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Category:SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT--LICENSING & RELATED ISSUES
MONTHYEARML20211J2851999-08-26026 August 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 146 & 137 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively ML20211D3981999-08-24024 August 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Requested Actions to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively ML20207B5931999-05-26026 May 1999 SER Accepting Licensee Proposed Alternative to ASME Code for Surface Exam (PT) of Seal Welds on Threaded Caps for Unit 1 Reactor Vessel Head Penetrations for part-length CRDMs ML20205B3351999-03-17017 March 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 143 & 134 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively ML20202J1731999-01-22022 January 1999 Safety Evaluation Concluding That NSP Proposed Alternative to Surface Exam Requirements of ASME BPV Code for CRD Mechanism Canopy Seal Welds Will Provide Acceptable Level of Quality & Safety ML20198L2211998-12-0707 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 141 & 132 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively ML20195D3821998-11-0404 November 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 140 & 131 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively ML20195D3761998-10-30030 October 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 139 & 130 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60 ML20154B9241998-09-22022 September 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 138 & 129 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively ML20237D6491998-08-13013 August 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 137 & 128 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively ML20237A8171998-08-0505 August 1998 SER Related to USI A-46 Program GL 87-02 Implementation for Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20236V4071998-07-28028 July 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 136 to License DPR-42 ML20247F9551998-05-0404 May 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 135 & 127 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively ML20217M6901998-04-29029 April 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Methodology for Relocation of Reactor Coolant Sys P/T Limit Curves & LTOP Sys Limits Proposed by NSP for Pingp,Units 1 & 2 ML20203H8331998-02-20020 February 1998 SE Accepting Proposed Alternative to ASME Code for Surface Exam of Nonstructural Seal Welds for Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant,Unit 2 ML20202B7211997-11-25025 November 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 134 & 126 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively ML20199H7251997-11-18018 November 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 133 & 125 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively ML20199C3671997-11-0404 November 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 132 & 124 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively ML20212G9371997-10-29029 October 1997 Revised SE Re Amends 125 & 117 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60 ML20211E7901997-09-15015 September 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 130 & 122 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively ML20141B0331997-06-12012 June 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 129 & 121 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively ML20148D5441997-05-16016 May 1997 Safety Evaluation of Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Individual Plant Exam ML20138J9961997-05-0606 May 1997 Safety Evaluation Accepting Proposed Alternative to ASME Code for Surface Exam of CRD Mechanism Canopy Seal Welds ML20137S5561997-04-0101 April 1997 Safety Evaluation Approving License Request for Transfer of Licenses for Monticello & Prairie Island,Units 1 & 2 Nuclear Generating Plants & Prairie Island ISFSI ML20134N7411997-02-19019 February 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 126 & 118 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively ML20147D8981997-02-10010 February 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 125 & 117 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively ML20128L6181996-10-10010 October 1996 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 124 to License DPR-42 ML20117J0851996-05-21021 May 1996 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 123 & 116 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively ML20093H5251995-10-0606 October 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 120 & 113 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively ML20086E2161995-07-0303 July 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 119 & 112 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-62,respectively ML20083M7571995-05-15015 May 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 118 & 111 