ML20133C408
| ML20133C408 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Monticello  |
| Issue date: | 12/27/1996 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20133C394 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-263-96-08, 50-263-96-8, NUDOCS 9701070179 | |
| Download: ML20133C408 (20) | |
See also: IR 05000263/1996008
Text
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION III
Docket No.: 50-263
License No.: DPR-22
Report.No: 50-263/96008(DRP)
Licensee: Northern States Power-Company-
Facility: Monticello Nuclear Generating Station
Location: 414 Nicollet Mall
Minneapolis, MN 55401
Dates: August 29 - October 16, 1996
Inspectors: A. M. Stone, Senior Resident Inspector
J. Lara, Resident Inspector
Approved by: J. Jacobson, Chief, Projects Branch 4
Division of Reactor Projects
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9701070179 961227
4 PDR ADOCK 05000263
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
, Monticello Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1
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NRC Inspection Report 50-263/96008(DRP)
This inspection included aspects of licensee operations, engineering,
maintenance, and plant support. The report covers a 7-week period of resident
inspection. 4
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Operations
. The operations committee inappropriately approved a technical
specification interpretation concerning fire hydrant operability
(Section 01.2).
. The inspectors identified three examples of plant operator inattention
to detail during plant rounds (Section 02.1).
. The licensee promptly evaluated the applicability of control room
concerns identified at another utility. The licensee's response was
considered a strength (Section 06.1).
. The shift manager responded promptly after identifying the inoperable i
fire hydrant. (Section M1.1)
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Maintenance
. A mechanic failed to follow procedure and did not notify operations on
two occasions when the acceptance criteria for a fire hydrant test was
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not met (Section M1.1).
. The licensee was unaware that a standby liquid control surveillance test
conflicted with the IST program. Also, the system engineer used an
unapproved informal calculation as a basis to revise the test.
(Section M1.2) l
. Material condition of plant equipment was acceptable. (Section M2.2).
Enaineerina
. The licensee's troubleshooting of repeated residual heat removal service
water air vent valve failures was acceptable. However, the licensee did
not determine a root cause for the failures to seat. The inspectors did
not identify deficiencies with the licensee's evaluations and
implementation of the orifice modification (Section E2.1). ,
. The system engineer assisted operations by providing a sound oper?.bility
evaluation for the #12 core spray pump (Section E2.2).
Plant Suocort
. The licensee discovered a mylar containing safeguards information
unmarked and improperly stored (Section S' ':
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1 Report Details
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Summary of Plant Statu.1
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The plant operated at or near full power for the entire inspection period.
Short term power reductions were conducted during the inspection period for
control rod and surveillance testing.
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I. Ooerations '
01 Conduct of Operations
01.1 General Comments (71707)
Using Inspection Procedure 71707, the inspectors conducted frequent ,
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reviews of ongoing plant operations. Specific events and noteworthy '
j observations are detailed in the sections below. The inspectors noticed
4 good attentiveness to control room panels and indications.
The inspectors observed plant operations during daily rounds and an
inspection of the condenser and feedwater heater areas. The operators
I were knowledgeable of plant conditions and initiated actions to correct
discrepant conditions. However, examples of inattention to details are
discussed in Section 02.1.
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The operators' performance during surveillance activities, problem
inntification and response to abnormal plant conditions was acceptable.
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4 For example, operators received unexpected fire alarm annunciators and
fire pump starts di;riag a maintenance activity. The operators promptly i
notified maintenarre personnel and halted the activity.
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01.2 Inanoropriate Technical Specification (Tp Interoretation )
, a. Inspection Scone (40500)
As discussed in Section M4.1. the shift manager identified that the #1
fire hydrant was inoperable due to standing water in the hydrant barrel.
The licensee implemented several corrective actions including initiating
a technical specification interpretation to clarify Yire hydrant
operability. The inspectors reviewed TS 4.13.D.1 and the licensee's
interpretation.
b. Observations and Findings
The operations committee (OC) approved an internal technical
specification interpretation to clarify the definition of an operable
fire hydrant. Jhe DC members reasoned that TS 4.13.D.1 required a dry
barrel prior to the winter season to prevent freeze damage tL the
hydrant. Therefore, the 3resence of water during non-winter periods did
not necessarily make the lydrant inoperable. The OC-approved TS
interpretation stated that a * fire hydrant barrel would not make the
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hydrant immediately inoperable. The inspectors noteJ that TS 4.13.D.1
. clearly stated that the hydrant hose station shall be demonstrated
operable by verifying that the hydrant barrel was dry. The licensee
immediately retracted the interpretation after further discussion with
the inspectors. The fire hydrant was subsequently repaired.
c. Conclusions
The DC members ina)propriately approved a TS interpretation concerning
fire hydrant opera]ility.
