ML20205F359
| ML20205F359 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 08/15/1986 |
| From: | Baxter T CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO., SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20205F366 | List: |
| References | |
| CON-#386-363 2.206, NUDOCS 8608190168 | |
| Download: ML20205F359 (38) | |
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 00cf.77,{:,7 F-
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BEFORE THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION In the Matter of )
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CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY )
and NORTH CAROLINA EASTERN ) Docket No. 50-400
- MUNICIPAL POWER AGENCY ) (10 C.F.R. 5 2.206)
)
(Shearon Harris Nuclear Power )
Plant) )
APPLICANTS' RESPONSE TO CASH'S SHOW CAUSE PETITION Thomas A. Baxter, P.C.
John H. O'Neill, Jr., P.C.
Delissa A. Ridgway Wilbert Washington, II SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE Richard E. Jones Dale E. Hollar CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY Counsel for Applicants August 15, 1986 8608190168 860815 PDR G
ADOCK 05000400 PDR N <- h
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o TABLE OF CONTENTS Page I. Introduction ............................................. 1 II. Standards for Deciding Whether a Show Cause Proceeding Should be Initiated ..................... 4 III. The Issues Raised by CASH are Improperly Before the Director Pursuant to 10 C.F.R.
$ 2.206 .................................................. 8 IV. The Allegations in the Petition Do Not Raise Significant Health and Safety Issues .............. 11 A. Emergency Planning ................................. 11
- 1. Chatham County ................................ 11
- 2. Full-Participation Exercise ................... 12
- 3. June 28, 1986 Siren .tctivation ................ 16
- 4. EPZ Size ...................................... 22
- 5. Conclusion .................................... 24 B. Falsification of Radiation Exposure Records and Health Physics Allegations ............. 24 C. Quality Assurance of Piping Welds .................. 29 D. CASH's Request for a Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement ............... ..... 32 V. Conclusion .............................................. 34 l
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 5/f,9j
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION '
BEFORE THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION In the Matter of )
)
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY )
and NORTH CAROLINA EASTERN ) Docket No. 50-400 MUNICIPAL POWER AGENCY ) (10 C.F.R. 5 2.206)
)
(Shearon Harris Nuclear Power )
Plant) )
APPLICANTS' RESPONSE TO CASH'S SHOW CAUSE PETITION I. Introduction Carolina Power & Light Company and North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency (" Applicants") are the holders or Con-struction Permit No. CPPR-158 for, applicants for a license to operate, and co-owners of the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant.
The Coalition for Alternatives to Shearon Harris (" CASH") and Mr.
Wells Eddleman filed a " Request for Institution of Proceedings Pursuant to 10 CER 2.206," dated July 2, 1986 (" Petition"), with the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.1/ On July 10, 1986, the Director acknowledged receipt of CASH's Petition.2/ On 1/ Mr. Wells Eddleman is a member of CASH and is an active in-tervenor in the Harris operating license proceeding. Presumably he desires to be a joint petitioner with CASH. In any event, we refer to petitioners collectively as " CASH."
2/ Citing General Public Utilities Nuclear Corp. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-85-4, 21 N.R.C. 561 1 (Continued Next Page)
July 16, 1986, Applicants received a letter dated July 11, 1986, from Mr. Bart Buckley of the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Reg-ulation inviting Applicants to respond to CASH's petition within thirty days of receipt of the letter. In accordance with that request, Applicants provide this Response, which includes the attached affidavits of Stephen A. Browne and Thomas W. Brombach.
CASH's Petition addresses its concerns regarding emergency planning requirements, the allegations of Ms. Patty Miriello regarding her radiation exposure records and Applicants' welding inspections, and its desire to have the NRC perform a supplemen-tal environmental impact statement. The stated bases for CASH's Petition essentially are Chatham County's May 27, 1986 rescission of its formal approval of its portion of the Shearon Harris emer-gency plan, the isolated sounding of an emergency siren, the al-legations of Ms. Miriello, and documentation concerning Chernobyl and Three Mile Island. The exact relief CASH seeks is unclear.
CASH requests the Director to issue a show cause order because of the siren issue, Petition at 7, revoke the fuel loading authori-i zation because of Chatham County's rescission of its emergency l
plan approval, id., withhold an operating license until " critical l
l (Continued) l (1985), the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation cautioned CASH l in his July 10 letter that issues which have been previously con-sidered in the operating license proceeding do not provide an adequate basis for relief under 10 C.F.R. 5 2.206.
plant safety violations are investigated," id. at 10, and to stay the Licensing Board's decision until the NRC prepares a supple-mental environmental impact statement, id. at 12. However, it is apparent that CASH's allegations, even if accepted as true (which the discussion in Section IV infra clearly refutes), do not con-stitute evidence of significant violations sufficient to warrant the issuance of a show cause order, or for that matter to give rise to any enforcement proceedings.
In essence, CASH seeks to have the Director stay the licens-ing of the Harris Plant. CASH's attempted use of 10 C.F.R.
$ 2.206 for this purpose is improper. A 2.206 petition may be denied on procedural grounds where, as here, the requested relief concerns the initial licensing of the facility and not an en-forcement action. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), DD-86-4, 23 N.R.C. 211, 214 n.1 (1986). Moreover, CASH's assumption that the licensing pro-ceedings must be delayed pending resolution of its Petition is incorrect. Even if the Petition had raised safety concerns (which it does not), the investigation thereof and the subsequent resolution of the Petition would not stay the issuance of an operating license for Shearon Harris. See Union Electric Co.
(Callaway Plant, Unit 1), DD-85-7, 21 N.R.C. 1552, 1555 (1985).
Finally, the relief sought by CASH is inappropriate in light of the Director's recognition that he does "not have authority under
F 1 10 C.F.R. 5 2.206 to direct the presiding Licensing Board to sus-pend the operating license proceeding." Cleveland Electric l Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2),
DD-85-14, 22 N.R.C. 635, 642 n.4 (1985) (citations omitted). As discussed below, under applicable legal standards, CASH has ut-terly failed to establish a basis for the issuance of a show cause order or any other relief pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 5 2.206.
II. Standards for Deciding Whether a Show Cause Proceeding Should be Initiated Section 2.206 of the Commission's regulations provides a mechanism whereby members of the public may request initiation of an enforcement action to modify, suspend, or revoke a license, or for such other action as may be proper. It also vests authority in the director of the appropriate NRC office to decide whether to institute an enforcement action by the issuance of a show cause order. The only criterion set forth in the rule itself for judging the sufficiency of a petition is the requirement that
"[t]he requests shall specify the action requested and set forth the facts that constitute the basis for the request." 10 C.F.R.
l 5 2.206(a).
l The apparent reason for the absence of a more specific stan-dard in the regulation is that the decision to institute an en-forcement action is not an adjudicative one, but rather is a i
c-matter of " prosecutorial" discretion. See Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc. (Indian Point Units 1, 2, and 3), CLI-75-8, 2 N.R.C. 173, 175 (1975). Nevertheless, the Commission has in previous decisions provided guidance delimiting the exercise of this discretion.
In Indian Point, supra, the Commission affirmed a Director's decision denying a 2.206 petition. In so doing, the Commission stated that "[t]he Director correctly understood that a show cause order would have been required had he reached the conclu-sion that substantial health or safety issues had been raised.
. . . a mere dispute over factual issues does not suffice" as a basis for issuance of such an order. Indian Point, supra, 2 N.R.C. at 176 & n.2.3/ This standard has been acknowledged in dicta by the D.C. and Seventh Circuits. Lorion v. NRC, 712 F.2d 1472, 1475 (D.C. Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.,
, Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 105 S. Ct. 1598, 1601 (1985), on remand sub nom., Lorion v. NRC, 785 F.2d 1038, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Rockford League of Women Voters v. NRC, 679 F.2d 1218, 1222 (7th Cir. 1982).
3/ The directors have adhered to the " substantial health and safety issues" test. See, e.g., Philadelphia Electric Co. (Lim-erick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), DD-85-11, 22 N.R.C.
149, 152 (1985); Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS Nuclear Project No. 2), DD-84-7, 19 N.R.C. 899, 923 (1984).
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The Commission has reiterated the " substantial health and safety issues" standard in Northern Indiana Public Service Co. !
l (Bailly Generating Station, Nuclear-1), CLI-78-7, 7 N.R.C. 429, 433 (1978), aff'd sub nom, Porter County Chapter v. NRC, 606 F.2d 1363 (D.C. Cir. 1979). In that case, the Commission also re-jected a claim that the Director erred in failing to permit peti-tioner to comment on, respond to, or cross-examine the views of the NRC Staff:
[The Director) is not required to accord presump-tive validity to every assertion of fact, irre-spective of its degree of substantiation, or to convene an adjudicatory proceeding in order to de-termine whether an adjudicatory proceeding is war-ranted. Rather, his role at this preliminary stage is to obtain and assess the information he believes necessary to make that determination.
Provided he does not abuse his discretion, he is free to rely on a variety of sources of in-formation, including staff analyses of generic issues, documents issued by other agencies, and the comments of the licensee on the factual alle-gations.
Id. at 432-33.
In order to meet the " substantial health and safety issues" standard, a petitioner must do more than merely state its disap-proval of NRC policy or its belief that the accused utility may be found to have been in violation of the Commission's regula-tions. Indeed, a petitioner must set forth evidence of some wrongdoing by the utility that goes beyond mere violations of the Commission's regulations. In order to satisfy the substantial l
health and safety issues standard, a petitioner must set forth i
evidence of violations of sufficient significance that the public l health and safety may be affected thereby. Thus, for example, in Limerick, supra, 22 N.R.C. at 166, the Director determined that the petitioners' showing that the plant suffered from a trend of operator errors did not amount to a significant safety problem warranting a show cause order. The Director noted that errors may occur at a nuclear plant, but that most violations discovered through NRC inspections are of minor significance. Id. at 161.
If more significant violations are discovered, escalated enforce-ment action may be considered by the Commission, including the imposition of civil penalties,.short of instituting a show cause proceeding. See id. If, however, a truly major deficiency is identified through the inspection process, or otherwise, then the NRC could issue a variety of orders, including a show cause order, to assure appropriate remedial action. See id. But, as the Director stated:
Isolated deficiencies in the licensee's program, however, do not necessarily undermine the program to such an extent as to give rise to a significant safety concern. What is required, wher a viola-tion is identified, is a careful assessment as to the significance of the violation, its cause, and I the corrective action taken to preclude recur-rence.
l l, Id. at 161-62 (footnote omitted). Thus, even before reviewing CASH's specific allegations in detail, it is clear that in the
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present case the CASH Petition must fail. CASH has failed to present cogent evidence of any violations of the Commission's regulations that rise to a level that would warrant the institu-tion of an enforcement proceeding against Applicants.
