ML20197B173

Insp Rept 50-263/97-15 on 971014-1124.Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Maint & Engineering

ML20197B173
Person / Time
Site:	Monticello
Issue date:	12/18/1997
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20197B115	List: IR 07100014/2011024 ML20197B112 ML20197B173
References
50-263-97-15, NUDOCS 9712230307
Download: ML20197B173 (15)

See also: IR 05000263/1997015

Text

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION 111

Docke! No: 50-261

Licenss Na: DPR 22

Report No: 50-263/97015(DRP)

Licensee: Northam States Power Company -

Facility: Monticello Nuclear Generating Station

Location: 414 Nicollet Mall

Minneapolis, MN 55401

Dates: Octooer 14 - November 24,1997

Inspectors: A. M. Stone, Senior Resident inspector

D. Wrona, Resident inspector

Approved by: J. McCormick-Barger, Chief

Reacior Projects Branch 7 ,

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9712230307 971210

PDR

G ADOCK 05000263

PDR ,

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Monticello Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1

NRC Inspection Report No. 50-263/97015(DRP)

This inspection included aspects of licensee operations, engineering, maintenance, and plant

support. The report covers a 6-week period of rtsident inspection.

Qoerations

• The operators' performance during routine operations and surveillance activities were

acceptable. With one exception, the operators were knowledgeable of pbnt conditions

and equipment status. Operators' questioning attitude resulted in the identification of

blockage in a motor cooling line and of a faulty bus insulator. (Section 01.1)

• The licensee's program for protecting plant equipment from cold weather conditions

appeared adequate. Plant personnel were instmetei to consider environmental concus

when planning and performing maintenance loi the winter months. However, the

inspectors identified that the intent of the winter checklist procedure was changed due tc

an improper use of the temporary change process. The licensee subsequently 'demified

that the procedure had not t>een approved in accordance with plant procedures. A

subsequent operability determination indicatod that the procedure change was not safety

significant. A violation of 10 OFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, " Instructions, Procedures,

and Drawings," was identified. (Section 01.2)

. An operator's failure to follow the electric fire pump startup procedure and inadequate

instruction for shutting down the fire pump resulted in an automatic start of the diesel fire

pump without operators' knowledge. Operations personnel appropriately declared the

diesel fire pump inoperable after it operated for 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> witt.out a minimum flow path.

Subsequently, the pump was declared operable after a successful operability test was

performed. (Section O2.2)

Maintenance

. In general, work associated with selected maintenance and surveil s - activities was

conducted in an acceptable manner. Good foreign material exclusio,i controls were

implemented for open systems; however, the return-to-service of the #14 residual heat

removal service water pump was delayed due to workers' unfamiliarity with the seal water

piping design. (Section M1.1)

E.noineerino

• Engineering personnel performed an acceptable operability determination for the residual

heat removal service water pump motor cooler low flow condition. Comprehensive

corrective actions were planned to address flow restrictions in the piping and to trend

performance. (Section E1.1)

. Engineering personnel demonstrated an excellent questioning attitude during review of

setpoint calculations for the turbine stop valve limit switch actuations. (Section E1.2)

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Report Details ,

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Summarv of Plant Status

The Unit operated at or near 100 percent power during this period.

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l. Operationg

D1 IConduct of Operations

01.1 General Comments (71707) *

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1 a. Inspection Scope

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Using laspection Procedure 71707, the inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongoing

plant operations, including observations of control room evolutions and shift tumovers.

The inspectors also reviewed control room logbooks and operability determinations.

' Updated Saft,ty Analysis Report (USAR) Section 13," Plant Operations,' was reviewed as

part of the inspection.

. b. - Observations and Findinos

With one exception as discussed in Section 02.2, operators were knowledgeable of plant

o - conditions, equipment status, and on-going maintenance and surveillar:ce activities.

