IR 05000010/1995008
| ML20217J111 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden  |
| Issue date: | 07/12/1995 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20217J022 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-010-95-08, 50-10-95-8, 50-237-95-08, 50-237-95-8, 50-249-95-08, 50-249-95-8, NUDOCS 9804300168 | |
| Download: ML20217J111 (21) | |
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{{#Wiki_filter:. * U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ,
REGION III
l Report Nos. 50-010/95008: 50-237/95008: 50-249/95008
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Docket Nos. 50-010: 50-237: 50-249 License Nos. DPR-2: DPR-19: DPR-25
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l Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company ! Opus West III 1400 Opus Place - Suite 300 Downers Grove. IL 60515 . l l ' Facility Name: Dresden Nuclear Power Station. Units 1. 2. and 3 l Inspection At: Morris. IL Inspection Conducted: April 25 through June 12. 1995 ! Inspectors: M. Leach Senior Resident Inspector D. Chyu. Reactor Engineer T. Kozak. Senior Radiation Specialist - j N. O'Keefe Reactor Engineer ! C. Phillips. Resident Inspector l T. Reidinger. Project Engineer l A. M. Stone. Resident Inspector i C. Settles. Inspector. Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety
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Originals Signed by P. L. Hiland 7/12/95 Approved By: , , P. L. Hiland, Chief Date , Reactor Projects Branch 1B Insoection Summary Insoection from Acril 25 throuah June 12. 1995 (Recort Nos. 50-010/95008: 50-237/95008: 50-249/95008) ' Areas Insoected: Routine, unannounced inspection of operations: maintenance and surveillance; engineering and technical support: plant support; plant material condition: safety assessment and quality verification. Unit 1 activities; and action on previously identified item ' 9804300168 950712 PDR ADOCK 05000010 0 PDR ,
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Results: Of the eight areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified in six areas. The following violations were identified: l l e inadequate corrective action in meeting NRC reporting requirements and '
* failure to follow a surveillance procedure (example of a previous violation).
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Dresden Nuclear Power Station Report No. 95008 Plant Ooerations Operational performance was adequate. Operators did not adhere to management expectations by failing to manually secure a Unit 2 reactor water cleanup pump prior to the pump tripping on low suction pressure, routinely using human out- ' of-services during maintenance, and moving the refuel bridge while personnel were sitting on a safety railing. Operators were unaware that 105 of 177 control rod drive temperature alarms were bypassed. The licensee identified several problems with the out-of-service progra Maintenance and Surveillance Maintenance performance was adequate. An instrument maintenance supervisor and technician failed to follow a surveillance procedure which potentially rendered both core spray trains on Unit 2 inoperabl Enaineerina and Technicel Suocort Performance was adequate. The licensee failed to report local leak rate test failures which exceeded the technical. specification leakage limits. The - licensee's corrective actions to a previous similar violation were inadequate and did not prevent recurrence. Engineering personnel aggressively identified a potential small fuel failure on Unit Plant Suncort Performance was adequate. Weaknesses were observed in station personnel radiation protection practices and radiation protection technician attention to detail. The radiation protection department support to operations during , the Unit 2 reactor shutdown was poor. However, an improving trend regarding personnel contamination events was observe Material Condition Overall station material condition was poor. The Unit 3 turbine tripped on high vibration due to a low pressure turbine blade failure. This resulted in an automatic reactor shutdown. The operators noted that four intermediate range monitors functioned erratically which prevented resetting of the shutdown signal. In addition, reactor water level increased to above the high
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DETAILS OPERATIONS (40500. H707, and 93702)
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The inspectors ' observed plant activities, interviewed station personnel, and conducted routine plant tours to assess equipment conditions.