III. The Issues Raised by CASH are Improperly Before The Director Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. I 2.206 It is " firmly established that ' parties must be prevented from using 10 C.F.R. 2.206 procedures as a vehicle for recon-sideration of issues previously decided, or for avoiding an ex-isting forum in which they more logically should be presented.'
Consolidated Edison Co. of New York (Indian Point, Units 1, 2 and 3), CLI-75-8, 2 N.R.C. 173, 177 (1975)." General Public Utilities Nuclear Corp. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-85-4, 21 N.R.C. 561, 563 (1985) (citations omit-ted).4/ CASH is attempting to seek another forum for reconsider-atton of issues previously decided by the Licensing Board. The Commission in Three Mile Island, supra, found such a tactic impermissible. In addition, certain of CASH's arguments assert 4/ This principle applies to non-parties seeking to reopen '
issues previously adjudicated as well. Three Mile Island, supra, CLI-85-4, 21 N.R.C. at 564. The founders of CASH, however, in-clude Conservation Council of North Carolina ("CCNC"), the Kudzu Alliance, the Chapel Hill Anti-Nuclear Group Effort (" CHANGE")
and Mr. Wells Eddleman. Those organizations and Mr. Eddleman have been active intervenors in the Harris operating license pro-ceedings for over four years. See Applicants' Response to CASH's Petition for Leave to Intervene (June 24, 1986) at 3, Attachments 1 and 2.
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deficiencies not in Applicants' actions or proposed actions but in the Commission's rules. Clearly it is inappropriate to seek enforcement action against a licensee as a vehicle for challenging established rules. See Seacoast Anti-Pollution League of New Hampshire v. NRC, 690 F.2d 1025, 1029 n.ll (D.C.
Cir. 1982).
The emergency preparedness issues, Petition at 4-8, were ei-ther raised before the Appeal Board and rejected (Chatham County rescission of formal approval of emergency plan), or are pending before the NRC Staff (full-participation exercise exemption re-quest), or could have been raised before the Appeal Board in *.
motion to reopen (siren activation).1/ Arguments challenging the established emergency planning zone have been raised before the Licensing Board and were rejected, and impermissibly attempt to challenge a Commission rule in an enforcement action.s/ Allega-tions regarding Ms. Patty Miriello's radiation exposure records, Petition at 8-9, have also been raised and rejected before the Licensing Board.2/ The allegations regarding improperly docu-mented welds Petition at 9-10 were available to intervenors (including Mr. Eddleman and other intervenor members of CASH) at 1/ See discussion at Section IV.A. infra.
p/ See discussion at Section IV.A.4 infra.
Z/ See discussion at Section IV.B. infra.
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least in January 1986 when Ms. Miriello's letter (attached to the Petition) was sent to the Chairman of the Licensing Board and was made available to the parties in the Harris operating license proceeding.8/ Mr. Eddleman and CCNC, who worked with Ms. Miriello, did not seek to raise this issue in a timely manner before the Licensing Board and cannot in a dilatory fashion do so now before the Director, either individually or as part of a reconstituted organization. As for the psychological stress ar-gument, Petition at 10-12, Mr. Eddleman early in the proceeding proposed a contention alleging the NRC Staff should prepare an evaluation on the psychological impact on neighboring residents of operating the Harris Plant (albeit without reference to Chernobyl).9/ This proposed contention 87 was rejected by the Licensing Board consistent with the Commission's Statement of Policy on Psychological Stress Issues. LBP-82-119A, 16 N.R.C.
2069, 2096, 2104 (1982). Its rejection was not appealed by Mr.
Eddleman. In any event, as discussed in Section IV.D. infra, psychological stress has been held by the Supreme Court as an issue not cognizable by the Commission in preparing its environ-
- mental impact statement under the National Environmental Policy Act.
8/ See discussion at Section IV.C. infra.
9/ " Supplement to Petition to Intervene", dated May 14, 1982 at 194.
Thus, while in the succeeding sections we demonstrate that none of the issues raised by CASH meet the standard for issuing a show cause order, as a matter of law the Director need not even reach an evaluation of such factual matters as they are improp-erly before him.
IV. The Allegations in the Petition Do Not Raise Significant Health and Safety Issues A. Emergency Planning
- 1. Chatham County The linchpin of CASH's attack on offsite emergency planning is a May 27, 1986 resolution passed by the County Commission of Chatham County, one of the four counties within the Harris plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone ("EPZ"). By their May 27, 1986 resolution, the Chatham County Commissioners re-scinded their prior approval of the county emergency plan for the Harris Plant, "pending further critical examination" of certain issues which had been raised by CASH. CASH argues that the May 27, 1986 resolution renders Chatham County planning " fatally deficient," and moots EEMA's prior findings of the adequacy of the Chatham County plan and the success of the May 17-18, 1985 full-participation exercise. Petition at 4-5.
The short answer to CASH's argument is that a subsequent resolution, adopted by unanimous vote of the Chatham County Commission on July 7, 1986, moots the issue. That resolution states, in relevant part, that "Chatham County endorses the emer-gency plan jointly developed with Wake, Lee and Harnett Counties and the State of North Carolina," and "Chatham County agrees to carry out the responsibilities identified in the plan both during training exercises and in the event of an ectual emergency."
Thus, the July 7, 1986 resolution eliminates any doubt about Chatham County's participation in offsite emergency preparedness for the Harris Plant. See " Memorandum and Order" (ASLAB July 11, 1986), at 4-5 (relying on July 7, 1986 resolution in rejecting intervenor motion for stay). CASH's reliance on the earlier res-olution is to no avail. .
- 2. Full-Participation Exercise CASH contends that a second full-participation exercise must be conducted prior to licensing on the ground that the original May 1985 exercine relied on Chatham County plans and resources which were assertedly withdrawn by the May 27, 1986 resolution.
But, as noted above, CASH's reliance on the May 27, 1986 resolu-tion is misplaced. The July 7, 1986 resolution reaffirms Chatham County's commitment to "the emergency plan jointly developed with Wake, Lee and Harnett Counties and the State of North Carolina"
-- the very plan that was fully exercised in May 1985. Accord-ingly, CASH's argument lacks merit.
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CASH emphasizes the requirement in 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appen-dix E Section IV.F.1, to conduct a full-participation emergency preparedness exercise within one year prior to issuance of the first operating license for full power and prior to operation above 5% of rated power, and alludes.to Applicants' request for an exemption from the one-year requirement.10/ But CASH fails to acknowledge the success of the May 17-18, 1985 full-participation exercise for the Harris EPZ. The NRC inspection team which eval-2 uated the exercise found no violations or deviations, and stated f in the May 19, 1985 public meeting that "the exercise was fully I successful; the licensee played very well; and the training and i
commitment to emergency preparedness was obvious in this exer-I cise." NRC Inspection Report No. 50-400/85-20 (June 5, 1985).
i Similarly, FEMA found that "the state and local emergency plans are adequate and capable of being implemented and the exercise demonstrated that off-site preparedness is adequate."11/
10/ Appl' cants' request for an exemption is presently pending before the NRC Staff. Mr. Eddleman, an active member of CASH, has filed comments on Applicants' exemption request and requested i a hearing. See Letter to Harold R. Denton (NRC) from Wells Eddleman (April 3, 1986); " Response by Carolina Power & Light
- Company and North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency To Wells Eddleman's Request for Hearing on Emergency Preparedness Exercise Exemption Request" (April 22, 1986). In addition, CASH l and Mr. Eddleman have jointly filed comments on the exemption re-quest and have requested a hearing. See Letter to Commissioners Zech, Roberts, Bernthal and Asselstine from Wells Eddleman and
- Steve Katz, for CASH (July 31, 1986). Presumably, these comments are being considered in the disposition of the exemption request.
i j 11/ Memorandum for Edward L. Jordan (NRC), from Richard W. Krimm j (FEMA) (August 7, 1985), Interim Findings on offsite Radiological (Continued Next Page) l
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- - - _= . _-
A Moreover, the May 1985 exercise was the subject of litigation before the Licensing Board. All issues raised as a result of the exercise were fully resolved through the summary disposition pro-cess. LBP-86-ll, 23 N.R.C. 294, 397-98 et seq. (1986). The Li-censing Board therefore found " reasonable assurance that adequate measures can be taken in the respects raised by the contentions to protect the public health and safety in the event of a ra-diological emergency at the Harris Plant." Id. at 398.
CASH also fails to note Applicants' commitment to conduct an annual exercise (pursuant to 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, Sec-tion IV.F.2) in October 1986, with the partial participation of the counties in the EPZ. The activities conducted by local off-site emergency personnel will include:
- a. Mobilize appropriate local county staffs;
- b. Activate local county emergency facilities;
- c. Confirm adequacy of local county facilities;
- d. Exercise command and control functions during emergency response;
- e. Confirm adequacy of communications between facilities and organizations; (Continued)
Emergency Response (RER) Plans and Preparedness for the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Station. See also " Safety Evaluation Report Related to Operation of Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No. 1," NUREG-lO38, supp. 3 (May 1986) at 13-2 to 13-3.
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- f. Exercise the alert notification procedures;
- g. Exercise the capability for ambulance support for contaminated injured person; and
- h. Exercise the capability for hospital support for contaminated injured person.
Further, CP&L, the State of North Carolina, and the local coun-ties have jointly scheduled a February 1987 full-scale local ex-ercise, with support from state agencies as necessary for direc-tion, control, and communication.12/ The continuing programs of emergency preparedness training, drills and exercises conducted by CP&L and the State and local governments provide assurance that the proficiency of emergency response personnel is being maintained from the May 1985 exercise to the upcoming February 1987 exercise. Accordingly, the NRC Staff has taken the prelimi-nary position that the exemption should be granted. See "NRC 4
Staff Response to Wells Eddleman's Request For A Hearing On Applicants' Request For Exemption From The Requirement For An Emergency Preparedness Exercise" at 7, n.5 (July 24, 1986).
CASH's mere recitation of the one-year requirement does not un-dermine the persuasive case advanced in Applicants' request for an exemption, and is entitled to no weight.
12/ Letter to Harold R. Denton (NRC) from A.B. Cutter (CP&L)
(May 2, 1986), re SHNPP Emergency Preparedness Exercise /
Supplemental Information; Letter to Harold R. Denton (NRC) from S.R. Zimmerman (CP&L) (July 10, 1986), re SHNPP Emergency Pre-paredness Exercise.
