ML20012A993
| ML20012A993 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07000036 |
| Issue date: | 02/26/1990 |
| From: | Foster J, Snell W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20012A988 | List: |
| References | |
| 70-0036-90-01, 70-36-90-1, NUDOCS 9003130173 | |
| Download: ML20012A993 (7) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION III Report No. 70-36/90001(DRSS)
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Docket Nos. 70-36 License No. $NM-33 Licensee: Combustion Engineering, Inc.
Nuclear Power Systems Windsor, CT 06095 i-Facility Name: Hematite l'
Inspection At:
Hematite, Missouri Plant Inspection Conducted:
February 7-9, 1990 Inspector:
J. E. Foster 2/ashe Date LObN Approved By: William Snell, Chief SA*/m Radiological Controls and Date Emergency Preparedness Section Inspection Summary Inspection on February 7-9. 1990 (Report No. 70-36/90001(DRSS):
Areas Inspected:
Routine unannounced inspection of the. Combustion Engineering Hematite fuel cycle emergency preparedness program (IP 88050).
The inspection involved one NRC inspector.
Results: No violations, deficiencies or deviations were identified during
-this inspection.
The Combustion Engineering emergency preparedness program continued to meet current contin 0ency plan and license requirements during 1989.
9003130173 900226 PDR ADOCV 07000036 C.
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..,t DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Combustion Engineerino, Hematite
- J. Rode, Plant Manager i
- R. Griscom, Engineering Manager
- R.
Fromm, Q.A. Manager
- A. Noack, Production Superintendent
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- L. Grossman, Director, Manufacturing Technology
- C, Proctor, Supervisor, Health Physics l
- H. Eskridge, Manager, Nuclear Licensing, Safety & Accountability
- The above personnel attended the February 9, 1990 exit interview.
The inspector also contacted other members of the licensee's staff during the course of the inspection.
2.
Licensee Actions on previously__ Identified Items a.
(Open) Open Item No. 70-36/88004-01:
This item tracks the minimal amount of training provided to offsite agencies who might be called upon to respond to the Hematite facility, and the. licensee's indication that the 1989 exercise would involve some offsite support group participation. A plant tour and training in onsite firefighting considerations was provided te the Hematite Fire Department in early 1990. As detailed elsewhere in this report, the licensee did not hold an exercise in 1989. Discussion with licensee personnel indicated that the 1990 exercise is intended to involve offsite support group activity.
This item will remain open.
b.
(0 pen) Open Item No. 70-36/88004-02: This it'em tracks licensee action: to improve the overall exercise and drill program, including development of a method of drill. evaluation and documentation.
No action had been taken on this item, partially, as noted above, due to not holding an exercise in 1989. This item will remain open.
3, Fuel Cycle Emergency Preparedness Program (IP 88050) a.
Offsite Support Agencies Coordination of Emergency Planning letters of agreement with offsite agencies which might be called-upon to respond to the Hematite facility were reviewed and found to be current.
Letters reviewed included: Hematite Fire Protection District (2/7/90); Festus Fire Department (1/6/89); Joachim-Plattin
' Township Ambulance (1/13/89); Department of Energy (1/9/89);
Jefferson Memorial Hospital (1/5/89); Jefferson County Sheriff (1/4/89); Barnes Hospital, St. Louis (1/4/89).
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The licensee had sent letters requesting updates to the letters of agreement in December, 1988. Also, letters to the Hematite Fire Protection District, Missouri Department of Natural Resources -
Environmental Emergency Response Center, and East-West Gateway l
Network had been sent under the federal Emergency Planning and Community right-to-know Act (EPCRA), providing the name of the onsite emergency coordinator and alternate, and providing a 24-hour phone number.
On January, 16, 1990, thirteen representatives of the Hematite Fire Department toured the site and were provided training in onsite fire fighting considerations.
Based upon the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptable, b.
Emergency Plans, Procedures, Facilities, and Equipment Emergency Plans and Procedures In 1989, the licensee initiated review and revision of the Radiological Contingency Plan (emergency plan) to meet the requirements of the revised Rule on Emergency Preparedness for Fuel Cycle Facilities and Other Radioactive Material Licensees, published in the Federal. Register on April 7, 1989, with an effective date of April 7, 1990. This revised Rule affects portions of 10 CFk 30, 40, and 70, and specifies provisions to be contained in required Emergency Plans.
