IR 05000277/1999007
| ML20217M684 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Peach Bottom  |
| Issue date: | 10/19/1999 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20217M668 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-277-99-07, 50-278-99-07, NUDOCS 9910280005 | |
| Download: ML20217M684 (19) | |
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, OFFICIAL RECORD COPY l U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
License No DPR-44 DPR-56 Report No Docket No Licensee: PECO Energy Company Correspondence Control Desk
, P.O. Box 195 I
Wayne, PA 19087-0195 i
l Facility: Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Units 2 and 3 Inspection Period: August 10,1999 through September 20,1999 Inspectors: A. McMurtray, Senior Resident inspector M. Buckley, Resident inspector B. Welling, Resident inspector Approved by: Curtis J. Cowgill, Chief Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects 9910280005 991019 PDR ADOCK 05000277 G PDR l^
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< EXECUTIVE SUMMARY l ..-
l Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station NRC Inspection Report 50-277/99-07, 50-278/99-07 .
This inspection report included aspects of PECO operations; surveillances and maintenance; engineering and technical support; and plant support area Operations:
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Main control room personnel performed well while responding to the plant transient that resulted from the trip of the 3A reactor feedwater pump. Site engineering personnel took reasonable actions to recover and restore the reactor feed pump govemor uninterruptible power supply (UPS). (Section O2.1)
Maintenance:
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The nuclear maintenance technicians effectively inspected new fuel for the upcoming Unit 3 outage. They identified a bent lower tie plate spacer and several pieces of foreign material. PECO took appropriate corrective actions. (Section M1.2)
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During a planned replacement of the Unit 3B reactor water cleanup system pump discharge check valve, the radiation dose received by workers exceeded the initial estimate due to poor initial planning and poor communication between work group (Section M1.3)
. A contract cleaning worker inadvertently bumped a jacket water coolant drain valve for the E2 emergency diesel generator, resulting in a partial drain down of the coolant expansion tank and an alarm in the control room. The emergency diesel generator was not rendered inoperable. Poor awareness by contract cleaning personnel of the potential for repositioning valves on the emergency diesel generator skid during cleaning i operations contributed to this problem. (Section M4.1)
Enoineerina:
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. During preparations for Tropical Storm Floyd, engineering personnel did not highlight to the station the degraded conditions that existed on the Unit 2 recirculation pump motor generator lube oil coolers or the need for contingency plans should their performance ,
further degrade. Further degradation in the Unit 2 recirculation pumps motor generator )
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- lube oil coolers occurred in the aftermath of the storm, which resulted in significant challenges for station personnel, especially Operations. (Section E2.1)
. During routine surveillance testing on August 14,1999, the Unit 3 high pressure coolant injection system exhibited oscillations in discharge pressure, speed. and flow rat Although the oscillations did not affect system operability, site engineering personnel determined that the oscillations were due to the hydraulic govemor needle valve for the ii o_
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high pressure coolant injection turbine being set too far open, allowing potential system instability. PECO took appropriate corrective action. (Section E3.1)
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E.1gineering personnel did not recognize the importance of maintaining the instr mentation constant during inservice testing for the 'A' emergency service water (ESW) pump. This resulted in the repeat performance of a surveillance test which causes long term, pump degradation due to low flow testing conditions. (Section E4.1)
Plant Support:
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During Tropical Storm Floyd, most of the station emergency sirens were rendered inoperable, mainly due to loss of power. PECO made a timely 10 CFR 50.72 notification to the NRC for significant loss of the offsite notification system. The station's response to the loss of emergency sirens was adequate. (Section P2.1)
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Around sunset on September 5,1999, a site security guard noticed that some of the perimeter security lighting near the warehouse building was off. Site security personnel immediately implemented compensatory actions for the loss of lighting until the lighting was restored. The security guard exhibited excellent questioning attitude and awareness of security equipment conditions by identifying the perimeter lighting that was off at dus (Section S2.1)
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TABLE OF CONTENTS EXEC UTIVE S U M MARY . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . ... ... ..... ..... ..... .......... . . . . . . . iv S um mary of Pla nt Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1. Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......... ..................... 1 01 Cond uct of 0perations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 01.1 General Comments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 02- Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... 2 O2.1 Trip of the 3A Reactor Feedwater Pump Due to a Failed Uninterruptible -
