IR 05000317/1993030

Insp Repts 50-317/93-30 & 50-318/93-30 on 931010-1113. Violations Noted But Not Cited.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations,Maint,Engineering & Plant Support,Including Emergency Preparedness,Security & Fire Protection

ML20058L487
Person / Time
Site:	Calvert Cliffs
Issue date:	11/30/1993
From:	Boyle M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20058L486	List: IR 05000317/1993030 ML20058L482
References
50-317-93-30, 50-318-93-30, NUDOCS 9312170007
Download: ML20058L487 (14)

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'U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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REGION I

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i Report No ; 50-318 i

i License No DPR-53 '!

l-i DPR-69 i  !

Licensee: Baltimore Gas and Electric Company >

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t Post Office Box 1475-  !

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Baltimore, Maryland 21203; ,

) Facility: Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2-

1 i Location: Lusby, Maryland - )

! Inspection conducted: October 10, 1993, through November 13,._1993'  ;

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Inspectors: _ Peter R. Wilson,_ Senior. Resident Inspector

Carl F. Lyon, Resident Inspector .

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Henry K. I.athrop, Resident Inspector '

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A Approved by:

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i Michael L. Boyle,%g Chief Date

' Reactor Projects Section No. IA Division of Reactor Projects  :

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Inspection Summary:

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t j This inspection report documents resident inspector core, regionaliinitiatise, and reactive

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inspection! performed during day and backshift hours of station activities including: . plant operations; maintenance; engineering; and plant suppor '

i Results:

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See Executive Summar ,

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i 9312170007 931209 E

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PDR ADOCK 05000317 *

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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i Calvert Cliffs N=elaar Power Pl==* U= lee 1 ==d 2 H a

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Insneceta= Renort Nos. 50-317/9130 ==d 50-318/9130 =

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1 Plant Operations: (Operational. Safety inspection Module 71707, Prompt Onsite Response to j Events at Operating Power Reactors Module 93702) There were no rnissidiy events during 1 +

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j Maintenance: (Maintenance Observations Module 62703, Surveillance Observations Module .j

61726) The unauthorized removal of a red danger tag from the Unit I spent fuel pool upender i' control switch and the inadvertent opening of two Unit 2 reactor trip circuit breakers were Unresolved Items, pending the completion of BG&E's root cause analyses and NRC review. . .j i

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A missed surveillance requirement on the electric fire pump was a non-cited violatio i

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Enaineering: (Module 71707) The i%t spent fuel storage installation test runs were; j j generally well-controlled and professionally conducted. ' BGAE's evaluation of a rupture of the - i!

j Unit I spent fuel pool transfer tube bellows demonstrated: good engineering judgment and i

appropriately addressed component operability. An emergency diesel generator exhaust manifold .

j fire did not result in component damage; however, this' issue .was Unresolved pending further; ~

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l Plant Support: (Module 71707)

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- Radiological Controls - Overall, a satisfactory level of ' performance. wasLobserved. -

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Emergency Preparedness - There were no noteworthy findings during the period,

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Security - Security program implementation was satisfactor g j

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Plant Chemistry - Primary and Secondary water chemistry 'was. maintained within

Technical Specification and procedural limits. No un==ptable conditions were note ,

- Fire Protection - No unneceptable conditions .were note y

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Housekeeping - In general, plant honsab+ ping was excellent. ' However,' housekeeping i in the emergency diesel generator rooms were inadequate with regards to minor engine  ;

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oil leaks. BG&E w,rrwiM this deficiency.~ y d

Safety Assessment and Ouality Verification:~ (Module 40500)7 There were no noteworthy ; ,i findings during the perio :

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SUMMARY OF FACILITY ACTIVITIES Unit 1 operated at power throughout the perio Unit 2 began the period with the main generator taken off the grid to replace a bad circuit card in the electro-hydraulic control for one of the gov _ernor valves. The card was replaced and the unit returned to full power without incident on October 11. Unit 2 operated at power for the remainder of the perio .0 PLANT OPERATIONS Operational Safety Verification The inspectors observed plant operation and verified that the facility wm operated safely and in accordance with licensee procedures and regulatory requirements. Regular tours were conducted of the following plant areas:

