ML20059M486
| ML20059M486 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07000036 |
| Issue date: | 11/07/1993 |
| From: | France G, Mccann G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20059M459 | List: |
| References | |
| 70-0036-93-03, 70-36-93-3, NUDOCS 9311190116 | |
| Download: ML20059M486 (15) | |
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION III Report No. 070-00036/93003(DRSS)
Docket No. 070-00036 License No.
SNM-33 Licensee: Combustion Engineering, Inc.
Nuclear Power Systems Windsor, CT 06095 Facility Name: Hematite Facility Inspection At: Hematite, Missouri Inspection Conducted: September 20-24, 1993 AntL/lh Ihr% % 0)I M%
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r In.,pector:
George'M. France, III Date Fuel Facilities Inspector Mhdo 3 /D)
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A-Approved By:
George' M. McCann, Chief Date Fuel Facility and Decommissioning Section Inspection Summary Inspection on September 20-24. 1993 (Report No. 070-00036/93003 (DRSS))
Areas Inspected:
This was an unannounced routine safety inspection of requirements specified in NRC regulations and license conditions. The inspection involved an evaluation of the licensee's performance in the areas of Management Organization and Controls (IP 88005); Radiation Protection (IP 83822); Operations Review (IP 88020); Transportation of Radioactive Materials (IP 86740); Criticality Safety (IP 88015); Fire Protection (IP 88055); and Radioactive Waste Management (IP 88035).
Results: Three violations were identified:
(1) an operator failed to close a sampling line valve and subsequently caused the release of uranium hexafluoride into the work area. This was a violation of the licensee's sampling procedure as described in Operating Sheet, OS 601.10; (2) the remains of three cardboard boxes were stored on the cylinder storage pad.
This violated License Condition No. 28., which prohibits the storage of combustible material on the UF, cylinder storage pad; and (3) the licensee failed to obtain a nasal smear from an operator prior to the operator taking a shower, after a U0, release. This violated Operating Sheet No. 324 which requires a nasal smear when calculated exposures are greater than 40 MPC hours.
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i Six Inspector concerns were identified as follows:
(1) frequent seal leaks, i
operator error, powder buildup, and untimely maintenance in operating the slugging press; (2) cylinder storage does not meet accepted practices as J
discussed in OR0-651 and ANSI N665 Fuel Cycle Fire Protection Standards; I
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(3) the sequence for sampling the R-1 and R-2 reactors should be reviewed by l
the Plant Safety Committee to distinguish between operator convenience and 3
l procedure requirements; (4) stack effluent data is approaching quarterly release limit. Data should be reviewed to ensure accuracy and steps taken to
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prevent a similar occurrence; (5) the licensee should examine the build up of zirconium oxide dust in and around the fuel rod scanner and mitigate any i
concern for fire safety; and (6) retrain operators and health physics i
j technicians on proper response to continuous air monitoring alarms. The slugging press incident indicated that more coordination is needed between 4
operators and HP technicians.
i The following improvement was noted in the licensee's program: A design improvement was noted during this inspection.
Specifically, the licensee had modified the lines to the two vaporizers to include carbon dioxide extinguishers. The extinguisher can be discharged during an accidental j
release which will quickly solidify any UF, releases from cylinders.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
- S. Borell, Manager, Chemical Operations E. Criddle, Supervisor, Health Physics
- H. Eskridge, Manager, Regulatory Compliance K. Hayes, Industrial Safety (Corporate)
- A. Keklak, Health Physicist G. Kersteen, Manager Assembly Operations R. Matchell, Process Engineer
- R. Miller, Manager, Administration and Production Control 1
- G. Palmer, Manager, Ceramic Operations B. Pigg, Supervisor, Chemistry Laboratory
- A, Noack, Manager, Facilities
- Indicates attendance at the exit meeting on September 24, 1993.
Other licensee employees contacted included, engineers, technicians, production operators, and office personnel.
2.
License Proaram Combustion Engineering's Hematite facility, produces uranium dioxide (U0,) fuel for the commercial nuclear power industry.
