ML20072H835
| ML20072H835 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Three Mile Island  |
| Issue date: | 12/09/1980 |
| From: | Womack E BABCOCK & WILCOX CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-*, TASK-02, TASK-06, TASK-07, TASK-2, TASK-6, TASK-7, TASK-GB NUDOCS 8306290768 | |
| Download: ML20072H835 (188) | |
Text
185 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
- f. SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK (3
q_)
_-___-_-------___---_________-______--_x
' GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES. CORPORATION, a JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT COMPANY,
' METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY and (7~1 PENNSYLVANIA ELECTRIC COMPANY, Plaintiffs, -
-against- Civil Action-No.
- 80 Civ. 1683 THE BABCOCK &'WILCOX COMPANY and (R.O.)
J. RAY McDERMOTT & CO., INC., a Defendants. :
______________----__________--_--______x
~
Continued deposition of BABCOCK &
WILCOX by EDGAR ALLEN WOMACK, JR., taken by Plaintiffs pursuant to adjournment, at the offices of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays d Handler, Esqs., 425 Park, Avenue,
, New York, New York, on Tuesday, December 9, 1980, at 10:00 o' clock in the forenoon, before Charles shapiro, a Certified Shor.thand Reporter and Notary Public within and for the State of New York.
~
DOYLE REPORTING. INC.
CERTIFIED STENOTYPE REPORTERS 369 L4x NOToM AVENUE 8306290768 821209 PDR T
ADOCK 05000289 .
New You. N.Y. ICol7 PDR Tet.spueNs 212 - as7-e220
2 1 186 2 Appe aranc es 3
4 KAYE, SCHOLER, FIERMAN, HAYS & HANDLER, ESQS.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs x 5 425 Park Avenue New York,,New York 6
BY: RICHARD C. SELTZER, ESQ.
7 -and-ANDREW MacDOHALD, ESQ.,
S of Counsel 9
10 (
DAVIS, POLK & WARDWELL, ESQS.
11 Attorneys for Defendants One Chase Manhar. tan Plaza 12 New York, New York
^
13 BY: ROBERT b. FISKE, ESQ. ,
-and-14 RODMAN W. BENEDICT, ESQ.,
15 of Counsel 16 17 Also Presents .
18 DAVID TAYLOR l 19 20 * * *
[
21 22 l 23 24 25 I_-
1 , 187
,O V ED GAR ALLEN 2 WOMACK, J R.,
3 having been previously duly sworn, resumed 4 and was examined and testified further as 5 follows:
6 *- MR. SELTZER: I would like to mark 7
for identification as GPU Exhibit 4 the S " Interim Report of the TMI-2 Occurrence 9 Technical Review Committee" dated May 25, e
10 1979. t 11 (Document entitled " Interim Report 12 of the TMI-2 Occurrence. Technical Review 13 Committee" dated May 25, 1979 was marked 14 GPU Exhibit 4 for identification, as of this 15 date.)
16 MR. SELTZER: I would like to mark as 17 GPU Exhibit 5 for identification the 18 " Interim Report of the TMI-2 Occurrence 19 Technical Review Committee" dated June 8, 20 1979.
91 (Document entitled." Interim Report of k
22 the TMI-2 Occurrence Technical Review 23 Committee" dated June 8, 1979 was marked 24 GP-U Exhibit 5 for identification, as of 25 this date.)
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WA.'dELTZER: I would like to mark -
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30 , as GPU Exhibit 6 for identification the r >
- .g f 4 " Final Report of the TMI-2 Occurrence .
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"' Technical Review Committee" dated " #
6 July 31, 1979. ,< -
f 7 (Document entitled " Final Report of '
c 8 the TMI-2 Occurrence Technical Review h' Committee" dated July 31, 1979 was marked 10 6 for identificati, ion, as of
'N e f.
.v(GPU E hibit 11j ,
7
,' -this date.)
12 MR. SELTZER: I would like to mark /* , .
O
/
13 ,
for identification as GPU Exhibit 7 14 another "Fina. Report of the TMI-2 I 15 Occurrence Technical Review Committee"/
16 dated October 15, 1979.
, a 17
~
(Document entitled " Final. Report of /l 18 the TMI-2 Occurrence Technical hteview l 19 Committee" dated October 15, 19[9 was 20 marked GPU Exhibit 7 for identification, as 21 of this date.)
l 22 EXAMINATION (continued) 23 BY MR. SELTZER:
l f 24 Q Who advised you that you were going l
l 25 to serve on the Technical Review Conmittee?
l
5 1 Womack 189
[U 2 A Mr. MacMillan, I believe. s 3 Q What did he say to you?
4 A He issued a memorandum which I believe is
( 5 reproduced in this report.
6 Q Is that the so-called charter of 7 : the Technical Review Committee?
8 A Yes, sir.
9 Q Did Mr. MacMillan speak to you orally 10 regarding your appointment to the TRC? k,
, 11 A I don't recall whether he did or not. -
1 12 Q How do you believe you'were advised O .
13 that you were going to serve on the TRC7
~
l 14 A By this memorandum that I told you about, 15 and I also recall being told by Dr. Roy that I 16 would be serving on the TRC.
17 Q What did Dr. Roy say to you, in words 18 or substance? '
19 A Essentially, that a Technical Review 20 Committee had been appointed and I was being' 21 asked to serve on it.
22 MR. SELTZER: Off the record.
l 23 (Discussion off the record.)~
24
[v} (Recess taken.)
25 MR. SELTZER: We have racessed and
~
I
1 Womack 190 2 started 45 minutes late this morning 3 because we are trying to resolve a 4 scheduling dilemma. I believe it's correct
[s I 5 to say that we and Mr. Fiske had originally 6 intended that this deposition would run at 7 least for five days this week. Now, 8 because of personal problems and 9 conflicting business commitments, Dr.
10 Womack expects that he will dnly be able ,
11 to appear for his deposition the first 12 three days of this week, and we have O ,
13 agreed to resume the deposition on Friday 14 of next week.
15 If any unforeseen exigencies come up f 16 that force a modification, we will certainly l
17 work with you, Mr.,Fiske, to try and come r
18 up with a mutually satisfactory schedule.
l 19 MR. FISKE: Yes, as long as this is l
20 on the record, I think it should be noted
( 21 that the personal problem that you alluded 22 to was an illness of Mr. Womack's wife and 23 it is that exigency that may mean that he
() 24 has to leave, go back today. S ubj e ct to 25 that, he will be here tomorrow.
1 Womack 191 2 MR. SELTZER: That was certainly my 3 understanding.
4 BY MR. SELTZER:
- 5 Q The first Interim Report of the 6 Technicai Review Committee is dated May 25, 7 1979. Do you have a copy of that in front of 8 you which has been marked as GPU Exhibit 47 9 A Yes.
10 Q I take it that the members of the 11 Technical Review Committee met sometime prior to 12 the issuance of the May 25th draft GPU Exhibit 4;
13 is that right?
14 A Yes, I believe that's right.
15 Q It is not until you get to GPU 16 Exhibit 5 that a list of members of the committee 17 appears on what's numbered as page ~1..
18 Could you take a look at GPU Exhibit 19 5, which is the Interim Report dated [une 8, 19797 20 A Yes.
21 Q Do you see the list of members of the 22 committee?
23 A Yes, I do.
( 24 Q Could you run down that list and 25 just quickly tell me what department in B&W each
3 1 Womack 192 2 member of the committee was in?
l 3 A To the best of my ability, yes. I am .
4 sorry, I can't identify Mr. Cannon /Mr. Burgo,
(' 5 who are the first listed.
6 Q Have you ever met Mr. Cannon?
7 A If I have, his identity doesn't come to my 8 mind. I dcn't recognize him from his name.
9 Q Do you have any mental impression of t 10 J. E. Burgo? t 11 A No, sir.
12 Q Norm Elliott is the head of Training?
13 A Yes, sir.
14 Q What department is Kubik in?
15 A Mr. Kubik is a member of the staff of 16 Babcock & Wilcox's Lynchburg Research Center 17 and he has since left the company. -
18 Where did he go, if you know?
Q 19 A I don't offhand know.
20 Q Do you know where he is?
i - 21 A No, sir.
k 22 Q How long ago did he leave?
23 A My recollection is that he left in the fall
() 24 of '1979.
25 Q After the Final Report of the
t 4 A 1 Womack 192A
. 2 Technical Review Committee?
3 A That I am not sure. It seems to me that 1
4 it was about the same time or slightly before, 5 perhaps.
, 6 (Continued on following page.)
7 4
8 i
9 10 t 11 12 t
0- 13 14 l
f 15 16 17
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18 19
-i j 20 4
21
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- 25 I
/1 1 Womack 193 i
2 g All right. What position did J. R.
3 Hamilton have?
4 A Mr. Hamilton was a member of the Nuclear
( 5 Power Generation Division staff. As I recall, he 6 was at that time the Manager of the Development 7 Unit, one of the development units'in the R&D 8 Section of the Engineering Department.
9 Q Did he report to Dr. Roy?
10 A No, sir. I don't believe he reported 11 directly to Dr. Roy.
12 g But he was in a unit that ultimately 13 reported to Dr. Roy?
14 A Yes, sir. '
15 g Where is Hamilton today?
16 A He is still a member of the Nuclear Power 17 Generation Division staff.
l
( 18 g Is he still in a development unit I
19 in an.R&D section of Engineering?. ,
l 20 A I believe that he is, an Advanced Energy i
- 21 Unit.
l 22 g What was D. W. Montgomery's l
23 position at the time that the TRC was operating?
l 24 A My recollection is that Mr. Montgomery was 25 Manager of an Advanced Energy Systems Department.
1 Womack 194
/}/
2 g what is advanced energy systems?
3 A Basically a developmental department looking 4 at systems and providing engineering for systems
( 5 which are advancements on the basic pressurized 6 water rea.ctor business of the division such as 7 the liquid metal fast breeder reactor projects.
8 Q Has Mr. Montgomery changed his 9 position with the company since what you have just 10 described? ,
f 11 A Yes.
12 Q What is his position now?
(s')r 13 A He -- his department has become a part of 14 the Business Administration and Integr~ation 15 Department.
J 16 Q What do they do?
17 A They encompass several staff functions as 18 well as management of advanced energy' system 19 endeavors.
20 g Is Montgomery a scientist or an 21 administrator?
22 A Montgomery is an engineering manager.
23 g Were there any people on the TRC or
'~N its. staff who were more scientist than manager?
24 25 A Yes. In fact --
1 Womack 195 fs -
2 Q Who?
3 A I w uld say that Mr. Kubik was. Although he 4 held a management position, he was definitely oriented to development issues.
( 5 Mr. Hamilton's 6 title, as I hace already said, and responsibilities, 7 as I have already explained to you, would point 8 him more in that direction. Mr. Welch, whom we g have not discussed, is, to the best of my knowledge, 10 a member of the Research and Develo.pment Division 11 of The B&W Company and primarily a technical 12 specialist.
13 Q Is he still with B&W7 14 A As far as I know, he is.
15 Q At the time of the work on the TRC, 16 was Taylor the Manager of Licensing?
17 A Yes.
18 Q What is he today?
19 A He is the Manager of Licensing.-
20 Q What was K. Schroder's position at 21 the time of the repert?
i 22 A I believe he was on the staff of the 23 Manager of Project Management.
Q What did that mean he had a 24 t
%J 25 background in?
1 womack 196
("%
2 A Mr. Schroder's background is in engineering 3 management with technical experience especially in 4 the area of control and instrumentation.
( 5 Q The July 31st final report, GPU 6 Exhibit 6, lists N. L. Snidow as a member of 7 the supporting staff.
8 Can you tell me what part of B&W 9 Snidow came from?
10 A I don't believe I can. g 11 Q Have you ever met Snidow?
12 A Yes, sir, I probably have.
O (m l 13 Q Do you have any idea whatsoever what 14 part of B&W Snidow comes from?
15 A No, sir.
16 Q None whatsoever?
17 MR. FISKE: He just said that,
~
18 'Mr. Seltzer.
19 MR. SELTZER: I am incredulous.
20 MR. FISKE: I really don't think that 21 helps very much.
/ ,
k MR. SELTZER: Let me press the 22 23 question one more time.
24 Q Is it your testimony as you sit here 25 today under oath that you have absolutely no idea
l 1 Womack 197 f ~.
\
2 what area of B&W's endeavors Snidow works in?
3 A That's my testimony, yes, sir.
4 Q He is not in Marketing, is he?
A Mr. Seltzer --
( 5 6 MR. FISKE: He just said he doesn't 7 know.
8 A --
if I could recollect where Mr. Snidow 9 was, I would certainly tell you. I am not trying 10 to be difficult. t 11 Q Each of the TRC reports that we have 12 marked as Exhibits 4 through 7 for identification 13 bear a date. Wo'uld it be your reco'llection that 14 you received copies of these reports on or about 15 the dates printed on the covers?
16 A I would presume that I did.
17 Q Were there offices assigned to the 18 TRC, office space?
19 A Not to my recollection, no. Other than 20 the normal offices of the individuals.
21 Q Did you have a conference room or k
22 work room assigned to the TRC7 23 A Not to my knowledge, no.
24 Q Who was the Chairman?
25 A Mr. -- Dr. R. M. Ball was the Chairman.
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1 Womack 198
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2 Q What was Ball's position?
3 A I believe at the time that Dr. Ball was 4 a Special Assistant reporting to Mr. MacMillan.
( 5 Q what is he today?
6 A Today Dr. Ball is a Manager of the R&D 7 Management group in the Businern and Integration 8 Department.
9 Q On the scientist / manager spectrum, 10 where would Ball fit? (
11 A Dr. Ball is especially strong in technical 12 areas. I would say he is a good scientist as well
("
13 as a manager.
14 Q Ball's name shows up on'the list of 15 TRC members for the first time on GPU Exhibit 6, 16 the final report dated July 31, 1979.
17 Is it correct that he 'as w appointed 18 to the committee after the committee's work was
~
19 already in progress?
20 A Frankly, sir, I don't understand that. I 21 don't -- my recollection was that he was the 22 Chairman of the committee from the beginning but 23 my recollection may be incorrect.
"T Q Was there a Secretary of the Technical (V 24 25 Review Committee?
1 Womack 199 O 2 A , I don't believe so, no.
3 Q Was there somebody who assumed the 4 responsibility of taking notes at meetings of the
( 5 Technical Review Committee?
6 A I don't believe a single person was given 7 that responsibility on a continuing basis.
8 Q What, if any, people took notes from 9 time to time?
10 A I would imagine that all members of the 11 committee took notes from time to time.
12 Q Did you see each of the members 3 .
13 taking notes at different times at different 14 meetings? Is that what you are indicating?
15 A No, I can't testify to that.
16 Q Did you take notes at some meetings?
17 A I don't know at this point. ,
18 Q Would it be your normal practice 19 to take notes at a meeting of the type - that was 20 convened for the TRC?
21 MR. FISKE: Well, I will object to 22 that question, Mr. Seltzer, unless there is 23 some evidence that this was a normal 24 practice of the TRC.
(
25 g When you said that you believed that
. - . - ... . . - -- -. .. _ ~ . . _ . -, - - , _ .-
1 Womack 200 (m.
t 2 the members of the committee would have taken 3 notes, what did you mean by that?
4 MR. FISKE: He said he imagined.
( 5 MR. SELTZER: All right.
6 Q What did you mean by that?
7 A simply that it would not be abnormal for 8 an individual -- individuals meeting together for 9 a special purpose such as this one to note something, 10 even if it was only the date of thet next scheduled 11 meeting.
12 Q over the course of time that the 13 Technical Review Committee was functioning, 14 approximately how many meetings did you attend?
15 A My guess would be less than five.
16 Q Do you think you attended four?
17 A Perhaps. ,
18 Q Did you receive minutes or notes of 19 any of the meetings which you had not attended?
20 A Yes, I believe I received some minutes or 21 notes.
22 Q Who sent those to you, to the best 23 of your recollection?
24 A To the best of my recollection, it would
(
i 25 have been Dr. Ball.
l i
, , _ _ . , _ _ , . . _ , . _ , - , - - - , - - - - - - - - -~
1 Womack 201 2 Q On how many occasions, to the best 3 of your recollection, did you receive notes or 4 minutes of TRC meetings?
( 5 A I can't guess at that.
6 Q 'More than five?
7 A No, I don't think so.
8 Q We have marked for identification 9 four reports of the Technical Review Committee.
10 How many, if any, additonal reports,do you recall 11 were issued by the Technical Review Committee?
i 12 A I couldn't say, sir. In fact, I am not sure b
\./ 13 that I can recall independently and separately 14 each of these four that you have marked.
15 Q I would like to ask you to look at 16 GPU Exhibit 7 marked for identification, please, 17 the October final report. .
18 Is it a fact that this is the last 19 report of the Technical Review Committee?
20 A Yes, I believe so.
21 Q Would you look at page 2-19 of 22 Exhibit 7. The first item on the page is 4 23 " Finding." What was the purpose of listing I
24 findings?
25 A To indicate those matters of fact or opinion
1 Womack 202 t
b 2 on which the committee was basing its 3 recommendations to Mr. MacMillan.
4 Q The finding on page 2-19 of GPU
( 5 Exhibit 7 states, "TMI-2 support efforts by B&W, 6 Lynchburg during the post-accident recovery period 7 could have been more effective had an organizational 8 structure and responsibilities been defined prior
. 9 ' to the accident to deal with emergency situations."
10 What do you understand the phrase 11 "could have been more effective" means?
12 A I believe that had we had a pre-established O 13 relationship for the purpose of emergency response 14 support with the operating utility, with the 15 appropriate communications and designation of 16 functions on both our -- and both in our 17 organization and in the utility's organization, 18 that we could have rendered advice and assistance 19 at an earlier time in the course of this recovery 20 operation.
21 That's what I understand that to 22 mean.
23 Q Your committee --
() 24 A Excuse me.
The fact is that this was a new 25
, __ _ . . _ - , ~ .__ _ _ , - _ - - - _ _ _ . _- _
1 Womack 203 O
U 2 role for us --
3 MR. FISKE: Just a minute, Mr. Womack.
4 I think you are going past.the question --
( 5 THE WITNESS: O.K.
6 MR. FISKE: --
that Mr. Seltzer i
7 just asked you, what does that phrase mean.
8 If he wants to ask you another question, 9 he will.
10 Q' Proceed. What were y.ou going to 11 say before you were interrupted by Mr. Fiske?
12 A Simply that this was a new role for us.
[
\
13 Q Is that all you were going to say?
14 A Yes.
15 Q In the finding it indicates B&W 16 could have been more effective had an organizational 17 structure been defined before the accident. That IS refers to an organizational structure'within B&W,
~
19 is that right?
20 A I believe that it refers to an 21 organizational structure both at B&W and at the 22 operating utility.
23 g At the bottom of that page, there 24 is a reference listed. Do you see that?
25 A Yes.
i r
1 Womack 204
~
(~)/
N-2 Q What is the purpose of the reference?
A Additional information is given in another 3
4 section of the report relating to that item.
( 5 Q Do the referenced programs refer to 6 implementation of the recommendations?
7 A I believe that was their intent.
8 Q Looking at the recommendation still 9 n Page 2-19, do you see where it says an 10 organizational structure should be pstablished?
11 A Yes.
12 Q That is an organizational structure
(%
'_)
( 13 at B&W, right?
14 A As I have indicated to you, it would 15 include an organizational structure at B&W but 16 an organizational structure at B&W alone I don't 17 think would accomplish the intention of this 18 recommendation.
19 Q I would like you to look at the 20 referenced Program 3-1-1 on page 3-29 of GPU 21 Exhibit 7.
A 22 Excuse me, could you give me the page 23 referen e again? 3-29? Thank you.
(~ 24 Q Is this the program for implementation k))
(
l 25 f the recommendation that we were just referring
,--g- . ,- ,- -. - - - - - . , , - - , ,r.. , , . - - , , , , ,
l 1 Womack 205 2 to on page 2-197 3 A It is undoubtedly that part of the program 4 which would affect NPGD, yes.
( 5 g Was this the Technical Review 6 Committee's program for implementing the 7 recommendations on page 2-197 8 A Yes.
9 Q Do you see anything in there regarding 10 developing an organizational structure at the 11 utility?
12 A By implication, yes, sir. .
C) 13 Q Show me. What do you mean?
14 A Item No. 3, " Provision of a continually 15 available communication link between each control 16 room and Lynchburg," which implies responsible 17 communications by the operating util'ity on that 18 communication.
19 Item No. 4, "Developmenf of a data 20 retrieval link with each plant to provide the
, 21 necessary data to make the response team 22 immediately effective," implies appropriate input 23 to the data retrieval.
() 24 Item No. 5, " Equipment ready for 25 deployment," presumes that there is an agreement
1 Womack 206 N.) 2 between The B&W Company and the operating utility 3 with respect to the equipment which might be 4 desired by the operating utility and that the f 5 deployment of that equipment could be accommodated 6 at the utility's site.
