ML20066F832

Motion to Compel Util Answers to First Set of Interrogatories.Certificate of Svc Encl.Related Correspondence

ML20066F832
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	11/15/1982
From:	Kinder E NEW HAMPSHIRE, STATE OF
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
Shared Package
ML20066F828	List: ML20066F826 ML20066F832
References
NUDOCS 8211190196
Download: ML20066F832 (17)

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 82 f$,1 lg .;..., ,50 Before the l;

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ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD 2.dy;F'NC-In the Matter of: )

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PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE,) Docket Nos: 50-443 ET AL. ) and

) 50-444 (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2) )

MOTION OF THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE TO COMPEL ANSWERS TO ITS FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES TO PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY The State of New Hampshire filed its First Set of Interrogatories to the Public Service Company on October 15, 1982. Public Service l Company served its response to those Interrogatories on November 3, l 1982. To a number of those Interrogatories., the Applicant Public Ser-vice Company provided incomplete and evasive responses. Although New Hampshire will attempt to informally resolve the question of complete-ness of response to those Interrogatories, New Hampshire hereby moves, pursuant to 10 C.F.R. Section 2.740 (f) , that the Applicant be compelled to answer those Interrogatories set forth below to which it has provided incomplete or evasive responses.

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8211190196 821115 PDR ADOCK 05000443 O PDR

Interrogatorv No. 9.1 Question:

Identify all persons who were and are responsible

• in a supervisory capacity for the design and installation of the radioactivity monitoring system for Seabrook.

Answer:

The persons currently responsible in a supervisory capacity for the design of the Radiation Data Management System (RDMS) are:

J. A. MacDonald, Radiation Protection Manager, YAEC, Framingham, MA R. P. Neustadder, Supervising Engineer, Instrumentation and Controls, UE&C, Philadelphia, PA.

These individuals are currently involved with the design of the RDMS. Others have been invol'ved in the past.

Ultimate responsibility for the installation of the RDMS rests with R. Rebel, Seabrook Construction Manager, UE&C, Seabrook, NH.

The Interrogatory asks for those who "were and are responsible" for the activity to which the Interrogatory relates . The response identifies only individuals currently involved with the activity. The response is incomplete and the Applicant should be ordered to provide the names of those individuals who were involved in the past in the activity to which the Interrogatory relates.

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1 Interroaatorv No. 9.6 Question:

Identify all documents which have been prepared f:r the purpose of studying, reviewing, or critiquing the .

radioactivity monitoring system, the RDMS or the PAMS, for Seabrook.

Answer:

The studying, reviewing and critiquing of the

Radiation Monitoring System is accomplished via a series of correspondence dealing with the system specification and the system design description. The documents which detail the correspondence, consisting of letters, memos -and notes of telecon, are in the UE&C RDMS specification file and system description file.

The Interrogatory has three parts:

1) The radioactivity monitoring system,

2) The RDMS, and

3) The PAMS.

The Applicant's response appears incomplete in that it does not address each of the three parts of the question. The Applicant should be ordered to complete the answer.

4-Interrogatory No. 9.8 Question:

Identify all aspects in which Seabrook Radiation Monitoring System is not in strict compliance with Reg.

Guide 1.97. For each aspect identified, indicate PSNH reason for non-compliance and the alternative method -

chosen by PSNH to comply with Criterion 64.

Answer:

Seabrook Station's Radiation Data Managements System conforms to the guidance in Regulatory Guide l

1.97 requirements as they pertain to Criterion 64, Effluent Releases.

The Interrogatory is set forth in two parts. The first part

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requests that all aspects in which the radiation monitoring system is not in strict compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.97 be identified.

The response does not answer this part of the Interrogatory. It does not identify aspects of the radiation monitoring system which are not in compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.97. Tne Applicant should be ordered to provide this information.

