ML20093C726

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Generic Ltr 89-10 Design-Basis Closure Millstone Unit 3
ML20093C726
Person / Time
Site: Millstone Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 10/06/1995
From: Hodge S
NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20093C724 List:
References
GL-89-10, NUDOCS 9510130003
Download: ML20093C726 (71)


Text

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Generic Letter 89-10 Design-Basis Closure

Northeast Nuclear Energy Company Millstone Unit 3 October 6,1995 T

i Prepared: !I- e /

S. T. Hodge //

MOV Team Supervis ,,

Reviewed: [ MX m- -

II. C. Elfstropf M ' Team Consultant, Liberty Reviewed: C- N R. Eisner glstone Unit 3 MOV Project Engineer Approved: [

R. T. Harris MOV Te n Manager Approved: -% b D. J. GerW Millstone Unit 3 Engineering Technical Support Manager 9510130003 951006 3 PDR ADOCK 0500

Millstone Unit 3 MOV Program October 6,1995 Table of Contents TABLE OF CONTENTS i .

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l TABLES IV l l

EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

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I. PURPOSE 7 l

2. INTRODUCTION 7
3. PROACTIVE FEATURES OF TIIE MOV PROGRAM h J. PROGRAM SCOPE 8
5. STATUS OF GL 89-10 PROGRAM MOV'S 9 LSilERON MEMO CROSS REFERENCE 27 4
7. VALVE MISPOSITIONING 27
8. MOV PROGRAM SCOPE CRITERIA 27
9. DESIGN BASIS REVIEWS 28 i

Millstone Unit 3 MOV Program October 6,1995

10. MOV SI7ING AND SWITCH SETTINGS 32 10.1 VALVE WEAK LINK ANALYSIS 32 10.1.1 LOAD CASES AND COMBINATIONS 33 10.1.2 USE OF EPRI MOV STEM TilRUST PREDICTION METilOD FOR WESTINGilOUSE FLEXIBLE WEDGE GATE VALVES, TR-103233 - DRAFT- DECEMBER 1994 35 10.2 VALVE OPERATOR LIMITS 35 10.3 ELECTRICAL 36 10.3.1 MOTOR PERFORMANCE FACTORS 36 10.3.2 EFFECTS OF DESIGN BASIS DEGRADED VOLTAGE ON MOV PERFORMANCE 37 10.4 DESIGN TilRUST 37 10.5 VALVE FACTOR 38 10.6 STEM FACTOR / STEM FRICflON COEFFICIENT 41 10.7 MARGIN 42 i 10.8 STEM LUBRICATION AND SPRINGPACK RELAXATION 44 10.9 SELECTION OF MOV SwlTCil SETTINGS 45 10.10 TORQUE SwlTCII BYPASS METIIODOLOGY 47
11. DESIGN-BASIS CAPABII ITY 47 11.1 IN-SITU DESIGN BASIS VERIFICATION TESTING 47 11.2 EXTRAPOLATION OF PARTIAL D/P TIIRUST MEASUREMENTS 48 11.3 LOAD SENSITIVE BEllAVIOR 48 11.4 POST-MAINTENANCE TESTING 50
12. DIAGNOSTIC TEST EOUIPMENT ACCURACY 51 12.1 GL 89-10 SUPPLEMENT 5 51 12.2 DIAGNOSTIC TEST EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS 52 12.2.1 DETERMINING ACCURACIES 53 12.2.2 APPLYINO ACCURACIES 53 12.2.3 LIMIT SwlTCil REPEATABILITY 54
13. GROUPING 54
14. PERIODIC VERIFICATION 56 14.1 PIIILOSOPIIY 56 14.2 DETERMINATION AND MAINTENANCE OF CORRECT SwlTCII SETTINGS 56 14.3 POSITION ON PERIODIC TESTING (POST CLOSURE) 57
15. TREND AND ANALYZE MOV FAILURES 58 15.1 TRACKING AND TRENDING REQUIREMENTS 58 11

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Millstone Unit 3 MOV Program October 6,1995 15.2 DIAGNOSTIC PARAMETER TRENDING - 58 153 MOV FAILURE TRENDING USING NPRDS 59 i'

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16. PRFSSURE LOCKING AND THERM 1AL BINDING 59 16.1 NRC POSITION 59 l 16.2 PLTB EVALUATION 59 16.2.1 EVALUATION CRITERIA 60 16.2.2 EVALUATION METIIOD 60' 163 EVALUATION RESULTS 61
17. INDUSTRY INFORMATION 65
18. PROGRAM SCHEDULE 65 19.OUAIITY ASSURANCE 66
20. AUDITS / INSPECTIONS 66 1
21. TRAINING 66 i
22. FUTURE PLANNED MOV ENHANCEMENTS 67 i

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23. MP3 CYCLE 6 TEST SCOPE (PRELIMINARY) 68 l l

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24. STATUS OF GL 89-10 INSPECTION FINDINGS 68 j l i 1

REFERENCES 69 l 1

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Millstone Unit 3 MOV Progrom October 6,1995 -

Tables Table 1: Summary ofMOV Types 9 Table 2: MOV- System Name and Function 10 Table 3: Probabilistic-Risk-Assessment (PRA) Priority 13~

Table 4: SafetyStrokes _ 14 Table 3: Information on Valve, Actuator and Motor 13 Table 6: ControlSwitch Thrust (Torquefor Butterfly Valves) 18 Table 7:. iest Data ' 21 Table 8: Basis For Closure 24 Table 9: Sheron Memo items - Cross Reference 27 Table 10: Calculation Listing 30 Table i1: As-Lep Load Combination (Design Basis) 34 Table 12: Non-As Lep Load Combinations 34 Table 13:StallLoadCombination 34 Table 14: Gate Valve ifCriteria 38 Table IS: Valve Factors and Rate ofLoading 39 Table 16: MeasuredStem to Stem-Nut Coeficient ofFriction (p) -42 Table 17: Margin 43 Table 18: Post-Maintenance Retest Requirements 50 Table 19: Test Equipment Accuracy Matrix $3 Table 20: Pressure Locking (PL) / Thermal Binding (TB) Summary 62 Table 21: Future MOVEnhancements 67 Table 22: Cycle 6 Monitoring / Test Scope 68 iv

I l Millstone Unit 3 MOV Program Octobcr 6,1995 4

CLOSURE OF MP3 GL 89-10 PROGRAM Executive Summary This document describes the bases for Millstone Unit 3's closure of the design-basis veri 0 cation l phase of NRC Generic Letter 89-10," Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve Testing and j Surveillance." This report was prepared to serve as a living document which controls the GL 89-10 1 design requirements, and provides in one place sufficient information to verify GL 89-10 closure.

This has been accomplished by deGning the Northeast Utilities Motor-Operated Valve Program as implemented at the Millstone Unit 3 Plant. Included in the report are actions taken to date, as well as descriptions of the longer-term program being implemented for on-going testing and surveillance of safety-related motor-operated valves (MOV's). This program verined and ensures MOV operability under design-basis differential pressure and How conditions.

4 in November of 1985, the NRC issued Bulletin 85-03 recommending licensees develop and implement a program to ensure the reliability of MOV's in several safety-related systems. In June of 1989, the NRC issued Generic Letter (GL) 89-10 recommending licensees develop a comprehensive program to ensure MOV's in safety-related systems will operate under design-bases conditions and mispositioned conditions.  !

Northeast Utilities (NU) committed to develop a detailed program for addressing GL 89-10 at l Connecticut Yankee , Millstone Unit No.1, Millstone Unit No. 2, and Millstone Unit No. 3 nuclear power plants. All safety-related MOV's and position-changeable MOV's in safety-related piping systems are included in this program. This program includes demonstrating the operability of safety-related MOV's by analysis and in-situ Dow tests at or near design-basis conditions, where practicable. The objectives of our program are to:  ;

e increase MOV operability assurance through a long-term preventive maintenance and trending program.

e Identify problem valves early (i.e., experience no failures during plant operation).

  • Minimize extended outages due to MOV testing related activities.

The NU MOV Program Manual specifies criteria and requirements for NU's implementation of GL 89-10. The MOV Program Manual applies to the Connecticut Yankee , Millstone Unit No.1, Millstone Unit No. 2, and Millstone Unit No. 3 nuclear power plants. It is the controlling document for Northeast Utilities Service Company (NUSCO), Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNECO),

Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company (CYAPCO), and contractors performing MOV Program activities at Northeast Utilities. The MOV Program Manual consists of the following sections:

  • Introduction Objectives, purpose, scope and applicability.
  • Responsibilities Responsibilities of key individuals / groups.
  • Integration Interfaces with other groups and individuals.
  • Technical Requirements Technical Requirements of the MOV Program.

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Millstone Unit 3 MOV Program October 6,1995 e Instructions Program Instructions (PIs) for implementation.

  • Figures Organization and process flow charts.

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  • References Source / supporting documents, management commitments.
  • Definitions Acranyms and terms.
  • Attachments Attachmenis which are significant.

Millstone Unit 3 completed the design-basis phase of GL 89-10 on June 6,1995, within the original NRC requested schedule, i.e., the third refueling outage after December 28,1989.

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Millstone Unit 3 MOV Program October 6,1995

1. Purpose The purpose of this document is to summarize, in one place, closure of the design-basis phase of GL 89-10, and future changes which impact design basis considerations. It also provides the baies for MOV settings and configuration. Finally, this report serves as a living document which will be periodically revised as anc element in configuration control. This closure report will be maintained as a controlled document within the MOV Program Manual and updated as necessary.

It is currently envisioned that this document will be reviewed after each refueling outage if changes are made which impact MOV functionality or GL 89-10 MOV design compliance. This document will not control control-switch setpoints, future test data, or calculation numbers. These and other parameters are controlled by NU procedures. Tables 6,7,10, and 17 will not be maintained as living. An example of an item which will result in a revision is a design change requiring revalidating design-basis capability.

2. Introduction On June 28,1989, the NRC stafTissued Generic Letter 89-10," Safety-Related Motor-Operated Vaive Testing and Surveillance,"' which provided recommendations to the licensees for the development of adequate programs to ensure operability of safety-related MOV's during design-basis conditions. The generic letter recommended that each licensee with an operating license complete all design-basis reviews, analyses, verifications, tests and inspections that have been instituted within five years or three refueling outages, whichever is later, of the date of the generic letter (June 28,1989).

The staff held public workshops to discuss the generic letter and to answer questions regarding its 2

implementation. On June 13,1990, the staffissued Supplement 1 to Generic Letter 89-10 to 3

provide the results of the public workshops. In Supplement 2 to Generic Letter 89-10, issued on August 3,1990, the staff stated that inspections of programs developed in response to the generic letter would not begin until January 1,1991.

In response to concerns raised by the results of NRC-sponsored MOV tests, the staffissued 4

Supplement 3 to Generic Letter 89-10 on October 25,1990. This supplement requested that Boiling ,

Water Reactor licensees evaluate the capability of MOV's used for containment isolation in the l steam lines to the high pressure coolant injection system and reactor core isolation cooling system; in l the supply line to the reactor water cleanup system; and in the lines to the isolation condenser, as applicable.

5 On February 12,1992, the staffissued Supplement 4 to Generic Letter 89 10 excluding considerations for inadvertent operation of MOV's from the scope of Generic Letter 89-10 for 6

Boiling Water Reactors. On June 28,1993, the staffissued Supplement 5 to Generic Letter 89-10 which requested that licensees review their MOV programs and to identify measures taken or planned to account for uncertainties in properly setting valve operating thrust due to increased inaccuracy of MOV diagnostic equipment.

7 Supplement 6 to Generic Letter 89-10, issued March 8,1994, further clarified NRC positions on the ,

schedule for completing MOV testing to verify design-basis capability and grouping of MOV's to i establish valve setup conditions. This supplement also provided staff responses to other general j public questions.

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Millstone Unit 3 MOV Program October 6,1995

3. Proactive Features of the MOV Program o Used a 0.6 valve factor for non-testable gate valves based upon review of Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Performance Prediction Methodology (PPM) results.
  • Use of the Kalsi Engineering Inc., KEl Gate Program for non-testable valves to validate our 0.6 valve factor assumption. In cases where the KEl Gate yields a value

> than 0.6, the " bounding" KEl Gate value is used to deHne the thrust window. KEI Gate was performed for NNECO due to delayed issuance of the EPRI PPM.

  • Developed a comprehensive structural analysis procedure and replaced diverse vendor seismic weak link calculations with consistent calculations for all GL 89-10 valves.
  • Backfit ASME Code, stress-based requirements to Haddam Neck, Millstone Unit 1, and Millstone Unit 2.

. Determined acceptable pressure boundary integrity at actuator stall in cases where actuators have been modified and stall thrust increased significantly.

  • Employ consistently determined results from three other nuclear units, thereby adding further validation to MOV program assumptions.

. Performed laboratory design-basis dynamic tests for selected replacement valves.

This work was performed for Northeast Utilities by the broadly recognized Alden Research Laboratory in Massachusetts.  !

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= Provided special treatment of Westinghouse gate valves in high differential pressure i applications. Not yet published EPRI research was used to define a more conservative l l

set of acceptance criteria for two Westinghouse MOV's in high pressure applications.

. Developed a more accurate model to evaluate stroke time for DC-powered actuators.

A specific linkage was drawn between higher assumed valve factors and stroke time, e Compiled digital photographs of MOV's for easy storage, retrieval and review.

4. Program Scope l l

The objective of the Millstone Unit 3 MOV Program is to ensure MOV operability under design- I basis differential pressure and flow conditions. This entails several program elements to:

(1) determine the design-basis conditions, l (2) determine the physical limitations of the valve and actuator, (3) perform the requisite testing and evaluate the data to determine the appropriate limit and / or torque switch settings, and (4) ensure that operability is maintained throughout the life of the plant through on-going maintenance activities and design control measures.

Setup and testing of the valves is accomplished using the Liberty Technologies Valve Operation Test and Evaluation System (VOTES) and other state-of-the-art measurement techniques (e.g., QSS -

Quick Stem Sensor and MPM - Motor Power Monitor).

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Millstons Unit 3 MOV Program October 6,1995 Millstone Unit 3's administrative program is defined by Nuclear Group Procedure (NGp) 2.32,

" Engineering Programs" with specific detailed procedural requirements contained in the Motor-Operated Valve Program Manual. Other ancillary procedures govern more specific aspects of the program such as use and calibration of test equipment and adjustment of switches, Finally,

. procedural interfaces exist with other programs governing routine maintenance, plant design changes and modifications, corrective action programs, and identification of non-conforming materials.

The Millstone Unit 3 MOV Program is based upon satisfying two key technical requirements. These are (1) the physical limitations of the valve and actuator based on allowable limits of subcomponents (e.g., torque limits on the actuator, thrust limits, valve component structural limits, etc.) and (2) the required differential pressure and flow environment in which the valve must function. Other effects such as operation at reduced voltage and elevated temperatures, use of proper stem factors, pressure locking and thermal binding have also been considered.

There are one hundred and forty three (143) motor-operated valves included in the Millstone Unit 3

MOV Program scope. A summary of valve types, disk type and valve manufacturer is defined in Table 1.

Table 1: Summary ofMOV Types g Disk T Manufacturer Butterfly (4) Contromatscs ,

(40) (36) Henry Pratt )

Gate Flex Wedge (12) Pacific l (62) (34) (7) Walworth (15) Westinghouse Solid Wedge (21) Aloyco (28) (3) Pacific Globe (4) Pacific (35) (10) Velan (3) Walworth f

_g 8 C gLrw g _ _ ___,,_ j Plug (6) (6) Xomox All Millstone Unit 3 MOV's within the program scope utilize Limitorque operators.

5. Status of GL 89-10 Program MOV's As of June 1995, all initial design reviews, valve set-up and static tests of the 143 valves in the Millstone Unit 3 GL 89-10 MOV Program were completed by the end of refueling outage RFO 5, the third refueling outage after the release of GL 89-10. Of the 143 MOV's in the program,102 were statically tested during RFO 5. Of the 94 testable MOV's in the program; 35 MOV's were

, dynamically tested during RFO 5,22 MOV's were tested the previous outage, for 6 MOV's the static test constituted the design-basis verification because the static breakaway torque requirements dominate the torque requirements,14 MOV's were grouped with other tested MOV's, and 17 MOV's were not dynamically tested due to high calculated margin / capability.

Information about each MOV in the Millstone Unit 3 MOV Program is contained in numerous tables within this report. Table 2 contains the valve tag number and system label name along with the functional description of each valve.

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Millstone Unit 3 MOV Program October 6,1995 Table 2: MOV- System Name and Function l Valve Tag Number System Name Function 3CCP*MOV045A Reactor Plant CCW Train A RPCCW Supply Header Ctmt Penetration 3CCP*MOV0458 Reactor Plant CCW Train B RPCCW Ctmt Supply Header isolation  ;

3CCP*MOV048A Reactor Plant CCW Train A RPCCW Ctmt Retum Inner isolation 1 3CCP*MOV0488 Reactor Plant CCW Train B RPCCW Ctmt Return Inner Isolation 3CCP'MOV049A Reactor Plant CCW Train A RPCCW Ctmt Retum Outer Isolation 3CCP'MOV049B Reactor Plant CCW Train B RPCCW Ctmt Return Outer Isolation 3CCP MOV222 Reactor Plant CCW Train A Chilled Water Supply 3CCP*MOV223 Reactor Plant CCW Train A Chilled Water Return i 3CCP*MOV224 Reactor Plant CCW Train A Chilled Water Return 3CCP*MOV225 Reactor Plant CCW Train A Chilled Water Return 3CCP'MOV226 Reactor Plant CCW Train B Chilled Water Supply isolation 3CCP*MOV227 Reactor Plant CCW Train B Chilled Water Supply isolation 3CCP*MOV228 Reactor Plant CCW Train B Chilled Water Retum isolation 3CCP*MOV229 Reactor Plant CCW Train B Chilled Water Retum isolation 3CHS*LCV1128 Charging Volume Control Tank Outlet Isolation 3CHS*LCV112C Charging Volume Control Tank Outlet isolation 3CHS*LCV112D Charging RWST Supply To Charging Pump Suction 4 3CHS*LGV112E Charging RWST Supply To Charging Pump Suction 3CHS*MV8100 Chargmg Seal Water Retum From RCP Ctmt Penetration 1 3CHS*MV8104 Charging Emergency Boration j 3CHS*MV8105 Charging Charging Header isolation j 3CHS*MV8106 Charging Charging Flow Controller isolation J 3CHS*MV8109A Charging RCP A Seal Supply Isolation Ctmt Penetration 1 3CHS*MV81098 Charging RCP B Seal Supply isolation Ctmt Penetration 3CHS*MV8109C Charging RCP C Seal Supply isolation Ctmt Penetration 3CHS*MV81090 Charging RCP D Seal Supply Isolation Ctml Penetration 3CHS*MV8110 Charging Charging Recirculation isolation To Sealwater 3CHS*MV8111 A Charging Charging Pump 3A Recirculation Isolation l 3CHS*MV8111B Charging Charging Pump 3C Recirculation Isolation i 3CHS*MV8111C Charging Charging Pump 3B Recirw ition Isolation l 3CHS*MV8112 Charging Seal Water Retum From RCP Ctmt Penetration j 3CHS*MV8116 Charging Bypass Control Valve 3CHS*MV8438A Charging Charging Pump A/C Discharge Isolation 3CHS*MV8438B Charging Charging Pump B/C Discharge isolation 3CHS*MV8438C Charging Charging Header Cross Connection 3CHS*MV8468A Charging LPSI to Charging Pump Suction isolation {

3CHS*MV84688 Charging LPSI to Charging Pump Suction isolation  !

3CHS*MV8507A Charging Bat A Gravity Boration 3CHS*MV85078 Charging Bat B Gravity Boration 3CHS*MV8511 A Charging Charging Pump Relief Train A isolation l 3CHS*MV8511B Charging Charging Pump Relief Train B lsolation l 3CHS*MV8512A Charging Charging Pump Relief isolation Train B l 3CHS*MV8512B Charging Charging Pump Relief Isolation Train A 3 CMS *MOV24 Containment Atmosphere Monitor Ctmt Atm Mntr Disch Ctmt Penetration i 3CVS*MOV25 Containment Vacuum Ctmt Vac Pump Disch Ctml Penetration 3FWA*MOV35A Aux. Feedwater Auxiliary Feedwater isolation Valve 3FWA*MOV35B Aux. Feedwater Auxiliary Feedwater Isolation Valve l 3FWA*MOV35C Aux. Feedwater Auxiliary Feedwater Isolation Valve l 3FWA*MOV35D Aux. Feedwater Auxiliary Feedwater Isolation Valve )

31AS*MOV72 Containment instrument Air instrument Air Ctmt Penetration l 3LMS*MOV40A Containment Leakage Monitor PT937 Containment isolation 3LMS*MOV40B Containment Leakage Monitor PT936 Containment isolation 3LMS*MOV40C Containment Leakage Monitor PT935 Containment isolation  ;

3LMS*MOV40D Containment Leakage Monitor PT 934 Containment isolation 3 MSS *MOV17A Main Steam SG1 Terry Turbine Non-return isolation 3 MSS *MOV17B Main Steam SG2 Terry Turbine Non-retum isolation 10

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Millstone Unit 3 MOV Progrcm October 6,1995 l

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Valve Tag Number System Name Function l 3 MSS *MOV170 Main Steam SG4 Terry Turbine Non-return isolation 2

3 MSS *MOV18A Main Steam Steam Generator 1 Pressure Relof isolation 3 MSS *MOV188 Main Steam Steam Generator 2 Pressure Rehof isolation 3MS$*MOV18C Main Steam Steam Generator 3 Pressure Relef Isolation 3 MSS *MOV18D Main Steam Steam Generator 4 Pressure Relief isolation j 3 MSS *MOV74A Main Steam Steam Generator 1 Pressure Relef Bypass  ;

3 MSS *MOV748 Main Steam Steam Generator 2 Pressure Relef Bypass

j. 3 MSS *MOV74C Main Steam Steam Generator 3 Pressure Relief Bypass i 3 MSS *MOV740 Main Steam Steam Generator 4 Pressure Relef Bypass 1 i- 3QSS*MOV34A Quench Spray Quench Spray Pump Disch Ctmt Penetration
3QSS*MOV34B Quench Spray Quench Spray Pump Disch Ctmt Penetration j 3RCS*MV8000A Reactor Coolant Pressurizer Power Rehof Isolation l 3RCS*MV80008 Reactor Coolant Pressunzer Power Relef Isolation )

1 3RCS*MV8098 - Reactor Coolant Reactor Vessel To Excess Letdown 3RHS*FCV610 Residual Heat Removal RHR Pump P1A Miniflow Recirculation i 3RHS*FCV611 Residual Heat Removal RHR Pump Pib Miniflow Recirculation 3RHS*MV8701A Residual Heat Removal RHR Loop A Outboard isolation 3RHS*MV8701B Residual Heat Removal RHR Pump Suction From RCS ,

P 3RHS*MV8701C - Residual Heat Removal RHR Loop A Inboard Isolation  !

3RHS*MV8702A Residual Heat Removal RHR Pump Suction From RCS l 3RHS*MV8702B Residual Heat Removal RHR Loop B Outboard isolation 3RHS*MV8702C Residual Heat Removal RHR Loop B Inboard isolation 3RHS*MV8716A Residual Heat Removal RHR Train A to Hot Leg and RWST 3RHS*MV8716B Residual Heat Removal RHR Train B to Hot Leg and RWST 3RSS*MOV20A Containment Recirculation Ctmt Recire Pump Disch Ctmt Penetration 3RSS*MOV208 Containment Recirculation Ctmt Recire Pump Disch Ctmt Penetration 3RSS*MOV20C Containment Recirculation Ctmt Recirc Pump Disch Ctmt Penetration 3RSS*MOV200 Containment Recirculation Ctmt Recirc Pump Disch Ctmt Penetration 3RSS*MOV23A Containment Recirculation Ctmt Recire Pump Suction Ctmt Penetration 3RSS*MOV238 Containment Recirculation Ctmt Recire Pump Suction Ctmt Penetration 3RSS*MOV23C Containment Reorculation Ctmt Recire Pump Suction Ctmt Penetration 3RSS*MOV230 Containment Recirculation Ctmt Recire Pump Suction Ctmt Penetration 3RSS*MOV38A Containment Recirculation 3RSS*PI A Miniflow Recarc 3RSS*MOV38B Containment Recirculation 3RSS*P1 A Miniflow Recirc 3RSS*MV8837A Containment Recirculation RSS To RHR Cross Connection 3RSS*MV88378 Containment Recirculation RSS To RHR Cross Connection 3RSS*MV8838A Containment Recirculation RSS To RHR Cross Connection 3RSS*MV8838B Containment Recirculation RSS To RHR Cross Connection 3SlH*MV8801A High Head Safety injection Charging Pump SI Header Isolation 3SlH*MV8801B High Head Safety injection Charging Pump SI Header isolation 3SlH*MV8802A High Head Safety injection St Pump Disch Hot Leg Ctmt Penetration 3SlH*MV8802B High Head Safety injection St Pump Disch To Hot Leg Ctmt Penetration 3SlH*MV8806 High Head Safety injection Refueling Water Storage Tank To SI Pump 3SlH*MV8807A High Head Safety injection LPSI Charging Pump Suction Cross Connect i 3SlH*MV8807B High Head Safety injection LPSI Charging Pump Suction Cross Connect 3SlH*MV8813 High Head Safety injection Safety injection Pump Master Miniflow Isolation 3SlH*MV8814 High Head Safety injection Safety inject;on System Pump Miniflow isolation 3SlH*MV8821A High Head Safety injection A Safety injection Pump To Cold Leg injection 3SlH*MV8821B High Head Safety injection B Safety injection Pump To Cold Leg injection 3SlH*MV8835 High Head Safety injection St Pump Disch To Cold Leg Ctmt Penetration i 3SlH*MV8920 High Head Safety injection B Safety injection Pump Miniflow isolation 3SlH'MV8923A High Head Safety injection A Safety injection Pump Suction isolation 3SlH*MV89238 High Head Safety injection B Safety injection Pump Suction Isolation 3SlH*MV8924 High Head Safety injection LPSI Charging Pump Suction 3SIL*MV8804A Low Head Safety injection LPSI To Charging Pump Suction 3SIL*MV8804B Low Head Safety injection LPSI To Charging Pump Suction 3SIL*MV8808A Low Head Safety injection SI Accumulator Tank 1 Outlet isolation 11

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-- ' Millstone Unit 3 MOV Program October 6,1995 Valve Tag Number System Name Function 3SIL*MV8808B Low Head Safety injection St Accumulator Tank 2 Outlet isolaten 3SIL*MV8808C Low Head Safety injection SI Accumuistor Tank 3 Outlet isolation 3SIL*MV88080 Low Head Safety injection SI Accumulator Tank 4 Outlet isolation SSIL*MV8800A Low Head Safety injection RHR Pump Discharge To Cold Leg Ctmt Penetration 3SIL*MV88098 Low Head Safety infection RHR Pump Discharge To Cold Leg Ctmt Penetration 3SIL*MV8812A Low Head Safety inject on A RHR Pump Suction isolation From RWST 3SIL*MV8812B Low Head Safety injection B RHR Pump Suction isolation From RWST 3SIL*MV8840 Low Head Safety injection RHR Pump Discharge To Hot Leg Ctmt Penetration 3SWP*MOV024A Service Water - A Service Water Pump Disch Stmr Backwash 3SWP*MOV024B Service Water B Service Water Pump Disch Stmr Backwash 3SWP*MOV024C Service Water C Service Water Pump Disch Stmr Backwash l 3SWP*MOV0240 Service Water D Service Water Pump Disch Stmr Backwash 1 3SWP*MOV050A Service Water Train A Service Water Supply Reactor Plant CCW 3SWP*MOV0508 Service Water Train B Service Water Supply Reactor Plant CCW 3SWP*MOV054A Service Water A Ctmt Rocire Cooler inlet 3SWP'MOV054B Service Water B Ctmt Recire Cooler inlet 3SWP*MOV054C Service Water C Ctmt Reorc Cooler inlet 3SWP*MOV0540 Service Water D Ctmt Recire Cooler inlet 3SWP*MOV057A Service Water A Containment Recirculating Cooler Outlet 3SWP*MOV057B Service Water B Containment Recirculating Cooler Outlet 3SWP*MOV057C Service Water C Containment Recirculating Cooler Outlet ,

3SWP*MOV057D Service Water D Containment Recirculatmg Cooler Outlet ,

3SWP*MOV071A Service Water A Service Water Header Turbine Pump CCW Hx Supply I 3SWP*MOV0718 - Service Water B Service Water Header Turbine Pump CCW Hx Supply l 3SWP*MOV102A Service Water A Service Water Pump Discharge Valve l 3SWP*MOV1028 Service Water B Service Water Pump Discharge Valve i 3SWP*MOV102C Service Water C Service Water Pump Discharge Valve  !

