ML20085J173

Assessment of Radiation Risks, util-medical Dialogue Presented at 800922-23 Intl Inst of Safety & Health Forum in Washington,Dc

ML20085J173
Person / Time
Site:	Point Beach, Turkey Point, 05000000
Issue date:	09/23/1980
From:	Lapp R AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF SAFETY & HEALTH
To:
References
NUDOCS 8310110530
Download: ML20085J173 (52)

Text

, _

i

^

~

RADIA7/0/ f l 8 ASSESSMENT OF RADIATION RISKS Ralph E. Lapp - .

f  ;

A UTILITY-MEDICAL DIALOGUE , _ ,,,j,,,

50-2Ml56/

A TWO-DAY FORUM ,

September 22-23,1980 Twin Bridges Marriott

. Interstate 95 & US #1 Wash., DC 20001 DR DO OOO O PDR by INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF SAFETY & HEALTH

BADIATIOm #

ASSESSMENT OF RADIATION RISKS 4,

Ralph E. Lapp A UTILITY-MEDICAL DIALOGUE A TWO-DAY FORUM

i September 22-23,1980 Twin Bridges Marriott Interstate 95 & US #1 Wash., DC 20001  !

l l

l l by l INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE  ;

OF SAFETY & HEALTH  :

I

i i

KEYNOTE ADDRESS--A UTILITY-MEDICAL DIALOCUE 22 SEPT 1980 '

INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF SAFETY & HEALTH R. E. LAPP ,

. Twin Bridge Marriott, Washington,D.C.

l ASSESSMENT OF RADIATION RISKS Our purpose in bringing together medical specialists, health physicists, federal regulators, scientists and utility executives is to put radiation risks in a realistic perspective. We owe it to radiation workers, the risk-takers, to provide them with the most reliable information on the health effects of low level ionizing radiation.

Seeing risks through the flames of cpntroversy can distort perspective and I. think you are all aware that the topics we dis-cuss today and tomorrow are considered to be inflammatory. In fact, there are so many specific radiation is, sues in controversy that some fire-fighting is essential if we are to bring perspective to the problem.

Controversy is essential to science but it must be rational and brought within the perimeter of the scientific community. But much of the radiation controversy is more emotional than scientific, more featured on television than in professional journals and more extremized than is rational. .

When the affairs of science are conducted in an emotional and political forum radiation risks are much distorted. When the Nuclear Regulatory Connission attenpted to enlighten the public discourse at Three Mile Island, angry citizens crowded the Fire Hall and paraded placards KRYPTON-85 KILLS. I made four trips to the Middle-town area and when I attempted a comparison of krypton-85 and another noble gas, radon-222, I found people to be uniquely con-cerned with krypton's biological ef fects. One person maintained:

" Radon is God's radiation."

Risks couched in rems, person-rems, millirems and curies are extremely difficult to translate for public consumption. When a l scientist proclaims: " Radiation is the most dangerous thing in the world." perspective is beyond our reach. When the principal vehicle for public understanding of radiation risks is electronic journal-ism, we know that sensation will triumph over reason.

l Consider, for example, the risk assessment of venting Three .

Mile Island. A numberlof independent evaluations were made and the -

risks were estimated to be 0.2 to 1 person-rem depending on the i purge rate for the containment gases. The National Council on Radia-l tion Protection 2 concluded that a 5 day release of krypton-85 would l produce less than 0.07 skin cancers from beta radiation and about l 0.00002 cancers from whole body gamma radiation in the 2.2 million population living within 50 miles of IMI.

j As a preface to releasing 57,000 curies of krypton-85 from i

TMI-2 it was essential to enter an airlock. This would entail the release of 0.04 curies or about a millionth of the radioactivity in containment. One Harrisburg M.D. was so concened about the con-i

2

sequences that he transported his family to the higher ground of Altoona, Pennsylvania. I estimate that the increased cosmic radi-ation resulted in a 600-fold greater radiation dose than that re-ceived by standing for three days at the TMI fencepost.

It's no wonder that a woman living near IMI wrote to the NRC. "I live in constant terror of what may have already happened to my unborn baby, and what lies ahead for the child. My nights are sleepless and of ten interrupted by nightmares about the results of venting this poison. Those gases must not be vented."

