ML20077K468

Motion That Stds for late-filed Contentions Not Apply to Contentions to Be Filed Based on Util Dcrdr & NUREG-0737, Rev 1.Document Unavailable to Intervenors Prior to Deadline for Contention Submission.Certificate of Svc Encl

ML20077K468
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	01/08/1983
From:	Eddleman W EDDLEMAN, W.
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
References
ISSUANCES-OL, NUDOCS 8301130068
Download: ML20077K468 (9)

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DOCKETED UNITED STATES OF AMERICA M#

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 8faguag fjh)$983

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BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD

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Glenn O. Bright Dr. James H. Carpenter James L. Kelley, Chairman In the Matter of

) Dockets 50 400 OL CAROLINA POWER AND LIGHT CO. et al. ) 50 401 OL (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, )

Units i and 2) )

)

Wells Eddleman's Motion Concerning DORDR Information As detailed in the additional DORDR contentions filed herewith, and the other contentions based solely on CP&L's "DCRDR" and NUREG-0737 Rev.1, the earliest of which I saw is 12-14-82, the information in CP&L's so-called "DCRDR" is inadequate to evaluate control room design.

The report itself has a. body of iv+1h pages, and the arpendices, e.g.,

give only 2 of some 35 HERSs referred to in it. However, the "DCRDR" l appendix KA lists a huge amount of information in the nossession of CP&L which has not been provided to me, or to other intervenors.

Now here 's a Catch-22: I can get that information by discovery on my contention 132, but NRC rules won't let me formulats a contention i

based on information which must later be obtained by discovery.

Therefore, I join w* th Dr. Wilson 's not$ nn ("Resoc nse" dated Jan 6 '83) that late-filing of contentions not be considered to apply to those based -

on specific HEDs, HERS, DER file, and othor records listed in said Anpendix.

CP&L has conceded that the DCRDR is a document not available to intervenors nrior to the deadline for submitted contentions in this case.

l 8301130068 830108 PDR ADOCK 05000400 <

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And the failure to include and sucoly inf ormation is clearly CP&L's and their contractor Essex Corocration's, not nine..

If in the alternative the Board decides to acoly the late-filing criteria to such contenticns, I argue (based solely on that assunption) that under 10 CFR s.71h(a)(1) there is good cause for failure to file on tine, because Apolicants withheld the information necessary to formulate the contentions, and are still withholding it so far; further, the NUnEG-0737 Rev.1 and other basis did not exist 5-14-82; There are no other means to protect my interest in this matter since no other party has more rights dhan I do to file contentions based on deficiencies in the DCRDR and the control room's conpliance with NRC rules, and intervenors file contentions as a matter of right.

Staff review is no substitute for this right, nor for litigation.

See ALAB-298, Perry, 2 NFC 730 at 736-7 (1975). Control rooms datang design and nrocedures, and energency planning concerns tied to the control roon and accurate renorting of plant data, are too comnlex to allow a a simple judgment by the Staff as to whether the Anplicants meet NRC licensing requirements. Perry, sunra, ibid.

Given the scarse nature of what CP&L has file d so far re DCRDR and the qualifications of its control room reviewers ~, it is clear that litigation of U11s issue can help in developing a sound record.

l I have training in systens and can ask good questions on these points.

l But the basic help to the record is getting the information before l the Board. The Board acknowledges the control rcon is an important issue, and has adnitted my contention 132 thereon.

As shown above, no other oarty can represent my interests in this unless they have ri Ehts I don't. Annlicants are clearly adverse

! to my interests in this matter, ad shown e.g. by their slowness to file even the thin documentation they have re control roon design review.

(Sco MacDuffic CP&L letter to Denton NRC 7 Dec '82 sLying CP&L was 1

filing this now, theuch it had been revised last in Sant 1981,

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to " expedite" this case. ) Staff, as noted above, car.not recrosent my interests under the test of Perry.

This matter of additional contentions re control roon design will not broaden the issues much, if at all, since a control roon contention is already adnitted. Indeed, contentions based on later revealed documents nay focus and narrow the control roon issues to be heard. Moreover, we are 20 months f ron hearing now, according to NRC 's new Harris licensing schedule of December 1982, so the admission of such contentions cannot act to delay the oroceeding significantly.

Finally, such contentions should be allowed because to do otherzwise wonid encourage anolicants in this and ether licensing proceedings to withhold information from intervenors in the hope of preventing them from f"aning contentions uoon inoortant safety and environmental concerns, such as the adequacy of control room design for accident conditions (public health and safety) and for providing data for emergency resoonse (ditto).

Written this 8th day of Ja nary 1983 71@ ~

Wells Eddleman Attached: contentions based solely on new information voceived on &

after dxx December 14, 1982 re contrb1 room design. Note that CP&L distribution of the document is spread over 10 days. The LPDR in Raleigh did not have the DCRDR document as late as 12-22-82 according to my search and to the ref erence librarian, I . Hickman.

y Additional contentions of Wells Eddleman based onbCRDR"I got 12-14 82 1323 The deisign of the Harris Unit 1 control room does not connly with the requirements of NUREG-0737, revision 1, dated 12-17-82, particularly the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) requirement.