Power Supply Battery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 11. ' M ainte n a nce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3 M1 Conduct of Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 M1.1 General Comments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 M1.2 Unit 3 New Fuel Receipt inspection Activities . . . . . . . . ........... 3 M1.3 Unit 3 Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) Maintenance Outage . . . . . . . 4 M4 Maintenance Staff Knowledge and Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 M4.1 E2 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Coolant Expansion Tank Partially Drained After Contract Worker inadvertently Bumps a Coolant Drain Valve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ................... 5 M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance Activities . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 M8.1 (Closed) Violation (VIO) 50-277/98-10-01 incorrect Refuel Floor Vent Exhaust Radiation Detector Disconnected During Calibration . . . . . . . 6 111. En gin eering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 E2 Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......7 E Shutdown of the Unit 2 Recirculation Pumps Due to Fouling on Service Water Side of the Motor Generator Lube Oil Coolers . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 E3 Engineering Procedures and Documentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 E Unit 3 High Pressure Coolant injection (HPCI) Rendered Inoperable Due to Large Oscillations in Pump Discharge Pressure arid (Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-278/3-99-003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 E4 Engineering Staff Knowledge and Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 E Discrepancies with Testing of the 'A' Emergency Service Water (ESW)
Pump................................................9 IV. Pla nt S u ppo rt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry (RP&C) Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 4 R1.1 Locked High Radiation Doors and Posting Inspections During Plant Tours l .................................................. .. 10 P2 Status of Emergency Planning (EP) Facilities, Equipment, and Resources. . 11 P Emergency Siren Losses During Tropical Storm Floyd . . . . . . . . . . . 11 S2 Status of Security Facilities and Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...... . . . . 11 iv l
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S Unexpected Loss of Part of the Protected Area Security Lighting . . . 11 V. Management Meetings . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . ......... ... . .......... . .12 X1 Exit Meeting Summary . . . . . . . ... .. .... . . .......... ... . 12 X2 Plant Performance Review Public Meeting . . . . . . . . . . . . ...... ... 12 INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED . . . ... ......... . .. ........... 13 LIST OF ACRONYM S USED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 l
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Report Details i:
Summary of Plant Status i
i PECO operated both units safely over the period of this repor l l- Unit 2 began this inspection period at 100% power. On August 21,1999, Unit 2 load was reduced to approximately 63% for condenser waterbox cleaning. Unit 2 retumed to 100%
- power on August 22. On August 24, Unit 2 load was reduced to approximately 73% to allow repair of a main steam isolation valve DC solenold. Unit 2 returned to 100% power on August ,
25 On September 6, Unit 2 load was reduced to approximately 94% for a rod pattern I adjustment. Unit 2 returned to 100% a couple of hours later. On September 17, Unit 2 load was .
reduced to approximately 37% after securing the 2B recirculation pump because of increasing j lube oil temperatures in the motor generator lube oil cooler due to increased service water side ;
fouling after Tropical Storm Floyd. Unit 2 power was reduced to approximately 30% on Geptember 19 when the 2B recirculation pump was restored to service and the 2A recirculation pump removed from service for motor' generator lube oil cooler cleaning. Unit 2 retumed to L 100% power on September 20 following rest', ration of the 2A recirculation pump and rod pattern '
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Unit 3 began this inspection period at 97% power, in end-of-cycle coastdown. On August 25, 1999, Unit 3 load was reduced to approximately 58% power as a result of the trip of the 3A reactor feed pump and subsequent recirculation system runback. Unit 3 was returned to 91%
- power later on August 25. At the end of the inspection period, Unit 3 was at 82%, in end-of-cycle coastdow l. Operations 01 Conduct of Operations'
01.1 General Comments (71707) !
Control room personnel performed well during plant maneuvers and transients during the j inspection period, including the response to the 3A reactor feedwater pump trip, two Unit i 2 load swings, and the challenges encountered during Tropical Storm Floyd. Most notable was identification by the Unit 2 reactor operator of increasing recirculation pump motor generator lube oil temperature approximately two hours prior to receiving the
- control room annunciator alarm. This allowed removal of the recirculation pumps separately from service and prevented a potential Unit 2 manual scram due to no j
' recirculation flo i
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l Topical headings such as 01, M8, etc., are used in accordance with the NRC standardized reactor inspection report outlin Individual reports are not expected to address all outline topics.
