUREINSTRUMENTATIONBEQUALIFIEDANDINSTALLEDPERIEEE3441975'HEREFORE'SEXSMICEVENTWILLNOTIMPACTTHEPROPEROPERATIONOFTHERCSWIDERANGEPRESSUREINSTRUMENTATION.THUS/THEMODIFICATIONNEITHERINCREASESTHECONSEQUENCESgNORDOESITREDUCETHEMARGINSOFSAFETYFOR"ASEISMIC*EVENTTHETHIRDEVENTCONSIDEREDIS~tPIPEBREAKSINSIDETHECONTAINMENTBUILDING".THENEWPRESSURETRANSMITTERWILLINTERFACEWITHTHEEXISTING3/8INCHPRTPRESSURESENSINGLINEINTHESAMEMANNERASDOESTHEEXISTINGPRESSURETRANSMITTER.THEREFORETHISMODIFICA-TIONDOESNOTINTRODUCEANYNEWFAILUREMODESCONCERNINGPIPEBREAKSINSIDETHECONTAINMENTBUILDING.THUS,THISMODIFICATIONNEITHERINCREASESTHECONSEQUENCES'ORDOESITREDUCETHEMARGINSOFSAFETYFOR"PIPEBREAKSINSIDETHECONTAINMENTBUILDING".ITHASBEENDETERMINEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSXENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENDETERMINEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS,ANDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODIFI-CATION.(20)

EWR4543PT-32.2TESTCABLEINSTALLATIONTHISPROPOSEDMODIFICATIONWILLPROVIDEANALTERNATECONTROLCABLETOBEDEDICATEDTOPORVTESTINGCONTROLCIRCUITS.THEDEDICATEDCABLEWILLCONNECTRACKR2INTHECONTROLROOMTOTHENEWTESTBOXLOCATEDNEARTHETOPOFTHEPRESSURIZERCUBICLE.SPECIFICALLY,EXISTINGSPARECIRCUITSR881ANDR882WILLBEUSEDTOACCOMPLISHTHEREQUIREDCONNECTIONS.ANEWTESTBOXWILLBEINSTALLEDANDONENEWTHREECONDUCTORCABLEWILLBEINSTALLEDTOACHIEVETHEDESIREDTESTBOXLOCATIONNEARTOPOFPRESSURIZER.THEADDITIONOFTHETESTBOXSERVESTWOPURPOSES'ONETOPROVIDEACONVENIENTRECEPTACLEFORPT-32.2TESTLEADSANDITWILLREDUCETHECABLERUNWITHINCONTAINMENT.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYNRCREGULATORYGUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATINGTOTHISMODIFIC-ATIONAREFIRE,SEISMICANDSMALLLOCAEVENTS.THEFIRSTEVENTANALYZEDISTHEEFFECTOFASEISMICEVENT.THEONLYHARDWAREASSOCIATEDWITHTHISMODIFICATIONISTHEANCHORAGEOFCONDUITANDATESTBOXNEARTOPOFTHEPRES-SURIZER.THEPROPOSEDTESTBOXANDCONDUITWILLBEMOUNTEDCONSISTENTWITHTHEC2REQUIREMENTSOFREGULATORYGUIDE1.29.THUSTHECONSEQUENCESOFAFAILUREDUETOASEISMICEVENTAREMITIGATED.THESECONDEVENTANALYZEDISTHEEFFECTOFAFIREONTHEPLANTDUETOTHISMODIFICATION.THECONTROLWIRINGFORTHECONNECTIONBETWEENTHER2RACKINTHECONTROLROOMANDTHETESTBOXLOCATEDATTHEPRESSURIZERCUBICLEISREQUIREDTOMEETREQUIREMENTSOFIEEESTD383-1984FLAMETEST.THUSTHEREISNOSIGNIFICANTINCREASEINTHEFIRELOADINGDUETOTHISMODIFICATION.THETHIRDEVENTANALYZEDISTHEEFFECTOFASMALLLOCAONTHEPLANTCAUSEDBYANINADVERTENTPORVOPERATIONDUETOTHISPROPOSEDMODIFICATION.THISPROPOSEDMODIFICATIONWILLNOTCONNECTTHETESTBOXTOTHEPORV'S;THEONLYTIMETHETWOWILLBECONNECTEDISDURINGSHUTDOWNWHENTESTINGANDTIMINGOFPORV'SISPERFORMED.THEREFORE,THECONSEQUENCESOFASMALLLOCADUETOTHISMODIFICATIONAREMITIGATED.

THEREFOREgBASEDUPONTHEABOVEANALYSISgITHASBEENDETERMINEDTHAT:A)THEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHESTATIONARENOTREDUCEDANDB)THESTRUCTURESgSYSTEMSgANDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSAREADEQUATE.-EWR-4640HU-1TRANSFORMERDIFFERENTIALRELAYMODIFICATIONTHISENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSESTHEMODIFICATIONWHICHMODIFIESTHEHU-1DIFFERENTIALRELAYSFORTRANSFORMERSNO.1,llAND12A.THEHU-1RELAYMODIFICATIONWILLLOWERTHETHRESHOLDOFRESTRAINTFORTHEHARMONICRESTRAINTUNITFROM154TO7.5%.ARESISTORWILLBECONNECTEDINPARALLELWITHTHEHARMONICRESTRAINTUNITOPERATECOIL(TOPUNIT),REDUCINGTHEPOTENTIALFORSPURIOUSOPERATIONRESULTINGFROMINRUSHHARMONICSDURINGENERGIZATION.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYNRCREGULATORYGUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICA-TIONAREFIRE,ANDEARTHQUAKE,LOSSOFOFFSITEPOWERANDLOSSOFELECTRICALLOAD.THISMODIFICATIONCONSISTSOFWIRINGANDCOMPONENTREPLACEMENTINTERNALTOTHEHU-1RELAYCASE.THEREISNOINCREASE'NCOMBUSTIBLEMATERIALANDNOINCREASEDPOTENTIALFORFIRE.THISMODIFICATIONISCLASSIFIEDNON-lEWHICHISCONSISTENTWITHTHECLASSIFICATIONOFTHETRANSFORMERSANDTHEEMERGENCYOFFSITEPOWERSYSTEM.THISMODIFICATIONDOESNOTDEGRADETHEABILITYOFTHERELAYTOPROVIDEITSPROTECTIONFUNCTION.THEREFORE,THEABILITYOFCLASS1ESYSTEMTOOPERATEPROPERLYDURINGASEISMICEVENTWILLNOTBEIMPAIRED.(22) 0 UPONLOSSOFELECTRICALLOAD,AUXILIARYLOADSAREAUTOMATIC-ALLYTRANSFERREDFROMTHE11TOTHE12ATRANSFORMER.THEPURPOSEOFTHISMODIFICATIONISTODECREASETHEPOTENTIALFORINAPPROPRIATEOPERATIONOFTHEDIFFERENTIALRELAYWHILEMAINTAININGTHEORIGINALTRANSFORMERPROTECTIONFUNCTIONOFTHERELAY.THECONSEQUENCEOFAFAILUREOFTHEPROPOSEDRESISTORADDITIONHASALSOBEENEVALUATEDANDHASBEENDETERMINEDTOBENEGLIGIBLE.SPECIFICALLY,IFTHERESISTORSHOULDOPENSTHEHU1RELAYWILLREVERTBACKTOA15%'ESTRAINTWHICHISTHEWAYTHERELAYOPERATEDPRIORTOTHEMODIFICATION.THECONSEQUENCESASSOCIATEDWITHTHERESISTORSHORTINGHAVEALSOBEENEVALUATED.ITHASBEENDETERMINEDTHATSHORTWOULDPRECLUDETHERELAYFROMOPERATINGSPURIOUS-LY.THISISANACCEPTABLEFAILUREMODEEVENIFADIFFERENTIALOPERATION'SREQUIREDBECAUSETHESYSTEMCONSISTSOFTHREESEPARATEHU-1RELAYSANDANYONEOFWHICHWILLINITIATEATRIP~THEMARGINOFSAFETY'NTERMSOFPROBABILITYOFLOSSOFOFFSITEPOWERFROMINAPPROPRIATERELAYOPERATION,ISINCREASED'ANDTHEDESIGNADEQUACYAS.DOCUMENTEDINTHEUFSAR'SNOTAFFECTED.ITHASBEENDETERMINEDTHATTHEMA'RGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTWILLNOTBEREDUCED.THEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMSANDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDFORTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODIFICATION.-EWR4657UPGRADEOFSERVICEBUILDINGSTRUCTURALTOSUPPORTPCMSHIELDINGTHISENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSESTHESTRUCTURALUPGRADEOFTHESERVICEBUILDINGTOSUPPORTPERSONNELCONTAMINATIONMONITOR(S)(PCM)SHIELDING.THEPROPOSED.MODIFICATIONWILLUPGRADETHESERVICEBUILDINGFLOORSTRUCTURALTOPROVIDETHENECESSARYADDEDSTRENGTHREQUIREDTORESIST.THEADDITIONALLOADDUETOTHEINSTALLATIONOFLEADSHIELDINGAROUNDTHEPCM'SINTHEMEN'SDECONTAMXNATIONAREA.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYTHEUSNRCREGULATORYGUIDE1.70.SEISMICEVENTSNEEDNOTBECONSIDEREDFORTHXSEWRBECAUSETHESERVICEBUILDINGISCLASSIFIEDASNON-SEISMIC.ZNADDITION,THEMODIFICATIONWILLNOTREQUIRETHEREPOSITIONZNGOFINSTRUMENTATIONgCONTROLSgOROTHERCOMPONENTSASSOCIATEDWITHSAFETYRELATEDSYSTEMS.(23)

ALLEXISTINGFIREPROTECTIONFEATURESREQUIREDTOASSURECOMPLIANCEWITH10CFR50gAPPENDIXRgORTOMAINTAINEQUIVALENTLEVELSOFPROTECTIONFROMFIRESWILLBEMAINTAINEDDURINGANDFOLLOWINGTHESTRUCTURALUPGRADEMODIFICATXONS.REVISION1TOTHISDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISINCORPORATECHANGESTOREFERENCERG&EUFSARREVISION2gDECEMBER1986".BASEDONTHEEVALUATIONSABOVE,THEREWILLBENOCHANGESTOMARGINSOFSAFETYANDADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS'NDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSWILLNOTBEDIMINISHED.THEPROBABILITYOFOCCURRENCEORTHECONSEQUENCESOFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTIONOFEQUIPMENTIMPORTANTTOSAFETY,PREVIOUSLYEVALUATEDINTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORT,WILLNOTBEINCREASEDBYTHEPROPOSEDADDITION.THEPOSSIBILITYOFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTIONOFADIFFERENTTYPEOTHERTHANANYEVALUATEDPREVIOUSLYONTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORTWILLNOTBECREATEDBYTHESEPROPOSEDMODIFICATIONS.EWR-4674S.I.PUMPMOTORGANTRYHOISTTHISENGINEERINGWORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSESTHEDESIGNANDINSTALLATIONOFAPORTABLELIFTINGGANTRYHOISTASSEMBLYFORUSEINREMOVALOFS.I.PUMPSAND/ORMOTORSFORMAINTENANCE.THISDEVICEZSDESIGNEDFOREASYDISASSEMBLYWITHTHEGANTRIES(SUPPORTINGLEGS)BOLTEDTOAMONORAILANDTOTHECONCRETEFLOORTOPROVIDEANCHORAGEANDSUPPORT.XTWXLLNORMALLYBYUSEDONLYWHENMAINTENANCEISTOBEPERFORMEDDURINGAPLANTSHUTDOWN.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORYGUIDE1'0'EISMICEVENTSNEEDNOTBECONSIDEREDFORUSEOFTHISGANTRYHOISTBECAUSEITWILLNOTNORMALLYBELEFTINPLACEDURINGPOWEROPERATION.ADDITIONALLYITISDESIGNEDANDFABRICATEDTOBEANCHOREDTOTHEFLOORWHENINPLACEOVERONESAFETYINJECTIONPUMP.THEREFORE,ITWILLNOTCREATEAHAZARDTOOTHERSAFETY-RELATEDEQUIPMENTDURINGITSUSE.BOTHTHEGANTRIESANDTHEMONORAILTHEYSUPPORTWILLBEREMOVEDFOLLOWINGMAINTENANCEACTIVITIES.(24)

USEOFTHEHOISTWILLBEADMINISTRATIVELYCONTROLLEDUNDERMAINTENANCEWORKPROCEDURESORUNDERTHETEMPORARYMODIFICA-TIONCONTROLPROGRAMSA14061gTOENSURE1)COMPLIANCEWITHTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONREQUIREMENTSAND2)THATONLYONETRAINOFEQUIPMENTISAFFECTEDBYITSINSTALLATION.BASEDONTHEEVALUATIONSABOVE,THEREWILLBENOCHANGESTOMARGINSOFSAFETYANDADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS'NDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSWILLNOTBEDIMIN-ISHED.THEPROBABILITYOFOCCURRENCEORTHECONSEQUENCESOFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTIONOFEQUIPMENTIMPORTANT*TOSAFETY,PREVIOUSLYEVALUATEDINTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORT,WILLNOTBEINCREASEDBYTHEPROPOSEDUSEOFTHISGANTRYHOIST.THEPOSSXBILITYOFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTIONOFADIFFERENTTYPEOTHERTHANANYEVALUATEDPREVIOUSLYONTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORTWILLNOTBECREATEDBYTHISPROPOSEDMODIFI-CATION.TSR-88-08FIREPROTECTIONYARDLOOPISOLATIONVALVESTHETECHNICALSTAFFREQUEST(TSR)ADDRESSESTHEMODIFICATIONOFTHEFIREPROTECTIONYARDLOOPTOINCLUDENEWISOLATIONVALVES.THEINSTALLATIONOFSIX(6)ADDITIONAL'ECTIONALIZZNGMANUALGATEVALVESONTHEDOMESTICWATERSYSTEMWILLPROVIDESEGMENTISOLATIONWITHOUTTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONSYSTEMIMPAIRMENTSANDIMPROVETHERELIABILITYOFTHEDOMESTICWATERSUPPLYSYSTEM.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDZNTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRINGANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORYGUIDE1.70.THEPROPOSEDMODIFICATIONDOESNOTAFFECTTHEPLANTTRANSXENTSANDACCIDENTSDESCRIBEDIN-CHAPTER15OF'THEUFSAR.THEMODIFICATIONDOESRELATETOTHEPLANTDESIGNASDESCRIBEDINCHAPTER3OFTHEUFSAR.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATIONAREFIRESANDTORNADOSANDWINDLOADING.(25)

THEFIREPROTECTIONYARDLOOPPROVIDESABACKUPSOURCEOF.COOLINGWATERZNTHEEVENTTHATSERVICEWATERISLOST.ITPROVIDESABACKUPAUXILIARYFEEDWATERSOURCEFORTHECON-.DENSATESTORAGETANKSFORTHEMOTORDRIVENAUXILIARYFEEDWATERORTURBINEDRIVENAUXILIARYFEEDWATERSYSTEMAND'BACKUPFORTHECONDENSATESUPPLYTANKFORTHESTANDBYAUXILIARYFEEDWATERSYSTEM.ITCANBEUSEDTOPROVIDECOOLINGWATERTOTHEEMERGENCYDIESELGENERATORSIFALLSERVICEWATERWERETOBELOST.THESTANDBYAUXILIARYFEEDWATERSYSTEMPROVIDESDECAYHEATREMOVALFUNCTIONINTHEEVENTOFATORNADOSTRIKE.OTHERMETHODSAREASSUMEDUNAVAILABLE.THEYARDLOOPCANBECONNECTEDFOLLOWINGDEPLETIONOFTHE10i000GALLONCONDENSATESUPPLYTANK..INTHEEVENTTHESCREENHOUSEWERELOSTDUETOTORNADOSTRIKE,THEYARDLOOPCANBEUSEDTOPROVIDEABACKUPSOURCEOFAUXILIARYFEEDWATERFORDECAYHEATREMOVALANDEMERGENCYDIESELCOOLINGBYUSEOFCONNECTIONSAVAILABLEINTHESEAREAS.THEINSTALLATIONOFTHEISOLATIONVALVESWILLNOTAFFECTTHEDESIGNOROPERATIONOFTHE-YARDLOOPFORTHECASESDESCRIBEDBECAUSETHEVALVESWILLBE.USEDFORISOLATIONPURPOSED,AREMANUALVALVES,ANDDONOTAFFECTTHECONNECTIONSTOTHECONDENSATESUPPLYTANKiCONDENSATESTORAGETANKSiEMERGENCYDIESELGENERATORROOMCONNECTIONSORSERVICEBUILDINGAUXILIARYFEEDWATERCONNECTION.OPERABILITYOFTHEYARDSYSTEMWILLBEIMPROVEDWITHTHEINSTALLATIONOFTHEVALVES.THEREFOREiTHEMETHODSOFCOMPLIANCEWITHTHEAPPENDIXRALTERNATIVESHUTDOWNSYSTEMISNOTAFFECTED.BECAUSETHECONNECTIONSTOTHESTANDBY.AUXILIARYFEEDWATERCONDENSATESUPPLYTANK,AUXILIARYFEEDWATERCONDENSATESTORAGETANKS,ANDEMERGENCYDIESELGENERATORPIPINGISNOTCHANGED,ANDTHELOOPINTEGRITYWILLBEMAINTAINEDTHROUGHTHEEXISTINGTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONSURVEILLANCEANDOPERABILITYREQUIREMENTS,ITISCONCLUDEDTHATTHEDESIGNOFSTRUCTURES,SYSTEMSANDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEMARGINOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDANDTHEADEQUACYOFTHESESTRUCTURESiSYSTEMSANDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDTOMITIGATETHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSISNOTDECREASED.THEPROBABILITYOFOCCURRENCEOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFANACCIDENT-ORMALFUNCTIONOF'QUIPMENTIMPORTANTTOSAFETYiPREVIOUSLYEVALUATEDINTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORT,WILLNOTBEINCREASEDBECAUSETHECONNECTIONSPROVIDEDFORYARDLOOPTIEINSARENOTAFFECTEDANDiTHEREFORE'ROCEDURALREQUIREMENTSFORTHISBACKUPSYSTEMWILLSTILLBEMAINTAINED.(26)

THEPOSSIBILITYOFOCCURRENCEOFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTIONOFADIFFERENTTYPETHANANYTYPEPREVIOUSLYEVALUATEDINTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORTWILLNOTBECREATEDBECAUSETHEINTEGRITYOFTHEYARDLOOPWILLBEMAINTAINEDINACCORDANCEWITHTHETECHNICALSPECIFICATIONSURVEILLANCEANDOPERABILITYREQUIREMENTS.THEMARGINOFSAFETYASDEFINEDINTHEBASISFORANYTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONWILLNOTBEREDUCED,BECAUSETHESEREQUIREMENTSARENOTBEINGALTEREDBYTHEMODIFICATION.BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTHEREQUIREMENTSOFGINNASTATIONTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONS,ITHASBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONSANDTRANSIENTCONDITIONSANTICIPATEDDURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDEDTHATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS~ANDCOMPONENTSPROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTSANDTHEMITIGATIONOFTHECONSEQUENCESOFACCIDENTSHAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHISMODIFICATION.(27)

SECTIONB-COMPLETEDSTATIONMODIFICATIONS(SMs)Thissectioncontainsadescriptionofstationmodificationproceduresperformedinthefacilityasdescribedinthesafetyanalysisreport.StationmodificationproceduresarewrittentocompleteaportionofanEngineeringWorkRequest(EWR)identifiedbythesameparentnumber.StationModificationsarereviewedbythePlantOperationsReviewCommitteetoensurethatnounreviewedsafetyquestionsorTechnicalSpecificationchangesareinvolvedwiththeprocedure.ThebasisforinclusionofanSMinthissectionisclosureoftheSMwhereportionsoftheparentEWR,intheformofotherSMsorotherdocumentation,remaintobecompleted.

SM-1594.5REMOVALOFREVERSEOSMOSISR.O.TANKANDASSOCIATEDCOMPONENTSFROMTHEAUXILIARYBUILDINGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEREMOVALOFTHEREVERSEOSMOSISTANKANDASSOCIATEDEQUIPMENTFROMTHEAUXILIARYBUILDING.SM-1594.10SPENTFUELPOOLCOOLINGSYSTEMELECTRICALEUIPMENTANDCONDUITINSTALLATIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONANDTURNOVEROFTHESPENTFUELPOOLCOOLINGSYSTEMELECTRICALEQUIPMENT,CONDUITANDSUPPORTS.SM-1594.12FLUSHANDHYDROSTATICTESTOFNEWSPENTFUELPOOLCOOLINGSYSTEMTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREIS1)TOCONTROLFLUSHANDHYDROSTATICTESTINGOFTHENEWSPENTFUELPOOLCOOLINGSYSTEMAND2)PROVIDEINITIALVALVELINE-UPFOREXISTINGANDNEWSPENTFUELPOOLCOOLINGSYSTEMS'M-1594.13SPENTFUELPOOLCOOLING-SERVICEWATERSYSTEMFLUSHANDHYDROSTATICTESTTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEFLUSHANDHYDROSTATICTESTOFTHENEWSPENTFUELPOOLCOOLINGSYSTEMSERVICEWATERPIPING.SM-2512.117SEISMICUPGRADEOFPIPESUPPORTS-ANALYSISLINECS-150CONTAINMENTSPRAYRISERSECTIONINCONTAINMENTTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTODOCUMENT/DIRECTMODIFICATIONOFCVSPRAYPIPINGSUPPORTSINCONTAINMENT.SM-2512.119STEAMGENERATORLEVELINSTRUMENTATIONTUBINGANDPIPINGSUPPORTSTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONANDTURNOVEROFSUPPORTSFORTHE"A<<STEAMGENERATORLEVELINSTRUMENTATIONTUBINGANDPIPING.SM-2512.120SERVICEWATERPIPINGSUPPORTTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONANDTURNOVEROFAPIPINGSUPPORTONTHESERVICEWATERPUMPDISCHARGEPIPING.

SM-2512.121SEISMICUPGRADEOFPIPESUPPORTS-ANALYSISLINESAFWSTANDBYAUXILIARYFEEDWATERBUILDINGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONANDTURNOVEROFTHESTANDBYAUXILIARYFEEDWATERSUPPORTSA-TRAININTHESAFWBUILDING.SM-2512.122SEISMICUPGRADEOFPIPESUPPORTS-ANALYSISLINESAFW-450-STANDBYAUXILIARYFEEDWATERBUILDINGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONANDTURNOVEROFSTANDBYAUXILIARYFEEDWATERCROSSOVERPIPINGSUPPORTS.SM-2799.21RVLMSRECALIBRATIONTESTINGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHETESTINGOFRVLMSSYSTEMFOLLOWINGRECALIBRATION.SM-2831.1BATTERYROOMRACKSSEISMICRESTRAINTMODIFICATIONTHE"PURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONANDTURNOVEROFBATTERYRACKlAANDBATTERYRACK1BSEISMICRESTRAINTMODIFICATION.SM-2846.1946A>>MSIVSOLENOIDPROTECTIVESTRUCTURETHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION=ANDTURNOVEROFTHEnA"MSIVSOLENOIDPROTECTIVESTRUCTURE.SM-2846.1946AA"MSIVSOLENOIDPROTECTIVESTRUCTUREDOORANDSHIELDPLATESTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLINSTALLATIONOFADOORANDSHIELDPLATESONTHEiiAitMSIVPROTECTIVESTRUCTURE.SM-3092.10BORICACIDPIPINGUPGRADEPHASE2BAPU-MECHANICALREMOVALRECONSTRUCTIONANDRELOCATIONSTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTODOCUMENT/DIRECTPIPINGMODIFICATIONBAPU-PHASE2.