The NRC license for the Hematite facility expired on December 31, 1989, and operations are being allowed to continue under a " timely renewal" request. The revised Emergency Plan is now under revision by personnel in Windsor, Ct, in preparation for inclusion with license renewal information to be submitted in the near future, The facility description and facility evacuation routes will be updated-to include recent construction, and other changes made as necessary under the new Rule, above.
Discussion with licensee personnel indicated that, as required by the new Rule, the new Emergency Plan would be submitted to State and local authorities for comment, and the comments would subsequently be sent to the NRC for consideration, t
The current plan and implementing procedures manual were reviewed during the inspection. While the current plan was adequate, it was recommended that the revised Plan include notification of nearby residents, even if on a courtesy basis, of any events at the plant.
The inspector also recommended that much of the information in the Plar, relative to the plant processes and criticality safety (contained in other license documents) simply be referenced rather than included in the Plan.
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3 The implementing procedures manual was reviewed and found to be i.
adequate. Some of the procedures.(Section VII) have recently been revised. ~However, some of the older procedures had not been revised since 1975.
The only immediately obvious discrepancy in the older procedures was that the road by the plant had been redesignated as.
Highway P.
It was recommended that the older procedures be reviewed, revised as necessary, and placed on a word processing l
i, system to facilitate subsequent reviews and revisions.
l Licensee personnel indicated that a Plant Safety Committee had been initiated in January 1990. One of the duties of this committee will be to review the results of emergency drills and exercises.
Based upon the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptable, c.
Emergency Kits, Communications, _ Rendezvous Facilities (Evacuation Facilities), and Onsite Medical FaciTities The Hematite facility is currently being expanded to accomodate expansion of fuel pellet production.
Several new structures have i
been constructed, and some equipment is currently being installed or readied for use.
Discussion with licensee personnel indicated that i
the updated emergency plan would include an updated description of the plant, r
The onsite emergency facilities were toured and were as described in the Emergency Plan. All facilities appeared to be in an acceptable state of operational readiness.
Telephones were tested for operability at each location and found to be functional. An i
emergency call list with a current date was observed at each telephone location.
It was noted that emergency alarm initiation buttons are located throughout the facility, particularly at exits.
Criticality monitors were noted in various areas.
Review of completed checklists for the period January 1989 through l
-January 1990 indicated that all procedurally required periodic r
emergency lighting equipment checks, first aid supplies inventories, and inventories of emergency tools, Health Physics and office supplies reserved for use by emergency responders had been completed.
Locations addressed in these checklists included:'the Tile Barn (Control Point), and various locations throughout the plant.
Inventory checklists specified minimum quantities of items and required verification of the supplies' locations and completeness.
Emergency supplies in the Tile Barn were inventoried as a part of 4
the inspection.
It was found that the inventory checksheet, recently revised, did not in all cases reflect the numbers of 4
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supplies.
For example, the list specified ten dosimeters versus the eight dosimeters available; the list specified two R0-2 survey r
meters, when one R0-2 and another model were available. The eight dosimeters were found to be marginally operable, but lacked serial numbers or any indication of calibration.
l Two hand held Radio Shack 49Mhz transceivers were available at the Control Point, intended for communication with a post-accident team h
in the plant proper. These transceivers are of limited range, especially for communication to individuals in a building cottaining considerable structural metal.
It was recommended that an alternative radio system be investigated, as it was doubtful that an
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in plant team could successfully communicate with the Control Point from various areas of the plant.
The inspector observed that supplies intended for both evacuees from the plant (blankets, etc.) and post-accident teams (survey r
i instruments, protective clothing, etc.) were present in the Control Point room containing telephones for emergency use.
If management l
personnel were attempting to communicate via telephone or radio, and
-l Supplies were being utilized, this room would be overcrowded and noisy.
It was recommended that the supplies be relocated to another room in the Tile Barn (Control Point).
j Presently, inventories of emergency equipment in the Tile Barn are i
being conducted on a weekly basis.