! personnel safety hazards, procedural adherence, and compliance with regulatory requirements. The inspectors independently verified the
- status of safety systems and compliance with technical specification j In addition to routine tours of the Unit 2 and 3 reactor and turbine buildings, the inspectors toured the following areas and systems: ]
Unit 1 - Fire protection system
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Spent fuel pool (SFP) -{
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Unit 2 , High pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system Standby liquid control (SLC) system Refueling bridge Station blackout (SBO) diesels
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Unit 3 - HPCI system < Main turbine Station blackout diesels Control room activities were adequate. Weaknesses were evident with regard to operators not meeting management expectations, lack of attention to details, and poor communications. The inspectors verified ,. ; operator knowledge of ongoing plant activities, equipment status, and i existing fire watche l No violations or deviations were identifie .1 Operations Summary i L Unit 1 ,
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The licensee's decommissioning activities continued including the identification corrosion on a steel beam in the Unit 1 SFP fuel rack The licensee planned to evaluate the effect of this corrosion on the structural integrity of the fuel rack Unit 2 The unit operated at power for most of the inspection period. On June 3 the licensee manually inserted all control rods and commenced a planned 4 104-day refueling outag l I Unit 3 The unit operated at power levels up to 100 percent. On May 28 the main turbine tripped on high vibration which resulted in an automatic reactor shutdown. The unit remained in cold shutdow .2 Operational Events During this inspection period, additional events occurred, some of which required a prompt notification of the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72. The ) following events were reviewed for reporting timeliness and immediate licensee response. The licensee's root cause investigation and corrective actions will be reviewed in a followup inspectio i
* On May 28 the Unit 3 main turbine tripped resulting in an automatic reactor shutdown from 100 percent power. This event is l
discussed in paragraph '
* On May 28 the licensee unintentionally entered a 7-day limiting i condition for operation (LCO) due to an inoperable Unit 3 isolation condenser. This event is discussed in paragraph ' * On May 31 the licensee determined that secondary containment was degraded on several occasions. This event is discussed in paragraph .3 Unit 2 Reactor Shutdown Control room operators did not meet management expectations for taking manual control of plant equipment. On June 5 during the Unit 2 reactor shutdown, the inspectors observed control room operators acknowledge a low suction pressure annunciator for the Unit 2 reactor water cleanup l
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. . (RWCU) pum For about 15 minutes the operators discussed the likelihood of a RWCU pump trip and finally decided to take operator !
action to secure the pump. However, the pump tripped before operator ' action was taken. Dresden station policy was to take manual action rather than rely on an automatic function. The operators were knowledgeable of this policy and could not provide a clear reason why the pump was not manually tripped. The operators' reliance on automatic equipment protective features was not in accordance with management expectations and was a weaknes . Also the radiation protection department organization did not provide the necessary support to operations during the Unit 2 shutdown which inhibited smooth operations. During the 15 minute period discussed above. the Unit 2 Supervisor was attempting to dispatch operators to two locked high radiation areas. the reactor water cleanup pump room and the shutdown cooling pump room. Entry to these areas was standard during'a shutdown. The operators were not able to obtain the keys and the unit supervisor became involved to obtain the keys in order to continue with the unit shutdown. It was inappropriate for the unit supervisor to ! become distracted from unit operations.
l l Unintentional Entry Into An LC0 During Unit 3 Shutdown l ' On May 28 during the cooldown from the Unit 3 turbine trip and automatic - reactor shutdown the licensee secured the isolation condenser when reactor pressure dropped below 150 psig in accordcnce with the shutdown procedure. The shutdown procedure required gland seal steam to be secured when condenser pressure reached 0 inches mercury. When gland seal steam was secured the cooldown stopped and the reactor began to heat up. Reactor pressure briefly rose above 150 psig before the isolation condenser could be returned to service. Technical specifications required the isolation' condenser operable above 150 psig reactor pressure. The licensee was investigating this proble , Control of Out of Service Activities Human out-of-service protection was used for routine evolutions rather than out-of-service tags. Management expected that human out-of- - services would be used only for emergency situations. A human out-of-service relied on an operator standing by the isolation boundary component to provide protectio .