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively ML20082M5711995-04-18018 April 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 117 & 110 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively ML20081F3411995-03-10010 March 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 116 & 109 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively ML20081A9081995-03-0808 March 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 115 & 108 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively ML20077K2541995-01-0505 January 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 113 & 106 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively ML20072C0901994-08-10010 August 1994 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 111 & 104 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively ML20069A1181994-05-17017 May 1994 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 110 & 103 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively ML20058N8021993-12-0808 December 1993 Safety Evaluation Approving Third 10-yr IST Program Requests for Pumps & Valves,Per 10CFR50.55a(f)(6)(i) & 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i) ML20058H0151993-12-0303 December 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 109 & 102 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively ML20057A6141993-09-0303 September 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 108 & 101 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively ML20046B6351993-07-29029 July 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 107 & 100 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively ML20044D3151993-05-0404 May 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 105 & 98 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively ML20035H6041993-05-0303 May 1993 SE Accepting Util Responses Re Test Plan & Justification for Use of Dynamic Load Factor for Special Handling Device ML20035H1821993-04-27027 April 1993 SE Supporting Implementation of Reg Guide 1.97 Re Instrumentation to Follow Course of Accident,Per GL 82-33 ML20035A2281993-03-22022 March 1993 SE Supporting Conclusions in Licensee 901127 Rept That Analysis of as-built Configuration That Demonstrated Const Error Causing Insignificant Impact on Responses of Both D5/D6 Bldgs Acceptable,As Built ML20128P4861993-02-0505 February 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 104 & 97 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively ML20127C0291993-01-0404 January 1993 Safety Evaluation Accepting pressure-retaining Components of safety-related Auxiliary Fluid Sys Associated W/Edgs ML20127C0071993-01-0404 January 1993 Supplemental SE Accepting Changes & Additions Described in Rev 1 to Design Rept for Station Blackout/Electrical Safeguards Upgrade Project ML20127C0151993-01-0404 January 1993 Safety Evaluation Accepting Instrumentation & Control Sys Aspects of Unit 2 Load Sequencer Sys in Station Blackout/ Electrical Safeguards Upgrade Project ML20127C0241993-01-0404 January 1993 Safety Evaluation Re Audit of Load Sequencer Implementation. Four of Five Items Reviewed Acceptable & Closed.One Open Item Remained Re Electromagnetic Environ Qualification for Lower Frequency Range of 30 Hz to 10 Khz 1999-08-26
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217G4461999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for Pingp.With ML20217A9931999-09-30030 September 1999 NRC Regulatory Assessment & Oversight Pilot Program, Performance Indicator Data ML20217A1691999-09-22022 September 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Engine Sys,Inc Controllers,Manufactured Between Dec 1997 & May 1999,that May Have Questionable Soldering Workmanship.Caused by Inadequate Personnel Training.Sent Rept to All Nuclear Customers ML20216E7151999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1999 for Pingp,Units 1 & 2. with ML20211J2851999-08-26026 August 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 146 & 137 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively ML20211D3981999-08-24024 August 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Requested Actions to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively ML20211C2531999-08-0404 August 1999 Unit 1 ISI Summary Rept Interval 3,Period 2 Refueling Outage Dates 990425-990526 Cycle 19 971212-990526 ML20210Q4891999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1999 for Pingp,Units 1 & 2. with ML20211B5971999-07-31031 July 1999 Cycle 20 Voltage-Based Repair Criteria 90-Day Rept 05000282/LER-1999-007-01, :on 990625,loss of CR Special Ventilation Function Was Noted.Caused by Broken Door Latch Pins on CR Chiller Door.Ts Amend Request to Establish Allowed OOS Time Was Submitted1999-07-23023 July 1999
- on 990625,loss of CR Special Ventilation Function Was Noted.Caused by Broken Door Latch Pins on CR Chiller Door.Ts Amend Request to Establish Allowed OOS Time Was Submitted