Low enriched uranium hexafluoride (UF ) limited to maximum enrichment of 5%
uranium-235 is received from Department of Energy (DOE) uranium enrichment / gaseous di. fusion facilities in 2.5 ton, 30 inch diameter cylinders. The licensee processes UF, through a series of reactors (R-1, R-2 and R-3) where UF, is converted to an oxide powder (U0,). The U0, powder is pelletized, packaged as fuel rods and ultimately used for commercial fuel.
3.
Manaaement Oraanization and Controls (IP 88005)
Hematite's staff was comprised of 164 workers and eight temporary workers as of September 1, 1993.
Hematite's Management oversight is supplemented by specialist from the corporate staff. These specialist conduct independent audits of the licensed program.
The inspector reviewed an independent corporate audit of the transportation program conducted on August 16-20, 1993. No violations of 10 CFR Part s 7?. 137, were identified during the audit.
Part s 71.137 requires the licensee to verify compliance and quality assurance (QA) of its transportation activities.
These audits are to be conducted by knowledgeable personnel, who do not report to the manager that administers transportation activities.
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The audit summary indicated that the licensee's QA program was adequate.
Two health physics technicians have been added to the radiation protection staff since the previous inspection (Inspection Report No. 070-00036/93002). The licensee indicated that this should improve the efficiency of providing radiological safety coverage throughout the pl ant. The radiation protection staff now consist of 5 full time technicians and two temporary technicians.
The inspector concluded that the licensee's audit of transportation activities demonstrates compliance with 10 CFR Part s 71.137 Audits.
Additionally, the increased presence of health physics technicians in production areas should help workers perform tasks with improved ALARA practices.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Operations Review (IP 88020)
On September 20-24, 1993, the inspector made daily plant tours to observe operations in the licensee's uranium hexafluoride (UF.) cylinder receiving and storage areas, oxide pellet operation, and fuel rod assembly plant.
a.
UF, Cylinder Receivina and Storace Areas The placement of cylinders in the UF, cylinder receiving room and vaporizer stations complied with posted requirements. However, the inspector observed that the remains of two cardboard boxes plus a third cardboard box that contained metal turnings were stored on the cylinder storage pad. The inspector acknowledged that the limited quantity of combustible' materials that were present on the storage pad, if ignited, would not cause any of the cylinders to reach 250" F.
According to the Oak Ridge manual for UF. cylinder handling, OR0-650, at this temperature closed cylinders of UF, would possibly deform and rupture. However, the presence of combustible materials in the cylinder storage area violates the following license condition: According to Special Nuclear Material License No. SNM-33, license Condition No. 28. no combustibles shall be stored on the concrete pad. Violation (V10 No. 070-00036/93003-01)
Other combustible materials, a woeden sawhorse and a 4 x 8 section of plywood were located in the proximity of stored cylinders. An array of cylinders protruded into a weed patch where the growth was more than a foot high. bnattended, the growth could continue, dry, and become more of a fire hazard than the cardboard boxes mentioned above.
In addition to combustible materials located on the cylinder storage pad, two cylinders containing heel quantities of UF, (less than 5 pounds) were stored adjacent to the vaporizer building. A garden hose, a wheel barrow, a cylinder valve cap, seven 55 gallon drums (probably containing limestone gravel), and a metal tube / pipe were either located on the storage pad or in 4
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proximity of the pad. According to the American National Standard for Nuclear Fuel Facilities (ANSI N665-1985) Lection 5.4 Uranium Hexafluoride Storage, storage areas should be separated by at least 50 feet from buildings and other storage areas.
Consequently, the licensee's cylinder storage practices do not meet the recommended practices discussed in ANSI N665.
