IR 05000341/1996011

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Insp Rept 50-341/96-11 on 961007-11.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Alara Committee Meeting Minutes for RFO5 Outage & Control Rod PIP Replacement Task,Also Interviewed Personnel Re Overall Effectiveness
ML20134K821
Person / Time
Site: Fermi DTE Energy icon.png
Issue date: 11/14/1996
From:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20134K799 List:
References
50-341-96-11, NUDOCS 9611200045
Download: ML20134K821 (8)


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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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REGION lli  !

, Docket No: 50-341 )

License No:

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l NPF-43 i i l i ( Report No: 50-341/96011 l l )

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Licensee: Detroit Edison Company (DECO)

! Facility: Enrico Fermi, Unit 2 Location: 6400 N. vixie Hw I Newport, MI 48166 l

Dates: October 7-11,1996 l

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j l 'spector: R. Glinski, Radiation Specialist

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(' Approved by: Thomas J. Kozak, Chief, Plant Support Branch 2 l Division of Reactor Safety l

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l 9611200045 961114 PDR ADOCK 05000341 0 PDR

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Report Details

R1 Status of Radiation Protection and Chemistry (RP&C) Controls R 1.1 A_LARA Committee Activities to Control Radiation Dose for RFOE Insoection Secoe (83750)

The inspector reviewed the ALARA Committee meeting minutes for the RF05 outage and the control rod position indicating probe (PIP) replacement task. The inspector also interviewed personnel regarding the overall effectiveness of the ALARA Committee, Observations and Findinas The ALARA Committee discussion of the PlP replacement task included a presentation of the proposed ALARA measures by the responsible contractor l

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These measures included mock-up training for the use of specially fabricated tools, the use of temporary shielding, and remote monitoring. The ALARA Committee further recommended that low dose waiting areas be designated for the workers and that only individuals who had completed mock-up training be allowed to sign onto the Radiation Work Permit (RWP) for this task. The effective implementation of committee recommendations was demonstrated by the dose savings achieved (See Section R1.2).  !

The ALARA Committee also discussed dose reduction measures for other RF05 tasks. The RF05 dose goal of 170 person-rem was based on dose rates from RFO4 and man-hours from RF03. Dose reduction and ALARA measures planned included the following: (1) depleted zinc injection, (2) temporary shielding, (3) pre-outage and pre-job ALARA briefings, (4) remote communications and monitoring for drywell activities, and (5) the use of experienced personnel. Other ALARA measures such as the sequencing of shielding, insulation, and lighting installation were also discussed. The outage dose of about 120 person-rem was due in part to effective implementation of the ALARA Committee recommendation Conclusion The ALARA Committee planning for dose reduction and ALARA activities for RFO5 was of sufficient scope and depth to contribute to dose savings achieved. The ALARA committee was effective in communicating high expectations to both the radiation protection staff and Task Managers.

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l R1.2 ALARA Reviews and Preoaration of Radiation Work Permits for RFO5

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- Insoection Scone (83729)

l l The inspector reviewed Radiation Protection Technical Procedure (RPTP)

63.000.100, " Radiation Work Permits"; and RPTP 63.0M.200, "ALARA Reviews".

The inspector also reviewed several RWP packages, inte viewed RP stuff regarding ALARA planning, and observed implementation of ALARA measurcA l

l Observations and Findinos l The inspector verified that ALARA packages and RWPs were comprehensive and l were prepared in accordance with station procedures. The reviewed RFO5 ALARA

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packages included the following: (1) historical data for airborne radioactivity, I contamination levels, dose rates, and lessons learned, (2) pre-job briefing material for dose estimates / goals and radiation protection (RP) coverage, (3) consideration for dose reduction measures and engineering controls, (4) dosimetry requirements  !

l and hold points for specific jobs, and (5) appropriate management review. The ALARA reviews were conducted by radiological engineers and included discussions and/or walkdowns with experienced RP technicians and RFOS Task Manager Although the ALARA reviews generally contributed to efft etive radiological control )

of outage tasks, the ALARA review for outage scaffolding installation did not

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l i accurately estimate the dose expenditure or work scope for *his task. A significant l contribution to this problem was the scaffolding required for the control rod position l indicating probe (PIP) replacement. RP staff used historical data which did not represent actual work conditions. As a result, the amount of scaffolding needed

! and the time to installit was significantly underestimated. In addition to problems with the PIP scaffolding, there were also instances when RP staff was required to intervene to prevent the removal of scaffolding prior to insulation replacement.

l In addition to the scaffolding problems encountered for the PIP replacement task, problems were encountered during the cable installation phase of this task. The PIP replacement project involved the removal and installation of 185 PIP cables and 185 thermocouple cables. The use of an experienced work crew and mock-up training in the Fermi 1 facility were effective exposure reducing initiatives during the cable i removal phase of the project. This resulted in efficient cable removal and low dose expenditure for this evolution. However, the time required for cable installation was significantly underestimated. The dose expended for this evolution was 13  !

person-rem vs the expected 1.43 person-re Conclusions  ;

Overall, the ALARA reviews and RWP planning for RF05 conducted by the RP staff l were good. However, examples of inadequate pre planning regarding scaffolding work and cable installation time for the PIP modification task were identifie :

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R1.3 Imolementation of Lessons Learned from RFO4 Insoection Sepoe (83750)

The inspector reviewed the lessons learned from RFO4, interviewed plant staff regstding the evaluation of these issues for RFO5 and observed field work to evaluate implementation of ALARA initiatives.

l l Observations and Findinas

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The licensee developed a RF04 lessons learned memo from ALARA post-job ,

reviews and submitted the findings to the ALARA Committee for approval and l implementation. The following is a partiallist of the lessons learned implemented for RFO5:

e Due to the Control Rod Drive (CRD) detorque machine being ineffective, the CRDs were manually detorqued in RF05. Also, floor interferences were moved prior to the CRD wor e Remote dosimetry / communication was extensively used for drywell and refuel floor activities.

l e Thread sealant was applied to the fittings for cans used to drain Local

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Power Range Monitors (LPRM), and new tubing was purchase e The use of a contaminated tool crib and a dedicated tool monitor for turbine

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wor e RP staff received training on reactor components and the lessons learned from RFO4.

