ML20247D402

Insp Rept 70-0036/98-01 on 980406-09.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Maint & Plant Support

ML20247D402
Person / Time
Site:	07000036
Issue date:	05/06/1998
From:	Hiland P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20247D335	List: ML20247D331 ML20247D338 ML20247D402
References
70-0036-98-01, 70-36-98-1, NUDOCS 9805150035
Download: ML20247D402 (16)

Text

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l

REGION lil l

Docket No: 070-00036 License No: SNM-33 i

Report No: 070-00036/98001(DNMS)

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Licensee: ABB Combustion Engineering, Inc. l l

l Facility: Hematite Nuclear Fuel Manufacturing Facility Location: Hematite, MO 63047 Dates: April 6-9,1998 Inspector: Courtney Blanchard, Fuel Cycle inspector Approved by: Patrick L. Hiland, Chief Fuel Cycle Branch Division of Nuclear Materials Safety l

l l 9005150035 980506 PDR ADOCK 07000036 1 C pm j i I

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EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

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ABB Combustion Engineering, Inc.

Nuclear Fuel Manufacturing Facility NRC inspection Report 070-00036/98001(DNMS)

The routine insoection included aspects of licensee operation, maintenance, and plant support.

Operations e The inspector identified that the housekeeping in the oxide plant, behind Building 253, l and in the south vault appeared to have degraded from the last regional inspection (see l Inspection Report 070-00036/97004, dated December 5,1997). Emergency egress I routes were clear of obstacles and required postings were in compliance with i requirements. The inspector noted that several general housekeeping issues and lighting concems were promptly corrected by the licensee. (Section 01.1) e The inspector identified a violation in which the licensee had not marked all material handling equipment with the required rated lifting capacity. Additionally, the inspector concluded that the licensee had not systematically analyzed all the lifting equipment used to lift UX-30 uranium hexafluoride (UFe ) cylinder overpacks with full UFe 30B cylinders. (Section O1.2)

Maintenance e The inspector closed two violations, one unresolved item, and nine inspection followup items.

Plant Support e The inspector concluded that the respiratory protection training program met the training requirements of 10 CFR 20.1703. Operators and maintenance workers appeared knowledgeable of the requirements to safely don, use, and doff a respirator.

(Section RS.1)

• The inspector concluded that the licensee's sampling program and results were in compliance with the license and licensee procedures. (Section V1.1)

• The licensee reduced the generation of process-contaminated byproducts by changing from a dry to wet scrubber and by using reusable high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters. (Section W1.1) e The inspector concluded that the initial and refresher general employee training courses included the topics required by 10 CFR 19.12 and the license. The weekly safety meeting appeared to effectively train and retrain employees on process safety issues. The inspector identified that process standdowns promoted operator in'volvement in developing and adhering to operation sheets. (Section 11.1) 2 i

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! Report Details

1. Operations 01 Conduct of Operations l

01.1 Facility Tours and Discussions with Operators

a. Inspection Scope (88020)

The inspector performed several facility tours to observe general housekeeping, operational safety limit and NRC-required postings, emergency egress routes, operation of high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters and lighting intensity throughout the production facility.

b. Observation and Findings During a facility walkdown, the inspector noted that housekeeping needed some attention in the uranium hexafluoride (UF,) oxide conversion plant. The UF, oxide conversion plant had insulation covera, new and used inau!ation, and receiver hopper tops located throughout the second level walkways. In add; tion, the inspector noted that flashlight I

batteries, tools, and trash were placed on top of the first flocr ventilation hood.

Subsequently, the inspector discussed the oxide conversion plant housekeeping issues l with the Director of Uranium Operations and the UF Conversion Plant Engineer. Tne following day, the inspector identified that the debris was removed from the oxide conversion plant except for the six receiver hopper tops.

The inspector observed the condition of the housekeeping behind Building 253 and ir the south vault. The inspector observed plastic sheets, halves of empty 30-gallon plastic drums, used insulation, empty 5-gallon pails, random sections of pipes, and removed process equipment behind Building 253. Additionally, the inspector noted that the south vault was congested with stored contaminated oil and used HEPA filters, in discussions with the inspector, the Health Physicist explained that most of the debris, contaminated oil, and used HEPA filters were either staged to be shipped to an approved disposal site or incinerated after the incinerator was fixed. The Health Physicist explained that during the winter months the approved disposal site imposed a surcharge on received shipments, therefore, the company had postponed the shipment of the debris until after the surcharge period (during the summer months).