1 The licensee also showed a weakness in managing the cylinder storage yard. Material handlers are responsible for l
receiving / shipping UF, cylinders. However, it was not clear as to i
which department has responsibility for maintaining the cylinder storage yard, material handlers from transportation, or operators from chemical operations. This chain of custody matter should be clearly defined. In addition, storage practices and procedures should be compared to ANSI N665 and OR0-651 practices. Management oversight of the cylinder storage yard will be reviewed during a l
future inspection as an inspection follow-up item (IFI l
No. 070-00036/93003-01).
b.
Uranium 0xide (U0,) Operations i
The inspector interviewed a health physics technician and two oxide operators using Line 2 oxide pellet press. The technician stated that the warning light on the continuous air monitor (CAM) i had blinked indicating the presence of radioactive airborne particulate, U0,, or a false alarm. The inspector had observed that the pellet machine was being cleaned in preparation for an i
assay change, or a change in the uranium-235 concentration of U0,.
l The health physics technician determined that the air sampler l
filter showed no discoloration which would indicate release of l
l U0,. The CAM alarm, normally set at 25% below MPC, was not l
l al arming. Hence, it was concluded that work could continue.
The inspector observed that an operator running the pellet press could be in the path way of U0, powder falling through the second floor opening.
The slugging press is located on the second floor directly above the pellet press, with the U0, transfer line connecting the two presses through the second floor opening. The operators stated that they normally work without hair protection.
Consequently, operators have detected hair contamination during routine personal surveillance. Although caps / bonnets are provided for the operators, there is no policy that requires the operators to wear the caps.
The licensee plans to cover the opening in the second floor in conjunction with a modification of the slugging press. The modification is scheduled to be completed by the second quarter 1994. This project will be reviewed during a future inspection (IFI No. 070-00036/93003-02).
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Control Room Operations In the gaseous diffusion process / uranium enrichment process Freon-ll4, a liquid fluorocarbon is used as a refrigerant. The Freon could cause elevated pressures in UF, cylinders if not i
completely purged from the fill tank. According to the American National Standards Institute ANSI N14.1, UF, shall be shipped only after it has solidified and the vapor pressure of the cylinder has been measured to be below one atmosphere. Cylinders received at CE Hematite typically contain UF. under sub-atmospheric pressures, or vacuum, ranging from 14 to 27 inches of mercury. Operators maintain a log of pressure checks for each cylinder. According to the control room log 22 cylinders had been pressure checked since August 6, 1993. The sub-atmospheric pressures ranged from 9 through 26 inches of mercury which is consistent with previous measurements. The licensee's procedure for pressure checking cylinders was described in Inspection Report No. 070-00036/93001.
One violation and two open items were identified.
5.
Criticality Safety (IP 88015)
During a tour of the erbium oxide pellet room, the inspector observed ten filled mop water pails stored in the vicinity of a ventilation blower, and spaced more than 12 inches apart. The laboratory analysis indicated that the uranium concentration was 27 grams per liter in at least one container. The licensee committed to storing mop water in fixed arrays when the uranium concentration exceeds 25 grams per liter.
Further investigation disclosed that a nuclear safety analysis had been completed, the storage area was identified on an engineering drawing, and operations was waiting on maintenance to install the fixed array (metal rings mounted on the cement floor, used for storing containers of SNM). Consequently, no violation was issued and maintenance completed the installation during the inspection.
The inspector also observed the operation of the screw fed device on the erbium oxide press, the prototype to be used on the U0, slugging press during second quarter 1994. This design should lessen the difficulty of operating the slugging press, while enhancing the ALARA concept.
Fixed arrays of SNM material stored in 5 gallon buckets and UO, oxide powder stored in bulk storage hoppers complied with posted nuclear safety instructions.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Radiation Protection (IP 83822)
The inspector reviewed the licensee's unusual occurrence file, and internal exposure control programs including the required records, reports and notifications.
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Source leak Checks In accordance with Licer.se Condition No. 13., leak tests were performed on two cobalt sources at the scheduled six month frequency (October 1992, and March 1993).
No problems were identified.
b.