Scientists who invaded the Karrisburg area following the Three Mile Island accident contributed to an exaggerated public

,, assessment of the raciation riaks. I refer to the scientist-provoca-teurs like Dr. Ernest Sternglass, Dr. George Wald and Dr. Helen Caldicott to name a few. It has become almost a rule that wherever there is a radiation incident, Dr. Sternglass will make an appear-ance and engage in statistical incantation.

I recall that Dr. Sternglass visited Connecticut and corre-lated the radioactive releases from Millstone Point with increased cancer in the Waterford community. Dr. John P. Cagnetta of North-east Utilities valiantly attempted to get Dr. Sternglass to pro-duce substantiation for his allegations but his correspondence was never answered. The Division of Health Statistics of Connecti-cut has provided me with the Waterford cancer mortality data for six years before star,t-up of Millstone-1 and for the following six year period. The "before" crude cancer death rate was 825 per 100,000 and the "af ter" was 816 per 100,000. But Dr. Sternglass still keeps up his contention that there is a statistically significant cancer .

mottality due to Millstone radioactive releases.

(I would point out that the BEIR-III report 4 provides a com-pelling refutation of Dr. Sternglass' arguments. However, the back pages of a technical document are hardly a match for the front pages of a newspaper.) H Let's return to the venting of Three Mile Island. This is a milestone in the history of nuclear power and the public under-standing of radiation risk. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission at-tempted to inform the public about the venting risks both in public hearings and in publications. NUREG-0673 ANSWERS TO QUES-IIONS ABOUT REMOVING KRYPTON FROM THE THREE MILE ISLAND, UNIT 2 RE\CTOR BUILDING is a very readable and reasonable exposition of I

the radiation risks. The NRC also published opposing views of the

?AI venting risk. '

An NRC publication 5 sets forth a critique by Dr. Irwin 3ross, biostatistician a t the Roswell Park Memorial Institute in Suffalo, N.Y. Dr. Bross found it ".. comparatively easy to esti-mate that the purging will produce at least 50 excess infant deaths in the area and somewhere between 500 and 5000 total casual-ties." In addition, Dr. Bross charged that "the approval of the purging would be a criminal action--reckless endangerment or egligent homicide at the leas t."

e-- , - . - - . - - -,_ . 9

~ _ . . _- -- - _ _ - - - - - - - ~ . - .. . . _ _

. n

3

Like Dr. Sternglass. Dr. Bross is not about to admit an error of estimation. In a recent letter 6 Dr. Bross wrote: In the future, the public and its representatives are not going to accept at face value the kinds of self-serving or inane statements from professionals that have frequently been made in the past. .. If professionals make statements which cannot provide public scrutiny, the public may well feel that these professionals are no longer necessary or worthy of support."

Dr. Philip Handler, president of the National Academy of Sciences, observed 7 earlier this year:

" Scientists best serve public policy by living within

[ the ethics of science, not those of politics. If the scien-tific community will not unfrock the charlatans, the public will not discern the difference--science and the

, nation will suffar."

The pregnant woman living near Three Mile Island could not distinguish between one Phd and another. Furthermore, she must be suspicious of authority. I think that very few people in Pennsylvania placed much confidence in federal or state author-ities so far as TMI was concerned. Here is where the public interest groups could have served the public by enlightening 8 the discourse. To my knowledge only one public interest group conceded sotto voce that the IMI purging involved an acceptable public risk.

Public interest groups have exploited public ignorance of radiation by emphasizing the negative and by failing to bring any pgrspective to the issues. "Let the public decide." is their 1.ftany. But how does the average person make decisions in the complex and alien world of nuclear technology? Tomorrew people in Maine will vote on abandonment of nuclear power in that state. I submit that this is primarily a " fear of radiation" g issue. If the citizen confronts the rem in the election booth

, he should be armed with facts.

! Whatever the outcome in Maine, I hope that some analysis

' will be made about the information sources that were critical to forming opinions about nuclear power. All too of ten the average American's thinking is dominated by the TV tube. The electronic reflexes of modern communication permit little time for careful evaluation of controversy. As a rule TV news gives equal air-time ( of ten more network seconds ) to critics. I would ask: How does a Cronkite calibrate a critic?" My question -

strikes at the core of the problem since most viewers lack ~

! the expertise to decide which conflicting view of a radiation issue is correct.