The inspector observed the location and accuracy of postings, emergency egress routes, pressure differentials across the HEPA filters, and the lighting intensity throughout the l plant. Posting of criticality limits and controls appeared consistent with Section 4.1.5,

" Posting of Limits and Control," and Section 2.4," Criticality Safety Limits and Signs," of l the license application and with Nuclear Industrial Safety (NIS) Procedure No. 201,

" Nuclear Safety Manual." The inspector observed that the current NRC Form 3 was posted at all pcrtals and on every bulletin board throughout the production plants, and that hallways, stairways, and paths were clear of obstacles for egress out of the production plants. Additionally, the inspector observed that the differential pressure was below 6-inches of water across the HEPA filters. The inspector identified that approximately 50 percent of the lights in the set-up room and set-up room hallway were 3

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[ not operating. The inspector noted the following day that the licensee had fixed the ,

lighting in the set-up room and set-up room hallway. I 1

c. Conclusions The inspector identified that the housekeeping in the oxide plant, behind Building 253, and in the south vault appeared to have degraded from the last regionalinspection.

Emergency egress routes were clear of obstacles and postings observed were in compliance w;th requirements. Inspector-identified housekeeping issues and lighting concems were promptly corrected by the licensee.  ;

l 01.2 Unloadina of UX-30B Overpacks Containina Full UF,30B Cylinders

a. inspection Scope (88020)

The inspector obse,ved the removal of four UX '30B overpacks containing full UF,30B cylinders at the UFe receiving dock. The Director of Uranium Operations and Senior l Environmental Engineer explained the company's procedures for selecting, purchasing, and using equipment used to lift special nuclear material (SNM).

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b. Observation and Findinas '

l During a routine tour of the oxide facility on April 8,1998, the inspector observed the

! unloading of four UX-30B overpacks containing full UF,30B cylinders from the flatbed of a semitrailer at the UFe receiving dock. The UX-30B overpacks had four lifting holes located approximately 2-feet in from each corner and just below the center line of the overpack. The inspector observed a % inch diameter welded, linked chain lead to each l corner of the UX-30B overpack from the gantry crane hook forming approximately a i 45-degree sling. This chain was attached to the gantry crane hook with an 1-1/4-inch

! diameter welded, oversized ring. The ends of the sling chain had hooks (with a minimum l cross section of 1-1/8 by 2-inches) that hooked to 5/8-inch shackles which were attached to the UX-303 overpack lifting holes with %-inch pins.

i l The inspector observed there was no indication of the lifting capacity on the sling or l shackles. The inspector noted immediately that the shackles and pins appeared undersized for lifting the UX-308 overpacks containing full UFe 30B cylinders (a combined weight of 8000-pounds (Ibs.)). The inspector questioned the Health Physicist and the Shipping and ReceNing Supervisor, both involved with the removal of the overpecks, on what the capacity of the shackles was and who approved the use of the shackles. The Shipping and Receiving Supervisor explained that the shackles were purchased in September 1997, at a local farm implement supply store and that the salesperson stated the 5/8-inch shackles had a capacity of 8500-Ibs.

The inspector discussed with the Director of Uranium Operations the size of the shackles used for lifting the full UX-30B overpacks. The inspector explained that the shackles appeared to be undersized for this purpose. The Director of Uranium Operations subsequently performed a stress analysis calculation and determined that the %-inch shackle pins (based on untreated carbon steel) were undersized and proceeded to the receiving and shipping dock. The Director of Uranium Operations personally confiscated 4

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I the affected shackles and pins and directed the Shipping and Receiving Supervisor not to l perform any type of lifting until an analysis of all equipment used for lifting was performed.

The inspector asked the Director of Uranium Operations who had responsibility for j selecting, purchasing, and testing the rigging equipment. The Director explained engineering was responsible for selecting equipment used to move or lift SNM. In addition, the Director stated that the company's expectation was not to allow supervisors I to select and purchase equipment or supplies used to lift SNM, The inspector reviewed load calculations for lifting the UX-30B overpacks containing full UFs 30B cylinders. The inspector noted that the 23rd edition of the Machinery Handbook i limited the working load of a carbon steel 5/8-inch shackle with a %-inch pin to 3000-lbs.