SM-3092.11BORICACIDPIPINGUPGRADE-PHASE2PRE-OUTAGEELECTRICALTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONANDTURNOVEROFTHEPRE-OUTAGEELECTRICALMODIFICATIONFORTHEBORICACIDPIPINGUPGRADE-PHASE2.SM-3092.12BORICACIDPIPINGUPGRADEPHASEIIBAPUELECTRICALREMOVALSRECONSTRUCTIONANDRELOCATIONSTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROL1)THEREMOVALS/REINSTALLATIONSANDTURNOVEROFHEATTRACEZONESANDASSOCIATEDELECTRICALEQUIPMENT~2)THEDETERMINATIONSRETERMINATIONgTESTINGSANDTURNOVEROFSPECIFICMOTOR-OPERATEDVALVES(MOVs).SM-3092.13BORICACIDPIPINGUPGRADEBAPUPHASEIIHEATTRACTTESTINGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHETESTINGANDTURNOVEROFTHEBORICACIDPIPINGUPGRADE(BAPU)PHASEIIHEATTRACESYSTEM.SM-3296.2046INSTALLATIONOFAUXILIARYBUILDINGBACKDRAFTDAMPERSANDSTATIONARYLOUVERSTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOPROVIDEBACKDRAFTPROTECTIONTOPREVENTDAMAGETOTHEAUXILIARYBUILDINGOUTERSHELLDURINGTORNADOWINDCONDITIONS.SM-3319.57MCC-1C15MTHERMALOVERLOADHEATERREPLACEMENTTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOPROVIDEINSTRUCTIONSFORTHERMALOVERLOADHEATERREPLACEMENTATMCC-1C/15MFORMOV-1815A.SM-3319A.1PHASEROTATIONCHECKPRIORTOBREAKERCHANGEOUTONMCC-1B1C1D1E1FAND1KTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDUREISTOPERFORMADOCUMENTEDSURVEYOFPHASEROTATIONONBREAKERSTOBEREPLACEDDURINGTHE1988OUTAGE~ALSOgTHEPHASEROTATIONATTHEFIELDTERMINATIONSFORTHEBORICACIDEVAPORATORPACKAGEANDTHE

AUXILIARYBUILDINGLIGHTING,TRANSFORMER1BWILLBEDOCUMENTED.SM-3319A.7PHASEROTATIONCHECKPRIORTOBREAKERCHANGEOUTATMCC-1FTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTODOCUMENTTHEPHASEROTATIONATBREAKERS,PRIORTOREPLACEMENTATMCC-1F.SM-3755.2P.O.R.V.BLOCKVALVEREPLACEMENT-MECHANICAL.THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEMECHANICALINSTALLATIONREQUIREDFORTHENEWPORVBLOCKVALVESMOV-515ANDMOV-516.SM-3768.4CONTAINMENTPENETRATIONCOOLINGSYSTEM-PIPINGANDINSTRUMENTTUBINGMODIFICATIONSTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONSTESTINGSANDTURNOVEROFPIPINGANDINSTRUMENTTUBINGASSOCIATEDWITHTHEPENETRATIONCOOLINGSYSTEMUPGRADE.SM-3797.7MRPISYSTEMTROUBLESHOOTINGANDREPAIRTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHETROUBLESHOOTING,INSTALLATION,TESTING,ANDTURNOVEROFPROBLEMSFOUNDDURINGOPERATIONOFTHEMRPZSYSTEM.THISINCLUDESCORRECTINGTHE130KHZOSCILLATION,MODIFYINGTHEDATACABINETCARDS'NDINSTALLINGTIMEDELAYSONTHERODDROPRELAYS.SM-3881.3BORICACIDTANKOVERLFOWPIPINGMODIFICATIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONANDTURNOVEROFTHEBORICACIDTANKOVERFLOWPIPINGMODIFICATION.SM-3881.5MOV-897ANDMOV-898FUNCTIONALTESTINGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOPROVIDEINSTRUCTIONSTOPERFORMTHEFUNCTIONALTESTINGOFNEWMOV-897AND898.

SM-3986.22APPENDIXRFIREWRAP-SUPPORTUPGRADETHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREZSTOINSTALLATIONOFFIREWRAPONCONDUITSUPPORTS.SM-3986.23STRUCTURALSTEELMODIFICATIONFORFIREWRAPCONTROLTHETHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONANDTURNOVEROFTHEMODIFICATIONTOTHEINTERMEDIATEBUILDINGSTRUCTURALSTEELANDHANDRAIL'OALLOWFORINSTALLATIONOF'APPENDIXRFIREWRAP.SM-4037.2S.P.I.N.G.TOP.P.C;S.INTERFACELINKTHEPURPOSEOF,THISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONSTESTINGSANDTURNOVEROFTHESPING/PPCSINTERFACEWIRINGANDASSOCIATEDCOMPONENTS.SM-4068.7R.M.S.PUMPANNUNCIATORTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDUREISFORTHER.M.S.ANNUNCIATORHOOKUPINSTALLATION.SM-4075.5INSTALLATIONOFELECTRICHEATINGCOILSINTHET.S.C.HVACSYSTEMTHEPURPOSEOFTHIS.NEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONOFELECTRICALHEATINGCOILS,ANDASSOCIATEDCOMPONENTSINTHET.S.C.HVACSYSTEM.SM-4282.1CVRECIRCULATIONFANCONDENSATECOLLECTORLEVELELECTRICALMODIFICATIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONANDTURNOVEROFCABLES'ONDUITSgANDINSTRUMENTATIONFORTHECVRECIRCULATIONFANCONDENSATECOLLECTORLEVELSYSTEM.SM-4526.18DGFUELOILSYSTEMDAYTANKLEVELINST.CONDUITRUNLOCATIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOINVESTIGATECONDUITROUTINGFORTHED/G*FUELOILSYSTEMMODIFICATIONEWR-4526.(5)

SM-4526.19DGINSTRUMENTTUBXNGSUPPORTSTHE'URPOSEOFTHIS-NEWPROCEDUREXSTOINSTALLTEMPORARYSEISMICSUPPORTS,ONTHEDIESELGENERATORINSTRUMENTTUBING.SM-4554.24AAND4BFEEDWATERHEATERSREPLACEMENTTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOPERFORM4AAND4BLPFEEDWATERHEATERSREPLACEMENT.SM-4618.2PRE-OPERATIONALTESTINGOFTHEMAINFEEDWATERPUMPROOMVENTILATIONSYSTEMTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHETESTINGANDTURNOVEROFTHEMAINFEEDWATERPUMPROOMNEWVENTILATIONSYSTEM.SM-4638.1GENERATORSURGECAPACITORSANDNEUTRALTRANSFORMERREPLACEMENTTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONANDTURNOVEROFREPLACEMENTOFTHEMAINGENERATORSURGECAPACITORSANDNEUTRALTRANSFORMER.SM-4761.2MOV857AAND857BPOWERSUPPLYSWAPOVER'UNCTIONALTESTTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREISTOCONTROLTHETESTINGANDTURNOVEROFTHEMOV857AAND857BPOWERSUPPLYSWAPOVERMODIFICATION.

SECTIONCTEMPORARYBYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTIONgSTRUCTUREFEATURES~SHIELDING~ANDFLUIDSYSTEMFEATURESThissectioncontainsdescriptionsandsummariesofsafetyevaluationsoftemporarychangespursuanttotherequirementsof10CFR50.59(b).

CATEGORYREVIEWEDREFERENCEPROCEDUREA.1402ROCHESTERGASANDELECTRICGINNASTATIONBYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTIONANDJUMPERCONTROLJOBFOREMANJUMPERWIR'n~FUNCTIONDATE:~~-LIFTEDWIRE0FUSESPULLED04ITE<cv4REQUEST¹:ifM~~~dSTATESBLOCK+OTME(OvJE'E.C~41~+rLEoiq$+IuCo~gPURPOSEJul+(W<woc-ps-z7~-P3'OCATiOW:r.c.O47re~J,~rEvo/~C~>~eelSAFETYEVALUATIONREQUIRED:Q'ES0NOPORCDATE(IFREQUIRED);>4TECHNICALMANAGER:SHIFTSUPERVISOR:13M7~SKETCHATTACHED:0YES0NODATB~OEE--DATEoINSTALLATIONDATE&TIMEENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSINSLINSTALLEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:md.c<REVIEW(ASNECESSARY)REMOVALDATE&TIME:/NUMBEROFTAGSREMOVED:REMOVEDBY~k~Jl>E~VERIFIEDBY:AX~rgP21989QAAttachadditionalpage(s)asnecessary'49'lEEAEVAE/88';,

PAGE2ANDTHECOMMITTEEHASDETERMINEDTHATNOTECHNICALSPECIFI-CATIONCHANGESORVIOLATIONSWEREINVOLVEDANDTH%KARENOUNREVIEWEDSAFETYQUESTIONS~THEFOLLOWINGDOCUMENTATIONISPROVIDEDASJUSTIFICATIONFORCOMPLIANCEWITH10CFR50.59.

REFERENCES:

GINNASTATIONQhMANUALJUSTIFICATION:THEMDHELECTROMETERSUPPLEMENTSOURCURRENTLYAPPROVEDLEVELIITESTEQUIPMENTFORCALIBRATIONOFSOURCES'HISINSTRUMENTWASPURCHASEDINCOMPLIANCEWITHSECTIONVIIOFTHEQA'AhOALANDISUSEDINCOMPLIANCEWITHSECTIONVZZZOFTHEKCaMHBXS.3'.0-88-116-002~~~88-4391THEPROC.SPEC.PRESENTEDTHISNEWPROCEDURE:THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDUREZSTOMEETPORCAPPROVEDGUIDANCEFORSUCHTESTS.THECOMMITTEEREVIEWEDTHEPROCEDUR~STEPBYSTEP'ANDRECOMMENDEDAPPROVALOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE.THEABOVEITEMWASREVIEWEDBYTHECOMMITTEEWITHRESPECTTOTHETECHNICALSPECZFZCATZONSANDTHECOMMITTEEHASDETERMINEDTHATNOTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONCHANGESORVIOLATIONSWEREINVOLVEDANDTHERE.ARENOUK%VIEWEDSAFETYQUESTIONS~THESTPROCEDUREINCLUDESSAFETYANALYSISTOCOMPLYWITH50.59-9.0OTf654DISCUSSION91.0-88-116-001ThEREACTORENGINEERPRESENTEDASAFETYEVALUATIONFORBYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTIONANDJUMPERCONTROLNUMBER88-68'HEJUMPERCONTROLWILLCONNECTARECORDERTOTHETESTPOINTSOFTHE-ACCUMULATORLEVELTRANSMITTERLT-935'HISTEMPORARYCONNECTIONWILLNOTCREATEANUNREVZEWEDSAFETYQ"~*kSOIRHXE.ALLOFTHEABOVEITEMSWEREREVIEWEDBYTHECOMMITTEEWITHRESPECT

PAGE3TOTHETECHNICALSPEClFICATIONSANDTHECOMMITTEE.HASDETERMINEDTHATNOTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONCHANGESORVIOLATIONSWEREINVOLVEDINTHECHANGESANDTHEREARENOUNREVIEWEDSAFETYQUESTIONS~'.HECHAIRMANADJOURNEDTHEMEETING..>>'.~~>>(,-l/a.JOYCEWRIGHTvPORCSECRETARYAPPROVEDBY:STM.ECTORSUPERINTENDENTK.NASSAVERQCENGINEERil~>>4~>>pI~~(Plllf4

CATEGORYEVIEWEDREFERENCEPROCEDUREA.1422gP'OCHESTERGASANDELECTRIC4,i-'II'INNASTATIONt.BYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTIONANDJUMPERCONTROITj"'OBFOREMAN'4C/DATE:/0I"ggREQUEST0:0.<h-7oJUMPERWIRE0LIFTEDWIREgFUNCTIONPT17-P9F'RFUSESPULLED0STATESBLOCK001HER0RiBAiu~mco~7Cgs<AiPURPOSE9+-7JAgeRerAJ&S'R7-39b7-2rgpggPSKETCHATTACHED:5YES0NODA1E:DATE:LOCATION:~~+<~wacoRa7CZnc.<SAFETYEVALUATIONREQUIRED:IYES"0NOI'OIICDAIE(IIIIEGUIIlED).'...ZP-2r.5"-.8')1ECHNICALMANAGER:.orArarSHIFTSUPERVISOR:INSTALLATIONDATE&TIME/"g0)5A~2IENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;1'~4NUMBEROFTAGSINTALLED:INSTALLEDBY:VERIFIEDBY'EMOVALDATE&TIME'NTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;~+NUMBEROFTAGSREMOVED:REMOVEDBY'ERIFIEDBY:REVIEW(ASNECESSARY)AUGQh.SposlnoN-5YfgAttachadditionalpage(s)asnecessary

SAFETYEVALUATZOSUEYFOgyp~8FSOFifr~FPNuJM~kgu<~PQIIExclusionfromScreeninCriteria-Items1,2,or6If"yes"isansweredforitems1or2,providethetypeof"inconsequentialchange"orthereferenced-lOCFR50.59safetyevaluationbelow:If"no"isansweredforItem6,providebasisforexclusionbelow:Bas'sfoxclusion:OC505atvuato<<Item7.If"no"hasbeenansweredforeachquestioninitems7athrough7gthischangeisnotan'nreviewedSafetyQuestion.Document:theJustificationfortheseconclusionsbelow.Listmaterialreferencedinthespaceprovidedasappropiiate.WrittenJusticatio:Mci~necee:cJnrIf"yes",PORCshallreviewandapprovethissubmittal,andthisproposedchangeisanUnreviewedSafetyQuestion(USQ)andrequiressubmittalto.theNRCfortheirreview.SubmittedBy:

1.iRaI-II((I8JIIIIII--PL(."eTFlj(K.,(~ayI.yytjt(I=Ottii)fl;.TCtg4rIItVIIlilaIIIIIIIIIIIHE&IIORTHOTRTHOT854OFHEFID59659735OFCORE59661649GFTSRT651OCT17il98888art~:U8COOLEDINCORETCstlRF:GINSRVGt(RYI-I>>IIID<-IIE--III6(.l",68IIIIIIFLO:.~'F.'E.:THOTCOI'RV:RCSMIDERRNGESLOOPFlLOOP898.52"13602.848.5'578.597.822175979549.648.3573.9PSIG0FOpGFFRCSt(RRROMRF(NGESLOOPFILOOP8RVGitictDT55.456.155.8oFTRV574.2573t8574.8OFTF;EF5'73.3OFTRV~-TF.:EFIIEVI1ieoFF,q0LEV=LPRE.=SSTtlTMTF.'SUF.'GEf48.8iPSIG640oF0oF-qc0FPF.ES"-URIZERRERCTORVESSELLEVEL101.2r.R108.7:.'-9aeec"0048PRES":UPIZERRELIEFTRI<((LEI!ELil~2PRESSTE(lP89.6PORV431CLOSEDPORV438CLOSEDSTERNGENERRTORLOOPRLOOP8TE(1PDTLVLMIDELVLMIDELEVELPRESSFFFSF-FFt853.o51.97133"'29330427952.II'2.271331383248-114INCHNL8rHKL8rHKL8iHFI=CLERPF2=cEVCAthCF3='=.IIUF5=FE.rC('.rNORtlt'3Lt(ODE~OHLINECPUR.

CATEGORYREVIEWEDREFERENCEPROCEDUREA.1402'IROCHESTERGASANDELECTRICGINNASTATIONBYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTIONANDJUMPERCONTROI>,EJOBFOREMAN'UMPERWIRE0FUNCTIONLIFTEDWIREgDATEFUSESPULED+CREQUESTSIIW7ISTATESBLOCK0OTHER0)PURPOSELOCATION:SAFETYEVALUATIONREQUIRED:PlYES0NOPORCDATE(IFREQUIRED):lC8I~TECHNlCALMANAGER:SHIFTSUPERVISOR:SKETCHATIACHED:0YESQNOremd>rr~sWDATE:DATE:,INSTALIATIONDATE8TIMEIi2%REMOVALDATE8TIMF'NTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSINST+/INSTALLEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:REVIEW(ASNECESSARY)Afimz)6'zF'fc'NTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSREMOVED:REMOVEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:d'7/QC>Attachadditionalpage(s)asnecessary40-1'ev.2/88...~~>

SAFETYEVALUATIONSpgpkssoiSWLWm~~<<~PAb~~)4g~Cob/FPpLExcusionfromScreeninCr'teria-Items1,2,or6'f"yes"isanswex'edforitems1or2,providethetypeof"inconsequentialchange"orthereferencedloCFR50.59safetyevaluationbelow:If"no"isansweredforItem6,providebasisforexclusionbelow:Basisfocuson//A-Item7.If"no"hasbeenanswez'edforeachquestioninitems7athrough,7g.thischangeisnotanUnreviewedSafetyQuestion.Documentthejustificationfortheseconclusionsbelow.List:material'referencedinthespaceprovidedasappropriate.W'tteJusao:JJJ.Wrmocn/gdiV/erscabs.?.2./.1>7,U/=SA.</l~~~v~~i5'rrv~SPec.7.2.&.4QIf"yes",PORCshallreviewandapprovethissubmittal,andthisproposedchango.isanUnriviewedSafetyQuestion(USQ)andrequiressubmittaltotheNRCfortheirreview.SubmittedBy:

$6I.KCTFVH!-.HK"FORTIJFII.QNCODETCI'IOV15m198869:86:81IICITIIID-I-IIIE-'-IIc;42oett.0045B440RWWI-I61059i9339F0048Sb60JS~n4c;08c'659061I6360860888b00IVII8b0755570614569jIIIII,IIIIIIIIIIIII0UBCOOLEDINCORETCs!1FiRGIIISRVGtIRXERD53oFHERD595599OPE37oFCORE595615HPTR54oFHOTB53oFTSRT651HCTRCSMIDERRNGESLOOPRLOOPBFLOVPRESSTHPTTCPDDTTH-TCTRIIG98.52212597.5SS5.641.9S?6.698.8r.2218PSIG598.6oF549.6oF498oF5?4'1oFPRESSUPIZEREVELYNS0cRESSI-40TNT640TRT651URGE650LPSMS8PSIGoFoFOF.RERCTORIVESSELLEVEL188.8~R188.4iBPRESSUP.I"'EF.RELIEFTFiNI!LEVEL72.5PRES':.8TEt1P85.2PORV431jCLOSEDlPORV438CLOSEDSTERI1GENERF!TORLOOPRLOOPBRl"SIIRRROMRRNGESLOOPRLOOPBRVGDT'51554552oFTFlVjS?4.2573.8'574.8oFTRE=5732oFTRVG-TREFDEVI1eoF*587'%VLIrJIDEVL'AIDEEVELP.ESSFFF-FFLLLPSF7753.551~8".18;I,93:.>1-I13581.9cSCONSOLEtlpfIIIII.tIODE.1.!kI.IHI:26951.952.171631183261-146ItICHPSIGICLBrH.:ICLBrH!ICLBrH

CATEGORYREVIEWEDROCHESTERGASANDELECTRICGINNASTATIONREFERENCEPROCEDUREA.1402BYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTIONANDJUMPERCONTROLJOBFOREMAN'UMPERWIRE0FUNCTIONDATELIFTEDWIREFUSESPULLED0a-W/IIREQUESTS:STATESBLOCK0OTHER0PURPOSE2F'r/E2Tl'-DATELOCATION'AFEIYEVALUATIONREQUIRED:~S'NOSKETCHATTACHED:0YESIFIIO(eF-Afjj4~$,l4CRC,S.+PORCDATE(IFREQUIRED):TECHNICALMANAGERPdg.CJSHIFTSUPERVISOR:+~:Q~INSTALLATIONDATE6TIMEENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSINSTALLED:INSTALLEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:REVIEW(ASNECESSARY)REMOVALDATE8TIME:ENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSREMOVED:REMOVEDBY:VERIFIEDBY~Attachadditionalpage(s)asnecessary491S2Rev.2/8S

SAFETYVLUTONSUMMARFO0~l'IPCNelusionfromScreeninCritei-Items1,2,or6If"yes"isansweredforitems1or2,'rovide=thetypeof"inconsequentialchange"orthereferenced10CFR50.59safetyevaluationbelow:If"no"isansweredfor*Item6,providebasisforexclusionbelow:BassforExclusocc.-tqaQ.JOgtC<<a~~dL,hcJcJi8-c<ec.aSra.4'./C50.9SafetEvaato-Item7If"no"hasbeenansweredforeach.questioninitems7athrough7gthischangeisnotanUnreviewedSafetyQuestion..Documentthe)ustificationfortheseconclusionsbelow.Listmaterialreferenced'inthespaceprovidedasappropriate.WtteJustificatocedIf"yes",PORCshallreviewandapprovethissubmittal,andthisproposedchangeisanUnreviewedSafetyQuestion(USQ)andrequiressubmittaltotheNRCfortheirreview.SubmittedBy:

CATEGORYREVIEWEOROCHESTERGASANDELECTRICGINNASTATIONREFERENCEPROCEOUREA.1402BYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTIONANDJUMPERCONTROLJOBFOREMAN/a8.SDATE:I-2REQUESTS:JUMPERWIRE0.FUNCTIONLIFTEDWIRE0FUSESPULLED0STATESBlOCK5eC~~elOTHER0PURPOSEIa~~se/~ed4~MAODATE:DATEllSHIFTSUPERVISOR:LOCATION:kr"~sr<<4L5cc44t~SAFETYEVALUATIONREQUIRED:6YES0NSKETCHATTACHED:0YESPORCDATE(IFREQUIRED):TECHNICALMANAGER:'INSTALIATIONDATE8TIMEENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG'UMBEROFTAGSINSTALLED:INSTALLEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:REVIEW(ASNECESSARY)REMOVALDATE&TIME:ENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSREMOVED:REMOVEDBY:VERiFIEDBY:Attachadditionalpage(s)asnecessary

r~'g1r'-aooltsTfaGAaaataaaccoaaoaavloll~S.lN~GINNASTATION:JOLIe.DATE:MADESY:~PAGEOF1I~Ig'equi>>css:Ues<~4>>i~~Am5otIZGO-Cger'~~Il,Is1'IIQivuiii>bg~gtvevA.~;.y'C.s~~l'C,+SpyO4y~lra.S9-e-.,4S0~i+LS~-4,VZ~w+vg<$W~~~kiNR<<vJ~4J,4v~~m~s+~'Ilw'.'-,.@-+4.mt~+d..4,.-A->>ss'>>i'~>>I+a.QSJi4V>>S~>>i'iiiiO+:<SAWl>~loWQci)orIkShSC~'WIa~FSAl'4.IIWlJ.M>.SA,;~>>il.ic.>>-.icedQP<<est&~Q+~~,t~picIm.AillI~IOo.m'c'm

CATEGORYREVIEWEDROCHESTERGASANDELECTRICGINNASTATIONftEFEOENCEPROCEDUIIEA-1402BYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTIONANDJUIVlPERCONTROLJOBFOREMAN'IEFIdJUMPERWIRE@LIFTEDWIRE0FUNCTION~(-Aosn"a)7APezDATEREQUEST¹:P106FUSESPULLED0STATESBLOCK0'THER0DurnRA.BS/ee8cu<gl5///:<nrLocA7~/58AC.PURPOSE~T6jrTQH(EuToLIoLc'<R.<<>5Iu¹r~-/7tIvlggi6'TgeAPLOCATION:W<8SAFETYEVALUATIONREQUIRED:gYESNOPORCDATE(IFREQUIRED):TECHNICALMANAGER:SHIFTSUPERVISOR:SKETCHATTACHED:0YES0NODATE:DATE:REVIEW(ASNECESSARY))+(T'/"¹'¹/¹~i1¹INSTALLATIONDA1E8llME>~~~L.ENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSINSTALLED:INSTALLEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:......~~~D(ELEjAllfg¹¹i¹d(.(o<'EMOVALDATERTIME:.?.",~/~tNUMBEROFTAGSREMgVPD:~REMOVEDBY:i8lv'4~"~'7.//VERIFIEDBY:(~(lIH.'0'it,,p,R2--1989CBVl'ar,(.1;t.t...ttDSAgS~SlllON.5YltS.Attachadditionalpage(s)asnecessary49(EE((e¹.2/8$/,4A%¹+',w.