3SWP'MOV102D Service Water D Service Water Discharge Valve 3SWP*MOV115A Service Water Train A Circulating Pump Lube Water Supply 3SWP*MOV1158 Service Water Train B Circulated Pump Lube Water Supply 1

Provided in Table 3 is the quantitative-based Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) priority for each 8

valve. All MOV's were reclassified in 1995 using component risk achievement worth (RAW) importance parameters. The new prioritization scheme is based upon superior insights and state of the art knowledge in comparison to the previous MOV prioritization schemes. The 143 valves in the Millstone Unit 3 MOV Program include 13 valves with a very high PRA rank,27 valves with high, and 99 valves with a medium PRA rank, and 4 valves with a low PRA rank. l 12

Millstone Unit 3 MOV Program October 6,1995 Table 3: Probabilistic-Risk-Assessment (PRA) Priority Valve Number PRA Rank Valve Number PRA Rank Valve Number PRA Rank 3CCP*MOV045A Medium 31AS*MOV72 Medium 3SlH*MV8802A Low 3CCP*MOV045B Medium 3LMS*MOV40A Medium 3SlH*MV8802B Low 3CCP*MOV048A Medium 3LMS*MOV40B Medium 3SlH*MV8806 Medium 3CCP*MOV048B Medium 3LMS*MOV40C Medium 3SlH*MV8807A Medium ICCP*MOV049A Medium 3LMS*MOV40D Medium 3SlH*MV8807B Medium 3CCP*MOV0498 Medium 3 MSS *MOV17A Medium 3SlH*MV8813 High 3CCP*MOV222 Medium 3 MSS *MOV17B Medium 3SlH*MV8814 Medium 3CCP*MOV223 Medium 3 MSS *MOV17D Medium 3SlH'MV8821A Medium 3CCP*MOV224 Medium 3 MSS *MOV18A Medium 3SlH*MV88218 Medium 3CCP*MOV225 Medium 3 MSS *MOV188 Medium 3SlH*MV8835 Medium 3CCP*MOV226 Medium 3 MSS *MOV18C Medium 3SlH*MV8920 Very High 3CCP'MOV227 Medium 3 MSS *MOV180 Medium 3SlH*MV8923A Medium 3CCP*MOV228 Medium 3 MSS *MOV74A Medium 3SlH*MV89238 Medium 3CCP*MOV229 Medium 3 MSS *MOV74B Medium 3SlH*MV8924 Medium 3CHS*LCV112B High 3 MSS *MOV74C Medium 3SIL*MV8804A Very High 3CHS*LCV112C High 3 MSS *MOV740 Medium 3SIL*MV8804B Very High 3CHS*LCV112D High 3QSS*MOV34A High 3SIL*MV8808A Medium 3CHS*LCV112E High 3OSS*MOV348 High 3SIL*MV8808B Medium 3CHS*MV8100 Medium 3RCS*MV8000A Medium 3SIL*MV8808C Medium 3CHS*MV8104 Medium 3RCS*MV80008 Medium 3SIL*MV8808D Medium 3CHS*MV8105 Hign 3RCS*MV8098 Medium 3SIL*MV8809A High 3CHS*MV8106 High 3RHS*FCV610 Medium 3SIL*MV88098 High 3CHS*MV8109A Medium 3RHS*FCV611 Medium 3SIL*MV8812A Very High 3CHS*MV81098 Medium 3RHS*MV8701A Medium 3SIL*MV8812B Very High 3CHS*MV8109C Medium 3RHS*MV87018 Medium 3SIL*MV8840 Medium 3CHS*MV8109D Medium 3RHS*MV8701C Medium 3SWP*MOV024A Medium 3CHS*MV8110 Medium 3RHS*MV8702A Medium 3SWP*MOV024B Medium 3CHS*MV8111 A Medium 3RHS*MV8702B Medium 3SWP*MOV024C Medium 3CHS*MV81118 Medium 3RHS*MV8702C Medium 3SWP*MOV024D Medium 3CHS*MV8111C Medium 3RHS*MV8716A Medium 3SWP*MOV050A Very High 3CHS*MV8112 Medium 3RHS*MV8716B Medium 3SWP*MOV050B Very High 3CHS*MV8116 Low 3RSS*MOV20A High 3SWP'MOV054A Very High 3CHS*MV8438A Medium 3RSS*MOV208 High 3SWP*MOV0548 Very High 3CHS*MV8438B Medium 3RSS*MOV20C High 3SWP*MOV054C Very High 3CHS*MV8438C Medium 3RSS*MOV20D High 3SWP*MOV054D Very High 3CHS*MV8468A Medium 3RSS*MOV23A Medium 3SWP'MOV057A Medium 3CHS*MV84688 Medium 3RSS*MOV23B Medium 3SWP'MOV057B Medium 3CHS*MV8507A Medium 3RSS*MOV23C Medium 3SWP*MOV057C Medium 3CHS*MV85078 Medium 3RSS*MOV23D Medium 3SWP*MOV057D Medium 3CHS*MV8511 A High 3RSS*MOV38A Medium 3SWP*MOV071 A Very High 3CHS*MV8511B High 3RSS*MOV38B Medium 3SWP*MOV071B Very High 3CHS*MV8512A High 3RSS*MV8837A High 3SWP*MOV102A High 3CHS*MV85128 High 3RSS*MV88378 High 3SWP*MOV102B High 3 CMS *MOV24 Medium 3RSS*MV8838A Medium 3SWP*MOV102C High 3CVS*MOV25 Low 3RSS*MV88388 Medium 3SWP*MOV102D High 3FWA*MOV35A Medium 3SlH*MV8801A High 3SWP*MOV115A Medium 3FWA*MOV358 Medium 3SlH'MV8801B High 3SWP*MOV115B Medium 3FWA*MOV35C Medium 3FWA*MOV35D Medium 13

Millstone Unit 3 MOV Program October 6,1995 Table 4 lists the credited safety function strokes for each valve. The 143 valves in the Millstone Unit 3 MOV Program include 36 valves with an open safety function,61 valves with a close safety function, and 46 valves with both an open and close safety function.

Table 4: SafetyStrokes Valve Number Safety Valve N Aber Safety Valve Number Safety Stroke t i,,oke Stroke 3CCP*MOV045A open/close 31AS*MOV72 close 3SlH*MV8802A open 3CCP*MOV0458 open/close 3LMS*MOV40A close 3SlH*MV8802B open 3CCP*MOV048A open/close 3LMS*MOV40B close 3SlH*MV8806 close 3CCP*MOV0488 open/close 3LMS*MOV40C close 3SlH'MV8807A open 3CCP*MOV049A open/close 3LMS*MOV40D close 3SlH*MV8807B open 3CCP*MOV0498 open/close 3 MSS *MOV17A close 3SlH*MV8813 close 3CCP*MOV222 open/close 3 MSS *MOV17B close 3SlH*MV8814 close 3CCP*MOV223 open/close 3 MSS *MOV17D close 3SlH*MV8821A close 3CCP*MOV224 open/close 3 MSS *MOV18A close 3SlH*MV8821B close 3CCP*MOV225 open/close 3 MSS *MOV188 close 3SlH*MV8835 close 3CCP'MOV226 open/close 3 MSS *MOV18C close 3SlH*MV8920 close 3CCP*MOV227 open/close 3 MSS *MOV18D close 3SlH*MV8923A close 3CCP*MOV228 open/close 3 MSS *MOV74A open 3SlH*MV8923B close 3CCP*MOV229 open/close 3 MSS *MOV74B open 3SlH*MV8924 close 3CHS*LCV1128 open/close 3 MSS *MOV74C open 3SIL*MV8804A open 3CHS*LCV112C open/close 3 MSS *MOV74D open 3SIL*MV88048 open 3CHS*LCV112D open/close 3OSS*MOV34A open/close 3SIL*MV8808A open

, 3CHS*LCV112E open/close 3OSS*MOV348 open/close 3SIL*MV8808B open 3CHS*MV8100 open/close 3RCS*MV8000A open/close 3SIL*MV8808C open 3CHS*MV8104 open 3RCS*MV80008 open/close 3SIL*MV8808D open 3CHS*MV8105 close 3RCS*MV8098 open 3SIL*MV8809A close 3CHS*MV8106 close 3RHS*FCV610 open/close 3SIL*MV8809B Olose 3CHS*MV8109A open/close 3RHS*FCV611 open/close 3SIL*MV8812A close 3CHS*MV8109B open/close 3RHS*MV8701A open/close 3SIL*MV8812B close 3CHS*MV8109C open/close 3RHS*MV87018 open/close 3SIL*MV8840 close 3CHS*MV8109D open/close 3RHS*MV8701C open/close 3SWP*MOV024A open/close 3CHS*MV8110 close 3RHS*MV8702A open/close 3SWP*MOV024B open/close 3CHS*MV8111 A close pHS*MV87028 open/close 3SWP*MOV024C open/close 3CHS*MV8111B close 3RHS*MV8702C open/close 3SWP*MOV024D open/close 3CHS*MV8111C close 3RHS*MV8716A open/close 3SWP*MOV050A open/close 3CHS*MV8112 open/close 3RHS*MV8716B open/close 3SWP'MOV050B open/close 3CHS*MV8116 open 3RSS*MOV20A close 3SWP*MOV054A open 3CHS*MV8438A close 3RSS*MOV20B close 3SWP*MOV054B ooen 3CHS*MV84388 close 3RSS*MOV20C close 3SWP*MOV054C open 3CHS*MV8438C close 3RSS*MOV200 close 3SWP*MOV054D open 3CHS*MV8468A close 3RSS*MOV23A close 3SWP*MOV057A close 3CHS*MV84688 close 3RSS*MOV23B close 3SWP*MOV057B close 3CHS*MV8507A open 3RSS*MOV23C close 3SWP'MOV057C close 3CHS*MV8507B open 3RSS*MOV23D close 3SWP*MOV0570 close 3CHS*MV8511 A open/close 3RSS*MOV38A open 3SWP'MOV071 A close 3CHS*MV8511B open/close 3RSS*MOV388 open 3SWP'MOV0718 close 3CHS*MV8512A close 3RSS*MV8837A open 3SWP*MOV102A open 3CHS*MV85128 close 3RSS*MV8837B open 3SWP*MOV102B open 3 CMS *MOV24 close 3RSS*MV8838A open 3SWP*MOV102C open 3CVS*MOV25 open 3RSS*MV88388 open 3SWP*MOV102D open 3FWA*MOV35A close 3SlH*MV8801A open 3SWP'MOV115A close 3FWA*MOV35B close 3SlH*MV88018 open 3SWP*MOV115B close 3FWA*MOV350 close 3FWA*MOV35D close 14

Millstone Unit 3 MOV Program October 6,1995 Table 5 lists the pertinent valve, actuator and motor information. The disc type is indicated for each valve as well as the size (diameter) of the valve in inches.

Table 3: Iriformation on Valve, Actuator andMotor Valvo Valve Actuator Motor Number Company Type Disc Size Company Type Company Size Type (in.) (ft lb) 3CCP*MOV045A Henry Pratt Butterfly Symmetnc 10 Limitorque SMB-00 Reliance 10 3CCP*MOV045B Henry Pratt Butterfly Symmetnc 10 Limitorque SMB-00 Rehance 10 3CCP*MOV048A Henry Pratt Butter 11y Symmetnc 10 Limitorque SMB-00 Reliance 10 3CCP*MOV048B Henry Pratt Butterfly Symmetric 10 Limitorque SMB-00 Reliance 10 3CCP*MOV049A Henry Pratt Butterfly Symmetnc 10 Limitorque SMB-00 Rehance 10 3CCP'MOV049B Henry Pratt Butterfly Symmetric 10 Limitorque SMB-00 Reliance 10 3CCP*MOV222 Henry Pratt Butterfly Symmetric 4 Limitorque SMB-000 Reliance 2 3CCP*MOV223 Henry Pratt Butterfly Symmetnc 4 Limitorque SMB-000 Rehance 2 3CCP*MOV224 Henry Pratt Butterfly Symmetric 4 Limitorque SMB-000 Reliance 2 3CCP'MOV225 Henry Pratt Butterfly Symmetnc 4 Limitorque SMB-000 Reliance 2 3CCP'MOV226 Henry Pratt Butterfly Symmetnc 4 Limitorque SMB-000 Rehance 2 3CCP*MOV227 Henry Pratt Butterfly Symmetric 4 Limitorque SMB-000 Rehance 2 3CCP*MOV228 Henry Pratt Butterfly Symmetric 4 Limitorque SMB-000 Rehance 2 3CCP*MOV229 Henry Pratt Butterfly Symmetric 4 Limitorque SMB-000 Reliance 2 3CHS*LCV112b Aloyco Gate Sohd wedge 4 Limitorque SB-000 Rehance 5 3CHS*LCV112C Aloyco Gate Solid wedge 4 Limitorque 58-000 Reliance 5 3CHS*LCV112D Aloyco Gate Sohd wedge 8 Limitorque SB-00 Reliance 10 3CHS*LCV112E Aloyco Gate Solid wedge 8 Limitorque SB-00 Rehance 10 3CHS*MV8100 Yarway Globe Guided 2 Limitorque SMB-00 Reliance 5 3CHS*MV8104 Yarway Globe Guided 2 Limitorque SMB-00 Rehance 5 3CHS*MV8105 Aloyco Gate Sohd wedge 3 Limitorque SMB-00 Rehance 25 3CHS*MV8106 Aloyco Gate Solid wedge 3 Limitorque SMB-00 Rehance 25 3CHS*MV8109A Yarway Globe Guided 2 Limitorque SMB-00 Rehance 10 3CHS*MV81098 Yarway Globe Guided 2 Limitorque SMB-00 Rehance 10 3CHS*MV8109C Yarway Globe Guided 2 Limitorque SMB-00 Rehance 10 3CHS*MV8109D Yarway Globe Guided 2 Limitorque SMB-00 Rehance 10 3CHS*MV8110 Velan Globe Standard 2 Limitorque SMB-00 Reliance 10 3CHS*MV8111 A Velan Globe Standard 2 Limitorque SMB-00 Reliance 10 3CHS*MV81118 Velan Globe Standard 2 Limitorque SMB-00 Rekance 10 3CHS*MV8111C Velan Globe Standard 2 Limitorque SMB-00 Reliance 10 3CHS*MV8112 Yarway Globe Guided 2 Limitorque SMB-00 Rehance 5 3CHS*MV8116 Velan Globe Standard 1 Limitorque SMB-00 Rehance 10 3CHS*MV8438A Westinghouse Gate Flex wedge 4 Limitorque SBD-00 Reliance 15 3CHS*MV84388 Westinghouse Gate Flex wedge 4 Limitorque SBD-00 Reliance 15 3CHS*MV8438C Westinghouse Gate Flex wedge 4 Limitorque SBD-00 Rehance 15 3CHS*MV8468A Westinghouse Gate Flex wedge 8 Limitorque SB-00 Reliance 15 3CHS*MV84688 Westinghouse Gate Flex wedge 8 Limitorque SB-00 Rehance 15 3CHS*MV8507A Westinghouse Gate Flex wedge 3 Limitorque SMB-000 Rehance 10 3CHS*MV85078 Westinghouse Gate Flex wedge 3 Limitorque SMB-000 Reliance 10 3CHS*MV8511 A Velan Globe Standard 2 Limitorque SMB-00 Reliance 10 3CHS*MV8511B Velan Globe Standard 2 Limitorque SMB40 Reliance 10 3CHS*MV6512A Velan Globe Standard 2 Limitorque SMB-00 Rehance 10 3CHS*MV8512B Velan Globe Standard 2 Limitorque SMB-00 Rehance 10 3 CMS *MOV24 Yarway Globe Guided 1 Limitorque SMB-000 Reliance 5 3CVS*MOV25 Yarway Globe Guided 2 Limitorque SMB-00 Rehance 5 3FWA*MOV35A Walworth Gate Solid wedge 3 Limitorque SMB-000 Rehance 5 3FWA*MOV358 Walworth Gate Sohd wedge 3 Limitorque SMB-000 Rehance 5 3FWA*MOV35C Watworth Gate Solid wedge 3 Limitorque SMB-000 Reliance 5 3FWA*MOV35D Walworth Gate Sohd wedge 3 Limitorque SMB-000 Rehance 5 3lAS*MOV72 Yarway Globe Guided 2 Limitorque SMB-00 Rehance 5 15

Millstone Unit 3 MOV Program October 6,1995 Valve Valve Actuator Motor g Number Company Type Disc Size Company Type Company Size Type (In.) (ft-lb) 4 3LMS*MOV40A Yarway Globe Guided 1.50 Limitorque SMB-00 Rehance 5 3LMS*MOV400 Yarway Globe Guided 1.50 Limitorque SMB-00 Rehance 5 3LMS*MOV40C Yarway Globe Guided 1.50 Limitorque SMB-00 Reliance 5 3LMS*MOV40D Yarway Globe Guided 1.50 Limatorque SMB-00 Rehance 5 3 MSS *MOV17A Walworth Globe Standard 3 Limitorque SMB-00 Reliance 5 3 MSS *MOV17B Walworth Globe Standard 3 Limitorque SMB-00 Rehance 5 3 MSS *MOV17D Walworth Globe Standard 3 Limitorque SMB-00 Reliance 5 3 MSS *MOV18A Walworth Gate Flex wedge 8 Limitorque SMB-0 Reliance 25 3 MSS *MOV188 Walworth Gate Flex wedge 8 Limitorque SMB-0 Rehance 25 3 MSS *MOV18C Walworth Gate Flex wedge 8 Limitorque SMB-0 Rehance 25 3 MSS *MOV18D Walworth Gate Flex wedge 8 Limitorque SMB-0 Reliance 25 3 MSS *MOV74A Pacific Globe Standard 8 Limitorque SMB-2 Reliance 60 3 MSS *MOV748 Pacific Globe Standard 8 Limitorque SMB-2 Reliance 60 3 MSS *MOV74C Pacific Globe Standard 8 Limitorque SMB-2 Rehance 60 3 MSS *MOV74D Pacific Globe Standard 8 Limitorque SMB-2 Reliance 60 3OSS*MOV34A Henry Pratt Butterfly Symmetnc 12 Limitorque SMB-000 Reliance 5 30SS*MOV348 Henry Pratt Butterfly Symmetric 12 Limitorque SMB-000 Rehance 5 3RCS*MV8000A Aloyco Gate Sohd wedge 3 Limitorque SMB-00 Rekance 25 3RCS*MV8000B Aloyco Gate Solid wedge 3 Limitorque SMB-00 Reliance 25 3RCS*MV8098 Velan Globe Standard 1 Limitorque SMB-00 Rehance 10 3RHS*FCV610 Yarway Globe Guided 2 Limitorque SMB-00 Rehance 5 3RHS*FCV611 Yarway Globe Guided 2 Limitorque SMB-00 Rehance 5 3RHS*MV8701A Westinghouse Gate Flex wedge 12 Limitorque SBD-3 Reliance 175 3RHS*MV87018 Pacific Gate Flex wedge 12 Limitorque SMB-1 Rehance 25 3RHS*MV8701C Westinghouse Gate Flex wedge 12 Limitorque SBD-3 Rehance 200 3RHS*MV8702A Pacific Gate Flex wedge 12 Limitorque SMB-1 Rehance 25 3RHS*MV87028 Westinghouse Gate Flex wedge 12 Limitorque SBD-3 Reliance 175 3RHS*MV8702C Westinghouse Gate Flex wedge 12 Limitorque SBD-3 Rehance 200 3RHS*MV8716A Pacific Gate Flex wedge 10 Limatorque SB-1 Rehance 40 3RHS*MV87168 Pacific Gate Flex wedge 10 Limitorque SB-1 Reliance 40 3RSS*MOV20A Henry Pratt Butterfly Symmetnc 10 Limitorque SMB-000 Rehance 5 3RSS*MOV208 Henry Pratt Butterfly Symmetnc 10 Limitorque SMB-000 Rehance 5 3RSS*MOV20C Henry Pratt Butterfly Symmetric 10 Limitorque SMB-000 Rekance 5 3RSS*MOV20D Henry Pratt Butterfly Symmetnc 10 Limitorque SMB-000 Rehance 5 3RSS*MOV23A Henry Pratt Butterfly Offset 12 Limitorque SMB-000 Reliance 2 3RSS*MOV238 Henry Pratt Butterfly Offset 12 Limitorque SMB-000 Rehance 2 3RSS*MOV23C Henry Pratt Butterfly Offset 12 Limitorque SMB-000 Reliance 2 3RSS*MOV23D Henry Pratt Butterfly Offset 12 Limitorque SMB-000 Rehance 2 3RSS*MOV38A Pacific Gste Sohd wedge 4 Limitorque SMB-000 Reliance 5 3RSS*MOV38B Pacific Gate Sohd wedge 4 Limitorque SMB-000 Rehance 5 3RSS*MV8837A Pacific Gate Flex wedge 8 Limitorque SB-0 Rehance 15 3RSS*MV8837B Pacific Gate Flex wedge 8 Limitorque SB-0 Rehance 15 3RSS*MV8838A Pacific Gate Flex wedge 8 Limitorque SB-0 Rehance 15 3RSS*MV88388 Pacific Gate Flex wedge 8 Limatorque SB-0 Rehance 15 3SlH*MV8801A Aloyco Gate Sohd wedge 4 Limitorque SB-0 Rehance 40 3SlH*MV88018 Aloyco Gate Sohd wedge 4 Limitorque SB-0 Rehance 40 3SlH'MV8802A Aloyco Gate Sohd wedge 4 Limitorque S B-0 Rehance 40 3SlH*MV8802B Aloyco Gate Sohd wedge 4 Limitorque SB-0 Rohance 40 3SlH*MV8806 Aloyco Gate Sohd wedge 8 Limitorque SB-0 Reliance 10 3SlH'MV8807A Aloyco Gate Sohd wedge 6 Limitorque SB-00 Reliance 10 3SlH*MV8807B Aloyco Gate Sokd wedge 6 Limitoraue SB-00 Rehance 10 3SlH*MV8813 Pacific Gate Sokd wedge 3 Limitorque S B-00 Rehance 10 3SlH*MV8814 Yarway Globe Guided 1.50 Limitorque SMB-00 Reliance 5 3SlH*MVB821A Aloyco Gate Sohd wedge 4 Limitorque SB-0 Rehance 25 3SlH*MV8821 B Aloyco Gate Sohd wedge 4 Limitorque SB-0 Rebance 25 16

i Millstone Unit 3 MOV Progon October 6,1995 Valve Valve Actuator Motor Number Company Type Disc size Company Type Company Size Type (In.) (ft-lb) 3SlH'MV8835 Aloyco Gate Solid wedge 4 Limitorque SB-0 Reliance 40 3SlH*MV8920 Yarway Globe Guided 1.50 Limitorque SMB-00 Reliance 5 3SlH'MV8923A Aloyco Gate Solid wedge 6 Limitorque SB-00 Reliance 10 3SlH*MV8923B Aloyco Gate Solid wedge 6 Limitorque SB-00 Reliance 10 3SlH*MV8924 Aloyco Gate Solid wedge 6 Limitorque SB-00 Reliance 10 3SIL*MV8804A Pacific Gate Flex wedge 8 Limitorque SB-0 Reliance 15 3SIL*MV8804B Pacific Gate Flex wedge 8 Limitorque SB-0 Reliance 15 3SIL*MV8808A Westinghouse Gate Flex wedge 10 Limitorque SBD-3 Reliance 150 3SIL*MV8808B Westinghouse Gate Flex wedge 10 Limitorque SBD-3 Reliance 150 3SIL*MV8808C Westinghouse Gate Flex wedge 10 Limitorque SBD-3 Reliance 150 3SIL*MV8808D Westinghouse Gate Flex wedge 10 Limitorque SBD-3 Reliance 150 3SIL*MV8809A Walworth Gate Flex wedge 10 Limitorque SB-3 Reliance 150 3SIL*MV8809B Walworth Gate Flex wedge 10 Limitorque SB-3 Reliance 150 3SIL*MV8812A Pacific Gate Flex wedge 12 Limitorque SB-1 Reliance 60 3SIL*MV8812B Pacific Gate Flex wedge 12 Limitorque SB-1 Reliance 60 3SIL*MV8840 Walworth Gate Flex wedge 8 Limitorque SB-2 Elec. Apparatus 80 3SWP*MOV024A Xomox Plug Plug 3 Limatorque SMB-000 Reliance 2 3SWP*MOV024B Xomox Plug Plug 3 Limitorque SMB-000 Reliance 2 3SWP*MOV024C Xomox Plug Plug 3 Limitorque SMB-000 Reliance 2 3SWP*MOV024D Xomox Plug Plug 3 Limitorque SMB-000 Reliance 2 3SWP'MOV050A Henry Pratt Butterfly Offset 30 Limitorque SMB 00 Reliance 15 l 3SWP*MOV0508 Henry Pratt Butterfly Offset 30 Limitorque SMB-00 Reliance 15 )

3SWP*MOV054A Henry Pratt Butterfly Symmetnc 18 Limitorque SMB-000 Reliance 5 3SWP*MOV0548 Henry Pratt Butterfly Symmetnc 18 Limitorque SMB-000 Reliance 5 3SWP*MOV054C Hen.y Pratt Butterfly Symmetric 18 Limitorque SMB-000 Reliance 5 3SWP*MOV054D Henry Pratt Butterfly Symmetnc 18 Limitorque SMB-000 Reliance 5 3SWP*MOV057A Henry Pratt Butterfly Symmetric 18 Limitorque SMB-000 Reliance 5 3SWP*MOV0578 Henry Pratt Butterfly Symmetric 18 Limitorque SMB-000 Reliance 5 3SWP*MOV057C Henry Pratt Butterfly Symmetnc 18 Limitorque SMB-000 Reliance 5 3SWP*MOV057D Henry Pratt Butterfly Symmetnc 18 Limitorque SMS-000 Reliance 5 3SWP*MOV071 A Henry Pratt Butterfly Symmetric 18 Limitorque SMB-000 Reliance 5 3SWP'MOV071B Henry Pratt Butterfly Symmetric 18 Limitorque SMB-000 Reliance 5 3SWP*MOV102A Contromatics Butterfly Offset 30 Limitorque SMB-00 Elec. Apparatus 15 3SWP*MO /102B Contromatics Butterfly Offset 30 Limitorque SMB-00 Elec. Apparatus 15 3SWP*MOV102C Contromatics Butterfly Offset 30 Limitorque SMB-00 Elec. Apparatus 15 3SWP*MOV102D Contromatics Butterfly Offset 30 Lim; torque SMB-00 Elec. Apparatus 15 3SWP'MOV115A Xomox Plug Plug 2 Limitorque SMB-000 Reliance 2 3SWP'MOV115B Xomox Plug Plug 2 Limitorque SMB-000 Reliance 2 17

Millstone Unit 3 MOV Program October 6,1995 The control switch thrust versus calculated minimum and maximum thrust (torque for butterfly valves) is tabulated in Table 6. The information in the table is presented to demonstrate design-basis closure. Future changes will be controlled by existing NU procedures.