7 Item No. 6, " Data Bank - current 8 information, drawings,"- and so forth. Once a .
9 contract is completed by B&W, updating of 10 information on data regarding the plant, its 11 operation, its design and its equipment is 12 entirely in the hands of the utility. It is at 13 their option and their option only to provide us 14 with current information. Such current information 15 could not be established by us and maintained by 4
16 us without the existence of an organization and 17 commitment by the- operating utility. ,
18 Item No. 1, " Improvement of the l
19 B&W on-site support," obviously requir5s a 20 relationship with the utility.
I 21 Q What is in paren after the words
! 22 you just read?
23 A Resident Engineer.
(~D 24 Q That is a B&W employee, isn't it?
l V
25 A Yes, it is.
l l
_ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ - ~ . _ ,_ _ _ .
1 Womack '207
[)
\/ 2 Q The first line on page 3-29 says 3 " Development of a B&W NPGD Emergency Response 4 Plan is in order as an aftermath of the TMI-2
( 5 incident. The major thrust of the plan would 6 be to improve the timeliness and quality of the 7 support availab,le to our customers in such 8 emergencies." -
9 The reference to the "' quality of 10 the support available to our customers" refers 11 to support from whom?
12 A From the NPGD.
13 Q Just :so that people know what that 14 means, what does'NPGD refer to?
15- A Nuclear Power Generation Division.
16 Q That's a B&W entity, right?
17 A Yes. '.
18 Q Solely; right?
~
19 A Yes.
20 Q Has B&W developed an emergency 21 response plan?
22 A Yes.
23 Q Was the emergency response plan in 24 place at the time of the Crystal River incident?
A I think it was s till in development at
( 25
^
l Womack 208 1
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2 that time.
3 Q Were you involved in any way in any 4 response by B&W to.the Crystal River incident?
l 5 A Yes.
4 6 Q What was your involvement?
J 7 A I assisted in providing support from the 8 Engineering Department to our service people who 9 were in communication with operations people at 10 the utility and the resident engineer, the B&W 11 resident engineer at the utility.
12 Q How quickly after the onset of that
. (~~
l transient were B&W personnel involved?
13 l 14 MR. FISKE: Just a minute, Mr.
15 Seltzer. I don't really see what the 16 ' answer to that question which, I understand',
17 relates to an incident that occurred a 18 substantial period of time after the i
j 19 accident that is the subject of"this case, 20 what the relevance of that is.
, 21 MR. SELTZER: Because we were talking km 22 about the development of an emergency 23 response plan which was in order as an 24 aftermath of the TMI-2 incident.
25 MR. FISKE: I understand.
L
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1 Womack 209
(^T
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2 MR. SELTZER: And I am trying to find 3 out what B&W does in responding to 4 transient conditions at plants.
( 5 MR. FISKE: I don't see what B&W 6 is doing today in response to other 7 transients has to do with what they did 8 back on March 28, 1979. I mean you have 9 the recommendation but I really fail to see 10 how the way in which B&W has since 11 implemented it has much to do with it.
12 MR. SELTZER: Well, it is his testimony
(~N s/ that they didn't implement it.
13 The plan 14 wasn't in place yet.
15 MR. FISKE: I think he said it was 16 s till -in development.
17 MR. SELTZER: I would like to proceed 18 with this line of questioning a little
~
19 bit farther before I will be in any 20 position to make a judgment whether this
, -21 is going to be fruitful or not.
k Are you instructing him not to 22 23 answer?
() 24 MR. FISKE: Yes, for the time being, 25 yes. I would be glad to discuss this with r n e , ,-. -
- - - - - - , -,.,-,,.,,-y. . , - , - - - , . , - , - - -
1 Womack .210
(\
U 2 you later. If you show me why B&W's 3 reaction or response to Crystal River is 4 somehow relevant to something that
( 5 happened nine months earlier, I will be 6 glad to reconsider that. But for the time 7 being I think I will instruct him not to 3 answer.
O MR. SELTZER: Mr. Fiske, I don't 10 think that we are going t'o expect you to ,
11 explain the relevance of .each of your 12 questi,ons when we challenge it. You know 13 that the Federal Rules of Ev'dence i don't 14 empower you to instruct a witness not to 15 answer. All objections are reserved until 16 the time of trial.
17 Your partner yesterday, Mr. Wise, 18 .put a stipulation on the record reserving 19 objections until the time of tria1. I 20 think it is improper for you to instruct 21 a witness on an issue like this not to 22 answer.
23 I think that it is clearly relevant
() 24 because it is the transient following the 25 Three Mile Island that is most analogous
. 1 Womack .211 O
V 2 to Three Mile Island. The question of 3 B&W's ability to respond and assist is very l 4 much an issue in the technical review plan --
( 5 I'm sorry -- the Technical Review Committee 6 report on our incident.
7 B&W castigates itself for not having 8 had an effective organizational structure 9 to respond. I am entitled to inquire what 10 B&W's ability td respond wast 11 MR. FISKE: I understand what you are 12 saying, Mr. Seltzer. I think the basic O
\- / 13 disagreement is that the Crystal River 14 incident, if it occurred before the Thren 15 Mile Island, I wouldn't quarrel with you.
e 16 How they responded to something a year 2
17 later is getting into an entire,ly different 18 situation which I really think is really 19 totally irrelevant to this and
I think 20 may well get into confidential matters that 21 shouldn't be discussed.
22 So, you know, I am going to tell 23 him, at least absent some more appropriate 1
24 showing as to the relevance of this, not
()i
\_
25 to answer. I think we have a good reason
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1 Womack .212 s
2 for doing it.
1 3 MR. SELTZER: You are impelling 4 us seriously to consider, before the
( 5 resumption of this deposition next week, 6 going to court and seeking a ruling. I 7 think this is the wrong place to pitch 8 that battle, Mr. Fiske, particularly 9 since the question is based precisely on 10 a report investigating the TMI-2 11 occurrence.
12 MR. FISKE: You have asked him a O 13 question --
14 MR. SELTZER: I will ask you to 15 reconsider that before we are finished 16 today.
17 BY MR. SELTZER: .
~
j 18 Q What was the Crystal River incident?
i 19 MR. FISKE: You can answei it 20 generally.
21 A I assume the incident to which you refer i k.
22 was a control system power failure incident 23 which occurred at the Crystal River-3 nuclear Power plant on February 26, 1980.
I
( 24 i 25 Q What was the control system failure?
e . .
s i
1 Womack 213
' CE) 2 A The control system failure involved a 3 short in one of the control system power supplies.
4 4 Q In the course of that transient there
( 5 was initiation of high pressure injection, l
6 wasn't there?
! 7 MR. FISKE: Yes, that is all right.
8 A Yes.
g Q what actuated the high pressure 10 injection signal? t 11 ,
A The low reactor coolant system pressure.
12 Q That was the signal that actuated
[
13 high pressure injection at TMI-2 on March 28, 14 1979, wasn't it?
15 A Yes, that's my belief.
16 Q The operators at Crystal River 17 left the high pressure injection on r.ather i 18 than terminating it as the operators at TMI-2 I 19 had terminated its right?
20 A Yes.
21 Q To your knowledge,,the operators I
22 at Crystal River were in touch with B&W 23 engineers during the time that high pressure injection was on, weren't they?
1
( 24 25 A Yes.
_- --. . , _ . _ _ - . . _ _ - _ - - _ - , , _ , , . _ _ , . . , , , . , . . - . _ . - . . . . . . , , , .,.~, .. . - . , , _ , . -
I 1 Womack 214 2 Q The operators of the Crystal River 3 plant had the benefit of revised procedures 4 from B&W governing termination of high pressure
( 5 injection which had been issued since the TMI-2 6 accident, hadn't they?
7 A That's my belief.
8 Q You know that revised procedures 9 governing the operation of high pressure injection 10 were issued shortly after the TMI-2 accident, 11 don't you?
12 A I know that B&W issued an advice to its
('h kl 13 operating utility customers regarding the 14 operation of high pr' essure injection.
15 Q That advice that you refer to was 16 issued shortly after the TMI-2 accident, wasn't 17 it?
18 A Yes.
19 Q That advice recommended th'a t 20 operators not terminate high pressure injection f
21 unless several conditions were observed; isn't 22 that right?
23 MR. FISKE: Which advice are you l
() 24 speaking about?
25 MR. SELTZER: The advice that the i'
1 Womack 225
('T 2 witness was just referring to.
3 A I think Mr. Fiske raises a' good point.
4 However, the answer to your question is yes.
( 5 Q What is the good point that Mr.
6 Fiske raises?
7 A That in the course of the time period 8 after March 28, 1979 several items of advice 9 from the NRC and the B&W company could cover the 10 period of time relating to the high pressure 11 injection operation were issued..
12 Q Which advice were you referring to 13 when you answered my question?
14 A The first.
15 Q The first advice which came from 16 B&W7 17 A, The first advice which came from B&W. ,
18 That's how I understood your question', yes, ,
19 sir, following the accident. ~
20 Q Who at B&W has been in charge of the 21 development of the emergency response plan? '
22 A The over-all responsibility has been with 23 Mr. Kosiba. The specific task has been with 24 Mr. Rudy Straub, S-t-r-a-u-b.
' ( 3f')}
^25 Q Why did the Technical Review
=
s ,
1 Womack .236 (D
^
2 Committee believe that it was important to 3 develop improved support for operating utilities 4 at the time of the transient?
( 5 MR. FISKE: Mr. Seltzer, I am going 6 to object to that question as you phrased 7 it. If you want to ask Mr. Womack for 8 his personal understanding, I have no .
9 objection to that but I don't think Mr.
10 Womack should be required to!-- ,
11 MR. SELTZER: I understand the 12 objection.
k' / 13 MR. FISKE: Fine. . ,
14 Q Was it the sense of the Technical 15 Review Committee at the time that it discussed 16 and came up with the findings and recommendations 17 that B&W should be rendering more e'f f.ec tive 18 support to operating utilities at the time of 19 a transient or an emergency?
20 A I believe that to the extent that I can
\
21 speak for the sense of the Committee, I wou d 22 hesitate to go beyond what is written in this 23 report, but the sense, as I understand what the I" 24 committee reported and is here documented, is N)T 25 that B&W has advice and information which could
1 Womack .217 I
(\
t 4
%/ 2 effectively be used by the utilities if they 3 chose to do so and that to offer such support 4 would be in the interests of the utilities and
( 5 the industry.
6 Q It would also be in the interests 7 of B&W, wouldn't it?
8 A Yes, sir. B&W is interested in the health 9 of the nuclear power industry, yes, sir.
10 Q It also reflects oa B&W's 11 competence and ability as a nuclear vendor, 12 doesn't it?
g s) 13 A Well, it's not my opinion that the 14 absence of the kind of plan described in 3-1 ~
15 reflects on B&W's competence as a nuclear vendor
, 16 since my best understanding of the relationship
~~
1 l
17 between'the parties in the industry w;as that 18 this was in fact a new role, not contemplated i
19 previously, for a nuclear steam supply' system 20' vendor, either ourselves or anyone else, as 21 indeed the conditions of the accident at TMI 22 were not entirely contemplated previously.
23 This recommendation goes beyond 24 the traditional role of an NSS vcador.
(
l 25 Q Let me accept your counsel's
1 Womack .218 2 suggestion.
3 Do you believe that it was doing 4 something that was useful and important for
( 5 B&W to establish a more effective organizational 6 structure to deal with emergency situations at 7 operating utilities?
8 A Yes.
9 Q Why?
10 A I think I have just explained that as well a .
4 11 as I could. I believe -- and I will say it
- 12 again. I believe that the nuclear steam supply 13 system vendor may have assistance in the form of 14 People with certain kind of technical understandings 15 which can help a utility deal with unforeseen 16 or uncontemplated situations and that making l
17 that assistance available to the util,ity-is an 18 important and reasonable thing to do,'as we 19 did in fact try to make it available 6n March 20 28th and thereafter.
21 (Continued on next page) 22 23 24 4
( )
25
1 Womack 219
('h
~
2 g What specific type of assistance aro 3 you referring to that could be rendered very early 4 in a site emergency?
( 5 A Consultation with the utility's on-site, 6 technical people regarding their interpretation 7 and diagnosis of co nditio ns and indications that 8 they are seeing in their system, and a consultation 9 with them on any special procedures which they may 10 wish to undertake to respond to those conditions.
11 Q You said consultation with site 12 technical people regarding their interpretation
,O
\/ 13 and diagnosis of conditions in the system.
14 Were you referring when you said "their 15 interpretation and diagnosis" to B&W people being d
16 able to give their interpretation and their 17 diagnosis during the early stages of a, transient?
18 A No, sir. Well, let me explain what I meant 19 in response to your question.
20 g Let me ask you this: Isn't it a fact 21 that if B&W engineers were in better communication 22 with the site during early stages of an emergency, 23 B&W engineers would be able to render their
() 24 interpretation and diagnosis of conditions in the 25 reactor system?
~
1 Womack 220
/^s
\ ,]
2 A Yes, sir. The converse seems to be not true.
'3 Q Isn't it a fact that one of the 4 beneficial purposes served by implementing the
( 5 recommendation on page 2-19 of Exhibit 7 would be 6 that B&W engineers would be able to give assistance 7 by giving their interpretation and diagnosis of 8 site conditions during the early stages of a ,
9 transient?
10 A Yes. t 11 Q How do you perceive the rendering of 12 that assistance in giving B&W's interpretation and fh 52 13 diagnosis of system conditions would assist the 14 operators handling an emergency?
15 A Well, without knowing the specific 16 circumstances of an emergency or transient, it is 17 not possible to be specific. However, the 18 expectation might be that if an ongoing transient --
19 if the information regarding the system's 20 performance or conditions during an ongoing f 21 transient could be brought in a comprehensive way
(
22 to the engineering people who had the special 23 design expertise and particularly for a transient
) 24 which might not have been previously drilled by 25 the utility 's operating staf f or contemplated by
1 Womack 221
[\
x> .
2 them or practiced by them, tha t the combination 3 of the experience and intelligence there, utility 4 operating and technical people and design people
( 5 would bring additional diagnostic capability to the 6 event.
7 Q It is a fact, isn't it, that part and 8 parcel of what you are saying is that B&W may have 9 expertise that is broader than the operators at the 10 plant, isn't that correct? (
11 A In certain specific areas, yes, but not 12 necessarily in plant operations .
O
'k 'I 13 Q In diagnosing and dealing with transient 14 conditions not previously anticipated, B&W might 15 have greater expertise, isn't that right?
s.
16 MR. FISKE: By that question, Mr.
17 Seltzer, do you mean that B&W mi,ght have
, 18 greater expertise in certain areas or are you 19 asking --
l 20 MR. SELTZER: Yes, exactly.
,_ 21 MR. FISKE: Well, the question is not
! km 22 clear. It suggests that you are trying to ask i 23 Mr. Womack to make an overall generalization.
1
[)
%)
24 MR. SELTZER: I am trying to probe his 25 last answer where he said that this assistance
- i. . , , . - . -
I womack 222 f^%
k- 2 could be useful in areas where the utility's 3 operating staff hadn't been previously drilled.
4 BY MR. SELTZER:
( 5 Q That is essentially what you said, 6 isn't it?
7 A Yes.
8 Q For B&W's staff to be useful, they 9 would have to have expertise in these areas where 10 the utility's operating s taf f had not been drilled, 11 isn't that right?
l 12 A Not necessarily. In fact, the tools of
/~
(_}/ 13 design which they might have and been able to 14 bring to bear might themselves been useful in 15 interpretation or diagnosis.
16 Q Could you explain that?
17 A For example, design involves extensive tools 18 for system analysis for analysis of system dynamic 19 events. In most cases, the designer's job is to 20 analyze those events which determine the limits 21 and margins of system performance in his area of 22 responsibility.
l 23 There is still, however, --
there are ex-24 still, however, other areas which could be l {N-r l 25 investigated with the same tools. That is what I i
1 Womack 223
<g -
(V 1 2 mean. That does not mean that the engineer 3 himself has ever experienced or analyzed a particular 4 set of conditions, but that he may have some tools l 5 to do so which are design tools and not immediately 6 available to the operating staff from other means.
7 Q I.see. I think I understand.
8 Are you saying that the engineers that 9 have engaged in design have analytic tools at 10 their disposal which may help them solve a problem 11 or contribute to solving a problem that the 12 operating staff might not have st their disposal?
[~h ,
kl 13 A Fo r example , as an example of the kind of 14 specialized assistance that might be available in 15 this hypothetical situation we are discussing.
16 Q There is no question in your mind, is i
~
l 17 there, that emergency situations do ar.ise at 18 operating utilties?
19 A No.
20 Q When you say "No," what do you mean?
21 A I mean that there is no question in my mind 22 that emergency situations do arise at operating 23 utilitier.
l () 24 Q That is not a hypothetical situation, 25 is it?
i l
1 1 Womack 224 2 A No.
3 MR. FISKE: I think when Mr. Womack 4 referred to a hypothetical situation, he was
( 5 making the point that your previous question 6 referred to a hypothetical transient.
7 MR. SELTZER: I understand.
8 MR. FISKE: Yes.
9 .
MR. SELTZER: I just did not want the 10- record to make it sound like we were talking 11 about some Alice in Wonderland scenario here.
12 BY MR. SELTZER:
%- 13 Q You said that the availability of 14 analytic tools was just one example of how the 15 B&W engineers would have something to contribute 16 that would be of assistance to the utility operating 17 staff dealing with an emergency. .
18 What are other areas in which the B&W
~
19 engineers would be able to render assistance to the 20 utility operating staff?
21 A Well, in one way or another, I --
22 Q I want to focus my question more 23 precisely. What else would the B&W engineers be
] 24 drawing on in addition to analytic tools or design 25 tools so tha t they would be able to render
?
1 Womack 225 2 assistance in areas not previously drilled by the 3 utility's operating staff? You.said the availability 4 of design tools was one example. What would others
( 5 be? ,
6 A well, any general experience of the specific 7 engineer which might include knowledge of system 8 performance, specialized knowledge of the ability 9 of equipment to perform in uncontemplated conditions.
10 For' example, the starting capacitors of the reactor 11 coolant pump motors at TMI-2.
12 Q Starting capacitors?
O
\/ 13 A Yes, sir.
14 Q Would you also say that they might 15 have more experience or knowledge about the ability 16 of the primary coolant pumps to withstand 17 cavitation. ,
18 MR. FISKE: Mr. Seltzer, I' don't think 19 he can answer that question, that is, clearly 20 in the. form you have asked it,that is clearly 21 a hypothetical question.
22 You are asking him about some assumed 23 transient without Mr. Womack knowing what
[)
u, 24 utility you are talking about, what the 25 capabilities or training of the particular
1 Womack 226 2 operators are.
3 I mean, you are asking him whether the 4 B&W engineers would know more about it than f 5 the operators, and I don't see how Mr. Womack 6 can draw that conclusion, that' kind of a 7 relative judgment, without knowing the other 8 side of the equation.
9 If you want to ask him would they have 10 information -- t 11 MR. SELTZER: Mr. Fiske, --
12 MR. FISKE: I don't see how you can ask O'
13 him .to make a comparative judgment when the 14 other side of the equation is unknown.
15 MR. SELTZER: You are a number one, 16 super litigator and my hat is off to you for 17 your litigation capability, but 1f you keep up ,
~
18 these speaking objections we are going to 19 start setting up bleachers in here to teach 20 our associates how to confuse a deposition, 21 how to tip off a witness by objection.
22 There are a lot of ways of stating an 23 objection that states for the record what
, 24 your objection is without giving the witness 25 three full paragraphs telling him exactly
_ , _ _ _ _ . , . . . , . _ _ _ , _ _ _ _ _ _ , , . _ _ , , _ _ . . . . ..__._,__,_m.. __m. , _ . _ . _ _ _ . - _ _ . _
I Womack 227 2 what he should or should not say, and I 3 object strenuously to that technique. I 4 don't think it is proper. I think I have seen
( 5 it done, I have seen it done many times, but 6 I don't think it is right and I don't think 7 that a court should countenance it.
8 MR. FISKE: Mr. . Seltzer, it seems to me 9 in this particular case, it would be important 10 for you to understand what the basis of that 11 objection was because you seem to have had 12 trouble understanding a couple.of times before b)
's/ 13 what the objection was all about.
14 If you want me to simply say "Ob j e c tio n "
15 and then discuss it with you outside the 16 presence of Mr. Womack, I will be happy to do 17 that. I don't think Mr. Womack, benefits a 18 great deal by listening to the lawyers argue 19 back and forth. He knows more about the 20 subject than you and I will ever begin to 21 know. The idea that I could educate him on 22 anything in this area is flattery to which 23 I am not accustomed.
\
[d / 24 MR. SELTZER: You are very adroit. You 25 know exactly what I am driving at, and I will L
1 womack 228 2 not make light of it. I think it is seriously 3 compromising my ability to get truthful 4 testimony from this witness, and I am grimly
( 5 serious about this, and if it continues we 6 are going to have to consider here whether 7 this is.the kind of pattern that we are going 8 to put up with for the rest of our depositions 9 in this case. It is a very grave 10 concern that this is the way you are handling 11 the first deposition.
12 MR. FISKE: Well, Mr. Seltzer, you do e
( '
\- 13 whatever you have to do, but I think --
14 MR. SELTZER: And will you do whatever 15 you have to do, and I want you to know this 16 is how I feel. I feel strongly about it and~
17 if there is any way you can see , clear to make 18 your objections more succinctly,'I will even 19 accept your offer to step out of'the room and 20 we will talk about that.