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O2 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment O2.1 Trio of the 3A Reactor Feedwater Pumo Due to a Failed Uninterruotible Power Supolv Battery Insoection Scope (71707 & 37551)
The inspectors reviewed the actions taken to recover from and restore the 3A reactor feedwater pump (RFP) after failure of the uninterruptible power supply (UPS). The generic implications for the other feedwater UPS systems were also discussed with the system manager and operations manage Observations and Findinas On August 25,1999, the 3A RFP tripped due to a failure of the UPS coincident with a 3A drywell chiller start. When the UPS detected a low voltage during the chiller start, it attempted to shift power to the installed battery. Although this shift had occurred previously without a problem, the battery failed and the system shut down which resulted in a trip of the 3A RF To address this issue, station personnel replaced the UPS for the 3A RFP and reviewed the records for the other RFPs UPSs for an extent of condition. The UPS battery for the 3A RFP was replaced almost two years ago. The UPS batteries were replaced on all the other RFP UPSs within the last year. The vendor expected batteries to last !
approximately three and a half years in the UPS, but Peach Bottom was replacing these batteries every two years based on previous battery failures. The system manager decided after this transient that battery replacement would be changed to yearl Based on reviews of the performance of the other reactor feedwater UPS supplies and the conditions under which the batteries operated, plant personnel determined that failures of the other RFP UPS batteries were not probable. The inspectors had no concems with this determinatio The inspectors noted that main control room personnel performed well while responding to this plant transient. The inspectors also noted that the instrumentation and control technicians changed the system self-check frequency from weekly to daily. This change was considered reasonable to reduce the possible time that a fault would go undetecte Engineering planned to evaluate the design of the RFP UPS and the effect of large load starts, such as the 3A drywell chiller. Action request A1225444 was initiated to investigate the problem with the reactor feed pump tri Conclusions Main control room personnel performed well while responding to the plant transient that resulted from the trip of the 3A reactor feedwater pump. The reactor feedwater pump tripped when the uninterruptible power supply to the reactor feed pump governor failed.
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Site engineering personnel took reasonable actions to recover and restore the reactor feed pump governor uninterruptible power suppl II. Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 General Comments l NRC Inspection Procedures 62707 and 61726 were used in the inspection of plant maintenance and surveillance activities. The inspectors observed and reviewed selected portions of the following maintenance and surveillance test activities:
Maintenance Observations: Observed On:
C18991503 3A RHR Room Cooler Cleaning August 10,1999 M018003 New Fuel Receipt and Inspection August 18-20,1999 M1224602 Unit 3 Reactor Building Bridge Crane August 19,1999 '
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. Surveillance Observations: Observed On:
RT-X-023-210-3 HPCI Flow Control Stability Test August 17,1999 ST-O-033-300-2 ESW, Valve, Unit Cooler, and Emergency August 18,1999 Cooling Tower (ECT) Fans Functional inservice Test ST-O-052-413-2 E3 Diesel Generator Fast Start and Full Load Test August 20,1999 ST-O-010-611-2 RHR Loop A Piping Pressure Test inspection August 20,1999 RT-X 623-210-3 HPCI Flow Control Stability Test August 23,1999
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ST-l-0i 3-100-3 RCIC Logic System Functional Test September 13,1999 The work and testing performed during these activities was professional and thoroug Technicians were experienced and knowledgeable of their assigned tasks. The work and testing procedures were present at the job site and were effectively used. Good pre-job briefs were observed prior to the performance of the maintenance and surveillance activities observe M1.2 Unit 3 New Fuel Recelot inspection Activities Inspection Scope (60710 & 62707).