I have stressed Three Mile Island for obvious reasons. Now I turn to the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard and contentions about risks to nuclear workers engaged in submarine repair and refit.

• 'e w deal here with reactors much less powerful than those supply-ing commercial electric power. Summaries of hand-out material 9 supplied to you detail worker exposures' in shipyards.

- ----,-_...m . , , , - , , , , . . . . _ -..._,_.,...,m,,, , , , . . . - . _ . . _ _ , -. ,,-,,,,,;,,., ,-r., ,y., ,.,,c.,,, ,- y. -, ,.e.,y

s .

.4.

As a consultant I visit five commercial reactors in New

. England and I assure you that the newspaper reports in the Boston >

Globe about high leukemia risk at the Pertsmouth shipyard had a f earful impact on plant personnel and their f amilies. Three months af ter Page One publication an article 10 appeared in Lancet giving .

data to substantiate-the-allegations. A total of 6 leukemia deaths were found in a population of 149 " nuclear" workers where one would expect only 1.1 such deaths. The risk factor of 5.5 became the basis for great publicity and for a Congressional hearing and the establishment of a " Blue Ribbon Ccemittee of Experts" to investigate the problem. Congress mandated that five of the experts be chosen for their critical expressions on radiation risks. The Congress has yet to receive a report from this Committee, but the latest analysesll of the PNS data show no excess leukemia mortality among the shipyard workers.

Once again, as in the case of the Waterford cancer conten-tions and the Three Mile Island casualty estimates, the allegations are not substantiated. But how is the public informed about these refutations? I need not answer this question; you are aware of the communications problem about which Llewellyn King will speak tonight.

Public perception of radiation risks has been sensitized by widespread publication of excess cancer mortality associated with nuclear explosions. From the explosions at Nagasaki to those in Nevada there have been contentions of radiation-induced cancers.

In the instance of Nagasaki about 100 veterans who parti-cipated in clean-up activities filed claims with the Veterans Administration for radiation-associated malignancies. The source of the radiation is fall-out radioactivity from the bomb cloud.

- If one considers the time of entry into the Nagasaki area and the '

decay of fallout activity there is no means for any veteran to receive a dose approaching i rem. Most publicized have been the cases of multiple myeloma, a rare bone cancer. The four such cases reported in the exposed group compare with 7.7 expected for a non-exposed group of the same age composition.

Moving to the Nevsda tests, some veterans have filed claims for leukemia resulting from exposure to the Smokey test. We have a paper being given tomorrow on this subject so I shall discuss the more remote radiation exposure, that is the fallout on Utah and Arizona. As some of you know this is a matter with which I was concerned at the time of testing. There can be no doubt that areas downwind of the Nevada tests did receive multiple f all- .

outs.13 A useful survey of the fallout patterns is to be found in a reportl4 of Rep. Bob Eckhardt's subecmaittee.

The exposure in Utah due to all nuclear tests can be esti-mated to be about 60.000 person-rem for about 172,a60 people at risk. That's 0.35 rem per person. Nearly a thousand cancer cases are in litigation for compensation of radiation injury attributed to fallout radiation. Using a risk indicator of I cancer-death per 10.000 person-rem, we would expect a total of 6 cancer-deaths associated with fallout although not all would be expressed to date. This assumes that doses of less than 1 rem may induce cancer.

i

~

l

5

Cancer mortality data for Utah during the 1950-1971 period show that among the 172,460 person at risk there were 3,300 cancer deaths. In other words. litigation involves about 1 of every 3

. cancer deaths. I estimate the natural background radiation account-ed for 350,000 person-rein for the population at risk and that medi-cal radiation added another 250,000 person-rem. This adds up to 600,000 person-rem or ten times the fall-out radiation. Clearly, not all the claimants can be identified as compensation cases.

The Courts are presented with an intriguing problem since only 1 of more than 600 cancer deaths have a theoretical linkage to fallout radiation. And, of course, none can be identified since we are dealing with cancers that do not permit of a unique radiation causation. How then do the Courts evaluate this risk?