21 MR. FISKE: Fine. I don't think there 22 is any problem about that. I just think --
23 g You testified --
MR. FISKE: Go ahead.
( 24 25 (continued on next page)
bt 1 Womack 229
/~)
I
\ '/
2 Q You testified that as one example 3 the specialized knowledge which B&W engineers had 4 would be knowledge about the starting -- what
( 5 did you say, starting capacitors on the reactor 6 coolant pumps at TMI Unit 2.
7 Could you tell me exactly what the 8
significance is of the starting capacitors on 9 the primary coolant pumps at TMI-27 10 A Yes. The reason I was able to use that as 11 an example is because that was"one of the questions 12 asked by the utility following the TMI accident i
( . 13 for which we did some assistance, did investigate 14 it for them. '
15 I can't say whether they asked us 16 to do that work for them because they hadn't 17 the capability or simply becasue they wanted our 18 assistance to supplement the capability they had, 19 but in any case, the matter here was tiat the 20 primary coolant pumps were operating in an 21 environment which had not been contemplated 22 for their operation, namely, an environment in 23 which a certain amount of radioactive material had 24 been expelled into the containment in which
[~)
\
25 the pumps rest and there was, therefore, around
2 1 230 Womack 7-2 the pumps a radiation field, and the question was 3 since this was an uncontemplated environment for 4 the operation of a reactor coolant pump, outside
( 5 the design basis of the operation of the reactor 6 coolant pump, the utility asked us to research 7 whether there were any known reasons why the pump 8 might not operate or might not be expected to 9 operate in this uncontemplated environment.
10 As a result of that resea.rch which 11 we did with the pump subvendor we identified 12 only one potential problem area which was the t'~T
(-) 13 possibility of the radiation field damaging the 14 di-electric of the capacitor which is a part 15 of the startup circuit for the pump motors. It's a B
16 rather specialized question.
17 Q Did you conclude that the insulation 18 would be damaged or wouldn't?
19 A Actually I believe that the work was 20 done mostly by the pump vendor, the motor vendor, and 21 I believe his advice was that there was a reasonable k.
22 chance that the di-electric would fail to maintain l 23 its insulating characteristics after a certain 24 period of time in such a high radiation field. It 25 did not ever become an operational problem but l
l
3 1 231 Womack
(~) ~
2 it was in fact a concern.
3 Q What unit in the B&W Engineering 4 Department would have as its area of responsibility
( 5 the reactor coolant pumps?
6 MR. FISKE: You mean at the time of the 7 accident?
8 MR. SELTZER: Yes.
9 A Pumps and Drives.
10 Q To whom did Pumps and Dr.,ives report?
11 A My recollection is that it was a unit 12 in the Systems and -- if I could consult yesterday's O
(_/ 13 exhibits. Aren't these those?
14 MR. TAYLOR: Yes. -
15 A A unit in the Fluid and Mechanical Systems 16 Section reporting to Mr. Stanek.
17 Q Do you know who was the head of 18 the Pumps and Drives Unit at the time df the i
~
19 Three Mile Island Accident?
20 A Yes. Mr. Robert Kennedy.
21 Q Have you ever spoken to Bob Kennedy 22 about the TMI accident?
23 A Yes.
24 Q More than once?
25 A Probably.
-.4-._ _
-r w. . ,_-, , p.- - ...-- . . , . , , , , , . . . , ...,.._-...__,___.,-,.-__,,,_,y.-_.-y-.._.,,r,
4 1 Womack 232 2 Q To the best of your recollection 3 it was more than once?
4 A Probably, yes. To the best of my
(' 5 recollection. I can recollect only once in 6 specifics.
7 Q At.some point during the sequence of 8 events following the 4 a.m. trip at TMI, the operators 9 terminated operat' ion of the reactor coolant pumps, 10 right? (
11 A That's my understanding.
12 Q What is your understanding of what 13 motivated --
14 MR. SELTZER: I didn't want an 15 objection from Mr. Fiske. .
16 Q -- but-I am asking you for your l
17 understanding. What do you understand, impelled l
18 the operators to terminate the reactor ' coolant pump I
19 operation at that moment?
20 MR. FISKE: I will object to that, i
,. 21 Mr. Seltzer. I don't think he should- have
! km l
4 22 to --
l 23 MR. SELTZER: Do you want to tell me 24 out of the room?
l 25 MR. FISKE: I think you know the basis t
5 1 Womack 233 0 2 for the objection.
3 Q O.K., you may answer.
4 MR. FISKE: No.
( 5 MR. SELTZER: .You will instruct him 6 not to answer on his understanding?
7 MR. FISKE: His understanding of what 8 he thought the operators were doing.
9 MR. SELTZER: Mr. Shapiro, could you 10 P l ease read back my question,t 11 (Record read by the repo rte r. )
12 MR. SELTZ'ER: I would implore you I am s_/ 13 entitled to this man's understanding.
14 MR. FISKE: As he sits here now you are 15 asking.
16 MR. SELTZER: That is what I have been 17 getting for the last day, his understanding 18 as he sits here now of everything. I am not 19 asking him to refer to notes that~ he has
.20 brought with him.
21 MR. FISKE: I will obj ect to the form of 22 the question, but I will let him answer.
23 MR. SELTZER: Do you want to have 24 the question reread, or do you understand it?
25 THE WITNESS: No, I think I understand
6 I
Womack 234 O .
2 the question. I am trying to factor all 3
the things I have known into a good 4
answer for you.
( 5 A My best understandin'g is that they 0
were concerned about vibration of the pumps.
7 Q It's your understanding, isn't it, 8
that they were concerned about vibration .
9 because they were getting steam and water going 0
through the pumps at the same time , 'isn ' t that 11 right?
12 A I don't know whether they concluded that 13 as the reason for vibration or not.
14 Q It's a fact, isn't it, that from your 15 knowledge of the sequence of events there was 16 voiding in the core at the time that 17 the pumps were shut off?
A From my knowledge of the sequenc of events.
I believe that at the time the pumps were shut 20 off that.there were substantial scids circulating 21 in the system.
22 Q And it is a fact, isn't it, from your 23 knowledge as an engineer that those steam voids 24 circulating in the reactor coolant system would 25 cause vibration in tiie primary coolant pumps, isn't
7 1 235 Womack O
]
2 that a fact?
3 A Yes, I believe I know that now.
4 Q Is that type of pump behaviour known as
( 5 cavitation?
6- A Technically cavitation is something slightly 7
different but the effect is similar.
8 Q What have I got wrong? Educate me. -
9 A Cavitation,as I understand cavitation in 10 pumps occurs when the local pressure.behind 11 the impeller goes.below the saturation 12 pressure of the liquid which is being pumped through O 13 .
the impeller and it creates local bubbles due to 14 the mechanical action of the impeller as opposed to 15 actually pumping two-phase liquid. ,
16 Q In other words, merely the mechanical 17 force of the impeller could create localized 18 saturation?
19 A That's right.
20 Q Just so that I can review where 21 we stand now, you have agreed that at the time -
22 the pumps were terminated, there were steam voids 23 in the reactor coolant system, and that those 24 steam voids passing through the reactor coolant 25 pumps would cause vibration of the pumps, is that
8 1 Womack 236 C' 2 right?
3 MR. FISKE: He has agreed that that 4 is his understanding.
lk 5 A Yes. -
6 Q That's all I am asking for. I will 7 stipulate all I am asking for at any point 8
in this deposition, until the. cows.come'homei is; .
9 your understanding.
10 A Yes, I have agreed that that is my 11 understanding.
12 g I will not ask for anything else but G
k/ 13 what you understand.
14 Let me just follow this up and conclude 15 this. There are specifications that you are 16 aware of -- and I don't care when you became aware 17 of them, but you are aware there are specifications 18 for the operation of the primary coolant pumps, 19 isn't that right?
20 A Yes, sir.
21 Q Those specifications specify what Y,
22 is the maximum vibration which should be permitted 23 on the pump shafts, isn't that right?
() '
24 A Yes. As I understand it.
25 Q It's also a fact, isn't it, that since
9 'l Womack 237 b
\# 2 the Three Mile Island Unit 2 accident, B&W has 3 issued an advisory or some other written 4 communication to its operators changing the allowable l 5 vibration on the primary coolant pump shafts, 6 isn't that right?
7 A I don't have personal knowledge of a 8 general advisory, no, sir.
9 Q Are you aware that there has been any 10 specific advice to any operating utility?
11 A Yes, I believe that that was part of the 12 specialized advice discussed with GPU following O 13 the March 28th accident.
14 Q When you say following the accident, 15 what'do you mean?
16 A When the pump was restarted in the evening, 17 I believe that we provided the utility.with a 18 vibration shutdown, vibration -- my recollection 19 is that provided a shutdown vibration limit for the 20 emergency condition in which we understood that 21' they would be operating.
22 Q It's a fact, isn't it, that the 23 vibration limit that was given to GPU at that time
(} 24 was greater than the vibration limit contained,in 25 the specifications previously sent to GPU, isn't
10 -l Womack 238 O
' ~
2 that a fact?
3 A I can't testify as to the specification f
4 previously sent.
l 5 My understanding is that the limit was 6 bigger than that, that I had learned was in -- or I 7 have since learned was in their shutdown procedure.
8 Q In other words, B&W was advised .
9 some 12 or more hours after the onset of the March 28th 10 transient that it would be permissible to operate 11 the reactor coolant pumps in the emergency with a 12 higher amplitude of vibration on the coolant pump 13 shafts than they had previously been allowed to 14 operate them under their operating procedures?
15 A Did you mean GPU was advised?
16 Q Yes.
17 A I don't believe that was the form of the 18 advice.
19 I think the form of the advice simply was 20 that with respect to concern about pump vibration 21 given the emergency condition under which they were 22 operating B&W provided what the pump specialists 23 felt was an outside limit for that particular -- at
(} 24 that particular time. I don't_believe it.. referred 25 to what may have existed previously.
]
1 1 Womack 239 O
V' 2 Q Just let me, cap it off then. Is it 3 your understanding that the outside limit which 4 the pump specialists gave to GPU on the evening
{
( 5 of March 28th was greater than the limits that 6 GPU had previously had?
7 A That I believe was my understanding now,
, 8 yes.
9 MR. SELTZER: Why don't we take a 10 recess? :
11 MR. FISKE: Fine.
12 MR. SELTZER: Off the record.
13 (Discussion off the record.)
14 (Recess.)
15 MR. SELTZER: I would like to mark 16 for identification as GPU Exhibit 8 a letter 17 from James Taylor, Manager of L1 censing, to ,
18 T. M. Novak at the NRC dated May 10, 1979 19 on the subject of operating limfts for 20 reactor coolant pump operation.
21 (Letter from James Taylor to T. M.
(.
22 Novak dated May 10, 1979 marked GPU Exhibit 23 8 for identification, as of this date.)
24 BY MR. SELTZER:
[~)N
(
25 Q You will notice that you are marked r,.-,-, r -
.~ , - . - , -- .,- -,-- ,--.-,,e- ,,._------_--,,mv , - , - - , . , , _ - - . - - - .
..-.,,--,c.,-,,..e,-+-
1 Womack 240 2 for a copy.
3 Is GPU Exhibit 8 a copy of a letter 4 which you received in or about mid-May 19797 A It appears to be.
( 5 6 Q Would you turn to page 2,7 please.
7 L ok at item 2-D. Could you~ read what it says 8 beginning on the second line, please.
9 A " (Note : Shaft vibration and frame vibration 10 have been increased for this emergency condition."
11 Q Thank you.
12 Would you also look at the first
~
\- '
13 page, the second paragraph where it says that 14 "B&W is in the process of passing this information 15 on to our operating utilities for incorporation 16 of appropriate sections into their operating 17 procedures."
18 Does this refresh your re' collection l
19 that after the TMI-2 accident B&W did send an 20 advisory to its operating utilities telling them
. 21 that the permissible shaft vibration on reactor L 22 coolant pumps was being increased?
23 A Yes, it does.
24 Q You said that pump specialists at t
25 B&W would have knowledge about what the ,
e
1 womack 241 O1 2 permissible vibration on the pump shafts would 3 be under emergency conditions, is that right? i 4 A Yes.
( 5 Q operating limits expressed in G'PU Exhibit 8 were Is it your understanding that the 6
7 developed by pump specialists at B&W?
8 A Yes.
9 (Continued on following page . )
10 g 11 12 13 14 15 O
16 17
, 18 i
i -
19 20 i
21 l
L 22 23 -
24 i 25
1 Womack 242 2 Q To the best of your know13dge, the 3' operators at Three Mile Island Unit 2 had not 4 been advised prior to the time they wanted to
(
5 restart the pumps in the evening following the 6- trip on March 28th that the shafts on the 7 reactor coolant pumps could withstand higher 8
vibration for emergency ope _7ation, isn't that .
9 right?
10 A I simply have no knowledge od,that subject.
11 Q O.K. Nobody's ever, told you that 12 GPU or Met Edison operators had received the type 13 of advice contained in GPU Exhibit 8 prior to 14 the time they shut off the reactor coolant pumps 15 on March 28th?
16 A Not that I can recall, no, sir.
17 Q Do you think that in your-judgment 18 it would have been useful if the operators at Met 19 Ed haci been able to get in touch with B&W pump 20 specialists prior to their terminating the 21 operation of the reactor coolant pumps on March 22 28th?
23 MR. FISKE: I am going to object to 24 that question, Mr. . Seltzer.
25 MR. SELTZER: I am asking for his
i
}
-l Womack 243 2 current judgment.
3 MR. FISKE: I understand, but --
. 4 MR._ SELTZER: Are you instructing him
(
.( 5
~
not to answer?
6 MR. FISKE: Yes. l 7 BY MR. SELTZER:
8 ,Q At the time you received GPU Exhibit 9 8 -- do you have a copy in front of you?
10 I A Yes, sir. (
Il i Q --
did you believe that these were 12 proper operating ins tructions for running the
[~'\ -
13 pumps under emergency situations?
14 A Yes,, sir.
15 Q What is your understanding regarding 16
~
why the operators would be given greater limits.
~
17 of operation for an emergency situation as 18 contrasted with the permissible levels of 19 vibration for nonemergency operation?.
20 A To permit them to operate the pumps to a 21 higher vibration level. j 22 Q Why would that be significant?
23 A To assure that the instructions recently
\ 24 iss'ued prior to this May 10th letter regarding
(/
N._
25 handling small break LOCA with pumps running L
_ _ _ . - - _ _ _ _ . - _ _ ~
w 4
1 Womack 244 2 could be carried out without interference.
3 Q How would it interfere if this s 's 4
instruction or operating limitgwcr,e not given?
k 5 A The advice regarding sma11' break LOCA or s .,,,
6 suspected small break LOCA dhich had then been 7 given as an interim step and at the instruction j 8 of the NRC to the B&W operating plants advised 9 them to continue operation of reactor coolane.
10 pumps following low-pressure initia' tion of ; i 11 high-pressure injection and not to interrupt'it.
12 A question had hee'n' raised by the NRC
() 13
')
staff rega'rding the ability of pumps to
, s 1 14 withstand such operation'. This[ letter was a , g principal answer to that questio;n. -
15 ,
e i 16 Q This letter which refreshed your x I 17 recollection on what had been communicated to
- 'a 4 18 operating utilities said'that the limits for 19 shaft and frame vibration have been increased; ,
20 right?
t
( 21 A Yes.
L .
22 9 That means, does it not, that the 23 prior operating limits' which the utilities had
) 24 spe'cified a lower limit for permissible vibratio'n_>
. 's' <
,' .s 25 on shaft and frames ri ht? .
\A w
E i
. I Womack 245
.2 A 1 believe that the antecedent to which that s 3 sentence referred is normal operating limits, 4 not prior operating limits.
( 5 Qr Well, you see where it says that 6 shaft vibration and frame vibration have been i
7 increased for this emergency condition. Doesn't --
8 2 MR. FISKE: What's the question?
9n MR. SELTZER: I am getting to it.
10 MR. FISKE: Oh, sorry.(
11 Q Doesn't that English language that 12 I just read necessarily imply that previously
/"' -
i' 13 the shaft and frame vibration for this emergency 14 condition was something less and that it was 15 increased to the level being announced in GPU 16 Exhibit.87 17 A In the context of that sentence.where it is 18 preceded by a sentence which says "All other 10 normal operating limits remain in effect," it 20 could be read to mean either the interpretation 21 you are suggesting or the interpretation that 7
2 these are-emergency limits increased or normal i
23 operating limits.
( 24 Q Right.
25 A And I am not in a position to testify
.-_ .. -. . - - - - ~ _ = _ . _ - . . _ _ - . . _
1 Womack 246 i
, 2 accurately as to specifically which it means.
3 Q Well, Dr. Womack, don't you understand 4 that previously there were operating limits that 5 made no exception for emergency condition?
6 A I understand, I believe, from what I have 7 been told, that the operating limits at TMI were 8 for vibration limits which were less than these.
- 9 Now, I frankly have not investigated 10 nor specifically asked the question,as to 11 whether there were other operating limits which 12 made exception for emergency condition at Three i
([) 13 Mile Island, at the Three Mile Island plant nor 7
14 whether there might be such procedures in other 15 plants. It's just --
16 Q Is it fair to say you are not aware 17 of any such exceptions is that right?.
18 A To the best of my recollection, I am not 19 aware of --
one way or the other, really.
20 Q And isn't it a fact that GPU Exhibit 21 8 makes an exception solely for operation of the 22 pumps under emergency conditions?
23 A I think that is fair, yes.
( ) 24 Q And if GPU Exhibit 8 is making some 25 change, it is that it is permitting operation of
1 Womack .247 (a~h 2 those pumps under emergency conditions with 3 greater vibration?
4 A ,
Yes, if it is making some change, that's 5 correct.
6 Q And you believe it is making a 7 change, don't you?
8 A I believe it might be. I just simply don't 9 know, yes or no, whether it would be a change 10 in every utility's procedures or nd,t. Sometimes 11 instructions are sent out simply to reiterate, 12 and I think I mentioned earlier what was a large
(~N d' 13 factor in prompting this letter.
14 Q You are familiar to some degree with 15 the TMI-2 sequence of events on March 28th, 1979, 16 are you not?
17 A Yes. -
18 Q What is your best understkndingof 19 when in the course of events the core first 20 became uncovered?
21 A Sometime after the termination of the last 22 two reactor coolant pumps is my best understanding.
23 Q What --
() 24 A of the operation.
25 Q What is the relationship physically
1 Womack 248 O
2 between the termination of the last two reactor 3 coolant pumps and uncovery of the core?
4 MR. FISKE: I am sorry, I just didn't hear that question.
( 5 6 Q What is the relationship physically 7 between termination of the last two coolant pumps 8 and uncovery of the core as you understand it?
9 MR. FISKE: Now I have heard it.
10 Maybe you can explain what yqu mean by 11 " physically."
12 MR. SELTZER: I mean the term that 13 physics uses the same roots as physical.
14 A I think it's useful to talk a bit about 15 uncovery of the core. Uncovery of the core is a 16 concept which in my mind only has a real meaning 17 in the instance in which there is not a forced 18 flow through the system. It simply means that 19 the level of water and froth in the core should 20 drop below the heated regions of the fuel and 21 that would - ,that almost automatically implies 22 that you are not circulating the stuff around.
23 So in a sense --
() 24 Q All right. Now, when did stuff, as you have called it, stop circulating around?
25
'l Womack 249 0'
2 A Presumably when the last of the main 3
reactor coolant pumps was shut down.
4 Q Therefore, then, it follows that when the last coolant pumps were shut down the stuff,
( 5 .
6 r water, as you call it, or as I think you mean 7
the water mixed with steam, ceased being pumped g around, then heated portions of the core ceased g being cooled by froth or water, isn't that 10 right?
11 A Basically, yes.
12 Q It's your understanding, isn't it,
~
13 that if the reactor coolant pumps had not been 14 terminated at that point but had been left on for 15 an additional one minute that adequate cooling 16 of the core would have continued for hhat additional 17 minute, isn't that right?
18 A That is what I would expect, yes.
19 Q And in fact until there was a further 20 loss of inventory had the pumps been kept on 21 there would have continued to be cooling of the L 22 core, isn't that right?
23 A That's what we expect, yes.
/" Q Have you seen any analysis of for
( o4
~
25 how much longer the core could have continued to
,,w.- , - , - - . . - - , - -_ - ___w
1 Womack 250
\' 2 be adequately cooled if the reactor coolant pumps 3 had not been terminated, when the last two pumps 4 were terminated?
A Not specifically for TMI.
{ 5 6 Q Have you seen a simulation for a 177 7 lowered loop plant like TMI or seen the results 8 of such a simulation or analysis?
9 A No, I don't believe so.
10 Q From whatever source you've seen it, 11 heard it, discussed it, are you aware of how much 12 longer any engineer or engineers within B&W believe (O_) 13 the core could have continued to remain adequately 14 cooled had the final reactor coolant pumps not 15 been terminated when they were?