Normal practice is to inventory such equipment on a less frequent basis, either monthly or quarterly, and inventory frequency could be reduced without degrading emergency preparedness.
Emergency equipment was inspected in the following locations:
Station #1 (Pellet Plant), Station #2 (Maintenance Shop), Station #5 (Cooling Tower Pump Room).
Equipment was present as outlined in i
section VII of the emergency plan.
It was noted that first aid kits and some small oxygen bottles in several locations (Station #1, for example) are older models in need of replacement with more modern equipment.
Likewise, the resuscitator located in the vicinity of t
-Station #1 is an old model which is now outdated and overly complicated to operate.
Inventory procedures included provisions for conducting inventories after use of the supplies or following discovery of an unsealed supply container, in addition to the periodic inventory requirement, a
Records reviewed indicated that problems identified during inventories and communications equipment checks had been corrected in a timely manner.
Onsite rendezvous facilities were examined and determined to be readily accessible, with operable communication equipment and emergency supplies as specified in the Emergency Plan.
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During the inspet. tion, it was noted that the plant meteorological l
F instrumentation was mounted on a relatively short pole above one of i
the plant buildings. This installation appeared to measure wind speed and direction only. Due to recent construction, this l
installation is no longer higher than several nearby plant i
structures, and the representativeness of its information is questionable.
Building wake effects and the height of the installation above the building it is mounted upon make the t
meteorological representativeness of any resultant data suspect.
It was recommended that a meteorologist review the equiptrent and installation.
Based upon the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptable.
Offsite Environmental _ Equipment
'The Hematite facility has two air samplers on site. These air samplers are inspected once a week.
One air sampling station was visited, and it appeared to be functioning properly.
Licensee personnel indicated that a third air sampling location was currently under consideration.
Based upon the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptable, d.
Tests and Drills Implementation of Tests and Conduct of Drills Discussion with licensee personnel indicated that plant evacuation drills are held in which the plant is evacuated and personnel relocate at the Tile Barn Control Point.
This same evolution occurs during the emergency exercise, and simulated ' reentry / recovery is conducted.
It was recommended that the revised emergency plan contain language which would define the actions anticipated during a drill versus an exercise.-
During 1989, the licensee had an event in which uranium hexaflouride was released to the limestone scrubber system. This was discovered on the day following the release, when the scrubber system _ limestone was found to be significantly more contaminated than expected under normal conditions. The licensee reported this event, responded to numerous media inquiries, and performed on and offsite surveys. A team of inspectors from NRC Region III went to the plant site to evalurte the release and the licensee's actions. The licensee subsequently inquired if these actions could suffice for the annual
-exercise of the emergency plan, since much of the actions expected in such an exercise (other than plant evacuation) had taken place in actuality.
Region III granted this request, and no emergency exercise was held in 1989.
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' Licensee personnel indicated that the 1990 exercise will involve h
participation with NRC Region III and offsite agencies to an extent which remains to be determined.
The emergency exercise is currently scheduled for the summer of 1990.
I Records of annual evacuation drills were reviewed and found adequate.
Evacuation drills were held on June 19, ?O, and 21,1989, each with a different manufacturing shift.
In each case, plant evacuation time was slightly over two minutes. The evacuation drill p
conducted on June.19, 1989 included contact with the local Sherrif.
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Documentation related to tests of the nuclear alarm system was L
reviewed and found adequate, Based upon the above findings, this portion of the licensee's
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program was acceptable.
V e.
Fire Protection Due to criticality safety considerations (water is a moderator) water is forbidden as a fire extinguishing agent onsite, and there are no sprinkler systems installed. During the course of this inspection, the inspector checked a number of fire extinguishers and found current inspection stickers and acceptable extinguisher pressures. The equipment appeared to be in an acceptable state of operational readiness. A monthly fire extinguisher check, including Scott air packs, is performed.
Based upon the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptable.
4.
Exit Interview (Ip 30703)
On February 9, 1990, the inspector met with those ' licensee representatives identified in Section 1 to present the preliminary inspection findings. The inspector provided his evaluation that the Combustion Engineering Hematite emergency preparedness program was being-adequately maintained.
The licensee indicated that none of the matters discussed during the exit interview were proprietary.
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