Table 6: ControlSwitch Thrust (Torquefor Butterfly Valves)

Valve Number TSDor Minimum Calculated As-Left LS Required Maximum CST 3CCP'MOV045A LS 48.4 73 73 3CCP*MOV045B LS 42.4 73 73 3CCP*MOV048A LS 44.6 73 73 3CCP'MOV0488 LS 31.6 73 73 3CCP*MOV049A LS 25.3 73 73 3CCP*MOV049B LS 26.3 73 73 3CCP'MOV222 LS 35.7 73 73 3CCP'MOV223 LS 28.7 73 73 3CCP'MOV224 LS 324.9 470 470 3CCP*MOV225 LS 263.9 470 470 3CCP*MOV226 LS 403.5 470 470 3CCP'MOV227 LS 208.8 470 470 3CCP*MOV228 LS 369.4 470 470 3CCP*MOV229 LS 219.3 470 470 3CHS*LCV1128 C 2594 3276 3044 3CHS*LCV112C 2816 5527 3552 3CHS*LCV112D 2 1 9446 17404 9487 3CHS*LCV112E 9990 17404 10198 3CHS*MV8100 1824 14771 11977 3CHS*MV8104 ll ..

, 1733 14771 11253 3CHS*MV8105 $$, 't 12745 19227 14762 3CHS*MV8106 @ 11721 17547 12279 3CHS*MV8109A f!!? 1296 14771 7374 3CHS*MV8109B i 1296 14771 9606 i Qj'i 3CHS*MV8109C %l $ 7 1296 14771 8638 3CHS*MV8109D JS j p 1296 14771 7565 3CHS*MV8110 _

j 8385 11625 11291 3CHS*MV8111 A .

8934 13188 11434 3CHS*MV81118 .

10648 15337 12763 3CHS*MV8111C I' #

10796 15337 12548 3CHS*MV8112 h 1826 14170 10980 3CHS*MV8116 3CHS*MV8438A

@  %)

VEB 11202 5293 14677 17090 13686 10960 3CHS*MV84388 P -

5663 17090 10372 3CHS*MV8438C .

ll  ! 7516 17090 10054 3CHS*MV8468A , j , 8696 9912 9174 3CHS*MVB4688 lMJ 86 % 9912 8720 3CHS*MV8507A DR6h i 2796 9728 3330 3CHS*MV8507B @@h 3717 9728 4297 3CHS*MV8511 A 5827 15337 14675 hYggy*

3CHS*MV8511B E T 5435 14994 13381 3CHS*MV8512A q l 12497 15337 12718 3CHS*MV85128 L 12728 14994 13848 3 CMS *MOV24 I hj l 1368 6461 3809 3CVS*MOV25 f, UBM 1263 13853 9497 3FWA*MOV35A TSB 6238 10900 10900 3FWA*MOV358 TSB 6698 10900 10900 3FWA*MOV35C TSB 5763 10900 10900 18

Millstone Unit 3 MOV Program October 6,1995 Valve Number l TSB or Minimum Calculated As-Left l LS Required Maximum CST 3FWA*MOV350 TSB 5143 10900 10900 3tAS*MOV72 1854 13467 8813 3LMS*MOV40A 1359 13971 5849 3LMS*MOV40B 1359 Y W l 3LMS*MOV40C 1359 13971 8320 3LMS*MOV400 1359 14291 9551 3 MSS *MOV17A 5101 14142 13589 3 MSS *MOV17 101 10707 8915 j 3 MSS *MOV17D 5101 11890 10044 l 3 MSS *MOV18A TSB 24970 33132 33132 1 3 MSS *MOV18B l TSB l 26527 33132 33132 3 MSS *MOV18C l TSB l 25043 33132 33132

3 MSS *MOV18D TSB 26400 33132 33132 )

3 MSS *MOV74A 16751 66162 54468 3 MSS *MOV74B 17053 65331 55139 j 3 MSS *MOV74C 17193 70278 65089 )

3 MSS *MOV74D 16751 66162 62379 i 3OSS*MOV34A LS 540 574 574 30SS*MOV34B l LS l 540 574 - 574 3RCS*MV8000A l TSB l 16424 17580 17580 3RCS*MV8000B TSB 15826 17580 17580

. 3RCS*MV809 1296 12293 11010 3RHS*FCV610 1296 14771 11051 l

3RHS*FCV611 1296 16970 15224 3RHS*MV8701A 44991 72319 56803 3RHS*MV8701 5963 W j

3RHS*MV8701C 41533 h 3RHS*MV870 5%3 20226 17322 3RHS*MV8702B 44991 72319 56332 3RHS*MV870 37776 88336 38228 3RHS*MV8716A 4415 g 3RHS*MV8716B 5708 27088 20481 3RSS*MOV20A LS 468 543 543 3RSS*MOV20B l LS l 468 543 - 543 3RSS*MOV20C l LS l 468 543 543 4

3RSS*MOV200 l LS l 468 543 543 4 3RSS*MOV23A l LS l 364 726 726 3RSS*MOV238 l LS l 364 709 709 3RSS*MOV23C l LS l 364 726 726 3RSS*MOV23D LS 364 709 709 3RSS*MOV38A 001 3286 3216 3RSS*MOV38B 2392 3286 2600 3RSS*MV8 970 17255 10433 3RSS*MV8837B VVW 4

3RSS*MV8 156 7937 ~F7 8B 4156 15942 8148 3SlH*MV8801A 1019 27339 24087 3SlH*MV8801B 10721 26903 20079 3SlH*MVB802A 5385 21050 18002 3SlH*MV88023 5391 26903 21555 3SlH*MV8806 8486 12243 11 % 9 3SlH*MV8807A 3385 7605 3947 3SlH'MV8807B 3385 6024 5802 3SlH*MV8813 5191 9156 8274 3SlH*MV8814 5436 12009 8912 3SlH*MV8821A 12249 24952 19

l Millstons Unit 3 MOV Program October 6,1995 Valve Number TSB or Minimum Calculated As-Left LS Required Maximum 3SlH'MV8821B 11689 18912 16096 3SlH*MVB835 13304 20124 17673 3SlH*MV8920 4920 16773 13522 3SlH*MV8923A 2181 3639 3372 3SlH*MV8923B 2181 3639 3282 3SlH'MV8924 2055 7605 4018 3SIL*MV8804 3251 7937 6789 3SIL*MV8804B 3251 15585 8388 3SIL*MV88 18910 75409 58690 3SIL*MV88088 18910 76806 47510 3SIL*MV8808 18910 76806 50937 3SIL*MV8808D 18910 73602 46194 3SIL*MV8809A 8310 69775 23270 3SIL*MV8809B 7094 75106 32340 3SIL*MV8812A 3191 35751 17501 3SIL*MV88128 3191 35751 17694 3SIL*MV8840 6354 38043 37780 3SWP'MOV024A LS 67.2 109 109 3SWP*MOV024B l LS l 67.2 109 109 3SWP*MOV024C l LS l 67.2 109 109 3SWP*MOV024D l LS l 67.2 109 109 3SWP'MOV050A l LS l 2389 2738 2738 3SWP*MOV0508 l LS l 2180 2738 2738 3SWP*MOV054A l LS l 1038.3 1195 1195 3SWP*MOV054B l LS l 5'. 8. 7 1195 1195 3SWP'MOV054C l LS l 1050.1 1195 1195 )

3SWP'MOV0540 l LS l 715.6 1195 1195 j 3SWP*MOV057A l LS l 788.1 1195 1195  ;

3SWP*MOV0578 l LS l 827.9 1195 1195 j 3SWP'MOV057C l LS l 800 3 1195 1195 i 3SWP*MOV0570 l LS l 634.1 1195 1195 ]

3SWP*MOV071A l LS l 285 1178 1178  ;

3SWP*MOV071B l LS l 779.1 1178 1178 3SWP*MOV102A l LS l 3612 5250 5250 3SWP*MOV102B l LS l 3612 5250 5250 l 3SWP'MOV102C l LS l 3612 5250 5250 3SWP'MOV102D l LS l 3612 5250 5250 3SWP*MOV115A l LS l 55 100 100 3SWP*MOV115B l LS l 50 100 100 I

TSB - Torque Switch Bypass  !

LS - Limit Switch t

20

Millstone Unit 3 MOV Frogram October 6,1995 The type of test, either static or dynamic, and the date of the latest test is included in Table 7. The l information in the table is presented to demonstrate design-basis closure. Future changes will be controlled by existing NU procedures.

Table 7: Test Data '

Valve Number Static Dynamic Open Close Open Close % DB D/P: % DB DIP:

Test Test Test Test DB DB Open Close Date Date Pressure Pressure D/P D/P Test Test 3CCP*MOV045A 4/27/95 Grouped 174 174 3CCP*MOV0458 4/27/95 5/25/95 115.3 115.3 174 174 66 % 66 %

3CCP*MOV048A 5/3/95 Grouped 143 174 3CCP'MOV048B 5/3/95 5/25/95 122.2 122.2 143 174 85% 70%

3CCP'MOV049A Grouped 174 174 4/27/95_

3CCP*MOV049B 4/27/95 5/25/95 134.2 134.2 174 174 77 % 77%

3CCP*MOV222 4/29/95 Grouped 1143 143 j 3CCP*MOV223 4/29/95 Grouped 143 f

g: ,

'~

3CCP*MOV224 4/29/95 Grouped 143 143  ; j

[

3CCP*MOV225 4/30/95 Grouped lj 143 143 l

3CCP*MOV226 4/30/95 5/24/95 112.2 112.2 143 143 78 % 78 %

3CCP*MOV227 5/1/95 5/24/95 99.9 l 99.9 143 143 70 % l 70 % l 3CCP*MOV228 4/30/95 5/24/95 112.2 l 112.2 143 143 78 % l 78 % l 3CCP*MOV229 4/30/95 5/24/95 99.9 99.9 143 143 70 % 70 % ,

3CHS*LCV1128 5/3/95 Non-Testable 118 118 l lg;y jjj:j;yg 3CHS*LCV112C 5/12/95 Non-Testable 118 118 @@fMf];egd 3CHS*LCV1120 5/9/95 Non-Testable 205 ( y .]..

3CHS*LCV112E 5/10/95 Non-Testable .. 93 205 g;ggig 3CHS*MV8100 5/7/95 Non-Testable E 133 133 g gggg.gg 3CHS*MV8104 8/28/93 High Margin LJC--- __ 134 111 G_T i _;_-

1 5/8/95 9/2/93 2556.6 2722 98 % 94 % l l 3CHS*MV8105 2556.6 l2597 l 3CHS*MV8106 9/10/93 9/2/93 2554.8 2554.8 2597 2722 98 % 04 %

5/4/95 2739 0 l 3CHS*MV8109A High Margin g]g + l 3CHS*MV8109B 5/11/95 High Margin Q$$k 2739 0

'l 3CHS*MV8109C 5/8/95 High Margin f."J4 f** 2739 0 High Margin Nk b 3CHS*MV8109D 5/2/95 2739 0

[h 3CHS*MV8110 9/8/93 9/3/93 2290.7 2290.7 l2673 2673 86 % 86 %

3CHS*MV8111 A 5/11/95 9/3/93 2317,1 2317,1 l2672 2672 87 % l 87 % l I 3CHS*MV8111B 8/26/93 9/3/93 2308 2308 l2672 2672 86 % l 86 % l 3CHS*MV8111C 8/23/93 9/4/93 2283.3 2283.3 l2672 2672 85 % l 85% l 3CHS*MV8112 5/3/95 Non-Testable gpwn%_m 133 133 mwdgsmjm;wa 3CHS*MV8116 9/3/93 9/2/93 2527.6 2527.6 l 790 2544 320 % l 99 % l 3CHS*MVB438A 9/9/93 9/2/93 2570.4 2563.6 l2534 0 101 % l N/A l 3CHS*MVB438B 8/26/93 9/2/93 2495 N/A l2534 0 98 % l N/A l 3CHS*MVB438C 8/31/93 9/3/93 2510 N/A 2534 0 99 % N/A 3CHS*MVB468A 3CHS*MV8468B 5/8/95 5/8/95 Non-Testable Non-Testable q$

ll 220 220 220 220 l

3CHS*MV8507A 5/1/95 Non-Testable j 146 216 <

3CHS*MV8507B 5/1/95 Non-Testable f 148 218 l 3CHS*MV8511 A 5/5/95 Non-Testable hi 2641 2619 l gm -m:m 3CHS*MV8511B 3CHS*MV8512A 5/4/95 5/7/95 Non-Testable i Non-Testable -

li

'- 419 2641 2619 2517 h h[ - - -

mm Jd

~~

[

~

3CHS*MV85128 4/29/95 Non-Testable gy 419 2517 ,;

3 CMS *MOV24 9/12/93 High Margin gj"" igggnTj@h] 34 27 W 3CVS*MOV25 9/7/93 High Margin ytpgMWfp6_ 19 0 4% _ _j ,

21

J I Millstone Unit 3 MOV Program October 6,1995 i

l Valve Number Static Dynamic Open Close Open Close % DB D/P: % DB D/P:

Test Test Test Test DB DB Open Close Date Date Pressure Pressure D/P D/P Test Test 3FWA*MOV35A 10/4/93 10/4/93 l 1482.5 l 1482.5 l 1516 1516 l 98 % l 98% l 3 RWA *MOV358 9/24/93 9/24/93 l 1495.8 l 1495.8 l1516 1516 l 99 % l 99% l 3FWA*MOV35C 9/25/93 9/28/93 l 1476.7 l 1476.7 l1516 1516 l 97 % l 97 % l 3FWA*MOV35D 9/22/93 9/18/93 1486.5 1486.5 1515 1516 98% 98%

31AS*MOV72 5/10/95 Non Testable 129 129 MW High Margin 0 39 3LMS*MOV408 W High Margin 0 39 MW High Margin 0 39 3LMS*MOV40D 5/2/95 High Margin 0 39 3 MSS *MOV17A 5/29/95 4/14/95 1020 1020 1185 210 86 % 486 %

3 MSS *MOV178 4/18/95 4/14/95 l 1070 l 1070 l1185 210 l 90 % l 510 % l 3 MSS *MOV17D 5/30/95 4/14/95 1020 1020 1185 210 86 % 486 % ,

Non-Testable 1185 1185 l 3 MSS *MOV18A 4/25/95 MW Non-Testable 1185 1185 l 3 MSS *MOV18C W Non-Testable 1185 1185 I I

Non-Testabl 185 118 3M g Non-Testable 1185 260 3 MSS *MOV74B 5/18/95 Non-Testable 1185 260 i Non-Testable 1185 260 g Non-Testa 1185 260 3OSS*MOV34A 4/27/95 Non-Testable 166 0 3OSS*MOV34B 4/27/95 Non-Testable jy 166 0 3RCS*MV8000A 5/10/95 Non-Testable 2485 2335 l 3RCS*MV8000B 5/11/95 yTestable -

I 2485 2335 3RCS*MV8098 8/17/93 H(n Margin 2523 0 3RHS*FCV610 8/29/93 High Margin 175 175 3RHS*FCV611 8/28/93 High Margin 175 175 ,

3RHS*MV8701A 5/19/95 Grouped g *

- - 2260 393 f_EHjMM 3RHS*MV8701B 5/12/95 4/15/95 ll 280.25 'l N/A ll 375 0 h 75 % ll N/A ill 3RHS*MV8702A 5/3/95 4/15/95 l 322 lj N/A ll 375 0 ll 86 % ll N/A I 3RHS*MV8702B 5/8/95 5/15/95 l 1500 l N/A l2260 393 l 66 % l N/A l 3RHS*MV8702C 5/22/95 5/15/95 l 1788.5 l N/A l1940 396 l 92 % l N/A l 3RHS*MV8716A 5/28/95 5/28/95 l 217.4 l 217.4 l 425 0 l 51 % l N/A l 3RHS*MV87168 5/22/95 5/22/95 256.7 256.7 425 0 60 % N/A 3RSS*MOV20A 4/18/95 Non-Tostable 261 261 ggdff]

3RSS*MOV20B 4/20/95 Non-Testabl 261 261 MpM.. U 3RSS*MOV20C 4/25/95 Non-Testable 261 261 fjf:f .

N 3RSS*MOV200 3RSS*MOV23A 4/26/95 5/25/95 Non-Testable Non-Testable p 261 48 261 49 gh f* J l 3RSS*MOV23B 5/25/95 Non-Testable 48 49 g b J. Q Q tJ 3RSS*MOV23C 5/25/95 Non-Testable [ 48 4 @ ft%

NWU#

3RSS*MOV23D 4/19/95 Non-Testable M E  :;)a_ _ 48 49 ._

3RSS*MOV38A 5/21/95 5/21/95 l 124 3 l 124.3 l 232 232 l 54 % l 54 % l 3RSS*MOV388 5/22/95 5/22/95 l 130 3 l 130.3 l 232 232 l 56 % l 56 % l 3RSS*MV8837A 5/27/95 5/27/95 l 237.3 l 237.3 l 250 0 l 95 % l N/A l 3RSS*MV8837B 5/22/95 5/22/95 241.6 241.6 250 0 97 % N/A 3RSS*MV8838A 9/1/93 Non-Testable 250 0 3RSS*MV8838B 9/3/93 Non-Testable 250 ,_.m , m..__,g 3SlH*MV8801A 9/4/93 9/3/93 l 2595.1 l 2593.1 l2759 707 l 94 % 367 % l 3SlH'MV8801B 8/27/93 9/3/93 l 2571.6 l 2561.6 l2759 707 l 93% 362 % l 22

1 Millstone Unit 3 MOV Program October 6,1995 1

Valve Number Static Dynamic Open Close Open Close % DB D/P: % DB D/P:

Test Test Test Test DB DB Open Close -

j Date Date Pressure Pressure D/P D/P Test Test 3SlH*MV8802A 8/14/93 9/2/93 1566.8 1566 8 1775 0 88 % N/A i 3SlH*MV88020 8/31/93 Grouped 775 0

! W Non-Testa 30 1

, MW Non-Testable 213 54 3SlH*MV88078 8/20/93 Non-Testable 213 54 1 3SlH'MV8813 8/19/93 9/2/93 1495 1495 1230 1230 123 % 122 %

i 3SlH*MV8814 8/15/93 9/2/93 l 1505 l 1505 l1230 1230l 122 % l 122 %

s 3SlH*MV8821A 8/14/93 9/2/93 l 1567 l 1567 l1775 1230l 88 % l 127 %

3SlH'MV88218 8/23/93 9/2/93 l 1567 l 1567 l1775 1230 l 88 % l 127%

3SlH*MV8835 8/31/93 9/2/93 l 1567 l 1567 l1775 1401 l 88 % l 112 %

, 3SlH*MV8920 5/27/95 5/13/95 742.6 742.6 1230 1230 60 % 60%

3SlH*MV8923A 8/15/93 Non-Testable 25 0

, 3SlH*MV8923B 8/29/93 Non-Testable 25 0 l MW Non-Testable 218 54 i MW Non-Testable 256 0 Non-Testable 256 0

)

. Non Testable 686 246 i 3SIL*MV8808B 5/6/95 Non-Testable 686 246 i MW Non-Testable 686 246 3SIL*MV8809A 5/21/95 5/21/95 226.8 226 8 375 163 60 % j 139 %

3SIL*MV88098 5/21/95 5/22/95 233.3 233.3 375 163 62 % 143% .

3SIL*MV8812A 8/15/93 Non-Testable 419 0 Non-Testable 419 0 .

i 3SIL*MV8840 8/30/93 High Margin 0 188 3SWP*MOV024A 5/14/95 Static Bounds 98 78 l 4 3SWP'MOV0248 5/2/95 Static Bounds 98 78 d

)

3SWP*MOV024C 3SWP*MOV024D 5/14/95 5/4/95 Static Bounds Static Bounds 98 98

'l 78

[

3SWP'MOV050A 5/17/95 5/17/95 48.3 48.3 93 93 52 % 52 % .

I 3SWP'MOV050B 4/28/95 4/23/95 ;l 49.3 ll 49.3 l! 93 93 1: 53 % O 53 %

3SWP*MOV0548 4/28/95 4/22/95 ll 64.1 ll 64.1 ll 94 94 il 68 % ll 68 %

3SWP'MOV054C 5/15/95 Grouped gwsm m,g_a 94 94 pgW.._ e..

3SWP*MOV054D 5/28/95 4/23/95 l 64.1 64.1 l 94 94 l 68 % l 68% l 3SWP*MOV057A 5/17/95 5/17/95 l 55.3 55.3 l 74 74 l 75 % l 75% l j 3SWP*MOV0578 4/28/95 4/23/95 l 64.1 64.1 l 74 74 l 87 % l 87% l j 3SWP*MOV057C 5/12/95 Grouped -jh. .  % _ 74 74 ggeg% wmi l 3SWP'MOV057D 4/28/95 4/23/95 l 64.1 64.1 l 74 74 l 87 % l 87 % l I 3SWP*MOV071 A 5/28/95 5/28/95 l 56 9 56.9 l 94 94 l 61 % l 61 % l l 3SWP*MOV071B 5/6/95 5/6/95 l 60.9 60.9 l 94 94 l 65% l 65% l 3SWP*MOV102A 5/13/95 5/7/95 l 92 N/A l 97 97 l 95 % l N/A l l 3SWP'MOV102B 4/29/95 4/23/95 N/A N/A 97 97 N/A N/A 3SWP'MOV102C 5/10/95 Grouped 97 97

3SWP'MOV102D 4/30/95 4/23/95 N/A N/A 97 97 N/A N/A 3SWP*MOV115A 5/13/95 Static Bounds 83 94 3SWP'MOV115B 5/4/95 Static Bounds 83 94 _ _ _ _

l i

l 23

Millstone Unit 3 MOV Program October 6,1995 The basis used for closure of each MOV is depicted in Table 8.

Table 8: Basis For Closure Valve Number Full or Group KEl Gate Large Rounded Non.

Partial With D/P (G) Calculated by Static Testable D/P Test Tested Butterfly Margin Test Globe Valves (B) Valve l 3CCP'MOV045A  %[f( G1 3CCP*MOV045B Partial 3CCP'MOV048A is( W 4 G1 (

3CCP*MOV048B Partial 3CCP*MOV049A i4 & G1 3CCP'MOV0498 Partial 3CCP*MOV222 G2 3CCP*MOV223 .

G2 3CCP'MOV224 G2 3CCP'MOV225 G2 3CCP*MOV226 Partial l l

~

3CCP*MOV227 Partial 3CCP*MOV228 Partial 3CCP*MOV229 Partial l 3CHS*LCV1128 '

G 3CHS*LCV112C l G ,

3CHS*LCV112D .

- -sa ... G 3CHS*LCV112E  ! jll G 3CHS*MV8100  ! I s X l

[Qgg'gglg ' ' ' :"j l{

3CHS*MV8104 ii X l 3CHS*MV8105 Partial ,

3CHS*MV8106 Partlal

, - = -e 3CHS*MV8109A 3CHS*MV8109B f

l d[ X X

~

i I j! ,

3CHS*MV8109C X f '

g .

3CHS*MV8109D ~

l X Q ij j j 3CHS*MV8110 Partial ,

l .

I 3CHS*MV8111 A Partial gf_1

= = = -

, i l

l [i 3CHS*MV8111B Partial r-

~

T  :

3CHS*MV8111C Partial gli in payin@jE P! l, lf mams "

3CHS*MV8112  :

i X 3CHS*MV8116 Partial l p 3CHS*MV8438A Partial s gg pma:

3CHS*MV8438B Partial T-

~

d<i '"

hk 3CHS*MV8438C Partial 3CHS*MV8468A SIEEEEE G L" '

3CHS*MV8468B 3CHS*MV8507A QP JQhj$ R G 0

3CHS*MV85078 -- -

G 3CHS*MV8511 A 3CHS*MV85118 6 y

j ([,g ,

ll' .

X X ,

3CHS*MV8512A ' l!

l X

3CHS*MV85128 i X E

3 CMS *MOV24 -

X '

~

3CVS*MOV25 .

  1. . -i$5 X 3FWA*MOV35A Partial i Ehhe m- - -wmew __ _f 3 A 5 a al 3FWA*MOV35D Partial

/ lllhh 555b 3LMS*MOV40C D'Mnsd $8 MEEIES iX

~

1 3LMS*MOV400 ($h ihh8!PWi%%l4!5 X :ms 1

24

Millstone Unit 3 MOV Program October 6,1993 l

' Vaive Aumber ' ' Group M'hf Gate La'rgo" Bounded ' Non-With D/P (G) Calculated by Static Testable ,

Tested Buttertly Margin Test Globe  !