Operators responded well to an instrument air system relay failure which caused an ,

instrument air relief valve to lift. During a surveillance test, plant operators noted that the

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reslaual heat removal service water (RHRSW) motor cooling piping depressurized at a

slower ra's than expected. This questioning attitude resulted in the identification of flow ,

degradation as discussed in Section E1.1. The licensee appropriately declared the

affected RHRSW pumps inoperable. A'so, plant operators noted unusual sounds when

. re-energizing the 1R transformer and r ontacted the system engineer prior to transferring

additionalloads to the transformer. The licensee later determined that bus insulators had

failed. The alertness of the operators and follov up actions by the system engineer

prevented a possible loss of offsite power condition.

, c. Conclusions

Operators performance during routine operations and surveillance activities was good. .

With one exception, operators were knowledgeable of plant conditions and equipment

status.' Operators' questioning attitude resulted in the iwatification of blockage in a motor

cooling line and of a faulty bus insulator.

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01.2 : Winter Checklist .

. a. Insoection Scope (71714)

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's efforts to protect safety-related systerns against

cold weather. The following documents were reviewed:

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• USAR Section 5.3.4," Reactor Building Heating and Ventilation Systems'

+ Procedure 1151, " Winter Checklist," Revision 37

+ 4 Administrative Work lastruction (AWI) 04.05.01, * General Work Controls,"

Revision 11

+ 4 AWI 02.02.05," Temporary Change Process," Revision 5

• Condition Report (CR) 96000108, "DPIS-1953 A RHRSW basket strainer

differential pressure switch found leaking fill oil, won't calibrate. Froze during

RHRSW pump removal."

+ CR 96002018,"USAR states the ventilation provides filtered outside air. During

winter months, filters are removed."

• CR 97001178, * Reminder to personnel of potential to freeze equipment'

+ CR 97002907," Failure to obtain proper signatures for temporar) change to OC

(operations committee) approved procedure"

+ CR 97002919, " Temp Change to Step 12 of Wintar Checklist (Procedure 1151)

may not be correct'

b. Observations and Findinas

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's winter season pceparation and de; ermined that

the licensee was adequately prepared for cold weather conditions. Lessons leamed from

two previous freeze events were communicated to operations, engineering, and

maintenance personnel. However, the inspectors identified a discrepancy between an

operability determination and current plant conditions, as oiscussed below.

Section 5.3.4. of the USAR stated that the reac.or building normal ventilation system

provided filtered outside air to alllevels and equipment rooms. In September 1996, a

system engineer identified that contrary to the USAR description the reactor building

supply ventilation filters were removed during the winter months (in accordance with the

operations winter checklist, procedure 1151). The licensee performed an operability

/) termination ac.d concluded that operation of the reactor building supply ventilation '

system during winter months without filters was acceptable since the filters were not

removed until there was snow cover on the ground. The snow cover helped prevent the

intake of airbome dirt or dust. Remov:1 of thenters was necessary to prevent blockage

in the ventilation supply lines due to ice buildup on the filters. As documented in CR

96002018, the licensee planned to change the USAR to reflect the practice of removing

the filters.

However, the inspectors identified that on October 27,1997, operations management

issued a temporary change to procedure 1151 which invalidated the operability

determination. The temporary change allowed the filters to be removed when outside air

temperature dropped below freezing. This changed the intent of the procedure, which

was contrary to 4 AW102.02.05. The inspectors brought this concem to the attention of

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' the system engineer and operations personnel. The system engineer performed another

operability dwtemdnation and concluded that the removal of the filters without snow cover .

on the ground was noceptable. The inspectors reviewed this evaluation and had no

concems with the conclusion. The removal of the filters without snow cover was not

significant to safety.

In addition, the licensee identified that the temporary procedure change was authorized

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by a shift manager and shift supervisor who were not on duty at the time. This was also

contrary to 4 AWI 02.02.05 (Step 4.3.1) wnich required that one of the approvals be from

the duty shift manager or duty shift supervisor. These two examples of failure to follow -

4 AWI 02.02.05 is a violation of 1C CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, " Instructions, .

Procedures, and Drawings," which required activities affecting quality be prescribed by

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and accomplished in accordance with documented procedures

(VIO 50 263/g7015-01(DRP)). In addition, the inspectors were cor,cemed that

outstanding operability evaluations were not easily traceable for the operations personnel.