Additionally, the inspector calculated that with a sling angle of approximately 45 degrees l the 8000-ib. load produced a tension load of approximately 2830-lbs. on each shackle.

This rough tension calculation did not include torsion forces produced by the chain hook or dynamic forces during crane accelerations. In discussions with the inspector, the Director of Uranium Operations stated that based on the facts known on April 8, the 5/8-inch shackle did not meet the company's safety margins for lifting equipment.

However, on April 9, the licensee obtained the manufacturer's specifications that specified a 6000-lb. working load for the four 5/8-inch shackles with %-inch pins. The inspector learned that the shackles were forged from high tensile steel and that the pins were heat-treated for added strength.

Safety Condition 8-1, of Special Nuclear Materials License No. SNM-33, requires that licensed material be used in accordance with the statements, representations, and ,

conditions in Chapters 1 through 8, of the application, dated October 29,1993, with I supplements. Section 2.6, of Chapter 2, of the supplement, dated August 8,1997, required, in part. that all operations whica affect licensed material shall be conducted in i accordance with approved procedures. Section 5.2, of Nuclear Industrial Safety (NIS)

, Procedure No. 221, " Material Handling Equipment," approved March 15,1996, required, in part, that licensed material handling equipment shall be marked with a rated lifting capacity before it may be used. On April 8, the inspector observed that crane shackles used to lift four full UX-30 UF cylinder overpacks were not marked with a rated lifting capacity. The failure of the licensee to mark the crane shackles with the rated capacity is a Violation of Safety Condition S-1 (Vio 070-00036/98001-01).

c. Conclusions The inspector identified a violation in which the licensee had not marked all material handling equipment with the required rated lifting capacity. Additionally, the inspector concluded that the licensee had not systematically analyzed all the lifting equipment used to lift UX-30 UFe cylinder overpacks with full UFe 30B cylinders.

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k II. Maintenance M8 Maintenance fssues (92702)

MS.1 (Closed ) URI 070-00036/97004-03: Timeliness for the submittal of a decornmissioning 20.304 burial work plan.

On October 21,1997, the licensee submitted an adequate justification to delay decommissioning. The NRC staff reviewed the submitted information and found it acceptable.

M8.2 (Closed ) IFl 070-00036/97004-02: Clarify requirements for securing a hazardous piping system during maintenance activities.

The licensee clarified through training that rnaintenance mechanics were required to lock and tag all energized systems (including potential hazardous piping systems) before performing maintenance activities.

M8.3 (Closed ) IFl 070-00036/97004-01: Maintaining spacing between full 2-gallon containers on carts.

The licensee installed physical controls to ensure that 2-gallon containers were properly located on carts.

M8.4 (Closed ) VIO 070-00036/97003-01: 1.icensaa failed to est&blish a lockout or install a danger tag on the steam isolation valve to a solid UF, feed . tine.

The licensee conducted lockout and tagout safety retraining for operations personnel, The retraining emphasized the proper lockout and tagout process. The inspector identified through discussions with five maintenance mechanics that the requirements to lock and tag hazardous piping systems was clarified through the additional training.

Additionally, the licensee added four lockout and tagout stations throughout the plant to facilitate implementation of NIS Procedure No. 219, " Control of Hazardous Energy."

M8.5 (Closed ) IFl 070-00036/97002-02: Tracking the development of a functional test for the oxide plant emergency stop push-button.

The licensee added to Operations Sheet (OS) No. 4101.00, " Oxide Inspection and Alarm Calibration / Testing " a requirement to test the UF, emergency shut off buttons once each year.

MS.6 (Closed ) IFl 070-00036/97001-04: Failure to conduct functional tests of the vaporizers' conductivity probes.

The inspector identified that the licensee added calibration, alarm, and operability tests for the vaporizers conductivity probes to OS No. 4101.00, " Oxide inspection and Alarm Calibration / Testing," Revision 7, dated March 14,1997.

M8.7 (Closed) IFl 070-00036/96005-02: Track the licensee investigation into high sample results for the recycle hopper areas.