, Valves ) Valve 3 MSS *MOV17A 3 MSS *MOV178 3 MSS *MOV17D 3 MSS *MOV18A _ G 3 MSS *MOV18B _

G 3 MSS *MOV18C G

3 MSS *MOV18D 3 MSS *MOV74A - X 3 MSS *MOV74B X 3 MSS *MOV74C X 4 3 MSS *MOV74D 3OSS*MOV34A G

3OSS*MOV34B G 3RCS*MV8000A -j G 3RCS*MV8000B 3RCS*MV8098 1 3RHS*FCV610 -

)

3RHS*FCV611 _ )'

3RHS*MV8701A G3 3RHS*MV8701B i

3RHS*MV8701C 3RHS*MV8702A 3RHS*MV8702B 3RHS*MVB702C 3RHS*MV8716A ~

3RHS*MV8716B ____

3RSS*MOV20A _; B 3RSS*MOV20B _EE!E B

, 3RSS*MOV20C --_1___

B 3RSS*MOV200 B 3RSS*MOV23A -es B i 3RSS*MOV23B S B 3RSS*MOV23C B 3RSS*MOV23D 5 B 3RSS*MOV38A 3RSS*MOV38B 3RSS*MV8837A 3RSS*MV8837B i 3RSS*MV8838A =E! G i 3RSS*MV8838B 3 G 3SlH*MV8801A ,

3SlH*MV8801B 3SlH*MV8802A 3SlH*MV8802B G4 3SlH*MV8806 -

G 3SlH*MV8807A G 3SlH*MV8807B 3SlH*MV8813 3SlH'MV8814 3SlH'MV8821A 3SlH*MV88218 -

3SlH*MV8835 -

3SlH*MV8920 G

3SlH*MV8923A 3SlH*MV8923B G 3SlH*MV8924 G j_

3SIL*MV8804A G 3SIL_*MV8804D ._

G -

25

Millstone Unit 3 MOV Program Octobcr 6,1995 Valve Number Full or Group KEl Gate Large Bounded Non-Partial With D/P (G) Calculated by Static Testable D!P Test Tested Butterfly Margin Test Globe Valves (B) Valve 3SIL*MV8808A G 3SIL*MV88088 G 3SIL*MV8808C 0 3SIL*MV8808D G 3SIL*MV8809A Partial

) 3SIL*MV8809B Partial 3SIL*MV8812A G a 3SIL*MV88128 G

! 3SIL*MV8840 X 3SWP*MOV024A X 3SWP*MOV024B X 3SWP*MOV024C X 3SWP'MOV024D X 3SWP'MOV050A Partial 3SWP*MOV0508 Partial 3SWP*MOV054A G6 3SWP*MOV054B Partial

' 3SWP*MOV054C G5 1 3SWP*MOV0540 Partial 3SWP*MOV057A Partial l 3SWP*MOV057B Partial 3SWP*MOV057C G5 3SWP*MOV057D Partial 3SWP*MOV071A Partial 3SWP*MOV071B Partla!

2 3SWP*MOV102A Partial j 3SWP*MOV1028 Partial

3SWP*MOV102C G6 3SWP*MOV102D Partial 3SWP*MOV115A X 3SWP*MOV1158 X X = Category Applicable P = Partial F = Full G1 = Grouped with 3CCP*MOV0458,0488,049B G2 = Grouped with 3CCP*MOV226,227,228,229 G3 = Grouped with 3RHS*MV8702B, C G4 = Grouped with 3SlH*MV8801 A,88018,8802A G5 = Grouped with 3SWP*MOV054B,054D,057A 057B,057D G6 = Grouped with 3SWP*MOV102A,102B,102D i

~

26

Millstone Unit 3 MOV Program October 6,1995

6. Sheron Memo Cross Reference Provided below is a quick cross reference of the section and page number for each of the items in the Sheron memo which required justification.

Table 9: Sheron Memo items - Cross Reference Section Page Sheron Memo item 10.5 38 Valve factor (including area assumption) 10.6 40 Stem fnction coefficient 11.3 48 Load sensitive behavior 10.8 44 Margins for stem lubrication degradation and springpack relaxation 10.3.1 36 Motor performance factors 11.2 48 Basis for extrapolation method of partial d/p thrust measurements 12.2.3 54 Torque switch repeatability 10.2 35 Use of Limitorque, Kalsl, or other sources for increasing thrust / torque allowab!e limits 12 51 Equipment error 11.4 50 Post-maintenance testing, especially valve packing adjustments 13 54 Grouping of MOVs 15 58 Trending of MOV problems

7. Valve Mispositioning Millstone Unit 3 has deferred consideration of valve mispositioning in our GL 89-10 program in accordance with guidance provided in NRR memo of July 12,1994 (the "Sheron memo").' The NRC staffis evaluating the request by the Westinghouse Owners' Group that the recommendation in GL 89-10 to consider valve mispositioning be removed. The NRC Staffis preparing a Supplement 7 to GL 89-10 on the need to consider valve mispositioning as part of GL 89-10 programs at Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) plants." If ongoing staff analyses provide adequate justification, the supplement will eliminate the recommendation for PWR licensees to consider valve mispositioning as part of their GL 89-10 programs.

During the time while the staffis preparing the proposed supplement to GL 89-10, the staff stated that a PWR licensee may defer consideration of valve mispositioning in its GL 89-10 program.'

Where a PWR licensee has completed its GL 8910 program with the exception of the consideration of valve mispositioning, the staff may close its review of the licensee's design-basis capability verification of MOV's within the GL 89-10 program provided the licensee commits to consider valve mispositioning if the staff determines that this recommendation in GL 89-10 remains appropriate.

Millstone Unit 3 committed in a memo'" dated June 16,1995, that they would consider valve mispositioning if the NRC Staff determines that the recommendation, to consider mispositioning, in GL 89-10 remains appropriate. Only two MOV's were removed from the program since they were in the program only to support mispositioning strokes: 3SWP*MOVl30A and 3SWP*MOV130B.

8. MOV Program Scope Criteria Program Instruction (PI)-1,"MOV Program Scope Determination," establishes the criteria for determining which MOV's are included in the MOV Program. PI l provides the methodology for 27

Millstone Unit 3 MOV Program October 6,1995 performing and documenting this process, and establishes the criteria to identify other MOV's in the balance of plant, commensurate with their importance to safety, to be included in the MOV Program.

In addition, it provides methods for determining the position-changeability of MOV's. Millstone Unit 3 has deferred consideration of valve mispositioning pending the results of the final NRC position on mispositioning.' The Millstone Unit 3 MOV Program scope is defined in the " Millstone Unit 3 MOV Program Scope Determination," Calculation 89-094 939ES, Revision 1, CCN 01, August 18,1995.

9. Design Basis Reviews PI-2,"MOV System and Functional Design Basis Review," defines the methodology and f requirements for performing system and design-basis reviews under the scope of GL 89-10. PI-2 l requires that the following key elements be identified:
1. All active safety-related functions for each MOV by reviewing all normal operating and abnormal valve line-ups.
2. The maximum bounding system parameters corresponding to each normal operating i and abnormal condition valve line-up, to include: j

. Line Pressure (Upstream and Downstream) llead differences due to elevation between the pump and the valve will, in general, be included in line pressure and differential pressure calculations (e.g. the pressure downstream of a pump during flowing conditions should be assumed to be equal to the pump discharge pressure plus any elevation difference). This assumption does not preclude the incorporation of  :

dynamic piping losses in future analyses as a means ofjustifying reduced l line pressure or differential pressure. l l

l Equation 1: P,,,,_ u,_,_ = P_, + H,,,,,,,, t H,,,,w 1

I Source Pressure (Psowee) can include any combination of the following:

. reactor coolant system pressure

. inter-connecting fluid system pressure )

. tank pressure

. atmospheric pressure

. containment pressure

. pressure contained in sections of pipe that could be pressurized; sources such as leakage past other valves or thermal expansion of the fluid.

. safety valve set point; nominal set pressure should be used for consistency. Use of set pressure tolerance is not required.

28 l

Millstone Unit 3 MOV Program October 6,1995 Pump Head (lipump) is the available head of any operating pump at the appropriate now rate converted to psig by an appropriate conversion factor.

If the subject valve's close stroke reduces the source pump flow rate to zero under its design basis conditions, then the Pump IIead is the Shutoff Head at the valve's full closed position. The nominal or design pump head curve should be used for the calculation of pump head.

Elevation Head (Hei,y.iion) results from elevation differences between the valve elevation and any higher or lower elevation of piping / components /

tank water levels, etc., converted to psig by an appropriate conversion factor.

. Maximum Line Pressure Maximum Line Pressure is the greater of the upstream and downstream line pressures.

. Differential Pressure The maximum differential pressure (psid) exists when the valve is in its fully closed position. Throttling valves are assumed to fully close in order to obtain a bounding differential pressure.

. Process Fluid Temperature and Flow Process fluid temperature and now values shall be determined and correspond to the highest postulated temperature and flow for the line pressure / differential pressure case listed.

. Flow Direction (forward and reverse) i The flow direction shall be determined for each MOV operation. In general, i the normal flow direction for the valve will establish the upstream and downstream side of the valve.

. Ambient Environment Temperature The ambient environment temperature shall be determined for each MOV (i.e. normal operation temperature, accident and post-accident conditions).

For post accident conditions, the ambient temperature based on the EEQ Profile should be used.

. Degraded Voltage at Design Basis Conditions The effects of degraded voltage at design-basis conditions on MOV performance shall be determined in accordance with PI-4, "AC and DC Motor Terminal Voltage Evaluation."

. Process Fluid and Phase The process fluid conditions (water, steam or two-phase) shall be determined for each identified MOV operation.

3. The maximum cases for both open and close operations.

29

Millstone Unit 3 MOV Program October 6,1995 i

The Millstone Unit 3 MOV Program design-basis review is contained in the Design Basis Review Calculations which are listed in Table 10. Also provided in Table 10 is a listing of the Electrical Calculations, Weak Link Calculations, and Target Thrust Calculations for each MOV. The information in the table is presented to demonstrate design-basis closure. Future changes will be controlled by existing NU procedures.

Table 10: Calculation Listing Valve Number DBR Rev Electrical Rev Weak Link Rev Target Thrust Rev 3CCP*MOV045A NUC-035 01 89-094-119E3 00 94103-C-01 00 89-094-1070M3 00 3CCP*MOV0458 NUC-035 01 89-094-119E3 00 94103-C-01 00 89-094-1070M3 00 3CCP*MOV048A NUC-044 01 89-094-119E3 00 94103-C-01 00 89-094-1026ES 00 3CCP'MOV048B NUC-044 01 89-094-119E3 00 94103-C-01 00 89-094-1026ES 00 3CCP*MOV049A NUC-047 01 89 /4 .19E3 00 94103-C-01 00 89-094-1071M3 00 3CCP*MOV049B NUC-047 01 f- '

119E3 00 94103-C-01 00 89-094-1071 M3 00 3CCP*MOV222 N UC-048 01 8'9'694-119E3 00 94103-C-02 00 89-094-1031ES 00 3CCP*MOV223 NUC-048 01 89-094-119E3 00 94103-C-02 00 89-094-1031 ES 00 3CCP*MOV224 NUC-048 01 89-094-119E3 00 94103-C-02 00 89-094-1032ES 00 3CCP*MOV225 NUC-048 01 89-094-119E3 00 94103-C-02 00 89-094-1032ES 00  :

3CCP*MOV226 NUC-048 89-094-119E3 00 94103-C-02 00 00 '

01 89-094-1031ES 3CCP'MOV227 NUC-048 01 89-094-119E3 00 94103-C-02 00 89-094-1031 ES 00 3CCP*MOV228 NUC-048 01 89-094-119E3 00 94103-C-02 00 89-094-1032ES 00 3CCP'MOV229 NUC-048 01 89-094-119E3 00 94103-C-02 00 89-094-1032ES 00 3CHS*LCV1128 89-094-0896ES 00 89-094-112E3 00 94103-C-12 00 89-094-0897ES 02 3CHS*LCV112C 89-094-0896ES 00 89-094-112E3 00 94103-C-12 00 89-094-0897ES 02 3CHS*LCV112D NUC-039 00 89-094-115E3 00 94103-C-03 02 89-094-0993ES 01 3CHS*LCV112E NUC-039 00 89-094-115E3 00 94103-C-03 02 89-094-0993ES 01 3CHS*MV8100 NUC-025 00 89-094-123E3 00 94103-C-05 01 89-094-0983ES 01 3CHS*MV8104 NUC-033 00 89-094-332E3 00 94103-C-05 01 89-094-0995ES 01 3CHS*MV8105 N UC-043 00 89-094-113E3 00 94103-C-13 01 89-094-0886ES 02 3CHS*MV8106 NUC-043 00 89-094-113E3 00 94103-C-13 01 89-094-0886ES 02 3CHS*MV8109A NUC-030 00 89-094-123E3 00 94103-C-05 01 89-094-1072M3 01 3CHS*MV8109B NUC-030 00 89-094-123E3 00 94103-C-05 01 89-094-1072M3 01 3CHS*MV8109C NUC-030 00 89-094-123E3 00 94103-C-05 01 89-094-1072M3 01 3CHS*MV8109D NUC-030 00 89-094-123E3 00 94103-C-05 01 89-094-1072M3 01 3CHS*MV8110 W 3-042 00 89-094-128E3 00 94103-C-41 00 89-094-1006ES 01 3CHS*MV8111 A ~ 'N M -042 00 89 094-128E3 00 94103-C-41 00 89-094-1006ES 01 3CHS*MV8111B flIJO-042 00 89-094-128E3 00 94103-C-06 00 89-094-1006ES 01 3CHS*MV8111C TOC-042 00 89-094-128E3 00 94103-C-06 00 89-094-1006ES 01 3CHS*MV8112 NUC-025 00 89-094-123E3 00 94103-C-05 01 89-094-0983ES 01 3CHS*MV8116 NUC-036 00 89-094-123E3 00 94103-C-18 01 89-094-0986ES 01 3CHS*MV8438A NUC-029 01 89-094-128E3 00 94103-C-33 00 89-094-0985ES 01 3CHS*MV84388 N UC-029 01 89-094-128E3 00 94103-C-33 00 89-094-0985ES 01 3CHS*MVB438C NUC-029 01 89-094-128E3 00 94103-C-33 00 89-094-0985ES 01 3CHS*MV8468A NUC-029 01 89-094-115E3 00 94103-C-35 00 89-094-0984ES 01 3CHS*MVB468B NUC-029 01 89-094-115E3 00 94103-C-35 00 89-094-0984 ES 01 3CHS*MV8507A NUC-034 00 89-094-123E3 00 94103-C-34 00 89-094-0989ES 01 3CHS*MV8507B NUC-034 00 89-094-116E3 00 94103-C-34 00 89-094-0989ES 01 3CHS*MV8511 A NUC-051 00 89-094-123E3 00 94103-C-38 00 89-094-0990ES 02 3CHS*MV8511B NUC-051 00 89-094123E3 00 94103-C-38 00 89-094-0990ES 02 3CHS*MV8512A NUC-051 00 89-094-123E3 00 94103-C-38 00 89-094-0990ES 02 3CHS*MVB512B NUC-051 00 89-094-123E3 00 94103-C-38 3 CMS *MOV24 89-094-1004ES 00 89-094-124E3 00 94103-C-07 00 01 89-094-0990ES 89-094-1013ES U1 3CVS*MOV25 89-094-0982ES 00 89-094-124E3 00 94103-C-05 01 89-094-0863ES 02 3FWA*MOV35A 89-094-0962ES 00 89-094-113E3 00 94103 4-08 00 89-094-0885ES 03 3FWA*MOV358 89-094-0962ES 00 89-094-113E3 00 94103-C-08 00 89-094-0885ES 03 3FWA*MOV35C 89-094-0962ES 00 89-094-113E3 00 94103-C-08 00 89-094-0885ES 03 1

30

l l

l Millstone Unit 3 MOV Program October 6,1995 l

i Valve Number DBR Rev Electrical Rev Weak Link Rev Target Thrust Rev ,

3FWA*MOV35D 89-094-0%2ES 00 89-094-113E3 00 94103-C-08 00 89-094-0885ES 03 3lAS*MOV72 89-094-09%ES 00 89-094-127E3 00 94103-C-05 91 89-094-0946ES 02 l 3LMS*MOV40A 89-0941021M3 00 89-094-127E3 00 94103-C-14 00 89-094-1059M3 00 3LMS*MOV40B 89-094-1021M3 00 89-094-127E3 00 94103-C-14 00 89-094-1059M3 00 3LMS*MOV40C 89-094-1021M3 00 89-094-127E3 00 94103-C-14 00 89-094-1059M3 00 3LMS*MOV40D 89-094-1021 M3 00 89-094-127E3 00 94103-C-14 00 89-094-1059M3 00 3 MSS *MOV17A 89-094-0977ES 00 u9-094-126E3 00 94103-C-09 01 89-094-1016ES 01 3 MSS *MOV17B 89-094-0977ES 00 89-094-126E3 00 94103-C-09 01 89-094-1016ES 01 3 MSS *MOV17D 89-094-0977ES 00 89-094-126E3 00 94103-C-09 01 89-094-1016ES 01 3MS.PMOV18A 89-094-0977ES 00 89-094-126E3 00 94103-C-10 01 89-094-1015ES 02 3 MSS *MOV18B 89-094-0977ES 00 89-094-126E3 00 94103-C-10 01 89-094-1015ES 02 j 3 MSS *MOV18C 89-094-0977ES 00 89-094-126E3 00 94103-C-10 01 89-094-1015ES 02 3 MSS *MOV18D 89-094-0977ES 00 89-094-126E3 00 94103 & 10 01 89-094-1015ES 02 3 MSS *MOV74A 89-094-0977ES 00 89-094-115E3 00 94103 & 15 00 89-094-1018ES 01 3 MSS *MOV74B 89-094-0977ES 00 89-094-115E3 00 94103-C-15 00 89-094-1018ES 01

]

3 MSS *MOV74C 89-094-0977ES 00 89-094-115E3 00 94103-C-15 00 89-094-1018ES 01 3 MSS *MOV74D 89-094-0977ES 00 89-094-115E3 00 94103-C-15 00 89-094-1018ES 01 30SS*MOV34A NUC-041 00 89-094-120E3 00 94103-C-40 01 89-094-1027ES 00 l 30SS*MOV348 NUC-041 00 89-094-120E3 00 94103-C-40 01 89-094-1027ES 00 3RCS*MV8000A NUC-040 00 89-094-113E3 00 94103-C-04 01 89-094-0887ES 02 3RCS*MV80008 NUC-040 00 89-094-113E3 00 94103-C-04 01 89-094-0887ES 02 3RCS*MV8098 NUC-045 00 89-094-116E3 00 94103 C-18 01 89-094-1001ES 01 3RHS*FCV610 89-094-0956ES 00 89-094-332E3 00 94103-C-05 01 89-094-1009ES 01 3RHS*FCV611 89-094-0956ES 00 89-094-332E3 00 94103-C-05 01 89-094-1009ES 01 32HS*MV8701A 89-094-0956ES 00 89-094-116E3 00 94103 & 36 01 89-094-1005ES 01 3RHS*MV8701B 89-094-0956ES 00 89-094-117E3 00 94103-C-19 00 89-004-1000ES 02 3RHS*MV8701C 89-094-0956ES 00 89-094-116E3 00 94103-C-36 01 89-094-1005ES 01 3RHS*MV8702A 89-094-0956ES 00 89-094-117E3 00 94103-C-19 00 89-094-1000ES 02 3RHS*MV87028 89-094-0956ES 00 89-094-116E3 00 94103-C-36 01 89-094-1005ES 01 3RHS*MV8702C 89-094-0956ES 00 89-094-116E3 00 94103-C-36 01 89-094-1005ES C1 3RHS*MV8716A 89-094-0956ES 00 89-094-116E3 00 94103-C-20 00 89-094-1011ES 01 3RHS*MV8716B 89-094-0956ES 00 89-094-116E3 00 94103-C-20 00 89-094-1011ES 01 3RSS*MOV20A NUC-028 00 89-094-120E3 00 94103-C-21 01 89-094-1030ES 00 3RSS*MOV20E, NUC-028 00 89-094-120E3 00 94103-C-21 01 89-094-1030ES 00 3RSS*MOV20C NUC-028 00 89-094-120E3 00 94103& 21 01 89-094-1030ES 00 3RSS*MOV20D NUC-028 00 89-094-120E3 00 94103-C-21 01 89-094-1030ES 00 3RSS*MOV23A NUC-031 00 89-094-120E3 00 94103-C-16 00 89-094-1028ES 00 3RSS*MOV23B NUC-031 00 89-094-120E3 00 94103-C-16 00 89-094-1028ES 00 3RSS*MOV23C NUC-031 00 89-094-120E3 00 94103-C-16 00 89-094-1028ES 00 3RSS*MOV23D NUC-031 00 89-094-120E3 00 94103-C-16 00 89-094-1028ES 00 3RSS*MOV38A NUC-038 00 89-094-117E3 00 94103-C-22 00 89-094-0987ES 01 3RSS*MOV38B NUC-038 00 89-094-117E3 00 94103-C-22 00 89-094-0987ES 01 3RSS*MV8837A NUC-026 00 89-094-332E3 00 94103-C-24 00 89-094-0899ES 03 3RSS*MV8837B NUC-026 00 89-094-332E3 00 94103-C-24 00 89-094-0899ES 03 3RSS*MV8838A NUC-026 00 89-094-112E3 00 94103-C-24 00 89-094-0899ES 03 3RSS*MV8838B NUC-026 00 89-094-112E3 00 94103-C-24 00 89-094-0899ES 03 3SlH*MV8801A 89-094-0964ES 00 89-094-128E3 00 94103-C-39 01 89-094-1007ES 01 3SlH*MV8801B 89-094-0964ES 00 89-094-124E3 00 94103-C-39 01 89-094-1007ES 01 3SlH'MV8802A 69-094-0964ES 00 89-094-128E3 00 94103-C-39 01 ,89-094-1008ES 01 3SlH*MV8802B 89-094-0964ES 00 89-094-128E3 00 94103-C-39 01  %-094-1008ES 01 3SlH'MV8806 89-094-0964ES 00 89-094-128E3 00 94103-C-31 01 89-094-1019ES 02 3SlH*MV8807A 89-094-0964ES 00 89-094-112E3 00 94103-C-17 01 89-094-0898ES 02 3SlH'MV8807B 89-094-0964ES 00 89-094-112E3 00 94103-C-17 01 89-094-0898ES 02 3SlH*MVB813 89-094-0964ES 00 89-094-128E3 00 94103-C-23 00 89-094-0991 ES 01 3SlH*MV8814 89-094-0964ES 00 89-094-128E3 00 94103-C-14 00 89-094-0999ES 01 3SlH*MV8821A 89-094-0964ES 00 89-094-118E3 00 94103-C-32 00 89-094-0997ES 02 3SlH*MV88218 89-094-0964ES 00 89-094-118E3 00 94103-C-32 00 89-094-0997ES 02 31

Millstone Unit 3 MOV Program October 6,1995 Valve Number DBR Rev Electrical Rev Weak Link Rev Target Thrust Rev 3SlH*MV8835 89-094-0964ES 00 89-094-128E3 00 94103-C-39 01 89-094-1010ES 01 3SlH*MV8920 89-094-0964ES 00 89-094-124E3 00 94103-C 14 00 89-094-0999ES 01 3SlH*MV8923A 89-094-0964 ES 00 89-094-124E3 00 94103-C-17 01 89-094-1002ES 01 l

3SIF*MV8923B 89-094-0964ES 00 89-094-118E3 00 94103-C-17 01 89-094-1002ES 01 3SlH'MV8924 89-094-0964ES 00 89-094-124E3 00 94103-C-17 01 89-094-1003ES 01 3SIL*MV88GiA 89-094-0972ES 00 89-094-112E3 00 94103-C-24 00 89-094-0900ES 03 3SIL*MV88048 89-094-0972ES 00 89-094-112E3 00 94103-C-24 00 89-094-0900ES 03 3SIL*MV8808A 89-094-0972ES 00 89-094-118E3 00 94103-C-37 00 89-094-1017ES 02 3SIL*MV8808B 89-094-0972ES 00 89-094-118E3 00 94103-C-37 00 89-094-1017ES 02 3SIL*MV8808C 89-094-0972ES 00 89-094-118E3 00 94103-C-37 00 89-094-1017ES 02

3SIL*MV8808D 89-094-0972ES 00 89-094-118E3 00 94103-C-37 00 89-094-1017ES 02 3SIL*MV8809A 89-094-0972ES 00 89-094-116E3 00 94103-C-11 01 89 094-1012ES 02 3SIL*MV8809B 89-094-0972ES 00 89-094-116E3 00 94103-C-11 01 89-094-1012ES 02 l

3SIL*MV8812A 89-094-0972ES 00 89-094-118E3 00 94103-C-25 02 89-094-0992ES 01 1 I

3SIL*MV8812B 89-094-0972ES 00 89-094-118E3 00 94103-C-25 02 89-094-0992ES 01 3SIL*MV8840 89-094-0972ES 00 89-094-125E3 00 94103-C-26 00 89-094-0998ES 01 3SWP*MOV024A NUC-049 01 89-094-121E3 00 94103-C-27 01 89-094-1073M3 00 3SWP*MOV024B NUC-049 01 89-094-121 E3 00 94103-C-27 01 89-094-1073M3 00 3SWP'MOV024C NUC-049 01 89-094-121 E3 00 94103-C-27 01 89-094-1073M3 00 i 3SWP*MOV024D NUC-049 01 89-094-121E3 00 94103-C-27 01 89-094-1073M3 00 l 3SWP'MOV050A NUC-052 00 89-094-121 E3 00 94103-C-28 01 89-094-1029ES 00 i 3SWP*MOV050B NUC-052 00 89-094-121 E3 00 94103-C-28 01 89-094-1029ES 00 3SWP*MOV054A NUC-062 00 89-094-121 E3 00 94103-C-29 00 89-094-1074M3 00 3SWP*MOV054B NUC-062 00 89-094-121 E3 00 94103-C-29 00 89-094-1074M3 00 3SWP*MOV054C NUC-062 00 89-094-121 E3 00 94103-C-29 00 89-094-1074M3 00 3SWP*MOV054D NUC-062 00 89-094-121E3 00 94103-C-29 00 89-094-1074M3 00 3SWP*MOV057A NUC-062 00 89-094-121E3 00 94103-C-29 00 89-094-1075M3 00

< 3SWP*MOV057B NUC-062 00 89-094-121 E3 00 94103-C-29 00 69-094-1075M3 00 3SWP*MOV057C NUC-%2 00 89-094-121E3 00 94103-C-29 00 89-094-1075M3 00 4 3SWP*MOV057D NUC-062 00 89-094-121 E3 00 94103-C-29 00 89-0941075M3 00 3SWP*MOV071 A NUC-054 00 89-094-122E3 00 94103-C-30 00 89-094-1076M3 00 3SWP'MOV071B NUC-054 00 89-094-122E3 00 94103-C-30 00 89-094-1076M3 00 3SWP*MOV102A NUC-053 00 89-094-122E3 00 94103-C-42 00 89-094-1069M3 01 3SWP MOV102B NUC-053 00 89-094-122E3 00 94103-C-42 00 89-094-1069M3 01 3SWP*MOV102C NUC-053 00 89-094-122E3 00 94103-C-42 00 89-094-1069M3 01 3SWP'MOV102D NUC-053 00 89-094-122E3 00 94103-C-42 00 89-094-1069M3 01 3SWP*MOV115A NUC-064 00 89-094-122E3 00 94103-C-27 01 89-094-1077M3 00 3SWP'MOV115B NUC-064 00 89-094-122E3 00 94103-C-27 01 89-094-1077M3 00

10. MOV Sizing and Switch Settings 10.1 Valve Weak Link Analysis NU has performed weak link analyses for all MOV's in the GL 89-10 Program. The weak link analyses have determined the thrust or torque structural capacity of each component involved in supporting the MOV opening and closing strokes.

These analyses evaluated all structural components of each MOV which typically included the valve body, bonnet, yoke, stem, disk and appropriate flanges including bolted interfaces as a minimum.

