ML20248C057

Amend 97 to License DPR-6,adding Operability & Surveillance Requirements for Alternate Shutdown Sys to Tech Spec Sections 11 & 12 & Including Tech Specs for Active Fire Barriers & Fire Detection Instrumentation

ML20248C057
Person / Time
Site:	Big Rock Point File:Consumers Energy icon.png
Issue date:	05/31/1989
From:	Yandell L Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20248C054	List: ML20248C050 ML20248C057 ML20248C062
References
NUDOCS 8906090250
Download: ML20248C057 (16)

Text

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" 'g UNITED STATES

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.g ij NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

...../

CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY BIG ROCK POINT PLANT DOCKET NO. 50-155 AMENDMENT TO FACILIY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 97 License No. DPR-6

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Comission (the Commission) has found that:

A. The application for amendment by Consumers Power Company (the licensee)'

dated February 6, 1987 superseded previous submittals dated September 30, 1985, March 4, April 21 and December 17, 1986 plus additional information provided on August 27, 1986, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Comission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Comission; C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public; and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Comission's regulations; D. The issuance of this emendment will not be inimical to the comon defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Comission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

l 8906090250 890531 l PDR ADOCK 05000155 P PDC

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. 2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical

' Specifications as indicated in'the attachment to this license amendment and Paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-6 is hereby amended to read as follows:

Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as.

revised through Amendment No. 97. , are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility

'in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

' Lawrence Yandell, Acting Director Project Directorate III-1 Division of Reactor Projects III, IV, V-

& Special~ Projec;ts Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: May 31, 1989 I t

i I

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 97 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-6 DOCKET NO. 50-155 f i

Revise Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by the captioned amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the area of change.

REMOVE INSERT ii ii 11-17 11-17 11-18 11-18 l 11-19 11-19 11-19a 11-19a 11-20 11,20 12-2 12-2 12-7 12-7 12-8 12-8 12-9 12-10 l 12-11 l 1

12-12 l l

I l

_ CONTENTS (Contd)

_ Fate No 8.0 Essaarch and Developeant Program (Deleted) ...... .

9.0 Inservice Inspection and Testing i

. . . . . . . . . . . . . - p-1 Objective . . . . . . . . .. .' .. . ..........

9.1 Applicability

• i 9.2 ..........' 9-1 9-1 9.3 Specifications ......

9.4 . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-1

~

Basis . . . . . . . . . . . ............ 3-1 10.0 (Section 6.0) Administrative Controls . . . . . . . . . . .

6.1 Responsibility 10-1 6.2 Organization ................... 10-1

, 6.3 ....................

Flant Staff Qualifications 10-1 6.4 Training ............. .

10-7 ~

. . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . ' . . . . . . . . ~ 10-7 6.5 Review and Andit . .......

6.6 . Deleted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~

10-7 6.7 safety Limit Violation ......... .

~

6.8 Proceduras ............... 10-13 6.9 Reporting Requirements 10-13 6.10 Record Retention .............. 10-14 6.11 Radiation Protection Program ~. . . . . . . . . . . 10-20 6.12 Righ Radiation Aras .. 10-22

................ 10-23 6.13 Environmental Qualification . . . . . .* . . 10-25 6.14 Process Control Program . . .*. . . . . . ..... ...... 10-26 6.15 Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (CDCN) ....... 10-26 11.0' (section 3.1.4/4.1.4) Emergency Core Cooling System . . . . 11-1 (Section 3.1.5/4.1.5) Reactor Depressurization 5fstem . . . 11-7 (Section 3.3.4/4.3.4) Containment Spray System ...... 11-14 l

(Section 3.5.3/4.5.3) Imergency Power Sources . . . . . . . 11-17 12.0 Fire Protection Program ....... ..........

12-1 (Section 3.3.3.8/4.3.3.8) Fire Detection Instrumentation . 12-1 (Section 3.7.11.1/4.7.11.1) Fire Suppression Water System . 12-3 (section 3.7.11.2/4.7.11.2) Fire Spray / Sprinkler Systems . 12-5 (Section 3.7.11.5/4.7.11.5) Fire Bose stations ...... 12-6 (Section 3.7.12/4.7.12) Penetration Fire Barriers . . ._. .

(Section 3.7.13 /4.7.13 Alt

.. . 12-7 Bases . . . . . . . . ). . .ernate Shutdown System . . . . . . . . 12-8

................... 12-11 13.0 Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications ...... 13-1 13.1 Radiological Effluent Releases . . . . . . . . . . .. 13-1 13.2 Radiological Environmental Monitoring . . . . . . . . 13-17 11 Amendment No. ,9.7 Ww- .. ..