Another dose reduction measure for RFO5 was the installation of an undervessel grating to facilitate a reduction of time spent in a relatively high dose rate area. As part of the ongoing source term reduction program, five valves which contain stellite were scheduled for removal, Conclusions Lessons learned compiled from RF04 ALARA post job reviews were effectively implemented for RFO5 and resulted in a net dose savings during the outage. The l inspector observed that implementation of the findings into RFO5 was effectiv R1.4 Observation of Work in the Radioloaically Restricted Area (RRA) Insoection Scooe (83750)

The inspector observed work in the turbine building, the reactor building, the i

drywell, the refuel floor, and the reactor building steam tunnel (RB-1). The

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inspector also interviewed RP and contract staff regarding radiological conditions within the plan b. Observations and Findinas During work observations, the inspector identified the following inappropriate practices:

A worker was in contact with potentially contaminated turbine components as he performed a task in a clean are * Safety glasses were hung on a stantion which designated a contaminated area boundar * On two occasions, pancake friskers were found with the detector face dow * Two tygon tubes from the scram discharge accumulators were not secured into the drain which was located just outside the contaminated boundar *

A piece of chewed gum was identified in the reactor buildin When informed by the inspector of these occurrences, the RP staff took immediate and aggressive action. However, the identification of chewed gum in the reactor building indicated a continuing problem in good RP practice by plant personnel. The licensee had identified evidence of eating and drinking on August 19 in the Radwaste Building and on August 26 around the turbine office (DERs 96-0998 and 96-1042, respectively). The licensee also discussed this issue at a lessons learned meeting on August 28,199 During observations of work activities, the inspector noted that postings and survey maps appropriately reflected plant conditions. The inspector independently verified selected survey data and no incorrectly posted areas were identified, in general, housekeeping was very good and no significant radiologicalimpediments to work activities were observed. The inspector noted that personnel dosimetry was worn :

as prescribed. The monitoring and control of potential airbome radioactivity was !

excellent as evidenced by the numerous air samplers and HEPA units throughout the RRA. The inspector noted thet temporary shielding for dose rate control was )

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The inspector observed excellent control of potentially contaminated materials. All i potentially contaminated items were either within the designated areas or were bagged and labeled appropriately. In addition, RP coverage for specific jobs and routine rounds were evident. The inspector observed that RP techs at the control !

points adequately briefed workers and exercised appropriate control of vanous i task I 5 l l

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i Overall, the RP staff exercised effective control of work practices and radiological conditions within the plant. However, the inspector identified severalinstances of inappropriate practice and a continued weakness regarding evidence of eating and drinking in the RR (

! X1 Exit Meetina Summarv I

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The inspector presented the inspection results to members of licensee management during an exit meeting on October 11,1996. The licensee did not indicate that any ,

materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietar I P

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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED 1 Licensee i P. Fessler, Plant Manager

, R. McKeon, Assistant Vice President, Operations E. Kokosky, Radiation Protection Manager S. Bartman, Chemistry Supervisor D. Williams, Radiological Engineering Supervisor

L. Crissman, General Supervisor, Radiation Protection Operations M. Offerle, General Supervisor, Radwaste A. Antrassian, Licensing Engineer P. Keenan, Radiological Engineer

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J. Oetken, Radiological Engineer

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J. White, Senior Radiation Protection Technician

R. Russell, Supervisor, Radiation Protection / Chemistry /GET Training i

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HEC A. Vegel, Senior Resident inspector, Fermi 2 C. O'Keefe, Resident inspector, Fermi 2

l Inspection Procedures Used IP 83750, " Occupational Exposure" IP 83729, " Occupational Exposure During Extended Outages" Items Opened and Closed None

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LISTING OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED i

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, Refueling Outage 4 (RF04) Lessons Learned Mem l

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Radiation Protection Technical Procedure (RPTP) 63.000.100, Revision 8, " Radiation Work Permits".

1 RPTP 63.000.200, Revision 9, "ALARA Reviews", Revision 6, " Radiation Protection

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Instrument Calibrations".

l Radiation Work Permit (P/.VP) 96-1047, " Installation and Removal of Drywell Baseline Shielding".

RWP 96-1081, " Radiation Protection Coverage, Surveys, Source Checks, Surveillances, Calibrations, and Tours in the Drywell and the RB-1 Steam Tunnel".

l RWP 96-1070, " Perform Scaffolding and Temporary Power and Lighting Work in the l Reactor Building, Auxiliary Building, and Torus Room".

RWP 96-1086, " Perform PMs on All Drywell Coolers and RB-1 Steam Tunnel Coolers:

4 Inspect, Lube Motors, and Test MCC."

RWP 96-1242/3, " Replacement of 8 Control Rod Drives".

C NPRC-96-0326, "ALARA Committee Meeting Minutes: PIP Project Presentation".

NPRC-96-0367, "Special ALARA Committee Meeting Minutes: RF05 Tasks".

Training Work Request (TWR) 94-0763, " Review RP Systems Course for Adequacy of Content Concerning Reactor internals as Radiological Hazards".

TWR 95-0555, "Need to Review and incorporate Lessons Learned from RFO4 - Training 1

Material for Technicians and Contractors". l

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