16 A Yes.
17 Q How much longer?
18 A The best expectation we have is that 19 reactor-coolant pumps force flow can cool a core 20 with a very high void fraction, that would stay 21 essentially indefinitely provided high pressure t
k 22 injection is being supplied.
23 Q At the time that the last two
(~N 24 reactor coolant pumps were tripped at TMI-2 there 25 was no high pressure injection, is that right?
1 womack 251 0 2 A To the best of my belief there had been no 3 high pressure injection for some hour and 20 4 minutes.
How much longer would the core have
( 5 Q 6 been able to remain adequately cooled if those 7 final two reactor coolant pumps had not been 8 tripped and high pressure injection had remained 9 on?
10 A -I can't really answer that qqestion.
11 Q Have you ever seen or heard any 12 discussion or analysis of that?
p 13 A Not that I specifically recoIlect.
14 Q Do you generally recall that there 15 has been such analysis performed?
~
16 A~ Not specifically for that, to answer that 17 specific question.
18 Q Analytically is that just'a variant 10 of the reactor coolant pumps on with high 20 pressure injection on analysis?
21 MR. FISKE: I don't understand what 22 you mean by the question.
23 Q- Could you extrapolate the answer to my question from an analysis that showed pumps
( 24
- 25 on high pressure injection?
1 Womack 252
/~S b ,
2 A Yes, I believe I could.
3 Q Could you explain how that would be 4 done?
( 5 A well, simply that from analyses done for a 6 different plant we --
I have the expectation 7 from the analytical work that with high pressure 8 injection on and with pumps on,the mixture being 9 circulated would carry heat away from the core 10 even though it may have a very high percentage of 11 steam and I don't know explicitly or specifically 12 what the limits of that might be. There is a (3
(-) "
13 substantial degree of uncertainty In my 14 extrapolating an answer to your question which 15 was, if I recall,1f I continued to operate the 16 pumps and continued to starve the cooling system 17 with injection how long would it operate without 18 core damage or how long would the cor'e remain 19 undamaged. I believe that was your question.
20 Q That's the question.
21 MR. SELTZER: Do you want to ask a L 22 question?
23 MR. FISKE: No, I believe he has 24 answered it.
25 MR, SELTZER: All right. Are you
I womack 253 2 trying to indicate to him that he has 3 answered?
4 MR. FISKE: No.
( 5 BY MR. SELTZER:
6 Q You said that under the analysis 7 that you are aware of which B&W has performed, 8 if the reactor coolant pumps remained running l
9 and there is high pressure injection the core 10 can remain adequately cooled with a very high 11 void fraction, that was your testimony, was it 12 not?
(_/ 13 A Yes.
14 Q In terms of percent of reactor 15 coolant system normal inventory, what percent 16 would constitute very high void fraction as you l 17 have used that phrase?
l l
18 A Greater than 90 percent.
19 Q In other words, there wou1~d be less 20 than ten percent of the normal reactor coolant l
l
, 21 system inventory? ,
(%
22 A Yes.
23 Q Could there be less than five percent
~'i under that analysis?
(d 24 25 A Probably.
1 Womack 254 N
'- Q What does that analysis assume about 2
3 the temperature of the steam and water?
4 A The analysis assumes that heat removal within the steam generators continues and that d- 5 6 it is effective heat transfer and that the heat 7 transfer occurs at a temperature which is at or 8 less than the normal regulation temperature for 9 the generators.
10 Q The analysis that you are referring 11 to, you said, assumes reactor coolant pumps 12 remain on, that high pressure injection is --
the b
N_/ 13 contribution of high pressure injection simply is 14 that it helps maintain the sufficient void fraction 15 to achieve cooling?
16 A' I don't believe I can accurateiy quantify 17 for you the contribution of high pressure injection 18 without consulting the analysis or even performing 19 additional analysis which I don't think we have 20 performed.
, 21 Q 7 take it it is consistent with your b
22 understanding and with this analysis that the 23 reactor coolant pumps can continue to operate 24 under emergency conditions with the very high w
25 void fraction that you have referred to?
l l
'l Womack 255 O 2 A Yes, it is.
3 Q In a future loss of coolant accident 4 at a B&W plant, is it your understanding of the
( 5 Technical Review Committee recommendation that 6 we have been looking at that it would be beneficial 7 for the utility to be able to communicate quickly 8 and effectively with B&W engineers?
9 A It is my belief that it could be beneficial.
10 Q is it your understanding that if the 11 utility operators reached a point where they were 12 about to terminate operation of the reactor
,O
\/ 13 coolant pumps after more than an hour into the 14 transient that it could be useful to communicate 15 with B&W engineers?
4 16 A Yes.
17 Q Specifically, it would be useful for 18 them to communicate-with engineers who had done I
19 the type of analysis on continued effe~ctive cooling 20 of the core with high void fractions', isn't that 21 right?
22 MR. FISKE: I think he said it could 23 be.
[j)
N 24 MR. SELTZER: That's what I am saying.
25 A That could be useful, I think the greatest
I i
1 Womack 256 3
2 benefit would be to understand why it was necessary 3 or might be necessary to terminate the pumps --
4 to even consider the terminating of the pumps.
( 5 Of course, to me that is hypothetical.
6 MR. FISKE: I think all of these 7 questions are hypothetical questions.
8 MR. SELTZER: You are entitled to your 9 OP i nion on that. I don't want to really 10 get into a contest with you.. I think that 11 we are getting into an area where I am 12 entitled to ask my questions. If you b
b/ 13 want to say that they are inadmissible when 14 we come to trial, fine, but this is 15 discovery, this is early discovery, and I 16 am trying to find out who knows what about 17 what and I am working from a very solid 18 foundation to be asking these discovery 19 questions.
i 20 MR. FISKE: Certainly this is 21 discovery, certainly it is early discovery, 22 certainly you are entitled to find out who 23 knows what.
() 24 I think what you are doing now is 25 asking Mr. Womack a series of hypothetical l . . . . _ _ _ - . _ _ _ - . , . . . . . _ - , - _ _
1- Womack 257
(~N 2 questions as to what might be useful in 3 the future.
4 MR. SELTZER: But I am asking it on
( 5 w rk that he has done studying the TMI-2 6 accident, Bob, and that's why I want to 7 find out. They said that they could have 8 been more effective and I am trying to find 9 out how they could have been more effective.
10 THE WITNESS: That is your question, 11 in the course of the TMI sequence?
12 BY MR. SELTZER:
13 Q I am"not asking that yet. We will 14 get to that.
15 My question was don't you believe 16 that it would be useful before operators 17 terminated reactor coolant pumps midway through 18 dealing with a transient if those operators could 19 communicate with B&W pump specialists who 20 were familiar with the analy' sis of core cooling 21 that you and I have just been discussing?
L 22 A It might be useful.
i 23 Q Useful in what ways?
24 A Well, as I began to explain to you, I think
(
25 the first thing one would ask is what system
1 womack 258
(~)
~
\,_/ conditions are leading the operators to even 2
3 contemplate that action in a hypothetical case, 4
f course you know, Mr. Seltzer, that the existing instructions would -- the currently
( 5 d
6 existing instructions would preclude that case.
7 Q Yes. I knew that.
8 The instructions that were in 9 existence on March 28, 1979,'however, would not 10 preclude that case, would they?
11 A That's correct.
12 Q And the current instructions that you
\(~j~\ -
13 are referring to are the instructions to go to 14 natural circulation within two minutes of the 15 onset of such a transient, is that right?
i 16 A' Yes.
17 Q The TMI-2 operators had no such 18 instruction from B&W on March 28, 1979, did 19 they? -
20 A That's correct.
21 Q In fact, it was consistent with the
('- instructions that the operators did have from 22 23 B&W on March 28, 1979 to leave the reactor coolant
, 'T 24 pumps operating after the onset of that loss of (G
25 n rmal feedwater transient, right?
)
1 Womack 259 j
/~'T
~J
\.
2 A I don't believe it was excluded that they 3 should do that.
4 Q It was consistent with instructions
( 5 that they had from B&W to leave the primary coolant 6 Pumps on, isn't that right?
7 A That's my belief.
8 Q Has there been any serious dissent g from that position at B&W, to your knowledge?
10 A Yes, indeed.
11 Q Are there people who believe that 12 there were operating instructions from B&W which
\
13 should have directed terminating reactor coolant 14 Pumps immediately after the onset of the transient 15 on March 28th?
16 A Please let me clarify the question that I 17 understood you asked and the question I answered 18 a minute ago.
19 When you said has there been -- has
, 20 there been dissent from that instruction at B&W, 21 I presume that you meant that instruction which 22 advice was given to the operating plants to l
23 terminate reactor coolant pump operation within O two minutes of low pressure of the actuation 24 25 of the high pressure injection system from low t
. - - -- , - , , , - - , ,..y----. , , - - , , , . - ,- . , - , , . , , . - , - , , - , - . . , - , , . . , - , . . - - - , - --
,-r--- - -- - - . -
1 Womack 260 f3
'-) 2 pressure. Is that the question you meant, because 3 that's the question I answered?
4 Q No. That's what I thought you were l 5 answering. My question previously had been don't 6 you believe that the operators were acting pursuant 7 to the then existing instructions from B&W when 8 they left the primary coolant pumps on following g the onset of their loss of feedwater transient, 10 your answer-to that question was yes, that's my 11 belief they were acting in accordance with B&W 12 instructions.
13 A Right. Yes, sir.
14 Q I am saying, have you heard any 15 dissent within B&W from your belief that the 16 operators were operating in accordance with B&W 17 instructions when they left those pumps on?
18 A Not that I can recall, no, sir.
19 Q Don't you believe in light'of the 20 analysis that you have seen on cooling the core 21 with high void fraction and the advisability 22 of better communication in emergency situations 23 that it would have been useful for the Met Ed 24 operators to have communicated with B&W
(
)
25 engineers regarding the decision to terminate the
1 Womack 261
. (~'-
\- '
2 primary coolant pumps on March 28th, 1979? ,
3 A I believe that it might have been useful.
4 It's based on more than just the factors you
(' 5 have mentioned but I believe that this is about 6 the third time I said it might have been useful.
7 Q You see, we snuck up on whether it I g would be useful to the Met Ed operators and I 9 don't think I ever asked you that.
10 A 0.K. t 11 Q And if I asked you that straight out 12 Mr. Fiske probably would have thought of 20 13 different objections.
14 A Oh, I doubt it.
15 g Isn't it a fact that one of the 16 reasons why it would have been useful is that 17 somewhere within the engineering staff at B&W 18 there were experts who knew that under emergency 19 conditions those reactor coolant pumps can 20 continue to operate with very high void fraction?
21 MR. .FISKE: I will object to the form 22 of the question. If you want to ask him 23 whether there were such experts at B&W, 24 I don't have any problem.
(V~)
25 MR. SELTZER: I will ask that as a
1 Womack 262 4
2 preliminary question.
3 A Yes, as I understand it there were 4 such experts at B&W.
/NArc k
( 5 Q And there were such experts on May f
6 28, 19797 7 A Yes.
8 Q Isn't it a fact that part of the 9 reason that it would have been useful, as you 10 testified, it would be useful to have communicated 11 with B&W experts before terminating the pumps 12 that those experts could have told GPU operators s,/ 13 that it Qas safe and advisable to continue running 14 the pumps with very high void fraction?
15 MR. FISKE: Mr. Seltzer, I will object 16 to that question.
17 MR. SELTZER: He already testified 18 that he believes it would have been useful.
19 I am asking him whether part of his reason i
20 for believing it would be useful is what
. 21 I have just enunciated.
L 22 MR. FISKE: He said it might have been 23 useful.
1 c) 24 R. eEteZER: A11 =iehe, I w111 eaxe 25 that.
1 Womack 263 2 Q Is part of the reason --
3 MR. SELTZER: I am entitled to find 4 out what he meant when he testified. And we will suspend this right now and go down
( 5 6 to court if I am not allowed to find out 7 what he meant on a crucial point like this.
8 MR. FISKE: Ask your question.
9 Q When you testified that you believed 10 it would or might be useful for thq Met Ed 11 operators to communicate with the specialists 12 at B&W who knew about pump operation and adequate
\/ 13 cooling before they terminated operation of the 14 reactor coolant pumps, is it part of your belief 15 that it would have been useful or might have been 16 useful because those specialists at B&W would have 17 told Met Ed that they could continue to operate i 18 those pumps with high void fractions and could 19 continue to achieve adequate cooling oY the core?
20 MR. FISKE: This is totally
, 21 hypothetical, Mr. Seltzer.
L 22 MR. SELTZER: I want to find out what 23 he meant when he testified a moment ago.
() 24 I press the ques tion.
25 A well, what I meant when I testified a minute
1 Womack 264
~
2 ago is that had such a question been asked, I 3 believe that the B&W engineering staff would have 4 attempted to understand what the conditions were which were leading to this consideration, and I
( 5 6 believe that would have been the useful --the 7 most -- might have been the most useful assistance 8 in that particular instance. If secondarily 9 to that question had come.up about continuea 10 operation it might have been of sope value but 11 the primary meaning of my testimony was with 12 regard to find out what the conditions in the r
k_.%) 13 system were at that time.
14 Q You are saying that as a secondary 15 matter it would have been useful for the Met Ed 16 operators to find out from the B&W specialists 17 that it was permissible and proper to continue 18 running those pumps with high void fr~ action?
19 MR. FISKE: Mr. Seltzer, this has gone 20 as far as it is going to go. I don't want 21 to make a speech because -- and tel'1 you 22 why I think this is objectionable because 23 you will object to that. But --
MR. SELTZER: Well, the witness
( 24 25 indicated he is willing to leave the room.
. . . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .~ ___. _ - -
I 1
l 1 Womack 265
,a 2 MR. FISKE: Yes, if you want to leave 3 the room -- if you want Mr. Womack to leave 4 the room, he can leave the room, but I am prepared to say why I think this is improper
( 5 6 and why I don't think this line of 7 questioning in this area or a lot of 8 other areas if you are planning to do the 9 same sort of thing in other cases should go 10 on and I think we might as well get this 11 resolved. If you.think this is so important 12 that you want to get -it resolved now we will (3
(_) 13 do it now, but I think you have gone way, 14 way, way beyond any proper scope of this 15 deposition. If you want to think about 16 that over lunch, we will think about it 17 o,ver lunch. .
18 MR. SELTZER: Are you saying that 19 even though the witness testifie~d he believes 20 it would have been useful to have this 21 greater communication and that it would 22 have been useful to have that greater 23 communication at the point where the i
24 operators were preparing to shut off the 25 pump, you are not going to permit me to i
I womack 266
("
\
2 ask this witness who was the Manager of 3
the Plant Design Section at the time and a 4 member of the Technical Review Committee why he now believes it would have been
( 5 6 useful'--
7 MR. FISKE: First of all --
8 MR. SELTZER: -- on the day of the g accident at the moment when the core was 10 about to be uncovered for thg first time, 11 you will not permit me to ask why he 12 understands it would have been useful?
s,) 13 MR. FISKE: First of all, Mr. Seltzer, 14 you persist in misstating his testimony as 15 having been that it would be useful. He 16 has repeatedly said that it mig'ht have been 17 useful and he has gone as far as I think 18 he should properly go in answering questions 19 of that type. Indeed, I am not -conceding 20 that it was proper to ask that question or
, 21 that having him answer that question itself L 22 was proper, but we, having let him do that, 23 certainly there is no basis for going any l
24 further with it, and I will be perfectly
('% /')
25 prepared to tell you why I think that's
1 1 I 1 Womack 267 O 2 right.
3 MR. SELTZER: I don't mind saying in 4 front of this witness, because I don't think l 5 it's a reflection on him, I think that some 6 of his testimony is a reflection of coaching 7 beforehand. I think that his choice of 8 words on using "would" and "probably" reflects 9 coaching ahead of time.
10 MR. FISKE: Mr. Seltzeg, it only 11 reflects the vagueness of your question.
12 - MR. SELTZER: Let me finish. Well, that
.C'N (ssl 13 can be your rebuttal. I think "would"'and 14 "probably" are questions of degree. I am 15 entitled to find out what the factors are 16 that affect a "perhaps" or a "probably."
17 MR. FISKE: My point, Mr. Seltzer, ,
18 is you are not entitled to ask the question 19 in most cases that leads to a "p'r o b ably "
20 answer in the first place. So I think that's 21 what has caused those answers. .
It's as L 22 simple as that. You asked the type of 23 question which I have repeatedly objected to
(} 24 but occasionally have allowed him to answer which by its very nature is speculative and 25
1 Womack 268 O' 2 he ends up with an answer like well, it 3 might have been or probably would have been 4 or.maybe it would have.
( 5 MR. SELTZER: And then when I try to 6 find out why it might have, you are 7 directing the witness not to answer.
8 MR. FISKE: Because I think that the g original question itself was improper and 10 having answered that it is certainly not i
11 a basis for going further with an improper 12 line of questioning.
13 (continued on following page.)
14 15 16 17
~
18
~
19 -
20 21 L 22 23 24 1
25 l
r
1 Womack 269 A
k- 2 MR. SELTZER: I think if there is one 3 thing that is clearly improper it is your 4 direction of the witness not to answer.
( 5 I don't know Judge Owen very well; you 6 probably know him much better than I do.
7 I know there are some Federal Judges who 8 think it is an outrageous interruption of 9 discovery to direct witnesses not to answer 10 when the Federal Rules clearly preclude 11 inst'ructing not to answer.
12 MR. FISKE: I think there are an awful (h
(_) 13 lot of Federal Judges who th nk discovery 14 is greatly abused by people asking 15 questions they have no right to ask and 16 I know of no way of stopping that other 17 than instructing the witness not to answer.
18 Simply to say, It is irrelevant; we i
19 will sit here for two weeks unti-1 it 20 becomes relevant" is not my idea of the way i
21 I would like to spend the next two weeks.
L 22 MR. SELTZER: Let's adjourn for 23 lunch.
24 (whereupon at 12:39 a luncheon 25 recess was taken.)
y- - -- , ,- , -,_--,,-w ,-e,,- m-m 9 ,, _ , , - , - - - -m y
1 270
[#
~
\
2 AFTERNOOli SESSION
'3 2:05 p.m.
4 E DGAR AL LE N WOMACK, J R.
( 5 resumed and testified further as follows:
6 EXAMINATION (Cont'd.)
7 BY MR. SELTZER:
8 Q In GPU Exhibit 7, page 3-29, will 9 you take a look at that (handing to witness)?
10 Page 3-29 contains the program for improving 11 B&W's communication with operating plants during 12 a site emergency; right?
O
(- 13 A I would say it contains a partial program.
14 It concentrates rather heavily on the NPGD's.
15 Q It concentrates heavily on what 16 NPGD can do to improve support and c mmunication?
17 A It concentrates heavily on those items 18 which would be done within NPGD in de'velopment 19 of an effective emergency or improved ~ emergency 20 response plan.
. 21 Q Item 1 is " Improvement of the B&W 22 on-site support (resident engineer) to make high i
23 quality advice and consultation immediately
() '
24 available to the operating staff."
What kind of improvement of on-site
[ 25 L
~
r 1 Womack 1271
(~\
kl 2 B&W support by the B&W resident engineer'did 3 you understand this first recommendation was 4 referring to?
( 5 A Well, it might include an expansion of 6 his training and area of expertise to include 7 operational matters to a greater degree or 8 emergency operational matters to a greater degree.
h 9 Q What other items did you understand 10 that first recommendation would include for 11 improving B&W "on-site support (resident 12 engine er) " ?
13 A It might also include additi$nal equipment
, 14 for providing generally higher communications 15 with him.
16 Q What do you mean by that?
17 A By the utility.
~
18 Q What kind of equipment are you 19 talking about? -
20 A For example, a pager.
21 Q Such as a doctor wears when he is
- k. on call at the hospital?
22 23 A It might include such. One could think of
(")
V 24 that kind of thing, yes, sir.
25 Q I am just trying to make it l
1 Womack 272
,f-Y' 2 comprehensible to somebody reading this record.
3 You mean he could walk around with a beeper i r.
4 his pocket and when the c'entrol ' room wanted to
(, 5 get in touch with him, they could make contact 6 ,
with him by having the beeper in his pocket 7 go off?
8 A That's one possibility for improvement of 9 immediate response contact. Another might 10 simply be to provide' operating personnel with
?
1 11 his home telephone number or his whereabouts in 12 case he had gone on a leave in an area. See, 13 as we understood it, or certainly --
excuse m 14 I should not say that'because I can't really 15 know how the others felt, but as I unde rs to'o d 16 it, the resident engineer, ab then conceived, 17 did not have operation, direct operational 18 gupport as an intended duty, major du'ty, in 19 d. >he sense of emergency response operafion.
?
4 .
20 Q Did you.believe that the.. B&W on-site 21 resident engineer could improve the' quality of C 22 his advice aad corisultation by having direct 23 operational duties in the event of an emergency?
s
(~T 24 A I believe he -- you will have to define what O
25 you mean by " direct operational duties" because
1 Womack 273 2 that goes beyond'what I have said.
3 Q No, sir. I believe those were 4 exactly your words. If you want, I will have
( 5 tead back your last answer.
, 6 A Please do that because if I used those
~
7 words I probably --
8 -
MR. FISKE: Let's hear what you g said.