Although operat!ons personnel reviewed operability determinations when written, the

licensee did not have a mechanism to easily determine which operability determinations

were still open.

c. Conclusions

The licensse's program for protecting plant equipment from cold weather conditions

appeared adequate. Plant personnel were property instructed to consider environmental

concerns when planning and performing maintenance in the winter months. The intent of

the winter checklist procedure was changed due to an improper use of the temoorary

- change process. A subsequent operability determination indicated that the change was

not safety significant. A violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, " Instructions,

Procedures, anci Drawings? was identified.

O2 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment

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02.1. Enaineer41gfety Feature System Walkdowns

- In addition to routine plant inspections, the inspectors used Inspection Procedure 71707

to walk down selected portions of the turbine, condensate and feedwater, fire protection,

and residual heat removal service water systems. No operability concems were

identified. Minor discrepancies were discussed with engineering personnel. The

inspectors had no further concems.

02.2 Unexeccted Start of the Diesel Fire Pumo

a. Inspection Scope (71707)

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On October 30,1997, a plant operator observed that the diesel fire pump v/as operating

- unexpectedly. The inspectors observed the licensee's investigation and reviewed the

following documents:

• Operations Manual B.08.05-05 D, "Startup Procedures - Manual Start of Fire

Pumps" .

Operations Manual B.08.05-05 F, " Shutdown Procedures - Fire Pumps,

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Deluges /Sprink!srs and Cable Spreading Room Halon System"

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. Surveillance Test 0261, " Electric Fire Pump 15 Minute Run"

• Surveillance Test 0266, " Fire Pumps Simulated Auto-actuation and Capability

Test"

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bi Observations and Findinas

.On October 30,19g7, from a local panel, a plard operator secured the electric fire pump -

which had been operating to support a maintenance activity. The operator shut down the -

fire pump by positioning the emergency run control handle to the off position and noted

that the fire pump immediately restarted. The operator then repositioned the handle and 2

the electric fire pump stopped. About 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> later, another operator noticed that the -

diesel fire pump was running. The shift manager immediately declared the diesel fire

pump inoparable since the pump had been operat;og without a minimum flow path.

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Subsequently, the diesel fire pump was declared operable after a successful operability

test was pe formed.

The lioer.tes determir,ed that the diesel fire pump started automatically due to a low -

pressure c;adition in the fire header when the electric fire pump was s5ut down earlier.

The low pressure condition resulted when the plant operator did not close the fire system

test valve, FP-5, while securing the electric fire pump. This caused the fire header .-

pressure to drop below the automatic initiation of the electric and diesel fire pumps and

explained why the electric fire pump immediately restarted when the operator interWed to

shut the pump off. The licensee initiated a condition report to determine the root cause

and corrective actions,

The inspectors reviewed several procedures and noted some discrepancies between the l

operations procedure B.08.05-05 D and F, weeldy surveillance test 0261, arxl j

surveillar.co test 0266. Procedure B.08.05 5 0 required the operator to open valve

FP-81, the fire system test bypass valve, to maintain heater pressure after starting one of -

the fire pumps. SL:veillance tests 0261 and 0266 required 'he operator to open valve

FP-5 for the same purpose. The operator who started the electric fire pump opened

valve FP-5 which was contrary to the startup procedure but was in accordance with

. routine practice. Also, the fire pump shutdown procedure B.08.05-05 F did not specify

- closing either the FP-5 or FP-81 valves. The licensee planned to correct these

discrepancies.