02 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment
02.1 00erational Reviews
a. Inspection Scone (71707)
The inspectors reviewed licensee response to various operations issues
and system walkdowns.
b. Observations and Findings
The inspectors observed plant operators during daily rounds and
conducted independent inspections of the plant. Operators were
knowledgeable of plant conditinns and generally initiated actions to
correct discrepant conditions However, the inspectors identified the
following:
. On October 7. the inspectors noted an increase in the #11 reactor
water cleanup (RWCU) pump seal leak. The seal previously leaked
about 1 dr?o every 2-3 seconds but had increased to not quite a
continuo % Mream. The inspectors reviewed the auxiliary plant
o)erator's completed reactor building morning log and identified
tlat no notation was made of the increased pump seal leakage.
Discussions with the on-shift operations shift supervisor
, indicated an unawareness of the increased leakage. Subsequent
! licensee review confirmed the increased leakage and preparations
l were initiated for the replacement of the pump seal. Further
l licensee reviews indicated that the auxiliary plant operator had
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noted the increa;e in leakage but had not documented the condition
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. On October 12, the inspectors reviewed completed surveillance
0090. " Standby Liquid Control System Checks " and determined that
j the tank level recorded by the plant operator exceeded the
acceptance criteria. The inspectors discussed this with the shift
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supervisor and determined that the shift management had not
identified the condition for the previous two readings. 10 CFR 50
Appendix B, Criterion XI required test results be evaluated to
assure requirements were met. Failure to identify the tank level
was above the specified limits is considered an example of a
violation (50-263/96008-01a).
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Subsequently, the shift supervisor determined that the plant
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o]erator misread the level indicator: however, acknowledged that
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t1e high reading should have been identified earlier. The i
inspectors verified the actual tank reading was within the l
specified limits and verified that TS Figure 3.4.1 was met. 1
. On two separate occasions, the inspectors identified two
continuous air monitors (CAMS) not recording or providing traces
of the measured radiation levels in the RWCU and main steam vault.
The inspectors notified operations personnel and the CAMS were
promptly restort i.
c. Conclusions
"m inspectors discussed the above examples with the General ,
,,erintendent of Operations who stated that managements' expectations l
were not met. The inspectors considered these events examples of l
inattention to detail. l
04 Operator Knowledge and Performance
04.1 Vulnerability in Communications Identified
a. jnsnection Scone (71707)
The inspectors observed three operating crews during r routine training i
exercise in the simulator. The drill involved a loss of stator water
cooling pump, failure of the generator runback circuitry, and recovery
from a reactor scram.
b. Observations and Findings
The inspectors noted that the crews responded appropriately during the
scenario. Crew briefings were informative and timely. A senior reactor
operator verified actions in accordance with the emergency operating
procedures and other recovery procedures.
However, the inspectors identified a vulnerability in communicating the
results of recent engineering issues. Specifically:
. One crew was unsure whether to isolate the RWCU during power
reduction below 90 percent power. This restriction was originally
initiated due to a design deficiency for the most limiting high
energy line break accident. On August 22, the operations
committee approved removing the power restriction based on a
subsequent engineering analysis. During the simulator scenario,
the shift manager a)propriately contacted operations management
and verified that t1e power restriction had been withdrawn.
. One crew did not follow the annunciator response procedure to
initiate a power reduction when a stator cooling water pump
tripped. Members of the crew incorrectly believed that the
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procedure had been changed after the root cause of the June 1996
, stator cooling water pump failures was identified.
The inspectors also reviewed the operations department's required
reading package for July and August. The reading material consisted of
procedure changes and revisions to various operations manual chapters.
The inspectors identified that several individuals, specifically 7 (in
July) and 17 (in August) had not reviewed the material.
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The inspectors discussed the training and required reading observations
with the General Superintendent of Operations and confirmed that these
actions did not meet established licensee expectations.
c. Conclusions
The inspectors did not identify problems resulting from this
communication vulnerability. However, the licensee implemented actions
to emphasize management's expectations.