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On June 7 the inspectors observed that two tasks involving the radioactive waste processing systems were planned to be performed using human out-of-services. One of these tasks would have involved the radioactive waste control room operator as part of the human out-of-l service which would have been a distraction from the operators dutie The supervisors involved both stated the reason for performing a human l out-of-service was to minimize the impact on the radioactive waste l processing system and to improve productivity. The two tasks planned l for human out-of-service were not performed on June 7 because of higher priority emergent work. The operations manager was not aware of the extent of the use of human out-of-service and took immediate corrective action when notified. Beginning on June 8 human out-of-service was restricted to emergency use onl . In addition, the licensee identified several other out-of-service problems. Although individually each was of minor safety significance, the over-all trend indicated a problem. The inspectors planned to follow-up on this item in future inspection ; I Lack Of Attention To Detail Resulted In Bypassed Control Room Alarms I On April 30 the inspectors discovered that many Unit 2 control rod drive (CRD) temperature alarms were bypassed. The Unit 3 alarm setpoint was also found to be 125 degrees higher than the Unit 2 setpoint. Licensee - investigation revealed that 105 of 177 temperature alarms were bypassed on Unit 2 and 24 alarms were bypassed on Unit 3. The safety significance of these problems were minimal but were examples of a lack of attention to detail and poor communication There was one CRD temperature alarm panel in the control room on each unit. All 177 individual CRD alarms fed that single alarm. The annunciator procedure required bypassing the alarm for an individual ; alarming CRD. The bypassed alarm was then logged by the operator in the ' control room. However, the log sheets were discarded at the end of the week and there were no instructions to return the alarm to service after the alarm condition cleare No explanation was discovered as to why the high temperature alarms on Unit 3 were 125 degrees higher than Unit 2. Unit 2 alarms were set at the manufacturer's recommended setting. The Unit 3 alarms were adjusted to match the Unit 2 set point , - l Discussions between the inspectors and a Unit 2 supervisor revealed, there had been a modification to the CRD thermocouple cables several years ago. Incorrect installation of the cables had resulted in ' inaccurate temperatures at the CR0 recorders. The Unit 2 supervisor had previously been the CRD system engineer. The current CRD system engineer had no knowledge of the modification or the inaccuracies of the CRD temperatures. The temperature differences were of minor safety significanc .7 Inappropriate Operator Actions while Controlling the Refueling Bridge The inspectors identified a person operating the refueling bridge while sitting on its top rail. The refueling bridge was over the Unit 2 spent fuel pool at the time. The licensee implemented immediate corrective actions and began investigating the cause of this proble .0 MAINTENANCE AND SURVEILLANCE (61726 and 62703) Station maintenance and surveillance activities were observed and reviewed to verify compliance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, and industry codes or standards, and conformance with technical
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The following items were considered during this review: approvals were - obtained prior to initi M ing the maintenance work or surveillance testing, and operability requirements were met during such activities: functional testing and calibrations were performed prior to declaring the component operable: discrepancies identified during the activities were resolved prior to returning the component to service: quality control records were maintained: and activities were accomplished by qualified personne The inspectors observed portions of maintenance and surveillance
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activities as noted belo Maintenance Activities: Reinstallation of the Unit 3 emergency core cooling system keep fill jockey pump minimum flow line restricting orifice Surveillance Activities
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DOS 1500-01 Low Pressure Core Injection (LPCI) System Valve Operability Test DOS 1500-10 LPCI System Pump Operability Test with Torus Available and u In-Service Test Program l DOS 1500-02 Quarterly Containment Cooling Service Water Pump Test for the Inservice Test Program DOS 7500-02 Unit 2/3 Standby Gas Treatment System Monthly Surveillance l and Operability Test
