ML20126B206
| ML20126B206 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07000036 |
| Issue date: | 12/09/1992 |
| From: | France G, Wiedeman D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20126B198 | List: |
| References | |
| 70-0036-92-05, 70-36-92-5, NUDOCS 9212220009 | |
| Download: ML20126B206 (9) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION Ill Report No. 70-0036/92005(DRSS)
Docket No. 070-00036 License No.SNM-33 Licensee: Combustion Engineering, Inc.
Nuclear Power Systems Windsor, CT 06095 Facility Name:
Hematite Facility Inspection At:
Hematite, Missouri Inspection Conducted:
November 16-20, 1992 Inspector:
Y GeorgelM. France, III Date Fuel Facilities Ins e or M
Approved By:
D'. G. Wiedeman, Acting Chi ~e'f Date'
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Fuel Facilities and Contaminated Sites Section Inspection Summary Insoection on November 16-20.1992 (Recort No. 70-0036/92005(DRSS))
Areas Inspectet This was an unannounced routine safety inspection of facility requirements specified in NRC regulations, license and license conditions. The inspection involved a review of the licensee's activities in the areas of Radiation Protection (IP 83822); Fire Protection (IP 88055);
Transportation of Radioactive Material (IP 86740); Operations Review (IP 88020); Maintenance and Surveillance Testing (IP 88025); Criticality Safety (IP 88015); Environmental Protection (IP 88045); and Radiation Waste Mar.agement (IP 88035).
Results: Within the scope of the inspection, two violations were identified, However, both violations were mitigated due to self-identification by the licensee, in one instance, the lack of degradation of any safety control, and the effort expended by the licensee in correcting the problem in each violation.
The violations included an inaccurate data sheet on a container located in a storage array approved for criticality safety, and the storage of waste oil in an unauthorized area.
Both are considered procedure violations, with no degradation to safety controls, f
9212220009 921209 PDR ADOCK 07000036 C
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
- S. Bore 11, Consulting Engineering, Asea, Brown, Boveri, Inc.
- E. Criddle, Supervisor, Health Physics
- L. Deul, Consulting Engineering
- H. Eskridge, Manager, Nuclear Licensing, Safety & Accountability
- R. Fromm, Manager, Quality Assurance
- L. Grossman, Director, Manufacturing Technology R. Moore, Supervisor, Maintenance R. Miller, Manager, Administration and Production Control
- A. Noack, Production Superintendent
- J. Rode, Plant Manager P. Weaver, Production Scheduler
- Denotes licensee attendance at the exit meeting on hovember 20, 1992.
The inspector also interviewed other licensee safety and production personnel.
2.
License Procram The Combustion Engineering facility at Hematite, Missouri, produces uranium dioxide (U0,) fuel for the commercial nuclear power industry.
Low enriched uranium hexafluoride (UF.) limited to a maximum enrichment of E% uranium-235 is received from Department of Energy (DOE) uranium enrichment / gaseous diffusion facilities in 2 1/2 ton, 30 inch diameter cylinders.
The licensee processes UF, through a series of reactors (R-1, R-2, and R-3) where UF, is converted to an oxide powder.
The powder is pelletized, shipped to a fuel fabricator and ultimately used for commercial fuel.
3.
Fadiation Protection (IP 83822)
The inspector reviewed the licensee's exposure control programs including the required records, reports and notifications.
Results of whole body counts were also discussed, a.
Monthly bioassay samples are analyzed by the licensee's corporate laboratory which is located in Windsor, Connecticut. An examination of bioassay data covering 503 urine samples collected during March through October 1992, operation period disclosed that the highest result was 7 MPC-hours.
The licensee's corporate radiation protection department provided an independent calculation to confirm that the regulatory limit for uranium exposure was not exceeded.
Hence, there was no indication that any sample result exceeded the 40 MPC-hour intake limit (derived NRC intake limit is 9.6 milligrams soluble uranium in a work-week).
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Ouiing this period, the licensee's contractor performed 113 in vivo measurements on union and non-union workers. There was no significant measurement above the detection limit of 63 pg of uranium.
b.
External Exposure Control A review of the licensee's film badge data disclosed that the highest exposure accumulation to any individual was 1.3 rem through October 1992.