06 Operations Organization and Administration
06.1 Resoonse to Industry Events
a. Insoection Scone (71707)
The licensee initiated a condition report (CR) to document actions taken
in response to a situation at another Region III licerisee. The NRC
issued a confirmatory action letter to the other Region III licensee in
response to several findings in the control room. Specifically, the NRC
identified concerns in shift manning, operators' ability to hear
annunciator alarms, and operator attentiveness to control panels.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's actions taken in response to this
industry event.
b. Observations and Findinos
The licensee reviewed medical records and verified that all operators
passed the audio portion of the examination. One individual experienced
a slight hearing loss from a previously administered test; however,
testing in the control confirmed that the individual's hearing level was
acceptable.
The licensee also performed a review of as-found control room .
annunciator sound levels. Work Order (WO) 9602513. " Check Audio Level l
Settings for Control Room Annunciators." was implemented to determine l
the as-found settings for the installed sound cards in the main control i
room. The inspectors reviewed the WO and witnessed implementation of
the WO steps. Sound cards were located in panels C04B and C06B and were i
found set on HIGH. A non-adjustable sound unit was also located in
panel C20. At the completion of the inspection period, the licensee had
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not completed the evaluation of the as-found data to determine if
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additional corrective actions were required.
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The inspectors verified that controls were initiated to ensure the l
requirements of TS table 6.1.1, " Minimum Shift Manning," were met. The
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inspectors routinely verified that a senior licensed reactor operator
was in the control room or in the shift supervisor office as specified
in TS. The inspectors did not identify any shift manning violations.
The inspectors interviewed several o)erators and determined that
training videos were not viewed in t le control room. If an individual .
needed to makeup required training, the video was viewed in a separate l
room. The inspectors also observed that operators remained attentive to i
the control board during a short safety meeting held in the control !
room.
No deficiencies were identified with the licensee's evaluation of
industry events or in the implementation of the CR corrective actions.
c. Conclusions
The licensee's evaluations and reviews indicated a heightened awarer.ess
of industry-wide issues and concerns. These activities were considered
strengths.
08 Miscellaneous Operations Issues
08.1 (Closed) Violation (50-263/95011-01A and B): Failure to maintain the
drywell spray subsystems operable ir. accordance with TS 3.5.C. The
licensee identified that a manual valve, RHR 74-2, had been closed and
unlocked for almost a sear. The valve was required to be locked open.
During this year period, the licensee unknowingly made the opposite
train of drywell spray inoperable simultaneously which resulted in a l
second example of the TS violation. Upon discovery, the licensee placed
the valve in the correct position and initiated corrective actions. The
licensee's long term corrective actions were identical to those
implemented in response to violation 50-263/95011-03. This item is
closed.
II. Maintenance
M1 Conduct of Maintenance
M1.1 General Comments
a. Inspection Scope (62703)
The inspectors observed all or portions of the following work
activities:
- WO 9602176 Diesel generator compressor K9B work
- WO 9602692 Investigate and repair undervoltage relay alarm
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. WO 9602510 Troubleshoot #12 core spray pump problems
. . WO 9602386 Bypass logic test for combustible gas control
- system, division II
. WO 9602288 Repair SV-2082A air leak
. WO 9602406 Obtain accurate data for ECCS motors
. WO 9602513 Check audio level settings for control room
. WO 9602571 Install new diaphragm into scram solenoid pilot !
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. WO 9602592 Repair 3 EPA logic cards I
. 0007A Condenser Low Vacuum SCRAM Instruments Test and :
Calibration Procedure :
. 0062 RCIC Steam Line High Area Temperature Test j
. 0012 APRM/ Rod Block / Scram Surveillance Test ;
e 0255-07-IA-1 Main Steam Valve Exercise Test !
. 0255-03-III Core Spray System Pump Operability Test !
. 0278A ATWS-Recirc Trips for Reactor Pressure and Level i
Trip Unit Test and Calibration *
b. Observations and Findinas
The inspectors found the work performed under these activities to be ;
professional and thorough. All work observed was performed ~with the !