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l DIS 1400-02 Core Spray Minimum Flow Valves Flow Transmitters FT 2(3)- 1464-A/B Channel Calibration and Environmental Qualification (EQ) Maintenance Inspection No violations. or deviations were identified. An inspection followup item was identified concerning the test results of core spray transmitter .1 Failure to Follow Procedure Resulted in Two Inoperable Core Spray Systems On April 24 an instrument maintenance'(IM) technician removed an end cap cover from the 2A core spray (CS) minimum flow valve flow transmitter in accordance with Dresden Instrument Surveillance (DIS) procedure 1400-0 " Core Spray Minimum Flow Valves Flow Transmitters FT 2(3)-1464-A/B Channel Calibration and EQ Maintenance Inspection." Step I.1 required the technician to replace the o-rings and torque the end cap , cover to 200 inch-pounds prior to returning the transmitter to servic l The IM technician was unable to locate new o-rings and hand tightened ! the end cap cover without replacing the o-rings at the end of the i evening shift. The technician believed the system was restored and i reported that to operations. The Unit 2 supervisor declared the 2A CS system operabl l On April 25 the IM supervisor tried to locate spare o-rings and directed
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another IM technician to continue the calibration on the 2A CS transmitter. Operations personnel declared the system inoperable during the calibration. The IM technician completed the calibration; however, the IM supervisor was unable to obtain the new o-rings. The Unit 2 supervisor declared the 2A CS system operable and declared the 2B CS ; system inoperable in preparation for calibration. The IM technician ' completed the surveillance but did not replace the o-rings for the 2B CS transmitter end cap covers. The Unit 2 unit supervisor declared the 2B CS flow transmitter operable upon completion of the surveillanc .
i , - On April 26 an IM engineering analyst discovered that the o-rings were not replaced and questioned operability based on environmental qualification. The Unit 2 supervisor declared both CS trains inoperable due to a degraded environmental qualification (EQ) condition and entered TS 3.5.A.8. Both CS systems were restored within the 24-hour limiting condition for operatio k Failure to follow DIS 1400-02 is contrary to 10 CFR 50 Appendix Criteria V and is considered another example of a previous violation (50-237/249-95D04-03(DRP)). The licensee's immediate corrective actions included operation personnel review of surveillance results prior to authorizing work on a different train or channe The licensee subsequently performed testing and concluded that the transmitters were not degraded during this event. The inspectors review of the test results is an Inspection Followup Item (50-237/249-95008-01(DRP)).. ENGINEERING AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT (37700) The inspectors evaluated the extent to which engineering prir,ciples and evaluations were integrated into daily plant activities. This was accomplished by assessing the technical staff involvement in non-routine events outage-related activities, and assigned technical specification - surveillances; observing.on-going maintenance work and troubleshooting: and reviewing problem identification form investigations and root cause determination One violation was identified regarding ineffective corrective action One unresolved item was identified concerning the licensee's corrective action on testing the secondary containment integrity. The details of this finding and others are discussed belo .1 Inadequate Corrective Actions Resulted In a Failure To Submit A Supplement To A Licensee Event Report (LER).
10 CFR 50.73 required the report of any operation or condition prohibited by the plant's technical specifications. The licensee submitted LER 50-249-94009 on April 11. 1994, reporting the failure of a local leak rate test (LLRT) on the isolation condenser condensate return throttle valve 3-1301-3 in excess of technical specification limits for type B and C leakage. The LER stated that a supplement would be submitted to report other valve failures during the outag There were
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15 other valve LLRT failures during the outage and no supplement was submitted. Without the supplement the root causes and corrective ' actions could not be evaluated by the inspectors.