10 (Record read by the reporter.)
11 A Your question is for me to clarify what 12 I maant by " direct operational support"?
%- 13 MR. SELTZER: No. Why don't you 14 read what my question really was, please.
15 (Question read by the reporter.)
'16 MR. FISKE: I think this is the 17 Problem. If you were intending to play 18 back his previous answer, you changed it.
19 MR. SELTZER: He can just ~say "no" 20 if he wants to, Bob. I really don't want 21 to quibble with you any more.
l 22 THE WITNESS: Well --
l' 23 MR. FISKE: I mean the problem is
.s
) 24 that to the extent that your second
\m/
l 25 question purports to be a restatement of t
L
1 womack .274 O
5- 2 his answer --
3 MR. SELTZER: No. I am trying to 4 get a little bit further down the road. I 4
(. 5 am trying to have a progression.
6' MR. FISKE: O.K. Read the question, 7 please.
8 (Question read by the reporter.)
+
9 A I believe that the operational -- the 10 resident engineer could contributet to emergency 11 response by having an understood, or perhaps 12 better defined, support role which, of course, O
- \m/ 13 would require the affirmative action on a 14 utility's part in an emergency response 15 organization.
16 Q In what specific ways are you saying 17 that the resident engineer could contribute by l
18 having a better defined support role?~
i t
19 A I believe a contribution he couId make is 20- to act as the focal point for contact and 21 communications provided that he has facilities to L 22 do that with the emergency respense center in 23 Lynchburg.
(~h 24 He may also, within the limits of O
25 his training, be able to render direct counsel I
1 Womack 275 f)
\2 2 in re'sponse to questions from the utility's 3 operating staff.
4 Q Direct counsel on what subjecus?
( 5 A On any subject for which he was 6 appropriately trained.
7 Q You had previously said that you 8 thought one of the things that could be done 9 was improve the training of the resident 10 engineer to deal with operation. In what ways 11 did you think the training of the resident 12 engineer could be improved?
s_) 13 A Well, my understanding of the resident 14 engineer program was to provide a better day-to-15 day contact on the routine operations and 16 particularly matters of perhaps equivalent 17 performance, maintenance, between B&W and the
~
18 utility. It had been a program undertaken, 19 really, at B&W's initiative and my re6ollection 20 is that it is supported by B&W as opposed to the 21 utilities themselves and therefore it was not 22 the intent nor, to the best of my knowledge, 23 had the utility requested that this man be
(~h 21 specially trained to assist in emergency --
in LJ 25 response to emergency conditions which might
_ _, _ _ _ . . . _. . _ . . _ _ . ~ . _ . _
1 Womack 276
(
k- 2 develop on the site, and so if he were to be --
3 if he were to have'this kind of a role added to 4 his responsibility, it would be advisable to
( 5 train him for it.
6 Q What additional training,would he 7 need?
8 A It would depend upon the individual and 9 the circumsta,nces of agreement with the utility 10 with regard to the kind of communication and 11 help that they wished to have.
12 Q Who was the resident engineer for A
k_) 13 B&W assigned to TMI-2 on May 28, l'9 7 9 7 14 A I believe that was Lee Rogers.
15 Q What additional training do you 16 think Lee Rogers would have needed to be able 17 to contribute in the fuller way that you have
~
18 been suggesting?
19 MR. FISKE: Well --
20 MR. SELTZER: Are you going to 21 instruct him not to answer again?
22 MR. FISKE: No.
23 A Well, I can't really competently answer 24 that question because I don't know Lee Rogers' 25 background and experience and training that well.
l l
Womack 277 2
Also another reason I really can't competently 3 answer that question is that I think that that 4
would be an issue that would have to be discussed
( 5 between our services people and the utility's 6 services people. Again, there.would be factors 7 other than his experience.
8 I understand the second part.
Q What 9 I am saying is I want to accept for the moment
( 10 what you are saying, that this B&WIresident 11 engineer should be equipped by training to 12 contribute more during a site emergency. That's (O
) 13 the thrust of what you and the Technical Review 14 Committee were saying, isn't that right?
15 A That's one element of a plan to provide 16 additional emergency support.
17 Q That's exactly what I am. focussing 18 on now. That's all I am focussing on right now.
~
19 You are familiar to a considerable 20 extent with the transient that took place on 21 March 28, 1979, you are part of the Technical 22 Review Committee that reviewed it, you had 23 ongoing responsibilities during the 28th and 24 the 29th with regard to the accident, didn't 25 you?
1 Womack 278 2 A Yes.
3 g Were you directly in touch with 4 Leland Rogers during the events of the 28th, l 5 the 29th, 30th?
6 A I don't think I was directly in touch 7 with Lee Rogers, at least not until possibly 8 the early evening or the middle of the evening, 9 no, sir. Your question, though, extended to 10 the 29th, 30th. Certainly, at some point during 11 those three days, I had contact with Lee Rogers, 12 yes, sir.
( -
13 g Are there areas in which you believe 14 Lee Rogers' performance during the TMI-2 15 accident would have been improved if he had had 16 different training?
17 MR. FISKE: I am going to suggest, 18 Mr. Seltzer, that that question be put in 19 the context of the TRC report ind not 20 asked of Mr. Womack as he is sitting 21 here today. If that subject was a part 22 of the TRC review, discussions, I have no 23 objection to it.
/~)
NJ 24 MR. SELTZER: I am going to press 25 my question as framed.
1 Womack -279 2 MR. FISKE: Then I will object to 3 it. I don't think you have a right to ask 4 that question of Mr. Womack as he sits
( 5 here today any more than you would anybody 6 else. You do have a right to inquire i 7 into the TRC. You are asking him what 8 his present -- you are asking for what his 9 present belief is and I am saying he doesn't 10 have to answer that questions 11 If it was part of the TRC review --
12 MR. SELTZER: He may have also formed
~
\my 13 an impression from being directly involved 14 in dealing with the accident on March 15 28th, 29th and 30th and being in direct 16 contact with Leland Rogers by his own i
17 testimony one minute ago at the height of
~
18 the accident.
i 19 I don't think your objection is 20 proper. I have laid a foundation.
. 21 MR..FISKE: Well, I still believe 22 that it is an objectionable question.
23 MR. SELTZER: You have stated your gy objection. The Court can rule on it.
25 MR. FISKE: 0.K.
m.._ . . - . . , _ _ . , _ -
g- . .. . .-r , , ... . .,_-.-,-,.r., , . , , - . . _ , - _ - . . , , . . , - - _ . , m_ _ - -. , , , . . - , - . , . . , - .
1 Womack 280 eg -
U. 2 MR. SELTZER: Are you instructing 3 the witness not to answer the question?
4 MR. FISKE: Yes, other than in the s'
't 5 context of the TRC report (indicating) 6 which I have already said I will let him 7 answer.
8 BY MR. SELTZER:
9 Q From your involvement in dealing 10 with the accident at the time the accident was 11 transpiring, did you believe that B&W's 12 efforts in rendering high quality advice and N- 13 consultation would have been assisted -- could 14 have been assisted more by a better trained i 15 B&W resident engineer?
16 A From my direct involvement with Mr. Rogers, 17 in my contact with him, I didn't come,to that 18 specific conclusion.
19 Q From your analysis done after the
, 20 accident and as part of the Technical Review
, 21 committee, is it your belief that B&W could i \-
22 have rendered better assistance and consultation 23 with a better trained or -- and I don't mean 24 to deprecate the training that Mr. Rogers had --
25 but more fully trained resident engineer?
1 Womack 281 2 A I would not go farther in stating a 3 conclusion in response to that' question than 4
4 simply to say that I consider these
(, 5 recommendations to be of a piece and I don't 6 believe that I would consent to conclude that 7 any one of these recommendations taken singly 8 or alone would necessarily give the support or 9 additional support we intended to offer by this 10 recommendation. t 11 The key issue in that day, it seems 12 to me, was one of communication and timeliness of i [\- '
13 communication.
14 Q It is a fact, is it not, that Mr.
i 15 Rogers was in communication with the control 16 room on the morning of March 28th?
17 A As I have understood it, someone at 18 Metropolitan Edison contacted Mr. Rogers on
~
19 the morning of March 28th, yes, sir.
20 Q And it was somebody who had contact i
21 with or was in the control room, isn't that 22 right?
I l
l 23 A That I don't know for sure.
1
[)
%J 24 Q Don't you know for sure that Mr.
25 Rogers was being advised of conditions that were
1 Womack 282
~
(~'s
\- 2 being read out in the control room?
3 A I know that some information, or I have 4 the understanding that some information which
( 5 would have been read out in the control room 6 was passed by Mr. Rogers between approximately 7 7:30 and 8 o'. clock on the morning of the 28th 8 to his contact in Lynchburg. That information g was very partial so it is impossible for me, 10 from that, to form the conclusion that he was --
11 that he had a full picture of what was going 12 on in the TMI control room.
s_/ 13 Q Was Rogers a licensed control room 14 operator?
15 A I don't know that. I don't know the 16 answer to that question.
17 Q Had Rogers received training on 18 the B&W simulator?
~
19 A I don't know, sir.
20 Q Had Rogers received instruction 21 from Elliott's training department?
22 A I don't know, sir.
I 23 Q Was it your understanding of the
( 24 Technical Review Committee's recommendation with 25 regard to improving B&W on-site support that
-_ ~ . . - - . l-. . . . -- . . -
4 1 Womack 283 i
%s 2 somebody in Mr. Rogers' position would receive i simulator training and other training in the 3
i 4 operation of a nuclear plant?
( 5 A That was what I had in mind, in part.
6 Q You mean you had that in mind and 7 more; is that right?
8 A Yes. I think I have already testified 9 to what was behind that recommendation in my 10 mind and I included training and certainly I 11 would not exclude, but if you wish I will 12 specifically include, simulator training.
13 Q Why did you believe th'a t simulator 14 training would be useful for somebody in Mr.
15 Rogers' position?
1 16 A Because I believe that simulator training 17 generally is useful for operationally visualizing 18 transient events in a control room and responding 19 to them. -
20 Q Item 2 on page 3-29 of GPU Exhibit
. 21 7 marked for identification is: " Establishment
~
(_ 22 of a well-trained response team drawn from 23 across the division to be constantly on call 24 with appropriate procedures in place."
25 When you say "across the division,"
i
.~.,_-,,,.,,._.._..,_..__...._._._,-._,,_.-..__-,_s , - . . - - - _ , .
1 Womack 284 em -
2 that's the Nuclear Power Generation Division of 3 B&W; is that right?
4 A Yes. That's what I understand the meaning
( 5 of that statement to be. I would amend it today 6 but that's all right.
7 Q What would you amend it to read?
8 A I think -- I think that it would really 9 be read by those following up on this as "from 10 across the company," not intended to exclude 11 expertise from outside the division.
12 Q Who outside the division would you (D
(_) .
13 want to call on as part of the well-trained 14 response team constantly on call?
15 A well, in particular in this particular 16 instance the -- my recollection was the request 17 from the utility was for additional assistance 18 . in radio chemistry and radiation technology, 19 as I recall, and we have such expertis'e both 20 within the Nuclear Power Generation Division 21 and also at the Lynchburg Research Center 22 which is not a part of the Nuclear Power 23 Generation Division.
[~}
r,.s 24 Q What did you understand the 25 phrase " constantly on call" to mean?
< -m - - , , - - , -
r , ,y ~ , , . . - - - - - - -
1 Womack 285 0)
\
'~ 2 A To be reachable with relati,ve promptness; 3 in other words, someone in a central communications 4 position has home phone numbers and the like
( 5 and on the part of the individual selected, 6 that he has given his consent to be reached 7 under such conditions outside normal working 8 hours should it be necessary to do so.
9 Q How promptly after the onset of a 1
10 transient did you believe the wellrtrained 11 response team should be able to be contacted?
12 A I don't know that I have reached a
[~'S
\-) 13 conclusion as explicit and specific as that.'
14 Q That's pretty important , - though ,
15 isn't it, to think of how quickly?
16 MR. FISKE: Mr. Seltzer, he just 17 said he didn't do it. .
18 MR. SELTZER: Now I am asking him 19 whether that's an important component of 20 being constantly on call.
21 MR. FISKE: Well, the question L 22 that you asked him was whether he considered 23 that in, I assume, reaching the conclusion 24 expressed by the words " constantly on
(
25 call." He said he didn't.
1
, , ,, . , . . --- ,. n - - ~ - , . -,,--- -- -- ..-- ,,. -,=.-. e m e .
1 Womack 286
- o' 2 Now, you may think it is important 3 but the fact is he d i d n ' t'. So I don't 4 see there is any point in pursuing it,
( 5 and I don't think this is the place to 6 debate back and forth whether it is or 7 isn't important. He said he didn't 8 specify to that degree at the time.
4 9 BY MR. SELTZER:
10 Q Why did you think thattthe operator ,
l 11 should have the telephone numbers of each of 12 the people on the response team?
l O'
13 THE WITNESS: Could you --
14 Q Why did you think that B&W 15 operators should have the telephone ~ numbers 16 for reaching each person on the response team?
~
l 17 A Oh, excuse me. ,
18 Because, since nuclear plants are 19 operated 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day, it might be n'ecessary i 20 to initiate steps in response at some time when l
21 the people on the response team were not in 22 their normal office quarters.
23 Q Why couldn't they wait until they 24 showed up at the office?
25 A In some instances it might be perfectly w- , - y., & v -w er e e- r rw u-v*, # =...--twm.--------,,,.,,--.,,_--e-r- wm r --r--ww+r- ws v -*---e --=-+m- - - = . -
1 Womack 287
-f~ .
V 2 appropriate for them to do so.
-3 Q In other instances would it be 4 inappropriate to wait?
( 5 A It might.
6 Q In what types of instances?
7 A In an instance in which the utility asked 8 for help as quickly as possible.
9 Q As you understand the need for 10 getting in touch with people quickly, would a 11 loss of coolant accident be such a circumstance?
12 MR. FISKE: I will object to this, O)
(_ 13 Mr. Seltzer, unless it is limited to what 14 was considered at the time of the TRC 15 report, ,not in terms of present questioning.
16 MR. SELTZER: Unless I am allowed 17 to discuss particular operation.s in a 18 nuclear plant, I am not going tb be able 19 to understand when you would ap[ly this 20 " constantly on call, well-trained response 21 team." It doesn't exist in a vacuum. It 23 has to respond to some transient and I am 23 trying to find out what transients the 24 well-trained response team constantly 25 on call would respond to.
1 Womack 288
("%
~- 2 MR. FISKE: And that's fine if the 3 question is in terms of wh'at was considered 4 by the Committee, but my simple point is --
( 5 MR. SELTZER: Wait a second. When 6 I asked him was it considered by the 7 Committee you interrupted and said, "Oh, 8 no, you have to ask what the witness was 9 thinking, you can't ask what the Committee 10 was thinking." (
11 Now I am supposed to ask what the 12 committee was thinking, not what the
(_) 13 witness thinks.
14 MR. FISKE: You can ask him what he 15 understood it to mean at the time and you 16 can ask him if it was discussed with other 17 members of the committee at the time.
18 MR. SELTZER: I am also ehtitled 19 to ask him what he understands ft to mean 20 today. These are words he participated 21 in writing.
22 MR. FISKE: That I disagree on.
23 MR. SELTZER: Let me make the record
(~ 24 clear for Judge Owen. Are you saying l \_s I
25 that I can't ask this witness whether one L
1 Womack 289 2 of the circumstances in which he envisioned 3 a well-trained respons2 team should be on 4 constant call is in the event of a loss
( 5 of collant accident?
6 MR. FISKE: If you put it the way 7 you just did, I wouldn' t object to it 8 because I understood that to mean --
9 MR. SELTZER: Why don't I just 10 proceed then? t 11 MR. FISKE: --
envisioned at the 12 time of the review.
I ~
(m/ 13 If you are making a record, I think 14 my position ought to also be clear. Mr.
15 Womack is not here to engage in answers 16 to a lot of conclusory questions which 17 may or may not be ultimate issues in this -
\
l 18 case, and that's what you have been doing 19 repeatedly during this deposition.
20 Now, if it is based on something l
21 '
that occurred in an actual event that he C. participated in, then it's a fact and he 22 l
23 will testify about the fact.
l f^ 24 But you and I have a basic N~j\I l
l 25 disagreement if you think that, because
- . . - , , , - . , , - . - ..--.,--a--.--,-. . - , - , - - . - - - -
1 Womack 290
\ 2 Mr. Womack is sitting here now, you can 3 ask him a whole series of what are 4 ultimately going to be conclusory questions
( 5 for someone to decide in this case and 6 get his opinion on them. That's where 7 we differ.
8 MR. SELTZER: I think you and I 9 were both trained in the modern school of 10 law that doesn't see a very pistinct 11 wall between ultimate questions. I think 12 in the twenties and thirties witnesses-C)\
(_ 13 couldn't testify to ultimate questions but 14 now witnesses such as Dr. Womack are 15 constantly being permitted to testify,1f 16 it is within their competence,to ultimate 17 questions particularly if he has 18 experience, relevant experience', that he 19 can bring to bear on it. -
1 20 But I am not sure we are at that 21 stage in my questioning today anyway.
I
- 22 am asking him whether the words they have 23 used here would apply to responding to a
/~% 24 loss of coolant accident and I am trying 25 to ask it in the best way I know how.
1 Womack 291
('N
-
- 2 MR. FISKE: I will let him answer 3 this one just so we can move along.
4 MR. SELTZER: If I have to engage in a 20-minute negotiation with you over every
( 5 6 question, it's not letting it move along.
7 MR. FISKE: I am letting him answer 8 the question.
9 A Yes.
10 Q Yes what? What are yop answering 11 "yes" to?
12 A That among the transients that we.e (s~)h, 13 envisioned on which -- during which a utility 1
14 might call upon us for such a response, that a 4
15 loss of coolant accident might be included. In 16 fact, we didn't intend to exclude any situation.
17 Q Are you saying that you~ intended 18 that the well-trained response team should be 19 able to be contacted and give a response when 20 a utility had a loss of coolant accident in 21 progress?
22 A If the utility chose to call on us.
23 Q The answer is yes?
24 A Yes, if the utility chose to call on it.
25 Q Just let me make clear. You left
1 Womack 292 O
t 2 the word out, "yes." I don't think it was clear 3 that you were saying the word "yes" when you 4 said "if the utility chose to call on us."
( 5 Since you are testifying that if 6 there were a loss of coolant accident in progress 7 and a utility wanted or needed B&W's advice 8 it would be appropriate for the well-trained 9 response team to be constantly on call, I want 10 to ask you: How soon after the onset of a 11 loss of coolant accident do you believe the 12 well-trained response team would have to be able O)
(_ 13 to be contacted in order to function in the way 14 that is envisioned by this Technical Review 15 committee program?
16 MR. FISKE: I think you asked him 17 that question once before and he answered ,
~
18 it.
i 19 MR. SELTZER: I didn't get an answer.
20 THE WITNESS: Would you like me to 21 answer again?
22 MR. FISKE: Yes.
23 A Again, that would depend on the particular 24 circumstances of any of a number of range of 25 accidents. As I said before, I think I said i
. _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ .._. _ . . ~ _ _ _ _ . _ _ ._
1 Womach 293 r
0 2 that I didn't, you know, try to pin it down 1
3 in my own mind, certainly in the sense that we 4 are trying to provide additional support or offer
( 5 additional support above and beyond that which 6 should be necessary to handle almost -- well, 7 maybe all transients.
8 It is going to be a matter of 9 judgment in any case, what the answer is.
10 (continued on next page) 11 12 13 14 1
15 i . ,
16
(
- 17 18
~
19 20 21 l
22 i n i
.I 24 25 i
( 1 1 Womack 294 O
2 Q Dr. Womack, you have testified that 3 at the time that these recommendations for the 4 creation of a response team were developed, it 5 was your understanding that the response team 6 would be able to respond to the full range of 7 transients you have told me, is that right?
8 A I said we didn't intend to exclude any.
9 Q O.K. In not excluding any, you would 10 be including some transients that wo,uld require 11 fairly prompt response, isn't that right?
12 A I would certainly include transients which n
V 13 would require some prompt response from the plant 14 operator staff as we understand the transients, 15 but we were not, to the best of my knowledge, 16 and certainly I was not thinking that this kind 17 of response and this kind of support should 18 become a part of the fixed and expected response 19 to a specific or particular transient from the 20 point of view of a utility's operational approach.
21 That's not what was intended. -
22 And so we are talking here about 23 something which is an addition for contingencies,
- a' 24 whatever they might be; an addition for 25 contingencies could be made at any time.
4 1 Womack 295 2 Q Would it be correct to say that if 3 an unanticipated contingency arose in the course 4 of a transient, that that would be a situation
( 5 in which you envisioned the well-trained response 6 team should be available for consultation?
7 A Yes.
8 Q The situation that existed at Three .
9 Mile Island Unit 2, where the pressurizer water 10 level was rising at the same time that the 11 reactor coolant system pressure was dropping, 12 was an unforeseen contingency, wasn't it?
O 13 MR. FISKE: ,I object. , Unforeseen i
14 by whom?