BASIS: the Detailed Control Room Design Review and its recow.nendations o prepared by Essex Corp. for CP&L in 1980-81, including the details thereing of CP&L/"Ebasco 's control room design for Harris 1, e.g.

Figure 1, p.10, make no reference to the SPDS and show no SPDS e 'uiument nor location for same. Thus, it is clear the SPDS isn't in the design as of 1980 by Ebasco, nor in the design as being updated in accord with the Essex DCRDR of 1981. .

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132C Ann 14. cants have not established that the Essex Corp review team had the appronriate nultidisciolinary qualifications requ! red drx section 5.1.b.(1) by NUREG-0737, Rev.1 of 12-1k7-82 and the ability to use accented human engineering principles, whizkxix in the DCRDR.

BASIS: the 12-7-82 dated docunent CP&L styles a DCRDR , section 1.1 (p.1) makes no reference to any established (or other) hunan engineering princioles used in this review. Nor does the rest of Section 1. -

1.2's conolete Section im2nznnmihahnamihm description of the teamb qualifications is as follows: "The evaluation team was connosed of six Essex Corooration l , employees permanently located in Raleigh and two CP&L employees. The Raleigh Essex starff were human factors specialists made up of two research scientist and four research associates. CP&L uersonnel functioned as contract administrators, onerat*ons suecialists, niant i liaison, and evaluation nrocess expeditors." This says nothing of the CD&L nennle 's qualifications, if any, and does not address the question of anpropriate multidisciplinary qualifications excent to say that all the Essex peonle are " human factors snecialists". This says nothing of their snecific cualification's oft multidisciolinary knowledge or abilities. Nothing further on this is in the "DCRDR".

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5 132C CP&L's "DCRDR" and control roon design fail to connly with hUREG-0737, Revision 1, sections 5.1(b)(ii),(iii)m(iv), 5.1(c) and 5.1(d) in at least the follouing ways:

(1) no function and task analysis was nerforned in the DCRDR, which itself states (p. iii, iten f) "The procedures for SENPP-1 have not been developed; "

... Section 2.0, u.x 3, begins with this: "2.1 For a olant under construction, such as SENPP-1, certain control roon and equipnent carameters cannot be evaluated. These paranetors include such elements as noise, light, control board components yot to be acquired, and procedures yet to be written."

By contrast, NUMxBO-0737 Rev 15.1.b. (ii) requires the use of function and task analysis that had been used as the basis for develoning ener-gency operating prodedures technical guidelines and nlant soecific emergency onerating procedures. Yet CP&L's "DCRDR" sec 6.3 n.13 states, (end of part (b)) "None of the problems mentioned in naraF"a,h 6.2b were identified from t hese task flows". No other part of the"DCRDR" states that such func tion and task analysis was used to identify problems.

(2) No connarison of the disclay and control room requirenents of NRC with any inventory is in the"DCRDR". Sec. 2.1 quoted above says this hasnot been done.

(3) the "DCRDR" does not address the usefulness of audible alcrm systems, information recording and recall capability at all. With respect to layout, the proposal arranges control and display cabinets such that they block or impede view of some others. (See Fig. 2, p.12, whero view of/ from panels 8,9,10&11 is obscured by #s 12,13,14 and 15 fron #'s 6,7, and 1,2,3,4 and 5. #6 and 7 are hidden f*on onerators by 1 and 2 (as well as nT 3,4 and 5) #'s 16 and 17, the incore instrunentation and inanrn nuclear instrumentat'en sveten ave alnost totally behind the 2 blocks 1 thwu 5 and 6-7 with ' respect to the

. . . 6 radiation nonitor equienent panels 12 thru 15, the 8-11 block (startup and generator) and the 1-5 block's sections i thru 4 and nossibly 5. Operator inability to see, read accurately, or integrate the info on these panels can im eril rublic safety jpef8ent.

The "D0903" does not nrovide the HERS (snecifications) for lighting and visual alarms, though section 2 3 says there are 17 of them (p.3): P.h is Missing from the cony of the "DC9DR" I have to make these contentions fron, but Appendix G, the HERS for emergency procqdures (and for procedures), the only ones given in the"DCRDR",

are mainly typesetting and format guides and do not explain how accepted human factors principles are incoroorated into them.

This is a basis for presun'.ng the other 15 h9?S are likewise deficient in explaining t;he accepted human factors principles involved in them.

Without seeing them it is silly to ask me to nredict this, so more ,

contentions may follow if the other 15 HERS are produced by CP&L.

(4) the "DCRDR" f ails to select doisign imurovements that will correct discrepancies that are significant in hunan engineering terns.

E.g. section 3 2(f) and (g), p.5, provide that concerns were evaluated using the Harris si nulator checklists, as deened applicable to SHUPP-1, but were referred to engineering or startuo personnel if not resolved.

At p. 6 (3 3 c) a total of 143 HED recorts are noted, 25 of which 30 became HERSs and 42 of which were judged inaoplicable since they refer to the simulator. That leaves 88 unaddressed. In all of this and throughout the "DCRDR" there is no indication of how significance of human engineering concerns re the control roon were determined, or if they were, or how the troposals will corr,ect the discrenancies.

