ML20046B029
| ML20046B029 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07000036 |
| Issue date: | 07/22/1993 |
| From: | Kenneth Lambert, Mccann G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20046B026 | List: |
| References | |
| 70-0036-93-02, 70-36-93-2, NUDOCS 9308030022 | |
| Download: ML20046B029 (5) | |
Text
e U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION III Report No. 070-00036/93002(DRSS)
Docket No. 070-00036 License No. SNM-33 Licensee:
Combustion Engineering, Inc.
Nuclear Power Systems Windsor, CT 06095 Facility Name: Hematite Facility Inspection At: Hematite, Missouri Inspection Conducted: June 24-25, 1993 Inspector: [M J
Kenneth J. La6bert Date Radiation Specialist Approved By:
r N.
- /C-7!21 !93 GeorgfM.P/Cann, thief Date/
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Fuel Facility and Decommissioning Section inspection Summary Inspection on June 24-25. 1993 (Report No. 070-00036/93002(DRSS))
Areas InsDetted:
This Was a special announced inspection to review and observe the operations of the first production run of the pellet loading facility. The areas reviewed included air sampling, removable wipe surveys, criticality safety, training, postings, interviews with personnel, and independent measurements.
Results: Within the scope of this inspection, no violations were identified.
The first production run of the rod loading facility was started and appeared to be operating as designed, with no problems noted.
9308030022 930726 PDR ADDCK 07000036 C
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
- John Conant, Manager, Nuclear Materials Licensing (corporate)
- Enos Criddle, Health Physics Supervisor
- Michael Eastburn, Criticality Safety Specialist
- Hal Eskridge, Manager, Regulatory Compliance
- Ann Keklak, Health Physicist
- Gary, Kersteen, Manager Assembly Operations '
- George Palmer, Manager, Ceramic Operations Rod loading operators Pellet alignment machine and inspection operator
- Indicates persons present at exit meeting.
2.
License Prcaram The Combustion Engineering facility at Hematite, Missouri, produces uranium dioxide (U0 ) fuel for the commercial nuclear power industry.
2 Low enriched uranium hexaflouride (UF ) limited to a maximum enrichment 6
of 5% uranium-235 is shipped from the Department of Energy (D0E) urani n t
enrichment / gaseous diffusion facilities in 2 1/2 ton, 30 inch diameter cylinders.
UF is passed through a series of three reactors and 6
chemically treated with steam and hydrogen to form 002 oxide. UO 2
powder is pelletized, loaded into fuel rods and assemblea into fuel bundles for nuclear power reactors.
j 3.
Operations Review (IP 88020)
I The inspector toured the facility to observe the operations in pellet alignment and inspection, pellet drying, pellet transport and pellet loading areas.
In the pellet alignment and inspection operation, an operator using a pellet alignment machine aligns the pellets in rows l
where they are inspected.
The operator mechanically rotates the table top to view all sides of the pellets.
The operator, wearing rubber i
gloves and using tweezers, removes pellets that arc either chipped or cracked.
The remaining pellets are then pashed onto trays and transported by cart to the pellet drying oven. The pellets are dried in the oven to remove excess moisture and loaded into Kardex pans.
Two t
Kardex pans are placed into a metal box, and two boxes are placed in the Cushman cart for transport outside to the rod loading facility.
The licensee has a policy of not transporting pellets if it is raining.
The l
boxes are removed from the Cushman cart and placed on a conveyor ~and transported to the Kardex unit, where the Kardex pans are removed and placed into the unit for storage.
Pellets are removed from the Kardex unit and placed on the rod loading table, where they are agaia inspected prior to loading into the rods. The operator pushes several rows of pellets into several rods at the same time. The loaded rods are then 2
v
I s.
conveyed down to the welding area where a-vacuum is drawn and the end I
cap is welded into place.
d The licensee's training program for personnel in the rod loading
)
facility includes about-12 hours of basic training over 2-3 days in radiation safety, hazardous materials, criticality, respirator protection, and hearing protection. There-is a written test with a 1
passing grade of 70 percent.
In addition, personnel receive job specific orientation and qualification training, which can last several j
l days or more depending on the complexity of the operation being I
performed.
From observations and discussion with several operators it l-appears they have received basic and specific training.
l The inspector concluded that the rod loading operation was being conducted as designed and the operators had a good understanding of i
their operations.
No violations or deviations of NRC requirements were identified.
4.
Radiation Protection (IP 83822)
The inspector reviewed the licensee's air sampling program for the rod loading facility, wipe surveys for removable contamination, and extremity monitoring.
In addition, the inspector took independent
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measurements and wipes for analysis in the Region III laboratory.
a.
The licensee has used a combination of lapel sampling and fixed location samplers for monitoring of airborne contamination during the testing phase of the rod loading facility.
The licensee currently is using nine fixed location samplers placed throughout 1
the restricted area of the facility.
The inspector reviewed fixed air sampling data for the period from May 17 to June 22, 1993, l
which indicated that samples were collected on 18 days during the
-J period.
Results of analysis ranged from 1.0 E-13 to 2.0 E-12 l
microcuries per milliliter (pCi/ml) (3.7 E-3 to 7.4 E-2 microbecquerel per milliliter (gBq/ml)), less than 2 percent of the maximum permissible concentration (MPC) of 1 E-10 pCi/ml (3.7 gBq/ml) total uranium.
b.