CATEGORYREVIEWEDROCHESTERGASANDELECTRICGINNASTATIONREFERENCEPROCEDUREA-14028YPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTIONANDJUMPERCONTROLJOBFOREMAN'UMPERWIRE0FUNCT(ON3ogvDATF'EQUEST¹:LIFTEDWIRE0FUSESPULLED0STATESBLOCK0OTHERgOUIbP.Li'0"8'iP.AIQ'JI7'HCaPEEAITLOCATION:A'i/AC.TI8-9SAFETYEVALUATIONREQUIREDYES0NO'ORCDATE(IFREQUIRED):TECHNICALMANAGER:':nSHIFTSUPERVISOR8.-/oSKETCHATTACHED.'YES0NO*DATE:3'I>-FglrrPURPOSEr0%NOVIa-'l'VMr"bur'7aPVLmIA'.Or78rrqLWc7INSTALLATIONDATE8TIME3Ld-!NUMBEROFTAGSINSTALLEDINSTALLEDBY:'~T"'>VERIFIEDBY:REVIEW(ASNECESSARY)REMOVALDATE8,TIME:ENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSREMOVED:REMOVEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:Attachadditionalpage(s)asnecessary

':py~lc's5cspjg/c/csc(s'-'>~'ClkrCsy."nut(c(Pn((hjucitsc<C'rnAv]ll(r:c/rrtLc.scc//ccrc//'ri:i/c:.rc:-hz*ns(lqtr17S)(5((Xrr/ter(/'(J4yrg(rl"l~I'~C;c8'crVCS~C/+SAN'r/rPqC,~/hS~4p/C/8CPc'6'r)/la>.Err././g.>6~~4=..rC~n~/~-y'.S'hc(dn~C/c'rrnrc/r(r'c/CJ(rir/y'rrcdF-insrrrrkYD/sr-'I"3('erg5jirzPscsf/n(rr'a.r'vrwp~rnrc'c:yI>'(c!z.cc)(c'r'cC/('-/ncnr<<::~-r'slv(Xf'rtr>Q(fcf"5Prj'g'zr4Yc'/hI.'le/(//1'8p,~CA>~c/g+n()p/6/..(V/~'kik'r>wrirCrls/'6g'/c/cu,/carrr/nc~r(r(1ncnscnnrfe.4c/'Cc>r<iKfY"/'~'-pc.'.///"><./~-)4'apc'<-z.J"CPP$er.'8WRCiAisaC'f>'rl<PVWVhatsrneiC)ural(~~9Q~4ZV/IjwdrirUf(rs>rh(rrc/w(si'c.lci'-c'n>r.irtn..crr<ibllIQcdw~(/"~~L'g'/>5//".:~WV~-."~'C-;./"4M-<+Z~/////kC'~'/.P>>-~~d~rn.~4.csnrrs/'(rr/b/nw/oAs.iicrr.rrc'.r/s.7/i,,+~rrrr"/c/rn~rhcr1(c'3~'~~~/>~/'ed'(4i~&~i.SiSgs7~~~.~crf6Q/lPCC><'3C'JJI///'/sP~~~-"~c"pk/s/c'q/.c<lg8P~8A9+/Syrc.qr///cs/~~a(s~~c1af.,4'g/~ir/A'o7l~W&~~~rag+/vg24:5-CP///h/rrP~'g.>Sg~J/3'gnq/'ter"rir'cc'/rkM1(4~csnri/rc/c(ny~5,8~"IC'kik")ills(fPs'.(rn5r(csincecrtdpr',1c'rnF/cr.Ycz:,Jy('r/,cn/1(src/(i7LCFhrs+Pigr/j(iC9hC1rSCrgri(r.CQlhrlVitCr/('%SfPa(rrrirrV/c4'(1crr!ydg7c~(crts~r/n(rrc/gr/n.gc7r/(ci;sly/nicePw8Asr/rs/tl/'RS./~l.//~I~s/0'eci(/cc/-Crcc('~'bi"i<>>fr:A'/s((rrncirciZrcridrrrr-crcriIV/(n.JlI"QL't./l/ANncl/r.;8c4ci(r:/~(/ccs.//c",r~r/~/h'>>('"4.P~~'/In:c1c(c/-(cJ,-'i-/+vice;-i1p<g'7.'7v'Akrlhsrr/IQrichhsnwhey.rhr'+27CC~PCSJPrfÃ'rs/P"J9Lrhrr~Prr'rCL/-A/(ICCSrn/P~rnCCCC-'(C(-:.;:,:\*~

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CATEGORYREVIEWEDI"REFERENCEPROCEDUREA.14023.3.5ROCHESTERGASANDELECTRICGINNASTATIONBYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTIONANDJUMPERCONTROLJOBFOREMANATE:~~III>>REQUEST>>:JUMPERWIRE0LIFTEDWIRE5FUSESPULLED0llFUNCTIONP)tlIw~lP.TMvc.FLrSTATESBLOCK0OTHER0cDiPURPOSELZF-~S<<W4~8-q6-l~/3-/C>OF3+LOCATION(-o~i<'MRDQw-A,~A.QI=4gc.>N".P.c.~SAFETYEVALUATIONREQUIRED:HAYES0NOPORCDATE(IFREQUIRED):TECHNICALMANAGER:SHIFTSUPERVISORMuSKETCHATTACHED:CfYES0NODATE:DATE:INSTALLATIONDATERTIMEŽ>IIENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSINSTALLED:INSTALLEDBY'ERIFIEDBY:"REMOVALDATEKTIME:ENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSREMOVED:REMOVEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:REVIEW(ASNECESSARY)t0L)iy&4Vt~8MSD~Mlnct-0CACt~CO~'AYeVO')9'8O'VC.-OokcVVC-4IcECO.~~~~ccTovtCc'l'c'.J.Qha.l"~~rckw.Attachadditionalpage(s)asnecessary49TE2Bed.2/89'

FIGURE2A,P~-j~SAFETYEVALUATIONSUMMARYFORM4".VF~'ROCEDUREDATEPCNExclusionfromScreeninCriteria-Items1,2,or6If"yes"isansweredforItems1or2,providethetypeof"inconsequentialchange"orthereferenced10CFR50.59safetyevaluationbelow:ChangeType:If"no"wasansweredforItem6,providethebasisforexclusionbelow:BasisforExclusion:10CFR50.59SafetEvauatio-Item7If"no"hasbeenansveredforeachquestioninitems7athrough7gthischangeisnotanUnrevievedSafetyQuestion.Documentthejustificationfortheseconclusionsbelow.Listanymaterialreferencedinthespaceprovided.writtenJustification:CLJeetencedNatea<FIf"yes"wasansweredforItem3,checkthisboxIf"yes",wasansveredforItem7,PORCshallrevievandapprovethissubmittal.ThisproposedchangeisanUnreviewedSafetyQuestion(USQ)'ndrequiressubmittaltotheNRCfortheirreviev.SubmittedBy:

CATEGORYREVIEWED.REFERENCEPROCEDuREA.1402ROCHESTERGASANDELECTRICGINNASTATIONBYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTIONANDJUMPERCONTROLJOBFOREMAN'UMPERWIRENfFUNCTIONUFTEDWIRE0DATEFUSESPULLED0Dc',vREQUESTSSTATESBLOCK0OTHER05E88K6'~M~d~KPURPOSE>>iM~~~V~.'~oZZroXr7ESrl&C7HZJAgeV~~P.c(f4)DMLOCATION:y5gPIASV/ZCCOi~iROISAFETYEVALUATIONREQUIRED:+YES0NOPORCDATE(IFREQUIRED)'ECHNICALMANAGERSHIFTSUPERVISORSKETCHATTACHED:0YES0NODATEINSTALLATIONDATEIITIMEENTEREDINOFFICIALLOP,INSTALLEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:REVIEW(ASNECESSARY)REMOVALg~DATERTIMF'NTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSREMOVED.REMOVEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:~.2/lr~I.RECORDSDISPOSITlON.gAttachaddttionalpage(s)asnece8%&j40N2Aev,2/58'-

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CATEGORYREVIEWEDREFERENCEPROCEDUREA.1402ROCHESTERGASANDELECTRICGINNASTATIONBYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTIONANDJUMPERCONTROLJOBFOREMAN'UMPERWIRE0FUNCTIONLIFTEDWIRE0SLYDATE:REQUESTS:FUSESPULLEDSTATESBLOCK0NS,)iri'c"isrt-iinOTHER0PURPOSEirsi.car'oi/~L~)iri~Ccmr'~LOCATION:SAFETYEVALUATIONREQUIRED:8YES0NOSKETCHATIACHED:0YES3hC(NOPORCDATE(IFREQUIRED):TECHNICALMANAGER:SHIFTSUPERVISOR:r-DATE:DATE:INSTALLATIONDATE&TIMEENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSINSTLLED:INSTALLEDBYREMOVALDATE&TIME'NTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSREMOVED:REMOVEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:REVIEW(ASNECESSARY)~w.nV8P.c:'7/V-VERIFIEDBY:r>c,'rZ.~f>Ol4~,rg)'C'~r4'Yrk/>>(r~Attachadditionalpage(s)asnecessary,>pi,wP49li2Ilev'2/8S

ROCHESTERGASANDELECTRICCORPORATIONGINNASTATION:DATE:MADEBY:49.169PAGEOFlFyA55dr.54rYFP'u'PZ'P4/%j,/v,)JJ/8/~gg4'>A.7c)L/d~Y't'A~S8+(4~~aj44'~i'+P&/+9/-u7/(C-c'>.447gg@pp,ndg.'I(/6'rc'c-'8c'8/i/~~g+ger~)"8'4'//+r8gdT'/Jl<)d'gArgrrr//s4'ce'rrpWic-v'rse'didd-/75cidu8p'rpre:vyWrrr.rr..cfrcs//I'/Ig/Igg/5/r/CDWrpgr4>.~<47<+dr(>/fC,lk/'Cr-C'P"CA'CAStngPCdSr/~gQ/M5g$Qry/I54"r9lp5eglpd/p/rig5~OVfr4/:.l5Ke/'6~.A4@i"SAj',<;/4qW.~+rggr'<Z,g/J+~'/.ee."rrst'//~/r3ti>'i.'+ipd:c.d/4've/ki'4~'nc<pipg/~+Ac.2FwQqrxmde,<ArC(g,J/g~~~I-h:w<4<4/-n~.~/4g..'r/8(ggg&/dcrf/c:d2l'."/ydrrrp/r5wdPArz.@dan<erg'v.,'sg'rcvlLiputcril1'tI/irderlcrIdv'gcc'v/indg6'c/1r/4gnz.reer%~%.:s,/d)z)/bscl/n'rn1gcchvg/Snd8/lccnncJarc9Lrc'cr'"ericsgvrernn/v'nhpru/rvr1eon'C'>illbererIurabid'diLcrr/r<nrb<dvsirrr//?>Iyhnq.~L/+/",P(Spybi<gXd/"C~~CmIIn-SivIII/4',/hePllsc5'6Plr'sdekPirrrrid/4iI4.Prc'IvitrhI'<]Ve+rCKC+Vn~D~occam)(('At(.nv<uferr(//r<<(d&re/p&4rc'c>l]~+>i(en//~jrr/Jzc.4//SJ.rc-/vrllrrvebc.rrv'tndirc..>i)c(Asvn//sirinr.v>ll~<<Zwcd'r:."C//4g;5cxchrngdwr~n'azr~nddCIcr-'.c"ncrv'ncr,r'ec./4'.s-6'/';4.'(/.,~4//",<H/r;iFr'ZP~~-.A.dg~CPA>'rguer/~ggii//gjwkgzgd'erri)yr/Crrvg+/u)5rlr,!iQ+c~r,~/ccrrr/vntufat/I.CA'-'<v8'/dt'sddr//nvrjigrrr='rMasniE.~rr~~'ccrilkrnrida'ty/'.rv>mrsrcP>inchvrdArdirrsQwipv~~dc'I19~rrrbecnsr//n~cj'ddroc."~/~/.~~~vr+c~.s"c".nc%.v,.~.riverrrcsc.crrim~i(ridr/err.rrvec,//r4w~'lr7uzYak~dies'rr~fdd>zALs/5kcl>nu/Cpcrh'a/cniir///i-"//sc/1.'::re(rr'/min%re'c'I"..l~"YrVS4//4/'~7~Pi</>"dX/~sLHdes/s<dc'rV'frh'r'7/87/34//vvrc4crp~rtc/dcr1d.vA'.em'cevgc./vl>vr/acreen/r/vrc'iiwjcrr<</d;rrL..Crdrr/dr~i/J.Qr.'rwj'/i~>><'ri'i.4W/b~i~'-'"

HAJJCATEGORY3.3.5REVIEWEDROCHESTERGASANDELECTRICGINNASTATIONREFERENCEPROCEDUREA.1402BYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTIONANDJUMPERCONTROLJOBFOREMAN'Sro.oTnreJUMPERWIRE0LIFTEDWIREKtFUNCTIONcn-h're~--FUSESPULLED00REQUEST¹:STATESBLOCK0OTHER0ToMcc~PURPOSEg.n1OUCoHa6rn6LOCATION:SAFETYEVALUATIONREQUIRED:EIYES~NPPORCDATE(IFREQUIRED):TECHNICALMANAGER:SHIFTSUPERVISOR:INSTALLATIONDATE&TIMEENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;gLfC89J'KETCHATTACHED:CfYES0NODATEDATEREMOVALDATE&TIME:ENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSINST8INSTALLEDBY:VERIFIEDBY'EVIEW(ASNECESSARY)eD:CdW-NUMBEROFTAGSREMOVED:REMOVEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:rroloAIIoorrovrorIsronoEoS/0r".rrrr88Attachadditionalpage(s)asnecessary

CATEGORYREVIEWEDREFERENCEPROCEDUREA.1402ROCHESTERGASANDELECTRICGINNASTATIONBYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTIONANDJUMPERCONTROLJOBFOREMAN'~~'~V'5JUMPERWIRE0LIFTEDWIREFUSESPULLED0STATESBLOCK0I~,r7FUNCTION4iC.'THER0PURPOSElNALOCATION'ot.SAFETYEVALUATIONREQUIRED:PfYES~NOPORCDATE(IFREQUIRED):-b-TECHNICALMANAGER:SHIFTSUPERVISOR:~f44'KETCHATTACHED;X(4ES~NO.~l-9-PDATE:~~~~~INSTALLATIONDATE&TIME.80'9ENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSINSTALLED:g/INSTALLEDBY:.VERIFIEDBY.f~<T'-~c~M>kent'r-'rREVIEW(ASNECESSARY)~>~+~aREMOVALDATE&TIME:ENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSREMOVED:REMOVEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:Attachadditionalpage(s)asnecessary4EB142AEV.t/88

10CFR50.59SafetyEvaluationforliftingwireforThermocoupleD07TheindicationsforTCD07areinconsistentwiththeresponseofotherrelatedcoreparameters(i.e.incorefluxmap&nearbythermocoupleindications).Thermocouplesareusedtosensecoreoutlettemperature,determinerelativefuelassemblypowerandcompensateRVLIS.SinceTCD07isnot.consistentwitheitherincoreorotherthermocouplesithasbeendeclaredinoperable.IthasbeendeletedfromprocessinginPPCS.Toremoveitfromtheaveragingcircuitatthethermocouplepanelrequiresliftingitslead.ThepanelwillthensenseanopenTCandremoveitfromaveraging.WithTCD07inoperabletheminimumrequirementper-Tech.Specs.of4thermocouplesperquadrantismet.TCD07isnotusedtocompensateRVLIS.ThefunctionsofthethermocouplesystemasdescribedintheUfSARarefulfilled.Therefore,neithertheprobabilitynortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionevaluatedintheUFSARisincreased.Thepossibilityofanewaccidentormalfunctionisnotcreated.ThemarginofsafetydefinedinTech.Specs.isnotreduced.

References:

Tech.Specs.3.5.3,UFSARSection7.7.4ffreyP.Wand11/30/89PORCApproval:/2.

Cp<SELECTFUNC.KEYORTURN-ONCODEJUN13>198988'36:26R-1-tIIBJIIIIIII56615451IIISUBCOOLEDNRRGINSINCORETCsRVGf&RHERD58oFHERD593595COREI9oFCORE594624THOTR57oFTHOTB56>oFTSRT653IDgIIE--III57322IIII5732261362619686086075659839611626176656817IIIIIIRCSMIDERAGESLOOPRLOOP6FLOM98.798.28PRESS22452238PSIGTHOT59625973oFTCOLD553.8549.8oFDTTH-TC43.448.2oFTRVG574.6573.2oFRCSNRRRQdRRNGESLOOPRLOQP8RVG593425964c'853458231592416035259948618S95974659442681485611e~S8595446886865755624735641357726LEVEL49.8iPRESS2241PSIGSTllT648oFWTRT647oFSURGEOF188.3r.R181.9>6PRESSURIZERRELIEFTRNNLEVELPRESS3.9TElIP83.7PORV431CLOSEDPORV438CLOSEDSTERNGENERRTORLOOPRDT55.455.45S.4oTRVGS73.8Sr3.rS73.3oTREF5738oTRVG-TREFDEVI50PRESSURIZER58635P.si8TEtIPDTLVLMIDELVLMIDELEVELPRESSSFFFSF-FF27953.951.869931723269-9726951.958.669938993188-81INCHPSIGNLBrHNLBrHNLB/HF2=F3=F4=CONSOLE~NORllRLFS=F6=tlODE=ONLINECPUR

October17,1988NEWSPENTFUELHEATEXCHANGEREWR1594BPIPINGSCAFFOLD88-110AfterthenewheatexchangerissetonthefoundationsplannedimmediatelysouthoftheAComponentCoolingHeatExchanger,pipinginstallationeffortswillrequireworkplatformsattheareaoverthe.westhalfoftheSFPheatexchangerandattheareanorthoftheeasthalf.Eachplatformwillrise5to6feetabovethefloor,andeachwillhavesomecoverageovertheAComponentCoolingHeatExchanger.Thedurabilityofthe'CWHXSissuchastoprecludeanydamagethatcouldbepostulatedfromtopplingpipe,knuckleandplankscaffold.CoolingcapabilityofoneofthetwoCCWHXSissufficienttoprovideforthecoolingloadsfortheplant.ClearancemustbeprovidedforaccesstovalvesandinstrumentsassociatedwiththeComponentCoolingHeatExchangersandBoricAcidEvaporatorCondensateDemineralizers.Care'shouldbetakentopreventdisturbingthesmokedetectorZ04DI.Withobservanceoftheabove,theworkplatformswillnot1)resultinachangetothefacilityoritsoperationasdescribedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,2)provideachangetothePlantTechnicalSpecifications,or3)involveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

October20,1988SPENTFUELCOOLINGPUMPPIPINGEWR-1594BSCAFFOLDS88-111InordertoinstallpipingfortheplannedSpentFuelCoolingPump,twoscaffoldsareplannedabovethepresentlyexistingpump,about6feetfromthefloor,perattachedsketch.TheSFPcoolingsystemisnon-seismicsafetyrelated(1)however,SeismicCategoryIitemsarewithintheimmediatevicinity,givenbelow.AandBResidualHeatRemovalPumpCoolingUnits(2),AResidualHeatRemovalPumpDischargeTemperatureTT-630(3)Otherinstrumentsintheareaforwhichcareshouldbetakentoavoiddisturbingarea'sfollows:ComponentCoolingReturnfromResidualHeatRemovalPumpsflowFI-651anditsassociatedtubing.(3)AResidualHeatremovalPumpdischargepressurePIC-629andPI-629Aandtheirassociatedtubing.(3)BecauseofthepresenceoftheaboveitemsthetwoscaffoldsshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsSeptember23,1988memoattachment).TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbytheConstructionEngineerandtheLiaisonEngineer,anditsseismiccapabilityinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebytheConstructionEngineer.TheLiaisonEngineermaysosignifythisinhisstead.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.TheConstructionEngineerortheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisorofconfirmationofseismiccapability.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.'InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,,anduponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershallaccepttheinstallation.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,te'stingandmaintenanceaccesstotheAuxiliaryBuildingsub-basement,allvalvesandinstrumentationinthearea.Page1of2

Withobservanceoftheaboverequirementsthescaffoldswillnot1)resultinachangetotheassumptionsfortheSafetyAnalysisintheSafetyAnalysisReport,2)providea'hangetothePlantTechnicalSpecifications,or3)involveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.NOTES1)'ualityAssuranceManualAppendixAQualityandSafetyRelatedListingandDiagramsSection2.2.4SpentFuelPoolCooling,outlinedinRG&EDrawing33013-1248(portionattached).2)UFSARSection9.4.9.1EngineeredSafetyFeaturesEquipmentVentilationandCooling.3)UFSARFigure5.4-7ResidualHeatRemovalSystem(portion.-attached)4)UFSARFigure9.2-4Sheet1ComponentCoolingWaterSystem(portionattached).Page2of2

November1,1988RELAYROOMCEILINGPENETRATIONWORKBYAUXRELAYRACKRA-2SCAFFOLD88-115ThepenetrationworkplannedwillrequireascaffoldbetweentheAux.RelayRackRA-2andtheMUXRoomdoor.Itistoriseabout15feetfromthefloor.OtheritemswithinthevicinityareContainmentIsolationRelayRacksA-1andA-2,SafeguardsInitiationCabinetsSI-AlandSI-A2,FoxRacks1and2,andCableTray164.Thescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordan'cewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbyanassignedLiaisonEngineer,anditsseismiccapabilityinrelation.totheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebytheLiaisonEngineer.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.TheLiaison.EngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisorofconfirmationofseismiccapability.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructural-Engineershallreviewtheinstallation,anduponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershallaccepttheinstallation.Withobservanceoftheaboverequirementsthescaffoldwillnot1)resultinachangetothe.assumptionsfortheSafetyAnalysisintheSafetyAnalysisReport,2)provideachangetothePlantTechnicalSpecifications,or3)involveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

November30,1988FIREWRAPUPGRADEEWR3986OVERMCC-1DSCAFFOLD88-118Ascaffoldisplannedto-extendfromthefrontof480Bus16-eastwardoverMCC-1DtothewallbehindMCC-lD.Itistoriseabout9feet.InordertopreventanyinterferencewithactivitiesinvolvingthealternatetrainBus14andMCC-lC,itisplannedto'onstructthescaffoldasaseismicinstallation.ThescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbytheConstructionEngineerandtheLiaisonEngineer.Inthefinalstageofconstructionpriortouse,theseismiccapabilityofthescaffoldinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebytheConstructionEngineer,ortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.TheConstructionEngineerortheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisorofconfirmationofseismiccapability.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orobservedduringerection,thatadeviation'romtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbal-guidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,and,uponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesamemanneras.describedabove.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testing,andmaintenanceaccesstoallelectricalpanelsontheBus16andMCC-,lD,toincludeclearancetorackoutbreakers.Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.Theinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetothe.assumptionsoftheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffecton.anyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgiveninthe.SafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:I'

DecreaseinReactorCoolantInventorySeismicEventsTheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangetothePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

November9,1988FIREWRAPUPGRADEEWR3986BYBSAFETYINJECTIONPUMPSCAFFOLD88-120Inordertoperformthenecessaryupgradeascaffoldapprox-imately9feethighwillbeneededtofollowtheroutingshownintheattachedsketch.TherouteisadjacenttotheBSafetyInjectionPumpandtheBContainmentSprayPump.Thescaffoldshallbeconstructedsoastomaintainaccessfortestingandemergencyoperationtoallassociatedvalves,instrumentsandh'eattraceconnectionsandcircuits.Theestimateddurationoftheproject,30days,issuchthatseismicconstructionrequirementsareimposed.ThescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbytheConstructionEngineerandtheLiaisonEngineer,anditsseismiccapabilityinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebytheConstructionEngineer.TheLiaisonEngineermaysosignifythisinhisstead.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.TheConstructionEngineerortheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisorofconfirmationofseismiccapability.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,and,uponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershallaccepttheinstallation.Withobservanceoftheaboverequirementsthescaffoldwillnot1)resultinachangetotheassumptionsfortheSafetyAnalysisintheSafetyAnalysisReport,2)provideachangetothePlantTechnicalSpecifications,or3)involveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

November9,1988FIREWRAPUPGRADEEWR3986OVERBCONTROLRODDRIVEMGSETSCAFFOLD88-121Ascaffoldisneededtoperformthefirewrapupgrade,theworkbeinglocatedovertheBMGset,andinthevicinityoftheMGsetcontrolpanels,theReactorTripBreakerPanels,,theReactorTripBypassBreakerPanels,andBSteamGeneratorSteamLinePressureTransmitters.Itistorise10feet.Becauseofthepresenceofthesafetyrelatedfeaturesincludedintheabovelist,thescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbytheConstructionEngineerandtheLiaisonEngineer,anditsseismiccapabilityinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebytheConstructionEngineer.TheLiaisonEngineermaysosignifythisinhisstead.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.TheConstructionEngineerortheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisorofconfirmationofseismiccapability.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,and,uponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershallaccepttheinstallation.Inadditiontotheabove,severalcautionsaretobeobservedasfollows:Constrainallplankingandprovidetoeboardstominimizethepotentialfordroppedobjects.Specialcareshouldbetakenduringmaterialmovementforscaffolderectionandremovaltopreventstrikingthenearbyinstrumentsandbreakercontrols.Ithasbeendeterminedthatthescaffoldinstallation,withobservanceoftheaboverequirementswillnot1)resultinachangetothefacilityoritsoperationasdescribedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,2)provideachangetothePlantTechnicalSpecifications,or3)involveanunreviewedsafetycpxestion.