Modern technology now challenges the judicial system.

Judge David L. Bazelon in dealing with the issue of risk and responsibility has written 15: "The astounding explosion of scientific knowledge and the increasing sophistication of the public have radically transformed our attitude toward risk regula-tion." Noting that societal risks are choices between' alternatives Judge Bazelon stated: "In primitive societies those choices were of ten made by the tribal witch doctor. .. In our time shamans carry the title doctor instead of wizard, and wear lab coats and black robes instead of religious garb."

I put the question of how the courts would handle the Utah claims to an attorney involved in the cases. His response was: ,

"The courts do not decide on certainty." In this case it appears that politicians will prevail.Section IV titled Compensation for Radiation Vittims of the Eckhardt subcommittee report "The Forgot-

' ten Guinea Pigs" dated August 1980 states 16: "The Subcommittee's inquiry into our country's early period of atmospheric testing readily elucidated the f act that many individuals have suf fered and continue to suf fer serious injury at a rate which is unique to their locale." Ihus we now confront political epidemiology as a new factor in estimation of health effects in human popula-tions. The Subcommittee favored a legislative solution to the Utah compensation claims, arguing that trying the cases in court might inv9veundueburdensfortheclaimantsandthegovernment.

1 l It noted l that two radiation claims 18 took 46 trial days, involved 650 exhibits and took up 15,000 pages of testimony.

It seems to me that Congress is opening up a Pandora's box in legislating compensation for radiation claims that involv e l

an average individual dose of 0.35 rem. Af ter all, the population -

l exposure of 60,000 person-rem is about the same as that for the l smaller population of Hanford workers who received an average oc-l cupational dose of 2.2 rem. If the Utah " victims" are compensated l shonid not the Hanford cancer deaths receive the same treatment?

l Tomorrow Dr. Ethel Gilbert will present an update on worker mortal-icy at Hanford. I assume that this paper will cenfirm the previous i finding of no excess cancer mortality among Hanford workers.

l

[

l

.- _, . - -- - . - - . , . . - , , , , , - , - - - , - - - - , -.~ - ,- ---- - , ., -

6

How will the courts treat the epidemiological evidence?

Instead of viewing the issue as that of an individual cancer case involving i rem or less of radiation dose, the judges and juries 4

will be asked to weigh the actual incidence of cancer ipga popula-tion. Will the courts take as gospel the Mancuso report or will it weigh the counter-evidence 2u? How will the courts view the fact that leukemia mortality among Hanford workers was less than expected? In retrospect it's remarkable that so much publicity was given to Mancuso's " excess cancer mortality" among Hanford workers, whereas no attention focused on the negative finding of leukemia mortality.

If the courts make awards for " radiation victims" how will they treat cases involving chemical causation. Consider, for ex-ample, the epidemiological evidence showing a leuk'emia excess 21 in chicken farmers'in the state of Washington and a deficiency in atomic workers? ( I deduced 22 a proportionate mortality ratio of 269 for poultrymen as opposed to a value of 49 for atomic workers. )

A recent epidemiological survey 23 will also confound the courts. Two Chinese populations having different radiation exposure, i.e. 9,300 person-rem, had comparable cancer rates. If one is a

" jump toe gun scientist" some Chinese data would make for headlines, namely, the Chinese population having a higher radiation background had 8.3 times more stomach cancer. On the other htnd, lung cancer was 12.7 times greater in the lower background population.

The contradictory and inconclusive evidence from epidemiolog-ical studies in the low dose range demonstrates that much larger populations are required for reaching definitive re.sults. Depending l

on the age structure of the population studied, very long observation

times will be required. Dr. E.E. Pochin pointed out in Health Physics that a population of 10,000 persons exposed to an annual excess of 0.5 rem would require a 56 year study of malignancies of all ages to be statistically detectable. The National Radiation Protection Board has extended 25 the analysis to a population of occupationally exposed workers. More recently Dr. Charles E. Land 26 has discussed cancer risk estimation from low doses of radiation. The National Council on Radiation Prote'etion27 has critically reviewed arguments

! contending that studies have shown positive correlations with low l dose radiation. (Apart from the fact that NCRP does not review argu-i ments unless they appear in the professional literature, it should

~

be noted that contentious claims are frequently not answered by ,

scientists for the simple reason that good scientists dislike having to review bad science.)