- 3. June 28, 1986 Siren Activation CASH also attempts to make much of the activation of a sin-gle siren in the early hours of the morning on Saturday, June 28, 1986. Shortly before 2:00 a.m., someone vandalized one of the sirens located in the Chatham County portion of the EPZ, scaling the siren pole to an elevated platform (ten feet above the ground), cutting the padlock on the control cabinet with bolt-cutters, and deliberately activating the siren at the siren loca-tion. The siren is on a timer, and sounded for only one cycle of approximately three minutes.13/
CASH devotes much of the its discussion of this issue to disputing the vandalism of the siren. See, e.g., Petition at 6; Frazier Affidavit at 3, 5;14/ R. Thomas Affidavit. The 13/ In an unrelated event, one of the Harnett County sirens was spuriously activated on July 27, 1986. Investigation indicates that a recent electrical storm had caused a transistor in the siren to fail. Normally, a sequence of two specific tones in rapid succession, transmitted over a telephone line, were re-quired to activate the siren. However, the failed transistor effectively reduced the requirement for activation to only the l
second tone. Subsequently, normal noise on the line, which hap-l pened to include the second tone, caused the siren to sound. To prevent further such activations, the equipment is being modified to require activation of the receiver by a subsonic " security" signal prior to receipt of the two-tone encoded signal. Thus, as l
modified, a siren cannot be activated until the security signal has been received, followed by the two-tone signal.
14/ The Frazier affidavit is misnumbered. Applicants' cites to that affidavit assume that the first page of the affidavit is page one and cites the subsequent pages accordingly.
supporting affidavits were gathered while CASH was under the im-pression that the siren which had sounded was "across the street from [ Ruth Thomas'] house, * *
- about 200 feet from her house."
R. Thomas Affidavit at 1; F,razier Affidavit at 2. CASH empha-sizes that that particular siren showed "no evidence of tam-pering." R. Thomas Affidavit at 2; Frazier Affidavit at 3.
While the thrust of this line of argument is never clear, it is plainly of no moment; for CASH eventually concedes, as it must, that the siren in front of Ruth Thomas' house actually was not the siren which sounded that morning. See Addendum to Affidavit of Dan Frazier.
CASH advances two primary concerns associated with the siren vandalism -- (1) security at the siren locations, and (2) the as-serted lack of a " method to secure information upon the activa-tion of an emergency siren." Petition at 6. But, as noted above, the control boxes located at the sirens in the Harris EPZ are secured by locks. CASH makes no showing that the June 28, 1986 siren activation was anything other than an isolated act of vandalism. Moreover, the adequacy of this means of securing the siren controls is best evidenced by its use for the siren systems at CP&L's other nuclear facilities and at dozens of nuclear power plants all across the country. CASH does not suggest that there have been serious problems with siren security at other sites, nor does CASH provide any basis for belief that the problem will be a recurring one at Harris. Indeed, the siren system had been installed in the Harris EPZ for more than a year prior to the events of June 28, 1986. Thus, contrary to CASH's assertions, this single incident of vandalism reveals no flaw in security at the siren locations.
In support of its allegations of lack of a " method to secure information upon the activation of an emergency siren," CASH pro-vides " play-by-play" accounts of several residents' efforts to obtain information on the reason for the June 28, 1986 siren activation. CASH emphasizes that various state and local author-ities contacted were initially unaware of the siren activation.
Petition at 6; Frazier Affidavit at 1-4; Keyworth/ Richardson Af-fidavit at 1-2. But CASH attributes undue significance to these facts, asserting that they demonstrate deficiencies in " activa-tion of emergency organization" and in the procedures for notifi-cation of offsite officials of an emergency at the Harris Plant.
Petition at 6, 7. CASH simply misapprehends the concept of oper-ations on which onsite and offsite emergency plans are based.
There is no basis in fact for CASH's apparent assumption that, because neither CP&L nor State and local authorities were initally aware of the June 28, 1986 siren activation by vandals, they would not know of an actual emergency. Because the vandals activated the siren at the siren location on June 28, 1986, offi-cials who were at a distance and could not hear the siren were not aware of the activation until they were able to verify the reports of nearby residents who heard the siren. But, in a real emergency, CP&L would promptly notify offsite authorities, using dedicated phone lines, not the sirens. Those offsite authorities would in turn decide whether to sound the sirens by activating them remotely, from central locations in each of the four counties in the EPZ. Thus, in the event of an actual emergency, both onsite and offsite authorities would be fully apprised of the activation of the siren system. Because there was no emer-gency at the Harris Plant on June 28, 1986, emergency organiza-tion activation procedures and emergency notification procedures l were not implemented. Accordingly, the events of June 28, 1986 evidence no flaws in those procedures.
Moreover, the regulatory scheme does not contemplate that the public is to rely upon personal conversations with State and local authorities as the source of information and instruction in an emergency. In compliance with NUREG-0654, everyone within the EPZ has been sent a calendar / brochure which provides information related to a Harris emergency, including instructions for action upon hearing the sirens. Those instructions properly emphasize not that residents should call state and local authorities, but rather that they should tune their TV or radio to the Emergency Broadcast System for further instructions and information about the emergency.
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l While there is no safety significance to such non-emergency siren activations, CASH wrongly assumes that "the next time one
! goes off like this, the same thing will happen again." Frazier Affidavit at 4, 5. CP&L recognizes that any siren activation raises concern among citizens near that siren. Therefore, de-spite the lack of safety significance, CP&L has committed to re- l view and modify procedures (as needed) to assure that -- if a j siren should accidently sound in the future -- the Company when l notified will in turn notify appropriate Company, State and local personnel, as well as the news media, so that any public concern can be dispelled more promptly. In addition, CP&L is working j with appropriate State and local agencies, to assure that proce-l l dures are established so that those agencies notify CP&L promptly of any siren activation. *
- CASH also attempts to resurrect the precise public notifica-tion issue which was litigated exhaustively before the Harris Li-censing Board -- whether the sirens will awaken the public in the event of an actual emergency. See Frazier Affidavit at 2, 3, 4, 5; R. Thomas Affidavit at 1. For example, CASH emphasizes that 1
l Ruth Thomas' family was not awakened on June 28, 1986 by the siren "about 200 feet from her house." R. Thomas Affidavit at 1.
But, as noted above, even CASH now concedes that the siren across l from the Thomas house was not the one which was vandalized.
Thus, CASH's analysis of awakening by sirens is fundamentally l
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flawed, because it is based on the assumption that a particular siren sounded when in fact it was another siren which was acti-vated.
There are other equally grave problems with CASH's superfi-cial analysis of this issue. First, as the acousticians who testified at the Harris hearings explained, the sirens are designed as a system, with many areas blanketed by sound from multiple sirens. Accordingly, the efficacy of the system (even I
at a single point) generally cannot be accurately tested by activating a single siren. See, e.g., Tr. 9618-19 (Keast).
Further, the ability of a siren to alert the public is di-rectly dependent upon the duration of the sound. " Testimony of David N. Keast, Alvin H. Joyner and Dennis S. Mileti on Eddleman 57-C-3 (Night-time Notification)" ("Keast et al."), ff. Tr. 9375, !
at 17; " Testimony of Karl D. Kryter Regarding Eddleman Contention 57-C-3," ff. Tr. 9690, at 6-7. While the vandalized siren cycled only once (for a total of three minutes), state and local offi-cials plan to sound the Harris sirens for a minimum of four three-minute cycles (a total of at least twelve minutes) in the event of an actual emergency. Keast et al. at 24-25. The evi-dance in the Harris case establishes that many people who might not be awakened by the first three minutes of sound would be awakened in the subsequent nine minates of siren activation.
CASH also observes that a few people dismissed the signal of the vandalized siren as the sound of the siren on an emergency vehicle (e.g., speeding to the scene of an auto accident). See Frazier Affidavit at 3; C. & E. Thomas Affidavit. But the sound of the Harris sirens in an actual emergency would be distin-guished by the extreme duration of the sound and by the steady nature of the signal (as contrasted with the siren on a moving vehicle, which would first grow louder, then gradually fade away as the vehicle passed). See generally Tr. 9548 (Keast).
Thus, nothing in CASH's anecdotal analysis of the events of June 28, 1986 undermines the considered determination of the Li-censing Board that the Harris alert / notification system meets the Commission's regulations, alerting 98.5% of the persons in the first five miles of the EPZ by a combination of sirens, tone alert radios and " informal notification," with 91% of the persons in the remainder of the EPZ notified via sirens and informal no-tification. LBP-86-11, 23 N.R.C. 294, 300-01 (1986). CASH's ar-guments must be rejected.
- 4. EPZ Size Appended to the Petition -- but not even mentioned in that document -- is a brief piece entitled " Comment on Outdated Fed-eral Guidance for Size of Emergency Planning Zone," with two at-tachments: a " Statement Concerning the Procedures for Selecting
o the Size and Configuration of an Emergency Planning Zone," and a Science magazine comment entitled " Nuclear Meltdown: A Calculat-ed (and Recalculated) Risk." Notwithstanding Petitioners' si-lence on the purpose of these enclosures, their general thrust is clear; they seek to challenge the size and configuration of the EPZ.
The Commission's regulations provide for a plume EPZ of ap-proximately 10 miles in radius. The precise bouncaries of the EPZ are to be determined "in relation to local emergency response needs and capabjlities as they are affected by such conditions as demography, topography, land characteristics, access routes, and jurisdictional boundaries." 10 C.F.R. i 50.47(c)(2). In the in-stant case, the State Plan reflects the consideration of the appropriate factors in the determination of the Harris EPZ. See
" North Carolina Emergency Response Plan In Support of the Shearon
!!arris Nuclear Power Plant," Annex I (map depicting irregular EPZ boundary, drawn to reflect required factors). There is no asser-tion here that the Harris EPZ fails to comply with existing Com-mission regulations; nor can there be. To the extent Petitioners seek to change the generic "about 10 miles" rule, they must pur-sue their interests in another forum. A $ 2.206 petition is an inappropriate vehicle for rulemaking.
1 1
- 5. Conclusion Nothing in the allegations raised by CASH regarding the var-ious emergency planning issues gives rise to a significant health and safety concern. Furthermore, this is not the proper forum to decide the exemption request already before the Director or to challenge the Commission's emergency planning regulations. There is no basis for issuance of a show cause order.
B. Falsification of Radiation Exposure Records and iIealth Physics Allegations CASH's allegations that Applicants falsified Ms. Patty Miriello's radiation exposure records and that Applicants are guilty of questionable health physics practices have been raised and rejected twice before. These allegations are based on claims made repeatedly by Ms. Miriello, first with the NRC Office of In-vestigations sometime in September 1985. See Petition at 8.
Ms. Miriello's claims were raised before the Licensing Board by Wells Eddleman and CCNC on April 22, 1986 as a basis for their late-filed contention.15/ The Licensing Board denied the Inter-venors' motion to admit the contention based on Ms. Miriello's claims because, inter alia, the Board found "no persuasive evi-dence of deliberate falsification of records and hence no j 15/ See " Request...for Admission of New Contention WB-4 (Falsi-fication of Exposure Records)" (April 22, 1986).
significant safety concerns." " Memorandum and Order (Rejecting Late Proposed Contention Concerning Alleged Falsification of Ra-diation Exposure Records)" (ASLB June 13, 1986) at 11. If the Intervenors had truly been interested in having these issues con-sidered prior to the authorization of Applicants' operating license, they should have, but chose not to, pursue an appeal of the Licensing Board's decision rejecting their contention. A 2.206 petition filed under the guise of a new organization of which Intervenors are members is not the appropriate method of achieving reconsideration of these issues.