! ' A notice of violation was issued in Inspection Report 50-237/249-94014 s for a problem where a similar supplement had not been submitted 3 years i after the end of a refueling outage. The licensee stated the cause of ' the problem was that extensions were granted to the due dates on nuclear tracking system (NTS) items without supervisory approval. The corrective action was to require supervisory approval to change due dates of NTS item The commitment to submit a supplement to LER 50-249-94009 was not assigned an NTS number. Thus, the licensee's corrective action failed to prevent recurrence. This is a violation of 10 CFR 50. Appendix Criterion XVI (50-237/249-95008-02(DRP)). Engineering Analysis of Unit 3 Turbine Blade Failure Following the Unit 3 turbine trip on high vibration. the licensee's inspection of the "C" low pressure turbine identified about 8 inches was missing from the end of one rotating blade, the outer tie wire was broken, and two additional blades were bent at the generator end of the turbin Nondestructive examinations of the first and fourteenth stages of the
"C" low pressure turbine rotor showed 24 indications of cracks in the
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i stellite wear strips on the turbine end blades and 23 indications of I cracks on the generator end blades. All of the blades which showed l indications were supplied by Asea Brown Boveri (ABB). One General l Electric (GE) supplied blade was known to be installed on the turbine rotor and it did not show indications of stellite cracking. Details of the licensee's investigation was documented in Licensee Event Report ,, 50-249/95-00 i Failure to Maintain Secondary Containment On May 31 the licensee performed a test to verify secondary containment integrity. During the test the licensee opened and closed several inner and outer doors to verify a vacuum was maintained in the reactor building, i 12 l
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The licensee identified excessive leakage when the Unit 3 reactor building material interlock inner door was opened and resulted in the l inoperability of secondary containment. On further investigation the licensee determined that this configuration failed to meet the l acceptance criteria during the test in Spring 1994: however, no ! maintenance work was performed to correct the condition. The licensee !' failed to recognize this degraded condition in 1994 and failed tio enter TS 3.7.c on several occasions during the following year when the inner
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I In addition, the licensee failed to test different configurations on l ' several other doors as well. For example, the test did not challenge secondary containment integrity with the Unit 3 reactor building material interlock outer door open and the associated inner door close The licensee determined that secondary containment was breached on ' several occasions since this configuration was untested. The licensee planned to test these door configurations prior to the startup of either unit. The licensee also revised procedures to require entry into TS 3.7.c when either Unit 3 reactor building material interlock door was opened. This event is an Unresolved Item (50-237/249 45008-03(DRP)) pending inspectors review of the licensee's corrective action .4 Unit 3 Potential Leaking Fuel Assembly The operators identified a spike on an offgas radiation monitor. The ' licensee initiated an investigation and identified a potential leaking fuel assembly. Subsequent testing identified control cell P-9 as the most likely location. The licensee planned to remove fuel assemblies for further testing during the next Unit 3 refueling outage. Overall station response to this event was goo .0 PLANT SUPPORT (71750, 81700, and 83750)
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The inspectors evaluated the involvement of support organizations in assuring safe and effective plant operation. Specific areas included radiation protection, security, emergency preparedness, and fire protectio No violations or deviations were identifie .1 Radiation Protection Controls
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. The inspectors verified workers were following health physics procedures and randomly examined radiation protection instrumentation for operability and calibration. The inspectors reviewed station radiological performance including personal contamination events (PCEs), dose performance, and work practice .1.1 Lack of Radiation Protection Technician Attentiveness - Radiation protection technicians showed a lack of attention to detail during outage activities for Unit 2. On June 6 the inspectors observed a sample hose for the Unit 2 drywell cavity continuous air monitor was kinked.and was not drawing a sample. This problem had not been identified by the radiation protection technicians. Preparations for removing the drywell cavity head were in progress and portable air samples were being drawn at individual job site .2 Security Each week during routine activities or tours, the inspectors monitored the licensee's security program to ensure that observed actions were being implemented according to their approved security plan. The inspectors noted that persons within the