If the Congress and the courts are befuddled by the uncer-tainties inherent in estimating health effects of low dose radiation imagine how confused the public is, especially when led by distor-tions that are readily amplified by the media. The conservative assumption of a linear dose-response relationship is translated:

"Anv dose of radiation; however small, may have some biological effect." This, in turn, is converted into a formula for fear--

l any release of radioactivity is dangerous. Unfortunately, the NRC l requirement for public reporting of even minuscule unplanned re-

. leases creates anxiety in communities near nuclear mer plants.

To my mind, the extrapolatien of the linear hypothesis to the icw l

L , _ _ _ , _ _ . _ _ _ _

7

dose range should be translated: "Near-zero radiation doses may pro-duce near-zero health effects."

Dr. Geoffrey G. Eichholz of t g Georgia Institute of Technol-ogy has made the following proposal  :

"At certain low dose levels the expected individual health -

effects are indistinguishable 'from zero and well below background. I Under these conditions it is futile to assign any real meaning to such low probabilities for observable health effects either in individuals or, by extension, in larger populations.

It is suggested that for finite population groups risk probabilities of 0.0017. (10-5) per individual or dose estimates that differ from zero by less than 1/10 the standard deviation of the estimated value be considered to be identically zero."

This proposal, if followed out, "would reduce the statistical manipulation of trivia."

Putting dimensions to risk is relatively new to the American experience. It's something that zero-riskers like Ralph Nader deplore. Nader wuld much prefer to isolate nuclear radiation as a unique risk and disregard the unavoidable public risks both those of radiation and of ev.ryday life. Consider, for example, how the UK's National Radiological Protaction Board frames the risks 29:

"The conclusions (regarding radiation exposure of the UK population) are:

(a) that the major contribution to the dose of the population is from natural background radiation; j (b) that the largest man-made contribution is from medical uses of radiation; (c) that the largest contribution from environmental contam-ination is still from the residual ef fects of f allout from nuclear weapons testing; o (d) that occupational and irradiation from miscellanecus sources, considered as contributors to the per caput dose to the population, are the next largest component;"

Turning to the American radiation experience, the dominant factors are the natural background ( 22 million person-rem ) and the medical radiation (18 million person-rem). More than a third of a million x-ray machines deliver almost 1 billion x-rays per year. Although progress has been made in d '+ reduction, many

, professionals believe that at least 5 4 ' person-rem of medi-  :

cal dose could be eliminated by cont e c.:.v- ,cactice and i= proved operations without compromising the g.i m interests.

In terms of individual dose the average American accumulates in a lifetime about 13 rem. I would note that the average f allout dose in Utah is 0.35 rem or about 3 percent of the lifetime total dosa. T- the e.ase of the Hanford workers the lif etime average dose ir almost six times larger than the average occupational exposure.

m

8

With this background set forth we can now consider the occupational exposure of nuclear power workers. In 1979 the NRC 30 classified 64,073 workers as having measureable radiation expos-ure. Their collective dose was 39,759 person-rem or 0.62 rem per worker. This average shrinks to 0.4 rem if we include all persons who are monitored for radiation exposure.

~ ~

Our' knowledge of the occupational exposure of radiation workers other than those employed at nuclear power plants is less precise. I estimate it as follows:

Medical personnel Person-rem External Radiation 30.000 Internal Medicine 30.000 60,000 Total Nuclear power plant workers 39.759 Federal contractors 22,200 Dental personnel 12,000 Navy nuclear program personnel 7.920 Industrial radioarachy 3.600 Electron microscopy 440 Total = _146.000 person-rem The annual radiation exposure of occupational groups in the US amounts to 0.37 percent of the annual radiation dose to all Amer'icans.

The U.S. Federal Radiation Policy Council (RPC) released a position paper 31 on occupational radiation exposure which in-cluded the following prefatory remarks:

- "A key point in the controversies on .the subject of exposures to ionizing radiation is that the community of people and organizations involved in research and regula-tion has not presented a uniform, self-consistent position which is credible to the people outside the - community. The reasons for this situation include scientific uncertainty, political expediency and the genuine differences in point of view.