However, a follow up review by the Health Physics Supervisor indicated that the badge was probably contaminated. The data indicated that for the period observed all film badge measurements were below the quarterly occupational dose of 3 rems (10 CFR Part 20.101 Radiation dose standards).
The inspector also reviewed the dosimetry reports of 18 workers that were assigned finger badges, The workers perform daily tasks in quality contrel of oxide pellet operations, oxide grinder operations, and pellet press operations.
During a four week period of February and March 1992 operations, the highest exposure reported was 60 millirem.
The inspector concluded that the reported exposure levels were significantly less than the permissible doses (18.75 rems per quarter) allowed in 10 CFR Part 20.101, " Radiation dose standards for individuals in restricted areas."
c.
Maintainina Exoosures As low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA)
During a tour of the oxide production facility, the inspector observed that the licensee had enclosed the two uranium oxide collection stations (splash box) with separate hoods for ventilation. Uranium oxide chemically formed in the reactors designated as R-2 and R-3 can be removed from the reactors via blow back valves at either of the collection stations.
Splashing of the oxide via venting has occasionally occurred. The release of oxide generally causes an increase in the radioactive airborne levels.
The installation of the ventilation hoods should mitigate the resuspension of uranium oxide powder from the collection stations and reduce exposure to both operators and maintenance workers to a level that is ALARA. The licensee demonstrated that the effort made to maintain radiation exposures ALARA is commensurate with 10 CFR Part 20.1 (c).
d.
Airborne Measurements The licensee charts weekly exposure to operators, quality control specialist, material control operators, and maintenance workers from airborne particulate matter.
The highest accumulative exposure to any one worker was about 42% of the quarterly limit, 3
L or 2.17 MPC-hours for the July through September 1992 operating period.
The Health Physics Supervisor indicated that the exposure data was-derived from counting the workers lapel sample._ There was also__an indication that the maintenance workers lapel sample may have been contaminated during the course of his duties. The inspector noted that although' the worker's lapel sample disclosed significant exposure, there was no indication of an inhalation problem or a lung burden, as determined by in vivo measurements.
The inspector concluded that the licensee's program for radiation exposure control as reviewed during this inspection, appeared to meet license conditions and regulatory requirements.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Maintenance and Surveillance Testina (IP 88025)
The inspector noted that the licensee had made significant improvement in documenting the maintenance performed on systems and equipment that handle Special Nuclear Material. The Maintenance Supervisor disclosed that forms used to document the maintenance and safe operation of critical items such as, equipment used in the movement of UF. cylinders were revised during September 1992.
The revised form includes a numbered Operating Sheet, O. S. 4002 for fork lift maintenance and 0. S.
4003 for maintaining the overhead crane. In-addition, the 0. S. refers the maintenance worker to a maintenance manual to review the _ appropriate-inspection procedure. This equipment is essential to plant operations in the receipt, storage, and retrieval of filled or empty UF, cylinders.
Procedures that describe instrument maintenance will be-reviewed during a future inspection.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Ooerations Review-(IP 88020) and Criticality Safety (IP 88015)-
The inspector toured the facility and observed the licensee's plant operations and operator performance relative to compliance with nuclear criticality safety requirements.
In October of 1991, NRC issued Bulletin 91-01, requesting licensees.to provide a description-of their-process to idertify and report' a loss or.significant degradation of a-criticality safety control. The licensees's response to Bulletin 91-01 is still under NRC review.
During a-plant tour, the inspector observed that transfer carts containing U0, peilets were parked at least 1 foot from other_00,.
processing equipment, such as the' pellet press, the hoods' at the 4
micronization station, and the dewaxer. The inspector also noted that the molybdenum boats containing UO pellets were placed in nonstacking arrays.
The inspector concluded tbat oxide pilet handling was proceeding according to the licensees approved procedure No. 1702.10,
" Transferring Pellet Sintering Boats." No problems were observed.
An apparent violation was mitigated in the storage of SNM material. The label on one five gallon storage container showed 21.55 kgs of U0, material enriched to 4.4% uranium-235.
This clearly violated the posted nuclear criticality safety requirement which allowed an enrichment of 4.3% for up to 22 kgs of U0,.
The production scheduler resolved the problem by performing a computer trace on the history of the container and the SNM material. Apparently, the material consisted of mixed enrichments and the label reflected the highest known enrichment.