Internal Excosures The following discusses the circumstances surrounding two unusual occurrences as identified and investigated by the licensee, and reviewed by the inspector:
i (1)
Urinalysis results of an operator and a health physics technician involved in a UF. release, were respectfully reported as 30 and 31 micrograms per liter (pg U/1). These levels exceeded the licensee's action level of 25 gg/1.
An operator was attempting to sample Uranyl fluoride (U0,F,)
from the R-1 reactor, where the hydrolysis products, 00,F, end HF are formed. The sampling manifold has a top and bcttom valve, with the entire manifold enclosed in a ventilation hood.
U0,F, is transferred from R-1 to the top valve. According to Operating Sheet No. 601.10, U0,F, Sampling; Sampling Procedure for R-1 Reactor," the following was required:
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Open the top valve of the sample line and l
let the accumulated material drain into the line between the two valves.
Close the top valve. Open the bottom valve and drain the material into the sample can. Close the bottom valve.
i The operator opened the top valve to allow the material t' drain into the sample line between the two valves. He then closed the top valve and opened the bottom valve to allow the material to drain into the sample container. The operator proceeded to sample R-2 reactor which was nearby.
However, the bottom valve on the R-1 reactor sampling line I
was still open. Within minutes, the fire alarm was activated by the white cloud escaping from the R-1 l
ventilation hood.
The top valve although closed had a bleed through, or leaked, and with the bottom valve open allowed l
U0,F, to escape. The hood is ventilated through the third l
floor filter bank. The smoke detector on the inlet side of the filter banks detected what appeared to be smoke and shutdown the ventilation blower for the Oxide Plant according to design. Without ventilation, the combination of UF., 00,F, and HF escaped from the sample hood into the-third floor area. Consequently, the operator's failure to close the bottom valve violates Operating Sheet 601.10, (VIO No. 07000036/93003-02).
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The inspector agreed with the assessment of the exposure to the operator and the HP tech. The operator inhaled a small amount of UF, (31 ug U/1 by the urinalysis result) while evacuating the area. When the emergency team made their initial response to the alarm they observed white smoke and immediately evacuated.
Consequently, the emergency teams exposure level was significantly less than the action level of 25 ug U/1. The HP tech arrived while the emergency team was evacuating. Being the last person to evacuate, she was probably exposed at that time (30 pg U/l).
The emergency team donned Scott Air Packs and returned to l
the third floor to assess and secure the area. The emergency team entered the area with adequate respiratory protection. This effort complies with 10 CFR Part s 20 requirements and the licensee's emergency procedures.
i Exposures to the operator and the health physics technician were less than 1 MPC-hours.
In reviewing the unusual occurrence, the inspector identified the following concern: Whether the operator i
should be allowed to start sampling the R-2 reactor while j
sampling is still ongoing at the R-1 sample hood may be a matter of operator preference cnd not covered by the procedure. This issue will be reviewed for its safety significance during a future inspection (IFI No. 070-00036/93003-03).
(2)
The second issue deals with a U0, exposure to a slugging press operator (line # 2) which occurred on July 2, 1993.
Based on fecal sample analysis, the operator's exposure level was 67 MPC-hours.
The inspector's review disclosed that the record of the occurrence, evaluation, and actions taken by the licensee were in compliance with 10 CFR Part s 20.103 (b) (2).
Part s 20.103 requires the licensee to evaluate and maintain a record of the intake when any individual exceeds the 40 hour4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br /> control measure, as specified for insoluble uranium in Appendix B, Table 1, of this part.
However, the actions taken by the operator and a health physics technician violated the licensee's procedure for handling airborne releases. According to Operating Sheet No. 324, " Airborne Release," Section B. 1. " Collecting and Counting Nasal Smears," the employee shall be directed to meet the health physics technician in the clear area for a nasal smear prior to cleaning the nose or showering.
l Interviews of the operator and the technician confirmed that they did not meet in the clear area.
Furthermore, the operator showered before a nasal sample could be collected.
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The licensee investigated and documented this issue in an j
occurrence report.