ML20209J1131999-07-15015 July 1999 Safety Evaluation of Topical Rept NSPNAD-8102,rev 7 Reload Safety Evaluation Methods for Application to PI Units. Rept Acceptable for Referencing in Prairie Island Licensing Actions ML20209F9811999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant,Units 1 & 2.With ML20196H8621999-06-30030 June 1999 NRC Regulatory Assessment & Oversight Pilot Program, Performance Indicator Data, June 1999 Rept ML20196F4081999-06-23023 June 1999 Revised Pages 71,72 & 298 to Rev 7 of NSPNAD-8102, Prairie Island Nuclear Power Plant Reload Safety Evaluation Methods for Application to PI Units ML20195G5181999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant,Units 1 & 2.With . Page 3 in Final Rept of Incoming Submittal Was Not Included ML20207B5931999-05-26026 May 1999 SER Accepting Licensee Proposed Alternative to ASME Code for Surface Exam (PT) of Seal Welds on Threaded Caps for Unit 1 Reactor Vessel Head Penetrations for part-length CRDMs ML20196L2501999-05-13013 May 1999 Rev 0 to PINGP Unit 1 COLR Cycle 20 05000282/LER-1999-005-01, :on 990508,containment Inservice Purge Sys Was Not Isolated During Heavy Load Movement Over Fuel.Caused by Missing Procedure Step in D58.1.6.PINGP 1224 Was Initiated to Communicate Event & Forestall Repeating Event1999-05-0808 May 1999
- on 990508,containment Inservice Purge Sys Was Not Isolated During Heavy Load Movement Over Fuel.Caused by Missing Procedure Step in D58.1.6.PINGP 1224 Was Initiated to Communicate Event & Forestall Repeating Event
ML20206L6191999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Pingp,Units 1 & 2. with ML20205N1081999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for Pingp,Units 1 & 2. with ML20205B3351999-03-17017 March 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 143 & 134 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively ML20205Q5101999-03-15015 March 1999 Inservice Insp Summary Rept Interval 3,Period 1 & 2 Refueling Outage Dates 981109-1229 Cycle 19,970327-981229 05000306/LER-1999-001-01, :on 990206,TS Required Reactor Protection Logic Test Was Missed.Caused by Personnel Error.Sd Banks Were Inserted at 0544,RT Breakers Were Opened & Test Was Performed.With1999-03-0808 March 1999
- on 990206,TS Required Reactor Protection Logic Test Was Missed.Caused by Personnel Error.Sd Banks Were Inserted at 0544,RT Breakers Were Opened & Test Was Performed.With
ML20207J6951999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant ML20202J7711999-02-0404 February 1999 Simulator Certification Rept for Prairie Island Plant Simulation Facility,1998 Annual Rept ML20207L2811999-01-31031 January 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Jan 1999 for Pingp,Units 1 & 2 ML20202G3761999-01-31031 January 1999 Non-proprietary Rev 7 to NSPNAD-8102-NP, Prairie Island Nuclear Power Plant Reload SE Methods for Application to PI Units ML20202J1731999-01-22022 January 1999 Safety Evaluation Concluding That NSP Proposed Alternative to Surface Exam Requirements of ASME BPV Code for CRD Mechanism Canopy Seal Welds Will Provide Acceptable Level of Quality & Safety 05000306/LER-1998-006-01, :on 981219,unplanned Actuation of ESF Equipment During Performance of Sp.Caused by Personnel Error.Control Room Took Prompt Action & Returned Plant to Proper Status & Second pre-job Briefing for SP-2126 Was Conducted1999-01-18018 January 1999
- on 981219,unplanned Actuation of ESF Equipment During Performance of Sp.Caused by Personnel Error.Control Room Took Prompt Action & Returned Plant to Proper Status & Second pre-job Briefing for SP-2126 Was Conducted
ML20205H0561998-12-31031 December 1998 Northern States Power Co 1998 Annual Rept. with ML20206P7861998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1998 for Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant.With ML20198J6441998-12-17017 December 1998 Rev 0 to PINGP COLR Unit 2-Cycle 19 05000306/LER-1998-005-02, :on 981109,RT from 22% Power During Planned SD Operation Was Noted.Caused by Tt.Fw Heater Drain Level Control Was Thoroughly Inspected & Calibrated.With1998-12-0909 December 1998
- on 981109,RT from 22% Power During Planned SD Operation Was Noted.Caused by Tt.Fw Heater Drain Level Control Was Thoroughly Inspected & Calibrated.With
ML20198L2211998-12-0707 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 141 & 132 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively ML20206N2731998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1998 for Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant,Units 1 & 2.With 05000282/LER-1998-016, :on 981029,negative Flux Rate RT Occurred Upon CR Insertion After Failure of CRD Cable.Caused by Internal Short Circuit Developing in CRDM Patch Cables at Reactor Head Connector.Replaced CRDM Patch Cables.With1998-11-24024 November 1998
- on 981029,negative Flux Rate RT Occurred Upon CR Insertion After Failure of CRD Cable.Caused by Internal Short Circuit Developing in CRDM Patch Cables at Reactor Head Connector.Replaced CRDM Patch Cables.With