The allowable thrust or torque capacity of each MOV was developed using the valve vendor's weak link analysis which have been independently reviewed and in most cases supplemented by Altran Corporation of Boston, MA. Completion of the weak link analysis results in identification of the 32

i

! Millstons Unit 3 MOV Program October 6,1995 weakest component of the MOV as well as the limiting thrust or torque load which could be accommodated by the valve for the given conditions.

The formulae employed in the weak link analyses are those traditionally used for determining stress )

and consider the appropriate temperatures and pressures along with other plant specific design loads j l applied as required. The weak link evaluation and acceptance criteria are governed by a detailed and i rigorous program instruction entitled, PI-3,"MOV Structural Evaluation". PI-3 criteria were based on the original valve design requirements as specified in the plant final safety analysis report, i original construction valve specifications and subsequent plant licensing items, such as the SEP and {

' GL 89-10. j With the exception of Millstone Unit 3, the original design code requirements were not stress (i.e.,

thrust) based criteria. The lack of thrust based limits would have precluded comparison with as-left and design-basis thrust values. With the exception of the valve actuator and stem nut, pressure and non-pressure boundary components of valves wue evaluated to Section III of the ASME B&PV '

Code in accordance with PI-3 instructions. 'ihis in effect constituted a voluntary Backfit for Haddam l

Neck, Millstone Unit 1, and Millstone Unit 2.

l Once the allowable stress was identified, the maximum thrust capacity of each structural element was solved for and tabulated in the weak link analysis. Additional thrust or torque limits were also j developed which defined the threshold that, if exceeded during testing / set-up, would require 1 engineering evaluation through more refined analysis techniques for potential corrective actions including inspection and / or replacement of weak link parts, included in the weak link analyses described above, NU has also evaluated the structural effects of motor actuator stall loads on the pressure boundary parts of MOV's for actuators which have been modified such that the resultant thrust output of the actuator at stall has been significantly increased." Part of the structural limits developed in the weak link analyses have included allowable thrust or torque under motor actuator stall conditions.

The purpose of this additional evaluation was to ensure the resultant increase in stall thrust output of the modified actuator would not introduce a malfunction of the MOV different than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report. The analysis compared the thrust or torque output at stall to the MOV's pressure boundary structural capacity and confirmed the valve's pressure boundary integrity was maintained. NU believes this analysis provided assurance that if a modified actuator developed stall thrust, the pressure boundary of the MOV would not be breached.

Conformance to the ASME B&PV Code allowable stress criteria and PI 3 requirements as well as meeting the analytical and testing acceptance criterion of all other applicable Project Instructions in NU's MOV Program Manual have confirmed both the integrity of the pressure boundary as well as the functionality of the MOV.

10.1.1 Load Cases and Combinations The valve components were evaluated for the following loading combinations for the valve opening and closing directions. Loads due to pressure, deadweight, seismic, other occasional loads (such as water hammer, blowdown and other hydrodynamic loads, if applicable), and thrust / torque were included in the weak link analysis.

33

Millstone Unit 3 MOV Program October 6,1995

~

10.1.1.1 As-Left Load Combinations (Design Basis)

Table i1: As-Left Load Combination (Design Basis) l Condition Load Combination Normal Pa + DW + Thrust / Torque OBE Pa + OBE + DW + Thrust / Torque l Pa + SSE + DW + Thrust / Torque I SSE where: i DW = Loads due to dead weight of the valve components including the operator.

Pa = Loads due to the maximum pressure of: design, operating, design accident or a valve mispositioning event (as applicable) per GL 89-10.

OBE = Loads due to the operating basis earthquake. i SSE = Loads due to the safe shutdown earthquake.

Thruv/ = Operational loads due to simultaneous seating stem thrust and torque loads Torque acting on the valve components. For purposes of this evaluation the l torque shall be taken as the stem thrust load times the stem factor.

10.1.1.2 Non-As-Left Load Combinations The valve components are also evaluated for the following MOV Program test (i.e., set-up) conditions for the appropriate valve direction (opening, closing).

l Table 12: Non-As-Left Load Combinations i

Conattion Load Combination Static Test: DW + P, + Thrust / Torque Dynamic Test: DW + P, + Thrust / Torque where:

4 DW and Thrust /forque as defined above Pi = Loads due to actual operating line / dynamic pressure during valve test.

10.1.1.3 Stall Load Combination For MOV's which needed to be evaluated for stall in accordance with NU's position on stall evaluations discussed above or, when the valve had been stroked in a manner which resulted in a stall event, the valve components were evaluated for the following motor stall conditions for the appropriate valve direction.

I Table 13: StallLoad Combination Condition Load Combination Stall: DW + P, + Thrust / Torque where:

DW and P. as defined above Thrust /rorque = Stall load as determined in accordance with Appendix E of PI-3.

4 34

l Millstone Unit 3 MOV Program October 6,1995 10.1.2 Use of EPRI MOV Stem Thrust Prediction Method for Westinghouse Flexible Wedge Gate Valves, TR-103233 - Draft - December 1994 Westinghouse Dexible wedge gate valves employ a unique stem-to-disk assembly and disc guiderail design. Due to this unique design, during high differential pressure closing strokes, the disk is free to translate relative to the stem in a direction parallel to Huid now. Under these conditions the translation of the disk imparts an added bending moment on the stem which has the potential of being signincant and reduces the structural capacity of the valve stem in the closed stroke direction.

Kalsi Engineering has developed a draft methodology for EPRI (TR-103233) which evaluates the effects on the stress in the valve rtem resultant from this added bending moment. Recognize that the reduction in valve stem closing allowable thrust could potentially affect the function of these Westinghouse Hexible wedge gate valves . NU acted pro-actively, employing an as yet unpublished methodology in addition to our traditional analyses per PI-3. There are no MOV's in the MP3 MOV Program which meet the criteria of this valve design in conjunction with a design basis requirement I to close under high differential pressure conditions.

10.2 Valve Operator Limits Similar to the " weak link" analysis for the valve, the operator's manufacturer (i.e., Limitorque) established limiting operating parameters for the operator. Situations occurred across the industry where the operator's limits would not allow attainment of the forces required to ensure the associated valve's operation under design-basis conditions. Thus, several utilities combined resources to fund a study by Kalsi Engineering tojustify increasing the published limits.

Northeast Utilities became an active participant in the Limitorque Phase I and II Overload Testing Program being conducted by Kalsi Engineering, Inc. The Phase I portion of this program provided ,

1 the necessary testing and analysis to substantially increase the published thrust rating for Limitorque operator sizes SMB-000 through 1. The thrust rating for each size operator was increased to 162%

of the published thrust rating for 2000 cycles or 200% of the published rating for 763 cycles. This report was reviewed and approved by the NU MOV Engineering group for use at Millstone Unit 3.

Applicable Target Thrust Calculations incorporate the Limitorque Technical Update 92-01 (use of 140% thrust rating). On a case basis, Kalsi reports are also utilized, as appropriate, in accordance with PI-9," Determination of Stem Thrust Requirements".

As an extension to the Phase I thrust overload test results, the Phase 11 program was initiated in March 1992 to qualify the SMB-2 and the SB-000 through 2 operator design to larger thrust ratings.

In addition, the torque carrying capabilities of the H0BC and the SMB-000 through SMB-2 operators were chosen for further study. The results provide ndditional margin and extend the results of the Phase I study to a broader population of motor operated valves at Millstone Unit 3. We also have the software for determining fatigue life for greater than rated torque.

We have extended the rating of SB operators based on Kalsi Engineering's Phase 11 report," Thrust Rating increase of Limitorque SB-00 Through SB-2 Spring Compensator Assemblies and SB-00 Through SB-1 Operators " Document No.1799C, Rev. O, October 7,1994. On January 30,1995, Limitorque issued a letter to Kalsi Engineering concurring with the conclusions of the Kalsi Phase II Report.

35

Millstone Unit 3 MOV Program October 6,1995 10.3 Electrical Calculations were performed to determine the motor-operated valve minimum terminal voltage using

' locked rotor current and to use the appropriate Limitorque operator factors and design thrust values in the Limitorque sizing equations to determine correct operstor motor sizing.

For alternating current (AC) MOV's, a motor control center (MCC) voltage corresponding to the minimum degraded bus voltage was used to supply the motor-operated valve feeder cables. This degraded voltage was based on load flow calculations assuming a hypothetical minimum switchyard grid voltage and accident (LOCA) bus loadings in accordance with PI-4,"AC and DC Motor Terminal Voltage Evaluation."

The cable voltage drop is developed using a constant impedance motor model for a given ambient temperature (90'C). The model was developed from the locked rotor current and the nameplate voltage, in response to Limitorque Part 21, Reliance actuator motors were derated due to ambient operating temperature in accordance with PI-4. Additionally, Millstone Unit 3 calculations applied this derate to the five actuators with non-Reliance motors in accordance with recent non-Reliance motor studies.i2 For valves located in areas where the maximum design basis accident (DBA) temperatcre exceeded 40 C, the derating was applied to the starting current for that valve motor at the maximum DBA temperature. The derate accounts for the resistive rise in the motor at elevated temperatures.

The cable size, cable lengths, and thermal overload and magnetic coil resistances were obtained for all of the listed 460V AC motor operated valves. Power factors for locked rotor torque conditions were obtained from Limitorque. The cables were derated to elevated temperatures, and the cable voltage drop / motor terminal voltage was calculated for each MOV. These motor terminal voltages were then used to determine appropriate motor sizing using the Limitorque sizing equation.

1 10.3.1 Motor Performance Factors Defined below are the values used for various motor performance factors:

. Motor rating We use 100 percent of nameplate rating for the motor.

. Emciencies used in open and close directions The source for open and close emeiencies is the Limitorque Sizing and Selection Procedure dated November 9,1990. For AC motors we use pullout efficiency in the open direction, running efficiency in the closed direction, and stall efficiency for stall calculations. For DC motors we use pullout efficiency in both the open and closed direction. Millstone Unit 3 does not have any DC motor MOV's in the GL 89-10 program.

. Application factor We use an application factor of 1.0 to determine motor capability for target thrust / torque calculations.

. Power factor used in degraded voltage calculations PI-4,"AC and DC Motor Terminal Voltage Evaluation," requires the use of the power factor supplied by the motor operator manufacturers for the 36

Millstone Unit 3 MOV Program October 6,1995 specific motor at Locked Rotor Current. If the value is not available from the manufacturer, we assume a 0.8 power factor.

10.3.2 Effects of Design-Basis Degraded Voltage on MOV Performance PI-4,"AC and DC Motor Terminal Voltage Evaluation," provides instructions for performing minimal terminal voltage evaluations for AC and DC powered MOV's. This evaluation provides direct input to the motor derate output torque evaluation which is then input to PI-9," Determination of Stem Thrust Requirements," for evaluating the effects of degraded voltage at design-basis conditions.

PI-4 uses locked rotor current at degraded voltage conditions to determine motor terminal voltage.

Because this is beyond the current licensing basis of the Millstone Unit 3 and Millstone nuclear units, when operability issues arise,(e.g., when inadequate motor terminal voltage is predicted during the course of a degraded voltage calculation), additional MOV specific calculations will be performed with less restrictive assumptions (e.g., use of starting current).

10.4 Design Thrust The following equation is used for design set-up with gate and globe valves.

Equation 2: Design Thrust = (DPx Asurx VF) + PL PE DP = Differential Pressure for the open or close stroke.

2 Asrwr = valve seat area = (3.14159'D ) / 4, where D is the mean seat diameter that most closely reflects the contact surface at the seat to disc interface. For plug-in-cage globe valves with piston / guide rings on the plug, the guide rings determine the Dparea rather than the seating diameter.

VF = Refer to Table 14 for the valve factor selection criteria for gate valves.

= 1.1 for globe valves.

PL = Packing Loads are assumed as follows:

Packing Load Valve Stem Diameter 1000 lb. s 1.0 in.

1500 lb. > 1.0 in. s_1.5 in.

2500 lb. > 1.5 in. 5 2.5 in.

4000 lb. > 2.5 in. $ 4.0 in.

5000 lb. > 4.0 in.

PE = Piston Effect (PE) is calculated as follows:

(1) Gate Valve: PE = Valve Stem Area x Line Pressure (LP)

(2) Globe Valve: PE = Valve Stem Area x (LP - DP)

Post set-up, static and dynamic testing valve factors, packing loads, and rate ofloading (ROL) values are revised appropriately, if measured values exceed design set-up values.

37

l Millstone Unit 3 MOV Program October 6,1995 10.5 Valve Factor NU's technical position on gate valve, valve factors (Vf's) reflects the "best available knowledge."

- Actions taken by NU in response to the November 30,1993, NRC Information Notice," addressing valve factor data, are contained in a memo" in the MOV Program Manual. The MOV Program Manual provides the criteria used to choose Vf for gate valves in the GL 89-10 program for  ;

operability, design set-up and for GL 89-10 closure.

"Best available data" was derived from quality assurance (QA) reviewed EPRI Performance Prediction Program (PPP) valve test results,' other industry testing, and guidance contained in Reference 16. EPRI results confirm 1.1 is an appropriate value for globe valve design set-up.

However, evaluation of this information prompted the adoption of increased valve factors for gate valves in many cases. Prior to this change NU had used vendor supplied valve factors or had assumed a 0.3 Vf for gate valves. A comparison ofNU GL 89-10 MOV's was made to the valves tested in the EPRI program. The results of this comparison" revealed no matches between EPRI valves and NU non-dynamically testable MOV's.

Table 14 summarizes the criteria used by NU for different categories of pate valve Vf's under varying plant conditions and for different phases of the MOV Program.' These values are used to achieve flow isolation in the close direction and are assumed to be applicable in the open direction.

The " Design Set up" values were used in conjunction with PI-9 during the preparation of target thrust calculations.

Table 14: Gate Valve VfCriteria Category Operability Design Set-up GL 89-10 Closure Comment Dynamically Dynamic Test t 0.4 Measured Vf or 0.3: Adjust for Design Testable (Note 1) Whichever is Basis Conditions ,

Greater (Notes 2 and 3) i Non-Testable: Intenm: 2 0.4 3 0.6 EPRI PPM or Intenm Operability Wedge Gate After 1" RFO: (Notes 4 and 5) Other (Note 6)

PPM or Other Other (Note 7)

Non Testable: Interim: 20.4 E 0.4 EPRI PPM or Note 8 ParallelDisc After 1" RFO: (Note 8) Other PPM or Other TestaDie: EPRI PPM, or E 0.9 or EPRI PPM or Vf 2 0.9 NOTPlanned for Grouping, or Grouping Vf Grouping Vf or (Note 9)

Dynamic Test Other Other Notes:"(1)This value includes margin for " preconditioning or aging" effects. NU will continue to monitor this effect during testing and through industry data, making adjustments as necessary. )

(2) Definitive determination of Vf and operability will be provided by dynamic testing properly adjusted to Design Basis conditions.

(3) A Vflower than 0.3 may be used ifjustified by test results.

(4) EPRI data indicates a Vf of 0.4 is a bounding value for stellite surfaces under high contact stress, flat-on-flat disc-to-seat contact, at temperatures above 350 F. An allowance of 0.2 is provided to allow for " poor geometry" and the differences between mu and Vf.

38 f . . _

Millstone Unit 3 MOV Program October 6,1995 (5) With the torque switch bypassed until Dow isolation, the thrust at this Vf -

constitutes the design-basis thrust due to dynamic conditions to be used for structural evaluation.

(6) Use of a Vf 2 0.4 is an interim operability screening value for use at each unit until their first refueling after December 4,1993. This is a more realistic number than the 0.3 Vf previously used in NU's MOV Program Manual. A 0.4 Vf bounds about 50% of EPRI blowdown tests; is the minimum value stated in Reference"'; and is a " good geometry" bounding value for high contact stress, flat-on-flat disc-to-seat contact, at temperatures above 350 F.

It is not considered a conservative value.

(7) "Other" includes technicallyjustifiable approaches, e.g. special tests, analysis, etc.

(8) A 0.4 Vf bounds the limited EPRI PPP test data for parallel-disc Anchor-Darling gate valves at temperatures > 350 F. This is also consistent with the results of blowdown testing performed by Anchor-Darling. EPRI testing also indicates 0.4 is a bounding value for high contact stress, flat-on-flat disc-to-seat contact, at temperatures above 350 F.

, (9) A 0.9 Vf bounds virtually all empirical data for gate valves.

Valve factors and measured rate ofloading values for each MOV are provided in Table 15. The 4

shaded areas represent MOV's set up on limit switch or torque switch bypacs control.

Table 13: Valve Factors and Rate ofLoading Valve Number Valve Factor l Rate of Valve Number Valve Factor l Rate of l Close O Loadin Close Open l Loading l 3CCP*MOV045A Y N/A 3RHS*MV8701A 0.6 0.33 l l 3CCP*MOV045B N/A N/A 3RHS*MV8701B 0.6 0.585 l l 3CCP*MOV048A N/A N/A 3RHS*MV8701C 0.6 0.33 l l 3CCP'MOV048B N/A N/A 3RHS*MV8702A 0.6 0.6 l l 3CCP*MOV049A N/A N/A 3RHS*MV87028 0.6 0.329 l l 3CCP*MOV049B N/A N/A 3RHS*MV8702C 0.6 0.159 l l 3CCP*MOV222 N/A N/A 3RHS*MV8716A 0.4 0.508 l l 3CCP*MOV223 N/A N 3RHS*MV87168 0.554 0.574 3CCP*MOV224 N/A N/A 3RSS*MOV20A N/A N/A 3CCP*MOV225 N/A N/A 3RSS*MOV20B N/A N/A 3CCP*MOV226 N/A N/A 3RSS*MOV20C N/A N/A 3CCP*MOV227 N/A N/A 3RSS*MOV20D N/A N/A 3CCP*MOV228 N/A N/A 3RSS*MOV23A N/A N/A 3CCP*MOV229 N/A N/A 3RSS*MOV238 N/A N/A 3CHS*LCV112B 0.6* 0.6* 3RSS*MOV23C N/A N/A 3CHS*LCV112C 06* 0.6* l l 3RSS*MOV23D N/A N/A 3CHS*LCV112D 0.6 0.6 l l 3RSS*MOV38A 0.4 0.399 20.7 3CHS*LCV112E 0.6 0.6 l l 3RSS*MOV388 0.4 0.571 l l 3CHS*MV8100 1.1 1.1 l l 3RSS*MV8837A 0.521 0.44 l -3.0 l 3CHS*MV8104 1.1 1.1 l l 3RSS*MV88378 0.341 0.183 l -21.0 1 3CHS*MV8105 0.341 0.218 l -5.6 l 3RSS*MV8838A 0.6 0.6 l l 3CHS*MV8106 0.097 0.167 l 4.2 l 3RSS*MV8838B 0.6 0.6 l l 3CHS*MV8109A 1.1 1.1 l l 3SlH*MV8801A 0.4 0.367 l 6.8 l 3CHS*MV81098 1.1 1.1 l l 3SlH*MV8801B 0.4 0.326 l 2.4 l 3CHS*MV8109C 1.1 1.1 l l 3SlH*MV8802A 0.25 0.327 l -0.7 l 3CHS*MV8109D 1.1 1.1 l l 3SlH'MV8802B 0.4 0.4 l l 3CHS*MV8110 0.47 N/A l -25.7 l 3SlH*MV8806 0.6* 0.6 l l 39

Millstone Unit 3 MOV Program October 6,1995 Valve Number Valve Number Valve Factor l Rate of Valve Factor l Rate of l Close Open l Loading l Close Open l Loading 3CHS*MVB111 A 1.1 N/A l -1.1 l 3SlH*MV8807A 0.6 0.6 l 3CHS*MV8111B 0.838 N/A l 9.4 1 3SlH*MV88078 0.6 0.6 l 3CHS*MV8111C 1.06 N/A l 8.2 l 3SlH*MV8813 0.18 0.18 l 1.7 3CHS*MV8112 1.1 1.1 l l 3SlH'MV8814 1.25 1.1 l -22.9 3CHS*MV8116 1.08 N/A l 5.4 l 3SlH*MV8821A 0.44 0.21 l -2.0 3CHS*MV8438A 0.163 0.142 l -0.4 l 3SlH*MV88218 0.41 0.357 l -6.7 3CHS*MV84380 0.3 0.226 l 6.9 l 3SlH*MV8835 0.436 0.178 l -4.6 3CHS*MV8438C 0.3 0.158 l l 3SlH'MV8920 1.1 1.1 l 3CHS*MV8468A 0.6* 0.6 l l 3SlH'MV8923A 0.6 0.6 l 3CHS*MV8468B 0.6* O6 l l 3SlH'MV8923B 0.6 0.6 l 3CHS*MV8507A 0.6 0.6 l l 3SlH*MV8024 0.6* 0.6 l 3CHS*MV85078 0.6 0.6 l l 3SIL*MV8804A 0.6 0.6 l 3CHS*MV8511 A 1.1 1.1 l l 3SIL*MV8804B 0.6 0.6 l 3CHS*MV8511B 1.1 1.1 l l 3SIL*MV8808A 0.6 0.6 l 3CHS*MV8512A 1.1 1.1 l l 3SIL*MV8808B 0.6 0.6 l <

3CHS*MV8512B 1.1 1.1 l l 3SIL*MV8808C 0.6 0.6 l 3 CMS *MOV24 1.1 1.1 l l 3SIL*MV8808D 0.6 0.6 l 3CVS*MOV25 1.1 1.1 l l 3SIL*MV8809A 0 51 0.642 l -0.03 3FWA*MOV35A 0.208 0.252 l 4.7 l 3SIL*MV8809B 0.4 0.4 l -10.3 l 3FWA*MOV350 0.458 0.366 l 9.7 l 3SIL*MV8812A 0.6 0.6 l I 3FWA*MOV35C 0.363 0.286 l -0.5 l 3SIL*MV8812B 0.6 0.6 l t l

-1.6 0.4 0.4 3FWA*MOV35D 0.29 0.16 l l 3SIL*MV8840 3lAS*MOV72 1.1 1.1 l l 3SWP*MOV024A N/A N/

3LMS*MOV40A 1.1 1.1 l l 3SWP*MOV0248 N/A N/A 3LMS*MOV40B 1.1 1.1 l l 3SWP*MOV024C N/A N/A 3LMS*MOV40C 1.1 1.1 l l 3SWP'MOV024D N/A N/A 3LMS*MOV40D 1.1 1.1 l l 3SWP*MOV050A N/A N/A 3 MSS *MOV17A 1.1 1.1 l l 3SWP*MOV0508 N/A N/A 3 MSS *MOV17B 1.1 1.1 l 3SWP*MOV054A N/A N 3 MSS *MOV1?D 1.1 1.1 3SWP*MOV054B N/A N/A 3 MSS *MOV18A 0.6 0.6 3SWP*MOV054C N/A N/

3 MSS *MOV188 06 0.6 3SWP*MOV054D N/A N/A 3 MSS *MOV18C 0.6 0.6 3SWP*MOV057A N/A N 3 MSS *MOV180 0.6 0.6 3SWP*MOV057B N/A N/A 3 MSS *MOV74A 1.1 1.1 3SWP*MOV057C N/A N/A 3 MSS *MOV748 1.1 1.1 l l 3SWP*MOV057D N/A N/A 3 MSS *MOV74C 1.1 1.1 l l 3SWP*MOV071A N/A N/A 3 MSS *MOV74D 1.1 1.1 3 swr *MOV0718 N/A N/

3OSS*MOV34A N/A N/A 3SWP'MOV102A N/A N/A 3OSS*MOV34B N/A N 3SWP*MOV1028 N/A N 3RCS*MV8000A 0.6 0.6 3SWP*MOV102C N/A N/A 3RCS*MV80008 0.6 0.6 3SWP*MOV102D N/A N 3RCS*MV8098 1.1 1.1 3SWP'MOV115A N/A N/A 3RHS*FCV610 1.1 1.1 l 3SWP*MOV1158 N/A N/A 3RHS*FCV611 1.1 1.1 l l

  • Our standard non-testable," default" valve factor of 0.6 has been used for these valves while KEI Gate calculations are being finalized. Any final valve factors above 0.6 will require a revision to this report.

40

Millstone Unit 3 MOV Program October 6,1995 10.6 Stem Factor / Stem Friction Coefficient Millstone Unit 3 calculations use a stem factor based on a friction coefficient of = 0.18 or greater for all valves unlessjustification is provided. This assumption is based on information and -

experience from the following sources:

  • Industry experience e Testing performed by Northeast Utilities e Limitorque sizing procedures e Millstone Unit 3 NCR 393-438,"MOV Stem / Stem Nut Coefficient of Friction," dated September 25,1993.

. NMAC Application Guide for Motor Operated Valves in Nuclear Power Plants, NP-6660-D e EPRI Stem / Stem-Nut Lubrication Test Report, TR-102135 1 The actuator of an MOV produces torque. For rising stem valves, the torque produced is converted to thrust at the stem and stem nut interface, or yoke-nut for rising rotating MOV's. The stem and stem-nut / yoke nut is a power screw which in most cases uses ACME threads. The emeiency of conversion of torque to thrust by the stem and stem-nut / yoke-nut is called the " Stem Factor." The stem factor is determined by stem geometry and the coefficient of friction between the stem and the .

stem-nut / yoke-nut. Since the geometry of a given stem is fixed, any change in coefficient of l friction will change the stem factor.

, 1 Industry testing has shown that the coefficient of friction can vary over a range of about 0.08 to 0.20. j This range of friction coefficient can change the output thrust for a given torque input by 250%,  :

thereby potentially effecting its ability to perform its intended function. Determining and l 4

maintaining a stem to stem-nut coefficient of friction is dependent upon mechanical condition, lubricant used, lubricant condition, and preventive maintenance practices.

Measurement of torque and thrust under static conditions may not provide an accurate representation of coefficient of friction for the design-basis condition. Under static running load conditions, the load on the stem to stem-nut is not high enough to maintain even contact loads between the stem and I stem-nut, causing the two to " float". This produces large swings in the measured coefficient of l

friction. Measurements taken at static torque switch trip can also be misleading, since at this point in i the valve stroke there is little or no actual rotational movement. Under this condition, the measured coefficient of friction although consistent, will usually be lower than the actual value under design-  ;

basis conditions. i l

Northeast Utilities has validated the assumed p = 0.15 by monitoring torque and thrust durmg selective dynamic tests for Haddam Neck, Millstone Unit 1, and Millstone Unit 2 for valves with similar lubrication practices. Millstone Unit 3 testing indicated that = 0.18 would bound data obtained. The disposition of NCR 393-438 identified past lubrication practices as the root cause for higher coefficient of friction. Table 16 provides the results of all applicable valid stem coefficient data measured in NU's MOV Program to date. As can be seen, p = 0.15 bounds 100 percent of the data for Haddam Neck, Millstone Unit 1, and Millstone Unit 2. For Millstone Unit 3, = 0.18 bounds 100 percent of the test data.

4 41

r l

r Millstone Unit 3 MOV Program October 6,1995 A review of EPRI PPP data at flow cutoff shows >> 99% of the data being below 0.15. This review covered in excess of 800 strokes. This adds signi6 cant credibility to NU's use of 0.15 as a bounding value.