While these allegations by Ms. Miriello have been made before, here CASH presents only a perfunctory version of them.
CASH refers to "the attached affadavit (sic)," Petition at 9, but there is no affidavit regarding falsified radiation exposure records or questionable health physics practices submitted with the Petition.16/ The only factual basis included with the Peti-tion to support its bald assertions is Appendix F to the Peti-tion, a letter from Ms. Miriello to Chairman James L. Kelley, dated January 1, 1986 ("Miriello Letter").12/ In her letter, 16/ Mr. Eddleman's and CCNC's Request for admission of Conten-tion WB-4 did include an affidavit of Patty S. Miriello, dated April 3, 1986. It was not submitted as part of the Petition.
12/ The Miriello Letter attached as Appendix F to the Petition is not identical to the letter sent to Chairman Kelley. Elimi-nated from the top of the first page is Ms. Miriello's hand-(Continued Next Page)
Ms. Miriello alleges negligent health physics practices and man-agement encouragement for her to falsify her exposure records.
This unsworn document provides precious little factual in-formation to support the serious allegations made therein, and as such is of little probative value. CASH weakly argues that if Ms. Miriello's ill-defined allegations are substantiated by the Office of Investigations then there would be a basis for a show cause order. Petition at 8. CASH's speculative approach hardly constitutes the submission of facts forming a basis sufficient to raise significant health and safety issues.18/ Moreover, the (Continued) ,
written, sarcastic taunt to the NRC to keep her letter confiden-tial and out of the hands of the power companies. In addition, pages 9 and 11 of the letter were not included in Appendix F.
Chairman Kelley had distributed the letter only to counsel and parties involved directly in the litigation of CCNC Contention WB-3 (Drug Abuse During Construction), and deferred placing it in the NRC public document room. See ASLB Order (Jan. 10, 1986). Subsequently, Chairman Kelley deferred to the Staff's request (en behalf of OI) that the letter not be placed in the public document room until related ongoing investigations were completed. See ASLB Memorandum at 18 (Feb. 10, 1986).
While CASH representatives criticized Judge Kelley's actions at length, when they presented Mr. Denton with the Petition in July in Raleigh, it is now CASH which has filed the Miriello letter for the world to see. Applicants refrain from placing a complete version of the letter in the public document room, as directed by Chairman Kelley, and assume that the Director has access to it through Staff counsel.
18/ At best, even if Ms. Miriello's allegations were true, she would only establish a single isolated violation which would not give rise to an enforcement proceeding for the issuance of a show cause order. See Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), DD-85-11, 22 N.R.C. 149, 161 (1985).
1
mere pendency of an investigation by the Office of Investigations does not raise a serious safety matter sufficient to form the basis for the institution of show cause proceedings. See Louisiana Power & Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), CLI-86-1, 23 N.R.C. 1, 7 (1986).
Attachment 1 to this Response is the Affidavit of Stephen A.
Browne ("Browne Affidavit") which was filed with the Licensing Board as part of " Applicants' Response to Request by CCNC and ,
Wells Eddleman for Admission of New Contention ~WB-4 (Falsifica-tion of Exposure Records)" (May 8, 1986). It is particularly noteworthy that the Licensing Board relied upon Mr. Browne's testimony / to resolve Joint Contention IV (Thermoluminescent Dosimeters), LBP-85-28, 22 N.R.C. 232, 258-66 (1985), and to re-ject these same allegations of Ms. Miriello (June 13, 1986 Memo-randum and Order, supra, at 10), finding Mr. Browne to be "cred-ible" and relying on portions of his testimony. In stark contrast, it gave "very little weight" to Ms. Miriello's testi-mony on CCNC Centention WB-3 (Drug Abuse During Construction),
finding it " unusually inconsistent." LBP-86-11, 23 N.R.C. at 325-326. The Board found that Ms. Miriello had misstated her qualifications, and that other statements in her testimony were
" difficult to credit" and " subject to question." Id at 326. The Board also took note of Ms. Miriello's retaliatory motivation, l
and hostility toward CP&L. Id. The Board was " skeptical of her l
l
testimony and did not rely on it." June 13, 1986 Memorandum and Order, supra, at 10.
The Browne Affidavit goes beyond the factual issues raised by the Petition as it addresses an affidavit prepared by Ms. Miriello that was submitted to the Licensing Board previous-ly. See note 16 supra. The Browne Affidavit clearly refutes Ms. Miriello's claim that Applicants falsified her exposure records and otherwise have questionable health physics practices.
While the Browne Affidavit has been part of the record in this docket since May 8, 1986, CASH has presented no rebuttal. The Licensing Board found Mr. Browne's response to Ms. Miriello's claims persuasive. To repeat, the intervenors did not appeal that Licensing Board decision.
CASH's assertion that Ms. Miriello cannot obtain her com-plete record, Petition at 8, certainly does not raise a substan-tial health or safety issue. Nor do Applicants understand her claim to be true -- at least to the extent that Applicants have provided Ms. Miriello with her final termination report providing the total dose she received during her employment with CP&L.
Browne Affidavit at 1 10.
CASH's allegation that Applicants may have violated 10 C.F.R. 5 0.735-30(c) (prohibition against disclosure of classi-fied information), Petition at 8-9, is frivolous as that provision applies to NRC employees, not a utility company.
l In summary, Ms. Miriello's allegations are misguided, decep-tive and in error. They certainly raise no significant health 1
and safety issues.
C. Quality Assurance of Piping Welds In an excess of hyperbole, CASH asserts "approximately 10%
of the welds in the inservice inspection program at the Shearon Harris Plant are defective and improperly documented." Petition at 9. The sole basis for this allegation is the Miriello Letter.
Ms. Miriello, however, never actually alleges that defective welds exist. She raises her " concern" that "this sort of thing" -- which appears to refer to her description of two exam-iners disagreeing about " indications" in ultrasonic testing of welds or to unauthorized revisions to weld data sheets - "oc-curred, to the best of [her) knowledge in at least 10% of the welds in the inservice inspection program. . . ." Miriello Let-ter at 4. Thus, even taken at face value, the Miriello Letter does not raise a significant health and safety issue concerning piping welds.
Ms. Miriello was employed by Nuclear Energy Services ("NES")
l I
as a Data Controller from April 1984 through February 1985.19/
19/ Ms. Miriello must have formed the alleged bases for her al-legations while employed by NES, which would have provided her only access to information concerning her welding allegations.
(Continued Next Page)
Affidavit of Thomas W. Brombach ("Brombach Affidavit") (Attach- .
ment 2 hereto) at 1 4.20/ NES was retained by CP&L to provide non-destructive examination ("NDE") testing services for preservice baseline inspections and examinations of safety-related piping at the Harris Plant. Id. Ms. Miriello's role was purely administrative and she was not qualified by training or experience to perform NDE examinations or to inter-pret data from such examinations. Id.
Ms. Miriello's allegations were investigated thoroughly by the NRC I&E, Region II in December 1985, and by CP&L's Quality Check Program in January 1986, when the Miriello Letter first surfaced. The allegations were found to be without merit. Id.
at 1 3, Attachment B. Harris Plant Procedure IST-101 Rev. 1, Paragraph 5.2.e, requires corrections to be completed by a single line drawn through an incorrect entry, initialed and dated by the l
responsible individual, and the corrections made. Brombach (Continued)
It is noteworthy, however, that Ms. Miriello did not raise her concerns when she transferred from NES to CP&L and was given an opportunity to do so. See Attachment 3 (quality check form l
j filled out and signed by Ms. Miriello).
20/ Mr. Brombach is a Project Specialist / Inservice Inspection employed by CP&L and is responsible for overseeing non-destructive examination and inservice inspection activities
- at Harris. He appeared as a witness in the operating license proceeding, testifying on eddy current inspections of Harris l steam generators. Tr. 10,077 et seg.
t l
1
O Affidavit at 1 8. NES and CP&L had interpreted Procedure IST-101 as requiring changes to be made pursuant to Paragraph 5.2.e only after the NES review process was complete. Id. at i 9. During the course of making the inspections in question, it was noticed that some incorrect data had been included on certain NES data sheets. These data sheets were only considered preliminary find-ings that would be carefully reconfirmed prior to filing the fi-nalized data shets at the completion of the inspection process.
Id. It was these final data sheets that NES and CP&L believed were subject to the requirements of Paragraph 5.2.e. Id. The issue raised by Ms. Miriello points to no more than a difference in the interpretation of a procedure. Id.
Most importantly, the welds in question, when reinspected by the NRC, were found to be as indicated by the NES lead Technical Reviewer on the revised data sheets. Id. at 1 8, Attachment B.
Furthermore, the NES preservice inspection is not designed to t
confirm the quality of piping welds. Each weld on safety-related piping systems has been inspected by radiography and the results reviewed for quality and proper documentation by QA personnel.
Id. at 6. Applicants' QA inspection program was found by the NRC Staff to be "one of Applicants' strengths" and was recognized to have "the ability to identify safety related hardware deficiencies regardless of the cause of the deficiency." "Testi-mony of Paul Frederickson and Richard L. Prevatte for the NRC
Staff Regarding Contention WB-3's Allegation Concerning Reinspection of Work Performed by Persons Suspected of Drug Abuse," ff. Tr. 10,166, at 8.
Ms. Miriello alleges that CP&L's practices are in violation of the ASME Code. Miriello Letter at 3. In fact, CP&L has adopted a standard for recording data from NDE examinations that is 50 percent more stringent than required by the ASME Code in order to acquire very conservative baseline data. If CP&L had simply followed the ASME Code, the data entries that Ms. Miriello brings to the Director's attention would never have even been recorded. Brombach Affidavit at 1 10.
It is abundantly clear that the piping weld issue and the other related minor allegations raised by Ms. Miriello (see Brombach Affidavit at 11 12-14) do not establish the existence of a significant health and safety issue.
D. CASH's Request for a Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement l
l Section VI of the Petition requests the NRC to prepare a supplemental environmental impact statement ("EIS") to take into account psychological stress and the impact of "new conditions" l
(e.g. Chernobyl, Chatham County's previous withdrawal from the emergency plan, and the effects of the siren incident). Petition i
at 10-12. CASH's request for a supplemental EIS is clearly l
l i
1 .
D outside the scope of 10 C.F.R. 5 2.206. The Director certainly could not bring an enforcement action against Applicants even if, as alleged, the NRC Staff had failed to comply fully with NEPA.