ML20196D7341998-11-20020 November 1998 Third Quarter 1998 & Oct 1998 Data Rept for Prairie Island Isfsi ML20195D3821998-11-0404 November 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 140 & 131 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively ML20155K6301998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1998 for Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant,Units 1 & 2.With ML20195D3761998-10-30030 October 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 139 & 130 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60 05000306/LER-1998-004-01, :on 980910,shield Building Integrity Was Breached.Caused by Inadequate TS Change.Revised Affected Procedures.With1998-10-0505 October 1998
- on 980910,shield Building Integrity Was Breached.Caused by Inadequate TS Change.Revised Affected Procedures.With
ML20202J7991998-09-30030 September 1998 Non-proprietary Version of Rev 3 to CEN-629-NP, Repair of W Series 44 & 51 SG Tubes Using Leaktight Sleeves,Final Rept ML20154H4061998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1998 for Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant.With ML20198R8061998-09-30030 September 1998 Rev 1 to NSPLMI-96001, Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Ipeee ML20154B9241998-09-22022 September 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 138 & 129 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively ML20198P0571998-09-0303 September 1998 Rev 1 to 95T047, Back-up Compressed Air Supply for Cooling Water Strainer Backwash Valve Actuator ML20153B0761998-08-31031 August 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1998 for Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant.With 05000282/LER-1998-009-01, :on 980731,noted That Recent Testing of RCS Vent Paths Had Not Been Performed in Literal Compliance with Wording of TS 4.18.1.Caused by Misunderstanding of Wording in TS Section 4.18.Will Modify Surveillance Procedures1998-08-27027 August 1998
- on 980731,noted That Recent Testing of RCS Vent Paths Had Not Been Performed in Literal Compliance with Wording of TS 4.18.1.Caused by Misunderstanding of Wording in TS Section 4.18.Will Modify Surveillance Procedures
ML20237D6491998-08-13013 August 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 137 & 128 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively ML20237A3961998-08-11011 August 1998 Safety Evaluation on Westinghouse Owners Group Proposed Insp Program for part-length CRDM Housing Issue.Insp Program for Type 309 Welds Inadequate from Statistical Point of View 1999-09-30
[Table view] |
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I SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION NORTHERN STATES POWER COMPANY PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT
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UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 PROPOSED MICROFILM REPRODUCTION OF RADIOGRAPHS l
f Principal Contributor:
William J. Collins, Sr. Metallurgist Office of Inspection and Enforcement ho04020422870327 ADOCK 05000282 p
PDR
INTRODUCTION By lett-r dated August 19, 1986, Northern States Power Company (NSP) requested NRC to review and concur with their proposal to microfilm radiographs of the piping system welds of the subject plants in accordance with paragraph IWA-6320ofASMECodeSectionXI(1980 Edition, Winter 1981 addenda) requirements.
In response to this request, a meeting was held on December 17-18, 1986 between representatives of NSP and NRC at Micro Media Inc., Minneapolis, 4
Minnesota, to review the proposed microfilming activities and quality assurance program. Enclosure 1 identifies the attendees of this meeting.
EVALUATION Micro Media Inc., is a small local microfilming company who has been assisting NSP efforts to develop a suitable method of radiograph reproduction
- g by microfilming. Their facilities essentially consist of comercial photographic equipment and automated film processing systems that are designed and primarily being used for microfilming medical x-ray records. No formal quality control system is employed by Micro Media. Rather, the final product is directly dependent on the skill and experience of trained technicians and line supervision.
Following a tour of the MMI facility, the procedure NSP proposed to use in microfilming the subject weld radiographs was discussed.
Briefly, the procedure would employ a multiple exposure technique to provide five microfilm images, in 35 nun format, of each radiograph to accommodate the expected film density range of 1.5 to 4.0.
Using this approach, NSP anticipated that at least one microimage would feature the actual density and equivalent sensitivity level of the original radiographs. The resulting microfilms would then be reviewed against the respective radiographs tc assure that all ASME Code requirements are met.
To demonstrate the methodology proposed, Micro Media was asked to microfilm a representative sample of 12 industrial radiographs furnished by the NRC staff. These radiographs were of carbon steel and austenitic stainless steel piping welds ranging from 0.5 to 1.3 inches in wall thickness, respectively.