Table 16: MeasuredStem to Stem-Nut Coeflicient ofFriction (p)

Valve Dynamic COF Close pen BA-MOV-373 0.046 CH-MOV-257 0.103 0.119 CH-MOV-257B 0.103 l 0.119 CH-MOV-2928 0.031 0.063 CH-MOV-292C 0.068 St-MOV-861C 0.120 SI-MOV-8718 0.133 0.085 1-CS-21B 0.106 1-LP-7A 0.096 2-FW-44 0.150 2-MS-201 0.068 2-MS-202 0.091 3CHS*MV8106 0.179 3CHS*MV8116 0.153 3CHS*MV8438A 0.146 3FWA*MOV35A ('93) 0.1 3FWA*MOV35A ('93) 0.135 3FWA*MOV35B 0.156 3FWA*MOV35D 0.103 3RHS*MV87028 0.093 3RHS*MV8702C 0.091 3RHS*MV8716A 0.109 3RSS*MV8837A 0.155 3RSS*MV8837B 0.125 {

3SlH*MV8801A 0.153 i

Where possible, NU's MOV's were tested using the VOTES Torque Cartridge / Quick Stem Sensor  !

(VTC / QSS) to validate our selection of friction coefGeient. Currently we have obtained 29 data points for coefficient of friction for the four Connecticut units. These data points were obtained under dynamic (i.e., flow and differential pressure) conditions, to best represent design-basis conditions. As noted, all data points are below 0.15 for Haddam Neck, Millstone Unit 1, and Millstone Unit 2, and below 0.18 for Millstone Unit 3; therefore validating our assumption. To add further rigor to NU's MOV Program, we are assessing the use of statistical analysis of our final data set (post Millstone Unit I completion) as a validation methodology. This will require additional data to permit meaningful statistical analysis.

10.7 Margin l The definition of margin varies from one licensee to another. Making simple comparisons of the ,

numerical value is an unreliable indication. For example, NU's quoted margin is approximately 2D l percent greater than a licensee who uses 0.5 for a non-testable gate valve factor, if all other  !

parameters are the same. The definition of margin is provided below:  !

l l

42

Millstone Unit 3 MOV Program October 6,1995 l

l r >

Thrusta - Thrust,,,a l Equat,on i 3: Margin = x 100%

< Thrust,,,a , 1 1

l Listed in Table 17 is the margin for the safety stroke for each valve. Also included is the periodic testing priority for each MOV (see Section 14.3). Open margin was not calculated for globe valves which have flow under the seat, and is indicated in the table by FUS (flow under seat). The flow would assist in opening the valve and the resulting open margin values would be very large. The l information in the table is presented to demonstrate design-basis closure. Future changes will be controlled by existing NU procedures.

l l

Table 17: Margin Valve Nurnber Periodic Close Open Valve Number Periodic Close Open Testing Margin Margin Testing Margin Margin Priority (%) (%) Priority (%) (%)

3CCP*MOV045A 2 31 32 3RHS*MV8701A 2 26 l 57 l 3CCP*MOV045B 2 61 119 3RHS*MV8701B 2 226 l 49 l 3CCP*MOV048A 2 6 32 3RHS*MV8701C 2 44 l 89 l 3CCP*MOV048B 2 104 144 3RHS*MV8702A 2 190 l 55 l 3CCP*MOV049A 2 15 23 3RHS*MV8702B 2 25 l 57 l 3CCP*MOV049B 2 94 47 3RHS*MV8702C 2 1 l 206 l 3CCP'MOV222 2 34 61 3RHS*MV8716A 2 183 l 100 l 3CCP'MOV223 2 53 84 3RHS*MV8716B 2 259 96 3CCP*MOV224 2 46 84 3RSS*MOV20A 1 16 3CCP*MOV225 2 106 84 3RSS*MOV208 1 16 3CCP"MOV226 2 157 171 3RSS*MOV20C 1 16 3CCP*MOV227 2 147 84 3RSS*MOV20D 1 16 3CCP*MOV228 2 82 99 3RSS*MOV23A 2 1 3CCP*MOV229 2 126 157 3RSS*MOV23B 2 95 3CHS*LCV112B 1 17 111 3RSS*MOV23C 2 100 . _ _ * - .

3CHS*LCV112C 1 26 167 3RSS*MOV23D 2 95 Eh 3CHS*LCV112D 1 0 72 3RSS*MOV38A 2 7 m ,y 136 l 3CHS*LCV112E 1 2 75 3RSS*MOV38B 2 ID 136 l 3CHS*MV8100 1 557 FUS 3RSS*MV8837A 1 , b Q1 ib 160 l 3CHS*MV8104 2 E%M FUS 3RSS*MV8837B 1 mod 160 l 3CHS*MV8105 1 16 MJ$jgg 3RSS*MV8838A 2 d hfIl 102 l 3CHS*MV8106 1 5 @@da 3RSS*MV8838B 2 Juhd#11 60 l 3CHS*MV8109A 2 469 FUS 3SlH*MV8801A 1 119 l 46 l 3CHS*MV8109B 2 641 FUS 3SlH*MV88010 1 41 l 70 l 3CHS*MV8109C 2 566 FUS 3SlH*MV8802A 2 g 142 l 3CHS*MV8109D 2 484 FUS 3SlH*MV8802B 2 M 92 l 3CHS*MV8110 1 39 =r 3SlH*MV8806 2 47 mmEmiiiniii 3CHS*MV8111 A 1 28 R!fil$ 3SlH*MV8807A 1 @ljgigtj 49 l 3CHS*MV8111B 1 20 G!il@Bl 3SlH*MV8807B 1 T#Ef 29 l 3CHS*MV8111C 1 16 Rm 3SlH*MV8813 1 59 -

ma 3CHS*MV8112 1 501 FUS 3SlH'MV8814 1 64 E 3CHS*MV8116 2 mmw-mm FUS 3SlH*MV8821A 2 24 Fjf 3CHS*MV8438A 2 107 3SlH*MV8821B 2 38 NH 3CHS*MV8436d 2 83 3SlH*MV8835 2 33 7 3CHS*MV8438C 2 34 3SlH'MV8920 1 175 3CHS*MV8468A 2 5 2 3SlH*MV8923A 2 55 _ __

PM 3CHS*MV8468B 2 0 3SlH*MV8923B 2 50 - 6G 43

1 l

Millstone Unit 3 MOV Program October 6,1995 '

\ l l

Valve Number Periodic Close Open Valve Number Periodic Close Open i Testing Margin Margin Testing Margin Margin 1 Priority (%) (%) Priority (%) (%) l 3CHS*MV8507A 2 'fA 186 3SlH*MV8924 2 96 M22d l 3CHS*MV85078 2 . .J . ) 184 3SIL*MV8804A 1  ; ;= ,

58 l 3CHS*MV8511 A 1 152 FUS 3SIL*MV8804B 1 ] $9iGl l 54 3CHS*MV8511B 1 146 FUS 3SIL*MV8808A 2 _

100 l 3CHS*MV8512A 1 2 ggg l 3SIL*MV8808B 2 FN 102 l 3CHS*MV8512B 1 9 Mm 1 3SIL*MV8808C 2 T- 102 3 CMS *MOV24 2 179 WOM il 3SIL*MV8808D 2 bliE H 95 3CVS*MOV25 2 ggggggg FUS 3SIL*MV8809A i 180 g@l 3FWA*MOV35A 2 7 di

"' l 3SIL*MV8809B 1 356 h ygp ,

3FWA*MOV35B 2 52 3SIL*MV8812A 1 448 M iHlil l 3FWA*MOV35C 2 82 3SIL*MV88128 454 31 3FWA*MOV35D 2 104 3SIL*MV8840 2 1

495 $$MNtg$ 4 l 31AS*MOV72 2 375 .

3SWP*MOV024A 2 79 79 3LMS*MOV40A 2 330 g[ 3SWP*MOV0248 2 79 79 3LMS*MOV40B 3LMS*MOV40C 2

2 319 512 m-g ,

, h 3SWP*MOV024C 3SWP'MOV024D 2

2 79 79 79 79 3LMS*MOV400 2 603 hh h 3SWP*MOV050A 3SWP'MOV0508 1 15 26 43 12 3 MSS *MOV17A 2 166 .

1 3 MSS *MOV170 2 75 l 3SWP*MOV054A i 15 3 MSS *MOV17D 2 97 3SWP*MOV054B 1 i 128

}

i 3 MSS *MOV18A 2 33 g 3SWP*MOV054C 1 e 15 3 MSS *MOV188 2 25 3SWP*MOV054D 1 M  % 73 3 MSS *MOV18C 2 32 3SWP'MOV057A 2 52 *gg 3 MSS *MOV18D 2 26 I 3SWP'MOV0578 2 44 %A7 3 MSS *MOV74A 2 -

FUS 3SWP*MOV057C 2 49 CMb 3 MSS *MOV74B 2 L FUS 3SWP*MOV057D 2 88 . c h(

3 MSS *MOV74C 2 FUS 3SWP*MOV071A 1 313 dfj 3 MSS *MOV74D 2 & l FUS 3SWP*MOV071B 1 51 ;HNNO 3OSS*MOV34A 1 52 6 3SWP*MOV102A 1 1

45 30SS*MOV348 1 52 6 3SWP*MOV1028 1  : 45 3RCS*MV8000A 1 1 16 3SWP*MOV102C 1 N s 45 3RCS*MV80008 1 1 16 3SWP*MOV102D 1 M 16 3RCS*MV8098 2 K@ nam FUS 3SWP*MOV115A 2 81 'i3PR'T 3RHS*FCV610 2 753 FUS 3SWP*MOV115B 2 100 1*E 3RHS*FCV611 2 1075 FUS 10.8 Stem Lubrication and Springpack Relaxation The MOV Program assumes little or no degradation of stem lubricant will occur between maintenance intervals. This is based on a preventive maintenance program, and using the " reservoir method" of stem lubrication, which limits degradation of stem lubricant. To validate this assumption,"as-found" dynamic tests may need to be performed unless another means of monitoring stem lubrication effectiveness statically can be developed. Currently, use of motor power to provide this capability without further dynamic testing is being evaluated. The small number of as-found tests conducted to date indicate that there is no lubrication degradation using the reservoir method, therefore validating our assumption that additional margin is not required. However, for those MOV's with small overall margin, we will continue to closely monitor for changes.

44

I 1

j Millstone Unit 3 MOV Program October 6,1995 -1 10.9 Selection of MOV Switch Settings item b, of GL 89-10 requires that methods exist for selecting and setting MOV switches (i.e., switch settings) to ensure high reliability of safety-related MOV's. MOV sizing calculations and methods for determining switch setting are described in PI-9," Determination of Stem Thrust Requirements,"

i memorandum MOV-RTH 93-034,"NU MOV Program: Acceptance Criteria for Gate Valve, Valve Factors (Vf),"" and target thrust calculations. PI 9 establishes the methodology for determining the target torque and thrust values for globe, gate, and %-turn valves, and the corresponding control switch settings. In addition,it provides instructions for determining a MOV's capability. The appropriate limit and torque switch settings are determined following the valve capability analysis.

MOV limiter plate sizing to prevent exceeding torque based limits is also included in PI-9. It is j conservative to use the motor pull-out efficiency to calculate valve thrust requirements for the open  !

f and closed cases, however it is also permissible to use the motor running efficiencies for closed l cases, for AC actuators. j 1 Design set-up calculations for determining thrust requirements and actuator capability assume the following: a valve factor of 0.4 for rising stem gate valves that will be dynamically tested; 0.6 for non-testable wedge gate valves; and 0.4 for non-testable parallel disc gate valves. For the non-testable valves or where representative dynamic conditions cannot be reasonably created, NU plans to use "best available data" in determining valve factors (e.g., the EPRI Performance Prediction I Program, Kalsi Engineering evaluation, or from grouping of data from other dynamic tests). We  !

1 i reviewed preliminary information provided by EPRI's Performance Prediction Program and used this information as a basis for raising our valve factor assumptions from the previous standard

assumption of 0.3 for wedge gate valves. For Millstone Unit 3 a stem friction coefficient of 0.18 is used for determination of actuator output thrust capability. Thrust requirements for setting of actuator torque switches are adjusted to account for diagnostic equipment inaccuracy and torque

. switch repeatability.

The design-basis thrust calculations specify a 1.1 margin for non-testable gate / globe valves to account for load-sensitive behavior (also known as " rate of loading"), unless the valve is on torque switch bypass (see Section 10.10). Load sensitive behavior data obtained from dynamic tests (i.e.,

testable gate / globe valves) is incorporated into target thrust calculations. Load sensitive behavior can reduce the thrust delivered by the motor operator under high differential pressure and flow conditions from the amount delivered under static conditions. The MOV Program allowance of 1.1

is based upon NU specific measurements statistically analyzed as a truncated normal distribution to exclude negative values (see Section 11.3). We will continue to monitor industry development of 4 increased understanding of this phenomenon and make changes to our analysis results" to account
for load sensitive behavior.

Four-rotor limit switches are installed on all actuators in the Millstone Unit 3 GL 89-10 program.

Actual limit switch settings are in the MOV schematic diagram or ESK drawings. The following

. limit switch settings apply to all MOV's, unlessjustified for a different setup, and are documented in accordance with PI 8," Control of MOV Settings":

j. Open Limit - shall be set to 5% (nominally) from the full open valve position. The exact set point shall be determined on a case by case basis in order to ensure the valve does not torque into the backseat, coast into the backseat or adversely effect the' stroke time of the MOV. The open limit shall be adjusted for the additional coast due to the piston efTect ofline pressure. The setting shall also be selected such that the valve disc does not excessively protrude into the flow stream.

45 2

) '.

t

  • v

Millstone Unit 3 MOV Program October 6,1995 Close Limit - shall be set 0 to 10% from the valve full closed position (hard seat contact / flow isolation) on limit closed valves. This setting is only applicable if the original plant design basis utilizes the close limit switch in its control circuit and the actuator speed requires closing on limit.

Open-to-Close Bypass - shall be set greater than 5% from the full open valve position on MOV's designed to backseat only. Otherwise, there are no requirements.

The "97% nominal close torque switch bypass"(CTSB) may be used. In this application the close torque switch is bypassed until flow cut offis ensured. Once the port is covered the torque switch comes back in the circuit and controls closure.

A limit switch repeatability of I % shall be applied to CTSB setpoint to ensure the port is covered and the motor is cut off before hard seat contact. Use of a limit switch repeatability less than 1% may bejustified by performing limit switch repeatability tests or via correlation to existing NU limit switch repeatability data.

All limit switch repeatability data must be statistically analyzed to ensure proper sample size and to confirm the actual limit switch repeatability is within a 95%

20 confidence range ,

y Close-to-Open Bypass - shall be set greater than 45% from the full closed valve position. This setting is critical to ensure operability of the valve. (Note: Some valves have interlocks which required setting at 20% from full closed.)

Open position indicator (green light off)- shall be set to trip within *0% to -2%

(of full stroke) of open control switch trip, for MOV's which open on limit. For MOV's which intentionally backseat, the switch shall be set in accordance with Unit Engineering requirements.

Close position indicator (red light off)- when MOV is torque closed then light shall be set no greater than 3% (of full stroke) before hard seat contact and no greater than 15% (of the distance between hard seat contact and CST) after hard seat contact. Iflimit switch controlled, the switch is set in accordance with an approved set-up procedure.

Intermediate Limits - Limits providing interlocks, status inputs, and special signals must be set so the limit switch at least changes state prior to the valve control switch.

For gate valves, limit control in the closing direction may be used in lieu of torque switch control, as appropriate. The limit switches associated with Limitorque actuators are used for various functions including interlocks, position indication and controlling valve position. The limit switches are gear-driven directly off the drive sleeve for models SMB-000 and SMB-00 or the worm shaft for mod-is SMB-0 through SMB 5. With this arrangement, it is possible to adjust a limit switch to control valve position within a few hundredths of an inch. For the nonnal uses the limit switch is put to, this fine control is not necessary, and therefore has not been evaluated.

Control of motor-operated gate and globe valves in the closing direction is normally performed by the torque switch. In certain cases, control by use of the limit switch is desirable. These cases include high inertia, bypassing the close torque switch until flow isolation is achieved, and butterfly /

plug (quarter-turn) valves. In all cases the valve is being controlled by stem position rather than 46

Millstone Unit 3 MOV Program October 6,1995 output torque. The allowable band of stem position in these situations is very small, sometimes as little a one quarter inch, so the ability to set the limit switch to control in these regions is critical."

In addition to the ability to set the limit switch, some determination of the ability of the switch to trip at the same point each time must be made. The repeatability of the limit switches for Limitorque actuators is commonly reported at 2 to 3%. There has been no industry documentation of any testing or evaluation oflimit switch repeatability. The purpose for which we use limit switch control of valve closure on a gate valve requires better repeatability than 2 to 3%. NU has determined limit switch repeatability for particular applications based upon statistical analysis of multiple valve strokes 2 (see Section 12 2.3).

At Millstone Unit 3, only the 46 butterfly / plug valves are set-up on limit switch control.

10.10 Torque Switch Bypass Methodology NU has implemented a methodology of bypassing the torque switch until flow cutoff. This control configuration is similar to limit-closed configuration because the full capability of the motor actuator is available to close the valve.1lowever, NU's torque switch bypass configuration differs because the limit switch removes the torque switch bypass until flow cutoff and not the motor power. This allows the motor to ensure the disk covers the flow path then fully seat the disk based on torque.

switch trip. The torque switch setting is adjusted as high as possible to provide the greatest assurance of proper valve seating under a static condition.

Using this control configuration, a possibility exists during a close stroke under dynamic conditions for the motor torque to exceed the torque switch trip setpoint, which is bypassed. As a result, when the torque switch bypass is removed (after flow cutoff), motor power will be cut off after flow is stopped and, possibly, prior to hard seat contact. NU uses information contained in EPRI's l NUMAC, " Application Guide for Motor-Operated Valves in ' Nuclear Power Plants," as guidance on the sealing contact force required to obtain a leak tight seal.

Terque switches are generally bypassed in the opening direction for approximately the first 45 - 65%

of the stroke. The open limit switch is used to control termination of the open stroke for rising stem and rising / rotating stem valves to prevent backseating of the valve. The torque switch is bypassed I in the closing direction except for the last 5-20% of the stroke. For butterfly valves, open and close torque switches are bypassed 100% of open and close travel.

11. Design-Basis Capability 11.1 in-situ Design Basis Verification Testing item c. of GL 89-10 requires that each MOV be tested in-situ at design-basis conditions, if l practicable, to demonstrate that it is capable of performing its intended function in addition, Item c.

requires that each MOV be stroke tested at no-pressure or no-flow conditions (static testing) to verify  ;

l that the MOV is operable even if testing with a differential pressure or flow cannot be performed.

PI-10," Static Testing," establishes guidelines for developing unit-specific test procedures for performing static condition testing of MOV's.

PI-l1," Determination ofIn-Situ Test Capability," establishes the methodology and requirements for determining in-situ testability of MOV's at design-basis conditions. In addition, it establishes the l

47

Millston) Unit 3 MOV Program October 6,1995 requirements for documenting and justifying those cases where in-situ testing cannot be practicably performed at design-basis conditions (see Calculation 89-094-1017M3, Rev. O, dated June 27,1995,

" Determination ofin-Situ Test Capability of Millstone Unit 3 MOV's."

Test procedures for in-situ design-basis verification testing are developed using established unit and i station procedures and guidelines. PI-12," Requirements for Design Basis Verification Testing," )

lists parameters which must be measured during the performance ofin situ tests.

The test procedures contain the test methodology, controls, and specifications for initial system conditions, test limitations, necessary differential pressures and flows, and appropriate test l acceptance criteria. MOV and system parameters such as motor voltage, upstream and downstream pressure, flow, and ambient temperature are documented in pre- and post-test data sheets. j 11.2 Extrapolation of Partial d/p Thrust Measurements Uncertainty in predicting thrust required at design-basis d/p increases as one departs from testing at )

100% d/p. This is a generic issue for gate valves, and to a lesser degree globe valves. Virtually all I Heensees have used extrapolation, typically from 50% of design-basis d/p. The NRC has reviewed i and found this practice acceptable for GL 89-10 closure." NU has also reviewed an evaluation of l the extensive EPRI test results for gate and globe valves which validated linear extrapolation.22 Published EPRI results demonstrate that the friction coefficient for stellite-on-stellite decreases with l increasing disc-to-seat contact pressure, i.e., increasing d/p. Thus, extrapolation from low d/p should be conservative. it is possible that contact stresses become so low that data scatter becomes significant.

We are using extrapolation approaches identical to that reviewed and accepted by NRC for other licensees. The approach is incorporated in a dynamic test methodology in accordance with PI-13,

" Evaluation of Dynamic Test Results."

11.3 Load Sensitive Behavior Rate of Loading (ROL) or load-sensitive behavior, as it is also called, is the condition where torque switch trip occurs at a different thrust under dynamic conditions than during static conditions for the 4 same torque switch setting. For example, an MOV that achieved 20,000 lbs. of thrust at torque switch trip during a static test delivers only 17,000 lbs. under dynamic conditions. This effect is normally considered as " positive" ROL, since a positive allowance is needed to ensure sufficient thrust under dynamic conditions. " Negative" ROL has also been observed, where mars thrust is delivered under dynamic conditions than static conditions. Some changes in torque as a function of loading profile may also occur. Equation 4 is used to determine ROL:

Thrustg ,wm - Thrust agu,,

Equation 4: ROL =

Thrust grun The mechanism that produces ROL is not well understood in the industry. It appears to be related to a change in stem factor brought about by changes in stem coefficient of friction as a result of stem lubrication. During gradual loading (dynamic conditions) stem lubrication is mostly in a boundary regime. During a rapid load increase (static test) some hydrodynamic lubrication appears to exist which decreases the coefficient of friction. During the past several years ROL has been the subject 48

. - ~ . - - .- . - . . - . . .- -

Millstons Unit 3 MOV Program October 6,1995 of numerous industry presentations, discussions, and experiments. ROL was examined during the EPRI Performance Prediction Program in an attempt to quantify it. EPRI concluded that ROL was not analytically predictable.

ROL is accounted for by two methodologies, dependent upon control circuit logic. Testable MOV's are evaluated for ROL as a part of the PI-13 dynamic test evaluation. If present, the ROL will be incorporated in a revision to the thrust calculation. Both positive and negative ROL are considered.

Positive ROL increases the minimum required thrust to close the valve while negative ROL decreases the maximum allowable control switch trip values.

More consideration must be given to those MOV's which are not dynamically testable. Millstone Unit 3 has 49 MOV's in this category. Of these,10 are controlled by limit switches and require no separate specific margin for ROL. The remaining 39 MOV's all have a specific 10% margin for ROL added to their required thrust. Table 15 above (see page 39) provides the measured rate of I

loading values.

For non dynamically testable torque switch controlled valves, an additional margin (e.g., the 10%

noted above) is added to the calculated required thrust. Rather than use a representative but arbitrary margin allowance of 10%, we have validated this assumption by the use of ROL data obtained from Millstone Unit 3 dynamic test results. We have not chosen to use multi-plant data because our testing has shown that ROL is affected by the base oil viscosity of the grease used for stem lubrication and lubrication practices. A statistical analysis" was performed of this data. To provide a conservative evaluation of this data, a "trtmcated" normal distribution was used (see Figure 1, page 49). The method is well described in statistical literature." This method eliminates all negative ROL values. This will result in a higher mean and a lower standard deviation than the use of a normal distribution.

The results of this evaluation provided a mean of 6.7% and a standard deviation of 5.1%, for a 95%

confidence level that the ROL is less than 16.6%. This ROL value is combined with other sources of uncertainty using the methods outlined in Reference 24. This method uses the mean as a margin in addition to all other margins, and two standard deviations are combined with the existing errors of diagnostic system accuracy and torque switch repeatability using the Square Root Sum of Squares (SRSS) method. The result is the equivalent of a " margin multiplier" slightly less than 10%,

validating our previous 10% margin allowance.

/(t) o Distribution of Positive ROL Data Normal Distribution of AH ROL Data i Figure I: TruncatedNormalDistribution 49

, Millstone Unit 3 MOV Program October 6,1995 1

! For MOV's that are controlled by limit switches, e.g., open direction, limit seating, and close torque

, switch bypass schemes, ROL is accounted for by the assumed stem-to-stem nut coefficient of friction.- In this case, a separate margin is not added to the calculated minimum required, the margin is included in the assumption for coefficient of friction. In this case, the validity of the assumption is

! verified along with the validation of coefficient of friction.

It is felt that current setup practices are sufficient to provide assurance of the ability of non-testable

{

valves to perform their intended safety function. Conservatisms are already included in the calculation of minimum required thrusta. These include conservative valve factors, diagnostic

system inaccuracy, torque switch repeatability, worst case difTerential pressure, derated motor torque, theoretical packing loads, actuator application factors, worst case undervoltage factors, and stem-to-stem nut coefficient of friction.

l 11.4 Post-Maintenance Testing I Post-maintenance testing and lubrication requirements are defined in PI-14," Post-Maintenance l Testing and Lubrication Requirements," for MOV's which have completed a baseline set-up with i diagnostic test equipment. Maintenance or modifications that affect the ability of an MOV to

perform its design-basis function must be followed by a new baseline static test in accordance with l GL 89-10 requirements. Listed in Table 18 are the retest requirements for various maintenance j items. The Unit MOV Coordinator may modify these requirements when written justification is

! provided to demonstrate the activity does not effect the ability of the MOV to perform it's design-l basis function.

! For testable valves, a dynamic test is performed at greater than or equal to 50% of design-basis

! differential pressure and 80% of design-basis flow conditions, following any modification which l could affect the valve factor. Machining of the seat, disc or disc guiding surfaces, when not per the original design, is evaluated by engineering to determine if the baseline dynamic test is required. If plant or system conditions do not allow a dynamic test to be performed, an analyticaljustification is j provided which verifies the ability of the MOV to continue to perform its required functions.

i l Table 18: Post-Maintenance Retest Requirements

] Maintenance Activity l Test l Comments l I Packing Replacement l X l A P3500 test, complete VOTES Test. calculation, or other means.

Packing Adjustment l X l A P3500 test, complete VOTES Test, calculation, or other means.

Valve Disassembly X Dynamic test should be performed following maintenance or j modification of the disk, seats, or guides. If plant or system conditions do not allow a dynamic test to be performed, provide an analyticaljustification to verify the ability of the MOV to continue to perform its required functions.

Cleaning and Re-lubricating Valve Grease or other approved lubncant shall be applied so that all stem i Stem surfaces that come in contact with the stem nut are well coated.

l R Valve X Tor Switch Removal X 4

Motor O rator Disassem X

S ' Pack Removat Pack Replacement X

' Pack stment Stem-Nut Removal X i

j 50

1 Millstone Unit 3 MOV Program October 6,1995 a

Maintenance Activity Comments l

) l Test l

} Motor Starter Contactor Replacement X l VOTES test is not required if contactor dropout time can be shown l to be at or below that determined from the previous VOTES test.

I Motor Replacement (i e. new motor) X Venfy correct winnq and motor rotation.

Limit Switch Removal Correct winng must be venfied and limit Limit Switch Replacement switch settings adjusted in accordance with

] approved procedures.