November10,1988SPENTFUELCOOLINGEWR-1594B-CONDUITINSTALLATIONOVERSFPHXTOTRAY136SCAFFOLD88-127AscaffoldisneededtoinstallconduitsupportsandconduittoextendfromneartheAuxiliaryBuildingintermediatefloornorthwestcornereastovertheGAux.'ldg.'xhaustFansuctionducttotray136,overtheeastendoftheSpentFuelPoolHeatExchanger.StandbyAuxiliaryFeedwaterSystemContainmentisolationMOVsarelocatedonthenorthsideoftheSFPHX.Thespace,betweentheheatexchangerandcontainmentisverycongestedwithpiping,pipesupportstructures,regulators,valves,instruments,andleadshieldingforaprocessmonitorintheservicewaterpipingfromtheheatexchanger.-AmajorportionoftheequipmenthereisassociatedwiththewastegassystemsupportingtheReactorCoolantDrainTankandthePressurizerReliefTank,bothofwhichareinContainment.ImmersedwithinthisspaceisoneoftheContainmentMini-purgedischargeisolationvalves.ConcurrentwiththeaboveplannedeffortisaplannedrepaironTurbineAux.FeedwaterPumpdischargecheckvalve4003.The'uthorizationforthescaffoldforthatjobwasbasedonmaintainingoperabilityoftheSAFWsystem.Becauseofthe.locationoftheabovediscussedSAFWContainmentisolationMOVs,thescaffoldshallbeconstructedasseismicusingtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).Theerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbythe-ConstructionEngineerandtheLiaisonEngineer,anditsseismiccapability,inrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffolduseby'theConstructionEngineer.TheLiaisonEngineermaysosignifythisinhisstead.Suchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginal,copyoftheAuthorizationForm.TheConstructionEngineerortheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisorofconfirmationofseismiccapability.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,anduponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershallaccepttheinstallation.Withobservanceoftheaboverequirementsthescaffoldwillnot1)resultinachangetotheassumptionsfortheSafetyAnalysisintheSafetyAnalysisReport,2)provideachangetothePlantTechnicalSpecifications,or3)involveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

November23,1988SPENTFUELCOOLINGEWR-1594BCONDUITSUPPORTANDCONDUITINSTALLATIONBETWEENSFPPUMPAREAANDASAFETYINJECTIONPUMPSCAFFOLD88-128InordertoinstallconduitsupportsandconduitforthisprojectintheAuxiliaryBuildingBasementascaffoldisneededforworkneartheceilingfromtheSFPpumparea,eastalongthecorridorbytheResidualHeatRemovalHeatExchangeroutletandbypassvalves,theRHRpipingtoSafetyInjectionPumpSuctionanditsassociatedflowinstrumentation,overthehosereelatcolumn8a-N1tothespaceabovetheASafetyInjectionPumpandadjacenttoAContainmentSprayPump.AstheportionbytheSFPpumpwouldessentiallyhavethesamepotentialeffectasthescaffoldofrequest488-111,becauseoftheproximitytotheoutletcontrolsofbothtrainsofResidualHeatRemoval*HeatExchanger,becauseofthepresenceofTrainAandTrainBcabletraysjusteastoftheSFPpumparea,becauseoftheproximitytotheCSafetyInjectionPumpandtheBContainmentSprayPumpinadditiontothosealternatepumpsmentionedabove,thescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).Theguidelinesstatement6.0shallbeaugmentedwiththerequirementthatthescaffoldshallbecompleteandseismictotheextentinstalledbytheendofeachshift.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbytheConstructionEngineerandtheLiaisonEngineer.Duringconstruction,theend-of-shiftseismicstatusshallbedocumentedonanattachmenttothefieldcopyoftheauthorizationformbytheConstru'ctionEngineerortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.Inthefinalstageofconstructionpriortouse,theseismiccapabilityofthescaffoldinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebytheConstructionEngineer,ortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.TheConstructionEngineerortheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisorofconfirmationofseismiccapability.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,and,uponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesamemannerasdescribedabove.

Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstotheAuxiliaryBuildingsub-basement,allvalves,instrumentation,panels,rotatingequipment,firefightingprovisions,andadjoiningroomsinthearea.Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:AccidentalRelease-WasteGasDecreaseinReactorCoolantInventorySeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapabilitybecausetherewillbenointerferencewithaccessprovided.tofirefightingprovisions.TheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangetothePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlanttechnicalSpecification'ases.Theinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionof,equipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.ITheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedin-theSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.Theinstallationdoesnot.reducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

December6,1988PIPEENTRYGROUTINGINAUXILIARYBUILDINGSUB-BASEMENTSCAFFOLD88-133Ascaffoldisneededwithaworkplatformabout8feetfromthefloor.Thecornerpolesshallbeextendedtotheceilingandhorizontalpolesshallbeextendedtoatleastonewallandotheranchoragepointsorbumpercontactpointsontheoppositesidetopreventmovement.BecausebothtrainsofResidualHeatRemovalPumpsarewithintheimmediatevicinityofthescaffold,thescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment),incorporatingthefeaturesdescribedabove.Allscaffoldshallbeinplacepriortotheendofshiftworkedonthedayitiserected.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbyanassignedLiaisonEngineer,anditsseismiccapabilityinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoseaffoldusebytheLiaisonEngineer.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.TheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisorofconfirmationofseismiccapability.Ifit.isforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,anduponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesamemannerasdescribedabove.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstoallvalves,instrumentation,androtatingequipmentinthearea.Theaboveconstructionandoperationalrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:AccidentalRelease-WasteGasDecreaseinReactorCoolantInventorySeismicEvents

TheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

December14,1988PIPEENTRYGROUTINGINAUXILIARYBUILDINGSUB-BASEMENTNORTHWESTCORNERSCAFFOLD88-134Ascaffoldisneededwithaworkplatformabout8feetfromthefloor.Thecornerpolesshallbeextendedtotheceilingandhorizontalpolesshallbeextendedtoatleastonewallandotheranchoragepointsorbumpercontactpointsontheoppositesidetopreventmovement.BecausebothtrainsofResidualHeatRemovalPumpsarewithintheimmediatevicinityofthescaffold,thescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment),incorporatingthefeaturesdescribedabove.Scaffoldinthenortheastcornershallbecompletelydismantledbeforebeg'inningthisconstruction.Allscaffoldshallbeinplacepriortotheendofshiftworkedonthedayitiserected.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbyanassignedLiaison=Engineer,anditsseismiccapabilityinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebytheLiaisonEngineer.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.TheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisorofconfirmationofseismiccapability.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection,that.adeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefroma.memberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,anduponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesamemannerasdescribedabove.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstoallvalves,instrumentation,and.rotatingequipmentinthearea.Theaboveconstructionandoperationalrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforinlOCFR50.59aregivenbelow.TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:

AccidentalRelease-WasteGasDecreaseinReactorCoolantInventorySeismicEventsTheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewill'enoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecification,bases..TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimpoitanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.Theinstallationdoesnotreduce*themarginofsafety'asdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

December20,1988tSPENTFUELCOOLINGPIPINGEWR1594BCOREBORINGATAUXILIARYBUILDINGINTERMEDIATEFLOORWESTSTAIRWELLSCAFFOLD88-139InordertoperformcoreboringandpipeinstallationattheSpentFuelPoolFilternorthvaultwall,ascaffoldwillbeneededwhichwillbeusingtheAuxiliaryBuildingbasementflooraspartofitsfoundation,andwillalsobepartlybasedontheintermediatefloor.Betweenthetwofloorsitwillinteractwiththescaffolds88-111forpumpdischargepiping(notstartedyet)and88-128forpumpconduit(presentlyexisting).Theitemsofequipmentwithinthevicinityofthesescaffoldsaredescribedinthereviewsfortheseinstallations,andtheirpresenceisthebasisforrequiringthesetobeconstructedinaccordancewithseismicscaffoldguidelines.Ontheintermediateflooranotherseismicscaffold(88-127)existsontheoppositesideoftheSpentFuelHeatExchanger,inthevicinityoftheStandbyAuxiliaryFeedwaterSystemContainmentIsolationMOVs.Totheimmediatesouthofthestairwell,onthewalltobecorebored,areSeismicCategoryIboundaryvalvesintheSFPpiping.BecauseoftheabovefactorsthescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).Theguidelinesstatement6.0shallbeaugmentedwiththerequirementthatthescaffoldshallbecompleteandseismictotheextentinstalledbytheendofeachshift.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbytheConstructionEngineerandtheLiaisonEngineer.Duringconstruction,theend-of-shiftseismicstatusshallbedocumentedonanattachmenttothefieldcopyoftheauthorizationformbytheConstructionEngineerortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.Inthefinalstageofconstructionpriortouse,theseismiccapabilityofthescaffoldinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebytheConstructionEngineer,ortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.TheConstructionEngineerortheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisorofconfirmationofseismiccapability.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,and,uponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesamemannerasdescribedabove.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstotheAuxiliaryBuildingsub-basement,allvalves,instrumentation,panels,rotatingequipment,andfirefightingprovisionsinthearea.

LockedareaaccessestotheAuxiliaryBuildingsub-basementandtheSpentFuelPoolfiltervaultarecontrolledbylockedgates.Ensurethatthescaffolddoesnotallowanyeasieraccesstotheseareas.Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:SteamGeneratorTubeRuptureRuptureofaSteamPipePrimarySystemPipeRuptureSeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapabilitybecausetherewillbenointerferencewithaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.TheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

January10,1989FIREWRAPUPGRADEEWR3986OVERBCONTROLRODDRIVEMGSETSCAFFOLD89-2Ascaffoldisneededtoperformthefirewrapupgrade,theworkbeinglocatedovertheeastendBMGset,andinthevicinityoftheMGsetcontrolpanels,theReactorTripBreakerPanels,theReactorTripBypassBreakerPanels,andBSteamGeneratorSteamLinePressureTransmitters.Itistorise10feet.Becauseofthepresenceofthesafetyrelatedfeaturesincludedintheabovelist,thescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbytheConstructionEngineerandtheLiaisonEngineer,anditsseismiccapabilityinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebytheConstructionEngineer.TheLiaisonEngineermaysosignifythisinhisstead.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.TheConstructionEngineerortheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisorofconfirmationofseismiccapability.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,and,uponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershallaccepttheinstallation.Inadditiontotheabove,severalcautionsaretobeobservedasfollows:Constrainallplankingandprovidetoeboardstominimizethepotentialfordroppedobjects.Specialcareshouldbetakenduringmaterialmovementforscaffolderectionandremovaltopreventstrikingthenearbyinstrumentsandbreakercontrols.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforuseoffirefightingprovisions.Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.

TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhich.areassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:RodClusterControlAssembly(RCCA)DropRuptureofaSteamPipeAnticipatedTransientsWithoutScramSeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapabilitybecausetherewillbenointerferencewithaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.TheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

January23,1989FIREWRAPUPGRADEEWR3986DECKOVERCABLETRAY192ADDENDUMTOSCAFFOLD89-2Inadditiontothescaffoldasmalldecknearthestairwayisneeded.ThisistobesecuredtoTray192andanearby4"diameterconduit,adjacenttotheworksite.Thetrayissupportedbyadoubleunistrutcantileveredfromstructuralsteeltotheeast,asshownontheattachedsketch.Thelimitingloadisconsideredtobeapointloadatthefreeendofthesupport.Theloadisestimatedtoberoughlyhalfofthecalculatedcapabilitybasedonthatloadconfiguration.Inordertoprovideaconfigurationwithwhichtheaddedloadmaybeconsideredinsignificant,verticalsupportshallbeprovidedunderthetrayintheformofajackstandor4X4woodwithaprovisiontobearupwardonbothsidesofthetrayorthewestsideofthetray.Therearenumerousbarriersinthesurroundingswhichpreventanyadverseeffectonsafetyrelatedequipmentdiscussedinthescaffoldreview.Anaccessladder,ifused,shallbetiedoff.Thedeckshallbeatminimumof1/2in.plywoodplacedontopofthetrayandshallrestontheoutertraybarriers.Nopressureshallbeappliedtocableswithinthetrays.'leatsshallbeappliedtopreventdisplacement.TheControlRoomOperatorsshallbenotifiedpriortocommencingdeckinstallation.~Basedonthefactorsdescribedabovethedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetothefacilityorproceduresasdescribedintheSafetyAnalysisReport.BecauseoftheadequacyofthesupportsystemasaugmentedandexistinginterveningbarriersdiscussedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectontheSeismicCategoryIornon-seismicsafetyrelatedequipmentinthevicinity.ThedesignbaseseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:RodClusterControlAssembly(RCCA)DropRuptureofaSteamPipeAnticipatedTransientsWithoutScram

1TheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecausetheadequacyofthe'upportsystemasaugmentedandthebarrierswhichint'ervenewithSeismicCategoryIornon-seismicsafety-relatedequipmentaresuchastoensuretherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.Theinstallationwillnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceor,theconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport'ecauseoftheadequacyofthesupportsystemasaugmentedandtheexistinginterveningbarrierstoSeismicCategoryIornon-seismicsafetyrelatedequipment.'Theinstallation-willnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecausetheadequacyofthesupportsystemasaugmentedand.thebarriersdescribedensurethattherewillbenoadverseeffectonSeismicCategoryIornon-seismicsafetyrelatedequipmentwithinthevicinity.Theinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasis"for-anyPlantTechnicalSpecification~becauseoftheadequacyofthesupportsystemasaugmentedandtheinterveningbarrierswhichwould'preventanyadverseeffectonanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

January'25,,1989SERVICEWATERPIPESUPPORTUPGRADE-EWR2512Z(SW-2200)WORKPLATFORMS89-4Thispipesupportupgradeeffortwillrequirefourplatforms',oneontheAuxiliaryBuildingtopfloorbyMCC-1Landthreeontheintermediatefloorin,thevicinityoftheGAuxiliaryBuildingCharcoalFilterandtheHeatTracePanel14anddistribution14BPrimary.BecauseoftheproximityofbothMCCs1LandlMtotheseplatforms,theyshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfrom-StructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbytheConstructionEngineeraridtheLiaisonEngineer.*Inthefinalstageofconstructionpriorto'use,theseismiccapabilityofthescaffoldsinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpiiortoscaffold'sebytheConstructionEngineer,ortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.TheConstructionEngineerortheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisorofconfirmationofseismiccapability.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.In.thisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,and,uponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesamemannerasdescribedabove.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testing,andmaintenanceaccesstoallvalves,instrumentation,panels,andfirefightingprovisionsinthearea.'heaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions,intheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalyses-givenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:LossofNormalFeedwaterPipeBreaksOutsidetheContainmentBuildingDecreaseinReactorCoolantInventorySeismicEvents

Therewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapability~~~~~becausetherewillbenointerferencewithaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.TheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.Theinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccident'ormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

March8,1989DIESELGENERATORFUELOILEWR4526BDISCHARGEPIPESUPPORTUPGRADESCAFFOLDS89-7InordertoperformpipesupportupgradeintheDieselGeneratorRoomspriortothecomingannualAI&0seismicallyconstructedscaffoldsareproposedtopermitsimultaneousexistenceinbothrooms,asshownontheattachedsketch.ThescaffoldsshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbytheConstructionEngineerandtheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisorofconfirmationofseismiccapability.Inthefinalstageofconstructionpriortouse,theseismiccapabilityofthescaffoldinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebytheConstructionEngineer,ortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.TheConstructionEngineerortheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisorofconfirmationofseismiccapability.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,anduponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershallacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesamemannerasdescribedabove.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstoallvalves,instrumentation,panels,rotatingequipment,andfirefightingprovisions.Theaboveconstructionandoperationalrequirementsaretobeobserved.Basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforinlOCFR50.59aregivenbelow.TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetothefacilityorproceduresasdescribedintheSafetyAnalysisReportAsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:

LossofallA.C.powertothestationauxiliariesDecreaseinheatremovalbythesecondarysystemwithcoincidentlossofon-siteandexternal(off-site)A.C.powertothestationSteamGeneratortuberuptureRuptureofasteampipePrimarysystempiperuptureAnticipatedtransientswithoutSCRAMwitha=lossofA.C.powerSeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapabilitybecausetherewillbenointerferencewithaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.TheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.The.installationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

February14,1989RHRRECIRCTIE-INEWR4675APIPETRENCHDECONSCAFFOLDFRAMEENCLOSURE89-8WorkplannedforRHRrecirctie-ininthepipetrenchwestoftheRWSTistobesupportedbydecontaminatingthetrenchintheworkareapriortothepipework.An8'x8'x8'caffoldframeenclosureisplannedtocontroltheareaduringdecontamination.BecauseoftheproximityofavarietyofSeismicCategoryIfeatures,thescaffoldframeshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbytheConstructionEngineerandtheLiaisonEngineer.Inthefinalstageofconstructionpriortouse,theseismiccapabilityofthescaffoldinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebytheConstructionEngineer,ortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.TheConstructionEngineerortheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisorofconfirmationofseismiccapability.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,and,uponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesamemannerasdescribedabove.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstoallvalves,instrumentation,panels,rotatingequipment,andfirefightingprovisions.Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforinlOCFR50.59aregivenbelow.TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:

DecreaseinReactorCoolantInventorySeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapabilitybecausetherewillbenointerferencewithaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.TheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

February14,1989RHRHEATEXCHANGERMONORAILINSTALLATIONANDEDDYCURRENTINSPECTIONWORKPLATFORMS89-9Planstoinstallmonorailstolift,eachRHRHeatExchangerandtoperformeddycurrenttestingwillrequireworkplatformsatseverallevelsatbothheatexchangersconcurrently.Becauseofthis,theyshallbeconstructedoneatatimeinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memo.attachment).Theguidelinesstatement6.0shallbeaugmentedwiththerequirementthatthescaffoldsshallbecompleteandseismictotheextentinstalledbytheendofeachshift.Theerectionprocessshallbemonitoredby,theConstructionEngineerandtheLiaisonEngineer.=Duringconstruction,theend-of-shiftseismicstatusshallbedocumentedonanattachmenttothefieldcopyofthe.authorizationformbytheConstructionEngineerortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.Inthefinal'stageofconstructionpriorto'eginningerectionofthescaffoldinthesecondheatexchangercubicle,theseismiccapabilityofthescaffoldframeinthefirstcubicleinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedbytheConstructionEngineer,or,theLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.'Suchdocumentation.shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.TheConstructionEngineerortheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisorofconfirmationofseismiccapability.Aftersuchconfirmationerectionofthescaffoldframeinthesecondcubiclemaybegin,accompaniedbymonitoring,confirmation,notificationanddocumentationaswiththefirstcubicle.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,and,uponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesamemannerasdescribedabove.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstoallvalvesandinstrumentationinthearea.Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.

TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:DecreaseinReactorCoolantInventorySeismicEventsTheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.The'installationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

March1,1989RHRHEATEXCHANGERMONORAILSMWR89-202289-10Inorderto,performeddycurrentexaminationontheRHRHeatExchangertubesaliftingarrangementhasbeendesignedtobeattachedwithineach.RHRHXcubicle.Thesketchesshowingdimensionsandrequirements,indicatingthedesignisSeismicCategoryIIoverI.Assuch,althoughthisstructuralfeatureisnotSeismicCategoryI,itiscapableofwithstandingaseismiceventequaltothatforwhichtheSeismicCategoryIitemsaredesignedwithoutprovidinganypotentialfordamagetoSeismicCategoryIitemswithin,thevicinity.TheinstallationandinspectionactivitiesshallbecontrolledperWP-7204-1.AnadditionalconstructionrequirementshallbethatthemonorailsaretobeinstalledinoneResidualHeatExchangercubicleatatime.UponcompletionofthefirstinstallationtheConstructionEngineer,ortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead,shallconfirm,anddocumenttheseismiccapabilityinrelationto-thedesignandinstallationrequirementsSuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.TheConstructionEngineerortheLiaisonEngineer'hallnotifytheShiftSupervisoroftheconfirmationpriortoproceedingwithinstallationinthesecondcubicle.Confirmation,documentationandnotificationshallfollowforthesecondcubicleaswiththefirst.TheconstructionEngineerortheLiaisonEngineershallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontherequirementsprovidedpriortoinstallation.Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59are-giyenbelow.rTheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismicallyconstru'ctedfeatureitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationor.intheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgiven,intheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:DecreaseinReactorCoolantInventorySeismicEventsTheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.

Theinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobability.ofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.Theinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviously,'valuatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

March9,1989NONREGENERATIVEHEATEXCHANGERPREPARATIONSFORLIFTFOREDDYCURRENTEXAMINATIONPLATFORM89-11InordertopreparetolifttheNonregenerativeHeatExchangerforeddycurrentexaminationaworkplatformisneededjustbelowthecomponentcoolingwaterinletflange.ThisheatexchangerisSeismicCategoryI.Becauseoftheestimateddurationoftheplatforminstallation,andtheeasewithwhichaseismicscaffoldcanbeinstalleditwasdecidedtoconstructitassuch.Accordingly,theplatformutilizeaframeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbytheConstructionEngineerandtheLiaisonEngineer.Inthefinalstageofconstructionpriortouse,theseismiccapabilityofthescaffoldinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebytheConstructionEngineer,ortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.TheConstructionEngineerortheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisorofconfirmationofseismiccapability.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,and,uponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesamemannerasdescribedabove.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstoallvalvesandinstrumentationinthearea.Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforinlOCFR50.59aregivenbelow.NTheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:

Theinstallationdoesnotinvolvea*changeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewill.benoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.Theinstallationdoesnotincreasethe,probabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.Theinstallationdoesnot,reducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithany'equipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

February27,1989SAFETYINJECTIONRECIRCEWR3881COREBORINGSCAFFOLD89-15InordertoperformcoreboringintheceilingabovetheAuxiliaryBuildingBasementaworkplatformisneededatthesite,betweentheASafetyInjectionPumpandtheRefuelingWaterTank.AlsowithinthevicinityarecabletraysforTrainsAandB,andtheHoseReelatColumn8a-N.Itistobeconstructedtakingadvantageofinterlockingwiththebuildingstructure,andinparticulartosurroundtheabovecolumn.BecauseoftheproximityoftheabovesafetyrelatedfeaturesthescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbytheConstructionEngineerandtheLiaisonEngineer.Inthefinalstageofconstructionpriortouse,theseismiccapabilityofthescaffoldinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebytheConstructionEngineer,ortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.TheConstructionEngineerortheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisorofconfirmationofseismiccapability.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,and,uponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesamemannerasdescribedabove.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstoallvalves,instrumentation,panels,rotatingequipment,andfirefightingprovisionsinthe'area.Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:

RuptureofaSteamPipe.DecreaseinReactorCoolantInventorySeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapabilitybecausetherewillbenointerferencewithaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.TheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.Theinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunction.ofequipmentimportant=tosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.The'installationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,it.willbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

RHRPUMPRECIRC.EWR-4675PIPETIE-INSCAFFOLD89-17.3/1/89TheRHRrecirc.tie-ineffortwillrequireaworkplatformintheAuxiliaryBuildingbasementasColumnline7a,whichisbetweenMOV-856RWSToutlettoRHRandRWST.,AlsowithinthisvicinityareSeismicCategoryIinstrumentsandcontrolsforRHR.HeatExchangeroutletandbypasscontrol.BecauseofthesethescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memo,attachment).Theerectionprocessshallbemonitoredby'theConstructionEngineerandtheLiaisonEngineer.Inthefinalstageofconstructionpriorto"use,the,seismiccapabilityofthescaffoldinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebytheConstructionEngineer,ortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.,Thisconfirmationshallincludereviewof"attributessuchasconfigurationofthescaffoldframeandsecuringoftheplanks.Suchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyof"theAuthorizationForm..TheConstructionEngineerortheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisorofconfirmationofseismiccapability.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,and,uponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesamemannerasdescribedabove.Duringconstructionandteardowncareshouldbetakentopreventbumpinganysensitiveequipmentandtubinginthevicinity.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstoallvalves,instrumentation,rotatingequipment,firefightingprovisions,andadjoiningroomsinthearea.Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.