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Interrogatorv No. 9.16 Question:

- NUREG 0737, III(D)(1.1) requires PSNH to imp'_ement a program to reduce leakage from systems outside containment that would or could contain highly radioactive fluids during a serious transient and/or accident. . Identify all documents relating to the ,

development of the program under III(D)(1.1) and-produce such documents pursuant to 10 C.F.R. Section 2.741. Explain the manner in which compliance with III(D)(1.1) will be achieved and specify all aspects in which strict compliance will not be achieved.

Answer: ,

PSNH will implement a pr'ogram to reduce leakage from systems outside containment that would or could contain highly radioactive fluids during a serious transient or accident in accordance with NUREG-0737,Section III.D.l.1. This commitment was made to the NRC by letter SBN-212, " Implementation of TMI Action Plan Requirements of NUREG-0737," J. DeVincentis to Frank Miraglia, dated February 12, 1982. The subject letter indicates the manner in which compliance to NUREG-0737 will be achieved. As required by III.D.1.1 a summary descripticn of the ongoing leak reduction program will be completed four months prior to fuel load.

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6-The Applicant's answer is incomplete and evasive.

While the Applicant states that a particular letter by PSNH indicates a commitment to compliance with III (D) (1.1) ,

the Interrogatory asks for identification of all documents relating to the development of the program. While the State understands PSNH's position that its program is not finalized at present, this does not relieve PSNH from the obligation to fully respond to the Interrogatory.

The Applicant should be ordered to identify all docu-ments relating to the development of the NUREG III (D) (1.1) program as requested by the Interrogatory.

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' Interrogatory No. NH 10.1 Question:

Identify all persons who were or are responsible in a supervisory capacity for the design and installation of the control room for Seabrook.

Answer:

The persons currently responsible in a superviscry capacity for the design of the Control Room are:

R. P. Neustadter, Supervising Engineer, Instrumentation and Controls, UE&C, Philadelphia, PA.,

W. H. Reed, Instrumentation and Controls Engineering Manager, YAEC, Eramingham, MA These individuals are currently involved with the design of the Seabrook Control Room. Others have been involved in the pdst.

Ultimate responsbility for the installation of the Seabrook Control Room rests with R. Rebel, Seabrook Construction Manager, UE&C, Seabrook, NH.

As with Interrogatory 9.1, this question asks for those "who were and are responsible" for the activity to which the Interrogatory relates.

The response identifies those currently involved with the activity. The response is incomplete and the Applicant should be ordered to provide the names of those individuals who were involved in the past with the activity to which the Interrogatory relates.

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Interrogatory No. 10.2 Question:

Identify all documents which have been developed for the purpose of studying, reviewing or critiquing the control room design, including but not' limited to the documents resulting from the Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR) required by NUREG 0737, Section ,

I(D)(1). Please produce such documents pursuant to 10 C.F.R. Section 2.741. Please provide information on the status of the DCRDR.

Answer:

The following documents have been developed I

specifically for studying, reviewing or critiquing the Control Room design.

Seabrook Control Room Review- attachment to letter No. SB-12593, dated, December 23, 1981. ,

2. Seabrook Station Control Room Design Review Preliminary Report - attached to letter No. SBN-274, May 12, 1982.

3. Nuclear Engineering Services Agreement between Yankee Atomic Electric Company and Thomas B. Sheridan '

Associates.

In addition, a file has been developed containing a large number of memos, letters and notes of meeting which deal with the study,. review and critique of the

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main control panel design. This file is labeled "MCB -

Seabrook, Human Factors, I99.99.29" and is maintained by W. G. Alcusky, Yankee Atomic Electric Company. ,

The DCRDR is currently being performed at Seabrook and is approximately 50% complete.

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The Applicant's answer appears. incomplete. The Applican:

stctes that the DCRDR is 50% (see answer to Interrogatory N.H.

10.2) complete but it is not clear that the documents identified in the answer include all those documents which have been developed i.