The computer trace indicated that a sample of the mixture was blended and analyzed for isotopic enrichment.
The actual assay was 3.7% uranium-235. About 27 Kgs of heterogeneous U0, may be stored at an enrichment of 3.7%.
Consequently, there was no degradation of nuclear safety parameters and no response would be required under NRC Bulletin 91-01.
A corrected label was placed on the container.
During a tour of the scrap recovery area, the inspector noted that the nuclear safety posting on the waste slurry make up hood was too restrictive. The posting allowed SNM material handling up to a maximum enrichment of 4.1% uranium-235, while the license allows a maximum of 5%
uranium-235.
The licensee agreed to reword the posting to allow the handling of the maximum licensed enrichment.
Operating Sheet 0. S.1702.12, " Removing 011 From Presses," Section c.
states that used unfiltcred press oil should not be stored "anywhere."
Contrary to this requirement two one gallon bottles of used oil was temporarily stored in an area contiguous to the oil collection point.
This procedure violation to Operating Sheet 0. S. 1702.12, was identified by the licensee's consulting engineer, while accompanying the inspector on a tour of the facility.
The inspector reviewed the nuclear safety analysis for handling contaminated oil and determined that the volume of oil cannot exceed 5 gallons.
Consequently, the presence of two gallons of contaminated oil
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does not indicate degradation of the nuclear safety requirement.
The inspector determined that this finding was initiated by self-identification on the part of the licensee. The plant superintendent was notified, appropriate instructions were issued to the operators, and the two containers of waste oil were removed.
The inspector applied the discretionary rule as described in 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C General Statement of Policy and Procedure for applied NRC Enforcement Actions, G. Exercise of discretion, and refrained from issuing a Notice of Violation.
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Product U0, is withdrawn _ from the reactors,_ cooled, and pneumat;cally transferred to storage hoppers. In the intermediate step where the oxide-is cooled the licensee recently discovered a problem. On November 12, 1992, during the transfer of oxide from the reactor to the. cooler the cooler jammed. The jam was caused by an increase in the moisture level.
Previous to the dump, the moisture level of the powder was tested at 0.1%.
The moisture level of the powder that caused the jam was 1.0%. A leak was-discovered in the shell at the entrance end of the cooler.
The cooler moisture sensor tested about two degrees out of the acceptable range. Consequently,.the leak was repaired and the moisture sensor was replaced with the spare unit. Under the nuclear safety analysis the moisture level of the powder remained within the maximum limit of 1.0%
moisture. On that basis there was no degradation of safety parameters nor was the double contingency criteria violated.
This was not reportable under Bulletin 91-01, but the licensee did remp'.y with the Bulletin by documenting the incident.
The licensee noted that although the nuclear safety parameter of 1.0%
moisture was not exceeded, the incident proved that the powder will resist flow at a much lower moisture level.
The licensee indicated that the powder will be transferred into cans and transported to the recycle area, dried, and returned for processing and pelletizing.
The UF, conversion process relies on process steam. Or at least te occasions over the last 4 years, the UF conversion process was interrupted when a faulty sensor caused the steam feed valve to " fail closed." The licensee stated that a back up sensing device (reference legs) was installed.
This arrangement should enable steam to continue to feed the R-1 reactor for the reaction of UF, and steam to form uranyl l
fluoride, (U0,F,) when either sensor is operative.
The inspector also observed construction activities in the new od loading plant.
The utility and ventilation building is now under roof and the concrete floor has been poured throughout the rod loading building.
The project manager indicated.that the construction effort is on schedule, and that arrangements have been made to analyze the oxide pellet storage and retrieval system (Kardex Unit) under the appropriate seismic code.
NRC Region III Office plans to continue monitoring the-licensee's progress in the installation of new equipment required to handle SNM material.
Under a Special Evaluation Traveler, the licensee performed the annual Raschig ring analysis in accordance with the American Nuclear Standards Institute (ANSI) ANSI /ANS 8.5-1986. The test adequately-demonstrated that compliance was met. Three vessels used in scrap recovery operations for processing uranium bearing filtrate and uranyl nitrate solutions in large volumas contain Raschig rings to retard neutron interaction in fissile material.