The inspectors observed portions of the work activities associated with the receipt inspection of new fuel for the Unit 3 outage.
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4 Observations and Findinos b
During inspection of new fuel on August 20,1999, nuclear maintenance personnel identified several small paint and metal chips in the fuel bundle and transport boxes. The chips were carefully removed from the fuel and thereafter each transport box was cleaned pric- to opening the p!astic fuels covers. Also, during the inspection the technicians 1ound a piece of tape inside a fuel bundle just above the third fuel space PECO initiated PEP 10010123 for these issue Nuclear maintenance personnel also identified a minor abnormality on fuel assembly YJT622, on the second spacer, above the lower tie plate. The new fuel bundle, received by PECO, had the lower tie plate spacer bent so that it rubbed against a fuel ro Believing this had the potential to cause fuel damage during operation, PECO personnel retumed this bundle to the fuel vendor. The bundle has subsequently been repaired by the vendor, returned to PECO, satisfactorily receipt inspected and stored in the fuel poo PECO expected an evaluation of this problem from the fuel vendor. PECO initiated PEP 10010175 to track this issu The inspectors noted that nuclear maintenance personnel were meticulous with inspection criteria and practices and considered the activity effective at identifying abnormalities with the new fuel for the upcoming Unit 3 outag Conclusions The nuclear maintenance technicians effectively inspected new fuel for the upcoming Unit 3 outage. They identified a bent lower tie plate spacer and several pieces of foreign material. PECO took appropriate corrective action M1.3 , Unit 3 Reactor Water Cleanuo (RWCU) Maintenance Outaae Inspectiun Scoce (62707 & 71750)
The inspectors reviewed the activities that contributed to the extended outage of the Unit 3 RWCU system and doses that exceeded the radiation dose estimates for the job. The inspectors also discussed these occurrences with the radiological management and the system manager, Observations and Findinos During a planned maintenance outage during the week of August 16, PECO replaced the Unit 3A RWCU pump discharge check valve (CHK-3-12-288). This work activity took 150 hours0.00174 days <br />0.0417 hours <br />2.480159e-4 weeks <br />5.7075e-5 months <br /> longer than initially planned due to welding problems. The extra time resulted in an actual radiation exposure that was 9 person-rem higher than initially planned. The welding problems were caused by misalignment and slight pipe diameter differences, high heat stress, and required welding position _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .
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The inspectors determined through discussions with the system manager and radiation protection personnel that initial planning did not consider the welding problems. Also, poor communication between work groups and work planning contributed to the delays and increased exposure. The welding problems did not get effectively communicated to the radiation protection engineer so that additional actions to reduce radiation dose could be used early in the process. Although the actual doses were higher than initially expected, no violation of NRC requirements occurre The inspectors also noted that PECO identified possible future actions to reduce the dose for this type of work, such as, removal and replacement of radioactive piping in the area, more aggressive flushing of the system to reduce the overall dose, work stoppage criteria when problems are encountered, and use of an automatic tool that cuts and preps the piping for welding in one step. Rad protection initiated PEP 10010173 to provide for a multi-organizational review of the activities associated with the RWCU check valve replacement and track the cause analysis and corrective actions for this activity. Corrective actions for this issue have been scheduled to be in place during similar work planned for early next yea Conc!asions During a planned replacement of the Unit 3B reactor water cleanup system pump discharge check valve, the radiation dose received by workers exceeded the initial estimate due to poor initial planning and poor communication between work group M4 Maintenance Staff Knowledge and Performance M4.1 E2 Emeraency Diesel Generator (EDG) Coolant Exoansion Tank Partially Drained After Contract Worker inadvertently Bum _ps a Coolant Drain Valve Inspection Scoce (62707)
On September 1,1999, the plant reactor operator received the "E2 Diesel Generator Trouble" alarm in the control room. An equipment operator (EO), dispatched to the E2 emergency diesel generator (EDG), identified that a jacket coolant outlet drain valve had inadvertently been bumped open resulting in the partial drain down of the coolant expansion tank. The inspectors reviewed the corrective action documentation and ECG operability determination for this issue. The inspectors also discussed this issue with Maintenance management and the system manger, C$bservations and Findinas irrnediately after the E2 EDG alarm was received the contract cleaning worker notified the control room that the " Coolant Low Level" annunciator was alarming locally. When the EO arrived in the E2 EDG room, the worker showed the operator where that worker had been cleaning and the EO noticed that the jacket coolant outlet drain valve was open. The EO closed the valve and immediately commenced filling the coolant expansion tank. The EO then vented the jacket coolant and air coolant heat exchangers