work package present and in active use. Technicians were experienced
and knowledgeable of their assigned tasks. The inspectors frequently
observed supervisors and system engineers monitoring job 3rogress, and ;
quality control personnel were present whenever required )y procedure. ;
When applicable, appropriate radiation control measures were in place. j
M1.1 Fire Hydrant Surveillance i
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a. Insoection ScoDe (61726)
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On September 25, 1996, the shift manager reviewed test 0319. " Fire
Protection System - Yard Hydrant Inspection " and noted that the
mechanic documented that 9 feet of water was left in the #1 fire hydrant
barrel. Technical Specification 4.13.0 required the hydrant barrel be
dry. The shift manager immediately declared the #1 fire hydrant and
hose house inoperable. The shift manager also noted that the
surveillance was initiated earlier in the week and the mechanic
technician failed to notify operations of the degraded condition. The
inspectors independently reviewed the test, ap)licable sections of TS
and Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSA1) and the licensee's
corrective actions,
b. Observations and Findinas
The purpose of the surveillance was to verify the condition of the
hydrant in accordance with TS 4.13.D.1.b. The test consisted of opening
the hydrant valve to verify that the barrel was not damaged and to
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establish flow through the hydrant. The hydrant valve was then closed
to verify proper operation of the drain valve and to prevent potential
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freeze damage from standing water within the barrel. The acceptable
condition as stated in test 0319 was less than 2 inches of standing
water in the hydrant barrel.
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The shift manager immediately declared the hydrant inoperable and 1
entered the appropriate limiting condition for operation. The licensee
initiated a WO to repair the drain valve. The standing water was
drained and the barrel was left dry. The hydrant was declared operable.
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The mechanic failed to notify operations personnel when the hydrant i
failed to meet the acceptance criteria. The licensee further identified I
that the same condition existed during the previous test in May 1996. I
The inspectors also reviewed the September 1995 test which documented a '
dry barrel . Therefore, the fire hydrant was inoperable since May 1996.
The inspectors also noted that the May 1996 test was reviewed by the
system engineer and operations personnel; however, no one identified the
discrepant condition.
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10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XI required test results be documented
and evaluated to assure test requirements were met. Failure to properly
review the May 1996 test and failure to communicate discrepant test
results for the September 1996 test is considered another example of a j
violation (50-263/96008-01b).
c. Conclusions
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The shift manager responded promptly after identifying the inoperable !
fire hydrant. The mechanic failed to follow procedure and did not l
notify operations when the acceptance criteria was not met. i
M1.2 Discrenancy Between Acceptance Criteria for Standby liauid Control
(SBLC) Surveillance and Inservice Testina (IST) Program Relief Request
a. Inspection Scope (61726 and 37551)
The inspectors reviewed the following documents:
. TS 4.4.A.1;
. Surveillance test 0085, "SBLC System Operability Test," Revisions
19, 20, and 22:
. Engineering Work Instruction (EWI) 09.04.01 " Inservice Testing
Program." Revision 3; and
. Safety Evaluation Report dated July 6, 1993, which approved the
methodology used for determining SBLC flow rates.
The inspectors reviewed these documents to verify design parameters were
translated into surveillance tests.
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b. Observations and Findinos
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The inspector reviewed EWI 09.04.01 and noted that the licensee had been
granted relief from IST requirements for determining SBLC flow. The
SBLC system did not provide a direct means to measure flow; therefore,
the licensee recuested permission to determine flow based on an
alternate methoc. This method consisted of measuring the amount of
fluid transferred to the test tank over a period of time. As stated in
the Safety Evaluation Report and EWI 09.04.01, the egaation used was:
0 - 261.8 x AL/At
where
0 = flow rate in gallons per minute
AL = change in test tank level
at = change in time
The constant 261.8 represented units conversion and dimensions of the
test tank.
The inspectors reviewed surveillance test 0085 Revision 22 and
identified that the equation specified in the procedure used 264.4 as
the constant. The inspectors noted that Revision 19 of test 0085
specified a constant of 261.8. The inspectors determined that the
licensee changed the constant on February 10. 1994, with the
implementation of Revision 20 of procedure 0085.
The inspectors discussed this discrepancy with the system engineer and
the IST coordinator. Neither of the individuals were aware of the
conflicting values. The system engineer stated that the value was
changed to reflect the true dimensions of the test tank. The 261.8
value assumed a tank diameter of 35.81 inches verses an actual diameter
of 36 inches. The system enginear presented a calculation showing how
the 264.4 value was obtained. The inspector noted that this calculation
was rather informal: the calculation was not titled or dated, was not
signed by the individual performing the calculation, and was not signed
by an independent reviewer. The licensee could not retrieve additional
documentation to support this procedure change.
The inspectors reviewed the surveillance results since June 1996 and did
not identify a operability concern. Regardless of which constant was
used, the SBLC pumps flow were within acceptable limits.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI. " Test Control." required
written test procedures to incorporate the requirements and acceptance
limits contained in design documents. The licensee revised test 0085
using an unapproved informal calculation and did not recognize the
revision differed from the IST program. This is considered another
example of a violation (50-263/96008-01c).