CASH apparently maintains that because the Supreme Court did not affirmatively prohibit the NRC from considering psychological stress under the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C.
S 4231 et seg. ("NEPA"), the NRC should gratuitously delay autho-rization of operations at Shearon Harris until it completes a supplemental EIS. The Supreme Court has ruled that psychological stress is not a factor that should be considered by the NRC under NEPA. The Court held that NEPA was solely intended to address the effects of agency action on the physical environment.
Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 773-776 (1983); see also Bauser, Through the Looking Glass and Back Again: the PANE Case, a Rebuttal, 9 Harv. Enytl.
L. Rev. 211 (1985). In any event, the so-called "new conditions" proffered by CASH do not present new relevant information which could affect the Staff's previously assessed environmental im-pacts of authorizing operations at Shearon Harris.21/ The i
- 21/ CASH argues that new information exists regarding radiation dispersed as a result of recent studies done on the Chernobyl and Three Mile Island accidents which must be considered prior to the authorization of plant operations. This argument constitutes an assault on NRC regulations and policy. CASH's belief that this information may warrant an expansion of the 10 mile EPZ is clear-ly unrelated to any enforcement proceeding contemplated by Section 2.206. See discussion at Section IV.A.4 supra.
l
"Chatham County pull-out" and siren vandalism have been discussed previously. CASH fails even to suggest the relevance to Harris of an accident at a Soviet built, graphite-moderated, containment-less reactor (Chernobyl).22/ There is no cause for the NRC to undertake a supplemental EIS to consider these "new" conditions. Nor do any of CASH's arguments in any way provide a basis for a show cause order.
V. Conclusion CASH has attempted to use the Section 2.206 petition to reconsider matters previously reviewed by the Licensing Board and Appeal Board, to place matters before the Director that could have or should have been placed (if at all) before the Licensing
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Board or Appeal Board and to challenge the Commission's policies and rules. This is an impermissible use of Section 2.206. Even if the matters raised were properly placed before the Director, 22/ In his June 5, 1986 testimony before the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, the Director, NRR, noted the sub-stantial design differences between commercial reactors in the U.S. and the Chernobyl reactor, and concluded that no immediate changes in the NRC's regulatory practices and policies are neces-sary. The Chairman of the Commission reached the same conclusion in his May 22, 1986 remarks before the Subcommittee on Energy Conservation and Power of the House Committee on Energy and Com-merce.
i they do not present significant health and safety issues. There is no basis for enforcement action against Applicants and the Pe-tition must be denied.
~ .
Thomas A. Baxter, P.C.
John H. O'Neill, Jr., P.C.
Delissa A. Ridgway Wilbert Washington, II SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE 1800 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 822-1148 Richard E. Jones Dale E. Hollar CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY P.O. Box 1551 Raleigh, North Carolina 27602
.(919) 836-8161 Counsel for Applicants Dated: August 15, 1986 -
9 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE This is to certify that copies of the foregoing " Applicants' Response To CASH's Show Cause Petition" were served by deposit in the United States mail, first class, postage prepaid, this 15th day of August, 1986, to the following:
Mr. Harold Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regula".fon U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Mr. Bart Buckley Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Stephen G. Burns, Esquire Office of the General Counsel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 ,
Docketing and Service Section Office of the Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Mr. Wells Eddleman 812 Yancey Street Durham, North Carolina 27701 Coalition for Alternatives to Shearon Harris (CASH) 604 W. Chapel Hill Street l
Durham, North Carolina 27701 l
l
[
/C d [L1 Thomas A. Baxter, P.C.
i
ATTACHMENT 1
. ($
.4 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )
)
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY )
and NORTH CAROLINA EASTERN ) Docket No. 50-400 OL MUNICIPAL POWER AGENCY )
)
(Shearon Harris Nuclear Power ) -
Plant) )
AFFIDAVIT OF SiJPHEN A. BROWNE County of Wake )
) SS. .
State of North Carolina )
Stephen A. Browne, being duly sworn according to law, de-poses and says as follows:
- 1. I am employed by Carolina Power & Light Company
("CP&L") at the Shearon Harris Energy & Environmental Center as a Project. Specialist-Health Physics. In this position I am re-sponsible for the technical direction of the personnel dosimetry program for all CP&L nuclear plants. I testified before the Licensing Board on November 1, 1984. See "Appli-cants '-Testimony of Stephen A. Browne in Response to Joint Con-tention IV (Thermoluminescent Dosimeters)," ff. Tr. 6407. A descr.ption of my professional experience and qualifications is provided in that testimony. I also prepared an affidavit, dated January 4, 1984, which was filed in support of 44rn?V7# _ . - -
'i Applicants' Motion for Summary Disposition of Joint Interve-nors' Contention IV. A copy of that affidavit is " Attachment A",to this affidavit.
- 2. The purpose of this affidavit is to report the re-sults of my review of the Affidavit of Patty S. Miriello, dated April 3, 1986, which has been filed with the Licensing Board in support of " Request by CCNC and Wells Eddleman for Admission of New Contention WB-4 (Falsification of Exposure Records)," dated April 22, 1986. I will first review the fundamental exposure monitoring and record-keeping practices at CP&L. Second, I will present the actual facts concerning Ms. Miriello's expo-sure history. Finally, I will respond to specific statements in Ms. Miriello',s affidavit.
- 3. At CP&L nuclear plants, routine personnel monitoring is performed using thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs). The objective of routine monitoring is to assess the cumulative dose to personnel for official exposure recordkeeping purposes and to ensure that total exposure for individuals is maintained below the. limits established by the Nuclear Regulatory Commis-sion. TLDs are rugged, reliable, and accurate for this purpose i
and are worn continuously by personnel while working in ra-
! diologically controlled areas. TLDs are normally processed at a spectfied regular interval, but may be processed at other times if necessary, such as when an individual's self-reading
, pocket dosimeter (SRPD) reading is suspect. TLDs and the TLD reading system are subject to an extensive quality control l
l
m program to ensure the accuracy of dosimetry readings. CP&L is accredited under the National Voluntary Laboratory Accred- 1 itation Program to process personnel dosimeters. Attachment A l
at 11 3-5; Browne, ff. Tr. 6407, at 4-5. 1
- 4. SRPDs are used for operational monitoring at CP&L nuclear plants. The objective of operational monitoring is to provide the basis for controlling and minimizing individual ex-posure during the course of working in radiologically con-trolled areas. The SRPD is suited to this purpose primarily because, unlike the TLD, it can be read directly by the worker at any time. However, the inherent design of SRPDs results in a tendency for them to give readings which are higher than the true dose as a result of " drift" and as a result of being dropped or bumped. On the average SRPDs give higher readings than TLDs, but TLDs are more accurate. SRPDs are worn in con-junction with TLDs by all personnel working in radiologically controlled areas. SRPD and TLD readings for an individual are l compared and significant differences investigated whenever ei-ther device gives a reading above 100 mrem. However, unless l
i there is evidenc'e that the TLD reading is invalid, the TLD reading is used as the official dose even if the SRPD reading is higher. Attachment A at 11 6-8.
S., jit CP&L, exposure monitoring records are maintained in a computer data base. The data base contains detailed records of each SRPD reading, TLD reading, dose estimate, and I
whole body count for every individual who is monitored at any l
1
- 1 i l I
l 4 !
i CP&L nuclear plant. The data base is maintained up-to-date and all official exposure entries are independently verified for completeness and accuracy by a second individual. In fact, at the time of Ms. Miriello's employment all official exposure en-tries were independently verified by two separate individuals from different departments within CP&L at differett physical locations. The computer data base is used to generate various official exposure reports. In addition to the computer data base, CP&L maintains individual exposure history files for every individual monitored. These files contain all original source documents relevant to the individual's exposure history at CP&L. Attachment A at 1 9.
- 6. The following is a summary of Ms. Miriello's short -
exposure history at CP&L, based on official records and docu-ments. Each line of the table represents a different TLD badge.
Official Dose Summary TLD Dose (mrem)
Location Period Whole Body Skin Harris 6/13/85 - 6/28/85 0 0' 6/29/85 - 8/02/85 0 0 8/02/85 - 8/30/85 0 0 Brunswick 8/05/85 - 8/09/85 29 33 8/09/85 - 8/30/85 0 0 Total 29 33
- 7. Ms. Miriello's brief exposure history at CP&L is unremarkable except for one unusual SRPD reading on August 9 at Brunswick, which was investigated and documented. On that l
l
s occasion her SRPD read higher than expected based on the dose rates in the work area and the amount of time spent in the area. Her TLD was promptly read to confirm,whether or not the SRPD reading of 360 mrem was valid. The TLD reading was 29 mrem. The TLD reading was accepted as the official dose for the monitoring period for the following reasons:
A. SRPDs are prone to false high readings, espe-cially when bumped.
B. The TLD and SRPD were worn together at all times, as Ms. Miriello verifie'd in her affidavit; there-fore, in the absence of any defect in the TLD or abnormal-ity during processing, the TLD should accurately reflect the true dose. .
C. There was no defect i~.1 the TLD based on the re-sults of subsequent testing, and no abnormality during processing based on the consistency in the results of the four independent TLD element readings for her TLD badge and on the results of TLD reader checks performed on the day.her TLD was read.
D. The exposure of one co-worker working in the same area was 5 mrem.
Two reports of exposure received were provided to Ms.
~
8.
Mirielr6. ~Only one of these reports is addressed in the Miriello Affidavit. A brief explanation of each report fol-lows.
t I
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- 9. At Ms. Miriello's request, a summary of her CP&L dose was prepared and forwarded to her on August 20, 1985 (this is the report referred to in her affidavit). .See Attachment B.
. The report only covered the period of time from February 25, 1985 through August 9, 1985, since at the time of her request her employment with CP&L had not terminated, and two TLDs which had been assigned to her (one at Brunswick and one at Harris) had not yet been processed. These last two TLDs were not pro-cessed until August 30, 1985, which was her official termina-tion date. The report contains the correct total dose, but .
through an inadvertent clerical error the doses for the second and third periods of time shown on the report were switched.
The report should show a dose of 0 mrem for the whole body and 0 mrem for the skin during the period from April 1, 1985 to June 30, 1985, and should show a dose of 29 mrem for the whole body and 33 mrem for the skin during the period from July 1, 1985 through August 9, 1985. The periods of time shown on this report are not intended to correspond to actual monitoring pe-riods, but rather represent each calendar quarter or portion thereof during which Ms. Miriello was employed by CP&L. The report is formated in this fashion so that the cumulative dose for each calendar quarter can be reported for purposes of de-monstrating-compliance with the quarterly dose standards estab-lished by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Other than the clerical error which resulted in the doses being corresponded with the wr:ng dates, this report was a complete and accurate J
6 representation of the total dose received at CP&L for TLD badges processed from February 25, 1985 through August 9, 1985.