Constructing a uniform and consistent approach to the control of occupational exposures to ionizing radiation and informing and conynring the public of the validity of that approach is thus business of the first order of import-ance."

The RPC report proceeded to discuss dose limit policy by postu- -

lating " of 100 workers receiving 5 rems per year for 50 years, 3 to 7 would, die of cancer induced by this radiation." This is hardly an example of reasonabl~e public comnunication. A 5 rem dose is 8 times higher than the industry average and 50 years is hardly a realistic timaframe for plant employment.

'I would suggest that the Radiation Policy Council take the initiative of preparing a summary report on radiation risks to bring some perspective to this issue. It could take some pages frem an NRC book 32, to wit:

"The American Cancer Society has reported that approxi-mately 25 percent of all adults in the 20-65 year age bracket

9 will develop cancer at some time from all possible causes

. such as smoking, food, alcohol, drugs, air pollutants, and

. natural background radiation. Thus in any group of 10,000 workers not exposed to radiation on the job, we can expect about 2,500 to develop cancer. If this entire group of 10,000 workers were to receive en occupational radiation -dose- of 1- ------ - - - - ~ - -

rem each, we could estimate that three additional cases might occur which would give a total of about 2,503. This means that a 1-rem dose to each of 10,000 workers might increase the cancer rate from 25 percent to 25.03 percent.

an increase of about 3 hundredths of one percent."

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency brief ed the NRC on Sept.3rd on its proposed guidance for occupational exposure.33 A summary of the proposed changes has been included in your hand-out material. The nuclear industry is already conforming to the proposed 5 rem /yr proposed guideline so this should present no chaitenge. However, tne triple tier of 0.0 to 0.5, 0.5 to 1.5 ~

and 1.5 to 5 rem per year ranges proposed by EPA for occupational exposures, with escalating regulatory requirements, may appear to many as a gradation of risk. I do not see the nuclear indus-try dividing its work force into three groups according to the EPA range classifications.

I am sure that the ERA proposal will come in for vigorous examination this morning. I wculd note here that EEA plans to place its final proposal in the Federal Register this year. Next spring it will hold regional hearings that will be advertised to the public. Af ter ERA has responded to criticisms and suggestions it's final recommendations will go to the White House. That will probably be over a year from now. At that point the President may sign the recommendations or he may solicit advice from FRC and federal agencies.

Since there are many utility executives in the audience I r

would like at this tLne to conclude by making some constructive recommendations as follows:

1. Each utility should organize a radiation task force to bring together in its organization representatives from operations, health physics, personnel. legal and executive departments. The task force would review occupational ex-posure policy, corporate ALARA ( As Low As Reasonably Achievable ) programs, adequacy and competence of HP per-sonnel, compliance with NRC regulations and prepare an -

annual radiation report for widespread distribution.

I 2. The radiation task force woald prepare material to be i introduced at the regional hearing sponsored by EEA to consider changes in occupational exposure limits.

3. Each utility should retain the services of a person qualified with respect to the health effects of icnizing radiation. This person could be a health physicist already knowledgeable or trained to be conversant with health ef fects of radiation. This individual wculd keep both l

management and workers informed about develop =ents in

.v._. . ._.. .--. , , - , , , , ,7 .., ,. . _ . - .

_m , m,. . ., . _ . _ - . . , _ -.r,,, _

..__.4. _ ,n,, , , - - _ , . _ . _ . ,.-_ .. , _ _ , , , - _ , _ _ _ , , . . , .

-* o l

10

radiation technology. l 4., Training programs for workers should be reviewed and uprated to assure that there is proper indoctrination in dealing with radiation risks. CET and GOT ( general employee and general occupational training ) should include material of the quality displayed in Con-Ed's THE RADIATION TEST--a film you may view tomorrow morning.

5. Health physics personnel hired for plant outages should be screened to make certain that these " rent-a-teks" are fully qualified as HPs. Personally, I favor formal certification of contractor HPs.