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and noted that water issued from the vents immediately. The system manager determined that the emergency diesel generator remained operable based on the heat exchangers remaining filled and the location in the system of the open drain valv PEP 10010204 was issued for this problem. Site psonnel determined that the jacket coolant outlet drain valve was accidently opened when the contract cleaning worker bumped the valve handle which repositioned the valve. This issue was reviewed with all contract cleaning personnel with special emphasis on the importance of being aware of the surroundings where cleaning is being performed. Temporary positive control devices were installed on most of the vent and drain valves for the four EDGs, to inhibit inadvertent valve movement. Site engineering personnel were working on permanent actions to prevent inadvertent valve repositionin The inspectors had no concerns with the EDG operability determination or the initial corrective actions for this issue. The inspectors determined through review of the PEP and discussions with Maintenance management that poor awareness of the surroundings by contract cleaning personnel and the potential for repositioning valves on the EDG skids during cleaning operations contributed to this proble Conclusions l
A contract cleaning worker inadvertently bumped a jacket water coolant drain valve for the E2 emergency diesel generator, resulting in a partial drain down of the coolant expansion tank and an alarm in the control room. The emergency diesel generator was not rendered inoperable. Poor awareness by contract cleaning personnel of the potential for repositioning valves on the emergency diesel generator skid during cleaning operations contributed to this problem.
M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance Activities i l
M8.1 (Closed) Violation (VIO) 50-277/98-10-01 Incorrect Refuel Floor Vent Exhaust Radiation Detector Disconnected Durina Calibration On August 10,1998, chemistry technicians were calibrating and testing the 'A' and 'C'
refuel floor vent exhaust radiation monitors. During calibration of the 'C' detector, the technicians in the field inadvertently removed and dropped the 'D' detector. The technicians in the field reconnected the 'D' detector and continued on with the calibration of the 'C' detector. None of the technicians involved with this work notified any control room operations personnel or Chemistry Supervision of the dropped detecto On August 11, instrument and control personnel determined that the 'D' detector was not working correctly because it had been damaged. During an investigation into the cause of the damaged 'D' detector on August 12, the chemistry technicians involved in the detector calibrations, informed the Chemistry Manager that they had removed the wrong detector, dropped it, and reinstalled it without notifying Chemistry supervision or operations personnelin the control room. PEP 10008822 was generated because of this issu . .
The inspectors reviewed the corrective actions for PEP 10008822 and discussed this issue with Chemistry and Maintenance management. This issue was discussed with all of the station chemistry staff with particular emphasis on procedural complianc ;
Chemistry supervision performed a follow-up review in March 1999 to determine if I corrective actions from this event were effective. No new related incidents had occurre In addition, Maintenance management discussed this issue with ah maintenance personnel and restated managements c::pa* vs for procedural adherence and reporting of unexpected conditions. The inspectors have no additional concerns with this I issu Ill. Enaineerina l
Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment
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E2 E Shutdown of the Unit 2 Recirculation Pumos Due to Foulina on Service Water Side of the Motor Generator Lube Oil Coolers Insoection Scope (37551 & 71707)
During the aftermath of Tropical Storm Floyd on September 16,1999, the Unit 2 reactor operator observed that the Unit 2 recirculation pumps motor generator tube oil temperatures were increasing. Operations personnel determined that the temperature increase was due to additional fouling on the service water side of the lube oil cooler Operations decided to remove each recirculation pump from service, separately, to allow cleaning of the coolers. The inspectors evaluated the response of operations personnel to this degraded condition and discussed this issue with several site engineering system managers and supervisors, Observations and Findiras During the week of September 13,1999, station personnel injected chemicals into the service water piping to control a.siatic clams. Immediately following this injection, differential pressures increased across both of the Unit 2 recirculation pump motor generator lube oil coolers. The inspectors observed that action request (AR) tags were hanging on these coolers noting increased differential pressure on the service water side across the cooler Site engineering personnel performed an analysis of the fouling of these coolers l following the chemicalinjection and decided that cleaning of the coolers could be ,
deferred until next year based on anticipated decreasing river water temperatur I Although engineering personnel evaluated the coolers heat transfer performance and I determined that cleaning of the coolers could be deferred, they did not develop contingency plans in the event ine coolers performance degraded furthe l The inspectors concluded that information regarding the degradation of the coolers was !