The failure to follow B-08.05-05 D while starting the electric fire pump and the failure to

providt: idequate instructions for shutting down a fire pump constituted NRC-identified

violations of Techn!ca' Specification (TS) 6.5.A.6. Because the electrical fire pump was

- operab c, the system e not safety-related, and the operators were not required to have

the procedure in-hand during performance of the test, these violations are being treated

as two examples of a Non-Cited Violation, consistent with Section IV of the NRC

' Enforcement Policy (NCV 50-263/97015-02(DRP)).

c. Conclusions

_ A plant operator's failure to follow the electric fire pump startup procedure and inadequate

- instruction for shutting down the fire pump resulted in an automatic start of the diesel fire-

pump without operators' knowledge. Operations personnel appropriately declared the

diesel fire pump inoperable after identifying the pump ope;ated for 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> without a

minimum flow path.- Subsequently, the pump was declared operable after a successful

operability test was performed.

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08 Operations O ganization and Administration

06.1 Use and Documentation of Overtime Deviations

a. Insoection Scope (71707)

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's program for controlling overtime and reviewed

the following documents:

• Forms 3361, * Authorization to Exceed Overtime Work Restrictions," completed for i

January to October 1997  ;

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• TS 6.1.F .

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• 4 AWI 08.10.01, " Overtime Restrictions and Fitness for Duty Requirements,"

Revision 3

b. Observations and FindlDER

The inspectors noted that deviations from the overtime guidelines were not excessive

between January and October 1997. In general, supervisory approval was obtained prior

to exceeding the overtime guidelines. Justifications for exceeding overtime limits

included resolv)ng equipment concoms such as reduced cooling flow for the RHRSW

pump motors, performing engirieering evaluations, preparing for an in-depth security

inspection, and changing to daylight savings time. The inspectors noted some

administrative discrepancies such as not documenting limitations on work or when the

individual would be in compliance with the overtime guidelines, The inspectors

concluded that the licensee adequately implemented controls on overtime,

11. Maintenance

M1 Conduct of Maintenance

M1.1 General Comments

a. Inspection Scope (62703 and 61726)

The inspectors observed all or portions of selected maintenance and surveillance ,

activities, included in the inspection was a review of the surveillance procedures or work

orders (WOs) listed as well as the appropriate USAR sections pertaining to activities,

b. Observations and Findinas

In general, the inspectors observed that the work associated with these activities was

conducted in a professional and thorough manner. All work obse:ved was performed with

the work package present and in active use. Good foreign material exclusion controls ,

were implemented on open systems.~ The inspectors frequently observed supervisors

. and system engireers monitoring job progress, and quality control personnel were

. present whenever requirod by procedure. When applicable, appropriate radiation control

measures were in place.

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The following work was observed. Specific concems or observationa are provided where

appropriate.

. WO 9703791, " Pin hole leak on seal water line to 14 RHRSW"

. WO 9705058, "#14 RHR [ residual heat removal) Pump seal leaking"

The inspectors reviewed the work packages, observed maimenance personnel

perform the work, and observed portions of post-maintenance testing. The

maintenance personnel established good foreign material exclusion controls. The

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inspectors noted that the work package contained some instructions for replacing

the packing; however, much of the work was considered skill-of-the-craft.

Maintenance personnel ha1 difficulty establishing seal water flow through the

packing and had to replace the packing three times after the packing was

damaged during post-maintenance testing. Th incorrectly installed packing did

not affect pump operability since the licensee had declared the pump inoperable

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prior to the maintenance activity; however, the nroblems delayed the

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retum-to-service by about a day. The system engineer initiated corrective actions

which included revising the generic pump packing guidance and updating the

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maintenance history file for the RHRSW pumps.