- 10. On September 10, 1985, a final termination report was forwarded to Ms. Miriello (no reference was made to this report in her affidavit). See Attachment C. This report covered her entire period of employment from February 25, 1985 through August 30, 1985, and was generated directly by the computer system, so no clerical errors occurred. (The previous report was generated manually using data retrieved from the computer system.) In this report the total dose by location is shown for each of the following periods: (1) the entire period of employment, (2) the latest calendar quarter, and (3) the latest calendar year. The dose for individual monitoring periods at .
each plant is not shown. This report includes the results of the last two TLDs which were not included in the previous report, although there is no difference in the total dose re-ported since both of the TLDs read 0 rarem. This report is a complete and accurate representation of the total dose received by Ms. Miriello during her employment at CP&L. A copy of this report was forwarded to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission as well as to Ms. Miriello, as required by regulation.
- 11. Ms. Miriello states: "The radiation exposure of 0 mrem or no-dose which CP&L provided as official is not only l false, it appears and I believe it to be the result of record
! tampering and destruction with malice by CP&L." Miriello Affi-davit, 1 2. This statement is incorrect, since the report
i referred to by Ms. Miriello in her affidavit clearly indicates a total official dose of 29 mrem for the whole body, not 0 mrem. While Ms. Miriello may not agree with the dose she was assigned during work at the Brunswick Plant, she was fully in-formed and aware of the dose assigned, and acknowledged such-by signing the Personnel Exposure Investigation form for that in-cident. See Attachment D. No evidence of tampering with her records has been presented.
- 12. Ms. Miriello states: "I was fortunate enough to carry two survey meters and I was accompanied by another technician; therefore, I know what my exposure was, but many employees of CP&L will never know." Miriello Affidavit, 1 3. The fact that Ms. Miriello carried a survey meter does not mean she was able to ascertain what exposure she actually received by her own m,easurements. A survey meter registers the instantaneous dose rate at a particular location and time, not the cumulative dose, like a TLD or SRPD. Since dose rates vary with both lo-cation and time in a nuclear plant, it would be very difficult for her to estimate her dose accurately. In any case, she' pro-vides no specific information in her affidavit about any mea-surements she made with the instruments which would support a i
claim that the TLD reading was not accurate.
l3'. 'EIs. Miriello states: "I estimate the missing dose or
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9 actual dose to be from 400 to several thousand mrem which I had received while working for CP&L in the time period indicated."
Miriello Affidavit, 1 5. The " missing" dose for.the period i
t July 1, 1985 to August 9, 1985 was inadvertently reported under the wrong time period on the first report provided to Ms. i 1
Miriello, as explained previously. The subsequently provided official termination report was complete and accurate. The 400 mrem referred to represents the SRPD readings, including the high reading of 360 mrem, obtained during the period of August 5, 1985 through August 9, 1985 at Brunswick. The corre-sponding TLD reading which was used as the official dose for this time period was 29 mrem. The dose that Ms. Miriello calls
" missing" is the unofficial dose from the SRPD readings; but SRPD dose is not used as official dose unless the TLD reading is unavailable or unreliable. In this case the TLD was avail-able and considered reliable. With regard to the possibility of several thousand mrem of dose being " missing" from her record, Ms. Miriello has presented no information which could possibly account for such a large exposure during any of her monitoring periods.
j 14. Ms. Miriello states: "The point is that: 61 mrem plus at least 400 mrem which I saw on the SRPD are missing from my dose records." Miriello Affidavit, 15 (p. 3). Again, this l statement refers to unofficial SRPD dose which was not "miss-ing", but which was superceded by the TLD reading which was used as'the~ official dose.
- 15. Ms. Miriello states: "The second TLD that I was given at BSEP must be read and that reading should have been added to my dose. It appears that this TLD reading is missing from my 1
1
h.
\
dose records." .Miriello Affidavit, 15 (p. 3). As previously explained, the second TLD at Brunswick had not been read at the time the first report was issued to Ms. Miriello, but was read and the results (0 mrem) were included in the final termination report issued to Ms. Miriello on September 10, 1985.
- 16. Ms. Miriello states: "Even though the dose access card shows that no dose was accumulated on the second SRPD which I made an entry with on August 9, 1985 (the last entry on the card) the TLD is more sensitive than an SRPD and it would probably show some dose." Miriello Affidavit, 15 (p. 3). If a SRPD indicates a dose of 0 mrem, it is highly unlikely that the TLD would indicate any dose, since the SRPDs normally read higher than TLDs as previously explained. Further, the TLD is not significantly more sensitive than the SRPD to gamma radia-tion, although it is more accurate.
- 17. Ms. Miriello states: "A third TLD reading also ap-pears to be missing from my dose records." Miriello Affidavit, l
15 (p. 3). This refers to the last TLD issued at the Harris Plant. As previously explained,.this TLD was not read until August 30, 1985 and was not included in the report issued to Ms. Miriello,on August 20, 1985. The dose from this TLD (0 mrem) was included in the official termination report issued on l September 10, 1985. Further, the zero readings at Harris are i
j consistent with our experience with other workers involved in l
the areas in which Ms. Miriello worked.
i !
f
- 18. In conclusion,- the primary allegation of Ms.
Miriello's affidavit is that records of her radiation exposure )
l while employed by CP&L were falsified to reflect less dose than ,
she actually received. The allegation is based on two beliefs:
first, that her SRPD reading was a more accurate reflection of her true dose than her TLD reading during one exposure period at the Brunswick Plant, and second, that several TLD readings were not entered into.her records at the Brunswick Plant and the Harris Plant as evidenced by a written report she received from CP&L. Based upon the facts presented above, I conclude -
that both beliefs are false, and that there is no basis in fact for the Contention WB-4.
S'tephen A. Browne Subscribed and sworn to before me This Lil day of /A , , 1986.
C .
Ast S. AA N A ry Public My Commission Expires 9/M /96
/ /
ATDCINENT A O
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD
.In the Matter of )
)
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ) Docket Nos. 50-400 OL AND NORTH CAROLINA EASTERN MUNICIPAL ) 50-401 oC POWER AGENCY )
)
(Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, )
Units 1 and 2) , )
i AFFIDAVIT OF STEPHEN A. BROWNE l
County of Wake )
) SS: -
State of North Carolina )
Stephen A. Browne, being duly sworn according to law, de-
. poses and says as follows:
j 1. I am employed by Carolina Power & Light Company
("CP&L") as a Project Specialist - Health Physics. In this po-sition I .am. responsible for the technical direction of the per-sonnel dosimotry program for all CP&L nuclear plants. My business address is: Shearon Harris Energy & Environmental Center, Route 1, Box 327, New Hill, North Carolina 27562. A 4
summary-of-my professional experience and qualifications is i contained in Attachment A to this affidavit. For the last eight years I have been directly involved with the supervision and direction of dosimetry programs using thermoluminescent l
l-
-np1np2tr
dosimeter (TLD) systems manufactured by Harshaw, Teledyne and Panasonic, which are the major manufacturers of TLD systems used in the United States today. Recently I have been asked by the National Bureau of Standards (NBS) to consult as a technical expert in assessing and evaluating personnel radia-tion dosimetry processors under the' National Voluntary Labora-tery Accreditation Program. I have personal knowledge of the matters stated herein and I make this affidavit in support of Applicants' Motion for Summary Disposition of Joint Interve-nors' contention IV. ,
- 2. In this affidavit I will discuss the issues of TLD accuracy and real-time monitoring capability. I will describe the major elements of Applicants' exposure control and person-nel dosimetry systems and show how together they provide accurate and timely information to assure worker safety and health. I will discuss certain fundamental dosimetry princi-
! pies and concepts and point out how they relate to the Joint Intervenors' contention and responses to interrogatories. I will relate Applicants' proposed programs to applicable regula-l -
\
tory requirements, standards, the state-of-the-art, and accept-ed practice in the nuclear power industry. Finally, I will show why the Joint Intervenors' recommendation to use portable pressutized_lonization monitors to corroborate TLD readings is not practical.
- 3. When a worker is exposed to a radiation field there is a complex relationship between the source of radiation and 2-
,-,,,,e~
the dose received by the individual at a specific point in the body. Some of the factors involved include the type and energy of the radiation, variation of the dose rate in the work area with location and time, and the orientation, movement, and time spent by the individual in the work area. Since it is not pos-sible directly to measure absorbed dose in tissue, dosimeters are placed on the surface of the body to estimate the dose received. Many different types of dosimeters are available for individual monitoring, including film, TLDs, and Self-Reading Pocket Dosimeters (SRPDs). Many factors must be weighed in selecting the type of dosimeter for a particular application.
Each type has certain advantages and is suitable for certain types of monitoring. ,
- 4. At CP&L's nuclear plants, routine monitoring is performed using TLDs. The objective of routine monitoring is to assess the cumulative dose to individuals.for official expo-sure recordkeeping purposes. TLDs are nearly ideal for routine monitoring because they are rugged, reliable, accurate, and sensitive. TLDs are capable of measuring the dose from the ,
types and energie's of radiation which represent significant external exposure hazards in nuclear power plants. For beta radiation, tha.TLDs proposed for SENPP are capable of measuring dose over the energy range from about 0.1 to 2.3 MeV. Betas below 0.1 MeV are too weak to be a significant external hazard, For gamma radiation, I while betas above 2.3 MeV are very rare.
the TLDs have a usable energy range from about 40 kev to 7 Mev.
Gammas above this range are rare and gammas below this range contribute relatively little to the total dose. The TLD also can be used for neutron monitoring with appropriate calibration. Other types of dosimeters have disadvantages
$ which make them less well suited for routine monitoring. Film i is more susceptible to temperature and humidity extremes which i are prevalent conditions in nuclear power plants, thus increasing the risk of invalid results. Film is also very en-ergy dependent in its response to radiation. SRPDs are knocked off-scale very easily by dropping or bumping them and are in-
! sensitive to beta radiation. Pressurized ionization chambers, suggested by the Joint Intervenors as an appropriate monitoring I
device, cannot be used for individual monitoring, since it is .
, impractical for them to be worn or carried by individuals.
I overall, TLDs are clearly superior and were therefore chosen i
- for use as the dosimeters of record for the Shearon Harris Nu-
- clear Power Plant (SHNPP).