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c. Conclusions
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The licensee was unaware that the test 0085 conflicted with the IST
3rogram. Also, the system engineer used an unapproved calculation as a
Jasis to revise the test.
M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment
M2.1 Molded Case Circuit Breaker (MCCB) Testina
a. Inspection Scone (62707 and 61726)
The inspectors performed a review of the licensee's troubleshooting and
testing activities associated with potentially damaged MCCBs.
b. Observations and Findinas
On August 20, 1996, the licensee issued CR 9602009 to document a failure
of two poles to trip in a safety related circuit breaker, B4416. During
performance of procedure 4846PM, " Molded Case Circuit Breaker
Maintenance and Test Procedure," Revision 7, two poles of the MCCB
failed to trip during an instantaneous current test as designed. The
existing MCCB was replaced with one which had been satisfactorily
tested. Additional reviews by the licensee determined that, based on
record reviews, a possible cause of the MCCB failure was that the trip
mechanism was damaged during previous testing Jerformed in May 1991.
The subject breaker contained a magnetic trip aut not a thermal trip
unit. However, it ap) eared from the 1991 data, that the MCCB may have
been subjected to a t1ermal test current (300 percent of rated) thereby
damaging the instantaneous trip mechanism. The higher test current
resulted in overheating of the instantaneous tri) mechanism and resulted
in melting the plastic parts within the trip meclanism. The licensee
identified additional MCCBs with similar type design of instantaneous
trip mechanism through records end drawing reviews. Of the 18 similar
type MCCBs, 4 were identified as possibly having been subjected to
inappropriate test currents. The inspectors witnessed the testing of
three of the four MCCBs:
1[0 MCCB. Descriotion
9602478 B4462, B Combustible Gas Control System Basket Strainer
9602484 B3414, Return Air Fan
B3423. Emergency Filter Fan
The test results indicated that the instantaneous trip mechanism was
operating properly as evidenced by the MCCBs tripping within the current
and time acceptance criteria. The fourth suspect MCCB (B3437) supplied
power to a reactor building closed cooling water drywell isolation valve
and could not be tested with the plant online. Based on the other test
results, the licensee believed it was acceptable to postpone testing of
this MCCB until the first available opportunity.
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At the completion of the inspection period. CR 9602009 remained open ,
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pending additional corrective actions including revisions to procedure
4846PM to provide additional instructions to better identify which MCCBs
do not have a thermal trip device and testing of MCCB B3437.
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c. Conclusions
The licensee's actions to evaluate and test possibly damaged MCCBs was
performed in a structured manner. Testing was determined to be
acceptably performed and the inspectors concluded that the licensee was
implementing appropriate corrective actions to resolve this issue.
M2.2 Current Material Condition and Impact on Operations Personnel
a. Insoection Scone (71707)
The inspectors conducted control room and plant inspections and j
interviewed operations personnel to assess the material condition of
plant equipment.
b. Observations and Findings
During inspections in the plant and control room, the inspectors noted
that the following degraded conditions were outstanding:
. Failed limit switch on the #1 turbine ston valve. A half scram
signal will be generated during weekly turbine valve testing. An
information card was placed on the valve handswitch to caution the ,
operators. The licensee inspected the valve during a load
reduction and found a problem with the open limit switches. The
licensee intends to repair this during an outage.
. #12 control rod drive numo discharge check valve does not
comoletely close. This leakage caused a relief valve to lift.
The operators placed this pump in operation to maintain this valve
open. An information card was placed on the hand switch and
instructed operators to isolate the discharge line when shutting
down the pump.
. #11 residual heat removal service: water air vent valve failed to
seat. This condition is discussed in Section E2.1.
. #12 core sorav numo failed to meet acceptance criteria. This
condition is discussed in Section E2.2
c. Conclusions
The inspectors verified that the above conditions did not violate TS.
The operators interviewed were knowledgeable of the conditions. The
inspectors verified that work orders were initiated to repair the
degraded equipment.