Measured film density ranged from 1.8 to 3.5 across the areas of interest.
Plaque type penetrameters shimmed to simulate weld thickness were present on each film. A 4T penetrameter sensitivity as required by code specifications was visible on the majority of films.
For the radiographs of the thin-wall pipe samples of carbon steel, a 2T sensitivity index was also visible, i
Collectively, the sample radiographs featured various code rejectable indications in the weldments. These included porosity, root burn through, inclusions, weld undercut, lack of fusion, cracking and various film artifacts. The indications varied from being very obvious and easily seen to very subtle, requiring expert interpretation.
In order words, the visibilit of the indications and penetrameter sensitivity (i.e., image quality index) y ranged from marginal to excellent depending on the contrast and resolution achieved.
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! Five microfilm images were made of each radiograph in 35 mm format as described above. A standard film density strip was required by the NRC staff to be microfilmed with each radiograph to aid in interpretation.
In microfilming, no automated circuitry was used to vary the light intensity or relative exposure to acconnodate the density gradient inherent in the 1
radiographs. Hence, the microfilm images merely showed different levels of density of which only one appeared interpretable.
Two viewers were made available by Micro Media for microfilm review by the task group (Messrs. Nelsen, Martinson, Dahlman and Collins). Unfortunately, the equipment was designed for viewing medical x-ray film and as a result proved inadequate for evaluating details of the microfilm images of the industrial radicaraphs.
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The reproductions were then placed on an industrial radiograph viewer and compared directly with the original radiographs utilizing a hand-held optical loupe (8x mag.) as a visual aid. As expected four of the five microfilm images were uninterpretable due to excessive film density. The remaining image was quite comparable to the original radiograph on the bases of film density strip estimates. However, the image showed no penetrameter sensitivity index (complete loss of 2T and 4T hole visibility) and relatively low resolution of certain flaw details. This was particularly evident in the microfilms of the heavy pipe thickness and was attributed to light scatter bridging the density gradients of the radiographs during microfilming.
In certain film, image aberrations occurred due to improper camera focusing which also degraded image quality and clarity of details. The lack of a capability to properly enlarge the microfilm and absence of a calibrated scale precluded further evaluation of the reproductions in accordance with code specifications.
CONCLUSION Based on the above, the group concluded that the microfilming techniques as presently proposed were not an acceptable alternative for the original radiographs. The group also concluded that several critical constraints in the existing methods and procedures need to be resolved by NSP. Specifically, these include:
1.
The microfilm viewer must be designed with sufficient operational capability in terms of variable focusing, lighting, calibrated scale and image enlargement to permit definitive interpretation of microfilm against code specifications.
2.
Special film types need to be evaluated to ensure equivalent sensitivity, contrast, and resolution characteristic of the original radiograph.
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.- 3.
Camera equipment designed with finite focusing, spatial alignment and variable lighting controls are necessary to optimize filming conditions. This must be accomplished in con,iunction with item 4.
4.
During the filming of a target film, the standard film density strip and the calibrated scale need to be filmed with the radiographs to aid interpretation and more importantly, verification that the microfilms are accurately reproduced from the original radiographs.
5.
A photographic film stability test, such as provided for in ANSI PH 4.8, 1978, needs to be considered as a means.to control film processing parameters and ensure archival quality of microfilms.
6.
The quality control program for microfilming radiographs is the
(;
responsibility of NSP and is currently in draft form. The program procedures need to be finalized before microfilming can commence. The y
procedure (s) must provide for control of all microfilming activities and final review processes to ensure the final product meets code specifications.
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is LIST OF MEETING ATTENDEES t
a R. I. Nelson NSP, Quality Control Supervisor a
L. C. Dahlman NSP, Materials and Special Processes Division K. B. Martinson NSP, Quality Control Supervisor G. Eckholt NSP, Nuclear Support Services J. McMerty Micro Media Inc.
N. Giannaccini Micro Media Inc.
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W. J. Collins U.S. NRC, IE, DEPER ik; i*
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