15 I object to that. I don't know how i 16 Dr. Womack can know what the answer to 17 that is.
18 MR. SELTZER: 0.K.
19 Q Prior to March 28th, 1979 were you 20 aware of the fact that in response to a small 21 break loss of coolant accident the B&W NSS could 22 respond with pressurizer water level rising 23 while reactor coolant pressure dropped?
( 24 A No, I don't think I was consciously aware 25 of that particular set of circumstances.
-,+,,-,e.- ,.-,y -
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1 Womack 296 (O _)- 2 l
Q so for you on March 28th, 1979 that 3 would have been an unfores~een circumstance, 4 wouldn't it?
5 A Yes. That of course doesn't single it out 6 from.a lot of operational transients, since I
-7 am not an operator.
8 Q You were somebody who was the head .
9 of the Design Section at that time; right?
10 A That's correct. ',
-11 Q And reporting to you were people 12 whose job it was to analyze small break accidents, 13 isn't that right?
14 A That's correct.
j 15 Yet you say you were unaware of the Q
16 possibility that the system could respond with 17 the pressurizer water level rising and reactor 18 coolant water level pressure dropping in the 19 aftermath of the small break water co$ ling 20 accident, is that right?
21 A To the best of my knowledge, yes, I was.
22 Q Is that the type of condition 23 occurring in a plant that you believed a B&W
( 24 response team should be able to render advice-25 on to an operating utility?
. . _ . _ . . _ . - _ . - _ . - . . . _ . . . . , - _ . _ . . , _ _ , . _ . _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ . . . _ , ~ . . . _ . . _ . , _ _ . _ . _ - . . _
1 Womack 297 (m
2 A Believed at what time?
3 Q At the time that you were 4 formulating the programs and recommendations for
( 5 the Technical Review Committee.
6 A Yes.
7 Q What type of advice in consultation 8 did you envision a B&W response team could give -
9 under those specific transient conditions?
10 A At'the time that this was being formulated?
11 Q Yes.
12 A In that case the response team might have
\#
13 been able to consult with the operational staff 14 on other information present and assemble an 15 operational picture leading to the correct 16 understanding of what was going on in the reactor 17 system, and advise the operational staff of one 18
( of the actions that could have been taken to 19 restore the reactor coolant system to a more i 20 normal and satisfactory state.
(
21 Q What information would the B&W
[ 22 well-trained response team try to assemble? You 23 said they would try to assemble an operating I
1
() 24 picture.
! 25 MR. FISKE: You are asking him what
1 Womack 298
~
2 he had in mind at the time of this report?
3 MR. SELTZER: What he mean when he 4 just said that.
5 MR. FISKE: Which is what he had in 6 mind when he wrote this report, i
7 A Certainly the information that I would, 8
at the time that I wrote this report, want to have 9 at least accessible to the response team would 10 include concurrent information on reactor 11 pressure, temperatures within the reactor 12 system, temperatures --
information regarding O 13 the pilot operated relief valve, and perhaps the ,
14 pressurizer valves generally, and their 15 discharge temperature couples, information 16 regarding any change in the condition of the 17 containment such as water, increased pressure or 10 in the condition of the reactor coolant drain 19 tank, as an example, but perhaps that's been 20 colored somewhat by the knowledge of the
< 21 specific transient, k
22 Generally the information we would 23 want available would be the general information
, 24 about the condition of the system, primary and 25 secondary pressures and temperatures concurrently,
m .
0 W mack
__ 299 0 2- _ the status of the flow, the status of the pumps, l 3 the status of other system operation, high-
' 4 ' pressure injection flow if the high-pressure 5 injection system,had been initiated.
l 6 Q Was any consideration given by the i
7 Technical Review Committee to whether the B&W 8 response team should keep itself well-informed
--J 9 on operating experience at a broad spectrum
?
- 10- of B&W plants? t 4
l_ 11 Let me modify that to say transient -
12 operating condition, like Davis-Besse.
13 A Let me just say that I believe that the ,
14 Technical Review Committee contemplated a well-15 . trained response team being knowledgeable of 16 operating experiences which might be applicable 17 to the counsel or advice that they might render.
18 Q Would that include being knowledgeable s
19 about an event such as the September 1977 20 transient at Davis-Besse?
! 21 A Yes.
22 Q How would their knowledge of that 4-l-7 23 transient help them deal with future transients, w
24 ~since you said that you would want them to be 25 aware of that one?
4 -?
4 ..--.r.. . - , , -- , - , , . . - - - , , - - - , ..-__,---...cm-- -
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,5-1 Womack , 300 ,.
p' '
s
- V e 2 MR. FI$KE
- You madn you are asking i 3 him again in'1 terms o f the work that. the v
~
n 4 committee did7-AbsolutAly.-
< 5 MR. SELTZER:
s .
6 MR .' ' F IS KE : Whedher --
(
7 A well, I don't know Now a specific transient 8 might help the team. However, I believe--and now s 9 I am speaking for'myself,'and I have tried to s . 4 10 answer your question a little bit,more broadly
- \ '
11 than you asked it. You asked if the4 Technical .
12 Review Committee considered it'and I am really s
13 speaking for myscif.
14 I think that the Technical Review ,
i 15 Committee had this in mind, I had it in mind, not i
16 the specific transient per se, but the .
17 im'portanca in rendering this kind of potentially 1 ,,
~
18 new kind of sup' port of being knowledgeable, more
~
19 knowledgeable tha'i? we presently were really with .
1 i 20 regard to operating ex'periences not only in 21 Babcock & Wilcox plants, but in other plants, 22 and it's very diff!sult at the time that one 23 studies a single.' experience, in most cases it is
- 0) 24 very difficult in time;- orie studies a single 25 experience to know how that will help you in the n .-,- - _ ._.- , , _ . _ , , , . , - - - - _ - , ,,.--,,w- , , . _ , -- - - - - , , , . . - - -
't E
1 Womack 301 A
2 future.
3 Q O.K. The Davis-Besse September 1977 4 transient is something that you have thought
( 5 about before today, isn't it?
6 A Yes.
7 Q The initiating event was a loss of 8 feed water rate?
9 A I am not sure that I know the transient
~~
10 well enough to say that. My understanding is 11 there were some sort of upset in the feed water
~
12 system.
l .
I 13 Q You also know that the pilot operator D
, 14 relief valve opened and failed to close at the 15 Davis-Besse plants right?
6 16 A ^ I believe that that was one of the outcomes, 17 yes. .
18 Q You believe it?
19 A Yes, I know that it did fail to close.
20 Q Thank you.
21 A It opened a number of times, I gather.
'.. It cycled open and closed several
! 22 Q 23 times and failed to open?
A That's what I understand. Whether the valve
( , 24 25 .was responsible for the failure or the l
l
9 1 Womack 302 2 instrumentation, I am not sure'I know. It ended 3 up open, as I understand it.
4 Q A falling reactor coolant system C 5 pressure automatically actuated high-pressure 6 injection at Davis-Besse, isn't that right?
7 A I believe so.
8 Q Following the automatic actuation of 9 high-pressure injection, the opsrators, to the 10 best of your knowledge, observed the level of 11 water in the pressurizer rising to within a 12 normal range, isn't that right?
O V 13 MR. FISKE: Can I hear that question 14 again, please?
15 (Question read by the reporter.)
16 A As I understand the transient, the 17 pressurizer level did stay or come into the 18 normal range, but I don't know the details well 19 enough to know what the sequence was.
20 Q You also understand, don't you, that
. 21 the operators at the Davis-Besse plant terminated 22 high-pressure injection manually, isn't that 23 right?
( 24 A I have been told that that happened, yes.
q_j 25 g You don't have any reason to doubt l
0 1 Womack "303 O;
\ ,
V 2 that, do you?
3 A No, no.
4 Q You weren't at the Davis-Besse
( 5 plant when.the transient occurred, were you?
6 A No, sir.
7 Q All right. I would assume then that 8 what you know is what you have been told or read.
9 The high-pressure injection was 10 terminated by the Davis-Besse opera' tors while 11 the pilot operator relief valve was stuck in the 12 open position, isn't that your understanding?
13 A Yes.
14 g A loss --
15 A or the flow reduced. I don't know whether 16 terminated is exactly right.
17 Q I think they terminated and TMI 18 operators reduced the flow.
19 A As I said, I don't know for sure.
20 Q Did you just tell me that you did know 21 that they either terminated or substantially 22 reduced high-pressure injection flow while a loss 23 of coolant accident was in progress?
()
v 24 A I said that I do know that, yes, or I do 25 understand that.
4
,. , - - + - - - - , --- - , - , - _- . _ . - . , - - - , . , , - . . _ . . , . , -
11 1 Womack 304 1
2 Q And you also understand, do you not, '
3 that after they terminated high-pressure 4 injection, the water level in the pressurizer 5 continued to rise?
6 A Yes, I understand that it stayed a normal 7 range or rose or it stayed in range, yes.
8 Q Didn't it continue to rise?
9 A I really am not absolutely sure whether it i
10 rose or not, but I suspect --
w e l'1,', I don't know.
11 I just don't know. I am not excluding it. I am 12 not making a point of it.
O 13 Q I am m'aking a point of it. ,
I want 14 to find out what your understanding was.
15 MR. FISKE: Well --
16 MR. SELTZER: Let me proceed. I am 17 not asking any improper questions, I am ,
18 not harassingorbadgeringthehitness.
19 MR. FISKE: I just think'he answered 20 che question.
21 MR. SELTZER: Maybe I have another 22 question.
23 MR. FISKE: Fine, ask the next one.
( 24 MR. SELTZER: I didn't say I was 25 finished.
2 1 Womack 305 O 2 MR. FISKE: Fine. Ask the next one.
3 That's all I was about to suggest.
4 BY MR. SELTZER:
5 Q The Davis-Besse operators didn't 6 shut the block valve until approximately 24 7 minutes after the start of their transients right?
! 8 As you understand it?
9 A My understanding was about 20 minutes. You 10 are a bit more precise than my unddrstanding.
11 Q Prior to their closing the block 12 valve, saturation occurred in the reactor coolant, O 13 isn't that right?
14 A I believe that's right.
15 Q It's your understanding that under 16 the circumstances where there is a loss of 17 coolant accident caused by a small break at the 18 top of the steam space in the pressurizer and 19 ensuing saturation in the reactor coolant system, 20 the phenomenon that occurs in the B&W reactors 21 is that the pressurizer level rises while reactor 22 coolant system pressure drops, isn't that right?
23 A That's the phenomenon that I understand 24 occurs in all pressurizer water reactors.
25 Q Including B&W's?
3 1 womack 306
/'
N_N 2 A Yes.
3 Q And it's your understanding that that 4 phenomenon would occur in the 20 or 24 minutes 5 before the block valve was closed at Davis-Besse; 6 right?
7 A Yes, I would expect it.
8 Q It's a fact, isn't it, that 9 knowledge of that experience from Davis-Besse 10 would have been useful in rendering advice or 11 consultation to the TMI-2 operators on May 28, 12 19797 13 MR. FISKE: I am going to object to 14 that.
15 MR. SELTZER: Let me ask you this.
16 Q Has it ever occurred to you that 17 knowledge of precisely what we have j.ust 18 discussed about the Davis-Besse transient would 19 have been useful to the operators at Met Ed on 20 March 28, 1979?
21 MR. FISKE: Mr. Seltzer, I don't 23 think it helps the question if you preface 23 by "has it ever occurred to you."
24 MR. SELTZER: I am asking whether 25 prior to today he ever thought of that and
r 4 1 Womack 307
(~s d 2 reached that conclusion.
3 MR. FISKE: That's exactly my point, 4 that what you are asking him for again is
< 5 an ultimate conclusion.
6 MR. SELTZER: Good. That's exactly 7 what I want.
8 MR. FISKE: Sure. I mean, we .
, 9 understand each other.
10 MR. SELTZER: 0.K. I
. 11 MR. FISKE: And that's what I am 12 objecting to.
\- 13 MR. SELTZER: Are you directing him 14 not to answer that very basic question?
15 MR. FISKE: Yes.
b 16 MR. SELTZER: On what grounds?
17 MR. FISKE: I think I have stated that 18 this --
you are asking him to e press an 19 opinion on what is essentially [ne of the 20 issues in the case.
21 MR. SELTZER: What if I asked him, 22 "Did you see Mrs. Harris shoot Dr. Tarnower?"
23 That's clearly one of the key issues in a
() 24 murder trial that is proceeding now. It may be 25 a jugular issue. Certainly witnesses are
5 1 Womack 308
[^>T u- -
2 allowed to be called to give testimony on 3 an ultimate issue.
4 MR. FISKE: Certainly, if he saw it.
5 If you asked him, sitting here today, did 6 he think she did it, I don't think he 7 should have to answer that question.
8 MR. SELTZER: Maybe it's just the ,
9 nature of our mutual practice of law that 10 the issues aren't quite as sdark as that 11 in the cases we handle, but I think that 12 this is no less nor more an ultimate O ,
13 question than "Did you see Mrs. Harris 14 shoot Dr. Tarnower?" And I think that 15 just saying, "Well, it's an ultimate 16 issue," Bob, really is not a sufficient 17 basis for objecting. -
18 MR. FISKE: Well, for the time being, 19 I am going to object. I will give it some 20 more thought.
21 You are basically asking him to sit 22 here and look back and say, "Would it have 23 been helpful if this had happened or that
() 24 happened; what would have happened if this 25 happened?" It seems to me those are -- he
, - , - - , , - . - , . , - - -- n - ~ - , - . - , ~ , , , , -
-- . , - - -.,.---e y
6 1 Womack 309 d 2 is just --
I mean --
3 MR. SELTZER: I disagree. I am not 4 asking those questions. I am asking him 5 about whether he has ever thought about 6 something previously and what his thoughts 7 were, I am not putting him on the stand as 8 an expert witness to consider something .
9 that he has never thought about before.
10 I think that if he has thought about this 11 question, it would be as an employee of 12 B&W. I think that if he has thought 13 about it as a B&W employee, it might have 14 been directly as the Manager of the Design 15 Section or as a member of the Technical 16 Review Committee studying the TMI-2 17 accident or it might have been on the day 18 or the day after the accident when he was 19 trying to help solve the problems at the 20 plant.
21 I think this is one of the people most 22 intimately involved in dealing with the 23 accident, analyzing the accident, and if I
() 24 am not allowed to ask him a question like 25 "Have you ever thought of whether such-and*
1 Womack 310 78 U 2 such would have. helped the operators?" and
, 3 then "Why did you think that, who told you 4 that, what analyses is it based on?" I 5 think you are just trying to cut my arms 6 off. I don't have to play baseball by 7 those rules.
8 MR. FISKE: I think it's the end of ,
9 your fingernails, not your arm in any 10 kind of relative term. (
11 MR. SELTZER: When you look at the 12 questions on which you have directed this b
\- 13 witness not to answer, it's always when I 14 get to the nub of the issue.
15 MR. FISKE: I have not instructed him 16 not to answer any question that calls for 17 a fact. The only time that I have objected 1
18 is when you have put these questions which l -
j 19 ask him to express an opinion on what is, 20 I think, an ultimate issue in the case.
21 MR. SELTZER: You are a more 22 experienced lawyer than I am by far and I l 23 take my hat off to you in many regards and
() 24 I think five years ago I would have been 25 intimidated by what you are trying to pull i
I.
1 Womack 311 O
.2 on me. Now I am consternated by it.
3 Let me finish what I am saying and i
1
- 4. you can say everything you want.
( 5 I have given you the floor for as 6 much time as you want. I remember from law 7 school reading that some great British 8 Lord Chancellor ruled that the state of a 9 man's mind is as much a state of fact as the 10 state of his digestion, and ( never 11 understood that in law school, but I i 12 understand it now, and what I understand
- j. O. 13 now is that if somebody prior to his 14 deposition had a state of mind, had 15 concluded something, I am allowed to find 16 out what his state of mind was before he 17 sat in here today just as much as I would 18 be allowed to find out on March 28th, "Did 19 you have an upset stomach, did you have 20 a stuffy nose that inhibited your thinking?"
21 MR. FISKE: I think that's a helpful 22 statement because I think it clarifies the 23 difference, and I might just say that I 24 think I have been anything but intimidating 25 in expressing these objections and I
-- _-,----y _w,-.---g ee, r-,---
1 Womack 312
.f) 2 haven't noticed --
3 MR. SELTZER: I said five years ago 4 I would have been intimidated.
5 MR. FISKE: His state of mind is 6 clearly relevant fact during a period of 7 time that is relevant to the case and his 8 state of mind at any time up till March 9 28, '79 or the conclusion of the accident j
10 with respect to relevance isylearly 11 relevant, and I have let him answer those 12 questions.
O 13 His state of mind today as he sits 14 here or yesterday when he was here,at the 15 end of the deposition or the week before, I 16 don't think is.
17 MR. SELTZER: His state of mind as he 18 sits here today is not perhaps relevant, 19 but I am just going to say one more thing 20 and then we are going to go to Court on 21 this, because I will not argue with you any.
22 more about it.
23 If a year ago Dr. Womack had written
/ 24 a memorandum in which he said the Davis-25 Besse transient was a substantial precursor
1 Womack 313 V 2 to what happened at Three Mile Island 3 Unit 2 on March 28th, 1979, they had feed 4 water transient, the PORV failed to close,
( 5 reactor coolant pressure went down while 6 pressurizer level rose; furthermore, if 7 the knowledge of those facts at Davis-8 Besse had been well communicated to the 9 Met Ed operating staff, it would have been 10 a substantial assistance to them in 11 handling the March 28th transient; if he 12 had written that down, there is no question, O
%/ 13 first, that that memorandum would have had 14 to be produced in this litigation; second, 15 there is no doubt in my mind that that 16 memorandum would be admissible in evidence; 17 three, there is no doubt in my mind that I l
l 18 would be able to cross-examine him until l
I j 19 I had run out of questions on what the l
20 implications of that memorandum were.
21 Now, Mr. Fiske, I think that you are 22 drawisg a distinction between something that 23 he wrote down and something that he may I~h 24 have merely had in his mind but did in fact
, %-]
25 think about one year ago.
I Womack 314 Nn .
6 2 I don't think that that distinction 3 makes any difference in terms of whether 4
I should be allowed to examine him.
( 5 MR. FISKE: And I don't think whether 6 . he thought about it a week ago as opposed 7 to for the first time today makes a 8 difference either. I think the question 9 is,'is this a question that goes to the 10 state of mind during a period.of time when i 11 events were occurring that were relevant 12 to this case.
s 13 MR. SELTZER: I think admissions 14 against interest can be made the day of an 15 accident, a week after an accident or a 16 year after an accident, and that's what we 17 are talking about right now.
18 MR. FISKE: You are suggesting that 19 what someone thinks in his mind and i 20 doesn't express is an admission?
- 21 -
MR. SELTZER: The state of a man's 22 mind is as much a state of fact as the 4
23 state of his digestion, yes. I think that I 24 if he has crystalli=ed a thought in his mind l %
25 but not written it down, it is a fact, just
? _ . . , .
1 Womack 315
~
O 2 as writing it down is a fact.
3 MR. FISKE: 0.K. Well, I think we 4 have elucidated --
( 5 MR. SELTZER: I take it you disagree 6 with that?
7 MR. FISKE: Yes, sir.
.8 MR. SELTZER: Why don't we take a 9 break?
10 MR. FISKE: Sure. (
11 (Recess taken.)
12 (Continued on next page.)
13 14
- 15 s
16 17 .
18
~
19 20 21 22 23 O 24 25 l
L
1 Womack 316 fN/ 2 BY MR. SELTZER: .
3 g Let's take a look at GPU Exhibit 7 for 4 identification. I would like you to look at page 2-23. I would like to call your attention to the
( 5 6 Paragraph that begins just under the middle of the 7 Page where the heading is " organization."
8 Have you had a chance to read the first 9' paragraph that appears under the heading 10 " organization"? g 11 A Yes.
12 Q The Technical Review Committee makes (s
(_-) 13 the statement there that "The responsibility for 14 P l ant safety and the oversight of safety issues 15 within NPGD is no t'.as clearly defined as it should 16 be."
17 Now, NPGD refers to the Nuclear Power 18 Generation Division of Babcock & Wilcox?
~
19 A Yes.
20 Q When you said "not as clearly defined 21 as it should be," what did that mean?
22 A I think I understand it to mean that, perhaps, 23 in practice, a more advisable focus for the home 24 for.such issues within the organization needed to 25 be established and advertised.
,[
1 Womack 317 sJ 2 MR. SELTZER: Could you read that 3 back, please?
4 (Record read)
[ 5 Q What does "for the home" mean ? What 6 did you mean by "for the home"?
-7 A Well, let me say that within NPGD, every 8 person feels a responsibility for safety issues.
9 However, safety issues can be raised which go 10 outside the responsibility of individuals and even 11 outside the responsibility or customary area of ,
12 knowledge of the organization as a whole. In that 13 case, it is useful to have some sort of a central 14 clearinghouse or central oversight area for the 15 follow-up on such issues. That is what I meant by 16 "home."
17 Q Hdw would that lead to a ~ c,learer 18 definition of " oversight of safety issues within
~~
19 B&W7 20 A Definition may be a mattar of having the 21 home defined and making sure that everybody knows 22 about it and knows -- having the central -
23 clearinghouse defined and making sure that everyone 24 knows about how it can be used.