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l On November 19,1996, a recycle hopper area operator received an uptake caused by a l leaking recycle hopper seal. The bioassay results indicated that the recycle hopper area operator received a dose of 50 millirem. On November 20,1996, an operator received an uptake while cleaning a hood that was not ventilating. The bioassay results indicated that this operator received a dose of 250 millirem. The licensee performed appropriate i followup investigations and training and the inspector had no further questions.

l l M8.8 (Closed) IFl 070-00036/96005-01: Timeliness regarding procedure reviews and implementation.

The inspcter identified that the licensee moved the responsibility of document control to the Director of Regulatory Affairs. The Director of Regulatory Affairs administrated a data management system. The data management system identified each procedure review date and flagged procedures that were within 30-days of expiration.

l M8.9 (Closed) IFl 070-00036/96004-03: Adequacy of criticality training.

l l Inspection Report 96005 identified that the nuclear criticality safety training session effectively integrated current criticality issues, criticality controls, and plant practices in a manner which operators could direc+1y apply to theirjobs.

M8.10 (Closed) VIO 070-00036/96002-02: Failure to ensure that a vehicle gate was locked or attended and that vehicles were escorted by constant surveillance in the controlled area.

l .The inspector interviewed the security staff, reviewed the licensee's escort tog book j maintained by the security staff and determined that all vehicles were being escorted on l site appropriately by plant staff, in addition, the inspector observed on sevarat occasions l that plant staff were provided as escorts for visiting vehicles entering the controlled area l cf the plant.

l l M8.11 (Closed) IFl 070-00036/94003-04: Contaminated rugs and outer garments were identified I outside the controlled area.

Inspection Report 95002 identified that the inspector made independent surveys for total fixed plus removable contamination of several clear areas (the cafeteria, entryways, and l

the change rooms in the oxide and pelletizing buildings) using a Ludlum Model 3 with a pancake probe (NRC No. 0445632, calibrated on August 22 1994). No contamination was identified with the sensitivity of the instruments used.

! M8.12 (Closed) IFl 070-00036/93001-02: 10 CFR Part 71.137, " Audits," requires that audits of l transportation ptogram be performed by members of the licensee staff who are not accountable to the manaper responsible for transportation activities.

The inspector identified that an independent audit was performed by trained personnel who were knowledgeable, but not accountable, for transportation activities.

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l 111. Plant Support R5 Staff Training and Qualification in Radiation Protection RS.1 Respiratory Protection

a. Inspection Scope (88010)

The respiratory protection training program was reviewed to determine if activities conducted were in compliance with procedures and license conditions.

b. Observations and Findinas The licensee used a computer program to instruct personnel on respiratory protection. l The inspector noted that the respiratory protection training computer program provided i good insight into respiratory protection (the importance of respiratory protection, i engineering controls, equipment maintenance, fit testing, types of equipment, etc.). The l inspector noted that the required respiratory exam sufficiently addressed in detail each objective covered in the class. In a discussion with the inspector, the Health Physics Supervisor explained that the existing respiratory protection training program included the training guidance NRC Regulatory Guide 8.15, " Acceptable Program For Respiratory Protection," issued in 1976. The Health Physics Supervisor also stated that the licensee planned to update the respiratory training program to include the current training guidance in Occupational Safety and Health Administration Guideline, Section 1910.134,

" Respiratory Protection," issued lyril 8,1998.

The inspector discussed the methods used to obtain and don a respirator with three operators and four maintenance workers. Each operator and maintenance worker were cognizant that respirator use required a yearly fit test, yearly physical, biannual respiratory protection refresher training, and the user to be clean-shaven. Additionally, the operators and maintenance workers explained the requirements regarding selection, fitting, issuance, maintenance, and testing of respirators, including testing for operability immediately prior to each use of a respirator as specified in NIS Procedure No. 326,

" Respiratory Selection, Use, inspection, and Maintenance."

c. Conclusions The inspector concluded that the respiratory protection training program met the training requirements of 10 CFR 20.1703. Operators and maintenance workers appeared knowledgeable of the requirements to safely don, use, and doff a respirator.  !