protected area displayed proper photo-identification badges and those individuals requiring escorts were properly escorted. The inspectors also verified that checked vital - areas were locked and alarmed. Additionally, the inspectors also verified that observed personnel and packages entering the protected area were searched by appropriate equipment or by han The inspectors noted incorrect priority among the security staff when implementing contingency actions for inoperable ingress equipmen Specifically, a security supervisor was directing personnel through inoperable equipment for hand search and did not control the overall activitie .. Emergency Preparedness The inspectors verified the operational readiness of the control roo technical support center, and operation support center. Non-routine events were reviewed to insure proper classification and appropriate emergency management involvemen _
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. PLANT MATERIAL CONDITION The inspectors noted the plant material condition and general housekeeping. The inspectors assessed the potential impact of the noted conditions on plant operation No violations or deviations were identified, u j Unit 3 Turbine Trip and Automatic Reactor Shutdown On May 28 the Unit 3 turbine tripped on high vibration and the reactor automatically shut down from 100 percent powe In addition to the l turbine trip there were three other anomalies in the shutdow '
First, the most significant event had the potential to render the HPCI system inoperable. A feedwater control system logic failure resulted in ; too much feed flow after the automatic shutdown. The reactor water ! level rose to a height that caused about 100 gallons of water to enter 1 the HPCI steam admission piping. The bottom of Dresden's HPCI steam ! admission piping connects directly to the reactor pressure vessel at a level of 58 inches on the narrow range level instrumentatio A similar event on Unit 3 occurred in January 1995 and was documented in : Licensee Event Report 50-249-95001. After a turbine trip and automatic - reactor shutdown from 89 percent power the water level increased to 57.6 inches. However, no water entered the HPCI piping. The licensee's analysis of that event determined the cause of the high water level was leakage by the feed water regulating valves. No corrective action was taken at the tim Second, several intermediate range monitors (IRMs) were erratic to a degree which prevented the licensee from resetting the automatic shutdown signal. The licensee was troubleshooting and repairing the
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problems with the IRMs at the end of the report perio Third, the 1A main steam isolation valve (MSIV) had a dual indication.
l The operations crew responded properly and shut the MSIV. Further troubleshooting revealed a limit switch problem which was correcte The inspectors planned to review licensee actions to control reactor water level after an automatic shutdown and the corrective actions for the IRM problems prior to unit startu ! l
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i SAFETY ASSESSMENT AND QUALITY VERIFICATION (SAQV) (40500) The effectiveness of management controls. verification, and oversight activities'were evaluated. Management and supervisory meeting involving plant status were attended to observe the coordination between departments. The results of licensee corrective action programs were routinely monitored by attendance at meetings, discussion with plant staff, and review of problem identification forms, root cause evaluation
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reports, and actions to previously identified problem No violations or deviations were identifie .1 Incomplete Corrective Actions While investigating the root cause for an isolation condenser level transient, the licensee identified th'at corrective actions stated in a previous licensee event report (LER 50-249/95002) were not complete The licensee determined that instructions regarding backfilling of sensing lines were not included in the work analyst package preparation guide. The requirement had been indicated as complete in the commitment tracking system. The licensee was investigating the cause of this ! discrepancy and the inspectors will evaluate the results during the review of LER 50-249-9500 . Dresden Performance Review Heeting The first of a series of performance review meetings with the Vice President of BWR Operations was held on June 1. The agenda included discussions on plant' operations, procedure adherence, material condition, work management, corrective action program, and radiation - protection. These meetings will be held monthly. The vice president challenged plant management to demonstrate performance improvement. The
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inspectors viewed this as a positive step in improving accountabilit .0 UNIT 1 ACTIVITIES (35701, 36800, 40702, 42700, 54834, 61700, 62702, 64704. 71707, 86700, 86721, 92701, 92720) The inspectors reviewed Unit 1 decommissioning activities and corrective actions described in the July 13, 1994, response to a Notice of Violation and Imposition of Civil Penalty. The activities'and actions l conducted to date were adequate.
