ML20059G183
| ML20059G183 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07000036 |
| Issue date: | 01/04/1994 |
| From: | France G, Kniceley J, Mccann G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20059G171 | List: |
| References | |
| 70-0036-93-04, 70-36-93-4, NUDOCS 9401240027 | |
| Download: ML20059G183 (4) | |
Text
,
U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION III Report No. 070-00036/93004(DRSS)
Docket No. 070-00036 License No. SNM-33 Licensee: Combustion Engineering, Inc.
Nuclear Power systems Windsor, CT 05095 Facility Name:
Hematite Facility Inspection At:
Hematite, Missouri Inspection Con ucted: November 30 though December 2, 1993 Inspectors:
k*M Of/CM9 i
Georg/M. France,III Date Fuel -acilities Inspector d~sc W. *4[
.A t/VhV James R. Kn'icele9 O
Date '
~
Physical Security Inspector Approved By:
M N.
D C-
/
Georg6 M. 41cCanni Chief Date /
Fuel Facilities and Decommissioning Section Inspection' Summary Inspection on Novembgr 30 throuah December 2. 1993 (Report No. 070-00036/93004(DRSS))
Areas Insoected: This was a special announced inspection to review open items identified during a previous inspection (Inspection Report No. 070-00036/93003). Other areas reviewed included nuclear safety analyses regarding process and equipment changes.
Results: Within the scope of this inspection, no violations were identified.
The licensee has corrected the deficiencies identified during the previous inspection pertaining to uranium hexafluoride (UF ) cylinder storage.
i 9401240027 940105 PDo ADOCK 07000036 C
PDR 4
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted S. Borell, Manager, Chemical Operations M. Eastburn, Criticality Safety Specialist H. Eskridge, Accountability Manager, Regulatory Compliance S. Junkrans, Vice President, Manufacturing Operations G. Kersteen, Manager, Rod & Assembly Factory R. Klotz, Criticality Specialist A. Noack, Manager, Utilities G. Palmer, Manager, Ceramic Operations Quality Control Technicians J. Rode, Plant Manager The above name persons attended the exit meeting on December 2, 1993.
The inspectors also interviewed selected personnel assigned to pellet production operations, quality control of production operations, and radiation protection.
2.
License Proaram Combustion Engineering's Hematite facility, produces uranium dioxide (UD,) fuel for the commercial nuclear power industry.
Low enriched uranium hexafluoride (UF ) limited to maximum enrichment of 5% uranium-235 is received from Department of Energy (DOE) uranium enrichment / gaseous diffusion facilities in 2.5 ton, 30 inch diameter cylinders.
The licensee processes UF, through a series of reactors (R-
- 1. R-2, and R-3) where UF, is converted to an oxide powder (U0 ).
The 2
U0, powder is pelletized, packaged as fuel rods and used for commercial fuel.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findinas (Closed) Inspection Followup Item (IFI) No. 070-00036/93003-01:
The inspector observed that the cylinder storage pad and contiguous area is in disarray.
The inspector confirmed that UF, cylinders and storage cradles were 1
aligned in an orderly manner and that all unauthorized material had been removed from the contiguous area of the storage pad.
4.
Doerations Review (IP 88020): Criticality Safety (IP 88015)
The inspector observed operations in the licensee's uranium hexafluoride (UF,) cylinder receiving and storage areas, oxide pellet operation, and fuel rod assembly plant.
a.
U_L Cylinder Receivina and Storaae Areas The appearance of the cylinder storage area complied with OR0-650 Oak Ridge manual for UF, cylinder handling.
The cylinders were 2
stored on authorized wooden cradles and the storage crea was maintained according to License Condition No. 28 (no combustibles shall be stored on the concrete pad).
b.
Oxide Pellet Operations During a plant tour the licensee indicated that preparations were underway to start the conversion process, converting UF, to U0, pellets. The inspectors also observed operator performance in pellet production relative to compliance with nuclear criticality safety requirements. Cylinders located in the vaporizer room were stored according to posted limits that allowed two cylinders to be used in the vaporizers. A review of pellet cans in storage arrays indicated that operators placed fissile quantities of oxide in storage arrays consistent with posted limits, quantified and prefixed by the percent enrichment of uranium-235.
On July 9,1993, the licensee performed a physical and chemical analyses of the Raschig rings used to retard neutron interaction in fissile material. Three vessels used in scrap recovery operations for processing uranium bearing filtrate and uranyl nitrate solutions in large volumes contain Raschig rings to retard neutron interaction in fissile material. The hold tanks are used to process uranium bearing solutions generated from uranium waste recovery operations. The original concentration of boron ranged from 11.3 to 13.8 weight percent boron oxide.
Test results averaged 12.23 weight percent boron oxide. Hence, the test adequately demonstrated that compliance was met in accord with the American Nuclear Standards Institute (ANSI) ANSI /ANS 8.5-1986.
The licensee employs an onsite Criticality Specialist and an Accountability Manager, Regulatory Compliance to monitor routine change requests that require a nuclear criticality safety analysis. An independent audit is conducted monthly by the Corporate Criticality Specialist.
Requests which could effect criticality safety such as, movement of equipment or containers which contain fissile material, are handled administratively the same as requests for nuclear and industrial safety process and equipment / facility change proposals.
These proposals require, at least two independent reviews before the request can be approved.
The inspector reviewed the following change requests:
1.
Eliminate the sampling of blended uranium oxide and erbium oxide (UD,/Er,0 ) powders from the 1,000 kilograms air-mix 3
blender for moisture analysis prior to storage.
3 g
f 2.
Install two 6 1/4 x 38 inch columns for washing porus metal filters; filters used to collect uranyl fluoride sol';ds from hydrolysis of UF. with steam.
3.
Use portable HEPA units throughout the facility to collect loose U0, powder. This unit minimizes occupational exposure to airborne contaminants. Commercially available Portable Unit: NFSRPS HEPA Filtration Unit.
4.
Install a powder can roller in the vicinity of a utility.
hood to facilitate preparation of powders for blending.
I The onsite Criticality Specialist remains classified as a
" specialist in training." Therefore, the independent review for l
record and compliance is conducted by the Corporate Criticality Specialist and the Accountability Manager.
Based upon records reviewed, the inspectors determined-that each criticality safety analysis had been independently reviewed and documented by a qualified specialist.
c.
Fuel Rod Loadino During a tour of the fuel rod plant an operator was preparing rods for the first end well cap. No problems were identified.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Exit Meetina The scope and findings of the inspection were discussed with licensee representatives denoted in Sec;lon 1 of this report at the close of the onsite inspection on December 2, 1993.
During the course of the inspection and exit meeting, the licensee did not identify any documents or statements and references to specific processes as proprietary.
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