V2 Environmental Protection l

i V1.1 Conduct of Environmental Protection Activities

a. Inspection Scope (88045)

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The inspector reviewed selected elements of the licensee's environmental protection program with respect to management controls and program implementation. The review included an evaluation of trends in the environmental data including sampling results for 8

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i air emissions, liquid effluents, and soil, water and vegetation. Specific documents reviewed were:

e Health Physics (HP) Procedure No. 301, " Exhaust Stack Sampling," Revision 3, j dated February 14,1996; j l

e HP Procedure No. 319, " Environmental Sampling, Water, Soil, Vegetation and Air," i Revision 5, dated October 17,1996; and  !

l e Chapter 5 of the license application, " Environmental Protection."

b. Observations and Findinas b.1 Ground Water Environmental Samplina Results The licensee had installed eight ground water monitoring wells around the plant. Ground water samples were collected monthly from each of the current wells. The health physicist explained that by April 28,1998, the licensee would submit to the NRC a burial pit hydrogeological work plan with a request to change ground water monitoring well locations and frequencies. The 1997 ground water well sample results indicated that there were no statistically significant trends above background identified for gross alpha or beta measurements in Well Nos. 8,9,15, and 16. Additionally, NRC Inspection Report 070-00036/97004 identified that the licensee stopped monitoring Burial Well No.14 because of identified elevated levels of organic compounds that exceeded Resource Conservation Recovery Act hazardous waste limits. The Health Physicist stated that the licensee commenced monitoring Burial Well No.14 again on July 7,1997, on a 6-month frequency.

Elevated gross beta readings ranging from 200 to 3100 picocuries per liter were identified in various samples from ground water monitoring Well Nos. 7,13, and 17b over the year. The Health Physicist stated that the elevated gross beta results were attributed to technetium-99 ("Tc) and that the licensee hired an environmental consultant to investigate the source of"Tc. The environmental consultant issued a report that indicated the main source of"Tc was from a former ring storage area rather than the previously believed settling ponds. The 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix B, limit for"Tc in liquid effluents to unrestricted areas is 60,000 picocuries per liter. The elevatud well readings were significantly below the 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix B, limit.

b.2 Air Samplina Results The air sampling program consisted of three air sampling stations located near the fence line on the licensee's propedy which were run continuously. Padiculate filters were analyzed weekly for alpha contamination (uranium). During the first quarter of 1997, the 45 average concentrations for all three samplers was approximately 1.1 X 10 microcuries per milliliter (uCi/ml) which is 2 percent of the 10 CFR Pad 20, Appendix B, limit for insoluble uranium-234, the most restrictive isotope.

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b.3 Liauid Effluent Samplina Results The sewage treatment outfall and the storm drain runoff outfalls were sampled weekly with grab sampl6s. The s;orm drain outfall fed into the site pond, and the overflow from i the pond (the site dam overflow) was sampled continuously with a composite sampler. I The composite sample was analyzed weekly. The average sampling results for uranium for the sewage treatment outfall, storm drain runoff outfalls, and overflow from the pond were as follows: l Samplina Location Jan - Jun 1997 Jul - Dec 1997 Jan -Feb 1998 sewage treatment outfall 15.0 x 104 uCi/ml 13.7 x 104 uCi/mi 1.9 x 104uCi/ml 4

storm drain runoff outfalls 9.4 x 10* uCi/mi 4.5 x 10 uCi/mi 2.8 x 104uCli.nl overflow from the pond 1.0 x 10 uCi/ml 1.5 x 10 uCi/mi 0.3 x 104uCi/ml 4 4 The average results were belou the 10 CFR 20, Appendix B,1;mit for uranium in liquid effluent to uncontrolled areas which is 30 x 104 uCi/ml.

b.4 Veaetation Samplina Results The vegetation sampling program consisted of four sampling areas located near the l fence line on the licensee's property which were sampled quarterly for gross alpha and gross beta contamination. The vegetation sample results indicated that there were no statistically .;ignificant trends identified above background. The 1997 annual average concentrations for all vegetation samples were less than 12 picocuries per gram (pCi/g),

which was less than the currently accepted limit of 30 pCi/g.