I as part of the DCRDR. Needless to say, the Applicant is under an obligation to identify and produce all documents relating to the DCRDR, regardless of whether or not the study is completed. The 1

Applicant should be ordered to produce all documents presently 1

available relating to the DCRDR.

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4 Interrogatory No. SAPL Surp. 3.7 Question:

Identify all documents which relate to an analysis of transients in accidents which postulate multiple failures including operator-errors. Please produce such documents pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 2.741. -

Answer:

See response to SAPL Supplement 3.6. (See below.)

( Interrogatory No. !SAPL Supp. 3.6 Question:

Identify all persons who have been assigned the responsibility of performing the analysis of transients and accidents which postulates multiple failures 4

including operator errors.

< Answer:

PSNH has not done an analysis of transients and accidents which postulate multiple failures including operator errors. However, multiple failure analyses i . . .

will be addressed by the Seabrook~Probabilistic Safety i

Assessment study (SPSA). The SPSA study, being performed by Pickard, Lowe, and Garrick, Inc., is currently scheduled for completion in the fall of 1983.)

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1 The Applicant's answer to Interrogatory SAPL Supp. 3.7 is incomplete and evasive. The answer refers to the answer to In-terrogatory SAPL Supp. 3.6, which indicates that multiple' failure analysis is being performed by a consulting firm, and that such study will be completed in Fall 1983. As indicated in previous Interrogatories, the Applicant appears to believe that if it has not completed its work in a specific area, it need not identify or produce documents which relate to that area. The State strenuously objects to this practice. If documents exist which relate to the Interrogatory, then the State is clearly entitled to have them identified and produced, regardless of whether or not the Applicant believes -an associated study is complete.

The Applicant should be ordered to produce all documents, including those which have been prepared in connection with the SPSA study, which relate to an analysis of transients and acci-dents, and which postulate multiple failures including operator errors.

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3.10 SAPL Suco.

Interrocatorv No. s d

Ouestion which have been developeor critiquing reviewing, Identify all documentsof studying, or other uld for the purposeof whether additional features '

the questionshould be added to Seabrook which woconsequenc accidents prevent or mitigate thePlease produce such documents ) .1 accidents. S'l 10 C.F.R. 2.741. .

Answer: have been developed or reviewing There are no documents that e of studying, I tures specifically for the purposof whether additional fea .

critiquing the question ld be added 'to Seabrook ious which or other accidents shoutJun consequences of ser would prevent or mitigate. fications to With regard to future modi ht accidents. or maintenance that mig

'the results station design, operationssafety, PSNH (SPSA) will rely on enhance station listic Safety Assessment of the Seabrook Probabi as an aide sently in its study, now in progress,Since the SPSA study is pre decisionmaking. f 1983, PSNH completion in the fall o at this scheduled for ted documentation cannot provide the reques time. l

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The Applicant's answer is incomplete and evasive.

Again, the Applicant states that there is an ongoing

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f study which relates,to the subject gatter of the Inter-rogatory and apparer;tly; believes it has no obligation ,

to produce documents relating to the ongoing' study.

Certainly, that is not the case. Any documents (as the'

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term is broadly defined in thei Interrogatories) which $\\

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fall within the scope of the Interrogatory must be L, s

identified and produced. The Applicant cannot withhold I pertinent information on the grounds that a study is v in progress. The Appl-icant should be ordered to identify

'\o and produce all documents, including those relating to y s

(_4 the Seabrook Probabilistic Safety Assersment, 'which 3-t  :

have been requested by the Interrogatory. -

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! Interrocatory No. SAPL Suco. 3.11 a

Question:

Explain what additiona_ features which would prevent or mitigate the consequences of serious accidents have been considered by PSNH and explain the reasons that such featureswere not included in the

, present design.

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Answe..

It is the opinion of PSMH, based on.the information ii -

E currently available, that the present design of l Seabrook Station encompasses those features required 4 .