L.irn!t Switch Adjustment Replace any Gears X Baseline test for gear ratio changes or spnngpack removal. Static retest not required if gear ratio unchanged and only motor pinion /

I worm shaft ars were removed and replaced with identical parts.

X X

Handwheel Assembly Removed X l

l Motor Removal (gear box not removed) Venfy correct winng and motor rotation.

- Replace actuator-to-yoke or yoke-to- X Retest not required if replaced one at a time in accordance with

! bonnet bolts / studs published guidance?

i i

i

12. Diagnostic Test Equipment Accuracy 4

12.1 GL 89-10 Supplement 5 l On October 2,1992, Liberty Techno!ogies, manufacturer of the VOTES system used at NU, issued a

! 10 CFR Part 21 notiGeation regarding potential inaccuracies in thrust measurements made with VOTES. On June 28,1993, the NRC issued Supplement 5 to inform licensees of a generic concern l

i regarding the accuracy of MOV diagnostic equipment. Liberty Technologies determined that two new factors can affect the thrust values obtained with its VOTES equipment. Those factors involve:

I

(1) the stem material constants, and (2) the failure to account for a torque effect when the equipment
is calibrated by measuring strain of the threaded portion of a valve stem. The Supplement requested l that the licensee evaluate this new information and any other information reasonably available to l them and provide a written response to two requests for additional information. NU provided the l

! additional information in a letter dated October 14,1993."  ;

i \

i NU uses Liberty Technologies VOTES diagnostic test equipment to conGrm and maintain GL 89-10 MOV torque switch and / or limit switch settings. NU also uses VOTES 2.31 software, which automatically calculates the torque correction factor (TCF), which accounts for the VOTES Part 21 3

thrust under-prediction measurement inaccuracy. The following is a summary of the actions taken to l address the diagnostic test equipment accuracy concern:

l (1) The Millstone Unit 3 performed VOTES thrust underprediction evaluations on July 12,1993. This effort corrected as-left measured thrust values. Internal reportability evaluations were issued to address potential valve structural over-thrusts which were successfully resolved and the valves were deemed operable.

(2) NU's Engineering Department verified that all MOV measured thrust values were proper and valid.

(3) CYAPCO and NNECO's Engineering Department instituted VOTES Part 21 thrust under-prediction corrections for all MOV thrust window calculations 4

4 51

Millstone Unit 3 MOV Program October 6,1995 completed after January 1,1993. Thrust windows incorporate the Liberty Technologies VOTES accuracy adjustment or TCF in their combined accuracy determinations. All VOTES diagnostic test systems now utilize Version 2.31 4 software, which automatically determines TCF. All VOTES test personnel are properly trained in the use of the 2.31 software.

(4) CYAPCO and NNECO revised the MOV Program Manual stem thrust procedure to incorporate Liberty Technologies VOTES .cystem TCF accuracy corrections.

All program thrust calculations automatically address VOTES measurement and system accuracies.

(5) During Millstone Unit 3 refueling outage 4 (1993) those valves exhibiting an over-thrust condition, due to the application of the VOTES Part 21 correction, were retested and their thrusts reduced to acceptable levels.

(6) NNECO identified and evaluated historical VOTES tests to determine if previous operating thrust setups were higher and determine if cumulative fatigue is a concern. Our evaluation corrected as left thrust values and resulted in further evaluations to address potential valve structural over-thrusts. A detailed structural analysis was used to increase the valve's nominal thrust to greater than the over-thrust value and, subsequently, the valves were deemed operable.

Detailed structural analysis for the over-thrusted valves revised the allowable design thrust. The revised thrust value for unlimited cycles exceeds the maximum thrust developed during past operation, when the thrust was under-predicted.

12.2 Diagnostic Test Equipment Requirements PI-15," Requirements for Test Equipment," establishes the requirements and optional parameters to be measured by MOV diagnostic test equipment. As a minimum, diagnostic test equipment will have the capability of measuring and recording the following parameters:

  • Stem Thrust - measured or calculated in both the opening and closing directions.

. Stem Torque - measured in both the opening and closing directions (VTC is closed only).

  • Motor Current e Voltage PI-IS specifies diagnostic test equipment calibration and system accuracy requirements. In addition, it provides general guidelines for test equipment associated with the NU MOV Program. Typically, systems and components are used from Teledyne Brown Engineering (QSS), Liberty Technologies (VOTES, STS - stem torque sensors), and calibrated strain gages. Millstone Unit 3 uses the VOTES diagnostic equipment to set the torque switches and perform diagnostic evaluations for MOV's in the GL 89-10 program.

52

1 1

Millstone Unit 3 MOV Program October 6,1995 1

12.2.1 Determining Accuracles 1 Minimum and maximum thrust requirements include margin for MOV test equipment accuracies as summarized in Table 19, with additional discussion below. These margins are combined using the square root of the sum of the squares method.

e Table 19: Test Equipment Accuracy Matrix Parameter Accuracy VOTES Diagnostic Test Equipment Close: 19% x TCF Open: i10% x TCF Teledyne Quick Stem Sensor (Torque and Thrust) 19.8 %

Limitorque Torque Switch Settings above #1 and 5 50 ft-lbs at TST t10%

Limitorque Torque Switch Settings above #1 and > 50 ft-lbs at TST t 5%

Limitorque Torque Switch Settings at #1 and > 50 ft-lbs at TST i10%

Limitorque Torque Switch Settings at #1 and 5 50 ft-lbs at TST i20%

A diagnostic test equipment (e.g., VOTES) closed accuracy of 9% x Torque Correction Factor (TCF) and open accuracy of 10% x TCF is assumed for the purpose of target thrust calculations based on Curve Fit Accuracy (CFA) calibration for the VOTES software, unless the testing is done outside the bounds of the Liberty assumptions. If outside the bounds, we contact Liberty to obtain the correct values, in cases where Best Fit Straight Line (BFSL) calibrations must be utilized, if the RSQ value is less than 0.997, the target thrust is recalculated to account for the difference in ,

l accuracy obtained via the CFA and BFSL methods.

The actual diagnostic test equipment accuracy used in post-diagnostic test analysis is taken from the calibration results obtained during performance of station specific procedures and / or the test  ;

equipment vendor manual, as appropriate. The calibration process may require technical guidance l

from the test equipment manufacturer to account for local physical variations or particular valve installations.

Any pressure measuring devices, permanent or temporary, used for determining system differential or line pressure during diagnostic testing have a minimum accuracy of 2% of the full scale reading.

The pre-diagnostic test analysis assumes a 2% pressure instrument accuracy.

, Based upon Limitorque specifications, the actual torque output for a given torque switch setting is repeatable within the values specified in Table 19. This repeatability of actuator output is applied to the allowable thrust / torque at torque switch trip as well as to the total allowable torque / thrust value which includes inertial effects after contactor dropout and minimum available thrust. The measured  ;

test values are compared to these adjusted limits.

(

12.2.2 Applying Accuracies

, Diagnostic and test equipment accuracy factors are applied in a conservative manner to the calculated allowables and / or measured torque and thrust values, as appropriate. The overall accuracy which is applied to the MOV thrust and torque values will be the square root of the sum of the squares of the torque switch repeatability accuracy and diagnostic equipment accuracy.

Pressure instrument (gages or transducers) accuracy factors are applied directly to the appropriate calibration range of the pressure instrument (e.g., percentage of full scale reading, percentage of reading, etc.) and added or subtracted to the measured test pressure in accordance with PI-13. It is i

53

Millstone Unit 3 MOV Program October 6,1995 -

important to note that pressure instrument accuracies are independent of the actual reading since they

, are a function of the full scale reading for a given instrument, unless the accuracy is expressed as a

, percent of reading. If pressure transducers are used it is important to use the total loop accuracy to the point where the data is being used. Corrections for elevation-head differences between installed 4

or temporary pressure instruments and the valve are applied in accordance with PI-13 for dynamic test evaluations.

Any other combination ofindependent accuracy factors will be compiled using the square root of the sum of the squares method.

12.2.3 Limit Switch Repeatability

~

The objective of the analysis " Millstone Unit 2 Repeatability Statistical Evaluation,"2 was to determine, at the 95 / 95 probability / confidence level, the repeatability of the limit switches for the

. Millstone Unit Two feedwater valve's closure from tests conducted at the site on October 6,1993.

The time from applying power to the motor on the MOV to the time when the limit switch was activated was measured on all four valves: 2-FW-38A,2-FW-38B,2-FW-42A and 2-FW-42B. In addition, valve closure tests were performed on 1-MS-5 at Millstone Unit One on March 16,1994.

Each of the four feedwater (FW) valves were subjected to five test runs of the valve motor until the limit switch was activated. The results of these tests consisted of times to closure and were recorded.

In addition, ten test runs of the valve motor were performed on 1-MS-5. The test results were j recorded.

. It is assumed that each measured valve closure time constitutes a random value from the population j of all measurements. Sequential measurements on a valve are also assumed to be statistically

independent and unbiased. The calculation method consisted of a sequence of steps

4 j 1. The measurements for each valve were adjusted (transformed) by their respective mean values.

2. Basic statistics were determined for the adjusted data.
3. The W-test was applied to verify that the data can be characterized by a normal 1 distribution (Millstone Unit 2 data only). t
4. Two-sided 95/95 probability / confidence values for the adjusted valve closure times
were determined.
5. The repeatability error for motor-operated valve closure times was then established by transforming the 95/95 values for adjusted valve closure times back to the original (pre-adjusted) times.

The most adverse 95/95 closure time for the five valves was used to specify the repeatability error as

a percent of average closure time. The calculation concluded that the Millstone Unit One valve was bounded by a limit switch repeatability 10.2% and the Millstone Unit Two valves were bounded by a10.5% limit switch repeatability.

t

13. Grouping
In GL 89-10 and its supplements, the NRC scaff requested that licensees test each MOV under 7

design-basis differential pressure and flow conditions where practicable. However, the staff recognized that it is not practicable to test each MOV within the scope of GL 89-10 in-situ dynamic 4

54

Millstone Unit 3 MOV Program October 6,1995 conditions. Therefore, if a licensee does not perform prototype testing at a test facility for each MOV that is not practicable to test in situ, the licensee will have to group MOV's that are not practicable to test in a manner that provides adequate confidence that the MOV's are capable of performing their design-basis function.

The staff continues to recommend testing MOV's under design-basis conditions where practicable.

Paragraph 1 of GL 89-10 allows licensees to propose alternatives to the recommendations of the generic letter wherejustification is provided. Grouping data from design-basis differential pressure testing of similar MOV's at or near design-basis test conditions is an acceptable option to establish design-basis valve setup conditions.

Grouping of MOV's is performed in accordance with the requirements of GL 89-10 Supplement 6 as summarized below: identical valve design ( the valves must either be ofidentical design orjustified identical in design by performing a detailed analysis including consideration of internal dimensions and clearances), representative (but not similar) operating conditions, the MOV's have similar installation conditions and orientation, the adequacy of the valve design has been verified through review ofindustry and plant specific data, and number of times the valve is stroked during an operating cycle.

Dynamic testing shall be performed on at least two MOV's from a group or 30% of the group (round up to the next high number of valves when taking percentages), whichever is greater. Dynamic testing need not be performed on the remaining MOV's in the group for GL 89-10 closure.

Grouping analysis methodology is contained in PI-l1. The valves exempted from dynamic testing meet the requirements of PI-11, Section 3.4; GL 89-10, Supplement 6 for excluding testable valves from dynamic testing; and the following guidelines for grouped valves:

  • Industry or plant specific data shows that valves in this group can perform their intended I function.

]

+ At least two (2) and no less than 30% of the number of valves in the group will be tested at or near DB conditions.

  • All valves in the group have been statically tested.

e Valves in same group with higher priority, least margin, or greatest safety significance have been dynamically tested.

  • The MOV's have similar installation conditions and orientations.
  • Valve designs are the same or similar.
  • Adverse performance results were reviewed for applicability to all MOV's in the group.
  • Valve maintenance histories were reviewed to determine if valve internals are in the same condition, l

Millstone Unit 3 MOV's which were grouped are indicated in Table 8.

55 i

Millstone Unit 3 MOV Program October 6,1995

14. Periodic Verification 14.1 Philosophy The purpose of GL 89-10 was to ensure that safety-related MOV's are operable, and to the extent practical this has been verified by testing the MOV's at conditions representative of their design-basis function. The unit's licensing basis requires that these valves are operable and be maintained j as operable after the closure of the design-basis verification phase of GL 89-10. There needs to be high confidence that degradation will not occur so as to erode margin or in some way render the l MOV inoperable. .l item J. of GL 89-10 speaks of the need to verify "MOV switch settings because of the effects of wear or aging"(Item d.). In Item J., the licensee is requested to perform periodic testing with surveillance intervals " based upon the licensee's evaluation of the safety importance af each MOV as well as its q maintenance and performance history. The surveillance interval should not exceed five years or -

three outages, whichever is longer, unless a longer interval can be justified for any particular MOV." i

. Millstone Unit 3, through implementation of the NU MOV Program, is committed to maintaining l I

these safety-related MOV's operable in accordance with our MOV Program requirements as specified in our MOV Program Manual. Periodic testing can include static, dynamic, and motor current tests, or other acceptable diagnostic test methods. NU believes that static tests are fully effective in detecting degradation, except where valve internals have been modified or somehow degraded. We are aware that issues still exist as to the need to periodically dynamically test GL 89-10 MOV's. This was responsively considered in our approach to periodic testing (see Section 14.3). l 14.2 Determination and Maintenance of Correct Switch Settings item d of GL 89-10 requires licensees to prepare or revise procedures to ensure that correct switch settings are determined and maintained throughout the life of the plant. PI-8," Control of MOV Settings," establishes the methodology for controlling changes to maximum and minimum thrust and torque settings, limiter plate sizes, limit switch setpoints, and thermal overload heater settings.

NGP 6.10,"Use of the PMMS Data Base to Indicate Quality Assurance or Special Program Applicability," provides methods for identifying which nuclear plant components have special program requirements. All MOV's within the scope of the MP3 MOV Program are included in a "special programs" PMMS screen. This action will provide a mechanism for identifying components which have special MOV Program requirements during the generation of Automated Work Orders or system reviews. This effort integrates the MOV Program as an element of the NU Configuration Management Program to help maintain the configuration management of MOV switch settings.

PEP Action Plan 2.3.2," Design Control Manual," has been established to redesign the design control process at Northeast Utilities. This effort is integrated with PEP Action Plans 2.3.1," Configuration Management," and 2.3.3," Engineering Programs." The Design Control Manual will provide a mechanism for ensuring that MOV design requirements are maintained.

56

Millstone Unit 3 MOV Program October 6,1995 14.3 Position on Periodic Testing (Post Closure)

The MOV Program approach to periodic testing of GL 89-10 MOV's is as follows:

1. Post-Maintenance Testing This will be performed as required by PI-14," Post-Maintenance Testing Requirements," which addresses the need for both static and dynamic testing.
2. Trending This is described in PI-16,"MOV Tracking and Trending Program." This PI will be enhanced by a revision to specify trending requirements in even greater detail. We consider the use of static diagnostic testing to be the core of an l effective periodic testing program. It allows detection of anomalies and / or early indication of degradation. Periodic static testing will be performed on all GL 89 10 MOV's.

. Frequency of periodic static testing will be based on the PRA ranking, with the MOV's being divided into two groups. Priority I will consist of MOV's with a "very high" or "high" PRA ranking; and l

. Priority 2 will consist of MOV's with a " medium" or " low" PRA .

ranking. The definition of"very high","high", etc. is as defined by l NU's Safety Analysis Branch. The frequency of testing will be: I

. Priority 1: Every three outages or five years, whichever is greater.

. Priority 2: Every six outages or ten years, whichever is greater.

. Grouping will also be employed to optimize the tested population.

3. Periodic Dynamic Testing Plans currently call for six supplemental dynamic tests to be performed over the ,

next three fuel cycles to verify that design-basis capability is being maintained. l MOV's will be selected with consideration of margin, safety importance, maintenance history, and other relevant considerations. The figure of six tests was determined independent of the number of GL 89-10 MOV's for the nuclear unit. These tests will be evaluated, along with other industry data which is then available to determine whether degradation, not detectable with static testing, is occurring.

These plans will be reassessed when the recently announced NRC generic letter on periodic verification is issued, and changes made if deemed appropriate.

Millstone Unit 3 will be reviewing valves with low (but acceptable) margin as potential candidates for either reclassification from periodic testing category Priority 2 to 1, or to have their torque switch settings increased at the next convenient opportunity, as appropriate.

57

i Millstone Unit 3 MOV Program October 6,1995

15. Trend and Analyze MOV Failures 15.1 Tracking and Trending Requirements Item h. of GL 89-10 requires that each MOV failure and corrective action taken, including repair, alteration, analysis, test, and surveillance, should be analyzed orjustified and documented. The documentation thould include the results and history of each as-found deteriorated condition, malfunction, test, inspection, analysis, repair, or alteration. PI-16, "MOV Tracking and Trending Program," establishes the tracking and trending requirements for the NU MOV Program. PI-16 requires that each MOV failure and corrective action taken, including any repair or alteration, shall be entered into the NPRDS data for their units to identify any trends.

All corrective work on MOV's is performed through the work request process. Procedures describe the method for documenting failures or nonconforming conditions that occur during operation, testing, or maintenance. Depending on the particular failure or deteriorated condition, follow-up action may include:

i e Generation of a Adverse Condition Report (ACR), which replaced Plant incident Report (PIR).

Performance of a Root Cause Determination (RCD).

. Notification under the Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System (NPRDS).

  • Generation of an additional work package (s) for follow-up or corrective maintenance.

15.2 Diagnostic Parameter Trending MOV performance is trtnded to ensure that switch settings remain adequate for a given MOV throughout the life of the unit. PI-16 provides guidance on the collection of as-found testing and the collection of diagnostic test data for trending. The following performance parameters shall be trended:

  • Motor running current and supply voltage at the MCC or at the motor, e Measured maximum thrust or torque (whichever parameter is used for " baseline") at close torque switch trip and running average.
  • Power factor (if found to be a quantitative parameter, otherwise motor power should be trended).

Valve stroke time is monitored and trended by existing nuclear unit In-Service Test (IST) Programs and will not be trended by the NU MOV Program. Our program should provide sufficient data to identify degraded MOV performance. During this RFO (1995) and last RFO (1993),143 valves had baseline static tests performed and, effectively,71 valves had baseline dynamic tests performed, including grouped valves.

58

Millstone Unit 3 MOV Program October 6,1995 15.3 MOVFailure Trending Using NPRDS The NPRDS system will be used to assist in root cause investigations of MOV failures. At least once every refueling cycle (i.e., every two years or after each refueling outage), a Component Failure Analysis Report (CFAR) will be generated from the NPRDS data on record for Millstone Unit 3 to identify trends related to MOV operability as a function of the failures reported in the nuclear industry. This effort will assist in determining areas for programmatic improvement.

16. Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding 16.1 NRC Position The NRC Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data (AEOD) completed AEOD Special Study AEOD/S92-07 (December 1992)," Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding of Gate Valves."

The staffissued the AEOD report in NUREG-1275, Volume 9 (March 1993)," Operating Experience Feedback Report Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding of Gate Valves." In its report, AEOD concluded that licensees had not taken sufficient action to provide assurance that pressure locking and thermal binding will not prevent a gate valve from performing its safety function.

A memorandum dated December 20,1993, from James T. Wiggins, Acting Director, Division of Engineering, NRR, to the Regions provided guidance on the evaluation oflicensee activities to address pressure locking and thermal binding of gate valves. Supplement 6 to GL 89-10, dated March 4,1994, provided information on the consideration of pressure locking and thermal hindin of gate valves. Finally, on August 17,1995, NRR issued GL 95-07," Pressure Locking and Thermat Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves."

The NRC regulations require that licensees design safety-related systems to provide assurance that those systems can perform their safety functions. In GL 89-10, the staff requested licensees to l review the design bases of their safety-related MOV's. In complying with the NRC regulations,"...

licensees are expected to have evaluated the potential for pressure locking and thermal binding of gate valves and taken action to ensure that these phenomena do not affect the capability of MOV's to perform their safety-related functions. If a licensee identifies a potential for pressure locking and thermal bindiq of gate valves, the NRC regulations require that the licensee take action to resolve that problem."

16.2 PLTB Evaluation The initial review of the potential for pressure locking and thermal binding of gate valves at Millstone Unit 3 was performed by Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation (SWEC) in 1990.28 Stone and Webster performed similar evaluations for the other Millstone Units and Haddam Neck.

During an NRC evaluation of the GL 89-10 Program at Millstone Unit 1, the NRC reviewed the 2

SWEC report, and identified potential deficiencies with the evaluation " and questioned the following assumptions:

  • Excluding steam system valves from the evaluation for pressure locking,
  • Excluding valves below 200'F for thermal binding and below 150 psi for pressure locking.

59

Millstons Unit 3 MOV Program October 6,1995 Since the same assumptions were used in the Millstone Unit 3 evalration, the SWEC naluation was revisited. During the re-evaluation, the following Adverse Condition Reports (ACR's) were initiated  ;

when there were indications of PLTB concerns with GL 89-10 MOVs: ACR's 00220 (2/27/95), i 00288 (3/10/95),00290 (3/14/95),00935 (3/17/95),00302 (3/25/95),00300 (4/17/95), and 03624 (6/14/95).

All ACRs were dispositied with all of the subject valves found to be operable. Final evaluations i were performed in accord see with PI-20,"MOV Program Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding j Evaluation", and documenicd la calculation 95-ENG-1129M3, "MP3 - MOV Pressure Locking and i Thermal Binding - PI-20 Evaluations", Rev. 0 with Calculation Change Notices 1,2, and 3, ]

June 16,1995, 1 16.2.1 Evaluation Criteria The following criteria were used to determine if a GL 89-10 valve is susceptible to either pressure locking or thermal binding:3 e ~ Pressure locking and thermal binding is only applicable to gate valves. Any valve that is not a gate valve is excluded from any further evaluation for susceptibility to pressure locking or thermal binding.

  • Pressure locking and / or thermal binding of a gate valve is only a safety concern when the valve is closed and the valve is required to open to perform its safety function. Valves that are normally open and must only be closed to perform their safety function are not required to be evaluated for pressure locking or thermal binding.
  • Double-disc parallel-seat gate valves are not subject to thermal binding due to their disc design. The wedging mechanism between the double discs collapses as the nem rises. This permits the parallel discs to move inward and be raised regardless of the change in system temperature.

. Solid wedge gate valves are not subject to pressure locking since the disc does not contain a cavity at the seating surfaces that can be pressurized, and simultaneous leak tightness of both disc sealing surfaces cannot be reliably achieved.

  • - Gate valves that perform non-design basis event opening for recovery from mispositioning only are excluded from this evaluation.

16.2.2 Evaluation Method Utilizing the above criteria, each of the valves in the GL 89-10 program have been screened for susceptibility to pressure locking and thermal binding. No further evaluation was required for valves eliminated based on one of the above screening criteria. For each valve that was not eliminated as a result of the screening, the following evaluation method was used:

  • The expected range of upstream and downstream operating conditions was established.
  • Each stroke in the Design Basis Review (DBR) calculation where the valve i:.

required to open from the full closed position was reviewed to determine if the 60

. Millstone Unit 3 MOV Program October 6,1995

  • conditions necessary to cause pressure locking or thermal binding of the dise exist ,

1 during that stroke. Recovery from mispositioning strokes were not included in this

eview.

The survciliance procedures that affect these valves were reviewed to determine if the surveillance procedure established the conditions that could result in pressure j i locking or thermal binding of the valve. )

. 1

The following are the conditions that must occur before the valve is required to open for pressure j locking or thermal binding to potentially exist

!

  • Thermal binding of a valve could occur if a valve is closed when hot and then cools down appreciably before it is required to open. PI-20,"MOV Program Pressure

! Locking and Thermal Binding Evaluation," provided the temperature changes for evaluation. The valve body and seats contract a greater amount than the disc causing

~j the seats to bind the disc more tightly, increasing the force required to open the valve, possibly exceeding the capabilities of the motor operator.

j e Pressure locking could occur if a valve is closed in a system that cperates at pressure j or is pressurized. The bonnet cavity and the area between the valve discs fili with

pressurized water, equalizing with system pressure over time. Subsequently, before the valve is required to open, the system pressure drops and the higher pressure fluid is trapped in the bonnet area and the area between the valve discs. The pressurized fluid forces the discs closed even tigl' , trapping the pressurized fluid and j preventing it from leaking by the discs. When the valve is required to open, the extra force required to open the valve due to the discs being pressed against the ,

1 valve seats could potentially exceed the capability of the motor operator.

1  !

  • Pressure locking could occur if a valve is closed ir a system that is normally filled l and slightly pressurized. The bonnet cavity and the area between the valve discs fill ,
with water, equalizing with line pressure over time. (Note that the head of water i t from a filled tank can provide enough pressure to fill the valve internals.)

Subsequently, before opening, the valve is heated by hotter fluid on either side of the valve disc or by an external heat source. Heating of the water in the bonnet and disc cavity results in the thermal expansion of the trapped fluid, increasing the pressure

. seating the valve discs against the seats. When the valve is required to open, the extra force required to open the valve due to the discs being pressed against the y valve seats could potentially exceed the capability of the motor operator.

}

16.3 Evaluation Results For each valve opening stroke or surveillance procedure where the potential for either pressure p locking or thermal binding exists, the corrective actions taken to preclude it from occurring are  ;

identified. The results / conclusions and corrective actions are summarized in Table 20.

l 1

i 61

Millstone Unit 3 MOV Program October 6,1993 Table 20: Pressure Locking (PL) / Thermal Binding (TB) Summary Valve Valve Wedge l Susceptible l Action g .

Desi . n PL TB .,

3CCP'MOV045A Butterfly Symmetnc y;y1 ; .. ...a ., ,. ; ..,m g.,;;9 ; 7; 3 g . o;i .

3CCP*MOV0458 Butterfly S mmetric : ( 7:l.{ l Q.n::: < H + ? W L ? * #f.I 3CCP*MOV048A Butterfly S mmetnc ' . . . .p H L . : 1 ~ s i:)::[: },;1[.[. $U jh .

3CCP*MOV0480 Butterfly S mmetnc "07. ;E ' ; J .?;' 'lM,f ]: p'jy ft:1R3 3CCP'MOV049A 3CCP*MOV0498 Butterfly S mmetnc

.W"'

W ; i;. n
. o 5;. . ,,,c 7 i 3CCP*MOV222 Butterfly Butterfly S mmetne ; ,-

S mmetnc 9:7..

f..Jj';[:;[f'f:llfM.fl-((:fM/f 1 0 ?.i ?;f: : Jin% . E 3CCP*MOV223 Butterfly S mmetric # $ ! Of I " ['7 "l . ' T?f :.1 N ? 3CCP*MOV224 Butterfly S mmetnc (Dll i? y  ?.}.f ( .. ,f 1] 4 y 7 3CCP*MOV225 Butterfly S mmetnc W 3D.9,':::.;::;7% .f 1:qf M :l$ 3CCP*MOV226 Butterfly S mmetric ,yGp; gff 3CCP'MOV227 Butterfly S mmetnc Lp 7 M " [1l}f . y, 6 f Q>g c L .:..[%(. f f..,[jJ$7 a. 3CCP*MOV228 Butterfly S mmetnc Wygd c., (i f: J,J.: .- ' 41, L'WW:t 3CCP*MOV229 Butterfly S mmetnc N$y3MU q dihd$d$;dN$d[hk  : 3CHS*LCV1128 Gate Solid No No 3CHS*LCV112C Gate Sohd l No l No l l 3CHS*LCV112D Gate Solid l No l No l l 3CHS*LCV112E Gate Sohd N No 3CHS*MV8100 Globe Guided 3CHS*MV8104 Globe Guided 3CHS*MV8105 Gate Sohd No No 3CHS*MV8106 Gate Solid N No 3CHS*MV8109A Globe Guided b 3CHS*MV81098 Globe Guided . 3CHS*MV8109C Globe Guided . 3CHS*MV8109D Globe Guided [ f 3CHS*MV8110 Globe Standard } 3CHS*MV8111A Globe Standard -

                                                                                                  @      $M                  E                !