- control room - security access point

- primary auxiliary building - protected area fence

-- radiological control point - intake structure

-- electrical switchgear rooms - diesel generator rooms

-- auxiliary feedwater pump rooms - turbine building Control room instruments and plant computer indications were observed for correlation between channels and for conformance with technical specification (TS) requirements. Operability of engineered safety features, other safety related systems and onsite and offsite power sources was verified. The inspectors observed various alarm conditions and confirmed that operator response was in accordance with plant operating procedures. Compliance with TS and implementation of appropriate action statements for equipment out of service was inspected. Plant radiation monitoring system indications and plant stack traces were reviewed for unexpected change Imgs and records were reviewed to determine if entries were accurate and identified equipment status or deficiencies. These records included operating logs, turnover sheets, system safety tags and temporary modifications log. The inspectors also examined the condition of meteorological and seismic monitoring systems. Control room and shift manning were compared to regulatory requirements and portions of shift turnovers were observed. The inspectors found that control room access was properly controlled and that a professional atmosphere was maintaine In addition to normal utility working hours, the review of plant operations was routinely conducted during backshifts (evening shifts) and deep backshifts (weekend and midnight shifts).

Extended coverage was provided for 21 hours2.430556e-4 days <br />0.00583 hours <br />3.472222e-5 weeks <br />7.9905e-6 months <br /> during backshifts and 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br /> during deep backshifts. Operators were alert and displayed no signs of inattention to duty or fatigu l The inspectors observed an acceptable level of performance during the inspection tours detailed ;

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2 Followup of Events Occurring During Insoection Period -

There were no notable operational events during the perio .3 Elant Operations and Safety Review Committee The inspectors attended several Plant Operations and Safety Review Committee (POSRC)

meetings. TS 6.5.1 requirements for member attendance were verified. The meeting agendas included safety significant issue reports, proposed tests that affected nuclear safety, 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations, reportable events, and proposed changes to plant equipment that affected nuclear safety. Overall, the level of review and member participation was satisfactory in fulfilling the POSRC responsibilitie .4 Offsite Safety Review Committee Portions of the Offsite Safety Review Committee (OSSRC) meeting on October 28 were attended by the inspectors. The OSSRC compusition and agenda were in compliance with the requirements of TS 6.5.4. The agenda included a review of plant status and significant safety issues and proposed changes to the operating license. A good questioning attitude and safety perspective were noted, and several items were referred to the plant staff for additional information before resolution. Overall, the level of review and member participation was satisfactory to fulfill the OSSRC responsibilitie .0 MAINTENANCE Maintenance Observation The inspector reviewed selected maintenance activities to assure that:

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the activity did not violate tecimical specification limiting conditions for operation and that redundant components were operable

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required approvals and releases had been obtained prior to commencing work;

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procedures used for the task were adequate and work was within the skills of the trade;

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activities were accomplished by qualified personnel;

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where necessary, radiological and fire preventive controls were adequate and implemented;

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quality verification hold points were established where required and observed; and 1

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equipment was properly tested and retumed to servic :

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l Maintenance activities reviewed included:

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3 MO 19305890 Replace fuel injection pumps for #10 cylinder on 11 EDG due to fuel oil -

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MO 19300955 Replace upender hydraulic cylinders in Unit I spent fuel pool ,

MO 19103148 Overhaul 11 atmospheric dump valve MO 29303742 Install cables, conduit, and junction boxes for saltwater flow instruments

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The work observed was performed safely and in accordance with proper procedures. Inspectors noted that an appropriate level of supervisory attention was given to the work depending on its ,

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priority and difficult .2 Surveillance Observation  :

The inspectors witnessed / reviewed selected surveillance tests to determine whether properly i approved procedures were in use, details were adequate, test instrumentation was properly . !

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calibrated and used, technical specifications were satisfied, testing was performed by qualified personnel, and test results satisfied acceptance criteria or were properly dispositione The surveillance testing was performed safely and in accordance.with proper procedure .

Inspectors noted that an appropriate level of_ supervisory attention was'given to the testing .

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depending on its sensitivity and difficulty. Notable observations are included below for selected activities. The following surveillance testing activities were reviewed:

STP O-8A-1 11 DG and 4kV Bus 11 LOCI Sequencer Test STP O-73J-2 LPSI Pump Performance Test .