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for preventing or mitigating the consequences of serious accidents. PSNH will rely upon the re~sults of the Seabrook Probabilistic Safety Assessment Study, now

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a in progress, as an aide in its decisionmking for evaluating possible future modifications to the Station p . design (see response to SAPL supplement 3.10). Since 1

, 'that study is not completed, PSNH cannot yet identify what features were considered and not adopted as Station design changes or modifications.

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The Applicant's answer is evasive and incomplete. This Interrogatory is simple and to the point. The State has asked for information relating to the consideration and rejection by PSNH of features which would prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents. Quite obviously, the evaluation by PSNH of such features is extremely important to the State. The response states only that PSNH is of the opinion that the present design is adequate. The State is already aware of the Applicant's opinion in this regard. In effect, the Interrogatory seeks the basis of that opinion by asking for an explanation of the reasoning by which such features were considered and rejected.

Again, the Applicant makes reference to the Probabilistic Safety Assessment. Certainly, if the assessment'contains in-4 formation relevant to this Interrogatory, that information should be identified.

The Applicant summarizes its answers by saying, "Since the study is not complete, PSNH cannot yet identify what features t

were considered and not adopted as station design changes or modifications." This sentence makes no sense if it is an attempt to link past evaluation' with the present study. If features were considered and not adopted, then they should be able to be identified, regardless of the status of the study.

The Applicant may, by this sentence, mean that in the context

of the study, it will not be able to determine what features were considered and rejected until the assessment is completed.

Even if this is the meaning, the Applicant is under an obligation to explain the additional features which the assessment is con-sidering. The State is entitled to an answer to the Interrogatory and the Applicant should be ordered to answer fully and completely.

Respectfully submitted, THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE GREGORY H. SMITH ATTORNEY GENERAL Q

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E. Tupper Kiniter Assistant Attorney General Environmental Protection Division Office of the Attorney General State House Annex Concord, New Hampshire 03301 Tel. (603) 271-3678 Dated: November 15, 1982

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g 18 Ri U CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE .

I, E. Tupper Kinder, Esquire, do hereby certI".0.

fy tha f I

"'$Ck a copy of the foregoing Motion of the State of New Hampshire to Compel Answers to Its First Set of Interrogatories to Public Sercice 3 Company, has been mailed this 15th day of November, 1982, by first class mail, postage prepaid, to:

Helen F. Hoyt, Chm. Dr. Emmeth A. Luebke Administrative Judge Administrative Judge Atomic Safety and Licensing Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Board Panel l U.S. NRC U.S. NRC Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555

Dr . Jerry liarbour Jo Ann Shotwell

! Administrative Judge Assistant Attorney General Atomic Safety and Licensing Office of the Attorney General Board Panel One Ashburton Place U.S. NRC 19th Floor Washington, D.C. 20555 Boston, Massachusetts 02108 Roy P. Lessy, Jr., Esquire - Mrs. Beverly Hollingsworth Robert Perliss, Esquire 822 Lafayette Road Office of Executive Legal Dir. P.O. Box 596 U.S. NRC Hampton, New Hampshire 03842 Washington, D.C. 20555 Robert A. Backus, Esquire William S. Jordan, II, Esquire 4

116 Lowell Street Ellyn R. Weiss, Esquire P.O. Box 516 IIarmon and Weiss

Manchester, New Hampshire 03105 1725 I Street, N.W.

Suite 506 Washington, D.C. 20006 Phillip Ahrens, Esquire Edward J. McDermott, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Sanders and McDermott State House, Station #6 408 Lafayette Road Augusta, Maine 04333 Hampton, New Hampshire 03842 Thomas G. Dignan, Jr ., Esquire Atomic Safety and Licensing Ropes and Gray Board Panel 225 Franklin Street U.S. NRC Boston, Massachusetts 02110 Washington, D.C. 20555 DOW M

.E. Tupper K(pdpr Dated: November 15, 1982

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