ML20154N421

Proposed Tech Spec Table 3.2.A, Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation & Page 84 Re Bases

ML20154N421
Person / Time
Site:	Cooper
Issue date:	03/11/1986
From:	NEBRASKA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT
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Shared Package
ML20154N416	List: ML20154N421 ML20154N474 NLS8600113, Application for Amend to License DPR-46,changing Main Steam Line High Flow Setpoint for Primary Containment Isolation from 140% to 150% of Rated Steam Flow.Ge MDE-43-0386 Safety Evaluation... Also Encl
References
NUDOCS 8603170321
Download: ML20154N421 (2)

Text

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COOPER NUCLEAR STATION TABLE 3.2.A (Page 1)

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT AND REACTOR VESSEL ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION Minimum Number Action Required When Instrument of Operable Components Component Operability Instrument I.D. No. Setting Limit Per Trip System (1) is Not Assured (2)

Main Steam Line High RMP-RM-251, A,B,C,6D 1 3 Times Full Power 2 A or B Rad.

Reactor Low Vater Level NBI-LIS-lut. A.B.C,&D >+12.5" Indicated Level

_ 2(4) A or B Reactor Low Low Water NBI-LIS-57 A & B #2 >-37" indicated Level 2 A or B Level NBI-LIS-58 A & B #2 Reector Low Low Low Water NBI-LIS-57 A & B #1 >-145.5" Indicated Level 2- A or B Level NBI-LIS-58 A & B #1 Main Steam Line Leak MS-TS-121, A.B.C,6D 1 200*F 2(6) B Detection 122, 123, 124, 143, 144,

d. 145, 146, 147, 148, 149,

? 150 Main Steam Line High MS-dPIS-Il6 A.B.C,&D 1 150% of Rated Steam 2(3) B l Flow 117, 118, 119 Flow Main Steam Line low MS-PS-134, A.B.C,&D > 825 psig 2(5) B Pressure High Drywell Pressure PC-PS-12 A.B.C,&D 1 2 psig 2(4) A or B liigh Reactor Pressure RR-P!-128 A & B $ 75 psig I D Main Condenser Low MS-PS-103 A.B.C,&D > 7" Hg (7) 2 A or B Vacuum Reactor Water Cleanup RWCU-dPIS-170 A & B 1 200% of System Flow I' C System High Flow B603170321 860311 PDR ADOCK 05000298 P PDR

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3.2 BASES

(Cont'd)

. and'the guidelines of 10CFR100 will not be exceeded. For large breaks up to the complete circ'amferential break of a-28-inch recirculation line and with the trip setting given above, CSCS initiation and primary systsm.

isolation are initisted in time to meet the above criteria. Reference-

. Paragraph VI.5.3.1 USAR.

The high drywell pressure instrumentation is a diverse signal for mal-tunctions to the water Jevel instrumentation and in addition to initiating CSCS, it causes isolation of Group 2 and 6 isolation valves. For the

~ breaks discussed above, this instrumentation will generally initiate CSCS operation before the low-low-low water level instrumentation; thus the results given above are applicable here also. The water level instrumen-

. tation initiates protection for the full spectrum of loss-of-coolant accidents and causes isolation of all isolation valves except Groups 4 and 5.

> Venturis are provided in the main steam lines as a means of measuring steam flow and also limiting the loss of mass inventory from the vessel during a steam line break accident. The primary function of the instru-mentation is to detect a break in the main steam line. For the worst case'of accident, main steam line break outside the drywell, a trip setting of 150% of rated steam flow in conjunction with the flow limiters l and main steam line valve closure, limits the mass inventory loss such

- that fuel is not uncovered, fuel clad temperatures peak at approximately

' 1000*F and release of radioactivity to the environs is below 10CFR100 guidelines. Reference Section XIV.6.5 USAR.

Temperature monitoring instrumentation is provided in the main steam l tunnel and along the steam line in the turbine building to detect leaks in these areas. Trips are provided on this instrumentation and when exceeded, cause closure of isolation valves. See Spec. 3.7 for Valve Group. The setting is 200*F for the main steam leak detection system.

For large breaks, the high steam flow instrumentation is a backup to the temp. instrumentation.

High radiation monitore in the main steam tunnel have been provided to detect gross fuel failure as in the control rod drop accident. With the established setting of 3 times normal background, and main steam line isolation valve closure, fission product release is limited so that 10CFR100 guidelines are not exceeded for this accident. Reference Sec-tion XIV.6.2 USAR.

Pressure instrumentation is provided to close the main steam isolation valves in RUN Mode when the main steam line pressure drops below Speci-fication 2.1.A.6. The Reactor Pressure Vessel thermal transient due to an inadvertent opening of the turbine bypass valves when not in the RUN Mode is less severe than the loss of feedwater analyzed in Section XIV.5 of the USAR, therefore, closure of the Main Steam Isolation valves for thermal transient protection when not in RUN mode is not required.

The Reactor Water Cleanup System high flow and temperature instrumentation are arranged similar to that for the HPCI. The trip settings are such that core uncovery is prevented and fission product release is within limits.

.g.