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STP O-8A-2 12 DG and 4kV Bus 21 LOCI Sequencer Test

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STP O-8B-1 12 DG and 4kV Bus 14 LOCI Sequencer Test  ;

STP 0-73K-1 Containment Spray Pumps 11 & 12 Performance Test I STP 0-73B-1 Service Water Pumps 11,12 & 13 Performance Test STP 0-73B-2 Service Water Pumps 21, 22 & 23 Performance Test i

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l 4 Missed Surveillance On October 26,1993, BG&E discovered that they failed to perform a surveillance test within the periodicity required by technical specifications. In particular, fire protection personnel failed to perform surveillance test procedure (STP) F-076-0, " Staggered Test of Electric Fire Pump" as scheduled. Performance of STP F-076-0 satisfied the surveillance requirements of Technical Specification (TS) 4.7.11.1.1.b. BG&E had scheduled the TS surveillance to be performed on September 30,1993, with the maximum allowable TS extension date being October 10, 199 The inspectors reviewed this event to determine the cause of the failure and adequacy of BG&E's corrective action Personnel error involving a lack of attention to detail was the cause of the event. Fire protection personnel mistakenly cancelled the test believing the test had already been performed during the test interval. The fire protection supervisor and the responsible functional surveillance test coordinator failed to recognize that the test had not been performe Upon discovery of the missed surveillance, BG&E took prompt and appropriate actions. They declared the electric fire pump inoperable and entered the applicable TS action statemen Subsequently, fire protection personnel performed STP F-076-0 satisfactorily, and BG&E declared the pump operable. BG&E informed the inspectors that this event would be formally reported to the NRC via a licensee event repor The inspectors found that this occurrence was an isolated incident. A review of plant records identified no similar occurrences. As a corrective action, BG&E management reiterated their expectation concerning the timely performance of STPs and attention to detai In conclusion, the inspectors found the event to be of minimal safety significance and was an isolated occurrence. BG&E took appropriate and prompt actions upon discovery that the test had not been performed. BG&E's corrective actions to prevent recurrence were adequat However, the failure to perform STP F-076-0 as scheduled was a violation of TS 4.7.11.1. It was not cited because the criteria for discretion specified in Section VII.B. of the NRC Enforcement Policy were satisfie .4 Taggine Violation Durine Unit 1 Soent Fuel Pool Upender Maintenance On November 9,1993, a BG&E engineer discovered the Unit 1 spent fuel pool upender control switch in the " vertical" vice the required " horizontal" position. The control switch's red tag had been removed and was found two to three feet away on a stanchio In 1988, BG&E determined that an unanalyzed condition could exist if both upender carriages were loaded with fresh unitradiated fuel and were raised in close proximity to a fuel handling machine also loaded with fresh fuel, and if there were no boron in the spent fuel pool. BG&E addressed diis possibility by administratively regulating the upender control switch with a red danger ta ;