Theinstallationdoesnot,resultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewith,nointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffect-onany,existingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhich.areassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:DecreaseinReactorCoolantInventorySeismicEvents~Therewillbeno.adverseeffectonfirefightingcapabilitybecausetherewillbe'nointerferencewithaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.TheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.The'nstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.rTheinstallationdoes'notreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedintheba'sesofTechnicalSpecifications.

3/14/89OFF-SITEELECTRICALRECONFIGURATIONEWR-4525CONDUITINSTALLATIONINRELAYROOMSCAFFOLD89-25ScaffoldingisneededtosupportconduitinstallationintheRelayRoom,whichisestimatedtotakeabout6weeks,andwillbeoverAuxiliaryRelayRacks,ContainmentIsolationRelayRacks,SafeguardsInitiationCabinetsandRelayLogicandTestRacks.ThescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).Theguidelinesstatement6.0shallbeaugmentedwiththerequirementthatthescaffoldshallbecompleteandseismictotheextentinstalledbytheendofeachshift.TheConstructionEngineerorLiaisonEngineershallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheguidelinesprovided.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbytheConstructionEngineerandtheLiaisonEngineer.Duringconstruction,theend-of-shiftseismicstatusshallbedocumentedonanattachmenttothefieldcopyoftheauthorizationformbytheConstructionEngineerortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead,Inthefinalstageofconstructionpriortouse,theseismiccapabilityofthescaffoldinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebytheConstructionEngineer,ortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.THisconfirmationshallincludereviewofattributessuchasconfigurationofthescaffoldframeandsecuring'oftheplanks.Suchdocumentation,shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.TheConstructionEngineerortheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisorofconfirmationofseismiccapability.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,and,uponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesamemannerasdescribedabove.Duringconstructionandteardowncareshouldbetakentopreventbumpinganysensitiveequipmentinthevicinity.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstoallinstrumentation,panels,firefightingprovisions,andadjoiningroomsinthearea.Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.

TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.,Asaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexisting'lantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheir'unctionsinnormaloperationor,intheirfunctionsasdescribed.intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththis,proposedinstallationarethefollowing:RuptureofSteamPipeDecreaseinReactorCoolantInventory=SeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapabilitybecausetherewillbenointerferencewithaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.TheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.Theinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesof,anaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,because,asaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhaveno,interfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

CONDENSATEMAKEUP/REJECTPIPESUPPORTTEMPORARYMODIFICATION89-26PREL1MINARY10CFR50.59EVALUATIONMay9,1989Asaresultofthismodificationthefollowingconclusionsmaybe,drawn:TheprobabilityofevaluatedinthemodificationwilllinetoitsdesignoccurrenceofanaccidentpreviouslyUFSARwillnotbeincreased.Thisreturnthecondensatemakeup/rejectintent.2)TheconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARwillnotbeincreased.Thismodificationwillnotchangeanyplantcomponentthatwouldchangetheconsequencesofanyaccident.3)Theprobabilityofoccurrenceofamalfunctionofequipmentimportant.tosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARwillnotbeincreased.Theaffectedlinedoesnotserveanaccidentmitigationfunctionandthenewsupportwillnotincreasetheprobabilityofanymalfunction.4)Theconsequencesofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetywillnotbeincreased.5)Sincethismodificationreturnsthelinetoitsoriginaldesigncondition,thepossibilityofanaccidentdifferentfromthoseevaluatedintheUFSARwillnotbecreated.6)ThepossibilityofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARwillnotbecreatedforthesamereasonasg5above.7)ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisfortheTechnicalSpecificationswillnotbereducedsincethismodificationwillreturnthelinetoitsdesignconfiguration.

3/18/89A'STEAMGENERATORSNUBBERREPLACEMENTEWR-1483SCAFFOLDSANDRIGGING89-38'The.scaffoldsfortheeffortsforsnubberremoval,bumperinstallationandhotclearanceconfirmationaredesignedandprovidedperRochesterScaffold=andEquipmentCompanydrawingsRS-116andRS-117.ThefollowinglettersareattachedtoindicatestructuralEngineeringevaluationofloadingofsteelmembersforscaffoldsupportandrigging,'ndseismiccapability:1.S.K.FergusonJanuary4,1988lettertoR.N.Murray,

Subject:

EWR1483TemporaryRiggingforSnubbersandStruts.2.S.K.FergusonJanuary14,1988lettertoM.J.Smith,

Subject:

S/GSnubberReplacementScaffoldingEWR14833.S.K.FergusonFebruary4,1988lettertoR.N.Murray,

Subject:

ScaffoldforSnubberRemoval.Theinstallationwilltakeplacewhiletheunitisincoldcondition;however,thehotclearancephasewilltakeadvantageoftheseismicdesign,allowingexistenceofsuchscaffoldsbybothSteamGeneratorssimultaneously.Unlessfurtherevaluationisperformedtopermitsimultaneousdismantlingofthescaffolds,scaffoldatonesteamgeneratoristobecompletelyremovedpriortostartingdismantlingscaffoldingat,theotherSteamGenerator.Basedontheseismiccapabilityofthescaffolddesignthedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.Theinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysis'givenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplant'provisionsintheimmediatevicinity,intheirfunctionsinnormal",operationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.The'designbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:Decrease'nReactorCoolantInventorySeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapabilitybecausetherewillbenointerferencewithaccessprovidedtofire'fightingprovisions.

TheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

3/18/89BSTEAM.GENERATORSNUBBERREPLACEMENTEWR-1483SCAFFOLDSANDRIGGING89-39Thescaffoldsfortheeffortsforsnubberremoval,bumperinstallationandhotclearanceconfirmationaredesignedandprovidedperRochesterScaffoldandEquipmentCompanydrawingsRS-,116andRS-117;ThefollowinglettersareattachedtoindicatestructuralEngineeringevaluationof,loadingofsteelmembersforscaffoldsupportandrigging,andseismiccapability:1.S.K.FergusonJanuary4,1988lettertoR.N.Murray,

Subject:

EWR1483,TemporaryRiggingforSnubbersandStruts.2~3~4~S.K.FergusonJanuary14,1988lettertoM.J.Smith,

Subject:

S/GSnubberReplacementScaffoldingEWR1483S.K.FergusonFebruary4,1988.lettertoR.N.Murray,

Subject:

ScaffoldforSnubberRemoval.S.K.FergusonMarch6,1989lettertoR.N.Murray,

Subject:

EWR-1483SnubberReductionProgramTemporaryRigging-"B"MainSteamLine.Theinstallationwilltakeplacewhiletheunitisincoldcondition;however,thehotclearancephasewilltakeadvantageoftheseismicdesign,allowingexistenceofsuchscaffoldsbybothSteamGeneratorssimultaneously.Unlessfurtherevaluationisperformedtopermitsimultaneousdismantlingofthescaffolds,scaffoldatonesteamgeneratoristobecompletelyremovedpriortostartingdismantlingscaffoldingattheotherSteamGenerator.BasedontheseismiccapabilityofthescaffolddesignthedeterminationscalledforinlOCFR50.59aregivenbelow.TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:DecreaseinReactorCoolantInventorySeismicEvents

~~~~~~Therewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapabilitybecau'setherewillbenointerferencewithaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.TheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.Theinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthe-basisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

May23,1989RESIDUALHEATREMOVALTOLOOPBVENTVALVE2779FLANGEHOSEREMOVALSCAFFOLD89-148Aworkplatformisdesiredinordertoremovethehosefromaflangeattheventvalve2779.WiththeReactorCoolantSystemattemperaturegreaterthancoldshutdowntemperaturetheexistenceofmorethanone'rainofsafeguardsequipmentwhichcouldbeincludedwithintheareawhichcouldbeaffectedbyascaffoldmustbeconsidered.Theareaoftheproposedscaffoldincludesequipmentassociatedwithtwotrains.ThescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering.(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbyanassignedLiaisonEngineer,anditsseismiccapabilityinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebytheLiaisonEn'gineer.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.TheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisorofconfirmationofseismiccapability.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection,that.adeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,anduponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershallaccepttheinstallation.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstoallvalves,instrumentation,panels,rotatingequipment,firefightingprovisions,andadjoiningroomsinthearea.Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:DecreaseinReactorCoolantInventorySteam.GeneratorTubeRuptureRuptureofaSteamPipe.SeismicEvents

Therewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapabilitybecausetherewillbenointerferencewithaccessprovidedto~~~~~~~~~~~~firefightingprovisions.TheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.Theinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceor=theconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerface,withanyexistingequipment.orsystemsinthevicinity.Theinstallationdoes,notreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlant'echnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

8/30/89ADIESELGENERATORROOMPAINTINGSCAFFOLD89-160Scaffoldingisneededforworkplatformsforceilingandwallpainting.Becauseofthemanyobstaclestousingeasy-builtscaffold,poleandknucklescaffoldmustbeused,whichwilladdtothedurationofscaffoldexistence;becauseofthisandthepotentialeffectontheMCCwithinthevicinitywhichcontainsthebreakerfortheBDieselGeneratorAirStartCompressor,thescaffoldingshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).Theguidelinesstatement,4.0requirementtowireallplankdecking'inplacemaybereplacedwiththealternativerequirementtousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunctionwithwoodencleats.(AcceptableasnotedperM.K.FitzsimmonsonAuthorizationForm89-167attached.)Theguidelinesstatement6.0shallbeaugmentedwiththerequirementthatthescaffoldshallbecompleteandseismictotheextentinstalledbytheendofeachshift.Thejobsupervisorshallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheguidelinesprovided.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbytheLiaisonEngineer.Duringconstruction,theend-of-shiftseismicstatusshallbedocumentedonanattachmenttothefieldcopyoftheauthorizationformbytheLiaisonEngineer,Inthefinalstageofconstructionpriortouse,theseismiccapabilityofthe.scaffoldinrelationto'heguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebytheConstructionEngineer,ortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.Thisconfirmationshallincludereviewofattributessuchasconfigurationofthescaffoldframeandsecuringoftheplanks.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.TheConstructionEngineerortheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisorofconfirmationofseismiccapability.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,and,uponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesamemannerasdescribedabove.During'onstructionandteardowncareshouldbetakentopreventbumpinganysensitiveequipmentandtubinginthevicinity.Nonon-seismicscaffoldconstructionorteardownactivityistobeundertakeninthealternateDieselGeneratorRoomunlessinterimorfinalseismiccapabilityisestablishedandisbeingmaintainedwithintheADieselGeneratorRoom.

Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstoallvalves,instrumentation,panels,rotatingequipment,andfirefightingprovisions.Theaboveconstructionandoperational'requirementsaretobeobserved.Basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforinlOCFR50.59aregivenbelow.TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetothefacilityorproceduresasdescribedintheSafetyAnalysisReportAsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectona'yexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:LossofallA.C.powertothestationauxiliariesDecreaseinheatremovalbythesecondarysystemwithcoincidentlossofon-siteandexternal(off-site)A.C.powertothestationSteamGeneratortuberuptureRuptureofasteampipePrimarysystempiperuptureAnticipatedtransientswithoutSCRAMwithalossofA.C.powerSeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapabilitybecausetherewillbenointerferencewithaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.TheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.Theinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisfor'nyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbe.independentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

8/30/89ADIESELGENERATORROOMPAINTSCAFFOLDEND<<OF-SHIFTSTATUSSincestartofscaffoldconstructionintheADieselGeneratorRoomonJuly10,1989,thebuildingcrewhasbeenalternatingbetweenthisinstallationandaninstallationintheScreenhouse,withhighest.prioritygiventotheScreenhousework.WheneverworkwasdoneonthescaffoldstructureintheADieselGeneratorRoom,Ihavebeennotifiedandperformedanend-of-shiftinspection.Atthecompletionofeachsuchworkeffortthestructurewasfoundtobecompleteandseismictotheextentinstalled.Thescaffoldisyettobeturnedoverforusebythepaintcrew.MichaelJ.SmithLiaisonEngineer

June20,1989SPENTFUELPOOLCOVER89-162hWorkabovetheSpent.FuelPoolisplanned,andasameasuretopreventdebrisfromentering,thepoolistobecoveredwithaprotectivestructureasshownontheattachedsketch.ShouldanydebrisenterthepoolnotificationtotheConstructionEngineershallbemade.Priortofueltransfersystemoperation,acompleteinspectionshallbemadeinthefueltransferslot.Theanalysisforprojectileimpingementon,theSpentFuelRackinvolvesamassequivalenttoautilitypole.Theplatformassemblycomponentsrepresentlessmass;thepotentialeffectontherackbytheassemblywouldbemorebroadlydistributed.Theaboveconstructionandoperationalrequirementsaretobeobserved.Basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.Theinstallationdoesnotorproceduresasdescribedindesignbasiseventanalyzedassociatedwiththisproposedaccident.resultinachangetothefacilitytheSafetyAnalysisReport.TheintheSafetyAnalysisReportinstallationisthefuelhandlingTheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseofthelackofanypotentialeffectonthefuelduetotheprotectionaffordedbytherackasdescribedabove.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport'becausethecapabilityoftherackandtheabsenceofsafetyrelatedequipmentinthearea.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftherackcapabilitydescribedabove,thelackofimpact.onreactorsafetyandtheboundinganalysisofthefuelhandlingaccident.Theinstallationdoesnotreduce,themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecificationbecauseof.thecapabilityoftherack.=Thetotalweightofthetemporarystructureisestimatedat8,600lbs.Thisweight.willbesupportedby32feetofSFPbridgetrackwhichisatotalsurfaceareaof4.67ft2.Thefinalloadonthetracksis1842lb/ftavaluefarlessthanthatexperiencedwhentheSFPbridgeismovingwithafuelassemblyattached.

Thestructurewillsupportpersonnelandsmalltoolsandequipmentsuchaspaintcansandbrushes,however,thecoverisnotintendedforuseasa.temporarystorageareafornon-relatedancillaryequipment.Duringassemblyofthestructuredoubleriggingwillbeused'forallmovesovertheSFParea.Sufficientspacewillbeavailableforvisual~SFP"waterlevelverification.

June20,1989MAINSTEAMLINEPRESSURETRANSMITTERTUBINGREROUTEEWR4933WORKPLATFORMS89-163WorkplatformsareneededtoperformthetubingreroutingtobelocatedbytheIntermediateBuildingNortheaststair,betweentheContainmentwallandthenorthwall.WithinthisvicinityaretheControlRodMGSetControlPanels,theReactorTripBreakerPanels,theReactorTripBypassBreakerPanels,theBMainSteamLinePressureTransmitters,andnumerouscabletrays.Thescaffoldframefortheseplatformsistoriseapproximately20Becauseofthepresenceofthesafetyrelatedfeatureslistedabove,thescaffoldframesystemfortheworkplatformsshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988.memoattachment).Theguidelinesstatement6.0shallbeaugmentedwiththerequirementthatthescaffoldshallbecompleteandseismictotheextentinstalledbytheendofeachshift.TheConstructionEngineerorLiaisonEngineershallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheguidelinesprovided.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbytheConstructionEngineerandtheLiaisonEngineer.Duringconstruction,theend-of-shiftseismicstatusshallbedocumentedonanattachmenttothefieldcopyoftheauthorizationformbytheConstructionEngineerortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.Inthefinalstageofconstructionpriortouse,theseismiccapabilityofthescaffoldinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebytheConstructionEngineer,ortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.Thisconfirmationshallincludereviewofattributessuchasconfigurationofthescaffoldframeandsecuringoftheplanks.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.TheConstructionEngineerortheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisorofconfirmationofseismiccapability.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,oiobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,and,uponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesamemannerasdescribedabove.Duringconstructionandteardowncareshouldbetakentopreventbumpinganysensitiveequipmentandtubinginthevicinity.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstoallvalves,instrumentation,panels,rotatingequipment,firefightingprovisions,andadjoiningroomsinthearea.

Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforinlOCFR50.59aregivenbelow.TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:RodClusterControlAssembly(RCCA)DropRuptureofaSteamPipeAnticipatedTransientsWithoutScramSeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapabilitybecausetherewillbenointerferencewithaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.Theinstallationdoesnot.involveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

June22,1989SAFETYINJECTIONTOBLOOPFLOWORIFICEFE-924SCAFFOLD89-166Aworkplatformisneededabout4ft.abovetheflooreast,oftheSafetyInjectiontoBLoopMOV's878AandB,northoftheExcess'LetdownLetdownHeatExchanger,whichisjustbehinda7ft.highchainlinkbarrier,westofabuildingcolumninterveningwiththeRegenerativeHeatExchanger,alsowithinthechainlinkbarrier,andsoutheastofCVCSairoperatedvalvesfor,normalchargingtoBColdLeg,chargingtoBHotLegandAuxiliaryPres'surizerSpray,inorderofdistancefromtheorifice.ThedistancetothefirstCVCSvalveisabout6ft.Theunitispresentlywith=RCS.temperaturelessthan350F,tobemaintained.assuchuntilafterremovalofthescaffold.Analternatepathfor'hargingtotheAloopexists,whichhasarouteawayfromthescaffoldarea.AuxiliaryPressurizerSprayisnotnormallyused.ThealternatepathforchargingtoA-Loopshallbemaintainedoperableduringthescaffoldexistence.ITheaboveconstructionandoperationalrequirementsaretobeobserved.Basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetothefacilityorproceduresasdescribedintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:DecreaseinReactorCoolantInventoryChemicalandVolumeControlSystemMalfunctionTheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseobservingtherequirementsofmaintaininglessthan350FandthealternatechargingpathoperablewillpermitsatisfyingtheassumptionsandbasesintheTechnicalSpecificationsdealingwithSafetyInjectionandChemicalandVolumeControl.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseobservingtheoperationalrequirementofmaintaininglessthan350oFassuresthattherewillbenoneedforthedeliverycapabilitiesofthe.SafetyInjectionSystemcalledforinthedesignbases.Thealternatechargingpathwillbeavailableintheeventofanyadverseaffectonthenormalchargingpath.""*l

TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasafeaturetobeinplaceonlyduringmaintainingRCStemperaturelessthan350FwiththealternatechargingpathtoALoopavailable,therewillbenoeffectonsafetyofoperations.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasafeatureinstalledwithimpositionofRCStemperaturelimitationof350FandmaintainingoperabilityofthechargingpathtoALoop,itwillhavenoeffectonsystemsasdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

7/7/89SCREENHOUSEWINDOWSECURITYBARSM-89-03BYASERVICEWATERPUMPSCAFFOLD89-167ScaffoldingisrequiredintheScreenhousefortheinstallationofsecurity'barsforSM-89-03.Thispermit(89-167)isforaseismicscaffoldadjacenttotheeastwallofthebuildingnearthesouthsideofthehouseheatingboiler(Ref.sketchattachedtopermit,).Thislocationiswithin11/2timesitsheightofsafetyrelatedservicewaterpumplA.ThescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines.providedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).TheJobSupervisorshallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheguidelinesprovided.'heerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbyanassignedLiaisonEngineer,anditsseismiccapabilityinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebytheLiaisonEngineer.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthoiizationForm.TheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisorofconfirmationofseismiccapability.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershal'1reviewtheinstallation,anduponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershallaccepttheinstallation.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstotheScreenhouseallvalves,instrumentation,panels,rotatingequipment,andfirefightingprovisions.Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:SeismicEvents

Therewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapabilitybecausetherewillbenointerferencewithaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.TheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeature*therewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

7/7/89SCREENHOUSEWINDOWSECURITYBARSM-89-03BYBUS17SCAFFOLD89-168ScaffoldingisrequiredintheScreenhousefortheinstallationofsecuritybarsforSM-89-03.Thispermit(89-168)isforaseismicscaffoldinthenortheastcornerofthebuildingalongcolumnlines7andEE(Ref.sketchattachedtopermit).Thislocationiswithin11/2timesitsheightofsafetyrelatedBusses17and18.ThescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).TheJobSupervisorshallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheguidelinesprovided.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbyanassignedLiaisonEngineer,anditsseismiccapabilityinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebytheLiaisonEngineer.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.TheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisorofconfirmationofseismiccapability.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,anduponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershallaccepttheinstallation.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstotheScreenhouseallvalves,instrumentation,panels,andfirefightingprovisions.Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:SeismicEvents

Therewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapabilitybecausetherewillbenointerferencewithaccessprovidedto~~~~~~~firefightingprovisions.TheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

7/7/89SCREENHOUSE'WINDOWSECURITYBARSM-89-03BYBUS18SCAFFOLD89-169ScaffoldingisrequiredintheScreenhouse~fortheinstallationofsecuritybarsforSM-89-03.Thispermit(89-169)isforaseismicscaffoldinthesoutheastcornerofthebuildingabovethestairwelltothebasement(Ref.sketchattachedtopermit).Thislocationiswithin11/2timesitsheightofsafetyrelatedBus18.ThescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).TheJobSupervisorshallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheguidelinesprovided.Theerectionprocess,shallbemonitoredbyanassignedLiaisonEngineer,anditsseismiccapabilityinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebytheLiaisonEngineer.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.TheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisorofconfirmationofseismiccapability.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,or.isobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,anduponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershallaccepttheinstallation.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstotheScreenhouseallvalves,instrumentation,panels,firefightingprovisions,andadjoiningroomsinthearea.Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:SeismicEvents

Therewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapabilitybecausetherewillbenointerferencewithaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.Theinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangein'.thePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewill*benoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.Theinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobability'ofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismic'eature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.Theinstallationdoes-notreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforany'lantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwill.beindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewith'nyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

7/7/89SCREENHOUSEWINDOWSECURITYBARSM-89-03BYDIESELFIREPUMPOILTANKSCAFFOLD89-170ScaffoldingisrequiredintheScreenhousefortheinstallationofsecuritybarsforSM-89-03.Thispermit.(89-170)isforaseismicscaffoldonthesouthwallofthebuildingneardoorSO(Ref.sketchattachedtopermit).Thislocationiswithin11/2timesitsheightofsafetyrelatedBus18.ThescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment.).The,JobSupervisorshallverifythatanorientationsess'ionhasbeenconductedontheguidelinesprovided.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbyanassignedLiaisonEngineer,anditsseismiccapabilityinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebytheLiaisonEngineer.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.TheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisorofconfirmationofseismiccapability.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,anduponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershallaccepttheinstallation.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstotheScreenhouseallvalves,instrumentation,panels,firefightingprovisions,andadjoiningroomsinthearea.Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:SeismicEvents

Therewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapabilitybecausetherewillbenointerferencewithaccessprovidedtofire.fightingprovisions.TheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecause.asaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent,of,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

7/7/89SCREENHOUSEWINDOWSECURITYBARSM-89-03BETWEENFIREPUMPSSCAFFOLD89-171ScaffoldingisrequiredintheScreenhousefortheinstallationofsecuritybarsforSM-89-03.Thispermit(89-171)isforaseismicscaffoldonthesouthwallofthebuildingneardoorS2(Ref.sketchattachedtopermit).Thislocationiswithin11/2timesitsheightofsafetyrelatedservicewater.pump1D.ThescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).TheJobSupervisorshallverifythat.anorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheguidelinesprovided.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbyanassignedLiaisonEngineer,anditsseismiccapabilityinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebytheLiaisonEngineer.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.TheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisorofconfirmationofseismiccapability.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,anduponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershallaccepttheinstallation.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstotheScreenhouseall.valves,instrumentation,panels,rotatingequipment,andfirefightingprovisions.Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:SeismicEvents

Therewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapabilitybecausetherewillbenointerferencewithaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.TheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

August1,1989SAFETYEVALUATIONFORTEMPORARYSTRUCTUREFEATUREAUTHORIZATIONFORM89-180Thistemporarystructurewillbeplacedunderthereferencelegpipingtosupportthecondensatepotandassociatedtubing.Thereferencelegpipingwillbeliftedbyhandwhilemeasuringandrecordingthemaximumliftforce.Theliftwillnotcreateanysubstantialdeflectionoftherootvalveandwillthereforenotcreateanunexceptablestressontheweldsinthereferenceleg.Thereferencelegwillnotbeliftedpastthecondensatespotsoriginaldesignelevation.Therefore,thistemporarystructurewillnotendangertheintegrityofthereferencelegpiping.Thistemporarystructurewillberemovedpriortoleavingthehotshutdowncondition.ThistemporarystructurewillnotincreasetheprobabilityofanaccidentortheconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR.ThistemporarystructurewillnoteffectthepressuretransmitterPT-429andthereforewillnoteffecttheresponseofsafetyinjectiontoanaccident.Thisstructurewillnoteffecttheintegrityofthereferencelegandwillonlybeusedtosupportthestaticloadofthepipingwillremainintact.ThistemporarystructurewillnotcreateanaccidentofadifferenttypethenthosespecifiedintheUFSAR.TheSafetyInjectionSystemwillreactasdesignedtoanyaccidentaddressedintheUFSAR.Thistemporarystructurewillnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinanytechnicalspecificationbasis.Thisstructuredoesnotrenderanyplantsysteminoperable,norwillitdegradeanyoperatingsystem.

8/11/89SCREENHOUSENORTHOFMCC-1GPLANTBETTERMENTPAINTSCAFFOLD89-183Scaffoldingisneededforceilingandwallpaintingintheareanorth*ofMCC-1Gnotcoveredbypreviouslyapprovedscaffolds89-167and89-168.BecauseoftheproximityoftheserviceWaterPumpsinbothtrainsandMCC-1GthescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).Theguidelinesstatement4.0requirementtowireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternativerequirementtousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunctionwithwoodencleats.(AcceptableasnotedperM.K.FitzsimmonsonAuthorizationForm89-167).TheJobSupervisorshallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheguidelinesprovided.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbyanassignedLiaisonEngineer,anditsseismiccapabilityinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebytheLiaisonEngineer.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.TheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisorofconfirmationofseismiccapability.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection,that-adeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,.verbalguidance'romamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,anduponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershallaccepttheinstallation.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstoallvalves,instrumentation,panels,andfirefightingprovisions.Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:SeismicEvents

Therewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapabilitybecausetherewillbenointerferencewithaccessprovidedto~~~~~~~firefightingprovisions.TheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.Theinstallationdoesnot'increasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

8/11/89SCREENHOUSESOUTHWALLOVERDIESELFIREPUMPPLANTBETTERMENTPAINTSCAFFOLD89-184ScaffoldingisneededforceilingandwallpaintingintheareaovertheDieselFirePumpbetweentheareascoveredbypreviouslyapprovedscaffolds89-170and89-171.BecauseoftheproximityoftheserviceWaterPumpsandFireServiceWaterPumpsinbothtrainsthescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).Theguidelinesstatement4.0requirementtowireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternativerequirementtousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunctionwithwoodencleats.(AcceptableasnotedperM.K.Fitzsimmons'onAuthorizationForm89-167).TheJobSupervisorshallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheguidelinesprovided.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbyanassignedLiaisonEngineer,anditsseismiccapabilityinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebytheLiaisonEngineer.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.TheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisorofconfirmationofseismiccapability.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,anduponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershallaccepttheinstallation.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstoallvalves,instrumentation,panels,andfirefightingprovisions.Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:SeismicEvents

Therewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapabilitybecausetherewillbenointerferencewithaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.TheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

8/28/89REFUELINGWATERTANKOPERATINGFLOORPAINTSCAFFOLD89-189InordertominimizecontaminationattheAux.Bldg.topflooritwillbenecessarytodecontheRWSTfromtoptothefloor,and,tofacilitatefuturedeconefforts,itisdesirabletofollowupwithpainting.Becauseofthenearnessof480VBus14andtherelativelylengthyprojecteddurationofthescaffoldexistence,thescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).Theguidelinesstatement4.0requirementtowireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternativerequirementtousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunctionwithwoodencleats.(AcceptableasnotedperM.K.FitzsimmonsonAuthorizationForm89-167).TheJobSupervisorshallverifythat,anorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheguidelinesprovided.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbyanassignedLiaisonEngineer,anditsseismiccapabilityinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebytheLiaisonEngineer.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.TheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisorofconfirmationofseismiccapability.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,anduponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershallaccepttheinstallation.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccessallvalves,instrumentation,panels,rotatingequipment,firefightingprovisions,andadjoiningroomsinthearea.Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.

TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:DecreaseinReactorCoolantInventoryRuptureofaSteamPipeSeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapabilitybecausetherewillbenointerferencewithaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.TheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