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No violations or deviations were identified. One open item regarding corrosion on a steel beam attached to the fuel rack located in the spent fuel pool was identifie .1 Spent Fuel Pool Activities The licensee identified a corroded steel beam attached to the fuel rack in the Unit 1 SFP. Various degrees of corrosion deposits were noted on the steel beam. Metallurgical analysis of a " cut out" section of the fuel rack assembly indicated superficial pittind and all the fuel storage racks appeared to be in good condition. The licensee planed to analyze the beam to determine the effects of the corrosion on the structural integrity of the fuel rack. This is an Inspection Follow-up Item (50-010-95008-04(DRSS)) pending review of the licensee's analysi .2 Fire Protection System Unit 1 buildings had no active fire detection systems, sprinkler systems, spray systems, or other fire suppression systems. Howeve fire extinguishers were located throughout the sphere and other l ' buildings. In the sphere, the inspection tags on the extinguishers indicated that monthly inspections were required, but the actual inspections were recorded on a quarterly schedule. A check of Unit 1 l procedural requirements indicated that quarterly inspections were . I acceptable for the sphere. The licen,see stated that they will revise l ' documentation to more clearly specify that quarterly inspections of fire extinguishers are required in the spher Telephones in the sphere were not all working and those that were I working were not marked as such. The licensee planned to review what l emergency telephone communications are needed in the containment sphere and active telephone locations would be clearly marke .3 Quality Assurance and Audits The inspectors reviewed selected Unit 1 license compliance and annual technical specification audits for compliance with regulatory requirements. Unit I audits were noted to be less comprehensive in scope as compared to Unit 2/3 audits: however Unit 1 findings were aggressively pursued with licensee management. A review of the response : to recent audits and field monitoring reports indicated that the effectiveness of long-term corrective actions continued to improv .
* Housekeeping Controls l Unit 1 buildings showed improvement in housekeeping since the last inspection. Small quantities of flammable material were found in the SFP storage building, the containment sphere and the Radwaste buildin The condition of storage lockers and the floor in the Radwaste building in general improved both from a fire hazard and a radiological o perspective.
i LICENSEE ACTION ON PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED ITEMS (92700, 92701, and 92702) The inspectors verified reportability requirements were fulfilled and corrective actions were implemented for the licensee event reports discussed below. The inspectors also verified appropriate reporting, timeliness, complete event description cause identification, and complete information. The need for onsite review was also assesse ' In addition, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's actions on previously identified item No violations or deviations were identifie .1 In Office Review of Licensee Event Reports
~ (Closed) LER 237/95007. Revision 0: A Senior Reactor Operator Was Absent From the Main Control Room for Seven Seconds on July 13, 199 The event was discovered during an audit that the licensee was conducting as a follow-up to similar problems identified at Byron Nuclear Power Statio The licensee included the event and expected operator actions as part of lessons learned training during operations cycle 95-02. This item is not being cited because it was not clear that the senior reactor operator actually left the control roo '
l (Closed) LER 237/94009. Revision 0: Unit 2 Isolation Condenser Manually' Isolated Due to Operator Action. A water leak from a shield water tank l on the refuel floor was mistaken for an isolation condenser leak. The
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Unit 2 isolation condenser was isolated while the licensee was investigating the source of the water. Operator action was conservative in this occurrenc (Closed) LER 237/94019. Revision 1: 2/3 Chimney Grab Sample Not Obtained Within Required Time Frame Due to Personnel Error. This LER l l
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was the subject of a non-cited violation as documented in Inspection Report 50-237/249-9401 (Closed) LER 249/94009. Revision 0: Type B and C Leakage Limit Exceeded ' Due to Valve 3-1301-3 Not Fully Closed. The inspectors reviewed the corrective actions and had no further concerns. The LER stated that a supplement would be written to report other valves that failed during the course of the Unit 3 refueling outage. No supplement was written as discussed in paragraph .2 Review of Previously Opened Items (Violation, Unresolved Items, l Inspection Followup Items) l (Closed) Violation (50-010-94009-09C(DRSS)): The Unit 1 service water i system, fuel transfer tube, and other systems still contained fluids and I were not properly laid up to prevent being challenged by temperature extremes. The licensee performed the final walkdowns of piping and i instrumentation diagrams (P& ids) to identify those systems that l penetrated the containment wall and which could contain water. The systems identified as having the potential to cause flooding were cut and capped as necessar I l