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. Preventative Maintenance (PM) 4190PM, " Diesel Engine, Fire Protection Pump"

. Surveillance Tests 0265-10-IA-2, "Drywell-Torus Primary Containment Valve

Exercise," 0255-17-1A-6, " Drywall-TonJs Quarterly Operability Test of Al-629," and

025517-IA-1, " Instrument Air System Valve Exercise," Revision 23

The inspectors noted that some confusion resulted from a misunderstood

prerequisite step which required that " plant conditions allow closing of CV-1478,

instrument air to dr,well isolation cor. trol valve." The shift supervisor marked the

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prerequisite step and the corresponding procedural stop that timed the closure of

CV 1478, as "NA' (not applicable). The shift supervisor and test engineer agreed

that the steps could not be done under currer.t rasctor conditions and proceeded

with the remainder of the test. During final review of the test results, the system

engineer noted that the step should have been performed and initiated another

test to stroke time CV-1478. The system engineer revised the procedure to clarify

the intent of the prerequisite.

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. Surveillance Test 0255-08-IA-1, "RCIC [ reactor core isolation cooling) System

Tests with Reactor Pressure at Rated Conditions," WO 9705492, "PM for

MO-2096," and procedure 4900-1PM, "PM for Limitorque Motor Operated Valves"

During this period, the licensee performed pieventive maintenance on the

RCIC system. The work activities included lubrication of ine valve stems for

several motor-operated valves. The inspectors noted that the licensee did not

perform valve stroke time testing prior to the maintenance work. The inspectors

reviewed 14 previous stroke time tests for 4 RCIC valves (MO-2100, MO-2106,

MO-2096, and MO-3502) to determine if the PM activity preconditioned the

J valves. The inspectors found that the stroke times for the aforementioned valves

were consistent and concluded that the PM activity did not affect the stroke timo

testing for these valves.

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c. Conclusions

in general, the performance of work and surveillance activities observed was acceptable. +

Good foreign material exclusion controls were implemented for open systems; however,

the retum-of-service of toe #14 RHRSW pump was delayed due to workers' unfamiliarity ' >

with the realwater piping design.

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lll Enaineerina

E1 Conduct of Engineering

E1.1 Low Motor Coolina Flow identified in the RHRSW oumos

a. Inspection Scope (71707 end 37551L

A portion of the RHRSW loop discharge flow provides cooling we.ter to the associated

RHRSW motors. On October 17,1907, a plant operator noted that the 011 RHRSW '

motor cooling piping dopressurized at a slower rate than expected when the pump was

secured. The operators then started the #13 RHRSW pump and noted a similar slow

depressurization rate when the pump was socered. The shift manager ubsequently

declare <1 tne #11 and #13 pumps (the A train pumps) Inoperable due tc. n apparent

blockage in the common motos cooling retum line. The inspectors observed the

licensee's investigation and reviewed the operability determinations as documented in

- CR 97002676, " Low Flow on sii and #13 RHRSW Motor Coolers."

b. .qhp_rvatbns and Findinas

The licenseo determined that the flow rate through motor coolers had never been

measured although drawings NX-9068-47, Revision A and NX-9068-37, Revision B,-

sMwed that the designed flow rates were 3.5 gallons per minute (gpm) at 95 degrees

Fahrenheit (*F) for the #12 pump and 4 gpm at 90*F for the #11, #13, and #14 pumps,

respectively An in-line flow indicator installed downstream of the motor coolers enabled

operators to verify cooling flow; however, flow rate could not be directly measured.

Engineering personnelinitiated a procedure change to open a drain valve downstream of

the motor coolcrs to allow operators to manually measure flow rates.- The flow measured

through the #11 and #13 motor coolers were 1.7 gpm and 2.6 gpm, respectively. The

- licensee flushed the piping with higher pressure water and compressed air and the

measured flow rates improved slightly to 2.3 gp.n and 2.7 gpm.

Engineering personnel performed an evaluation to justify continued operation with these

degraded flow rates, noting that the #11 RHRSW pump had been operating for 80 days

during the forced outage from May through July 1997 wiihout performance problems. In

addition, vibration data obtained during that period were acceptable, and oil samples

taken after the extended run showed no signs of oil degradation. Engineering personnel

developed a special test to trend thrust bearing oil temperatures with the pump operating.