September6,1989AMAINSTEAMARV-3411REPAIRWORKPLATFORM89-190RepairworkonARV-3411willnecessitateaworkplatform,constructedofpolescaffoldandplankssuchastosurroundtheAMainSteamleadandthereliefvalveinletpiping,somewhatbelowtheARVinletflange.ThesmalltubingfortheARVairoperatorwillbedisconnectedduringthevalverepairpreparations.AssuchtheplatformwillhavenopotentialeffectontheARVs,andthestructureswillberestrictedfrommovementinthedirectionofanyothersafetyrelatedequipment.TheMainSteamleadsandthereliefpipingaresufficientlysturdytoprecludeanydamagefromtherelativelylightscaffoldmaterials;however,pipingofsmallerdiameterthanthescaffoldpolematerialisincorporatedastheisolationvalve3507bypass.Thedurationofscaffoldexistenceisprojectedtobe2weeks.Becauseoftheabovefactors,thescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).Theguidelinesstatement4.0requirementtowireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternativerequirementtousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunctionwithwoodencleats.(AcceptableasnotedperM.B.FitzsimmonsonAuthorizationForm89-167).TheJobSupervisorshallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheguidelinesprovided.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbyanassignedLiaisonEngineer,anditsseismiccapabilityinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebytheLiaisonEngineer.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.TheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisorofconfirmationofseismiccapability.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,anduponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesamemannerasdescribedabove.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstoallvalves,instrumentation,andfirefightingprovisionsinthearea.

Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforinlOCFR50.59aregivenbelow.TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:SteamGeneratortuberuptureRuptureofasteampipeSeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapabilitybecausetherewillbenointerferencewithaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.TheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecification"bases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

September7,1989LAUNDRYEXHAUSTFANVIBRATION/EXPANSIONRINGREPLACEMENTWORKPLATFORM89-191RepairisrequiredonductworkattheLaundryExhaustFan,locatedinthevicinityoftheAFeedwaterLine.TheentriesfromtheMotorandTurbineAuxiliaryFeedwaterPumpdischargesarenearby,andthereisahighdensityofsnubbersforthispipinginarea(5mechanicaland1hydraulic).Atemperaturesensor(TE-2096)islocatedatthetopofthefeedwaterlinedownstreamofcheckvalve3003.Becauseoftheexistenceoftheabovefeatureswithinthevicinityoftheproposedscaffold,scaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).Theguidelinesstatement4.0requirementtowireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternativerequirementtousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunctionwithwoodencleats.(AcceptableasnotedperM.B.FitzsimmonsonAuthorizationForm89-167).TheJobSupervisorshallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheguideline'sprovided.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbyanassignedLiaisonEngineer,anditsseismiccapabilityinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebytheLiaisonEngineer.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.TheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisorofconfirmationofseismiccapability.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,anduponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesamemannerasdescribedabove.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingandmaintenanceaccesstoallvalves,instrumentation,panels,andfirefightingprovisionsinthearea.Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.

TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdes'cribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:LossofNormalFeedwaterLossofallA.C.powertothestationauxiliariesSteamGeneratortuberuptureRuptureofasteampipeSeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapabilitybecausetherewillbenointerferencewithaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.TheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,it.willbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

September12,1989SIRECIRCFLOWORIFICEFE-916LEAKREPAIRWORKPLATFORM89-192AworkplatformisrequiredtocorrectaleakconditionatSIrecircfloworificeFE-916,locatedbetweentheRefuelingWaterTankand480vBus16.AlsowithinthevicinityareTemperatureIndicatorTI-917,andSIrecircMOVs897and898.TheMOVsarewithintheASMESeismicClass2boundaryasindicatedonPAID33013-1261ContainmentSpray(SI).Theplatformistobeabout4ft.high,estimatedtobeinexistence2days.BecauseoffactorsgivenabovethescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).Theguidelinesstatement4.0requirementtowireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternativerequirementtousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunctionwithwoodencleats.(AcceptableasnotedperM.B.FitzsimmonsonAuthorizationForm89-167).TheSobSupervisorshallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheguidelinesprovided.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbyanassignedLiaisonEngineer,anditsseismiccapabilityinrelationtotheguidelinesshall.beconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebytheLiaisonEngineer.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.TheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisorofconfirmationofseismiccapability.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,anduponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesamemannerasdescribedabove.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testingand.maintenanceaccesstoallvalves,instrumentation,panels,andfirefightingprovisionsinthearea.Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.

tTheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffect,onanyexistingplant'provisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Thedesignbasiseventsanalyzedin.theSafetyAnalysisReportwhich.areassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:DecreaseinReactorCoolantInventorySeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapabilitybecausetherewillbenointerferencewithaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions..Theinstallationdoes'ot.involveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffect.onassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremain'independentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.,TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

9/26/89AUXILIARYBUILDINGTOPNORTHWALL(CNMT)PLANTBETTERMENTPAINTSCAFFOLD89-193AscaffoldisplannedforpaintingthenorthwallattheAuxiliaryBuildingtoplevel,toextendfromtheSpentFuelPooltotheareanorthof480VBus14,andtieintoaplannedscaffoldaroundtheRWST,controlledbyAuthorizationForm89-189.Becauseofthelargeareatobecovered,includingtheareasurrounding480VBus14,andtherelativelylengthy-projecteddurationofthescaffoldexistence,thescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).Theguidelinesstatement4.0requirementtowireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternativerequirementtousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunctionwithwoodencleats.(AcceptableasnotedperM.B.FitzsimmonsonAuthorizationForm89-167).TheJobSupervisorshallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheguidelinesprovided.Inaddition,partoftheorientationshallstresstheimportanceoftakingcarenottobumpanylivesmokedetectors.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbyanassignedLiaisonEngineer.Inaddition,theJobSupervisorshallnotifytheFireProtectiongroupduringinstallationtoallowforconsultationonanypotentialinterferenceswithfiredetection/sprinklerprovisionsencountered.Duringconstruction,theend-of-shiftseismicstatusshallbedocumentedonanattachmenttothefieldcopyoftheauthorizationformbytheLiaisonEngineer.Inthefinalstageofconstructionpriortouse,theseismiccapabilityofthescaffoldinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebytheLiaisonEngineer.Thisconfirmationshallincludereviewofattributessuchasconfigurationofthescaffoldframeandsecuringoftheplanks.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.TheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisorofconfirmationofseismiccapability.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,and,uponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,theStructuralEngineershalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesamemannerasdescribedabove.

Duringconstructionandteardowncareshouldbetakentopreventbumpinganysensitiveequipmentandtubinginthevicinity.Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testing,andmaintenance,accesstoallvalves,instrumentation,panels,rotatingequipment,andfirefightingprovisionsinthearea.ThescaffoldshallbeconstructedsoasnottointerferewithAuxiliaryBuildingCraneuseduringfueltransfermechanismworkplanned.Duringscaffolduse,G.JossshallbecontactedonpreventionofpaintingILRTinspectionareasonthecontainmentwall.Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforinlOCFR50.59aregivenbelow.TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:"DecreaseinReactorCoolantInventoryRuptureofaSteamPipeSeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapabilitybecausetherewillbenointerferencewithaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.TheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.

TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

AUXILIARYBUILDINGTOPSOUTHWALLWESTFROMCOLUMNLINE8aPLANTBETTERMENTPAINTSCAFFOLD89-1949/26/89'1Ascaffoldisplannedforpaintingthesouth-wallattheAuxiliaryBuildingtoplevel,toextendfromtheDeconPittotheMonitorTanks.Becauseofthelargeareatobecovered,includingtheareaimmediatelyadjacenttobothComponentCoolingHeatExchangers,andtherelativelylengthyprojecteddurationofthescaffoldexistence,thescaffoldshallbeconstructedinaccordancewiththeattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelinesprovidedfromStructuralEngineering(M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment).Theguidelinesstatement4.0requirementtowireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternativerequirementtousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunctionwithwoodencleats.(AcceptableasnotedperM.B.FitzsimmonsonAuthorizationForm89-167);ITheJobSupervisorshallverifythatanorientationsessionhasbeenconductedontheguidelinesprovided.Inaddition,partoftheorientationshallstresstheimportanceoftakingcarenottobumpanylivesmokedetectors.TheerectionprocessshallbemonitoredbyanassignedLiaisonEngineer.Inaddition,theJobSupervisorshallnotifytheFireProtectiongroupduringinstallationtoallowforconsultationonanypotentialinterferenceswithfiredetection/sprinklerprovisionsencountered.Duringconstruction,theend-of-shiftseismicstatusshallbedocumentedonanattachmenttothefieldcopyoftheauthorizationformbytheLiaisonEngineer.Inthefinalstageofconstructionpriortouse,theseismiccapabilityofthescaffoldinrelationtotheguidelinesshallbeconfirmedanddocumentedpriortoscaffoldusebytheLiaisonEngineer.Thisconfirmationshallincludereviewofattributessuchasconfigurationofthescaffoldframeandsecuringoftheplanks.SuchdocumentationshallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorizationForm.TheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisorofconfirmationofseismiccapability.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orobservedduringerection,thatadeviationfromtheguidelineswillbenecessary,verbalguidancefromamemberofStructuralEngineeringshallbeobtained.InthisinstancetheStructuralEngineershallreviewtheinstallation,and,uponbeingsatisfiedwithitsseismiccapability,the'tructuralEngineer-shalldocumentacceptanceoftheinstallationinthesamemannerasdescribedabove.Duringconstructionandteardowncareshouldbetakento'preventbumpinganysensitiveequipmentandtubinginthevicinity.

Clearanceshallbemaintainedforoperations,testing,andmaintenanceaccesstoallvalves,instrumentation,panels,rotatingequipment,andfirefightingprovisionsinthearea.ThescaffoldshallbeconstructedsoasnottointerferewithAuxiliaryBuildingCraneuseduringfueltransfermechanismworkplanned.Theaboveconstructionrequirementsaretobeobserved;basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforinlOCFR50.59aregivenbelow.TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.AsaseismicallyconstructedfeaturewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribedaboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisionsintheimmediatevicinityintheirfunctionsinnormaloperationorintheirfunctionsasdescribedintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:DecreaseinReactorCoolantInventoryRuptureofaSteamPipeSeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapabilitybecausetherewillbenointerferencewithaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.TheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapabilityandaccessprovisionsincorporated.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependentof,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyexistingequipmentorsystemsinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecification,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent.of,andwillhavenointerfacewithanyequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

TemorarInstallationand0erationofStandbS.F.P.Coolin~SetemAspartofENR-1594;"SpentFuelPoolCooling",theStandbyS.F.P.CoolingSyst:emwillbeutilizedinadifferentconfigurationthenoriginallyanalyzed.Therecirculationpump,heatexchanger,andassociatedSpentFuelPoolpipe,valves,fitting,hoses,andinstrumentationwillbeprovidedandinstalledasshownonattachedsketch(s)andperSM-1594.8A.Thestandbysystemwillremaininserviceuntilthenewsystemisinstalled,tested,andplacedinoperationperEWR-1594.TemorarFluidProvisions:HosesareconnectedfromtheS.W.systemtotheskidmountedS.F.P.HeatExchanger.Thesetwohoseswhichpasswithin5'feachC.C.W.pumpwillbesecuredtoexistingplantstructuralmembers.Thehosedesignpressureis200psigwhichexceedstheS.N.systemdesignoperatingpressure.Asystemreliefvalvelocatedontheheatexchangershellwillpreventthesystempressurefromexceeding150psig.Isolationvalvesareprovidedtoisolateservicewaterfromtheskidmountedheatexchanger.TheC.C.N.systemrequiresonlyonepumptomeettherequireddesign.IntheeventofafailurewhichcausesacompletefailureoftheC.C.W.system,residualheatremovalwouldbeaccomplishedwithauxiliaryfeedandsteamgenerators.ThiseventhasbeenanalyzedintheUFSARanddoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.EWR-1594addressesapostulatedbreakinthesixinchsupplyandreturnlines.Sincetherearetwotrainsofservicewater,theassumptionis,ifonetrainislost,theothertrainwillprovidetherequiredcoolingfortheplant.Failureofthesixinchreturnlinewouldnotaffectthecoolingofcomponentsintheservicewatersystem,Aredundantservicewaterreturnlineisprovided.Inbothcasesstatedaboveisolationvalvesareprovidedtoisolateservicewaterfromthe'skidmountedheatexchangerandassociated-hoses.Theinstallationandtie-intotheS.W.systemofhosestoandfromtheskidS.F.P.heatexchangerandtheirlocationsinreferencetoC.C.W.pumpsandassociatedcomponentswillnot1)resultinachangetothefacili'tyorit'soperationasdescribedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,2)provideachangetothePlantTechnicalSpecifications,or3)involveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.S.F.P.RecirculationHosesPieandFittinsTheskidpumpdischargepipinghoseandfittingwhichconnectstothebottomoftheskidmountedS.F.P.heatexchangerwillnotbelocatednearanysafetyrelatedequipment.oranyotherplantpiping.Thehosewillberoutedalongthefloor.Page1of3

Theskidmountedheatexchangerdischargesintotheexistingpooldischargepipe.ThehoserouteisfromtheS.F.P.HxDischargealongthesouthwalloftheAuxiliaryBuildingandtiesintotheexistingS.F.P.dischargepiping.Exceptforhose,valves,andfittingslocatedoverthespentfuelpool,thehoseisnotlocatednexttoanysafetyrelatedequipment.Thehosewillbesecuredtostructuralmembers.ThehosewillrunwithinapproximatelytwofeetofradiationmonitorR-18.AhosebreakinthisareawhichcouldcauseR-18tobecomeinoperablecouldincreasethepossibilityofanunmonitoredrelease.DuringliquidreleasesR-18andassociatedsystemsaremonitored;thus,afailureandthereleaseofanyunmonitoredreleasewouldbeminimized.Plantproceduresdictatethatpriortoanyliquidreleasethelimitsforactivityarebelowthoserequiredby10CFR20.Thedischargehose,valves,andfittingslocatedoverthesouthwestcorneroftheSpentFuelPitwillbetiedintotheexistingpooldischargepipe.Theexistingdischargepipeisprovidedwithavacuumbreakertopreventthesiphoneffectandeventualdraindownofthespentfuelpool.Thehosewillbesecuredtostructuralmembers.Thecombinedweightoftheabovestatedcomponentsislessthanthatofa1490lb.woodenpoleorfuelhandlingtoolwithattachedassembly.Theimpact:oftheaboveuponthefuelracksisanalyzedintheUFSAR.Therefore,thisinstallationboundedby.theabovewillnotchangeanyassumptionasdescribedinUFSAR.Thesuctionpipewillprotrudebelowthenormalspentfuelpoolleveltoanelevationnolowerthan275'"(elevationofuppersuctionpipe).ThepipeandattachedfittingswillbelocatedinthesoutheastcorneroftheSpentFuelPool.Spentfuelisnotlocatedinthisarea.ThepipewillbelocatedatorabovetheelevationoftheupperpoolsuctiontapwhichhasbeenanalyzedanddesignedtopreventpooldraindownasstatedinUFSAR.Abreakorruptureofthesuctionhoseoutsidethepoolandatanelevationbelowthepoolwaterlevelwouldonlydrainthepoolwaterleveldowntothatoftheuppersuctiontap.whichhasbeenanalyzedintheUFSAR.Aventvalveandisolationvalvelocatedabovethepoolwaterlevelandinthetemporarysuctionlinecouldbeoperatedtostopthesiphoningofwaterfromthepool.Therefore,thisinstallationdoesnotchangetheassumptionsasstatedinUFSAR.Thewe'ightofthehoseandfittingsislessthanthatofawoodenpoleorfuelhandlingtoolwithattachedassembly.Therefore,thisinstallationboundedbytheabovewillnotchangeanyassumptionsasdescribedinUFSAR.Page2of3

S.F.P.HeatExchanerThespentfuelstandbyheatexchangerwillbelocatedlessthan1.5timestheheightawayfromsafetyrelatedequipmentandthefloodedweightoftheheatexchangersisgreaterthan7200lbs.Theheatexchangerwillbeseismicallymountedtopreventcontactwiththe1ACCWpumpduringaseismicevent.ServicewaterreturnfromtheS.F.P.back-upheatexchangerwillbesampledandanalyzedtodetectanytubeleakage.S.F.P.RecirculationPumTheS.F.P.recirculationpumpislocatedfurtherthan1.5timesitsheightfromanysafetyrelatedequipment.Thepumpbasewillbesecuredtothefloortopreventmovement.The3phasepowersupplytothepumpmotorwillbefromanon-safetyrelatedsourceandthecablewillnotbelocatednexttoanysafetyrelatedcomponents.Back-uSentFuelPoolSstemBasedonalltheabovethestandbyspentfuelpoolcooli'ngsystemwillnot1)resultinachangetotheassumptionsasdescribedinth'eSafetyAnalysisReport,2)provideachangetothePlantTechnicalSpecifications,or3)involveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.PreparedBy:Oa~e:ApprovedBy:PORCReviewDate:Page3of3

TEMPORARYINSTALLATIONANDOPERATIONOFSTANDBYS~F.P.COOLINGSYSTEMASPARTOFgWR1594.tiSPENTFUELPOOLCOOLING<<THESTANDBYS.F.P.COOLINGSYSTEMWILLBEUTILIZEDINADIFFERENTCONFIGURATIONTHENORIGINALLYANALYZED.THERECIRCULATIONPUMPHEAT"EXCHANGERgANDASSOCIATEDSPENTFUELPOOLPIPEgVALVESgFITTINGgHOSESgANDINSTRUMENTATIONWILLBEPROVIDEDANDINSTALLEDASSHOWNONATTACHEDSKETCH(S)ANDPERSM-1594.8A.THESTANDBYSYSTEMWILLREMAININSERVICEUNTILTHENEWSYSTEMISINSTALLED,TESTED,ANDPLACEDINOPERATZONPEREWR-1594.TEMPORARYFLUIDPROVISIONS:HOSESARECONNECTEDFROMTHES.W.SYSTEMTOTHESKIDMOUNTEDS.F.P.HEATEXCHANGER.THESETWOHOSESWHICHPASSWITHIN5'FEACHC.C.W.PUMPWILLBESECUREDTOEXISTINGPLANTSTRUCTURALMEMBERS.THEHOSEDESIGNPRESSUREIS200PSIGWHICHEXCEEDSTHES.W.SYSTEMDESIGNOPERATINGPRESSURE.ASYSTEMRELIEFVALVELOCATEDONTHEHEATEXCHANGERSHELLWILLPREVENTTHESYSTEMPRESSUREFROMEXCEEDING150PSZG.ISOLATIONVALVESAREPROVIDEDTOISOLATESERVICEWATERFROMTHESKIDMOUNTED.HEATEXCHANGER.THEC.C.W.SYSTEMREQUIRESONLYONEPUMPTOMEETTHEREQUIREDDESIGN.INTHEEVENTOFAFAILUREWHICHCAUSESACOMPLETEFAILUREOFTHEC.C.W.SYSTEM,RESIDUALHEATREMOVALWOULDBEACCOMPLISHEDWITH

AUXILIARYFEEDAttDSTEAMGENERATORS~THISEVENTi{ASBEENANALYZEDIttTHEUFSARAtiDDOFSttOTINVOLVEANUttRFVTFWt;liSAFETYQUF.R'<'TOll.EWR-1594ADDRESSESAPOSTULATEDBREAKINTHESIXINCHSUPPLYANDRETURNLINES.SINCETHEREARETWOTRAINSOFSERVICEWATER/THEASSUMPTIONISgIFONETRAINISLOST'HEOTHERTRAXNWILLPROVIDETHEREQUIREDCOOLINGFORTHEPlhtfT.FAILUREOFTflESIXIt(CItRETURNLIt(EWOULDNOTAFFECTTHECOOLINGOFCOMPONENTSINTHESERVICEWATERSYSTEM.AREDUNDANTSERVICEWATER,RETURNLINEISPROVIDED.INBOTHCASESSTATEDABOVEISOLATIONVALVESAREPROVIDEDTOISOLATESERVICEWATERFROMTHESKIDMOUNTEDHEATEXCHANGERANDASSOCIATEDHOSES.THEINSTALLATIONANDTIE-XNTOTHES.W.SYSTEMOFHOSESTOANDFROMTHESKIDS.F.P.HEATEXCHANGERANDTHEIRLOCATIONSItfREFERENCETOC.C.W.PUMPSANDASSOCIATEDCOMPONENTSWILLNOT1)RESULTINACHANGETOTHEFACILITYORXT'SOPERATIONASDESCRIBEDINTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORT,2)PROVIDEACHANGETOTHEPLANTTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONS,OR3)INVOLVEANUNREVIEWEDSAFETYQUESTION.S.F.P.RECIRCULATIONHOSESPIPEANDFITTXNGS/RX'soL>7~+tj-rd'6fTHESKIDPUMPDISCHARGEPIPINGHOSEANDFITTINGWHICHCONNECTSTOTHEBOTTOMOFTHESKXDMOUNTEDS.F.P.HEATEXCHANGERWILLNOTBELOCATEDNEARANYSAFETYRELATEDEQUIPMENTORANYOTHERPLANTPIPING.THEHOSEWILLBEROUTEDALONGTHEFLOOR.Zmeyacc~p'~THESKXDMOUNTEDHEATEXCHANGERDXSCHARGESINTOTHEAUXILIARYBUILDINGAND'TIESINTOTHEEXISTINGS.F.P.DISCHARGEPEPIN.EXCEPTFORHOSE,VALVES,ANDFITTINGSLOCATEDOVERTHESPENTFUELPOOL,THEHOSEXSNOTLOCATEDNEXTTOANYSAFETYRELATEDEQUIPMENT.-T8~44ZWILLBESECUREDTOSTRUCTURALMEMBERS.PROXXRYESTHEEXISTINGDISCHARGEPIPEISPROVIDEDWXTHAVACUUMBREAKERTO

PREVENTTHESIPHONEFFECTANDEVENTUALDRAINDOWNOFTHESPENTFUELPOOL.THEHOSEWILLBESECUREDTOSTRUCTURALMEMBERS.ETHEREFORE,THISINSTALLATIONBOUNDEDBYTHEABOVEWILLNOTCHANGEANYASSUMPTIONASDESCRIBEDINUFSAR.THESUCTIONPIPEWILLPROTRUDEBELOWTHENORMALSPENTFUELPOOLLEVELTOANELEVATIONNOLOWERTHAN275i0(ELEVATIONOFUPPERSUCTIONPIPE).THEPIPEANDATTACHEDFITTINGSWILLBELOCATEDINTHESOUTHEASTCORNEROFTHESPENTFUELPOOL.SPENTFUELISNOTLOCATEDINTHISAREA.THEPIPEWILLBELOCATEDATORABOVETHEELEVATIONOFTHEUPPERPOOLSUCTIONTAPWHICHHASBEENANALYZEDANDDESIGNEDTOPREVENTPOOLDRAINDOWNASSTATEDZNUFSAR~ABREAKORRUPTUREOFTHESUCTIONHOSEOUTSIDETHEPOOLANDATANELEVATIONBELOWTHEPOOLWATERLEVELWOULDONLYDRAINTHEPOOLWATERLEVELDOWNTOTHATOFTHEUPPERSUCTIONTAPWHICHHASBEENANALYZEDINTHEUFSAR.AVENTVALVEANDISOLATIONVALVELOCATEDABOVETHEPOOLWATERLEVELANDINTHETEMPORARYSUCTIONLINECOULDBEOPERATEDTOSTOPTHESIPHONINGOFWATERFROMTHEPOOL.THEREFORE,THISINSTALLATIONDOESNOTCHANGETHEASSUMPTIONSASSTATEDINUFSAR.THEWEIGHTOFTHEHOSEANDFITTINGSISLESSTHANTHATOFAWOODENPOLEORFUELHANDLINGTOOLWITHATTACHEDASSEMBLY.THEREFORE,THISINSTALLATIONBOUNDEDBYTHEABOVEWILLNOTCHANGEANYASSUMPTIONSASDESCRIBEDINUFSAR.S.F.P.HEATEXCHANGERTHESPENTFUELSTANDBYHEATEXCHANGERWILLBELOCATEDLESSTHAN1.5TIMESTHEHEIGHTAWAYFROMSAFETYRELATEDEQUIPMENTANDTHEFLOODEDWEIGHTOFTHEHEATEXCHANGERSISGREATERTHAN7200LBS.THEHEATEXCHANGERWILLBESEISMICALLYMOUNTEDTOPREVENTCONTACTWITHTHElACCWPUMPDURINGASEISMICEVENT.SERVICEWATERRETURNFROMTHES.F.P.BACK-UPHEATEXCHANGERWILLBESAMPLEDANDANALYZEDTODETECTANYTUBELEAKAGESSTANDBYS.F.P.RECIRCULATIONPUMPTHES.F.P.RECIRCULATIONPUMPZSLOCATEDFURTHERTHAN1.5TIMESITSHEIGHTFROMANYSAFETYRELATEDEQUIPMENT.THEPUMPBASEWILLBESECUREDTO'HEAUXILIARYBUILDINGOPERATINGFLOORTOPREVENTMOVEMENT.THE3PHASETEMPORARYPOWERSUPPLYTOTHESTANDBYS.F.P.PUMPMOTORWILLBEFROMMCC-1CPOS~1HWHICHPRESENTLYISASPAREBREAKER.THETEMPORARYCABLEWILLBEROUTEDFROMMCC-1CPOS.1HPOSITIONALONGTHEEXISTINGCONDUITSUPPORTS

ANDBUILDINGSTRUCTURESTOTHESTANDBYS.F.P.PUMP.THEPUMPTEMPORARYPOWERSUPPLYHASBEENEVALUATEDANDAPPROVEDBYELECTRICALENGINEERING(SEELETTER$13N1-RR-L2131FROMJOHNH.SMITH).THECABLETOBEUSEDISQ.A.APPROVEDANDMEETSZEEE38/SPECIFICATIONS,quJ~ie),.TEMPORARYHOSEBETWEEN"A"CVCSHOLDUPTANKANDS.'F~P~COOLINGSYSTEMADRAINHOSEANDPORTABLEPUMPWILLBEINSTALLEDBETWEENTHEDISCHARGEOFS.F.P.COOLINGPUMPANDTHE"A"H.U.T.THISPROCEDURESM-15948AWILLCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONANDDRAINDOWNOFTHES.F.P.COOLINGSYSTEMPIPINGTO"A"H.U.T.THEREISADEQUATECAPACITYINH.U.T.'STODRAINAPPROXIMATELY1500GALLONSOFBORATEDWATERFROMS.F.P.PIPING'ROCEDURALCONTROLSANDCONTINUOUSMONITORINGOFTHEDRAINDOWNPROCESSWILLNEGATEANYPOSSIBILITYOFDRAININGOFSPENTFUELPOOLWATERTOCVCSHOLD-UP-TANKS'ACK-UPSPENTFUELPOOLSYSTEMBASEDONALLTHEABOVETHESTANDBYSPENTFUELPOOLCOOLINGSYSTEMWILLNOT1)RESULTINACHANGETOTHEASSUMPTIONSASDESCRIBEDINTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORT,2)PROVIDEACHANGETOTHEPLANTTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONS,OR3)INVOLVEANUNREVIEWEDSAFETYQUESTION.THEABOVEITEMWASREVIEWEDBYTHECOMMITTEEWITHRESPECTTOTHETECHNICALSPECIFICATIONSANDTHECOMMITTEEHASDETERMINEDTHATNOTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONCHANGESORVIOLATIONSWEREINVOLVEDANDTHEREARENOUNREVIEWEDSAFETYQUESTIONS.THISITEMISNOTCOMPLETE,PENDINGREVIEWOFMODIFICATIONINSTALLATION.

s.+.~+z~7wc8/rt>EKE7zdEc.zaka,fw7c,c'L.inkz-~7/e~nv/)g4g5~.~fp)6v!7~sicjy4gpk74e~</s7r~p~i.~Z)~n7~~c//n~g<~5l~<>/c8Q<7e~7+curZgQq,g~~~(7yggog(o.zZxckgn77<Qd'nil-v,.Fr~~ari>4n7l~~c+//+~~~iy~rn+gg<<p~~g~~+yv-~c~~++t.~4~c~~0~wZ~CV/cZ/Qrs'ceo~c7iep~p7dv'g>~pPyc'mvj~e~va'i=Fyr/e>go7~~A<~p~vz-~z~n~lgc+Nec7(c5A+9~z7eJpg05-=r-+p~ej~wis7i'n.ggl/d.wing~</vices5As-4'~KG><<~pt-~ECow&~~~~~7<4~~~~~r48Yh'~~~<~ccc~pd'sZ.cs'nps<~gc.~tA'ecg~in'v~se~7')qn7=cp@Pio(gyyezienZyc7.).gg~~&5~d~~<d~/~~~~~~gib~g<MWcCc~b'nppv.c~7~s.Fi~Acact'i~gMcf~in-is7vnsi~-c~mjoP

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March16,1989LOSSOFDECAYHEATREMOVALEXPEDITIOUSACTIONINTERIM"A"HOTLEGLEVELTRANSMITTER89-9Genericletter88-17recommendedexpeditiousactionsincludinginstallingtwoindependentRCSwaterlevelindicationswiththecapabilitytoprovidewaterlevelinformationtoControlRoomoperators.Onesuchprovision,apressuretransmitter(PT-432A)withindicationattheMainControlBoardhasbeeninpermanentexistence;however,asimilarprovisionistobeinstalledpriortoenteringthenextreducedreactorcoolantinventoryoperation.ThiswillbeinstalledatatestconnectiondownstreamoftheLoopAHotLegSampletapmanualrootvalve504,usingtubingofidenticalmaterialtothepermanentinstallationforPT-432AintheBLoopSampletapexceptthat3/8"tubingmaybeusedinplaceof1/4".Atransmitter,similartoPT-432A,istobeinstalled,designatedDPT-432Batthetestpointdiscussedabove,tobemountedsecurelytotheadjacentwalloronastandwhichwillbefabricatedandinstalledsuchastoinsureagainsttopplingbyuseofstruts,bumpersortie-downs.ThesignalcablewillbeinstalledunderthecontrolsofprocedureA-1405installationandremovaloftemporarycables.Theexistingprocedure0-2.3.1,DrainingtheReactorCoolantSystem,istoberevisedtoaddresstheindicationstobemonitored,includingthesubjectprovision.Regardinglevelindicationdifferencebetweenmeasurementpoints,thedifferencecalculatedfromWestinghouseESBU/WOG-88-173datedOctober14,1988willbeprovidedtooperatorsforguidance.Theaboveconstructionandoperationalrequirementsaretobeobserved.Basedonthese,thedeterminationscalledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.TheinstallationdoesnotresultinachangetotheassumptionsoftheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseofthesubstantialtubinginstallationandtheadequatesupportsystemtoprovidedasdiscussedabove,itwill.nothaveanyadverseeffectonthesafety-relatedequipmentinthevicinity,orresultinadecreaseinreactorcoolantinventory.ThedesignbaseseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociatedwiththisproposedinstallationarethefollowing:DecreaseinReactorCoolantInventoryTheinstallationdoesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationsbecausethesubstantialtubinginstallationandtheadequacyofthesupportsystemissuchastoensuretherewillbenoeffectonassumptionsprovidedinthePlantTechnicalSpecificationbases.

TheinstallationdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityofanoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecausethesubstantialtubinginstallationandtheadequacyofthesupportsystemtobeutilizedensurestherewillbenoadverseeffectonsafety-relatedequipment.TheinstallationdoesnotcreatethepossibilityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecausethesubstantialtubinginstallationandthesupportsystemadequacy,asdescribedabove',ensurestherewillbenoadverseeffectonsafetyrelatedequipmentwithinthevicinity.TheinstallationdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnicalSpecificationbecauseofthesubstantialtubinginstallationandtheadequacyofthesupportsystemwhichensuresagainstanyadverseeffectonequipmentorsystemsdiscussedinthebasesofTechnicalSpecifications.

10CFR50.59SAFETYEVALUATIONTEMPORARYMODIFICATION89-21ATEMPORARYCONNECTIONOFLT-426REFERENCELEGTOLT-427INTRODUCTIONThistemporarymodificationwillconnectthereferencelegofLT-426withtheexistingreferencelegofLT-427.TheplantiscurrentlyatHotShutdownandwillremainathotorcoldshutdownwhilethistemporaryconnectionisinplace.ThepurposeofthistemporaryconnectionistodeterminetheoperabilityofLT-426whileconnectedtothereferencelegofLT-427duetoapossibleobstructioninthereferencelegofLT-426.ThereferencelegofLT-426alsohaspressuretransmitterPT-429.ThispressuretransmitterprovidesinputtoOT~T,lowpressurizerpressure,andhipressurizerpressuretripalongwithlowpressurizerpressuresafetyinjectionandpressureinterlockinputtoPORV430.ThereferencelegforLT-427haspressuretransmitterPT-430.ThispressuretransmitterprovidesinputtoOT~T,lowpressurizerpressure,andhipressurizerpressuretrips,lowpressurizerpressuresafetyinjectionalongwiththepressureinputtoPORV430,andthelowpressurealarmat2185pslgoThetemporaryconnectionwillbeconstructedof3/8stainlesssteeltubingandwillbeconnectedfromthelowsideofLT-426onthereferencelegsideofV12231LandthereferencelegwithPT-429(LT-426Sreferenceleg)willbecapped.TheotherendofthetemporaryconnectionwillbeconnectedtothedrainpointofthereferencelegofLT-427,atthetransmittersideofthelowsideisolationvalve.Theprocessofvalvinginthistemporarytubingwillallowoperabilityofthe2/3lowpressuresafetyinjectioncircuitry.Initially,LT-426andPT-429willbeinoperable,isolatedandtheassociatedbistableswillbeinthetripcondition.Allremainingpressurizerpressureandleveltransmitterswillbeoperable.AfterthereferencelegofLT-426iscapped,pressuretransmitterPT-429willbedeclaredoperableanditsbistablesreinstalled.Atthispoint,LT-427willbedeclaredinoperableanditsbistablestripped.Thiswillgenerateareactortripsignalfrom2/3hipressurizerlevel(reactortripbreakerswillbeopenpriortotripofbistables).TheconnectionwillthentakeplacebetweenthelowsideofLT-426andthereferencelegofLT-427.Page1