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! M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance Issues
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M8.1 (Closed) Licensee Event Reoort (50-263/96009): The licensee failed
to perform the required actions within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> following the discovery
of water in a f;rr ehydrant barrel. This event is discussed in
Section M1.1. The inspectors had no additional concerns with the
licensee's report.
l III. Enaineerina
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E2 Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment
E2.1 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Service Water (SW) #11 Pumo Declared
Inocerab_le Due to an Inonerable Air Vent Valve
l a. 'Insoection Scone (37550 and 62707) I
The inspectors performed a review of the licensee's troubleshooting,
j maintenance, and engineering activities pertaining to the inoperable #11
RHRSW pump. Problems associated with the inoperable pump were of
concern due to the recurring nature of the failure mode.
b. Observations and Findinas
l In Inspection Report 50-263/96006, paragraph E2.2. the inspectors
l discussed the failure of air vent valve, AV-3147, to close when the #11
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RHRSW pum) started on June 19. The air vent valve was located on the
pump disclarge piping and was designed to close after air was ejected
from the pump celumn and system piping. This condition was documented 1
in CR 9601666. Following extensive testing and monitoring of system i
l parameters such as system flow and pressures, the licensee performed
l adjustments to the throttling device located on the air vent valve. ~
l Post-maintenance testing of the valve indicated acceptable results as
evidenced by the valve properly seating during several tests. As a
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result, the licensee declared the valve and RHRSW pum) operable and j
exited the limiting condition for operation (LCO). T1e licensee j
continued to review the root cause of the air vent valve failures. =
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On September 18, the air vent valve failed to seat again during routine i
r surveillance testing. Operators declared the pump inoperable and
l entered the ap)licable TS LCO. The system engineer initiated additional
l testing to gatler baseline system pressure information and also directed ;
maintenance perscnnel to swap the air vent valve with that installed on -
the #13 RHRSW system. The licensee was unable to determine a root cause l
of the failure. The system was returned to the original configuration
and successfully tested daily for about a week. The system was again j
j declared operable. The other three RHRSW air vent valves have not '
! experienced the same failures to seat.
5 On October ll, the operators started the #11 RHRSW pump to support other
- testing. The air vent valve again failed to seat. The licensee
- discussed the results of previous troubleshooting and system
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performance with the valve manufacturer and a discernible root cause was
not determined. The licensee's corrective actions for this failure
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consisted of installing an orifice plate in the inlet to the air vent
valve. The purpose of the orifice was to allow the entrapped air in the
system to escape but would throttle the flow and allow the valve to
seat.
l The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective actions including
modification 960150, its corresponding safety evaluation and applicable 1
UFSAR sections. The modification safety evaluation included I
l consideration of the orifice plate material composition, ASME Section XI
testing requirements and reliability verification. The inspectors also
4 observed the installation of the orifice plate. Post-modification
testing had not started by the end of the inspection period; however. !
- the results and other licensee actions will be documented in Inspection
Report 50-263/96011.
} c. Conclusions
j The licensee's actions in evaluating the RHRSW air vent valve were
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acceptable. Extensive testing was performed and included gathering of
pe.tinent system operational data. A root cause for the inoperative air
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vent valve was not identified. However, the inspectors did not identify
deficiencies with the licensee's evaluations and implementation of the
orifice modification. I
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E2.2 #12 Core Snray Pumo (CS) in the REQUIRED ACTION Range
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a. Insnection Stone (61726)
The inspectors reviewed the September 19. 1996, results of surveillance
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test 0255-03-I11. " Core Spray System Pump Operability Test." The
- operators measured several pump performance parameters and determined
Lnat the acceptance criteria for' d1tterential pressure and required flow
were not met.
The inspectors also reviewed applicable sections of TS and UFSAR. {
b. Observations and Findings
The ins)ectors noted that operations personnel declared the pump
inopera)le, entered the appropriate TS LCO, and notified the system
i engineer. Instrumentation and controls personnel verified that pressure
gauges were calibrated and instrument lines were full. The system
engineer initiated WO 9602510 to troubleshoot the cause. The WO
consisted of adding instrumentation and re-performing portions of
surveillance test 0255-03-III. All parameters were within the
acce)tance criteria. However, the engineer noted that slight movement
of t1e selector switch for flow indicator, FI7188, caused the mV reading
to change and indicated a lower flow. The system engineer initiated WO 9602521 to investigate the switch problem. The system engineer prepared
form 3108. " Pump. Valve. Instrument Record of Corrective Action." and
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determined that the pump was operable. The engineer also placed the #12
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CS pump on an accelerated testing frequency as a conservative measure.
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The inspectors observed the additional testing and independently
verified the surveillance results and calculations. The inspectors also
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reviewed previous test data including vibration information and did not
observe a decline in the pump's performance. The inspectors reviewed i
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the engineering evaluation and had no concerns. '
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c. Conclusions
. The inspectors determined that the operability evaluation and
accelerated testing were appropriate actions. The system engineer
provided a technically sound operability evaluation.