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After discovery of the displaced red tag, BG&E determined that the tag had not been cleared for removal by the tagging authority, although post maintenance testing on the upender hydraulic rams had been performed the previous week. BG&E initiated a root cause analysis of this event on November 10. BG&E's investigation was ongoing when the repon period ende The inspectors reviewed the preliminary findings of BG&E's investigation and interviewed plant personnel involved with the root cause analysis. The inspectors could draw no firm conclusions from the data available to date; however, inadequate communications, job training, and tagging procedure understanding appeared to be factors. The inspectors did note that there were no nuclear safety consequences of the event because no fuel movement was in progress at the time and no fuel was located in either upender carriage. However, this issue is Unresolved pending completion of BG&E's root cause analysis and further NRC review (URI 50-317 and 318/93-30-01). Inadvertent Trio of Two Unit 1 Trio Circuit Breakers On October 13, a degraded voltage on 120 VAC vital instrument bus 1Y02 resulted in the inadvertent opening of two of the eight Unit I reactor trip circuit breakers. There was no trip signal to the breakers, and no actual consequences to the plant as a result of the two breakers openin The degraded voltage occurred when the 12 inverter, which supplied the bus, overheated after being wrapped in plastic. Personnel erected the plastic to protect the inverter from marinite insulation work being done in the vicinity. Operators investigating the breaker trip found that voltage had degraded to about 107V. Voltage returned to normal immediately after the plastic was removed. Operators also found that the 11 inverter had been wrapped in plastic, but that ventilation holes had been cut. There was no voltage degradation on 11 inverte Inspectors reviewed the list of equipment supplied by 1YO2 and operator actions associated with the event. There were no actual safety consequences. Operators responded promptly and as required by procedures and TSs. The breakers were reshut about I hour and 40 minutes after they tripped, following removal of the plastic and preliminry evaluation of the event. BG&E's root cause analysis was still in progress at the end of the period. The issue is Unresolved (URI 50-317 and 318/93-30-02) pending finalization of BG&E's investigation and NRC revie .0 ENGINEERING Emercency Diesel Generator Slow Start Concerns On September 9,1993, the 21 emergency diesel generator (EDG) failed surveillance test procedure (STP) O-8-2 and was declared inoperable. The occurrence and BG&E's corrective actions were documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-317 and 318/93-25. During the STP, the EDG failed to reach rated frequency (60 hertz) and soltage (4.16 kV) within 10 seconds as i

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required by the above test procedure. Following the failure, BG&E conducted three fast start tests on the 21 EDG to collect more data for evaluation. In all three tests, the EDG attained rated voltage and frequency within the required 10 seconds. BG&E decided to increase the testing frequency on the 21 EDG until they had reasonable assurance that it was reliable. Since the 21 EDG had failed to reach rated speed within 10 seconds on three past occasions (September 1989, January 1990, and January 1993), inspectors conducted a review and evaluation of BG&E's resolutions of these test failures to assess whether the evaluations and corrective actions were appropriat Review of Past Events The first 21 EDG failure occurred on September 20,1989, when the EDG reached rated speed in 11.3 seconds and voltage at 11.75 seconds. BG&E found that the governor booster had clogged ports and a degraded piston seal. Following replacement with a new updated model governor,21 EDG was tested successfully and returned to servic A second failure occurred on January 13,1990. BG&E reviewed the past surveillance test data back to 1985 for all EDGs. The data revealed that 21 EDG engine was showing some degradation and an increasing trend for start time. In addition, BG&E noted that the 21 EDG engine starting times were erratic (wide time band ranges) as compared to the other two diesel engines (11 and 12). BG&E concluded that the most probable cause was a combination of wear / corrosion / contamination buildup in the engine distributor or air start check valves. Physical inspection conducted by BG&E revealed a heavy buildup of a " gunk" like material in the distributor throughout the housing and in each of the distributor start valves. In addition, one of the distributor start valves was found recessed into its housing. Following replacement of the springs, consumables, and questionable parts, along with the air start distributor valves, the EDG was successfully teste On January 21, 1993, 21 EDG failed a surveillance test due to rust buildup in the air start distributor, as documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-317 and 318/93-02. BG&E attributed the rust buildup to the removal of the air compressor after cooler unit for an extended period of time (approximately 6 months). BG&E concluded that this configuration may have introduced moisture into the pilot valves of the engine. After cleaning the air distributor system and replacing the pilot valves the EDG was tested satisfactoril The inspectors reviewed test data and maintenance documentation and interviewed BG&E staff involved with the diesel troubleshooting for these events. They concluded that BG&E's evaluations and corrective actions were reasonable and appropriate, Most Recent Event The test data and investigation results of the test failure of 21 EDG on September 9,1993, were reviewed by inspectors. No abnormalities were noted. Several surveillance tests of 21 EDG were witnessed by inspectors and no deficiencies were observed. BG&E has found no specific

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cause for the failure, but believes that the most likely cause for the slow start c# '.ne EDG was again due to the diesel air start system, based on past performance, observations, and maintenance histor Conclusion Based on review of the physical condition of the EDG, the test results obtained by BG&E, and BG&E's previous corrective actions, inspectors concluded that BG&E had taken appropriate corrective actions for each test failure. Since BG&E has not been able to establish concrete evidence of a definite root cause for the last slow start of the 21 EDG, inspectors agreed that BG&E's ongoing plan to increase the testing frequency svas prudent to prove its reliability.