not provided by site engineering to other station personnel during preparations for Tropical Storm Floyd. Most site organizations participated in several meetings held to i I
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ready the station for Tropical Storm Floyd. During these meetings, site engineering personnel did not highlight the degraded conditions on the Unit 2 recirculation pump motor generator lube oil coolers or the need for contingency plans should their performance further degrad The inspectors observed that operations personnel performed very well while maneuvering the unit to allow removal the recirculation pumps from service to facilitate cleaning of the Unit 2 recirculation pumps motor generator lube oil ecoler Conclusions During preparations for Tropical Storm Floyd, engineering personnel did not highlight to the station the degraded conditions that existed on the Unit 2 recirculation pump motor genera'or lube oil coolers or the need for contingency plans should their performance further degrade. Further degradation in the Unit 2 recirculation pumps motor generator lube oil coolers occurred in the aftermath of the stcrm, which resuked in significant challenges for station personnel, especially Operation E3 Engineering Procedures and Documentation E Unit 3 Hiah Pressure Coolant Iniection (HPCI) Pendered inoperable Due to Larae Oscillations in Pumo Discharae Pressure and (Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER_J,5_0, 278/3-99-003 Inspection Scope (37551 & 71707)
Near the and of a routine Unit 3 High Pressure Coolant injection (HPCI) pump, valve, flow, and unit cooler functional and in-service surveillance test on August 14,1999, the HPCI system exhibited oscillations in discharge pressure, speed, and flow rate. The HPCI system was subsequently declared inoperable. The inspectors reviewed the Licensee Event Report (LER), PEP and other technical information associated with this event. In addition, the inspectors discussed this issue with the system manager, Observations and Findinas After the HPCI system was declared inoperable, operations personnel placed the HPCI turbine auxiliary oil pump in pull-to-lock and reported this issue to the NRC per 10 CFR 50.72. Subsequently, engineering personnel determined that the HPCI pump remained operable even with the system oscillations. However, since the auxiliary oil pump had been placed in pull-to-lock, the HPCI system was inoperable following the oscillations until normal system alignment was restored. Station personnel wrote PEP 10010133 to document this even Site engineering personnel determined that the cause of the oscillations was due to the hydraulic governor needle valve for the HPCI turbine being set too far open allowing system instability. Opening this needle valve caused the turbine and pump to be more responsive to reaching full flow and pressure conditions but also results in the turbine
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and pump being more unstable. Closing the needle valve caused the tuibine and pump to be less responsive but more stable. Procedural instructions for setting the needle valve position incorporated information from the governor vendor instructions. The ;
inspectore noted that conflicting information existed in the governor vendor instructions, !