b.5 Soil Samples 4 l

The 1997 soil sampling program consisted of eight sampling areas located on the licensee's property which were sampled quarterly for gross alpha and gross beta contamination. Seven soil sample results indicated that there were no statistically significant trends identified above background. However, several elevated readings were measured from one sampling location (the former limestone storage area that was located south of new wet scrubber). The licensee indicated that the soil sample contained a higher than average amount of"Tc due to the proximity of the sampling area to the spent pile of scrubber rocks. The scrubber rocks had filtered some "Tc (a by-product from uranium processing) from the main exhaust stack for the oxide plant in the 1970s.

b.6 Exhaust Stack Air Samples l The 1997 " Weekly Stack Sample Concentration Reports" documented that stack concentrations of uranium had not exceeded the require 1 invest;gation level of I 5 x 10~" uCi/miin the accessible unrestricted area. There were 18 exhaust stacks that were continuously sampled during routine operations. The dry scrubber stack had one elevated reading during the third quarter of 1997. The licensee conducted an investigation and determined that there were some mechanical problems with the collection equipment. The defective collection equipment was promptly repaired. The l

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licensee immediately collected another air sample which indicated readings that were consistent with its previous stack readings.

The " Monthly Stack Loss Report" for uranium lost to the atmosphere during 1997 totaled 13.0 uCi for the first quarter,24 uCi for the second quarter,122 uCi for the third quarter, and 17 uCi for the fourth quarter. None of the results exceeded the license limit for total plant exhaust effluents of 150 uCi per calendar quarter.

c. Conclusions The inspector concluded that the licensee's sampling program and results were in compliance with the license and licensee procedures.

W1 Conduct of Radioactive Waste Management Activities b

W1.1 Reducina Contaminated Waste

a. Inspection Scope (88r'0_5)

The inspector discussed reducing the generation of contaminated waste with management.

b. Observation and Findinas In discussions with the inspector, the Plant Manager stated that the licensee had made several process changes over the past few years to eliminate the generation of contaminated waste produced from every process. The Plant Manager stated that the installation of a wet hydrogen fluoride (HF) scrubber was an example of the licensee's commitment to eliminate contaminated waste. The wet HF scrubber produced HF as a byproduct which the licensee markets. The inspector also leamed that the licensee changed to reusable HEPA filters. The Plant Manager explained that the only uranium process that presently generated contaminated waste was the uranium recycle and recovery operation. Additionally, the Plant Manager stated that engineering would continue to make appropriate changes to eliminate the generation of contaminated waste from the uranium recycle and recovery operation.

c. Conclusions The licensee reduced the generation of process-contaminated byproducts by changing from a dry to wet scrubber and by using reusable HEPA fdters. .

11 Conduct of Training Activities 11.1 Facility Indoctrination and Refresher Trainina

a. Lnspectio- Scope (88010)

The licensee's general employee training was reviewed to verify it included the topics required by 10 CFR 19.12, " Instruction to Workers," and Section 2.5, " Training," of the license application.

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b. Observations and Findin,qs The inspector reviewed the general employee training courses; discussed course content with licensee trainers; reviewed the course overview, course objectives, and course material; and reviewed the exam administrated to workers upon completion of the required courses. This training was required to allow an employee unescorted access to the controlled area. The inspector noted that the general employee training included nuclear criticality safety (NCS), radiological safety, and emergencv training. l The inspector verified that the training included the required topics, including:

e the storage, transfer, and use of special nuclear material; 1

e the health risks associated with exposure to radiation and radioactive material; e precautions and procedures to minimize exposure;  ;

e the purposes and functions of protective devices; i e NRC regulations rogarding the protection of personnel from exposure to radiation and radioactive material; e the responsibilities of site workers to immediately report to the licensee any condition which may lead to or cause a violation of NRC regulations; e the appropriate responses to warnings and alarms made in the event of an unusual occurrence that may involve exposure to radiation and radioactive material, and illustration of evacuation routes through or around the site buildings; e NRC Forms 3,4, and 5; and i e general NCS principles. )

Section 2.5, " Training," required that previously trained employees who are allowed unescenea access to a controlled area be retrained at least every two years. The inspector determined that the training at the licensee was tracked electronically using a computer-based data management system. In addition, operating personnel were required to receive a refresher course in critica!ity control and radiation safety on a j biennial basis. The criticality control and radiation safety refresher training was identical l to the training given to new employees. The inspector reviewed computer records for -

l selected operating personnel and confirmed that they were retrained on a biennial basis.