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Inspectors will continue to monitor EDG performanc .2 ISFSI Dry Runs

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Preoperational testing of the independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) was completed on October 19. Inspectors reviewed the engineering test procedures used to conduct the training exercise, attended the pre-evolution briefings, and verified that the testing satisfied the preoperational license conditions. Following the testing, the results were submitted to the NRC for review in accordance with 10 CFR 72.82(e). In addition, inspectors verified that the security plan was implemented as required by the license. Portions of the testing monitored by the inspectors were gmally well-controlled and professionally conducte .3 Emergency Diesel Generator Exhst Fires While observing the performance of Surveillance Test Procedure (STP) O-8A-2, "12 DG and

, 4kV Bus 14 LOCl Sequencer Test," the inspectors identified a small fire on the 12 emergency diesel generator (EDG) on the north side exhaust header. The fire was about two feet from the ,

EDG generator. An operator promptly put out the fire using a CO, fire extinguisher. The !

source of the fire was fuel oil soaked lagging located below a flanged connection of the l combined exhaust manifold. The fuel oil had accumulated in the exhaust header and then leaked j out into the lagging. Except for burn marks on the lagging, the inspectors did not identify any damage as the result of the fire. Due to the importance of emergency diesel generators to nuclear safety, the inspectors initiated a review of the event to determine the cause of the fire 4

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and any safety significanc The EDGs utilized 12 cylinder opposed piston engines manufactured by Fairbanks Mors l Following EDG operation, residual fuel oil leaked past the upper cylinders into the exhaust i anifold. As the exhaust manifolds cooled down, an opening was created between the exhaust etders, a gasket, and the combined exhaust manifeld. BG&E informed the inspectors that this was a gener% problem with EDGs of this type.

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The inspectors discussed this problem with BG&E's responsible system ergineer. Exhaust -

manifold fires occurred frequently prior to 1989 with no adverse effects. He exhaust fires were--

either extinguished by operators or had gone out after all the residual fuel oil had been burned off. In 1989, BG&E began to manually bar over the El>G engine after each operation to reduce the probability of exhaust manifold fires. His practice has been successful in reducing the number of fires. BG&E informed the inspectors that an EDG exhaust manifo;d fire could be expected approximately every six month The inspectors conducted a detailed walkdown of the other EDGs and did not identify other areas of excessive oil soaked lagging. However, they noted several. small oil leaks .on the '

EDGs. While some minimal oil leakage was expected, hous#eeping.was not adequate to keep -

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the EDGs satisfactorily clean.- BG&E subsequently cleaned these machines and the inspectors did not observe further instances of inadequate housekeepin While EDG exhaust manifold fires have not resulted in any damage or affected EDG operability, the presence of an open flame near the EDGs governoriwas potentially safety significant, especially if housekeeping measures were not rigorously implemented. Therefore, this issue is Unresolved pending further NRC review (50-317 and 318/93-30-03). Unit 1 Spent Fuel Pool Tramfer Tube Bellows Image -

On November 11, 1993, BG&E discovered an air leak from the bellows assembly in the Unit -_

1 fuel transfer tube (FfT) at the spent fuel pool end. The FIT connects the spent fuel pool and the primary containment, allowing the transfer of fuel to and from the reactor. vessel. The-primary containment end is sealed by a blind flange and double o-ring configuration during power operation. The spent fuel pool end is isolated by a valve. - A two-ply bellows assembly acts as an expansion joint allowing indapaaht motion of both containment and auxiliary buildings during a seismic event without loss of containment integrity. - The area between the

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bellows plys is pressurized with ai BG&E conducted an evaluation of the potential cffects of the leak on containment integrity and long-term component degradation. The source of the leakage was a one-inch long gash in the outer ply of the expansion bellows on the SFP side. A visual inspection determined that the -

inner ply apparently was not damaged. BG&E, however, conservatively assumed that the inner ply had been breached.- Preliminary results of the effects of borated water exposure on FIT .

components indicated that no gross corrosion of the carbon steel liner would occur over.the nominal 40-year plant lifetime. Consequently, BG&E concluded that continuert operation with-the existing leak would not jeopardize containment integrity or impair. the-bellows from performing its oesign function during a seismic even .