The licensee has committed to conducting daily wipes for the first 1
30 days of operation in the new praduction areas. These areas include the pellet drying area, pellet shipping and receiving area, and the restricted area of the rod loading facility. A minimum of 12 wipes are collected, 6 on the floor and 6 on l
equipment. Wipes are analyzed for gross alpha (a) and beta (s) i activity.2 The licensee's action levels are 5000 dpm (84 Bq)/100cm a or #, requiring cleanup at the end of the shift and j
2 10,000 dpm (167 Bq)/100cm a or B, requiring immediate cleanup.
1 The inspector reviewed the daily wipe results which indicated that onMay7,1993thefloorareainfront'oftheatrayloadinggood 2
had 11,800 dpm (197 Bq)/100cm a and 6,141 dpm (102 Bq)/100cm #
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activity gnd a stainless steal cart numbgr 87 had 4770 dpm (80 Bq)/100cm a and 9817 dpm (164 Bq)/100cm s activity. Wipes taken
'i on the floor and the cart the following day revealed activity well below the action levels. The results of other daily wipes reviewed did not identify any other areas with activity above the action levels.
c.
The inspectar discussed extremity monitoring of personnel involved with handling pellets in the new processing area, especially the rod alignment machine operator who assists in aligning the pellets and conducts inspections of the pellets.
From observations of the rod loading process, this operator appears to be the individual-who would receive the greatest exposure to the extremities.
The licensee stated that during the month of July workers who handle pellets for the rod loading facility will be provided extremity l
dosimetry. The licensee also stated that annually during the-month of July, workers who have a potential for extremity doses are monitored. The exposure information gathered will determine if continual monitoring will be required for any individuals.
This area will be reviewed during a future inspection.
d.
The inspector conducted independent measurements with an Eberline Model E-520, serial number 2123 coupled with an Eberline HP-270 detector, last calibrated on August 26, 1992, at varinus locations throughout the rod loading operation. Measurements taken at the pellet alignment machine with the detector shield open and one
'l inch above the pellets indicated 22,000 counts per minute (cpm) beta / gamma. Measurements taken in unrestricted areas, conference room; equipment room; hallway; and an office, surrounding the pellet storage (Kardex) unit were indistinguishable from background of 0.01 milliroentgen per hour (mR/hr) (2.6 E-6 l
(mC/kg)/hr). The Kardex unit, which has a capacity of 18 tons of i
pellets contained less than 2 tons of pellets at the time of_the survey. Measurements in the restricted area of the pellet loading
'i facility at operator work stations and in front of the Kardex unit were indistinguishable from background.
In addition, the fuel rod assay system, which contains a californium-252 and a cesium-137 source was surveyed. The measurements at the operator work stations were indistinguishable from background, the measurement at the east end of the assay system on contact with an access door was 0.04 mR/hr (1.0 E-5 (mC/kg)/hr).
No violations or deviations of NRC requirements were identified.
5.
Criticality Safety (IP 88015) t The inspector reviewed the criticality alarm system, which was installed in January-February 1993. The alarm system has six detector locations with two detectors at each location. The alarm control panel is located i
in the health physics office and interfaces with the plagt wide alarm control system.
The alarm set point is 10 mR/hr (2.6 E' (mC/kg)/hr).
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l A uranium pellet is placed in proximity to each detector location jo produce a radiation field of between 0.1 to 0.5 mR/hr (2.6-13.0 E' (mC/kg)/hr) to ensure detect If a detector measures lessthan0.01mR/hr(2.6E"grsareworking.
(mC/kg)/hr) the alarm system registers a-j detector power failure. System does not differentiate between a detector failure and a power failure.
For the criticality alarm to greater than 10 mR/hr (2.6 E'ge location must measure an-exposure rate activate, both detectors at o i
I (mC/kg)/hr), if one detector is not functioning then the remaining detecto ill activate the alarm if it measuresgreaterthan10mR/hr(2.6Egw(mC/kg)/hr).
If power is lost to both detectors at a location, the operation is stopped in that area, unless the area is covered by another set of detectors.
However, most of the facility has overlapping coverage from a second detector i
location. The inspector reviewed calibration for four detectors calibrated on June 18, 1993. The detectors are calibrated using a.
i radioactive source with an electrical signal used to determine the alarm j
set point.
From a tour of the rod loading facility the inspector determined that the rod loading facility has criticality alarm system detectors in place j
and that the licensee has posted criticality control limits.
4 No violations or deviations of NRC regulations were identified.
6.
Exit Meetina The scope and findings of the inspection were discussed with licensee representatives as indicated in the persons contacted section of H isi 1
report. The inspector stated that the review of daily wipe results and
'l air sampling did not identify any problems. The criticality alarm i
system appears to be operating properly and covers the rod loading facility. Training of personnel includes basic training for radiation protection and hazardous materials along with qualification training for i
specific operations. The rod loading facility appears to be operating as designed.
L Licensee representatives questioned whether they could incorporate the HEPA filter checklist with the operating procedures for filter installation rather than develop a separate checklist to be completed each time the filters need to be leak tested (0 pen Item No. 70-0036/93001-04). The inspector indicated that this would be acceptable.
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