The licensee determined that the equilibrium oil temperature was about 126*F with a river

temperature of 53*F. Based or. Ge resdts of the special test, river temperature at or

below 53*F, and performance observations during the 80 days of pump operation, the

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licensee declared the #11 and #13 pumps operable.

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Because of the potential for a common modo problem, the licensee also measured 'the -

flow rates through the (B train) #12 and #14 motor coolers. ' The flow measured through

the #12 motor cooler was 3.7 gpm which was acnoptat,le; however, flow through the

1. 14 motor cooler was 3.8 gpm. . Engineering personnel determined that a flow rate of -

3.25 opm at 53*F was equ' valent to the required 4 gpm at go'F. The licensee concluded ,

' the #12 and #14 pumps were operable based on a river temperature of 53*F or lower.

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The licensee initiated several actions to resolve the degraded flow conditions. These _ _

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- included changing the pressure regulator setting on the common motor cooling piping to

increase pressure in the line, modsfying the piping Jownstream of the motor coolers to -

allow operators to measure flow rates, implementing a procedure to measure flow rates, -

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i and determining the feasibility of installing larger diameter cooling coils. Since the

operability of the pumps was based on a river temperature of 53'F or less, this issue is -!

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an inspection Followup item (IFl 50-263/g7015-03(DRP)) pending completion of the

corrective actions or licensee's re-evaluation using higher river temperatures. >

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Enginaering personnel performed an acceptable operability determination for the

- RHRSW pump motor cooler now flow condition. Comprehensive corrective actions were

planned to address flow restrictions in the piping and to trend performance.

E1.2 Concem With Turbine Stoo Valve f.imit Switch Settinas

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a. Inspection Scope (37551)

on November 6,1997, engineering personnel determined that the limit switch setpoints

for the turbine stop valves were outside of TS Table 3.1.1 requirements. The inspectors

- observed the licensee's inytstigation and reviewed the following documents:

• WO 9705806, " Test Turbine Stop Valva Scram'

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• Drawing 754E513, Revision 0, " Main Stop Valve Assembly No.1,3 and 4"

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• Condition Report g~r002847, " Turbine Stop Valves RPS [ reactor protection

system] Limit Switch Setting Error"

. TS Tabl6 3.1.1

. TS Bases Section 3.1

1 * Surveillance Test 0300, " Turbine Stop Valve Closure Calibration Checks"

5. Observations and Findinas

During a review of the turbine stop valve closure scram setpoints, engineering personnel

determined that the limit switches for these valves r @.t be set non-conservatively based

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on the design of the actuator stem to valve stem coupling. The coupling allvuod the -

actuator to stroka G inches to produce a stroke length of 5.5 inches for the valve stem.

This 0.5 inch gap was designed to produce a hammer blow effect on the valve stem

should the vcive become bound. TS Table 3.1.1 required an automatic reactor trip signal

be generatnd wieen the turbine stop valves were less than or equal to 10 percent closed.

' The limit switches were located on the actuators and the trip setpoints were based on

10 percent of actuator movement, or 0.6 inch travel. Initially, engineering personnel

believed that the actuator accelerated faster than the stem due to a high actuator spring

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constant and that the reactor trip would be generated before the stem moved 0.55 laches

(10 percent of stem movement). On November 7,1997, tho valve manufacturer supplied

the actual spring constant and the engineers concluded that the spring constant was not

large enough to support the preliminary evaluation. Engineering personnel determined

that the setpoint did not correspond to 10 percent valve stem movement (0.55 inches)

which could result in a limit switch setpoint outside of TS requirements. The engineers

reviewed calibration data obtainoa on May 17,1996, and concluded that the current

setpoint for stop valve #1 and #3 appeared to be outside of the TS.