E2.3 Licensee Actions to Resolve Control Rod Insertion Time Discrenancies
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a. Insoection Scone (37550)
The licensee continued actions to address control rod insertion time
degradation due to scram solenoid pilot valve (SSPV) problems. On
October 9. 10 and 16. 1996, the licensee performed individual control
' rod scram testing on 25 control rods. The inspectors observed portions
of the test and replacement of solenoid diaphragms.
b. Observations and Findinas
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The inspectors observed the evolution briefing for this test. The
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nuclear engineer clearly described the test and expected results to the
- control room operators. Operators established excellent communication ,
- between all individuals involved with the test. The nuclear engineer '
! evaluated the data promptly and provided guidance to the operators and
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operations management. The inspectors also noted good procedure
adherence.
Technical Specification 3.3.C.1 required an overall average 5 percent
insertion time of 375 milliseconds. The 5 percent insertion time
pertains to the time required to insert a control rod 5 percent from the
fully withdrawn position. However, the licensee conservatively decided
to replace four SSPV diaphragms which were slower than this group limit.
The inspectors witnessed the replacement of two SSPV diaphragms.
Subsequent control rod testing indicated acceptable test results. No
deficiencies were identified during the inspectors' witnessing of
control rod testing and SSPV diaphragms replacements. The inspectors
independently reviewed the test results and had no concerns.
The licensee's test results showed that the overall 5 Jercent insertion
rate had slowed since the last test. Control rods wit 1 SSPV diaphragms
installed in 1996 showed more incremental slowing than those installed
in 1994. However, the licensee extrapolated the test data and concluded
this slowing will not impact the rods' ability to scram as required by
TS.
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c. C_onclusions
The testing was conducted in a controlled manner. The evolution
briefing was informative. The 1i censee's decision to replace four
diaphragms was conservative.
E2.4 High Pressure Coolina Iniection (HPCI) System Observations
a. Insoection Scone (37550) i
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The inspectors performed a walkdown inspection of various plant areas !
including the HPCI pump room. Inspection attributes included material l
condition and system readiness. '
b. Observations and Findings
During plant tours, the inspectors noted that a junction box located on
the HPCI pump skid was open and did not contain a means to properly
secure the box closed. The HPCI system engineer was interviewed to
evaluate the safety significance of the open junction box.
The box was labeled as 0403. 0404. 0405. and 0409. The inspectors were
concerned that a possible steam leak or high humidity condition could ,
affect the existing terminal block terminations (e.g., shorting) located i
in the junction box. The system engineer determined that the
terminations located in the junction box were associated primarily with
annunciator circuits which, if shrted or became inoperative would
necessitate operator's response et would not prematurely affect the
operation of the HPCI pump. Cabies for a 3ressure switch (PS-7312) and
solenoid valve (SV-1) which could affect tie HPCI pump operation were
routed through the junction box. However, these wires were no longer
terminated at the terminal strips within the junction box but were
spliced using Raychem heat shrink material. These Raychem splices were
cualified for harsh eneironment. The inspectors inde)endently reviewed
c rawings NX-8292-45 and C-895-X-3 and verified that t1e circuits routed
through the junction box were associated with annunciator circuits or
were Raychem spliced.
From interviews with the system engineer, the inspectors could not
readily determine how long the opened junction box had existed. The
system engineer initiated WO 9602431 to provide a means to secure the
box closed. The ins Sectors verified implementation of the work order
and concluded that t1e safety significance of the above equipment
condition was minimal although the degraded material condition should
have been identified by licensee personnel prior to NRC questioning.
c. Conclusions
The inspectors concluded that the material condition of the HPCI system
was acceptable. One minor material condition indicated a need for an
increase in plant personnel awareness to changes in component material
condition.
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E2.5 Results of UFSAR Review
a The inspectors routinely compared current operational practices with
those described in the UFSAR. The inspectors did not identify any
discrepancies. The observed )lant practices, procedures, and parameters
were consistent with the UFSA1.
IV. Plant Support
R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls
R1.1 General Comments (71750)
Using Inspection Procedure 71750 the inspectors conducted frequent
reviews 0" the radiological protection area. In general, plant
personnel followed good radiological worker practices. Contaminated and
radiation areas were appropriately identified and marked. Routine
surveys were updated and radiation work permits were current for the
work observed. The expectation to keep individual exposure low was
discussed at pre-job briefings. Work activities were generally well
coordinated between plant and radiation protection personnel.