(Closed) Violation (50-237/249-93024-03(DRP): NRC violation for failure to take adequate corrective action following identification of the cross -
connection between containment cooling service water (CCSW) train Corrective actions included: 1) The licensee held tailgate sessions with all station engineering and construction personnel on January 1 , to discuss single failure safety analyses: 2) Design Basis Document DBD-DR-098 Rev A., providing application of single failure criteria, was approved on March 29, 1994: 3) A modification to add check valves was determined to not be needed since isolation exists by closing manual valve 2/3-1589-100; and 4) Drawing M-3121 was revised on June 23. 1994, to reflect valve 2/3-1599-100 in the normally closed position. The inspectors had no further concern '
(00en) Insoection Follow-uo Item (50-010-94009-06(DRSS)): The inspectors reviewed resolution of the gasket service life issu implementation of the permanent procedure, and results of the examination of the section mating surfaces. The Unit I spent fuel pool upper gate gasket was replaced earlier in 1994 and the lower gasket is scheduled for replacement in July 1995. The lower gasket replacement and results of. the examination of the lower section mating surfaces will be reviewed during a future inspectio t
, . . - (Ocen) Insoection Follow-uo Item (50-010-94014-14(DRSS)): The licensee planned to continue to evaluate the potential sources of a small amount of water seeping into the basement of the Unit 1 containment from a seam in the concrete floor. Portable dehumidifiers in containment have substantially reduced the amount of standing water. Analysis of the latest samples of the water taken from the dehumidifier's collection points identified about 450.000 pico-curies per liter of tritium The licensee indicated that the small sample size and the lack of baseline data prevented drawing a firm conclusion about the origin of the wate The licensee's evaluation was continuing' and will be reviewed during a future inspectio (00en) Insoection Follow-uo Item (50-010-94019-05(DRSS)): The licensee identified the presence of "A7" str 1 in various components in containment. Because of the potential for a low temperature brittle fracture failure mode, the licensee iinposed administrative controls on loads during cold weather. The licensee planned to analyze samples of the steel. The licensee planned to currently re-evaluate containment heating system requirements for the next heating season. The licensee's evaluation will be reviewed during a future inspectio .0 MANAGEMENT MEETINGS (40500)
i Preliminary Inspection Findings (Exit) The inspectors contacted various licensee operations, maintenance, engineering, and plant support personnel throughout the inspection perio At the conclusion of the inspection on June 15. 1995, the inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted below by *) and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities. The licensee acknowledged the inspectors' comment The inspectors also discussed , the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspectors. The licensee did not identify any such documents or processes as proprietar S. Perry. Vice President. BWR Operations
* T. Joyce. Site Vice President l * R. Bax. Unit 2 Outage Director * H. Drumhiller. Plant Engineering Superintendent * M. Heffley Unit 3 Station Manager * P. Holland. Regulatory Assurance Supervisor
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, o* * T. Nauman. Unit 1 Station Manager * T. O'Connor. Operations Manager * M. Pacilio. Unit 3 Maintenance Superintendent R. Radtke. Support Services Director P. Scardigno. Unit 2 Maintenance Superintendent * F. Spangenburg. Site Engineering Manager * R. Stols. Site Quality verification Director , Additional Management Meetings
, On May 1 Mr. W. Russell. Director. Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulatio Mr. J. Martin. Regional Administrator. Region III, and other NRC senior managers met with Mr. T. Joyce. Site Vice President to discuss recent Dresden station performanc On May 12 Mr. J. Martin. Regional Administrator. Region III, presented the Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance 13 report for the Dresden station. The assessment is documented in Inspection Report 50-237/249-9500 On May 31 Ms. C. Pederson. Director. Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards. Region III. and other NRC representatives met with Mr. R. Bax. Unit 2 Outage Director, and other Dresden personnel to discuss ALARA plans for the ongoing Unit 2 refueling outage and the - licensee's review of contaminated material control problem .0 DEFINITIONS 10.1 Inspection Followup Items Inspection followup itams ye matters which have been discussed with the licensee which will be reviewed further by the inspectors and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or licensee or bot Inspection followup items disclosed during this inspection are discussed '~ in paragraphs 2.1 and .2 Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items violations, or deviations. An unresolved item disclosed during this inspection is discussed in paragraph __ _ ___ }}