The inspector also determined, through discussions with training personnel, that the computer-based data management system interfaced with the electronic system that controlled personnel access into a process work station except for the recycle and recovery process. If an employee allov -d any required training to lapse, the computer based data management system would t o' allow access into the process work station. i On April 8, the inspector attended a weekly safety meeting that focused on three new ,

postings that the licensee was updating in the process plants. During the safety meeting,  !

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I the Criticality Safety Manager discussed the effect the new post lngs imposed on the process in detail.

The inspector observed selected activities associated with a standdown for the rod assembly area. The process area standdowns were instituted to perform a thorough ,

review of every operations sheet for a process :;rea by cognizant operators. The i inspector noted that the instructor prcmoted open commun: cation throughout the rod assembly area standdown. Additionally, the Production Manager stated that procedures such as operations sheets were living documents that needed to be continually reviewed for safety enhancements, verbatini compliance, and efficiency guidance.

c. Conclusions The inspector concluded that the initial and refresher general employee training courses included the topics required by 10 CFR 19.12 and the license. The weekly safety meeting appeared to effectively train and retrain employees on process safety issues. The inspector identified that process standdowns promoted operator involvement in developing and adhering to operation sheets.

V. Manaaement Meeting X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspector met with plant management and other staff throughout the inspection and on April 9,1998, for the exit meeting. The inspector summarized the observations and findings of the inspection.

The licensee did not iaantify any of the information discussed at the meetings as proprietary. ,

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i PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee

• B. Kaiser, Vice President

• B. Sharkey, Director of Regulatory Affairs

• M. Eastburn, Nuclear Criticality Specialist

• R. Freeman, Nuclear Criticality Specialist

• H. Eskridge, Senior Consultant Regulatory Affairs

• G. Page, Director, Ceramic Operations

• E. Saito, Health Physicist K. Funke, Health Physics Supervisor

• K. Hayes, Industrial Safety Engineer

• D. Underwood, Engineering Manager

• M. Cohen, Controller

• D. Wallace, Document Control Administrator

• D. Rohde, Technical Training

• Senior licensee official at exit meeting on April 9,1998.

INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 88005: Management Organization and Contrcis IP 88010: Operator Training / Retraining IP 88020: Operations Review IP 88045: Environmental Protection l IP 92702: Followup on Corrective Actions for Violation and Deviations i

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ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened 070-00036/98001-01 VIO marking lifting capacities on all lifting equipment

Closed 070-00036/97004-03 URI timeliness of burial work plan 070-00036/97004-02 IFl requirements for securing hazardous piping systems j 070-00036/97004-01 IFl maintaining spacing between full two-gallon container on carts 070-00036/97003-01 VIO failing to lockout hazardous piping system 070-00036/97002-02 lh functional test for the oxide plant emergency stop push-l button 070-00036/97001-04 IFl no functional tests for conductivity probes on vaporizers  ;

i 070-00036/96005-02 IFl follow investigatic, into high sample results for operators in I recycle hopper area l

070-00036/96005-01 IFl timeliness regarding procedure reviews and implementation j 070-00036/96004-03 IFl adequacy of criticality training l

l 070-00036/96002-03 IFl failing to implement requirement of security plan i

l 070-00036/94003-04 IFl contaminated rugs and outer garments were identified outside the controlled area

( 070-00036/93001-02 IFl transportation program audits not performed per regulatory l requirements 15

e LIST OF ACRONYMS USED "Tc technetium-99 ALARA As-Low-As-Reasonably-Achievable CFR Code of Federal Regulations HEPA High Efficiency Particulate Air HF Hydrogen Fluoride IFl Inspector Followup Item IP Inspection Procedure LOTO Lockout and Tagout MDNR Missouri Department of Natural Resources NIS Nuclear Industrial Safety NMSS Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission OS Operations Sheet pCi/g picocuries per gram PDR Public Document Room PPE Personal Protective Equipment rem Roentgen Equivalent Man SNM Special Nuclear Material uCi/ml microcuries per milliliter U F, uranium hexafluoride URI Unresolved item VIO Violation 16

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