SAFETYEVALUATIONTheprobabilityofoccurrenceorthe.consequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARwillnotbeincreased.SincethestainlesssteeltubingrunfromLT-426toLT-427willberatedforsystempressureandtemperature,theprobabilityofaLOCAfromthetemporarytubingwillnotbeincreasedfromtheLOCAaccidentaddressedintheUFSARChapter15.Sincethetemporarytubingandbothconnectionpointsare3/8"indiameter,aleakfromthetemporarytubingwillbeequalto,orlessthanthecapabilitiesofthechargingsystem.Sincetheplantismaintainedatthehotshutdowncondition,theReactorTripsfromboththepressurizerpressurechannels(OT+Tlowpressureandhipressure)andthelevel.channels(hilevel)arenotrequiredtobeoperableperTechnicalSpecification3.5table3.5-1.Letdownisolationsignalwillnotbeoperableduringthisevolution.TheconsequencesofanaccidentwillnotbeincreasedbecausetheletdownisolationsignalisnotassumedintheaccidentanalysisofChapter15oftheUFSAR.Since,thepressurizerlowpressuresafetyinjectionsignalwillbeinthetripconditionoroperable,safetyinjectionwillremainfullyoperabledur'ingthistemporarymodification.ThepossibilityofanaccidentofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARwillnotbecreatedbythistemporarymodification.ThesafetyinjectionsystemwillremainfullyoperableduringthistemporarymodificationandwillrespondtotheaccidentasaddressedinChapter15oftheUFSAR.ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisofanyTechnicalSpecificationwillnotbereducedbythistemporarymodification.Section3.5ofTechnicalSpecificationswillbesatisfiedduringthistemporarymodification.AsimulatedsignalwillbeinstalledintothedefeatedLT-427channeltoallowoperationofthepressurizerheatersandtokeep100kwofheatersoperable.ZnChapter15accidentanalysis,letdownisolationistotakeplacethroughCVisolationsignalofAOV-371andnotvialetdownisolation.CONCLUSIONTemporarilyconnectingthereferencelegofLT-427toLT-426doesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionprovidingtheconnectionisperformedasspecifiedabove.Page2

SECTIOND-PROCEDURECHANGESThissectioncontainsadescriptionofthechangestoproceduresasdescribedintheUFSARandasummaryofthesafetyevaluationpursuanttotherequirementsof10CFR50.59(b).

us00PROCEDUREDATE48'CN-Items1,2,or6If"yes"isansweredforItems1or2,providethetypeof"inconsequentialchange"orthereferenced10CFR50.59safetyevaluationbelow:ChangeType:If"no"wasansweredforItem6,providethebasisforexclusionbelow:BasisforExclusion:-Item7If"no"hasbeanansweredforeachquestioninitemsVathrough7gthischangeisnotanUnreviewedSafetyQuestion.Documentthe)ustificationfortheseconclusionsbelow.Listanymaterialreferencedinthespaceprovided.WrittenJustification:VaYlOIf"yes+wasansweredforItea3,checkthisboxIf"yes",wasansweredforItem7,PORCshallreviewandapprovethissubmittal.ThisproposedchingeisanUnreviewedSafetyQuestion(USQ)andrequiressubmittaltotheNRCfortheirreview.SubmittedBy!

50.59forPT-32AAmendment34totheGinnaTechnicalSpecifications,mandateslogictraintestingforthereactortripandbypassbreakers,onanalternatemonthbasis.Thismonthlylogictestingwillverifytheoperabilityofallsetsofreactortriplogicactuatingcontacts,onthetrainundergoingtesting.Duringthistesting,operationofonesetofcontactswillresultinareactortripbreakertrip,theoperationofallothersetsofcontactswillbeverifiedbytheuseofindicationcircuitry.Thetestingshallbeperformedmonthlyunlessthereactortripbreakersareopenorshallbeperformedpriortostartupiftestinghasnotbeenperformedwithinthelast30days.Themonthlytestingofthebypassbreaker,willverifymanualtripofthebypassbreakerusingtheshunttripcoil,actuatedfromthetestswitchesinthereactorprotectionrack.Thereactortriplogicwasdesignedtohavethecapabilityoftestinganyofthevariouslogiccombinationswhileatpower,withtheuseofthebypassbreakerastheallowingfactor.Duringsuchlogictesting,thereisnoreductioninplantsafetyduetothetrippingscheme,wherebythetrainnotundergoingtestinggeneratesthetripsignalforitsrespectivereactortripbreakerandthebypassbreakerwhichisinservice,bypassingtheoppositetrainsreactortripbreaker.Therefore,ifanactualtripsignalweretobegenerated,boththebypassbreakerandthereactortripbreakerontheactivetrainwouldopen,resultinginareactortrip.TheprobabilityofoccurrenceofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARwillbeincreased,duetothenatureoftheincreasedtestingofthelogicactuatingrelaysandassociatedcontacts.ThisisanobviouspointinthatthehistoryoftheserelaysandcontactswerethedeterminingfactorintheNRC'sdecisionto'testthembi-monthly,inlieuofyearly,ashadbeendoneinthepast.Therefore,byvirtueoftheNRC'sreviewofthisissueandtheirdecisiontoincreasethetestingfrequency,nounreviewedsafetyquestionsexist.Additionally,evenifthemalfunctionrateincreasessubstantially,thefactthatwearetestinginanestablishedsafetyconscioustestalignment,willnotcompromiseplantsafetyorcauseanyunreviewedsafetyquestionstobegenerated.GreggE.Joss4/29/89

0PROCEDUREDATEPCNs0oee-Items1,2,or6If"yes"isansweredforItems1or2,providethetypeof"inconsequentialchange"orthereferenced10CFR50.59safetyevaluationbelov:ChangeType:If"no"wasansweredforItem6,providethe.basisforexclusionbelov:BasisforExclusion:Item7If"no"hasbeenansweredforeachquestioninitems7athrough7gthischange.isnotanUnrevievedSafetyQuestion.Documentthejustificationiortheseconclusionsbelov.Listanymaterialreferencedinthespaceprovided.WrittenJustification:e~Vg0~If"yes+"wasansweredforItex3,checkthisboxIf~yes~,wasansweredforXtex7,PORCshallreviewandapprovethissubmittal.ThisproposedchangeisanUnrevievedSafetyQuestion(VSQ)andrequiressubxittaltotheNRCfortheirreview.SubxittedByi

50.59forPT-32BAmendment34totheGinnaTechnicalSpecifications,mandateslogictraintestingforthereactortripandbypassbreakers,onanalternatemonthbasis.Thismonthlylogictestingwillverifytheoperabilityofallsetsofreactortriplogicactuatingcontacts,onthetrainundergoingtesting.Duringthistesting,operationofonesetofcontactswillresultinareactortripbreakertrip,theoperationofallothersetsofcontactswillbeverifiedbytheuseofindicationcircuitry.Thetestingshallbeperformedmonthlyunlessthereactortripbreakersareopenorshallbeperformedpriortostartupiftestinghasnotbeenperformedwithinthelast30days.Themonthlytestingofthebypassbreaker,willverifymanualtripofthebypassbreakerusingtheshunttripcoil,actuatedfromthetestswitchesinthereactorprotectionrack.Thereactortriplogicwasdesignedtohavethecapabilityoftestinganyofthevariouslogiccombinationswhileatpower,withtheuseofthebypassbreakerastheallowingfactor.Duringsuchlogictesting,thereisnoreductioninplantsafetyduetothetrippingscheme,wherebythetrainnotundergoingtestinggeneratesthetripsignalforitsrespectivereactortripbreakerandthebypassbreakerwhichisinservice,bypassingtheoppositetrainsreactortripbreaker.Therefore,ifanactualtripsignalweretobegenerated,boththebypassbreakerandthereactortripbreakerontheactivetrainwouldopen,resultinginareactortrip.TheprobabilityofoccurrenceofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARwillbeincreased,duetothenatureoftheincreasedtestingofthelogicactuatingrelaysandassociatedcontacts.ThisisanobviouspointinthatthehistoryoftheserelaysandcontactswerethedeterminingfactorintheNRC'sdecisiontotestthembi-monthly,inlieuofyearly,ashadbeendoneinthepast.Therefore,byvirtueoftheNRC'sreviewofthisissueandtheirdecisiontoincreasethetestingfrequency,nounreviewedsafetyquestionsexist.Additionally,evenifthemalfunctionrateincreasessubstantially,thefactthatwearetestinginanestablishedsafetyconscioustestalignment,willnotcompromiseplantsafetyorcauseanyunreviewedsafetyquestionstobegenerated.GreggE.Joss4/29/89

PROCEDUREDATE6PCNsonfomSreeCte-Items1,2,or6If<<yes<<isansweredforItems1or2,providethetypeof"inconsequentialchange<<orthereferenced10CFR50.59safetyevaluationbelow:ChangeType:If<<no<<wasansweredforItem6,providethebasisforexclusionbelow:BasisforExclusion:FR50.59SafetEvauatio-Item7If<<no<<hasbeenansweredforeachquestioninitems7athrough7gthischangeisnotanUnreviewedSafetyQuestion.DocumenttheJustificationfortheseconclusionsbelow.Listanymaterialreferencedinthespaceprovided.WrittenJustification:""Cuur/a+iIf<<yes"wasansweredforItem3,checkthisbox&FitC7P/C~c4Maw'cIf"yes<<,wasansweredforItem7,PORCshallreviewandapprovethissubmittal.ThisproposedchangeiaanUnreviewedSafetyQuestion(USQ)andrequiressubmittaltotheNRCfortheirreview.SubmittedBy:

TheattachedprocedureRF4.".2controlsthee>;aminationoffuelasembliesXTOandXT04.Dothfuelassemblieswillbeeaminedinthespentfuel'oolduringtheoutageperiodthatthecoreiscompletelyunloaded.FuelassemblyXT04willbee;;aminedvisuallyonly.FuelassemblyXTO~willbee>:aminedvisually,but=willalsohaveindividualrodsremovedforspecificmeasurements.Toremovetherodsthefuelassemblywillbeplacedinthenewfuel'elevatorandraisedtoadepthoFnolessthan8I'tbelowthepoolsurface.Atthislevelt:heuppertieplatewillberemovedandindividualrodsgrappled.Eactsrodwillberemovedandreinserted<<'0inchesbyllafldtoinsurethei,rarenointerferencesatthegrid..Therodwi11becompletelyremovedbyloweringthenewfuelelevator.Afterthemeasurementsarecompletedtherodwillbe'reinsertedbyhand20inches,andthenfullyinsertedbyralsingtheelevator.Additional1yperipheralrodswi11bereinsertedusingaspecialfi::I:uretominimi"etI>epotentialforIiooI;outatgrid1QcaIiiolIs~TransIeroFfueJasemblieswittiinthespentfuelpoolwillbeinaccordancewithexistingprocedureRFB.4.No1oadsine::cessofafuel'ssemblyanditshandlingtool<1500lbs)willbesuspendedoverrackscontainingspentfuel.Thereforetheradiologicalreleasefromapotentialfuelhandli.ngaccidentremainsboundedbythatanaly".edinse<-ion15.7.3oftheUFSAR.PlacementO'FasI)entfuelassemb1yinthenewfuelelevatorisnotaddressedinSection9.1.4..~~?intheUFSARwhichspeciFicallystatesthattheelevatorwi11beusedfornewfuelonly.ThesafetyconcernisthepotentialFortheelevatortoberaisedtothepoolsurfacewithaspentfuelassembl)creatingasevereradiologicalha"ard.Howeverthepotentialforthistoocrurisminirni";.edthroughtwoindependentmeasulesFirst)elevatoroperationisnormallycontrolledbyapushbuttoni:hatmustbecontinuouslydepressedforoperation.Theelevatorcablewillbesuitiblymarkedtoprovidetheoperatorwithindicationwhenminimumdepthisapproached.Second,theuplimitswitchontheelevatorwillbeadjustedtomaintaintheminimumSftdepth.TransferoFsingleFuelrodswillbebyhandtools.Thesetoolswillbemarkedtoindicatetheminimumrequireddepthof6ft.Thefuelrodelevatorwillalsobeequipedwithlimitswitchestomaintaintheminimumdepthat6Initialofthefuelrodsfromthefuelassemblywillbeperformedmanuallytopreventthepotentialforoverloadingtherodduring1owerinoftheelevator.Initialinsertionoftherodwillalsobeperformedmanual1ya

TheattachedprocedureRF02.2controlsthee;-;aminationoffuelassembliesXTOiandXT04.BathFuelassemblieswillbee;;aminedinthespentfuelpoolduringtheoutageperiodthatthecoreiscompletelyunloaded.FuelassernblyXTrr0wi11bee~aminedvisual1yonly.FuelassemblyXTO~willbee;(aminedvisuall'y,butwillalsohaveindividualrodsremovedforspecificmeasurements.Toremovetherodsthefuel,assemblyrvillbeplacedinthenewfuelelevatorandraisedtoadepthofranlessthan8ftbelo<vthepoolsurface.Atthisleveltheuppertieplatewillberemovedandindividualrodsgrappled.Eachrodwillberemovedandreinserted20inchesbyhandtoinsuretheirarenointerfereracesatthegrids.Therndwillbecompletelyremovedby,.loweringthenewFIrelelevator...AfterthemeasurementsarecornpletedtherodwillbereinsertedbyhaAd20inches,andthorrfullyinsertedbyraisi'ngtheelevator~.Additional1yperipheralrodsuri11bereinsertedusingaspecialfi::turetominirni"ethepotentialforbool:nutatgrid~1neatinns.Transferoffrelassemblieswithinthespentfuelponlwillbei'accordancewithe;:itingprocedureRF8.0.Noloadsin':;cessofaFuelasserrlb1yanditshandlingtool(15001bs)wi11besuspendedoverrackscontainingspentFuel.ThereForetheradiologicalreleasefromapotentialfuelhandlinpaccidentremainsboundedbythatanaly"edins-.tion15.7.3oftheUFSAR.Plclcerl)erltnfa'spel'ltfuelassemb1yinthenewfuelelevatorisnotaddressedinSectionP.i.0.3.2intheUFSARwhichspecificallystatesthattheeleYa'tnluri11beusedfornetfuelonly.Thesafetyconcernisthepotentialfortheelevatortoberaisedtothepoolsurfacewithaspentfuelassemblycreatingasevereradiologicalha"ard.Howeverthepotentialforthistoocrurisrninirni"edthroughtwoindependent.measures.First,ele'vatoroperationisnormal1ycontrol1edbyapush'uttonthatmustbecontinuouslydepressedforoperation.Theelevatorcable<villbesuitiblymarl;edtoprovidetheoperatorwithindicationwhenrninimurgdepiliisapproached-.Second,theup1imitswitch,ontheelevatoruril1beadjustedtomaintaintheminimum8ftdepth.TransferoFsinglefuelrodswillbebyhandtools.Thesetoolswillbemellh'pdtnindicatetheminimumrequireddepthof6ft.Thefuelrodelevatorwillalsobeequipedwithlimitswitchestomaintaintheminimumdepthat6ft.Theinitialpullofthefuelrodfromthefuelassemblywillbeperfnrmedmanuallytopreventthepotentialforoverloadingtherodduringlnrveringoftheelevator.InitialinsertionnFtherodwillalsobeperformedmanually.Thereforethisproce>sdoesnotpresentanunrevicuredsafetyquestionfnlthefnl1DivingIeasons:1.Theprobabi1ityofoccurrer)ceortheconsequencesofanidentormalfunctionoFequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysisreportisnotincreased.I'IThefuelhandlingaceidentisaddressedin.ch'a'pter,:.15,ofth'e+UFSAR;-".-,;.;~'~>7;.~~'tnotimeismorethanonefuelassembly'hei'ng:-"Cranspdr't'Od':;by'Ya',"~"'-~',.-".It~y.WV'

handlingtoolorinstalledintlutenewfuelelevatorFuie::amiflation.notimedoestheoppor<unityoccur,formoreth'anoneassemblytobedamagedbyahandlingaccident.Therequiredbuildingsventilationalignmentandtheradiol'ogicalsourcetermisboundedbytheLJFSAF(assumptions.2.Thepossibi1ityforanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysisisflotcleated~Severeradiologicalconsequence=wouldresultiFaspentfuel"assemblywasraisedtothesurFaceofthepoolinthenewfuel.elevator.However,thiswouldrequirethefailureoftwoindependentmeansofrestrictingtheassemblyheightto,themaximumspecified.The.marginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisForanytechnicalspeciFicationisflolreduced.TherequiredsystemstomitigatetheeffectsoffuelhandlingaccidentsarerequiredForthisFuelexamination.Therequireddepthfortheee'aminedfuelassemblyinthenewfuelelevatorwillprovidesufFicientradiologicalshielding,oradjustmentswillbemadebaseduponreviewbyhealthphysicspersonnel.'Thedoublefailurerequiredraisingthefuelassemblymakesevaluationofthisevente-sary.

SECTIONE-COMPLETEDSPECIALTESTS(ST)ANDEXPERIMENTSThissectionistocontainadescriptionofspecialtestsandexperimentsperformedinthefacility,pursuanttotherequire-mentsof10CFR50.59(b).Withinthetimeframeofthisreport,thereweretwoconducted.

<<<<E~~P-+'"~~CENTRALRECORDSOALIFr:FIMF.FIGURE4A-301.1:llRefertoA-301.1forstructionsS2~TYEMQlJATIONSUNDRYREPORT3>l'orSTPFs02No.DESCRIPTIONOFMODIFICATION,SPECIALTESTOFEXPERIMENT:Qgeci5,~e.s+"QgSLEcUO~IO-P-a~I"PREPAREDBY:).~,P.,A.%acres.1.DOCUMENTSREVIEWED:JsJA.UFSAR-SECTION8~)SECTIONSar.+ID'9.6,B.TECHNICALSPECIFICATIONSDgkgY~<mAoMDATE:P~esIS.l.II.I-ID.I.IDIPAGES(.14l'lPAGES~~~A<M(~4Pres/56~IW~mISSECTION5.3SECTION2.EVALUATIONRESULTS:WS'ISPAGES.Q-)v~PAGES>~-P+~~~3>-gA.ANUNREVIEWEDSAFETYQUESTIONINVOLVED(IFYES,CHECKAPPLICABLEREASONBEZDW)-ZNCRFASEDPROBABILITYOFOCCURRENCEOFCONSEQUENCESOFANACCIDENTORAMALI!UNCTION:-POSSIBILITYCREATEDFORACCIDENTORMALFUNCTIONNOTCONSIDEREDBEFORE:-MARGINOFSAPIDDEFINEDINBASISFORTECHNXCALSPECZFICATXONSISREDUCED:B.ACHANGEINTECHNICALSPECXFICATIONSREQUIRED~$ZFYESIBRIEFDESCRIPTION:NOiAPPROVEDPORCDATE:08NSARBDATE:USNRCAPPROVAL(ZFREQUIRED)TITLEITEMNUMB~@+Gi~~DDATE0-)hh

SAFETYEVALUATIONSpecialTest"RCSLeakageDeterminationof10/7/88ST-88.21.0SCOPEOFANALYSIS:~Thepurposeofthistestistodeterminethecause(s)of"B"SIAccumulator("A"LoopAccumulator)inleakageanddeterminethecauseofanobservedelevatedpressureandtemperatureonlAHighHeadSILine("B"LoopSILine)andcorrectifpossible.1~2Thescopeofthisanalysisistoassurethattheconductofthistestduringreactorpoweroperationdoesnot:a~increasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafety,previouslyevaluatedintheFSAR,orb.c~createthepossibilityofanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethananyevaluatedpreviously,orreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisofanyTechnicalSpecification.4

REFERENCES:

GinnaUpdatedFacilitySafetyAnalysisReportSection6andSection15.2'2.3GinnaTechnicalSpecificationsSection3.3.RG&EDwg.33013-1262.3.0SAFETYANALYSIS:3.110CFR50.59ReviewTheproposedproceduretodetermineRCSleakageof10/7/88hasbeenreviewedtodetermineifsections50.59(a)(2)(i),(a)(2)(ii)and(a)(2)(iii)apply(a)(2)(i)TheclosureofMOV878"B"or"D"constitutestheenteringofalimitingconditionforoperation(LCO)(Section3.3GinnaTechnicalSpecifi-cations).TheLCOconstitutesananalyzedconditionwithintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Therefore,theprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyisnotincreasedbeyondthatassumedintheTechnicalSpecificationLCO.

However,giventhatthe878B/DflowpathsareessentialindeliveringwatertoeachcoldlegoftheRCSduringanaccidentconditionwithnofunctionalreplacement,similartotheaccumulatoroutletvalves,itisrecommendedthatthe878B/Dvalve,1)remainactivewhileclosedand2)shouldbeclosednomorethan(1)onehoursimilartotheaccumulatoroutletvalvespecifi-cation.(a)(2)(ii)NodifferenttypeaccidentormalfunctionotherthantheSARevaluatedaccidentsormalfunctionsasdefinedbytheTechnicalSpecificationLCOiscreated.(a)(2)(iii)NoreductioninthemargintosafetyasdefinedinthebasisofTechnicalSpecificationsisintimatedbythistest[seediscussionin(a)(2)(i)above]4.0PRELIMINARYSAFETYEVALUATION:Basedontheaboveitisdeterminedthat:a~theprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafety,previouslyevaluatedinthesafetyanalysiswillnotbeincreased,andb.c~thepossibilityofanaccidentormalfunctionofadifferenttypethanthatevaluatedpreviouslyinthesafetyanalysiswillnotbecreated,andthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationisnotreduced.PREPAREDBY:ResponsibleSineerDATE:REVIEWEDBY:eactorEngineerDATE:APPROVEDBY:>">~>CCenicalMaagrDATE:)0-

A-301.1:11RefertoA-301.1forInstructionsSAFER'YEVMZJATIONSUMMARYREPORTpopPRDcf~l48kNo.57-P9.jIV~~/d'Ah'red$7E47ig/~rd~/kj'dnagQ/Af5Qc'~s~~)8izZQ54'C5g~/4E~iOHo/NorA'p84/eddySysvZePi/mrgV/RrEWPdrQRy/~s~w~vio4c)Fwb'M4'olde/zS5'Ag<~R<YsIS10Am&3-W/A7/80'REPAREDBY:DATE:53III1.DOCUMENTSREVIEWED:A.UFSAR-SECTIONSECTIONB.TECHNICALSPECIFICATIONSSECTIONSECTION2~EVALUATIONRESULTS:A.ANUNEKVIEWEDSAFETYQUESTIONINVOLVED(IFYES,CHECKAPPLICABLEREASONBEZDW)PAGES~~/~,~-P3PAGES~-/~P4')wgFr$S&IIIII-INCREASEDPROBABILITYOFOCCURRENCEOFCONSEQUENCESOFANACCIDENTORAMALI'UNCTION:-POSSIBILITYCREATEDFORACCIDENTORMALFUNCTIONNOTCONSIDEREDBEFORE:-MARGINOFSAFETYDEFINEDINBASISFORTECHNICAL'PECIFICATIONSISREDUCED:-,B.ACHANGEZNTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONSREQUIRED~QZFYES,Hu:EFDESCRIPTION:APPROVEDPORCDATE:NSARBDATE:hUSNRCAPPROVAL(ZFREQUIRED):TITLEITEMRJNBYS./0-Bgogoe

SAFETYANALYSISGINNASTATIONTEMPERATURESTRATIFICATIONMONITORINGTEMPORARYMODIFICATIONREVISION0APRIL27g1989PREPAREDBY:ElectricalEngineerDateREVIEWEDBY:eactorEngineerrrDateAPPROVEDBY:5anager,TechnicalEngineeringDate C

RevisionStatusSheetPageLatestRev.PageLatestRev.PageLatestRev.000-00SafetyAnalysisPageiiRevision0

SAFETYANALYSIS1.0SCOPEOPANALYS1S:NRCBulletinNo.88-11,"PressurizerSurgeLineThermalStratification",requestsalladdresseestoestablishandimplementaprogramtoconfirmpressurizersurgelineintegrityinviewoftheoccurrenceofthermalstratification,andrequiresthemtoinformthestaffoftheactionstakentoresolvethisissue.PursuanttosatisfyingtherequirementandscheduleofBulletin88-11,RochesterGasandElectricCorporationisparticipatinginaprogramforpartialresolutionofthisissuethroughtheWestinghouseOwner'sGroup(WOG).TheWOGprogramisdesignedtobenefitfromtheexperiencegainedintheperformanceofseveralplant-specificanalysesonWestinghousePWRsurgelines.Thesedetailedanalysesincludeddefinitionofrevisedthermaltransients(includingstratification).TheoverallanalyticalapproachusedinalloftheseanalyseshasbeenreviewedbytheNRCstaff.Asignificantamountofpressurizersurgelinethermalmonitoringdatahasbeenobtainedinsupportoftheseplant-specificanalyses.AdditionalpressurizersurgelinethermalmonitoringandplantsystemdatacontinuestobemadeavailablewithintheWOG,resultinginasteadilyincreasingdatabase.PressurizersurgelinetemperaturestratificationdatawillbecollectedatGinnaforinclusionintheWOGdatabase.1~2ThermalstratificationandcyclingphenomenawerealsodiscoveredinauxiliarypipingconnectedtotheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS).Thesephenomenamaycausepipecracksintheunisolablesections.ofauxiliarypipingsystems.USNRCissuedBulletin88-08andsubsequentsupplementstoaddressthisphenomena.Asaresult,electricutilitiesarerequiredtoprovideresponsetotheNRCregardingthereviewandidentificationofauxiliarypipesectionsconnectedtotheRCSthatmaybesub)ectedtothermalstratificationnotconsideredinthedesignoftheplant.Westinghousehasidentifiedthreepipingsectionsthatmaybesub)ectedtothermalstratification.Theseare:SafetyAnalysisPage1Revision0Date4789

a)charginglinetoLoopBhotlegbetweencheckvalve393andtheRCSnozzleb)alternatecharginglinetoLoopAcoldlegbetweencheckvalve383AandtheRCSnozzle1.3c)auxiliaryspraylinebetweencheckvalve297andthemainpressurizerspraylineThisanalysisaddressestheconsequencesof-installingtemporarythermocouplesonthepressurizersurgeline,LoopBchargingline,LoopAalternatechargingline,-andauxiliarysprayline.Thermocoupleextensionwireshallbetemporarilyroutedtoadataacquisitioncontroller.Thecontrollershallprovideadigitaloutputtoaremotepersonalcomputer.Thedataoutputlineshallutilizetemporarycableandexistingsparecircuitstoexitcontainment.1~4Inadditiontothethermocouples,fourtemporarydisplacementtransducersaretobeinstalledonth0pressurizersurgeline.Thetransducerswillmonitorlinemovementduringheat-up,cool-down,andduringtemperaturestratificationconditions.REFERENCEDOCUMENTS:2'2'2'2.52.6GinnaStationProcedure,A303'reparation,Review,andApprovalofSafetyAnalysisforMinorModificationsorSpecialTests".GinnaStationProcedure,A<<1405,"InstallationandRemovalofTemporaryCables".GinnaStationProcedure,"A-1406,"ControlofTemporaryModifications".R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantUpdatedSafetyAnalysisReport.USNRCRegulatoryGuide1.70,StandardFormatandContentofSafetyAnalysisReportsforNuclearPowerPlants,LWREdition,Revision3,November1978.AppendixRAlternativeShutdownSystem,"GinnaNuclearPowerPlant,Revision4,January1987.SafetyAnalysisPage2Revision0Date42789

2'GAI,"FireProtectionEvaluation"ReportNo.1936,March1977.3.0SAFETYANALYSIS:3.1AreviewhasbeenmadeofalleventsanalyzedintheGinnaFSARandtheeventsrequiringanalysisbytheUSNRCRegulatoryGuide1.70.Theeventsrelatedtothismodificationare:3.1.13~1.23'~31)seismicevent2)majorandminorfiresAlltemporaryinstrumentcableinstalledshallberoutedtofollowtherespectivelinetobemonitoredandthendropverticallytocontainmentfloorelevation235'.Thetemporarycablewillthenberoutedalongthefloor,followingtheshieldwalltothefreestandingdataacquisitioncontroller.Noseismicimpactisanticipatedsinceinstrumentcableweightisnegligiblecomparedtopipe/insulationweight.Instrumentcableroutedonthefloorandthefreestandingcontroller(approx.10"Hx12"Wx24"D)willnotaffectseismicstructuresintheimmediatevicinity.Thedataacquisitioncontrollerwillbeplacedoutsideoftheshieldwallnearthelowerendofthepressurizer.Temporarycableusedforthedatalinkshallfollowtheshieldwallatelevation235',risetoelevation253'iasouth-eaststairs,andfollowtheshieldwalltoIncoreReferenceJunctionBox1B.Noseismicimpactisanticipatedsincethiscablewillfollowafloor/stairrouting.CableseparationinIncoreReferenceJunctionBox1Bshallbemaintained.ThetemporarydatalinkcableshallbesplicedtosparecircuitA780.CableandconductorinsulationshallberestoredusingRaychemWCSFsleeves.ThesplicedcablesshallbedressedinIncoreBox1BsothatdistancebetweenA780andIncoreThermocouplecablesismaximized.SafetyAnalysis*Page3Revision0Date789

3Thistemporarymodificationwillnotpropagateamajororminorfire.CablesusedforthermocouplesandthermocoupleextensionsareindividuallysheathedinInconelOverbraid(thermocouples)orTinnedCopperOverbraid(extensions).Noadditionalfireloadingisanticipatedbytheoverbraidedcable.TemporarycableusedforthedatalinkisratedandqualifiedtoIEEE-383flamerequirementsasaminimum.Totalestimatedcontainmentfireloadingforthistemporarydatalinkcableis200000BTUs.3'~5TemporarycableusedforthedatalinkwillbesplicedtoexistingsparecableA779intheAirHandlingRoom.RoutingisthroughafloorpenetrationtotheMux.Room.TotalfireloadingforthetemporarycableintheAirHandlingRoomisnegligible.TotalfireloadingforthetemporarycableintheMux.Roomisestimatedat2000BTUs.3.1.63.1~73.1~83~23~2~1Firebarrierpenetrationswillberepairedandreplacedinaccordancewithexistingplantprocedures.Thereforeexistingsealswillnotbedegraded.Thismodificationdoesnotaffectthesafeshutdownanalysis.intheAppendixRsubmittalsincethereisnoeffectonseparationofexistingcircuits,associatedcircuits,orfireareaboundariesasanalyzedintheAppendixRsubmittal.ThismodificationwillnoteffectthecapabilitiesoftheAlternativeShutdownSystem.Furthermore,noneoftheexistingproceduresforobtaininganAlternativeSafeShutdownwillbeeffected.Thismodification,therefore,complieswith10CFR50,AppendixR.ThismodificationdoesnotdegradethecapabilityofanySafetySystemtoperformitsfunction.Theassumptionsandconclusionsofexistinganalysesareunchanged.Nonewtypesofeventsarepostulated.Therefore,ithasbeendeterminedthatthemarginsofsafetyduringnormaloperationsandtransientconditionsanticipatedduringthelifeofthestationhavenotbeenaffected.Ithasalsobeendeterminedthattheadequacyofstructures,systems,andcomponentsprovidedfortheconsequencesofaccidentshavenotbeenaffected.SafetyAnalysisPage~Revision~

4'PRELIMINARYSAFETYEVALUATION:4.1Theprobabilityofoccurrenceortheconsequencesofanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetywillnotbeincreasedbytheproposedmodification.4'4.34'Thepossibilityofanaccidentoramalfunctionofadifferenttypeotherthananyevaluatedpreviouslywillnotbecreatedbytheproposedmodification.ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecificationwillnotbereducedbytheproposedmodification.TheproposedmodificationdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionorrequireaTechnicalSpecificationchange.SafetyAnalysisPage5Revision0Date78

l,@AlloftheabovewerereviewedbythePORCcommitteewithrespecttotheTechnicalSpecificationsandthecommitteehasdeterminedthatnoTechnicalSpecificationchangesorviolationswereinvolved.Additionally,thesechangeswerereviewedinc'ommitteetodetermineiftheypresentedanUnreviewedSafetyQuestionandthegeneralsummationsofthesereviewsareasfollows:Thesechangesdonotincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrence,ortheconsequences'fanaccidentormalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetyaspreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSAR,because:2~Thesechangeswere'adetoensurecontinuedoperability/availabilityofplant,equipmentandwillnotresultinanyequipmentbeingoperatedoutsideofitsnormaloperating'ange.Thisresultsincontinuedoperability/availability,ofequipmentimportanttosafety.Thesechangesadditionallywillnotresultinachangeofoperatingcharacteristicsofequipmentusedintransient/accidentmitigationwhichprecludesanincreaseintheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccident.Becausethesechangesensurecontinuedavailabilityofplantequipment,thelimitsshownintheTechnicalSpecifications,andtheassumptionsofthesafetyanalysesoftheUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReportcontinuetobemet.Asaresultthereisnoincreaseintheconsequencesofanypresentlypostulatedaccident.IThesechangesdonotcreatethepossibilityforanewordifferentkindofaccident,oramalfunctionofadifferent,typefromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheUFSARbecause:3~Thesechangesdonotpresentnewfailuremechanismsoutsideofthosepresentlyanticipated,andareboundedbytheeventscontainedintheUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport.Thesechangesdonotreducethemarginofsafetybecause:PresentmarginsascontainedintheTechnicalSpecificationsarevalid,andtheseprocedurechangesaremadewithin.thoselimits.TheseprocedurechangeswillnotresultinviolatingthebaselineassumptionsmadeforequipmentavailabilityintheTechnicalSpecifications,andtheUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport.

~'