- 5. TLDs are worn continuously by individuals while working in the radiologically controlled areas of nuclear power plants and are processed to obtain official dose readings at i regular intervals, normally monthly. More frequent processing l
! is possible and sometimes performed under special i
l circumstancas, such as when an SRPD is lost or goes off-scale.
l Extensive quality control measures are applied to the ,
processing of TLDs and recording of individual dose to ensure accuracy. Some of the major controls are (1) semi-annual 4
I - - - . _ - - . - - . - _ _ ,
calibration of TLDs and associated processing equipment to standards traceable to NBS; (2) daily calibration checks to as-sure constancy in the operation of equipment; (3) formal training and qualification of operating personnel; (4) formal review of all records and data; and (5) participation in periodic personnel dosimetry intercomparison studies. As part of the overall qualit,y control effort, CP&L has applied for ac-creditation of its dosimetry laboratory under the recently announced Dosimetry Processor Laberatory Accreditation Program administered by the NBS.
- 6. At CP&L's nuclear plants, operational monitoring is performed using SRPDs. The objective of operational monitoring is to provide the. basis for immediate actions and decisions by the worker in order to control and minimize personal exposure.
The SRPD is well-suited to this purpose because it is small, rugged, and easily read. The TLD is actually more accurate and reliable than the SRPD, but it cannot be read by the worker.
For operational monitoring, frequent reading of the dosimeter is necessary, therefore ease of reading by the worker himself is more important than the accuracy of the dose measurement.
Because of their physical construction and principles of operation, SRFDs inherently tend to respond higher than the actual _ dose in normal use. This provides a built-in conserva-tism which is beneficial from an exposure control standpoint.
- 7. SRPDs are worn by individuals while performing i
certain tasks or while working in certain areas where :
l
O significant radiation exposure is possible and are read at varying intervals by the worker. As discussed in Applicants' FSAR at 12.5.3.6.1.1, SRPDs will be used at SENPP for specific job exposure evaluation and to indicate current individual ex-posure status. Although SRPDs are only useful for gamma radia-tien, they will provide workers with adequate real-time moni-toring, since the majority of individual dose comes from gamma exposure. In cases where significant beta exposure is possi-ble, beta-sensitive survey instruments are used to establish beta dose rates for exposure control purposes and TLDs are used to determine the dose of record. The quality control for SRPDs includes semi-annual calibration to ensure exposure response, charging operation, and charge leakage are within established specifications. The use of SRPDs assures that workers will have adequate real-time monitoring capability which will allow
,. prompt decisions and actions to avoid unnecessary exposure.
- 8. Although TLDs and SRPDs are used primarily in sepa-rate and distinct roles for dose assessment and exposure l
control respectively, they are also used in auxiliary roles as backup for one another. For example, if a worker loses his l
TLD, his SRPD can be used to estimate his dose during the period for official record purposes with only slightly less ac-I curacyr- Orr if a worker's SRPD goes off-scale as a result of being dropped, the TLD can be processed immediately instead of at the end of the month, and used to update the individual's exposure control records. Also, the results of both SRPD and l -. - . - - _. . - - . - _ - _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
TLD readings for individuals who receive significant dose are compared and differences above designated control levels are investigated. This check serves to detect gross problems with the monitoring devices, the methods of use, or the records of dose.
- 9. CP&L maintains a computer-based dosimetry record keeping. system in which complete dose history data is maintained for every individual who is monitored. When a TLD is first issued to an individual a record is created on the computer. Initially, the individual's prior dose history is obtained from previous employers and is entered into the com-puter record. Based on the applicable administrative limits and prior dose history, the computer automatically calculates the dose, known as available dose, which the individual may receive without exceeding the limits. Each time the individual's SRPD is read, the dose is entered into the com-puter system and a new available dose is calculated. At this l point, the dose total is unofficial because it is based on SRPD l
readings. Normally, an individual's SRPD will be read several times and the computer record updated accordingly before the individual's TLD is read. The SRPD readings provide the l
interim dose status between TLD readings. When the TLD is l
l read, which_is at least monthly, the dose is entered into the l
computer record replacing the SRPD readings for the exposure 1
l period and the new, official dose total is calculated. Because the computer system allows on-line, real-time updating of l
l l
l records, the individual's current dose status is always immediately available. The net effect is that the readings from the TLDs and the SRFDs are maintained in the record-keeping system both as separate readings and in combination such that at any point in time the total accumulated dose for an individual is known based on the latest TLD reading, plus any SRPD readings which have been made.since the TLD was last read. Through this record-keeping system the needs for accurate official dose totals and up-to-date exposure control status for each individual can be satisfied effectively.
- 10. The use of TLDs for personnel monitoring is generally accepted as the state-of-the-art technique. Over the past few years the use of TLD badges has steadily increased, while the use of film badges has decreased. CP&L haa used TLDs success-fully for eight years to monitor personnel at its operating nu-clear plants. During this time the NRC has always accepted the results of TLD badges as complying with the occupational expo-sure monitoring requirements of 10 C.F.R. Part 20. Many nucle-ar power plants and other organizations use TLDs for personnel monitoring. During a two year study conducted by the Universi-ty of Michigan for the NRC, approximately two-thirds of the dosimeters submitted for testing by fifty-nine processing orga-nizations- of-all types were TLD badges. Performance Testing of Personnel Dosimetry Services - Procedures Manual, NUREG/CR-1063 l
(January 1980); Performance ' Testing of Personnel Dosimetry Services - Final Report of Two Year Pilot Study October 1977 -
1 l
1 ,
September 1979, NUREG/CR-1064 (January 1980); Performance Testing of Personnel Dosimetry Services - Supplementary Report l of Two Year Pilot Study October 1977 - December 1979, NUREG/CR-1304 (January 1980); Performance Testing of Personnel Dosimetry Study - Alternative and Recommendation for Personnel Dosimetry Testing Program, NUREG/CR-1593 (August 1980);
Performance Testing of Personnel Dosimetry Study - Final Report Test 3, NUREG/CR-2891 (February 1983); Performance Testing of Personnel Desimetry Services - Revised Procedures Manual, NUREG/CR-2892 (February 1983).
- 11. At the present time Applicants intend to use TLDs manufactured by Panasonic Company at SENPP as the official dosimeter of record. These TLDs have been tested and found to ,
i meet the performance specifications of ANSI N13.ll-1983 for .
photons and betas. The testing was conducted at the University of Michigan by Dr. Phil Plato as part of a study sponsored by the NRC. During the study the dosimeters were irradiated to a variety of radiation sources whose calibrations were verified by NBS. The methods used during this study are documented by Performance Testing of Personnel Dosimetry Services - Revised l
Procedures Manual, NUREG/CR-2892 (February 1983 ) and the results of testing are documented in Performance Testing of Personnel Dosimetry Study - Final Report Test 3, NUREG/CR-2891 (February 1983) . In these reports CP&L is listed as processor number 187. This study demonstrates that the TLDs proposed for SHNPP meet the accuracy requirements which have been endorsed l
by the national consensus standard of ANSI and recommended by the international community of radiation protection and mea-surement authorities as appropriate to ensure the safety and health of workers.
- 12. In making their allegation that TLDs are too inaccu-rate to assure worker safety and health, the Joint Intervenors have been very vague, in light of the complexities in measuring radiation dose described above, about either the nature or mag- ;
nitude of the inaccuracies about which they are concerned. In response to various interrogatories, the Joint Intervenors have cited inaccuracies for TLDs of 20, 30, and 50 percent without supplying specific technical references or specifying the l !
conditions of exp,osure, such as radiation type, energy, .
dosimeter design, and irradiation geometry. Because of the lack of any detailed information, it is difficult to understand or address the Joint Intervenors' concerns.
- 13. The International Commission on Radiation Units and Measurements (ICRU), the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP), and the National Council for Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP) have addressed the issue of accuracy for individual monitoring and published rec-ommendations 4n ICRU Report 20, ICRP Report 12 and NCRP Report
- 57. These_ organizations are considered to be authorities in the field of radiation protection and measurements and their recommendations are the basis for radiation protection practice and regulations in countries throughout the world. In general,
_ _ _ _ _ __ -. _ _ _ _ =_
1
. l l
they recommend greater accuracy at high (accident) dose levels than at levels below the maximum permissible levels. Disre-garding dose level, their recommendations for accuracy range from within 20 to within 90 percent. Eecause of the low risk at low dose levels these authorities recommend that individual monitoring is not needed at doses less than 25 to 30 percent of the maximum permissible dose level. NRC regulations follow these recommendations and 10 C.F.R. 5 20.202 states that per-sonnel monitoring is not required for doses less than 25 I
percent of the quarterly dose limit. According to ICRU Report 20, the maximum permissible dose levels have been set so con-servatively that great accuracy in dose measurement is not con-sidered necessary.
- 14. The current standard for testing the performance of dosimetry processes, ANSI N13.ll-1983, specifies tolerance levels which are a compromise between the various recommenda-(
tions previously mentioned and the limitations of available measurement techniques determined through the series of tests conducted at the University of Michigan involving many .
dosimetry processors. In this standard, ANSI set the tolerance level at 50 percent for doses from 0.03 to 10 rem and at 30 percent for doses from 10 to 500 rem. It should be noted that the ANSI.pex.formance criteria specify that for a series of dosimeter measurements the sum of the average absolute bias (accuracy) plus the standard deviation must be less than the specified tolerance level. The average absolute bias is a
measure of the deviation of the' average measured dose from the true dose, while the standard deviation is a measure of the variation or spread of the individual dosimeter measurements about the average measured dose. Since a series of dosimeter measurements normally contains a certain amount of statisti-cally random variability about the average value, the bias ac-tually must be better than 50 percent in the normal (non-accident) dose range to meet the standard. To illustrate, if the percent standard deviation for a series of measurements is 10 percent, then the bias or accuracy must be better than 40 percent to pass the combined criteria of 50 percent. Since all of the values for the accuracy of TLDs mentioned by the Joint Intervenors fall within the tolerance levels established by ANSI N13.11-1983, it is not clear on what basis the Joint In-tervenors claim that TLDs are not accurate enough. The ANSI standard will be used as the basis for. testing dosimetry pro-cessors under the recently announced dosimetry processor ac-l creditation program'which will be administered by the NBS and as such it appears to be the best available standard for.com.-
parison.
- 15. The Joint Intervenors also contend that TLDs lack real-time monitoring capability. The pertinence of real-time monitoring. capability for the dosimeter of record is not clear.