3CHS*MV8111B Globe Standard ggpggh -- ;._ _ 3CHS*MV8111C Globe Standard RJgg- Ws=Uk

                                                                                                                      ~

m r ik ' 3CHS*MV8112 Globe Guided ilEMig .. 3CHS*MV8116 Globe Standard gg j [ ' . 3CHS*MV8438A Gate Flex No , No 3CHS*MV84388 Gate Flex No No l 3CHS*MV8438C Gate F;ex No No l 3CHS*MV6468A Gate Flex No No l 3CHS*MV84688 Gate Flex No No l 3CHS*MV8507A Gate Flex Yes No Dntled Disc" l 3CHS*MV8507B Gate Flex Yes No Dniled Disc" l 3CHS*MV8511 A Globe Standard nygg - --- - -

                                                                                                                                                 - p 3CHS*MV8511B       Globe      Standard @                                                                        -

f 4 1 3CHSHV8512A Globe Standard @$ 5 l 3CHS*MV85128 Globe Standard N 3 CMS *MOV24 Globe Guided lM = m 4 3CVS*MOV25 Globe Guioed W8$$M mumcm-3FWA*MOV35A Gate Solid No l No l 3FWA*MOV358 Gate Sohd No l No l 3FWA*MOV35C Gate Solid No l No 3FWA*MOV35D Gate Sohd N No 31AS*MOV72 Globe Guided 3LMS*MOV40A Globe Guided 1 3LMS*MOV40B Globe Guided i l 3LMS*MOV40C Globe Guided l SD [ 3LMS*MOV400 Globe Guided N.x . 62

Millstone Unit 3 MOV Program October 6,1995 Valve Valve Wedge Susceptible l Action g Design PL B 3 MSS *MOV17A Globe Stop Check 3 MSS *MOV17B Globe Stop Check 3 MSS *MOV17D Globe Stop Chock ll j 3 MSS *MOV18A Gate Flex Yes Yes Dnli Disc" - RFO 6 3 MSS *MOV18B Gate Flex Yes l Yes l Dntl Disc - RFO 6 3 MSS *MOV18C Gate Flex Yes l Yes l Dnli Disc"'- RFO 6 d 3 MSS *MOV18D Gate Flex Yes l Yes l Dnli Dise '- RFO 6 I 3 MSS *MOV74A Globe Standard . __ _ ._ews,qgg;_ __-_ _ _ _ _ _ ___ w

                                                                                            -vem 3 MSS *MOV74B    Globe     Standard                                                               um=      N1 3 MSS *MOV74C    Globe     Standard 3 MSS *MOV74D f          !.

Globe _ Standard , 3OSS*MOV34A Butterfly Symmetric 3OSS*MOV34B Butterfly Symmetnc l l 3RCS*MV8000A Gate Solid No No 3RCS*MV8000B Gate Solid No No 3RCS*MV8098 3RHS*FCV610 Globe Globe Standard Guided

                                                                                          ,)

l I df y]Qg 3RHS*FCV611 Globe Guided ' - t- W j " 3RHS*MV8701A Gate Flex Yes No Open TS Bypass"- RFO 5 Connect Bonnet Bypass * - RFO 6 3RHS*MV87018 Gate Flex No No 3RHS*MV8701C Gate Flex Yes No Bonnet Leakoff Connected ** , l 3RHS*MV8702A Gate Flex No No 3RHS*MV87028 Gate Flex Yes No Open TS Bypass"- RFO 5 Connect Bonnet Bypass' - RFO 6 3RHS*MV8702C Gate Flex Yes No Bonnet Leakoff Connected'* 3RHS*MV8716A Gate Flex No No 3RHS*MV87168 Gate Flex No No 3RSS*MOV20A Butterfly Symmetne lg_' r . zms c ~ us-3RSS*MOV208 Butterfly Symmetnc j -

                                                                                                                                                                    *{

3RSS*MOV20C Butterfly Symmetnc i {. 3RSS*MOV20D Butterfly Symmetnc f* 3RSS*MOV23A 3RSS*MOV23B Butterfly Butterfly Offset Offset

                                                                                                                                ~
                                                                                                                                       $h T1                              i l

3RSS*MOV23C Butterfly Offset  % 3RSS*MOV23D Butterfly Offset N $ifM _.: 1 3RSS*MOV38A Gate Sohd No No I 3RSS*MOV388 Gate Sohd No No 3RSS*MV8837A Gate Flex No No l 3RSS*MV8837B Gate Flex No No 3RSS*MV8838A Gate Flex No No 3RSS*MV8838B Gate Flex No No J 3SlH*MV8801A Gate Solid No No 1 3SlH*MV88018 Gate Sohd No No l 3SlH*MV8802A Gate Solid No No ElH*MV8802B Gate Sohd No No 3SlH*MV8806 Gate Sohd No No 3SlH*MV8807A Gate Sohd No No 3SlH*MV8807B Gate Sohd No No 3SlH*MV8813 Gate Sohd No No 3SlH*MV8814 Globe Guided Rds m m:WemmveMnemW#5MMW 3SlH*MV8821A Gate Sohd No No 3SlH*MV8821B Gate Solid No No l 3SlH*MV8835 Gate Sohd No No 3SlH*MV8920 Globe Guided ;w eem,d: MEW &rmammimmaemsminkvW 3SlH*MV8923A Gate Sohd No l No l 63

Millstone Unit 3 MOV Program October 6,1995 Valve Valve Wedge l Susceptible l Action Type Design l PL l TB l 3SlH*MV89238 Gate Solid l No l No l 3SlH*MV8924 Gate Solid l No l No l 3SIL*MV8804A Gate Flex l No l No l 3SIL*MV8804B Gate Flex l No l No l 3SIL*MV8808A Gate Flex l No l No l 3SIL*MV88086 Gate Flex l No l No l 3SIL*MV8808C Gate Flex l Ne l No l 3SIL*MV8808D Gate Flex l No l No l 3SIL*MV8809A Gate Flex l No l No l 3SIL*MV8809B Gate Flex l No l No l 3SIL*MV8812A Gate Flex l No l No - l 3SIL*MV8812B Gate Flex l No l No l l 3SIL*MV8840 Gate Flex No No q 3SWP'MOV024A 3SWP'MOV024B 3SWP*MOV024C Plug Plug Plug lem 9 3SWP'MOV024D Plug ,j j y j 3SWP*MOV050A M Offset - 3SWP*MOV050B M Offset 3SWP*MOV054A M met 3SWP*MOV054B M S mmetric mmetnc 3SWP*MOV054C Butterfly i 3SWP*MOV0540 M S metn 3SWP*MOV057A M S mmetnc 1 3SWP*MOV057B M S metri l 3SWP*MOV057C M S metr ) 3SWP*MOV057D M Butterfly S mmetnc Symmetnc 3SWP*MOV071A 3SWP*MOV071B Butterfly Symmetnc l$$j 3SWP'MOV102A Butterfly Offset - d 3SWP'MOV1028 Butterfly Offset 'M .3 H SME 3SWP*MOV102C Butterfly Offset Ug!U W$% m-3SWP*MOV102D Offset WS r$0pkM f , 3SWP*MOV115A Butterfly Pleg l! - - 3 VM N 8 3SWP*MOV115B Plug & . EkhQ dn s . h... .. . l l The NRC regulations require an analysis under 10 CFR 50.59 for any valve modifications and establishment of adequate post-modification and in-service testing of any valves installed as part of the modi 6 cation. For example, the licensee would have to evaluate the effects of drilling the hole in the disk if used to resolve a pressure locking concern. One consideration in this evaluation is the fact that the MOV will be leaktight in only one direction. The Millstone Unit 3 Safety Analysis was documented in Millstone Unit 3 PDCR MP3-95-020.34 If an MOV is found to be susceptible to pressure locking or thermal binding and the licensee relies on the capability of the MOV to overcome pressure locking or thermal binding, the staff will review the licensee justification during inspections in consideration of the uncertainties surrounding the prediction of the required thrust to overcome these phenomena. If the staff 0nds that a licensee has not adequately addressed the potential for pressure locking and thermal binding of gate valves, enforcement actions and schedules for response will depend on the safety signincance of the issue at the plant. At Millstone Unit 3 modiGcations were made to four valves: 3CHS*MV8507A/B, 3RilS*MV8701C, and 3RHS*MV8702C, we did not have to rely on MOV capability calculations to overcome pressure locking or thermal binding. Acceptable to the NRC,35 two valves 64

Millstona Unit 3 MOV Program October 6,1995 (3RHS*MV8701 A and 3RHS*MV8702B} are currently relying on MOV capability to overcome a pressure locking condition, i.e. operable.3 This operability condition is until an acceptable physical modincation will be performed during RFO 6. Four valves,3 MSS *MOVl8A/B/C/D, are currently relying on a procedure change to prevent pressure locking and thermal binding. A physical modincation will be performed during RFO 6 for these valves.

17. Industry Information NRC information notices, industry technical and maintenance updates, and 10 CFR Part 21 notices are entered into our mainframe-based Action item Tracking and Trending System (AITfS) computer database. The assignments, due dates, required response, and resultant action can be reviewed by any individual with access to a computer.
18. Program Schedule In a letter dated June 28,1989,' the NRC Staffissued Generic Letter 89-10, " Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve Testing and Surveillance." The letter required each licensee with an operating i license to complete all design-basis reviews, analyses, verifications, tests, and inspections instituted l to comply with GL 89-10 within five years or three refueling outages of the date of the letter, whichever was later. The required documentation had to be available within one year or one refueling outage of the date of the letter, whichever was later. The documents should include the description and schedule for the design-basis review recommended in item a. (including guidance from item e.) for all safety-related MOV's and position-changeable MOV's as described, and the program description and schedule for items b. through h. for all safety-related MOV's and position-changeable MOV's.

Northeast Utilities certified in a letter dated December 15,1989,36 that they were "... developing detailed programs for addressing Generic Letter 89-10 at the Millstone Unit 3 Plant...", and that the "... programs will encompass the guidance as detailed in the Generic Letter." The proposed schedule for Millstone Unit 3, with the program denned by January 1991 and the program completed within three refueling outages (1994). 3 In a letter dated August 3,1990 , the NRC Staffissued Supplement 2 to GL 89-10. In this letter, the NRC staff stated that licensees were not required to have their respective program descriptions in place until at least January 1,1991. Northeast Utilities informed the NRC in a letter dated May 4, 199237, that they did not fully comply with their commitments to develop program descriptions by April 1991. This conclusion was based upon an audit, part of a routine in-house Quality Services self-assessment, which determined that in-place program descriptions for addressing GL 89-10 did not contain all of the necessary technical elements specined in GL 89-10. Northeast Utilities then stated that they "... plan to have the program descriptions completed by the end of 1992." This commitment was met with the release of the Motor Operated Valve Program Manual on December 18,1992. In a letter dated December 13,1993,38 Northeast Utilities provided the NRC with an updated schedule for completion of testing at the third refueling outage (1995). This change represented a change in the Millstone Unit 3 date for the third refueling. The GL 89-10 MOV Program was completed at Millstone Unit 3 within three refueling outages after the date of the GL 89-10 letter. Additionally, documentation was provided to the NRC Staff within 30 days following the completion 65

Millstons Unit 3 MOV Program October 6,1995 of the third refueling outage. Therefore, Millstone Unit 3 has met all schedule commitments with respect to GL 89-10 requirements. I

19. Quality Assurance l item f. of GL 89-10 requires that documentation of explanations and a description of the actual test methods used for accomplishing design-basis verification testing be retained. Calculations associated with design-basis reviews and development ofin-situ testing are performed in accordance with Nuclear Group Procedures (NGP) 5.05, " Design Inputs, Design Verification, and Design Interface Reviews," and NGP 5.06," Design Analyses and Calculations." All MOV Program records and test procedures are retained in accordance with NGP 2.13, " Nuclear Plant Record.: Program."

NU developed Motor-Operated Valve Engineering Program Plan, Revision 1, dated July 16,1992, to ) address the recommended actions of GL 89-10. The documents that implement this plan are the Motor-Operated Valve Program Manual and its Program Instructions. Based on the results of an internal audit, NU recognized that they were behind schedule in meeting their prior commitment to develop a GL 89-10 MOV Program Description for Millstone Unit 3 by April 1991. Management took action to cor ect this problem by assigning lead responsibility for MOV program development to the systems engineering group. To complete this effort, NU used contractr.'ssistance to prepare the MOV Program Instructions, differential pressure test procedures and othen r&ed documents. Northeast Utilities committed to have the Motor-Operated Valve Program Manuai i1 place by December 31,1992, and they completed this effort on December 18,1992.

20. Audits / Inspections We performed a self-assessment of our MOV Program from June 14-25,1993, following a meeting with Region I and NRR staff on May 20,1993, where we proposed our plan to do a self-assessment at the Millstone Nuclear Power Station and documented by letter, dated June 4,1993. Region I authorized our self-assessment in lieu of the NRC inspection mandated by NRC Temporary Instruction 2515/109. NRC inspectors monitored the self-assessment and found that the findings were equivalent to those that would have been identified by an NRC team. The self-assessment was conducted for the three Millstone units. The findings were significant, proper emphasis was placed on the importance of the items, and disposition of each finding was adequately addressed.

Additionally, an internal audit was conducted during RFO 5 by Quality Assessment Services personnel. The audit covered outage activities, including MOV testing, design changes, maintenance, procedure use, organization, and engineering calculations. The results of the Millstone Unit 3 Audit A30345" identified six concerns that were transferred to six Adverse Condition Reports (ACR's), in accordance with a revised QAS reporting procedure, and two recommendations for the MOV Program.

21. Training PI-17," Qualification of Personnel," establishes MOV Program training and personnel qualification requirements based on position and functional assignments. Departmental training requirements for Nuclear Group personnel are governed by NGP 2.26," Departmental Training." All personnel performing maintenance and / or testing on MOV's are required to attend and satisfactorily complete the necessary training courses. Supervisors evaluate each individual's competence and previous 66

Millstone Unit 3 MOV Progran October 6,1995 MOV experience to determine an individual's qualification to perform work. The Nuclear Training Department provides VOTES and MOV technical training for nuclear unit department personnel. Millstone Unit 3's MOV training program has been accredited by the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations. It outlines the specific requirements as well as continuing and refresher training for various technicians and engineers. This program includes both classroom knowledge and hands-on laboratory skill development. Numerous types of MOV hardware are used as training aids at the NU training facility. VOTES equipment is borrowed from Generation Test Services for training and returned for actual work at the unit. Each instructor has an individual training folder which contains qualifying documentation covering the background and qualifications of the instructor. NRC discussions with the training staff regarding MOV issues verified that they were knowledgeable and experienced. The Nuclear Training Department staff check and validate contractor training by examination requiring an 80% on a written test and a display of proficiency in the laboratory before being allowed to assist qualified personnel from Millstone Unit 3 or Generation Test Services. The Nuclear Training Department maintains a matrix of all qualified personnel in each department and distributes this information to department heads periodically. After completion of the required MOV training, the department head qualifies the trainee with applicablejob related training. The completed training information is sent to the Nuclear Training Department to update the matrix with a qualification status and a date for requalification. Required training updates are designated on the matrix to signify when new elements of training are required. The Training Program Control Committee reviews regulatory and industry documents to determine their applicability to the licensee's MOV program. Representatives from training and maintenance meet periodically to discuss the need to modify training as a result of any new industry or vendor information.

22. Future Planned MOV Enhancements Table 21 provides work items in the Cycle 6 planning / review process for Millstone Unit 3 to provide enhancements of GL 8910 MOV's.

Table 21: Future MOV Enhancements Valve Work Item 3CHS*LCV112E Spnng pack change / upgrade - Inspection URI 95-17-08 3CHS*MV8109B Adjust packing, replace spring pack 3RHS*MV8701A Add pressure locking bypass, re-establish conventional open torque switch bypass 3RHS*MV8702B Add pressure locking bypass, re-establish conventional open torque switch bypass 3RSS*MV8837A Spring pack change / upgrade 3SlH'MV8806 Stem nut replacement & stem inspection 3SlH*MV8923B Adjust packing, inspect stem for galling 3SIL*MV8804A Spring pack change / upgrade - Inspection URI 95-17-08 3SIL*MV8808A Spring pack change / upgrade -Inspection URI 95-17-08 3SIL*MV8808C Spnng pack change / upgrade Inspection URI 95-17-08 3SIL*MV8808D Spnng pack change / upgrade -Inspection URI 95-17-08 3SIL*MV8809A Spnng pack change / upgrade -Inspection URI 95-17-08 3SIL*MV8812A Spring pack change / upgrade - Inspection URI 95-17-08 3SIL*MV8812B Spnng pack change / upgrade -Inspection URI 95-17-08 67

Millstone Unit 3 MOV Program October 6,1995

23. MP3 Cycle 6 Test Scope (Preliminary)

Provided in Table 22 is a preliminary summary of future MOV monitoring activities and retests in addition to periodic testing. Table 22: Cycle 6 Afonitoring / Test Scope Valve Static Test Dynamic Test Comments  ; 3SlH*MV88018 X X Partial disposition to NCR 395-408 l 3CHS*LCV112C X

24. Status of GL 89-10 Inspection Findings NU extensively modified its position on gec v@e f'etors in December,1993 in response to the release of the EPRI PPM test data and the issuance M NRC Information Notice 93-88." This position which was documented in January 1994 has rr,mained unchanged." The memo provided requirements for operability and design-setup for both testable and non testable gate valves. j Validation of these valve factor criteria is required as part of design-basis closure of GL 89-10. The i need tojustify these values was reaffinned in the July 12,1994,"Sheron memo".

The approach for dynamically testable valves has been to validate Vf's used for design setup by l dynamic testing with appropriate allowances for uncertainties and extrapolation. For non-testable valves, validation is provided using the EPRI developed Performance Prediction Methodology j (PPM)." Due to the extensive delay in the release of PPM to the industry, NU took the pro-active ) step to hire Kalsi Engineering Inc. to provide valihtice using their KEl Gate program under their l QA Program. KEl Gate is the functional equivalent of the gate valve model in the EPRI PPM program. Kalsi Engineering Inc. was the developer of the gate valve model under contract to EPRI. . NU recognizes that the NRC Staffintends to formally review PPM and issue a Safety Evaluation i Report (SER). NU will examine the NRC SER when issued and reconcile any differences with KEl j Gate. The schedule for resolution is dependent upon the significance of the change, and in no case  ! would it be later than RFO 6. This recognizes that control switch settings may have to be adjusted if j significant changes were made which would involve static diagnostic testing. Subsequent calculations for new valves, new conditions, or for those previous KEl Gate calculations which require revision will all be analyzed using the NRC reviewed version of EPRI PPM. Results of a NRC inspection of the Millstone Unit 3 MOV program on June 19-30,1995, were issued in a report dated September 11,1995. The inspection report, which included one unresolved item 1 and several inspector follow items, is under review by Milistone Unit 3 staff to determine the appropriate actions. The inspector follow items covered the same MOV Programmatic issues which were reviewed and accepted by the NRC during their closure of the Haddam Neck MOV Program"

                                                                                                                                  ]

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Millstone Unit 3 MOV Program October 6,1995 l References i ' James G. Partlow letter to All Licensees of Operating Nuclear Power Plants and 11olders of Construction Pennits for Nuclear Power Plants," Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve Testing and Surveillance (Generic Letter 89 10) -- 10CFR50.54(f)," June 28,1989. l 2 James G. Partlow letter to All Licensees of Operating Nuclear Power Plants and 11olders of Construction Permits for Nuclear Power Plants, and Individuals on the Attached Distribution List," Supplement I to Generic Letter 8910: Results of the Public Workshops," June 13,1990. I 1 ' James G. Partlow letter to All Licensees of Operating Nuclear Power Plants and floiders of Construction Permits for Nuclear Power Plants," Supplement 2 to Generic Letter 89-10: ' Availability of Program Descriptions'," August 3,1990.

  • James G. Partlow letter to All Licensees of Operating Nuclear Power Plants and IIolders of Construction Permits for Nuclear Power Plants," Generic Letter 89-10, Supplement 3, ' Consideration of the Results of NRC-Sponsored Tests of Motor-Operated Valves'," October 25,1990.

' James G. Partlow letter to All Licensees of Operating Nuclear Power Plants and flolders of Construction Permits for Nuclear Power Plants," Generic Letter 89-10, Supplement 4, ' Consideration of Valve Mispositioning in Boiling Water Reactors'," February 12,1992. ' James G. Partlow letter to All Licensees of Operating Nuclear Power Plants and flolders of Construction Permits for Nuclear Power Plants," Generic Letter 89-10, Supplement 5, ' Inaccuracy of Motor-Operated Valve Diagnostic Equipment'," June 28,1993. 7 James G. Partlow letter to All Licensees of Operating Nuclear Power Plants and lioiders of Construction Permits for Nuclear Power Plants," Generic Letter 89-10, Supplement 6, 'Information on Schedule and Grouping, and Staff Responses to Additional Public Questions'," March 8,1994.

  • Y. Khalil to R. Eisner memo, NE-95-SAB-337," Quantitative PRA Rankings of Millstone Unit 3 GL 89-10 MOVs (Preliminary input)," August 16,1995.

' Brian W. Sheron to NRC Regional Directors memo," Guidance on Closure of Staff Review of Generic Letter 89-10 Programs," July 12,1994.

'" R. T. liarris to MOV File (MOV Program Manual, Notes / Memo Tab) memo, MOV-RTil-95-026, Rev. 2, "GL 8910 Closure items," June 16, !995.
" R. T. IIanis to MOV File (MOV Program Manual, Notes / Memo Tab) memo, MOV-RTii-94-037,"NU MOV Program Position on Structural Calculations at Stall (Locked Rotor) Condition," April 8,1994.
" J.11. Mutchler / R. J. Bumstead to S. T. Ilodge memo, MOV-95-399," Ambient Temperature Torque Derate of Non-Reliance AC Motors," August 25,1995.
" NRC Information Notice 93 88," Status of Motor-Operated Valve Performance Prediction Program by the Electric Power Research Institute," November 30,1993.
 " R. T. llarris to MOV File memo, MOV-RTil-93-034,"NU MOV Program: Acceptance Criteria for Gate Valve, Valve Factors (Vf)(Re: PI-9 and PI-I I)," January 25,1994.
 " EPRI Letter,"EPRI MOV PPP Update of Results and Specifications and Drawings for Flow Loop Test Valves," December 14,1993.
  J. E. Richardson to NRC Regional Directors memo," Guidance for Inspections of Programs in Response to Generic Letter 89-10," April 30,1993.
 " R. Eisner to R. T liarris memo, MOV-94-021," Comparison of EPRI Performance Prediction Program Valves to NU's GL 89-10 Program Motor Operated Valves," January 25,1994.
  Tetra Engineering Group, Inc.," Analysis of Millstone Point Unit 3 Motor Operated Valve Rate of Loading,"

TR-95-034, October 3,1995. 1 I 69 l

                                                                                                                                          )

f l

          - Millstons Unit 3 MOV Program                                                                        October 6,1995
              " J. H. Mutchler to R. C. Elfstrom memo, MOV-94-206 " Limit Switch Repeatability for Limitorque
                 ' Actuators," March 26,1994.
          '
  • NU Calculation W2 517-1075-RE, Revision 3," Millstone 2 MOV Repeatability Statistical Evaluation,"
                 . May 4,1994.

8' John M. Jacobson (NRC) to E. Watzt (Northern States Power Co.) letter,"Close-Out inspection of GL 89 13 (Monticello)," May 11,1995. 22 Private Communication to NU, November 22,1994. 23 Onedenko, B. and Ushakov, I., Probabilistic Reliability Engineering, John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,1995, Page 19.

           ; 2* EPRI MOV Performance Prediction Program," Performance Prediction Methodology implementat.,

Guide," November 1994.

             " R. T. Harris to MOV File memo, MOV RTH-95-19,"NU MOV Program Position on Replacement of Operator or Yoke Bolts / Studs of GL 89-10 MOV's Without Diagnostic Retesting," April 6,1995.
               J. F. Opeka letter to U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,"Haddam Neck Plant, Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit Nos.1,2, and 3 Response to Generic Letter 89-10, Supplement 5, ' Inaccuracy of Motor-Operated Valve Diagnostic Program'," October 14,1993.
              " Liberty Technology Center Inc.," VOTES 2.0 Users Manual" Software, Version 2.3.1.

2'" Final Report Thermal Binding and Hydraulic Lock of Gate Valves for Millstone Unit 3 Nuclear Power Station", Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation, J.O. No. 1727409, November 15,1990.

               R. T. Harris to Distribution memo, MOV RTH-94-034," Pressure Locking / Thermal Binding of Power Operated Valves," March 21,1994.
              '* PI-20,"MOV Program Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding Evaluation," Revision 2.
               PDCR MP3 95-021,"3 MSS *MOVl8A/B/C/D Dise Modification."
              " PDCR 3 95-041,"RHR System, Reestablishing Remote Manual Action Design Basis for 3RHS*MV8701 A and 3RilS*MV8702B."
              " PDCR MP3 95-015,"3RHS*MV8701 A/C and 3RHS*MV8702B/C Valve Modification for Pressure Locking."
               PDCR MP3-95-020, Revision 0,"3CHS*MV8507A/B Disc Modification," Approved for Construction April 20,1995.
               " E. M. Kelly, USNRC to J. F. Opeka, inspection Report #50-423/95-17," Millstone Unit 3 MOV Inspection Report 95 17," September 11,1995.
                E. J. Mroczka letter to U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,"Haddam Neck Plant, Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit Nos.1,2, and 3, Generic Letter 89 10, ' Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve Testing and Surveillance'," December 15,1989.
               " J. F. Opeka letter to U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,"Haddam Neck Plant, Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit Nos. I,2, and 3, ' Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve Testing and Surveillance',"

May 4,1992.

                J. F. Opeka letter to U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission," Millstone Unit 3 Plant, Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit Nos.1,2, and 3, Generic Letter 89 10, ' Motor-Operated Valve Testing Program',"

December 13,1993.

                " QAS' Audit Repoit No. A30345," 'MOV Program' Millstone Unit 3," QAS-95-4302, September 15,1995.
             '** E. M. Kelly, USNRC to J, F. Opeka, Inspection Report #50-213/95 12,"Haddam Neck Motor-Operated                I Valve inspection 95 12," September 29,1995.

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