a General Electric Service information Letter (SIL), and Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) regarding the correct position of the HPCI turbine governor needle valve settin After further analysis of the conflicting information, site engineering changed the procedural instructions for setting the needle valve following this event and verified that j
. the Unit 2 HPCI tv .ce needle valve was set in the new positio l The inspectors determined that actions by operations personnel to render the HPCI pump inoperable following the oscillations were appropriate until engineering personnel fully evaluated the problem. The inspectors reviewed the operability determination for 4 the HPCI system with oscillations and had no concern I The inspectors performed an on-site review of LER 3-99-003 and identifie'J no violacion of NRC requirement Conclusions During routine surveillance testing on August 14,1999, the Unit 3 high pressure coolant injection system exhibited oscillations in discharge press'a re, speed, and flow rat Although the oscillations did not affect system operability, site engineering personnel determined that the oscillations were due to the hydraulic governor needle valve for the high pressure coolant injection turbine being set too far open allowing potential system instability. PECO took appropriate corrective actio E4 Engineering Staff Knowledge and Performance E4.1 Discreoancies with Testina of the 'A' Emeraency Service Water (ESW) Pumo Inspection Scope (37551)
The inspectors reviewed the activities for an inservice test (IST) performed on August 18, 1999, of the 'A' emergency service water (ESW) pump. The inspectors also discussed testing issues with the system manager and engineering managemer Observations and Findinas Due to the 'A' ESW pump indicating decreasing pump capacity with performance in the alert range per the inservice testing program, site engineering personnel increased the pump testing frequency, in an effort to obtain more precise indication of actual pump capacity, higher accuracy discharge pressure gauges were temporarily installed in addition to the gauges normally used during surveillance testing. The surveillarse procedure was changed to allow the use of the temporary gauges in lieu of the permanently installed gauges. Although the temporary gauges indicated that the 'A'
ESW pump was in the action range which rendered the pump inoperable, engineering
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personnel determined that the pump remained operable based on data taken fmm the permanently installed gauges. Based on review of the IST code requirementt, engineering personnel declared the test invalid. The testwas rep"6rmed using the permanently installed gauges and showed that the 'A' ESW pump was net in the action range. The 'A' ESW pump remained on an increased testing frequenc The insoectors determined that the engineering personnelinvolved with the recomn ondation for the installation of the temporary gauges did not have a full recognition of the importance of maintaining the !.1strumentation constant during IST testing. This resulted in the repeat performance of the surveillance test which increased the amount of time the system operated in a low flow configuration. Engineering personnel have determined that operation in a low flow configuration results in long term degradation of the ESW pum Conclusions Engineering personnel did not recognize the importance of maintaining the instrumentation constant during inservice testing for the 'A' emergency service water (ESW) pump. This resulted in the repeat performance of a surveillance test which causes long term pump degradation due to low flow testing condition JY. Plant Suppott ,
R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry (RP&C) Controls i R1.1 Locked Hiah Radiation Doors and Postina Inspections Durina Plant Tours Inspection Scope (71750)
l The inspectors toured the Unit 2 and 3 turbine and reactor buildi1gs during the inspection periodand verified that high radiation doors were properly posted and locke Observations and Findinas
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The inspectors tested approximately 40 high radiation doors that were required to be locked. The inspectors also observed numerous radiological postings throughout the Unit 2 and 3 turbine and reactor buildings. All high radiation doors required to be locked were found locked. No deficiencies were noted with the radiological postings. All locked high radiation doors tested and postings observed met the requirements of Technical Specification 5.7. No concerns were identified by the inspector Conclusions Locked high radiation doors and postings in the Unit 2 and 3 turbine and reactor buildings, observed during this inspection period, were adequately maintained per technical specification and plant administrative requirements.
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P2 - Status of Emercency Planning (EP) Facilities, Equipment, and Resources P Emeraency Siren Losses Durina Tropical Storm Floyd Inspection Scooe (71750)
During Tropical Storm Floyd, most'of the station emergency sirens were rendered ,
inoperable, mainly due to loss of power. Also, the transceiver at Peach Bottom lost
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power during the storm. This prevented the controller *, from communicating wi'h the
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sirens. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective actions and discussed this issue with site emergency planning personnel, Observations and Findinas Due to the loss of many of the emergency sirens, Peach Bottom personnel made a 10 CFR 50.72 notification to the NRC for significant loss of the offsite notification syste Almost all of the sirens were restored to an operable condition a couple of days following the stor Site personnel determined that problems occurred with the transceiver at Peach Bottom when the 34 kilovolt power supply (351 line) was lost during the storm. This line had numerous outage problems throughout the sun.mer. The licensee planned to evaluate improving the reliability of power to the transceiver and other plant equipment serviced by the 351 line. Several possible upgrades were being considered.