After review of the occurrence report, i
the inspector agreed with the licensee's conclusion, that i
is, failure to follow Operating Sheet No. 324 is a violation j
of the licensee's health and safety procedure (VIO No. 010-1 00036/93003-03). Documentation and inspector findings I
indicate that the operator had difficulty managing the i
slugging press throughout the shift.
If not properly i
maintained, the slugging press may cause the release and resuspension of U0, powder, as a potential source of 1
inhalation exposure.
The inspector concluded that several factors contributed to i
the operator's exposure. The operator had less than six J
months experience in operating the slugging press.
2 Secondly, U0, powder may release into the work area, when an operator uses a mallet to tap the outside of the transfer 1
chute in order to make the powder flow. The inspector observed that U0, powder leaks are minimized by either i
caulking or taping the connecting seal around the transfer line. The licensee informed the inspector that a modification of the powder transfer chute is being tested on the erbium oxide powder slugging press.
If tests prove to be adequate, the device will be adapted for the U0, slugging press. The modification, scheduled for completion during the second quarter 1994, will contain a screw thread feed of l
powder-to-slugging press rather than the gravity slope chute i
that is currently used. This should eliminate the need for i
operators to tap on the transfer chute to enhance powder flow.
The inspector examined two other problems associated with J
the slugging press:
(1) the slugging press is located on the second floor. Oxide flows from the slugging press to the granulator and through transfer lines that extend from the second floor to the pellet press, located on the first floor. The transfer lines are visible through an opening between the second and first floors. The licensee plans to close the opening between the first and second floor during the scheduled modification. This should prevent the possibility of U0, powder falling through the floor opening
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and contaminating workers at the pellet press; and (2) in addition, during a work shift U0, powder accumulates in the base of the slugging press.
In accordance with the operating procedure, the operator vacuums'the slugging press base in order to recycle the powder. Operators are trained to wear respiratory protection before vacuuming. The i
operator involved in the slugging press incident stated that j
she wore a respirator while vacuuming oxide powder that accumulates on the base of the slugging press.
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l After the occurrence, the slugging press was eventually taken off-line for maintenance.
It was indicated that the i
doors to the base of the press were not sealing. The operator was suppose to hold or press the doors tightly while operating the press. This practice of holding the door and operating the slugging machine appears to be a poor operational process.
Apparently, experienced operators have developed certain techniques in operating the slugging press, where the incident above describes a problem of an inexperienced operator. Nevertheless, it is not clear as to what the operating status of the slugging press must be before it can be scheduled for maintenance.
This will be reviewed during a future inspection.
Operations complained that the health physics staff's response to the incident was untimely.
This was caused by a problem with the pager system.
The communication system was l
recently installed and a mix up on the HP pager number caused confusion.
Since the incident involving the slugging press, all plant personnel have been advised about the correct pager number, and the operator and the health physics technicians were counseled regarding the importance of following procedures.
The inspector concluded that operators and health physics technicians should be retrained on responding to emergencies, such that procedures are followed. The licensee should assess the efficiency of operation of all operator controlled equipment to ensure that maintenance is timely and that ALARA practices are maintained.
The licensee's actions in resolving these concerns will be reviewed during future inspections (IFI-070-00036/93003-04).
c.
Other Unusual Occurrences During annual maintenance a bank of HEPA filters was destroyed by HF gas infiltrating the ventilation system. When the plant is down for maintenance latent HF is usually captured by a small liquid bubbler - scrubber. The latent volume of HF overwhelmed l
the scrubber and the escaping vapor was drawn into the filter banks.
The HF reacted with the filter media causing particles from the filter to be vented through the stack. Any UO, powder embedded in the media was also vented.
An area survey was l
performed and filter material was found on the roof and the plant grounds.
Neither filter media, or elevated counts were detected off-site.
The stack sampling data indicated that about 80 gCi (2.96 Mbq) was released to the environs. According to License Condition No. 20. A., there is a quarterly stack release limit of 150 gCi (5.55 Mbq). Although the license was not violated, stack sampling data was estimated at 140 gCi (5.18 Mbq) which is slightly less than the quarterly limit. The final stack sampling data along with engine. ring plans designed to prevent a similar incident will be reviewed during a future inspection (IFI-070-00036/93003-05).