Referral to startup, or nnking a recommendation, is not enough; and there are 88 HED renorts (not listed or described further in the "DCRDR")that seem to have fallen through the cracks.

(5) the "DCRDR" does not verify that each selected design improvenent will nrovide the necessan correction, as m19m-0737

Rev.1 5.1(d) requires. Indeed, the repor$ by Essex has ao its fir,st result, quoted above (1, suura, ref. section 2.1,n 3) that this' has not and cannot be done for several inportant areas.

132 D The "DCRDR" for SHNPP utterly f ails to conply with the requirenants of.NUREG-0737 Rev.1 with respect to Harris Unit 2.

The design of the Harris 2 control roon does not connly with the requivamenta of that document.

$ ASIS: OP&L's "DCRDR"a_ddresses unit #1 only. No nontion of a

unit 2 is nado in it. CP&L has not sunnlied a DCRDR f or Unit 2 yet.

However, NURFG-0737 Rev.1, section 5.2f provides that for anplications with an SSER dated after June ,1983, Control Roon Design Review will be required prior to licensing. According to N90s 12-28-82

" Schedule Change Milestones for Shearon Harris Unit 1", the SSER for Unit 1 was scheduled for Jan 9,1988h, now is slated for 4-2-8h, a 3 month klippage. Both these dates are beyond June 1983, and Unit 2 cannot be finished har6mm before Unit 1. No schedule of Unit 2 SSER has yet been provided by NRC, but it nurt be af ter Unit l's.

Although energency n1anning contentions are deferred, I think

, it nrudent to file the following emergency plan contentions now also's ,

l l based on NUREG-0737, Rev. 1 of 12-17-82:

Contention 142: CP&Ls meteorological monitoring a t SHNPP is unable to accurately represent noteorological conditions within 10 miles of the plant.

BASIS : Wind patterns, patterns of raitr, snow and othe r nrocinitation j differ considerably between SHEPD and neavby sites, e.g. NC State U and Raleigh-Durhan airport, where meteorological data is taken regularly.

l The SHNPP site is charadterized by highly variable vinds with a nearly 1

l circular wind rose and frequent chcnges of wind direction.

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< Contention 1h3; CP&L's Energency Ocerati.cns Facility, alternate EOF, EncrConey Oncrations Procedures (EOPs), Technical Sunnart Center (TS'C), Operational Support Contor 3(OSC) and required conmunications between and anong these are inadequate to nrotect the nublic health and safety adequately and do not conaly with the rea.uirements of NUREG-0737, REY. 1,12-17-82, particularly those of Table 1, and sections 7,6 and 8 thereof.

BASIS: These facilities'are either incomolete or unbuilt now, the connunication lines do not er.ist and have not been tested, and NRC has not assessed CP&L's compliance with HUREG-0737 Rev.1 as required prior to SENPP operation. .

Contention 1hk: CP&L's emergency and security norsonnel l'ovels do not neet the requirements of HUREG-0737, REY. 1, Table 2.

BASIS: The security plan isn't complete, and is unavailable for review until security exnerts have been qualified, which is being hold up by Applicants ' objections. The staffing le vols shown in the FSAR are insufficient to meet the requirements fo'r x one damaged and en one undamaged unit. -

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Wells Eddleman ,

i l written Jan 8 '83, sewved Jan 10 l

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UNITED STATES OF AME9ICA NUCIJAR REGUIATOPI C0!C4ISSION In the matter of CAROLIhA PO'.iER & LIGHT C0. Et al. ) Dockets 50-h00 Shear o~ n Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 ) and 50hh01 0 L.

CERTIFICATE 0F SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of W.E. notion concerninn DORDn info and additi.nnal contentions based solely nn decunents accuined en &

arter Ld-ut-on HAVE been served this 10thday of January 1981_, by deposit in the US Mail, first-class posth6c prepaid, upon all parties whose names are listed below, except those whose names are marked with an asterisk, for whom service was acconplished by Judges James Kelley, Glenn Bright and Janes Carpenter (1 cony each)

Atonic Safety and Licensing Board US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington DC 20555 George F. Trowbridge (attorney for Anplicants)

Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge 1800 M St. NW Washington, DC 20036 Office of the Executive Legal Director Phyllis Lotchin, Ph.D.

Attn Docke ts 50-400/k010?L. 108 Bridle Run USNRC Chanel Hill

~ NC 2751h Washington DC 20555 Dan 9ead Docketing and Service Section CEANGT/ELP l Attn Docke ts 50-h00/h01 0.L. Box 52h

, Office of the Secretary Chapel Hill NC 27514 l

USNRC Washington DC x 20555 Pat & Slater Newman CANP John Runkle 2309 Weynouth Court CCNC Raleigh NC 27612 307 Granville Rd .

Chapel Hill Nc 2751h Travias Payne Edelstein & Payne Box 126h3 Raleigh NC 27605 Richard Wilson, M.D. Certified by *erw 729 Hunter St. .

Apex NC 27502

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