Samples of the boron impregnated rings were removed from each tank under engineering 6
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surveillance._ The loss of boron (0.016 to.0764%) was chemically determined by the licensees vendor. - The data was consistent with reports filed over the 1978-1992 operating period. No problems were identified.
Certain activities, as described above, appeared to be in violation of NRC rcquirements._ However, the two violations were categorized at Severity Level V and are not being cited because the criteria specified in Section Vll. B. 1 of the " General Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Actions," (Enforcement Policy, 10 CFR Part 2,-
Appendix C (1992), were satisfied.
6.
ltansoortation of Radioactive Materials (IP 86740)
The inspector examined the chipping manifest for three shipments of radioactive contaminated waste. The shipments occurred over the June through October 1592, operating period and consisted mostly of solidified liquid wasta and contaminated limestone chip 2 recovered from the hydrogen fluoride (HF) rock scrubber towers.
The manifest were traceable to the Radiation Protection Department files. These files indicated that dose levels were measured on each shipment.
Smears were also taken and counted for removable alpha and beta contamination. There were no dose levels above 0.1 millirem and smear data was significantly below contamination wipe limits listed in Table Vc of 10 CFR Part 71.87 of the NRC regulations. No problems were identif d in this general area.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Environmental Protection (IP 88045)
The inspector reviewed the licensees environmental sampling program with emphasis on groundwater monitoring.
Sample data is provided by the licensees vendor. Four wells are located in the vicinity of:the old -
burial gymnd. A review of well sample data covering the 1990 through 1992 monitoring period indicates that the radioactive concentration of uranium is significantly _less than 30,000 picocuries per liter which is listed as the maximum permissible concentration limit-for uranium in'-
water (10 CFR Part 20).
The inspector concluded that there was no apparent evidence of groundwater intrusion from_the burial ground.
Region III plans to sample the four wells during a future inspection.
No violations or deviatiors were identified.
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8.
Fire Protection (IP 88055)
The inspector made a special tour of-the facility to trace location of fire alarm " pull down stations." Instructions for activating these alarms are displayed on each device. The process areas are housed with-alarms mounted near exits, stairwells, and near the men and womca's locker room entries. -The second and third floors are equally equipped.
In addition, the filter housing is equipped with smoke detectors.
Both the pull down alarm device and the smoke detector are traceable to the master control panel.
An alarm enunciating on the control panel will identify the plant area of concern and an alarm that signifies a problem in the filter stack will cause the filter stack blower to disengage.
Although, the licensee is still on the learning curve, Fire Protection Teams are being trained to identify the alarmed area, the need for emergency evacuation of a process area, and the development of the capability to respond accordingly.
The Regica III Emergency Preparedness inspector plans to perform a thorough review of the licensees emergency programs during the week of December 7, 1992.
No violations or deviaticns were identified.
9.
Radioactive Waste Manaaement (IP 88035)
Effective October 1992, the licensee's waste management program was divided into seven major cate9 aries.
During a tour of the facility the inspector reviewed the following waste categories:
low level waste for burial, HEPA filters and fiberglass prefilters, recovery feed material, and miscellaneous liquids.
The inspector observed that a summary of waste materials was developed by a staff engineer and lists the material by quantity of material, -
quantity of uranium, and the total volume in each waste category.
The inspector concluded that designating a staff engineer to manage the waste program, and subsequently classifying waste by specific category, should improve the efficiency of waste volume reduction.
The licensee also noted that NRC approval of the pending license amendment which allows the licensee to use limestone rock for onsite land fill, will greatly improve plant area appearance, and eliminate the present practice of storing unsightly limestone rock piles. -The inspector concl:ded that the waste summary should be an excellent guide for monitoring-the' generation, storage, and disposition of contaminated materials.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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10.
DLil Meeting The scope and findings of the inspection were discussed with licensee L:-
representatives denoted in Section 1 of this report at the close of the-onsite inspection on November 20, 1992.
The licensee agreed to increase the uranium enrichment level for processing contaminated materials in the slurry hood.
The inspector stated that the two violations were mitigated because of the licensee's self-identification in one area, and the effort expended by the licensee to initiate immediate corrective actions in both areas.
During the course of the inspection and exit meeting, the licensee did not identify any documents or statements and references to specific processes as proprietary.
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