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TABLE 3.3-8 TIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTS Minimus Instruments Total Onorable Instrument Location Instruments Heat Smoke

1. Elsesrical Equipment Room Zone 1 Elevation 614' 5 -

3

. Zone 2 Elevation 603' 2 -

1 Zone 3 Elevation 399' 4 -

2 -

2. Exterior Cable Penetration Room .

Zone 1 Elevation 654' 5 -

3

3. Interior Cable Penetration Room

^

Zone 1 Elevation 614' 6 -

4

4. Imergency Diesel Generator Room 2 1 -

5. Screenwell and Pump House 4 2 -

6. Ccatrol Reca 9 Cene 1 Elevation 627'-9" 2 -

1  !

Zene 2 Elevatien 626'-0" 3 -

2 l

7. Core Spray Pe=p Reed 2 -

1 S. Computer Room 2 -

1

9. Cendensate Pu=p Roem 2 -

1

10. Control Rod Drive Accumulator Room Zone 1 Elevation 509' 2 -

1

11. Shutdown Heat Exchanger Room 2 -

1

12. Recirculation Pump Room 3 2 -

13. Alternate Shutdown Building 2 -

1 l \

i 12-2 AmendmentNo.J8',)d97 l

1

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PLANT 5YSTEMS-i 3/4.7.12 PENETRATION FIRE BARRIER $_

_.IMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION i

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3.7.12 All penetration fire barriers including fire doors and fire dampers protecting safety related areas shall be functional.

APPLICABILITY: At all times ACTION: -

a. With one or more of the above required penetration fire barriers non-functional and with the area of the affected barrier (s) monitored by OPERABLE (pursuant to Specification 3.3.3.8) fire detection instrumentation, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> estabitsh a fire watch patrol and inspect the affected area (s) at least once per hour. -

b', With one or more of the above required penetration fire barriers non-functional and with the area of the affected f

- barrier [s) not monitored by OPERABLE (pursuant to Specification

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3.3.3.8)firedetectioninstrumentation,establishacontinuous fire watch on at least one side of the affected penetration within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. .

- SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 1~

4.7.12 Each of the above required penetration fire barriers shall be verified to be functional by a visual inspection; At least once per 18 months, and a.

b. Prior to declaring a penetration fire battier functional

. following repairs or maintenance. ,

l l

l Amendment No. J7,97 l

12-7 )

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PLANT SYSTEMS

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3/4.7.13 ALTERNATE SHLTDOWN SYSTDi LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 3.7.13 The alternate shutdown system (ASD) equipment shown in Table 3.3-9 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY During power operation.

ACTION With less than the minimum ASD equipment in Table 3.3-9 OPERABLE, restore the inoperable equipment to OPERABLE within 7 days, or' provide equivalent shutdown capability and restore the inoperable equipment to OPERABLE within 60 days, or be shutdown as described in Section 1.2.5(a) within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and shutdown as described in Section 1.2.5(a) and (b) within the fc,11owing 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.s.*

• The #1 control rod drive pump, its associated ASD power source and the two amargency condenser indicating lights are the ASD equipment considered to have equivalent shutdown capability.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIRDThTS 4.7.13.1 The ASD monitoring instrument;: shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performing a check and a calibration per Table 4.3-9. .

4.7.13.2 Each transfer switch, power supply and control circuit shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at each major refueling shutdown

• by operating each actuated component from both the control room and the remote location.

4.7.13.3 At sech major refueling shutdown *, perform a verification to ensure that equipment (alternate power sources) moeded to achieve and maintain cold shutdown is available.

4.7.13.4 The ASD battery charger shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performing a weekly verification that the float voltage is greater than 130 volts.

l 4.7.13.5 The ASD battery surveillance requirements are contained in Sectis,n 11.4.5.3 . l

• But no lass than once every 18 months.

Amendment No; 27,97 12-8

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TABLE 3.3-9 ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM EQUIPMEh7 i

INSTRUMENT READOUT LOCATION  !