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Two violations and three inspection concerns were identified.
7.
Transportation of Radioactive Material (IP 86740)
The inspector observed the preparation and shipment of fuel bundles from the fuel rod plant.
Both the driver and the licensee's material handler performed a safety check of the vehicle including, the fuel assembly tie-down to the truck bed. The preparation proceeded according to l
Operating Sheet No. 3420, " Loading, Fastening Container on Conveyance Vehicle." DOE Form 741 was reviewed and found to be in order.
The driver indicated that the truck was equipped with satellite communication which enabled him to maintain communications with base operations throughout the trip.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Radioactive Waste Manaaement (IP 88035) i The licensee has not completed procedures for handling rad waste in the erbium oxide pellet room.
Contaminated materials whether combustible or noncombustible, are packaged and stored for future uranium recovery operations.
In the fuel rod loading plant, pellets removed from defective rods are recycled. Defective rods are segmented, decontaminated, and shipped off-site for recycling. Residual contaminated waste is recycled through the scrap recovery plant. According to knowledgeable staff no more than a few drums of waste is expected to be generated in an operating year.
No problems were identified.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Fire Protection (IP 88055)
The inspector observed operations in the fuel rod loading plant, and held discussions with several workers and members of the staff regarding fire protection.
Class D dry powder type fire extinguishers used to combat fires in combustible metals, such as magnesium, zirconium, uranium, and sodium were available. A Class D extinguisher was accessible in an area less than 75 feet from workers performing tasks in areas of " low to moderate hazard occupancy."
The zirconium metal used in the fuel rods was test defined for l
ignitibility according to NFPA requirements. Apparently, flame propagation from the zirconium is not likely.
At one work station the operator uses a deflashing lathe to remove a metal ring that forms on the zirconium rod during a final weld.
Although the ignitibility of the rods met NFPA test requirements for l
flame propagation, the worker placed a container of water in the 11
vicinity to catch the metal scrap. This method of control appeared to meet the " metal scrap and dust control" requirements of NFPA 482.
The inspector observed that zirconium oxide powder was collecting on the tube exit slide where the rod exits through the fuel scanner chamber.
While no fire hazard is imminent, the licensee will examine this r
phenomenon more closely. The inspector will review this concern during a future inspection (IFI No. 070-00036/93005-06).
No violations, but one inspection concern was identified.
10.
l.icensee Actions on Previous Inspection Findinas (Closed) Inspection Follow-up Item or IFI No. 070-00036/93001-01:
Shipping paper checklist not clear for checking exclusive use versus nonexclusive use carrier.
The inspector confirmed that the format was revised and that material i
handlers or others can select the appropriate category from the shipping l
check off list.
(Closed) Inspection Follow-up Item or IFI No. 070-00036/93001-02:
10 CFR Part f 71.137 requires that audits of transportation program be performed by members of the licensee staff who are not accountable to the manager responsible for transportation activities.
The inspector confirmed that the auditors report dated August 16-20, 1993, demonstrates an independent audit was performed by trained personnel who were knowledgeable but not accountable for transportation activities.
(Closed) Inspection follow-up Item or IFI No. 070-00036/93001-03:
Other than through the knowledge of the records clerk, the inspector was unable to distinguish whether workers attending generic training were categorized as new hires, seasoned workers, or contractors, or whether the workers were scheduled for training or retraining.
The inspector confirmed that attendance forms were modified.
Each employee is required to sign the attendance sheet under a specific work category, as discussed above, 11.
Exit Meetina The scope and findings of the inspection were discussed with the licensee's principal staff at the close of the on-site inspection on September 24, 1993.
The inspector stated that the incident involving the failure of the operator to close the R-1 reactor sampling valve violated a procedure. The inspector informed the licensee that a violation will be issued.
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The inspector stated that other concerns, such as the circumstances surrounding cylinder storage criteria and slugging press operations, were to be discussed with NRC Region III management.