However, radiation protection personnel.were not aware of the magnitude '
of a fire sprinkler inspection in a high radiation area prior to the
prejob briefing. The fire protection system engineer did not schedule
this inspection during the outage when expected dose would have been
considerably less than at power. The radiation protection technician
postponed the surveillance until a planned power reduction.
S1 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities
-$1.1 Safeauards Material Found Unmarked and Imoronerly Stored
On September 17, the licensee notified the inspectors that a mylar
containing safeguards information was found unsecured. The mylar was ;
not marked as-safeguards material. The licensee determined that this
mylar should have been marked safeguards ~ and secured properly in l
August 1995 as part of corrective actions to a previous problem.
However, it appeared that this mylar was inadvertently missed during the ;
review. The licensee's corrective actions included retrieving the mylar -
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and storing it properly, initiating a CR, documenting the loggable
event, and requesting a quality assurance audit of drawing control.
This event is considered an Inspection Followup Item
(50-263/96008-02(DRS)) pending review by a security inspector. ;
V. Management Meetinas
X1 Exit Meeting Summary
,
On October 18, 1996, the inspectors presented the inspection results to
the Plant Manager. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.
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The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during
the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary ;
.
information was identified. '
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X3 Management Meeting Summary
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X3.1 Systematic Assessment of licensee Performance Meetina
On September 10, 1996. Mr. W. Axelson, Acting Deputy Regional
-
Administrator, presented the SALP 13 report to Mr. D. Antony, President,
Northern States Power Generation. The areas of operations, maintenance,
and plant support were considered superior and were rated a SALP 1
Category 1. The engineering function was rated a SAIP Category 2 with '
weaknesses noted in design engineering.
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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
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Licensee
l E. Watzl, Vice President Nuclear
W. Hill, Plant Manager
B. Day, Training Manager
M. Hammer, General Superintendent Maintenance
K. Jepson, Superintendent. Chemistry & Environmental Protection
L. Nolan, General Superintendent Safety Assessment
M. Onnen General Superintendent 0)erations
E. Reilly, Superintendent Plant Scleduling
C. Schibonski, General Superintendent Engineering
W. Shamla, Manager Quality Services
J. Windschill, General Superintendent, Radiation Protection
L. Wilkerson, Superintendent Security
In addition to the above, the following individuals were also present during
the SALP 13 publ~ .ceting:
Licensee
J. Howard, Chief Executive Officer
D. Antony, President, Northern States Power Generation
T. Amundson, Director Generation Quality services
R. Anderson, Director Licensing and Management Issues
- Nuclear Regulatory Commission
W. Axelson, Acting Deputy Regional Administrator
C. Pederson, Division of Nuclear Materials Safety Director
M. Ring, Division of Reactor Safety Branch Chief
T.J. Kim, NRR Project Manager
M. Jordan, Division of Reactor Projects Branch Chief
A.M. Stone, Senior Resident Inspector
J. Lara, Resident Inspector
M. Bugg, NRR Intern
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INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
, IP 37551: Onsite Engineering
IP 40500: Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in Identifying, Resolving, and
Preventing Problems
IP 61726: Surveillance Observations
IP 62703: Maintenance Observations
IP 71707: Plant Operations
IP 71750: Plant Support
IP 92700: Onsite Followup of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power
Reactor Facilities
ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened
50-263/96008-01 VIO Three Examples of Inadecuate Test Control
50-263/96008-02 IFI Mylar Found Unmarked anc Unsecured
Closed
50-263/95011-01 VIO Failure to Maintain the Drywell Spray Subsystems
Operable in Accordance with TS 3.5.C
50-263/96009-00 LER Failure to Perform the Required Actions Within One
Hour Following the Discovery of Water in a Fire
Hydrant Barrel
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers
CAM Continur)us Air Monitor
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CR Condition Report
HPCI High Pressure Coolant Injection
IFI Inspection Followup Item
IST Inservice Testing
LCO Limiting Condition for Operation
LER Licensee Event Report
MCCB Molded Case Circuit Breaker
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission
OC Operations Committee
RHRSW Residual Heat Removal Service Water
RWCU Reactor Water Clean-Up
SBLC Standby Liquid Cer. trol .
SSPV Scram Solenoid Pilot Valves l
TS Technical Specification j
UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report i
VIO Violation
WO Work Order
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