1

1. Steam Drum Level /LI-6819 Panel C31 J

2. Steam Drum Pressure /PI-6819 Panel C31

3. Emergency Condenser Low Level Panel C31 l Alarm Indicating Light /LS-3550 l l

4 Emergency Condenser Firewster Panel C31 )

Makeup Tiow Indicating Light /TS-4947 TRANSTER SWITCHES / POWER SUPPLIES /C0hTROL CIRCUITS SVITCH LOCATION

1. Emergency Condenser Outlet Valve ASD MD-7053 Motor Control MO-7053* $ tarter .

OR Esefgency Condanser Dutlet Valve ASD MD-7063 kktor Control MO-7063* Starter I

2. Main Steam Isolation Valve Control MO-7050 Motor MO-7050 starter

3. Emergency Condenser Firewster Makaup Panel C31 -

, Valve Control SV-4947

4. Control Rod Drive Pump No. I and Equipment Lock associated ASD Poyer Source O

• Section 3.7.13(a) applies only if the siternate shutdown controls for both smargency condenser outlet valves, MO-7053 and MO-7063, are inoperable at the same time. l NOTE: Alternate Shutdown Battery operability requirements are contained in Section 11.3.5.3 Amendment No. 97 12-9

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TABLE 4.3.-9 ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM INSTRUMENT SURVE1LLANCE REQUIRDfEhTS

.: l INSTRtW.NT SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY METHOD ,

1. Steam Drum Level. A. Check Weekly compare to known level LI-6819 B. Calibration Every 18 apply known differential months pressures to transmitters

2. Steam Drum Pressure, A. Check Weekly compare to known pressure PI-6819 B. Calibration Every 18 apply known pressures to months transmitter

3. Emergency Condenser A. Check Monthly initiate flow in line Makeup Line Flow Switch Indicating Light FS-4947 ,

4. Emergency Condenser Low A. Check Monthly simulate Icw level Level Alarm Indicating Light. LS-3550 B. Calibration Every 18 apply known differential (Panel C31) sonths pressure to switch l

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12-10 Amendment No.- 97 e e .

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O BASES-3/4.3.3.8 FIRE DETECTION 1hSTRUMENTAT10N OPERABILITY of the fire detection instrumentation ensures that adequate warriing' capability is available for the prompt detection of, fires. This capability is required in order to detect and locate 41'res in their early stages. prompt detection of fires will reduce the poten-

~

tial for damage to safety related equipment ed is an integral element in the ovprall facility. fire protection program.,

In the event that a portion of the fire detection instrumentation is .

inoperable, the establishment of frequent fire . patrols in the affected.

areas is required to provide detection capability until the inoperable instrumentation is restored to OPERABILITY.

3/4.7.11 FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTDiS '

The OPERABILITY of the fire suppression systems' ensures 'th'at" adequate '

fire suppression capcbility is available to confine and extinguith fires occuring in any portion of the facility where safety related equip:ent .

is located. .The fire suppression system consists of the water system

• spray and/or sprinklers, and fire hose stations. The collective capability of the fire suppression systes is adequate to minimize

~

potential damage to safety related equipment and is a major element in the facility fire protection program. .,

In the event that portions 'of the fire suppression systems are inoperable, alternate backup fire fighting equipment. is' required.to be made available in the affected areas until the inoperable equipment is restored to service.'

In the' event the' fir'e' suppress' ion water system becomes inoperab1'e.

imediate corrective c.easures must be 'taken since this system provides the major fire suppression capability of the plant. The requirement for a tventy-four hour report to the Comission provides for prompt evalva-tion of the acceptability of the corrective measures to provide adequate

- fire suppression capabilitt for the continued protection of the nuclear plant.

3/4.7.12 PENETRATION FIRE BARRIERS The functional integrity of .the per!etration fire barriers'entures 1 that fires will be confined or adequately retarded from spreading to adjacent portions of the facility. This design feature minimizes the i possibility of a single fire rapidly involving several areas of thefire The penetration I l

, facility. prior to detection and extinguishment. barriers includ . . _ _ . _

4 ,programandaresubject.to.periodicJnspections.*.During period fire watch patrols in conjunction with 0.PERABLE fire detection instrumentation or a continuous fire watch are required to be maintained in the vicinity of the affected barrier until the barrier is restored to functional status...

Amendment NO. 97 12-11 . ,,

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BASES (Contd) 3/4.7.13 ALTERNATE $NL'TDOW SYSTDi ,.

The requirements for the Alternate Shutdown System provide assurance that shutdown and cooldown to approximately 212*T can be achieved in the event of major fire in critical areas of the plant. This capability is in accordance with the criteria of Appendix R to 10 C D 50.

t i

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Amendment No. 97 12-12

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