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The inspectors reviewed the results of BG&E's evaluation and discussed the findings with system engineering personnel. The inspectors noted that even if material failure occurred, leakage from the spent fuel pool would be significantly less than make-up capability (25 gpm versus 150 gpm).

The inspectors concluded that BG&E's evaluation was conservative and appropriately addressed FTI' operability. The licensee is currently evaluating repair methods. Inspectors will monitor ,

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BG&E's evaluation and repair of the bellow .0 PLANT SUPPORT

! Radiological Controls During tours of the accessible plant areas, the inspectors observed the implementation of selected i portions of the licensee's Radiological Controls Program. The utilization and compliance with special work permits (SWPs) were reviewed to ensure detailed descriptions of radiological conditions were provided and that personnel adhered to SWP requirements. The inspectors i

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observed that controls of access to various radiologically controlled areas and use of personnel monitors and frisking methods upon exit from these areas were adequate. Posting and control of radiation areas, contaminated areas and hot spots, and labelling and control of containers holding radioactive materials were verified to be in accordance with licensee procedure j l

Health Physics technician control and monitoring of these activities were determined to be goo I i Overall, a satisfactory level of performance was observe .2 Emergency Preparedne.ss The inspectors toured the onsite emergency response facilities to verify that these facilities were in an adequate state of readiness for event response. The inspectors discussed program 1 implementation with the applicable personnel. The resident inspectors had no noteworthy findings in this are i

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A graded emergency preparedness exercise was held on October 28, with full participation from outside agencies. The results of the exercise are documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-317 and 318/93-2 .3 Security l During routine inspection tours, the inspectors observed implementation of portions of the security plan. Areas observed included access point search equipment operation, condition of physical barriers, site access control, security force staffing, and response to system alarms and degraded conditions. These areas of program implementation were determined to be adequat No unacceptable conditions were identifie *

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! Plant Chemistry The inspectors verified that primary and selected secondary water chemistry were maintained within technical specification and procedural limits. In addition, they reviewed secondary water ;

activity analysis and radiation monitor alarm status to confirm steam generator tube integrit !

The iraspectors also examined analysis trending data to determine if appropriate action was being j

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implemented to restore plant chemistry to normal values. There were no unacceptable conditions identifie .5 Fire Protection During plant tours, the inspectors assessed plant areas for fire hazards including ignition sources and flammable materials. They also examined fire alarms, extinguishing equipment, emergency lighting, actuating controls, fire fighting equipment, and fire barriers for operability. In addition, the inspectors verified that required compensatory measures, such as fire patrols, were

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properly implemente .6 Iiousekeepine The inspectors assessed the control of plant housekeeping in safety related areas. They also examined these areas for potential missile hazards, such as gas cylinders, that could damage safety significant equipment. General plant housekeeping during the period was generally excellent. The inspectors observed several small oil leaks on the emergency diesel generator While some minimal oil leakage was expected, housekeeping was not adequate to keep the EDGs satisfactorily clean. BG&E subsequently cleaned these machines and the inspectors did not observe further instances of inadequate housekeeping.

SAFETY ASSESSMENT AND QUALITY VERIFICATION There were no noteworthy findings during the perio .0 MANAGEMENT MEETING During this inspection, periodic meetings were held with statior. management to discuss inspection observations and findings. At the close of the inspection period, an exit meeting was held to summarize the conclusions of the inspection. No written material was given to the licensee and no proprietary information related to this inspection was identifie .1 Pgiminvy Inspection Findings Unresolved items were identified with regard to a tagging violation on Unit I spent fuel pool upender (see Section 3.4), an inadvertent trip of two Unit I trip circuit breakers (see Section 3.5), and EDG exhaust manifold dres (see Section 4.3). A non-cited violation was identified with regard to a missed electric fire pump surveillance (see Section 3.3).

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11 Attendance at Manan_ement Meetines Conducted by Region Raeevi Ins _oectors

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Inspection Reporting .. .

Date - Subiect Renon N Inspector i

10/28/1993 EP Exercise 50-317/93-26 D. Silk i 50-318/93-26 i

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