- Subsequently, these concerns were identified as violations (see Section 4. a. Operations Review and Section 6. b.
(1) and (2) Radiation Protection). The inspector informed the licensee of these violations by telephone on October 5, 1993.
The licensee acknowledged the absence of clear delineation of management responsibility for the care and operation of the cylinder storage pad and the surrounding storage area (see Section
- 4. Operations Review).
The licensee stated that plans are in place to modify the slugging press and close the second floor opening above the pellet press during the second quarter of 1994, (see Section 6. Radiation Protection).
The licensee indicated that the HF chemical reaction incident caused a release of U0, at concentrations that approached the quarterly stack release limit, for the quarter ending September 30, 1993. Since their estimates were conservative, the licensee agreed to recalculate the data (see Section 6. c.
Radiation Protection).
During the course of the inspection and the exit meeting, the licensee did not identify any documents or inspector statements and references to specific process as proprietary.
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Reaion III Concerns While performing a routine inspection of licensee activities on September 20-24, 1993, the inspector identified the following concerns, or Inspection follow-up Items IIFI) to be addressed by the licensee.
Responses should include the dates when review, or corrective action is completed, or scheduled for completion.
IFI No. 070-00036/93003-01: The inspector observed that the cylinder storage pad and contiguous area is in disarray.
Identify the cognizant manager of the cylinder storage pad and the area i
contiguous to cylinder storage.
Provide assurance that operators and j
material handlers have been retrained to maintain the cylinder storage j
area in accordance with OR0-651 Uranium Hexafluoride: Manual of Good Handling Practices.
Review ANSI N665 Standard for Nuclear Fuel Facilities, Section 5.4 Uranium Hexafluoride Storage, and ensure that cylinder storage arrays are separated by at least 50 feet from buildings and other storage areas.
Consider posting storage requirements that prohibits the storage of unauthorized material in the cylinder storage area. Consider installing a concrete, or gravel barrier between the cylinders and the vegetation growing in the area contiguous to the cylinders.
IFI No. 070-00036/93003-02: The inspector observed that tape and caulking material were used to seal components of the slugging press (the powder transfer chute and the panels in rear of the press).
Redefine the procedure and technique needed for each operator to operate the slugging press and retrain operators to maintain good ALARA practices.
Consider establishing a policy on issuing and enforcing the donning of head gear (cotton cloth bonnet) for operators using the slugging press, the pellet press, or other equipment where an aerosol of oxide powder is likely to occur. Describe the severity of an operating condition that would require the foreman to schedule maintenance for the slugging press.
In the described incident, it did not appear that maintenance was performed in a timely manner.
IFI No. 070-00036/93003-03: Sampling R-1 and R-2 reactors.
Discuss the safety implications of operator preference when the operator elects to sample reactor R-2 before completing the sampling on reactor R-1. The Plant Safety Committee should review this concern and modify the procedure accordingly.
IFI No. 070-00036/93003-04: Operator and health physics technician responsibility in response to air monitor alarm.
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An apparent weakness regarding the response to air monitor alarms was identified during the inspection.
Retraining of operators and technicians appears appropriate, such that health and safety practices and emergency procedures are followed.
IFI No. 070-00036/93003-05: The chemical reaction of HF on HEPA filter media caused deterioration of filter material and led to the stack release of SNM.
Refine the stack release calculation and determine whether or not the accumulative stack effluent exceeded the quarterly limit. Describe the engineering changes that are planned to protect the ventilation system by collecting / scrubbing the latent fumes of hydrogen fluoride.
IFI No. 070-00036/93003-06: Dust purported to be zirconium oxide is accumulating on the tube / rod slide where the rods exit the fuel scanner.
Identify the powder by appropriate chemical analysis and assure by periodic inspection that there is no build up of powder in the scanner chamber, or pathway of the rod. Discuss by reference, the assessment and mitigation of fire protection concerns such as, combustible metal oxide, associated with the powder.
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