The licensee verified the limit switch aetpoints every refueling outage using surveillance

test 0300. The test involved a worker physically measuring actuator movement as an

- operator cycled the valve. This measuring method introduced potential enor due to

delayed reaction time of the individuals and measuring a small distance with a ruler. The

licensee concluded that additional data was notded in order to verify the operability of

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Mop valves #1 and #3. Engineering personnel developed a special test which utilized

limit switch actuation and position indication computer points. This more precise method

of timing showed that all four turbine stop valve limit s#.ches were within

TS requirements and would actuate before the ve've stem moved 0.55 inche ;. The

inspectors independently reviewed the test results and agreed that the settings were

consistent with TS Table 3.1.1.

c. Conclusion

Engineering personnel demonstrated an excellent questioning attitude during remw of

setpoint calculations for the turbine stop valve closure scram.

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E8 Miscellaneous Engineering issues

E8.1 (Closed) Violation (50-263/96006-03): Inadequate Operator instructions for Operating

Combustible Gas Control System Post accident. This item was closod in Section E8.3 of

Inspection Report No. 50-263/97C12; however, the report incorrectly referenced

item 50-263/97006-03. Therefore, violation 50-263/96006-03 is closed.

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IV. Plant Support

l R1 Conduct of Radiological Protection and Chemistry controla (71750)

l During normal resident inspection activities, routine observations were conducted in the

j area of radiatien protection. The inspectors noted that effective radiological controls were

i established and that technicians provided support during maintenance and surveillance

j activities.

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t $1 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities (71750)

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During nor al resident inspection activities, routine observations were conducted in the

areas of as vity and safeguards activities. No concems were noted

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V. Manaoement Meettiens

X1 Exit W,)eting Summary

On December 1,1997, the inspectors presented the inspection results to members of

licensee management. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. The inspectors

asked the licensee whether any materials examined duiing the inspection should be

considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

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_ _. ._ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - -

.

PARTIAL UST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

,

M. Wadley, Vice President Nuclear Generation

M. Hammer, Plant Manager

B. Day, Training Manager

K. Jepson, Superintendent, Chemistry & Environmental Protection

L Nolan, General Superintendent Safety Assessment

M. Onnen, General Superintendent Operations

E. Reilly, General Superintendent Maintenance

C. Schibonski, General Guperintendent Engineering

A. Ward, Manager Quality Services

J. Windschill, General Superintendent, Radiation Protection

L Wilkerson, Superintendent Security

,

s

13

~

_ _ _ _ _ _

4

INbPECTION PROCEDURES USED

IP 37551: Onsite Engineering

IP 61726: Surveillance Observations

IP 62703: Maintenance Observations

IP 71707: Plant Operations

IP 71750: Plant Support

IP 92700: Onsite Followup of Written Repor;s of Nonroutine Events at Power Reactor

Facilities

IP 93702: Prompt Onsite Response to Events at Operating Power Reactors

ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened

50-263/97015-01(DRP) VIO Failure to follow temporary procedure changt, process

which invalidated an operability determination

50-263/97015-02(DRP) NCV inadequate procedure for shutting down a fire pump and

failure to follow procedure for starting the electric fire pump

l

50-263/97015-03(DRP) IFl Completion of corrective acticns since operability of

RHRSW pumps is based on a 53*F river temperature

Closed

50 263/96006-03(DRP) VIO Inadequate Operator Instructions for Operating

Combustible Gas Control System Post-accident

14

.- -_- _ _ ___ _ _ -_ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __-_____________-____-_____________________________J

I

'

I

t-

UST OF ACRONYMS USED

.

'

AWI - Administrstive Work instruction

CFR Code c1 Federal Regulations

CR Condition Report

'F Degrees Fahrenheit

DRP Division of Reactor Projects

Opm Gallons per Mirtute

IFl inspection Folicwup item ,

NA Not Applicable

NCV Non-Cited Violation

NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission

OC Operations Committee

PM Preventative Maintenance

RCIC Reactor Core isolation Cooling

RHR Residual Heat Removal

RHRSW Residual Heat Removal Service Water

RPS Reactor Protection System

TS Technical Specification

USAR Updated Safety Analysis Report

VIO Violation I

WO Work Order

)

v

0

a

15