I The inspectors determined based on discussions with emergency planning personnel and review of this issue that the station's response to the locs of emergency sirens was adequate. The inspectors noted that the licensee's long term corrective actions for the loss of power to the transceiver were comprehensive and the inspectors had no concerns with these actions.
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l During Tropical Storm Floyd, most of the station emergency sirens were rendered inoperable, mainly due to loss of power. PECO made a timely 10 CFR 50.72 notification to the NRC for significant loss of the offsite notification system. The station's response to the loss of emergency sirens was adequat S2 Status of Security Facilities and Equipment S Unexpected Loss of Part of the Protected Area Security Liahtina Inspection Scope (71750)
Around sunset on September 5,1999, a site security guard noticed that some of the perimeter security lighting near the warehouse building was off. Power to the lighting was lost when a clearance was applied to work a breaker that fed the warehouse. The
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inspectors reviewed the PEP associated with this problem and discussed the issue with l security managemen Observations and Findinas Site security personnel immediately implemented compensatory actions for the loss of lighting, then installed temporary lighting until the permanent lighting was restore Security personnel determined that the lighting for the perimeter had not degraded to the point where unauthorized er undetected access to the protected area could have occurred. However, this issue was logged as a security recordable event per 10 CFR 73, Appendix l Site security personnel were not notified that the breaker clearance would de-energize part of the perimeter security lighting. PECO identified in PEP (l0010216) that an inadequate station operating procedure and an out-of-date security lighting matrix were the main causes of this problem and resulted inadequate actions being initiated for the warehouse breaker clearance. The station operating pr~o cedure was updated to require notification of security prior to de-energizing the warehouse breaker The inspectors noted that the security guard exhibited exce!!ent questioning attitude and awareness of security equipment conditions by identifying '.5e perimeter lighting that was off at dusk. The inspectors had no concerns with the response or evaluation of this condition by security personne Conclusions Around sunset on September 5,1999, a site security guard noticed that some of the perimeter security lighting near the warehouse building was off. Site security personnel ,
immediately implemented compensatory actions for the loss of lighting until the lighting !
was restored. The security guard exhibited excellent questi]ning attitude and awareness of security equipment conditions by identifying the perimeter lighting that was off at dus V. Manaaement Meetinas X1 Exit -Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the results of the inspection to members of licensee management on October 6,1999. The licensee acknowledged the findings presente X2 Plant Performance Review Public Meeting On August 12,1999, members of the NRC Region I management team met with PECO management in a public meeting to discuss the results of the plant performance review letter dated April 9,199 !
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INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED l
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IP 37551 Onsite Engineering Observations j IP 60710 Refueling Activities IP 61726 . Surveillance Observations IP 62707 ' Maintenance Observations
' iP 71707 Plant Operations IP 71750 Plant Support Activities l
l l ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED'
Opened / Closed None Closed 50-277/98-10-01 VIO Incorrect Refuel Floor Vent Exhaust Radiation Detector Disconnected During Calibration 50-278/3-99-003 LER High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System Declared inoperable Due to Erratic Behavior Resulting in a Loss of a Single Train Safety System Discussed-None l
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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
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AR action request l^ ECT emergency cooling tower ;
EDG emergency diesel generator ;
EO equipment operator !
EP emergency planning )
EPRI Electric Power Research Institute ' I ESW emergency service water !
l HPCI high pressure coolant injection
.l lST inservice testing' l LERs- licensee event reports j PECO PECO Nuclear !
PEP performance enhancement program RCIC ' reactor core isolation cooling RHR - residual heat removal RFP reactor feedwater pump l
RPS reactor protection system l
RWCU reactor water cleanup i SIL Service Information Letter
! TSC Technical Support Center UPS uninterruptible power supply i VIO violation !
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