It appears that the Joint Intervenors do not understand the re-lationship between the different types of monitoring performed, j routine and operational, and the types of dosimeters used, TLDs I
and SRPDs. As discussed above, the purpose of routine monitoring is the assessment of individual dose for official exposure records, while the purpose of operational monitoring is the control of exposure to the individual. The two functions are closely related, yet distinct. Separate dosinators are normally used for each purpose. The TLD is used for routine monitoring and the SRPD is used for operational
~
monitoring. For exposure control purposes, real-time moni-toring capability is important because it provides the basis for immediate decisions and actions to minimize individual ex-posure. For official record purposes, accuracy and reliability are more important than timeliness. This is manifest in the fact that TLDs are normally only read monthly. Real-time moni- ,
toring capability is not needed.in TLDs, but SRPDs do provide i
this capability more than adequately to ensure the safety and health of the workers.
i 16. Finally, the Joint Intervenors recommend that porta-ble pressurized ionization monitors be used to corroborate TLD readings. In response to interrogatories served by Applicants and the Staff, the Joint Intervenors amplified upon this recom-mandation to include real-time recording equipment as part of the proposed monitoring equipment configuration. " Joint Inter-venors LResponse to Applicants' Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents to Joint Intervenors (First Set),"
l dated March 29, 1983, at 6; " Joint Intervenors' Response to Staff Interrogatories," dated August 31, 1983, at 5-6. The l
M Joint Intervenors stated that such equipment should be located near work stations and that accumulated dose could be obtained through computation from the output of the real-time recording equipment with greater accuracy than TLDs worn on the body by workers. Id. at 5-6.
- 17. What the Joint Intervenors actually have proposed is a work area monitoring system, rather than a personnel moni-toring system. The equipment proposed by the Joint Interve-nors, although technically portable, is designed to be used in a stationary position. The equipment cannot be carried or worn by the worker and the results it provides will not represent or correspond to the dose of any individual. The results from any off-the-body instrument, regardless of its inherent accuracy, are subject to many variables and inaccuracies which can only -
be reasonably accounted for by an on-the-body device. These variables are discussed below:
A. Seatial variations in the exposure rate within the work area: Order of magnitude variations are common between various points in a single work area at a nuclear *
. plant. In fact the radiation fields are often so non-uniform that the dose to one part of the individual's body may differ significantly from the dose to another part (e.g. head compared to chest). Such dif-forences are often unpredictable and neces-sitate the wearing of multiple dosimeters on various parts of the body. The highest
-- dosimeter reading is selected as the dose
-of record. An off-the-body monitoring de-vice would not be abis to assess the dose to different parts of the body simulta-neously, nor would a stationary monitor be able to assess the dose rate at multiple locations within the work area where different individuals might be working simultaneously.
l B. The movement of the worker within the work area: Such movement will cause the worker to be exposed to varying dose rates during the time ht is working in an area because of the non-uniformity of radiation fields.
Even the difference between standing or kneeling may be significant to the dose received by the individual. A stationary, off-the-body monitoring device cannot account for the movement or position of the individual.
C. The variation of the radiation field as a function of time: In a nuclear plant the radiation fields are constantly changing and fluctuating as a function of the operating conditions. Often the work being performed affects the radiation field as shielding is installed or removed and as contaminated equipment, parts, or waste are moved about. Even the most accurate surveys of an area with portable monitoring equipment are of only transitory value be-cause of changing radiation fields. A sta-tionary monitor with a real-time recorder would o'nly monitor the changes at one point in,an area.
D. The variable time spent by workers in radiation fields: A worker spends a certain amount of time in one work area and then proceeds to other areas. The amount of dose received is a function of the expo-sure time in each area. Different workers will spend different amounts of time in the same or different areas. With a stationary monitoring system a worker's exposure would .
tur extremely difficult to assess since it would require a precise knowledge of each area entered and the time spent in each i area and a complex series of computations I for the dose received in each area. Such I an approach would still fall far short of individual monitoring by TLDs in terms of o.y_erall accuracy.
- 18. As a result of these variables the dose to a worker will be a complex function of his position, orientation, move-ment, and time in the radiation field, as well as a function of
l any changes in the field itself during the period of exposure to the worker. Each individual worker will be subject to a unique combination of these variables, so that the final doses received under apparently similar conditions may be signifi-cantly different. It would be impossible for the system pro-posed by the Joint Intervenors to account for these variables and corroborate the accuracy of the dose measured by TLDs worn by the worker.
- 19. In addition, the "real-time" monitoring aspect of the Joint Intervenors' proposed system for corroborating TLD mea-surement is unrealistic. Since the output of the pressurized ionization monitors will be a dose rate, computations will be required to assess individual integrated doses. The time period for integration will be different for each individual who enters a given area and will require separate computation.
Likewise, the dose rate in each area which an individual may enter will be different and will require separate computation.
To calculate the total dose for an individual will require an exact knowledge of each area entered, the time of entry, the' time of exit and the integrated dose in each area over the specific time intervals spent in each area. In fact, the com-putations required would be so complex and time-consuming that they c6 Eld' Hot be accomplished by any feasible means on a "real-time" basis.
- 20. .Although pressurized ionization monitors are not suitable for the use proposed by the Joint Intervenors, CP&L l
does use such equipment for other more appropriate purposes.
For example, in environmental monitoring the pressurized ion- )
I ization monitors are used effectively because of their accuracy i
and sensitivity at very low dose levels. In addition, the dose rates in the environment are relatively uniform and constant compared to the dose rates in work areas; therefore, a station-ary monitor is acceptable.
- 21. In summary, with respect to accuracy, the TLDs proposed by Applicants for use at SHNPP are adequate and meet applicable standards. The standards themselves are reasonable, considering the state of current measurement technology and the conservatism of radiation dose limits. With respect to real-time monitoring capability, SRPD's which can be read by the individual will be
. used for this purpose. The primary purpose of TLDs is to assess the cumulative dose of individuals for official records, not for real-time monitoring. Finally, with respect to the Joint Inter-venors' proposal for corroborating TLD measurements, the use O
M
& *M l
i
e e
of portable pressurized ionization monitors with real-time recording equipment is completely impractical.
I
~
Stephen A. Browne Subscribed and sworn to before me this 9d day of (1 ... 1984.
/ ('
A4 caryJ.PublicLA My Commission Expires 9 41!15.
O ens HO ^W l
l l
18 -
l 2
e 1
ATTACHMENT A Stephen A. Browne Harris Energy & Environmental Center Carolina Power & Light Company New Hill, North Carolina 27562 Education and Training B.S. degree in Physics, Union College (1971)
M.S. degree in Environmental Health Engineering, Northwestern University (1974)
Professional Societies Health Physics Society Experience A. 1972 to 1974 - Radiation Safety Officer, Packard Instrument Company, Downers Grove, Ill.
B. 1974 to September 1978 - Health Physicist, General Electric Company, Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory, Windsor, Conn.
September 1978 to April 1979 - Lead Engineer, General Electric
( Company, Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory, Windsor, Conn.
l C. April 1979 to October 1981 - Senior Specialist - Desimetry, CaroI1na Power & Light Company, New Hill, N.C.
~' October 1981.to present - Project Specialist - Health Physics, Carolina Power & Light Company, New Hill, N.C.
._m.
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7 ATIW2D D T B
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- r. L Carolina Power & Light Company Shearon Harris Energy & Environmental Center Route 1, Box 327 New Hill, North Carolina 27562 August 29, 1985 Ms. Patty S. Miriella P.O. Box 28871 !
Raleigh, North Carolina 27611 Dear Sirs The following exposure information is provided for your records:
Names Miriello, Patty S. Social Security No. 298-46-0985 Period of Employment at CP&L from 02/25/85 to 08/99/85
- 1. Radiation Exposure Information in REMS Extremity Estled Whelm Regz Ehin Wannt et Leutt 02/25/85 to 03/31/95 0.000 0.000 N/M 94/81/95 to 06/38/85 0.029 0.833 N/M 37/81/85 to 08/99/85 0.000 0.999 N/M
, Total 8.029 0.033 N/M i
II. Whole Body Counting and/or Bioassay Information A. No whole body count or bicassay was performed.
B. X Whole body count and/or bicassay was performed and the results indicated no significant activity.
III. This report is furnished to you under the provisions'of the Nuc1' ear Regulatory Commission Regulation 10CFR, Part 19.
You should preserve this report for further reference.
N/M - not monitored
~ a 4
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%W 1 PERSopeIEL DATA Nw /hu5t/4Mllo /M7/
fir 5T wi sS. JLo T-</G - 6 V 7 5' liC. 9AOGE b M D EW LOYER ON EG .
- i:600
[I'.d(d,a" hS"< c8
+ 4. m -.A 11 OESCRIPTION OF OCQJRREICE CEvicE: TLD i i SP D I 42ASON: LOST I I CAuAGEO i I 4tGH 0a 4'NOA AL Si'OING l '8 Scat! , i TLD OR ERIAL NO. (/Y79 GTE/f'wEOFOCC#iaCEP!9/f3 '
0 7'3d e r I N0l v 10uA L 4A S 4AK I NG t,NOER AN 3# , 3 t vE de No. h (@ // , NA I
- g O ALOULATED 00SE: (4aK *aE A 00$E A ATE) x (rius iN 4AEA) = watu/wR) x( 43 . 9 t i s,4 REMA % : A. %A u & dm> Ad V V V
/ //
111 AS$1(DIED 0051mETNT RESULTS IV. OTHER PERSONNEL ( As Ao:s I csel el FOR AS$1GNED TLD OR SFO O! VICES, FOR CTwEAS WORKING IN SAwE AAEA, SHow OOSE INFORMATION:
SHOW 00$E IWORMATION:
DOSE (uREM) OCSE (MREM)
TLD W $20 8 TLD $9 0 ' 35 0 " TLC Sm o G 414.2 C,, 3/+1T LLJ '
+'. r> u C =%
w N G G B B UAL UAL UAR UAE LL LL RL RL OEL iAL UER vEd LEL LEL LEM L9 V. 00$lesETNT DEVICES YES N0 TLD REMOVED FR04 SERVICE l 6/ (~T NEW TLD AS$lGNED lyf I! IF YES, SEA 8 AL No.: Od963 7 TLD TO BE TESTED 11 I
$@0 REMOVED FACH SERVICE I I I -
$@ 0 TO SE TESTED II i i VI. FI ACTICII I VI No DOSE AS$lGeetENT. Napp4AL TLD REAOlNGS ACCIP TED I I DOSE AS$1GNED BASED ON TNIS INVESTIGAfl0N ANO ENTEAE0 IN RlWS:
- 0LE B00Y GAtesA/ BETA WREM wHOLE 800Y NEUTRON WREN LPAER EXTREMI TIES WAEM SKIN
- EM LO4ER Ex REulfiES
- Eu 8ASl5: CECUtXTED 1 l SFOli TLD 1 l CO-4RKER I I OfaEA I I 01SCUSSiON: [ A-f Mdd F.
b hb .
IN0lv10 VAL'S SIGNATLRE: b. DATE: 8'b b INVESTIGATED BY: h,s '
' ' ~ ' '~
h
- [*T-9_6 spo0vEO 8Y: ~ ( RG FCRD4 > ANf OATE: M/t/}ft--
f-REviEwEO SY bb
- i (//6/ F REVIEWED BY:
R&G5 UG51ML TNT GATE:
QG 5 J'ERY 6 50R
[ /
- (lNCIDENT)
- (PRIOR TO IPC10ENT)
.