25 Q So you are saying that B&W would have
1 Womack 318 O -
- k- 2 better oversight of safety issues if there was a 3 central clearinghouse for the consideration of 4 safety issues?
( 5 A Well, there was, in fact, and is, in fact, 6 and has been since I have been there a central 7 area for the consideration of safety issues,for 8 the oversight of the consideration of safety 9 issues.
10 Q Then what are you adding with this 11 sentence?
12 A Here we were suggesting that that function 13 be strengthened and more broadly -- more broadly 14 reinforced,its function, its function be 15 reinforced with all the members of division staff.
d 16 Q Has that been done?
17 A Yes, sir.
18 Q The next sentence on page ~2-23 of I
19 GPU Exhibit 7 marked for identification states as f
l 20 a fact that "The resolution of safety issues has, 21 at times, taken too long and the completion of k.
22 resolution action, particularly where customer 23 action is required, is not assured."
t 24 MR. FISKE: Excuse me.
25 MR. SELTZER: Did I read that correctly?
i
?
_m.. _.. _..m, - _ . , _ .-_ _ . . - - __ _ . _ _ _ , _ . - _ _ _ _ _ , . - _ . _ . , -__ , , . . --
1 Womack' 319
/~
2 MR. FISKE: You read it beautifully.
3 I w uld just take exception to your preface 4 where, I think, you referred to it as a statement of fact,.and I would just --
( 5 6 MR. SELTZER: Let's see if there is 7
fiction involved here.
g MR. FISKE: No, no, I just referred 9 to the phrase immediately before the word 10 " organization." "TRC recomme,nds considering:"
11 MR. SELTZER: Well --
12 MR. FISKE: I don't know whether what
, () 13 the impact of that is or --
~
~
14 MR. SELTZER: I'think that'is very useful 15 for you to point that out to the witness.
/
16 MR. FISKE: It may or may'not be an 17 appropriate direction.
18 MR. SELTZER: What I was focusing on 19 was "The resolution of safety issues has, at times, taken too long..."
20 21 BY MR. SELTZER:
22 Q Do you see that?
g3 A Yes.
24 Q At the time the Review Committee wrote that "The resolution of safety issues has, at times, 25 1
1 -
Womack 320
/"'s
~
2 taken too long..." will you tell me what specific 3 safety issues had taken too long to resolve?
4 A At the time that the committee wrote that,
( 5 I am not sure I can give you a. complete list, but' 6 let me try to answer your question as best I can, 7 if I may.
8 The B&W Company, the NPGD in its role 9 as a nuclear steam system supplier, was primarily 10 engaged in building new reactor plants and 11 delivering them to the point where their op- --
12 where the responsibility for their operation was g-
\~ 13 assumed by the plant customer. At this point, to 14 an even larger degree than before, the role of the 15 B&W company became much more an option for 6
16 whatever the customer asked us to do. He could 17 choose not to involve us or even to inform us on 18 issues.
~
19 Now, the reason for saying this whole 20 sentence, in my mind, --
21 Q Wait a second.
22 MR. FISKE: He is answering your 23 question.
[~) 24 A I am trying to --
V 25 MR. SELTZER: You can proceed with that
1 Womack 321
-s -
- 2 answer if you want, after I tell you I am 3 really interested in what specific safety 4 issues had taken too long to resolve.
, ( 5 MR. FISKE: I think he is about to tell 6 you.
7 MR. SELTZER: I would be happy if he 8 is about to tell me, but it didn't sound like 9 it.
10 -
MR. FISKE: I would like him to be able 11 to finish'his answer.
12 THE WITNESS: I would like to be able to n
k_) 13 fini'sh my answer, 14 MR. SELTZER: I move to strike what you 15 said so far. I want to know what specific 16 safety issues had taken too long to resolve.
17 MR. FISKE: You can move to strike it, 18 but I don't see how you can cone'lude that it 19 is not responsive until he finishes giving it, 20 which is what he is about to do.
l 21 MR. SELTZER: I am being engaged in 22 filibuster by you, Mr. Fiske, and to a lesser 23 extent by the witness.
/~h 24 You unilaterally told me after we agreed V
25 on having a week,because of business
1 Womack 322
(~)
2 commitments and personal problems, we are 3 only going to get three days, and one day 4 next week, and you are taking up more of my
( 5 time with objections, and now he is taking up 6 my time with a long-winded answer.
7 I am going to be a little bit concerned 8 that we are nov r going to finish.
9 MR. FISKE: I won't prolong this by 10 responding to that because I think it has 11 already been responded to numerous times, but 12 I do think he was answering your question.
I s_/ 13 If you want to put another one, go ahead.
14 MR. SELTZER: All I was trying to do 15 was reconstruct what was in his mind. If he 16 wants to continue with that answer, he still 17 can. I said that at the outset.
18 A I will try to shorten it for you, Mr. Seltzer, 19 Simply focusing on the words "too long," too long" 20 are --
"too long" is a matter of subjective 21 judgment. I believe the committee felt that because 22 of our role and past practice and because of our 23 responsibilities as an NSS vendor, the resolution
(~}
'% )
24 of safety issues followed a phase which'was more 25 complex rather with the kind of deliberate design
1 womack 323 2 phase for a 12-year-long reactor construction 3 project.
4 From time to time, we became aware of
( 5 safety issues that might be important to reactors 6 currently in operation, and we saw a need to, 7 perhaps, change the definition of what is the right 8 length of time to try to deal with those safety 9 issues. We also now saw,and that is the reas'on 10 for the conjunctive clause in that sentence,that 11 to follow through on those actio ns simply depends
, 12 on the customer and cannot be assured unilaterally 13 by us.
14 MR. SELTZER: I move to strike all 15 that. I want now examples of safety issues I
l 16 which took too long to resolve. I don't think 17 you said a word about that y e t'. Give me a 18 specific saf ety issue that took too long to 19 resolve that you are referring to here.
20 MR. FISKE: As long as it is one 21 referred to by Dr. Womack at the time he wrote 22 that report, I have no objection.
l 23 A I am sure I could cut through this to some i
24 extent for you, Mr. Seltzer, and~say it was -- it-25 was among the issues in my mind was the issue with I
g Womack
~
324
~
2 respect to pressurizer level that we have 3 earlier discussed.
4 Q What other safety issues had taken too 5
( long to resolve? -
6 A I am not sure I can recall further, additional 7 issues at this point in time.
8 g o,x, 9 A I would be glad to review the --
I would be 10 glad to review, but I don't have things in front of ,
11 my mind.
12 What would you r'eview that is in writing Q
s_/ 13 that would help you? Are there any backup papers?
14 A I don't know. If I could find any -- i f I 15 could find any notes that might have been made by 16 myself or others in the course of this, that might 17 help me review, or I might talk to others on this 18 committee that contributed.
19 Q You said that one instance was the 20 pressurizer question, pressurizer level, right?
A 21 Yes.
1 q -
22 Q In what way is that a safety issue?
23 A Well, it had been suggested by Mr. Dunn that D 24 in his memorandum that that might lead to an unsafe
.)
25 condition.
m-,. . , - - - - . - . .- y e ,y-, , - - ~ - - . . , ,y- - - . - . ,, ---+ -- =,------- , g ,,-----.--r,- -.
1 Womack 325 s
kj 2 Q You are referring to his February 1978 3 memoranda?
4 A Yes, I believe that is the right memorandum.
( 5 I don't know the date fro,m knowledge, but I presume 6 it is the one.
7 Q You are also aware, aren't you, that Mr.
8 Kelly wrote a memorandum on the same subject in 9 November of '777 10 A I am now aware of that, yes, sir.
11 Q That raises the same safety issue, 12 right?
(.-
s_ 13 A I believe that is correct, yes, sir.
14 Q The safety issue, to put it very 15 precisely, is that it was known that the operators 16 at the Davis-Besse plant had terminated high-pressure 17 injection prematurely in response to' pressurizer 18 level, right?
19 A In the issue that those operators may have 20 acted in a way that was counter to our expectations.
21 Q It is a safety issue because if there k 22 is a loss of coolant accident in progress, the 23 operators ideally should not be terminating
(~T 24 hig h -pr e s s u r e injection, right?
L) 25 A That is correct.
i 326 1 Womack
(~)h
\- 2 Q Kelly and Dunn had proposed in November 3 '77 and February of '78 that an advisory be sent by 4 B&W to the operators at B&W nuclear plants on the
( 5 subject of terminating high-pressure injection that 6 had actuated automatically, isn't that right?
7 A I think that is right, yes, sir. I would like 8 to have the documents in front of me if you are 9 going to question me on the details of the documents.
i 10 Q I am not going to question you any 11 further than you have already conceded knowledge.
12 It is a fact, isn't it, that B&W did 13 not send an advisory out to the operators of its 14 plants regarding termination of high-pressure 15 injection in response to pressurizer level until 16 after the Three Mile Island accident, isn't that 17 correct?
18 A To the best of my belief, that is correct.
I 19 Q The Three Mile Island accident was 20 at the end of March and the B&W advisory on the 21 subject of high-pressure inj ection termination was 22 not sent out until early April 1979, right?
23 A Yes.
(~T 24 Q So even though Kelly had first suggested 25 sending out such an advisory in November of '77, b?
I womack 327 i
\_/ 2 B&W did not send out the advisory until April 3 1979, right?
4 A Yes.
( 5 Q You would agree that that took, that it 6 took too long to resolve that safety issue, is that 7 correct?
8 A In retrospect, I could have wished that that
. 9 had been resolved earlier.
10 Q It is a fact, .isn't it, that you believe 11 that that safety issue took too long to resolve?
12 A I think that is a fair interpretation of what 13 I said.
14 MR. FISKE: Yes.
i 15 Q Did the Technical Review Committee 16 discuss the Kelly-Dunn recommendation and the fact 17 that it took 16 months before an advisory was 18 '
issued on this question of high-pressure injection
~
19 termination?
20 A I don't remember such discussions, but I can't 21 deny that they took place.
L 22 Q Without asking you to recall verbatim 23 what was discussed, do you recall that the Technical 24 Review Committee did discuss the length of time 25 that it had taken to resolve the issue of sending
s 4
1 womack 328 n
2 an advisory to customers on high-preasure injection
~
4 3 termination?
4 A No, as I said, I.cant recall such discussions
( 5 and the reason,that I said I could not conclusively 6 answer your question was because,'an yombighthave 1 O 7 guessed from my earlier answers, I.certalnly did'not
'\
8 attend all the meeting' cN the Technical Review -
I 9 Committee.
10 Q Are you testifyinh that,at no haeting '
11 that you attended did. th'ey dis'cus s ' th e long period' 1 3 12 of time that it took for'B&W to send out an advisory (O_/ 13 on terminating high-pressure inj e c tio n?
14 A I am testifying I can't recall those 15 discussions to.. the extent to be'able to answer the 16 kind of question that you just.aaked.
y 17 Q I au trying to hone.it down a little 18 further. I am net asking you to recall thi substance
~
19 of the discussion. I am just asking you whether 20 you recall that it was discussed.
. 21 A I don't recall that it was discussed when I 22 was present, Mr. Seltzer. It hac-$een some'many 4
23 months since those neetings took place, and you have 24 already demonstrated.the defects in my,me ory, f_)/
s , .,
25 Q You feel you have a defective memory?
f
. , , . _ . - . , , . . . - , - . - _ . , . . - . . . . , , - . - , . - - - - ,, ,,,,a+, .-
1 Womack 329
\~/ ,
2 A Yes, sir.
3 Q In what respects?
4 A Well,'I don't remember everything I have ever 5 . read and everything I discussed as~to exactly
( ,
6 the time, chronology.and extent.
7 MR. FISKE: Which makes his memory just 8 about as defective as everybody elses in this
. S '
room, s
10 ' j , MR. SELTZER: Right, I wanted to make t l .
11 sure he hadn't any specisl genetic defect.
a- 12 THE WITNESS: It might not be genetic.
I 13 BY MR. SELTZER:
. 3
\ 14 .Q The Technical Review Committee suggested, 15 ,
in fact they recommended in the next paragraph
' E 16 "... forming a safety review group comprised ._ t c
i{e- ,
17
^
of management personnel to oversee and audit the
\ 18 j eprocessing of safety-related issues th'ro ugh to 3 ,10 complete resolution. The purpose of this group
, i 1
20 I would be to assure timely and appropriate action
/
21 on safety matters."
~
22 Has such a management review group 23 been formed?
(~}
%.)
24 A Yes, I believe it has.
25 Q It is also a fact, isn't it, that B&W s
s,- x
. k
l 1 Womack 330
[2
\- 2 has instituted special procedures for the 3 Processing of safety-related issues?
4 A Yes, it would be, perhaps, more correct to
( 5 say that the procedures which are in place have 6 been emphasized and somewhat changed.
7 Q some of the changes that have been 8 made are changes to attempt to insure prompter and 9 more complete resolution of safety issues, isn't 10 that right? (
11 A That certainly is among the priority 12 intentions of those changes, yes, sir.
(~%
\m,) 13 Q What has been done to assure prompter 14 and more complete resolution?
15 A Expectations of processing times have been 16 s e't , reviews have been put in place, as this 17 suggests, for issues that after which certain
~
18 periods of time passed, based on the potential 19 impact as assessed in a preliminary assessment of 20 an identified concern and.the responsibility focus 21 has been made.;> Retraining and additional -
22 training for all members of the division in these 23 procedures has been done.
24 Q Is it the intent that if those 25 procedures had been in place at the time that Kelly
[-
1 Womack 331 O
k.-) 2 and Dunn were writing their memoranda, the 3 particular safety issue involved there regarding 4 high-pressure injection following rising pressurizer level would be resolved more promptly?
( 5 6 A What assumption do you wish for me to make 7 in connection with that issue? ,
8 Q If the procedures that have now been g created were in effect when Dunn and Kelly were 10 writing their memorandum. g 11 A Those procedures, I think, alone could not 12 guarantee that, no, sir.
D)
(_ 13 Q If the safety issues raised by Dunn and 14 Kelly had been resolved on the time schedule set 15 forth in the new procedures, wouldn't the issue have 16 be~en resolved more quickly?
17 A Yes, I believe that is fair to say.
ig Q It would have been resolved before the Three Mile Island accident occurred, wouldn't it?
19 20 A I am n t sure I can assure you of that.
21 MR. FISKE: I think --
22 A There were issues of substance being 23 discussed and, as I understand the history of that S 24 discussion and I cannot assure you that those CJ 4
25 issues of substance might not have taken a fair
1 Womack 332 N' 2 amount of time, perhaps even as much time as 3 actually transpired to resolve it'in a new system.
4 Q Are you testifying that you believe the
( 5 issues that were raise ~d by the Dunn-Kelly memorandum 6 realistically could take 16 months to resolve?
7 MR. FISKE: Just a minute, Mr. Seltzer.
8 I am going to object to that question on the 9 same grounds that we have been objecting to 10 before. ,
11 What you are asking now is did he take 12 some procedures that are in effect today and n(,/ 13 speculate as to what would have happened to I
14 an internal discussion at B&W if those 15 procedures had been in effect before, and 16 that is a conclusion that it seems to me --
17 I am not even sure that is going to be an
~
18 ultimate question in the case, but in any 19 event, it certainly falls within'the framework, 20 the principle that I have asserted before, 21 so...
L 22 (continued on next page)
B
(~}
v 24 25
b/l 1 Womack 333 7- '
(_/ 2 Q Let me ask you, Dr. Womack, in 3 enunciating the recommendations and procedures 4 for resolving safety issues more promptly, have
- ( 5 you ever been in a discussion at B&W where 6 somebody said to you that they thought that B&W 7 was locking the barn door after the horses were 8 out?
9 A No, I can't recall having heard that 10 statement made. ,
11 Q Have you ever heard anything said 12 of substance like that? Not using those exact 0)
( 13 words.
14 A No, sir. I think that...
15 MR. FISKE: No is fine. We will d
16 accept that answer.
17 Q When, to the bes't of your knowledge, 18 were the different concerns raised bythe 19 Kelly-Dunn safety issue resolved? '
20 MR. FISKE: Could you clarify what 21 y u mean by " resolved"?
22 MR. SELTZER: I mean resolved in the 23 same sense that the word resolution appears 24 three times in Dr. Womack's recommendations v .
25 n page 2-23.
-- y* , - - ., ., ,, .._,-c- m.,-,.y,-.., -
, _ . - - - . - - , - . - - - m %.
1 Womack 334
[\
\/ 2 MR. FISKE: 0.K. Just a second.
3 Go ahead and answer.
4 THE WITNESS: You are not objecting?
MR. FISKE: No.
( 5 6 .A In that the complete resolution of 7 those concerns required customer follow-up, I 8 would have to consult the NRC's records on 9 that follow-up and training and testing to give 10 you the date. t 11 Q' B&W resolved that issue by sending 12 out an advisory to customers, didn't it?
13 A We resolved our internal position with 14 respect to that issue by sending out an advisory 15 to customers on April the 4th, I believe, 1979.
i v
16 Q When prior to April 4, 1979 did 17 B&W resolve the safety issue internally?
18 A I suspect --
19 MR. FISKE: Just --
that's all right, 20 you can answer that.
21 A I believe that the discussions.whic'h, you
\s 22 know, finally came, brought on the conclusion, 23 were in the days just preceded to April the 4th 24 that resulted in the advisory.
Os 25 MR. FISKE: I think, Mr. Seltzer, I
1 Womack 035 O-' 2 don't object to this but since we are now 3 getting into an area where conceivably the 4 form of the question could be important
( 5 -later on, I think it would be important, 6 if you are going 'to pursue this,to identify 7 what the sources of Dr. Womack's information 8 are.
9 You asked him a question when did 10 B&W resolve it and he tried to give you 11 his best answer but I think the record 12 should reflect what the basis for that ,
(~)
(_/ 13 answer is.
14 MR. SELTZER: I have a lot more
+
15 questions on this later on and we will 16 explore it in excrutiating detail.
17 MR. FISKE: I am sure.
18 MR. SELTZER: I am just'trying to 19 find out generally what the witness knows.
20 MR. FISKE: I understand but for 21 the purpose --
m 22 MR. SELTZER: Why don't I ask the 23 questions and I don't mind if you suggest
(} 24 a few questions now and then.
want to ask him a question?
Do you Go ahead.
25
, . - - - , , - , . -, . -, -- _ . - - - - - - - - - , - - - - - .-.~, .
I womack 336 f~)
~
A> 2 MR. FISKE: It's just --
3 MR. SELTZER: If you would like to 4 ask him a question, ask him.
( 5 MR. FISKE: It's a perfectly 6 Proper question for discovery. It's an 7 improper question if you are going to use 8 it later on at the trial, so I will object g to'the form.
10 g were you consulted on,,the resolution?
11 A Yes.
12 Q By whom?
O (J 13 A My recollection is that Dr. Roy asked me 14 to work out and release an advisory on this or 15 get such an advisory released.
16 Q so you were responsible for the 17 ultimate resolution, is that right?
18 A Yes. As I recall, I was given the assignment 19 of seeing that it happened. '
20 Q Did you then pull together for the 21 first time for yourself the Kelly, Dunn and Hallman 22 memoranda?
23 A No. That was not the manner in which I 24 chose to pursue the matter.
25 g Are you testifying that prior to
1 Womack 337
(~h
\- 2 issuing the advisory on April 4th, you did not 3 see any of tha Kelly, Dunn or Hall an memoranda?
4 A No, I am not te'stifying to that.
( 5 Q which of those did you see before 6 April 4th?
7 A I'm not sure. I am simply testifying that 8 the approach I took was not --
did not rely on 9 pulling those memoranda together.
10 Q I didn't ask you whether you relied 11 on it. I just asked you whether you did do it.
12- MR. FISKE: No, I think you asked 13 him. .Anyway, go ahead..
14 A In any event, I don't recall having done 15 that as a step. I don't know that I had not seen 16 one or all of those memoranda at that time. My 17 best recollection, if you wish to have that, 18 Mr. Seltzer, is that I hadn't although I may have
~
19 seen --
20 Q Whom did you speak to?
21 A With regard to resolving this issue? My (A
22 best recollection is that the people that I asked 23 to work to prepare an advice were Mr. Dunn,
/~ 24 Mr. Hallman and Mr. Elliott. I may also have
\_)h 25 asked Mr. Karrasch but I can't recall specifically
1 Womack 338 Nl 2 whether he was one.
3 Q Did you bring Dunn, Kelly and 4 Hallman together in one room and Elliott to talk about this?
( 5 6 A I don't think I mentioned Mr. Kelly, 7 Q I'm sorry, I mentioned him. You 8 said you pulled together'Elliott, Dunn and 9 'Hallman and possibly somebody else, right?
10 Karrasch? ,
11 A Yes. I think those were the people who 12 were primarily involved.
13 Q Did you bring those people together 14 in one room?
15 A I d n't recall bringing them together in i
16 one room.
17 Q Did you bring any of them together?
18 A 7 don't recall whether I did or not.
19 Q Did you speak to any of them 20 1"diVid""1177
- 21 A My best recollection is that I spok'e to d
22 each of them individually.
23 Q Who prepared the advisory?
24 A That group of people. I don't know which
(
25 one. Probably Dunn. I may have exaggerated my e
- - , -- ,--,v-- ,, --- ----,m-.-,-m-- .v------,,-- - . .
1 Womack 339
\- 2 own role. I believe Mr. Kosiba was involved in 3 this.
4 Q It is a fact, isn't it, that Dr. Roy
( 5 asked you to take charge of this and resolve it 6 after the TMI accident?
7 A That's right.
8 Q Who advised you that there was any 9 issue to be resolved?
10 A I believe, to the best of my. recall, it 11 was Dr. Roy. It might have been Mr. Kosiba.
12 Q What remained for resolution?
R k_) 13 A The matter of following up on making sure 14 that this kind of advice, without inquiring 15 whether the utilities had this kind of advice 16 already in their instructions, that this kind of 17 advice was in their hands as a result of having 18 understood the TMI accident.
19 Q So you are saying the matter that 20 had to be resolved was whether the utilities 21 already had this advice in their hands?
22 A That was one of the matters. That was 23 the outcome of the resolution, the product of the resolution. Among the matters to be resolved,
(~')
NJ 24 25 of course, was the question of exactly what advice
1 Womack 340 fM./ 2 to give.
3 Q What was the issue there?
4 A What were issues there?
Yes.
( 5 Q 6 A Well, they included exactly how long
'T 7 and under what conditions to stipulate HPI running, 8 they included issues about would there be any 9 concern as a result of that for taking the 10 Primary coolant system into a condition where the 11 water was flowing out the top of the pressurizers, 12 the system was essentially filled with liquid _
13 water and the like.
~
14 Q At the time you stepped in to 15 resolve the issue at Dr. Roy's request, were there 16 some people who were functioning on the issue 17 who at that time believed the pumps should be shut 18 off?
19 A The HPI pumps should be shut off?
20 .Q That's correct.
, 21 A No, not that I recollect that there were k 22 People who said they should be shut off but there 23 were, and I am glad that there were, people who 24 wanted to be sure that in giving this advice, we 25 were not giving advice which in another operational
l l
1 Womack 341 gg,
(-) 2 condition might be detrimental.
3 Q who raised that issue?
4 A I believe that Mr. Hallman raised it.
( 5 certainly it was in my mind that that's a -- that 6 would be a nominal concern in treating any such 7 issue, any such issue.
8 Q so you are testifying to something 9 that was in your mind. Did you write it down'?
10 A I don't recall writing ic down.
11 Q That was part of your state of mind, 12 is that right?
f%
(_,) 13 A To be sure that we were giving the right 1
14 advice, to the best of my ability, it was very 15 much'in my state of mind. .
16 MR. FISKE: What we will consider 17 for this purpose a relevant period of time.
18 For the purpose of discovery, we will allow 19 that question. -
20 Q That particular concern is a concern 21 that had been voiced prior to the Three Mile Island 22 accident, isn't that right?
23 A I understand that it had been, yes, g- 24 0 It had at least been raised as early
\m-25 as August 1978 by Mr. Hallman, hadn't it?
i
~
1 Womack 342 3
2 MR. FISKE: Now, Mr. Seltzer, are 3 you asking him what he knows now or --
4 MR. SELTZER: What he knows now,
( 5 sure.
6 THE WITNESS: Oh.
7 A That's my understanding from what I have 8 read or understood about what Mr. Hallman has '
9 indicated in various testimony to the Kemeny 10 Commission. ,3 11 Q What, if anything, are you aware of 12 that B&W was doing between August 1978 when 13 Mr. Hallman enunciated this concern and April 4, 14 1979 when Dr. Womack resolved the concern?
15 MR. FISKE: Well, if the question 16 is asking for his present knowledge --
17 MR. SELTZER: You bet it is. That's 18 exactly what it is.
19 MR. FISKE: Then I object to the 20 form.
, 21 MR. SELTZER: I insist on an answer.
km 22 MR. FISKE: You can answer.
23 THE WITNESS: Could I have the
()
\/
24 question again, please.
1 25 Q What, if anything, are you aware of j 1
1 Womack 343 b)
\- 2 that B&W did between August 1978 when Hallman 3 first enunciated the concern and April 4, 1979 4 when you resolved the concern to consider review and resolve it?
-( 5 6 A I believe I am only aware of what I have 7 heard again from such testimony or reports of 8 testimony that I mentioned earlier. My
~
9 understanding is that Mr. Karrasch and Mr. Hallman 10 had a conversation at some time dur,ing that time 11 about Mr. Hallman's concern and if I am correctly 12 reporting this and I am very shaky on this because m
((,) 13 I haven't read this in detail, but if.I am correctly 14 reporting this, I believe that Mr. Karrasch had 15 told Mr. Hallman to go ahead and proceed on the 16 basis of something similar to what we sent out 17 on April the 4th.
18 Q Mr. Karrasch told Mr. Hallman to 19 proceed to issue the advisory that went out on 20 April 4th?
21 A I think that's right.
22 Q O.K. About when, to the best of 23 your recollection, did that conversation between
,/"] 24 Karrasch and Hallman take place?
\__/
25 A I don't know. Sometime during that period,
- - - - v - , --,,--,---% - . - - , - - - . - - --w - , , , e--,- - - - - - - - , - - ,, . - - - ,
1 Womack 344
\
2 I believe.
3 Q Are you aware of any analyses that 4 were done by B&W to investigate the Hallman
( 5 concern?
6 A During that period of time?
7 Q Any period of time prior to April 4, 8 1979.
9 A Well, their analyses which would go to 10 the question, the relief capability (, pilot 11 operated relief valves,which would be applicable 12 by extrapolation to that concern.
13 Q After the concern was enunciated, 14 the answer is no, is that what you said?
15 A Please ask the question. I'm sorry for 16 interrup' ding.
17 g Do you know of any analyses that 18 B&W did to resolve Hallman's concern after he 19 had enunciated it? -
20 A I don't believe I do.
21 Q other than the conversation with 22 Karrasch, are you aware of any internal conversation 23 at B&W after Hallman had enunciated his concern 24 and. discussions to resolve that concern?
- 25 Let me rephrase that. Are you aware
- _ , _ . _ _ - _ _ _ _ . ~ _ _. . . _ . . . _ _ _ _ _ . . _ . _ _ _ . . _ . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ . . _
1 Womack 345 V 2 of any discussions which took place other than 3
the Hallman-Karrasch discussion which were directed 4
at resolving Hallman's concern prior to April 4, f
( 5 19797 A No, not to my knowledge.
6 7 Q If Dr. Roy had asked you to resolve 8 this question in August 1978 when you became head 9
f the Design Section, are you aware of any 10 impediment that would have existed to your 11 resolving it then?
12 MR. FISKE: I will object to that.
13 It is totally hypothetical.
MR. SELTZER: I am asking for a 14 15 fact.
4 16 Q Are you aware of any impediments that er.isted in August of 1978 that.would have 17 18 Prevented your resolving the Hallman concern gg then? That is a fact. Do you know of- any impediments that existed as of August 1978 that 20 w uld have prevented solving Hallman's concerns 21 22 then and there?
MR. FISKE: I will object to that, 23 Mr. Seltzer, because he has testified he O
k.J 24 didn't even know about it in August of '78.
25
1 Womack 346
(~)
k
2 MR. SELTZER: He now knows for a 3 fact that Hallman enunciated his concerns 4 for the first time in August of 1978.
( 5 MR. FISKE: Correct.
6 MR. SELTZER: That happens to be 7 the same month in-which he became the head 8 of the Design Section.
g MR. FISKE: Correct.
10 MR. SELTZER: I am asking him does 11 he know of any impediments that existed 12 in August of 1978 that would hava prevented
(, 13 the resolution of the Hallman concern in 14 August 1978.
15 MR. FISKE: All right. You can 16 answer that.
17 A The impediments of the normal' work 18 priorities and simply getting the people who 19 have the right knowledge together to assure that~
20 we put together the best response we could are
< 21 the only impediments that come to my mind in the 22 hypothetical case you mentioned.
23 (Continued on following page.)
I V) 24 25
- - ~ - . . . -
=
1 Womack 347
(#)
2 Q Mr. Dunn was not in the hospital h
3 in' August of 1978, to the best of your 4 recollection, was he?
( 5 A To the best of my recollection, he wasn't.
6 Q In fact, to the best of your 4
7 recollection, Mr. Dunn was available for 8 consultation in August of 1978, wasn't he?
g A Yes.
, 10 Q Mr. Hallman was available for 11 consultation in August of 1978, wasn't he, to 12 the best of your recollection?
' Q
(~) 13 A Yes.
14 Q Mr. Ellio'tt was available for 15 consultation in August of 1978, wasn't he?
16 A As far as I know.
17 Q Mr. Karrasch was available for 18 consultation in August of 1978, wasn't he?
19 A As far as I know.
20 Q Between the time that Dr. Roy asked
, 21 you to resolve the safety issue and August 4th L.
22 when the safety advisory was issued to B&W 23 customers, how much of your time would you say
(~ 24 you spent on the resolution o f this issue?
U) 25 A The first statement, your question said
-, y . , . - , , ,_...n .- . , _ _ . _ . , , - . . . , _ . - - , , . ,_,-.._,..,-,__--,-.,,,s-..- ,y . , _ . < - _ . ~ _ . .
I womack 348 2 August 4th. I believe you mean April 4th, 3 do you not?
-4 Q Yes. Let me state it again.
( 5 Roy asked you to resolve this 6 question some time after the accident but 7 before April 4, 1979; right?
8 A Yes.
9 Q i take it he didn't ask you to 10 resolve this on the day that the accident was 11 transpiring, did he?
12 A No.
s-) 13 Q Do you recall how long after the 14 day of the accident he asked you to resolve it?
15 A No.
16 Q How much of your time did it 17 consume resolving this question priog to 18 April 4, 19797 19 MR. FISKE: The total number of 20 hours?
21 A I would guess it consumed a number of
~
I 22 hours, perhaps four, eight.
23 Q Four to eight?
j - 24 A Yes.
25 Q Do B&W engineers keep time records?
1 Womack 349 2 A Yes.
3 Q Would it be possible to look back 4 in your time records to determine how much
(, 5 time you spent resolving this safety concern?
6 A No.
7 Q Why not?
8 A Because I don't keep time records.
9 Q Does Bert Dunn?
10 A No. (
11 Q Hallman?
12 A No.
O- 13 Q How low down do you have to go 14 or how high up that people keep them?
15 A The people that report to Dunn keep time 16 records.
17 Q Would you take a look,'please, at ,
18 GPU Exhibit 6 marked for identification, and 19 page 4-4, please (handing to witness)'.
20 Do you see the statement after 21 " Background"?
22 A Yes.
23 Q It says there: "During the initial phase of the TMI-2 incident, our lack of
) 24 25 knowledge of the system hardware and method
1 Womack 350 2 of operation was a deterrent to timely 3 response to questions posed by the site team."
4 What does the phrase " system hardware"
( 5 refer to?
6 A It refers to the entire hardware of the 7 nuclear power plant.
8 Q Does that include the NSS?
'g A Yes. But obviously this is an area in t .
10 which our knowledge was the greatest. The 11 indictment was not to indict our knowledge of 12 the NSS.
\ 13 Q You were indicting your knowledge of.
44 what?
15 MR. FISKE: I think I will object 16 to the form of that question.
17 A The --
- 18 MR. FISKE: You can answer it.
~
19 THE WITNESS: O.K.
20 A The point here is that there is a large 21 ,
portion of the nuclear power plant in the 22 so-called quote, balance of plant, close !
l 23 quote, outside the nuclear steam system which !
~ I g4 is very important to its operation. This j
,s 25 includes such systems as electrical power i __ _ . , _ . , , _ _ _.- _ - -.- . - - - _ . - . ~ - - - -- .---- - - -- - -
a 1 Womack 351
[h
' '~
2 supply systems, feed water and heat removal 3 systems, waste disposal and removal systems 4 and many interconnections of those systems to
( 5 themselves and, in some instances, to the NSS.
6 In my mind that was the thrust, 7 that would be the thrust I would-understand 8 of this comment.
9 Q It was your belief at the time 10 the report was being prepared that B&W should 11 gain more knowledge of the balance,of the plant; 12 is that right?
O)
\_ 13 A It was my belief that such a knowledge 14 would be an important adjunct to the kind of 15 support we had been discussing as recommended 16 in the later and final recommendation.
17 .Q Would you look at GPU Exhibit 7, 18 page 2-22,;please. Would you take a iook at 19 Item 6 at the bottom, the portion tha't is i -
20 underlined? It says there that " Internal 21 organizational structure can influence the L 22 product design by excessive responsibility 23 subdivision thereby creating the need for 24 excessive interface control in the involvement 25 of too many persons in the resolution of any l
l i -
1 Womack 352 2 given problem."
3 What does the phrase " excessive 4 responsibility subdivision" mean?
( 5 A It simply means that if the technical 6 disciplines in which people. work are too narrow 7 it is possible that resolving the problem 8- which cuts across a number of technical 9 disciplines may take longer, take longer than 10 you would like it to take. t 11 Q Was it your belief at the time 12 that the Technical Review Committee was preparing A
(_,/ 13 this report that excessive division of 14 responsibility had slowed down the process for 15 resolving problemst at B&W?
16 A No, I don't believe so. I think if we 17 had meant that we would have said it. I 18 believe the question, the comment here simply 19 goes to saying that this can happen and 20 looking to the future that it would be reasonable 21 to follow through on a question of "Do we 22 have the right kind of technical discipline 23 subdivision to be able to deal with these 24 issues quickly?"
25 Q It is a fact, isn't it, that after l
u __ _
1 Womack 353 2 the accident there was internal reorganization 3 of B&W?
4 A Yes, that's a fact.
( 5 Q And the subdivision of 6 responsibilities was changed; isn't that right?
7 A some of it was changed, yes, it was.
8 Q And it was changed to streamline 9 ' work; isn't that right?
10 A That was one of the objectives, yes.
11 Q Was another objective to reduce 12 interface control in the involvement of too
(~h 5J 13 many people in the resolution of a given 14 problem? '
15 A Yes, I believe so.
16 Q If you can you try to reduce 17 excessive interface and reduce the' number of 18 people involved in the resolution of ~ a problem.
19 That contributes to the prompt resolu' tion of 20 the problem?
21 A That is a good management principle that
, 22 is generally true, yes.
23 Q In what areas that you can testify
() 24 to had the Technical Review Committee observed 25 excessive interface control?
F 1 Womack 354 2 MR. FISKE: I will object to the 3 f rm of that question.
4 Q Where, if anywhere, had the TRC
( 5 observed excessive interface control?
6 A I don't believe that the TRC had observed 7 excessive interface control anywhere. Does 8 it say excessive interface control?
g Q Yes, they say that excessive 10 responsibility subdivision creates,'the need 11 for excessive interface control.
12 A Oh, I see, yes.
/~T N-) 13 MR. FISKE: Well, you might as 14 well start from the beginning if you are 15 going to read it.
16 MR. SELTZER: I read the whole thing 17 already.
18 MR. FISKE: As long as Dr. Womack 19 can read it.
20 THE WITNESS: O.K. Let me read 21 it from the beginning.
)
22 A I don't know that there were specific l j
23 things in mind here. This is a general and 24 continued concern of technical organizations I
25 which are' highly discipline-oriented into
~-. . _ --_.__.
T 1 Womack 355 d 2 areas of technical specialty. I think in.my 3 mind I would treat this as a general adjunct 4 to the discussion we just had. We would like h 5 to be able to move faster on issues and this 6 is certainly an area which is reasonable to 7 look at for any technical organization that 8 wishes to move faster on issues.
9 Q O.K. Now, B&W is an organization 10 that wished to move faster; right?.
11 A Yes. -
12 Q Where did the TRC perceive you could
(\- .
13 reduce the level of interface control in order s
- 14 to move faster?
15 A I don't know that the TRC perceived such 16 specifics. I don't recall that they did. I T
17 feel that if we had such specific perceptions 18 they would have been recorded here. -
~
19 Q Is there anywhere where you 20 perceived there was excessive interface? Let 21 me make a suggestion. In your design section 22 where you had integration under Karrasch and 23 you had several other sections and some of
/~ 24 your sections overlapped with other sections
\m-} -
25 reporting to Dr. Roy, did you perceive any
\
-nm - - ~ . ~ aw-- - ,e,. . - - - , , - , - - - - . - - - - -
t ,
1 Womack ,
/356 o >s
,j.
h 2 problems ofs interface control? 4
>j 3 A From time to time and on specific issues,
- 1. . /
4 I did. The qEostion, of course, vay doec,that
( 5 mcan that the whole organization is'w'rong, 'and i
'6 frequently it doesn't.
1 7 Q , , I didn't ask whether the whole >
8 organization was wrong. I will save that g question for tomorrow.
10 A And even if the organizdtion is wrong, s i > .
11 if you understand what I mean.!
4
/
4 12 Q Have you perceived at any time that m
l _4 13 there were too many. people involved ^in the 14 resolutiono{a give n problem .r t B &t:', /*
15 A YesJ 3 i 't } '
's with specific re :'e re nce to problems 16 Q '-
)
that were [ considered by the Tichnical Review 17
[ .5 18 committee,' can you give me any examples?
1 19 A In a particular perf 0 '
o f ti ne"[
That were ;Jons.13ered .l ,
by ' ne .l .
20 Q TRC, ,
, i as your counsel would like me to ask. '* '
21 i i ,' 8 I,
' a ll ,,
22 MR. FISKE: 'I chink Ne answered" [' #
'r ? ~
'I 23 that, Mr. Seltzer, that there.were none. ,
[VT 24 THE WITNESS.
'l Well, I believe he t
25 ,has framed the que'stion dif ferently now. l
' \ >
\ l s
, , _ . . _ _ . . _ . _ _ _ . _ _,4 _ . , . . . . . _ _ _ _ _ . .
4 j ;;p , ,-
! jo si i womack 357
~)
G 2 He asked if I had personally seen issues er
~
3 and'--
4 , MR. FISKE: Go ahead and answer it.
f 5, , A I am trying to think of a good example 6 for you.
7 Q Why don't you give me whatever 8 examples are running through your mind. ,
9 MR. FISKE: He is trying to think
'iN) whether there are any, Mr. Seltzer.
11 A In the context of perhaps too many people, s
j $ 12 B&W's discussions of high-point events, I
()
t'k/ , 13 don't know whether that was a matter considered
?
' by the Technical Review Committee but it was a 3- 1' 14 15 matter stipulated and requested by the Nuclear 16 Regulatory Commission after TMI, and in the case 17 of such a design issue there ultimately has to 18 be a judgment call mado, s< ' ody's hudgment I! f )
[\ 19 has to be exercised.
i 20 If you get too many people involved, 4 V '
l' T '
21 you are going to have a broad diversity of opinion 22 which has a great deal of value when you are 23 exploring issues but in the final analysis
( 24 someone has to exercise a judgment, and this.
25 is a case when I felt perhaps we had more
r 1 Womack 358 O 2 people involved than we needed to have. That 3 is the kind of thing I had in mind, Mr. Seltzer.
4 MR. SELTZER: Rather than get
(~ 5 into a new subject, why don't we 6 suspend and try to start promptly at 7 9:30 tomorrow and put in a full day.
_8 MR. FISKE: Off the record. ,
9 (Discussion off the record.)
10 (Time noted: 4:45 p.m.)
11 12 13 14 Edgar Allen Womack, Jr.
~
15 16 l
17 Subscribed and sworn to _
's 18 before me this day '
~
19 of , 1980 20 21 33 25
r 13 1 359 O
b CERTIFICATE 2
STATE OF NEW YORK )
3
- ss.: i COUNTY OF NEW YORK )
4 F I, CHARLES SHAM Ro
>.. 5
, a Notary I Public of the State of New York, do hereby i
certify that the continued deposition of EDGAR ALLEN WoMACK, JR.
was taken before ,,
me on
- December 9, 1980 consisting of pages 185 through 358 ;,
I further certify that the witness had been previously sworn and that the within 13 transcript is a true record of said testimony; That I am not connected by blood or marriage with any of the said parties nor interested directly or indirectly in the matter in controversy, nor am I in the employ of any of the counsel.
18 19 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my yy 20 hand this 11 day of MCCm(6R ,( Qo 21 fa i
Charles Shapiro, C.S.9. -
25
i 360
. I NDE X
, s .
WITNESS PAGE i . s Edgar Allen Womack, Jr. (Resumed) 188
- a. ..)
l T l , EXH IB ITS GPU NO. FOR IDENT'.
4 Document entitled " Interim 187
~
haport of the TMI-2 Occurrence j Technical Review Committee" 2
dated May 25, 1979 t
5 Document entitled "Inte, rim 187 Os . Report of the TMI-2 Occurrence Technf. cal Review Committee" dated June 8, 1979 6 Document entitled " Final 188 '
Report of the TMI-2 Occurrence Technical Review Committee" dated July 31, 1979 7 Document entitled " Final' 188 Report of the TMI-2 Occufrence Technical Review Committee" dated October 15, 1979 -
, 8 Letter from James Taylor to 239 T.M. Novak dated May 10, 1979 4
e
- i J. * *
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