6. Pre-employment medical exams should detail the applicant's medical history and take note of any radiation exposures.

Medical records of employed workers should be carefully documented. The average age of most nuclear workers is in the low thirties. As this work force ages, the normal in-cidence of cancer will express itself and utilities may face litigation on the grounds that occupational exposure to radiation caused the cancer.34

7. Utilities should encourage and participate in community discussions of radiation risks. Northeast Utilities, for example, has innovated in information programs that aid public understanding of nuclear issues.

1 Final Environmental Assessment for Decontamination of the Three Mile Island Unit 2 Reactor Building Atmosphere" NUREG-0662.

, NRC. (May 1980).

'" Krypton-85 in the Atmosphere" NCRP News Release (May 16,1980).

Letter dated Mar.8.1980, pg.8 NUREG 0662.

4 Committee on the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiations "The

. Effects on Populations of Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation." pp 561-566.(1980).

m

'NUREG-0662. Vol.II, p.129 (May,1980).

6" Reassessment of Radiation Hazards: Can Health Physicists Keep Up?"

Health Physics, 38, p.430 (1980).

7" Science and the American Future" speech given at Duke University, ,

Mar. 6, 1980 8

Telephone statement of Tom Cochran. Natural Resources Defense Council, cited p.244, NUREG-0662 Vol .li (1980) .

9" Occupational Radiation Exposure from U.S. Naval Nuclear Propul-sion Plants and their Support Facilities." Naval Sea Systems Command, Report NT-80-2. Dept. of the Navy, (Mar.1980).

10 T. Najarian & T. Colton, " Mortality from Leukemia and Cancer in Shipyard Nuclear Workers" Lancet, p .1018 (May 13,1978) .

1 T. Colton. E.R. Greenberg & J. Barron "An Analysis of Deaths among Nuclear Shipyard Workers" Final Report Under Contract 80-1574 NIOSH (Jun.20',1980).

..e .

11

12" Occupation Forces in Japan Faced Little or No A-Danger" Navy Times, p.25 (Sept.8,1980). ,

13 B. Shieien, " External Exposure from Nuclear Weapons Tests to the

. _ Offsite Population Around the Nevada Test Site between 1950 and 1970" (Jan.1980).

14" Low-Level Radiation Effects on Health" Hearings before the Sub-committee on oversight and Investigations, House Canmittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Serial 96-129.

15 D.L. Bazelon " Risk and Responsibility" Science, 205, 277 (1979).

16 Committee print 96-1FC 53, (Aug.1980) fn.14.

L7 Fn. 16, p.34.

18 Fn. 14, p.243.

19 '

T. Mancuso, A. Stewart & G. Kneale, " Radiation exposure of Hanford workers dying from cancer and other causes." Health Physics. 33 - ~.;.

90"369

- Influence (1977).

of Dose and its Distribution in Time on Dose-Response Relationships for Low-Let Radiations" p.160-166 NCRP Report 64 (1980)

Data derived fran " Occupational Mortality in Washington State" NIOSH 76-175-A,3.C.

22 R.E. Lapp The Radiation Controversy (Reddy Communications, Green-wich, Ccnn.1979).

23" Health Survey in High Background Radiation Areas in China."

Science, 209, 877 (Aug.22,1980) .

'4"P'roblems Involved in Dctecting Increased Malignancy Rates in Areas of High Natural Radiation Background." Health Physics,31. 148 (1976).

-~

75

~ J.A. Reissland, P. Kay & G.W. Dolphin "The Observation and Analysis of Cancer Deaths among Classified Radiation Workers" Phys. Med.

Biol. _21_, 903 (1976).

i '6"Esttnating Cancer Risks from Low Doses of Ionizing Radiation."

Science. 209, 1197 (Sept.12.1980).

27 fn.20 28" Statistical Cut-of f Criterion" Health Physics , 38.433 (1980).

29 7 .E. Taylor and G.A.M. Webb " Radiation Exposure of the UK Popula-tion." National Radiological Protection Board. NRFB-R-77 (Nov.1978).

20 Update of data " occupational Radiation Exposure st Co=mercial Nuclear Power Reactors.1978" NUREG-059C courtesy of NRC. -

11

--Task Force on Occupational Radiation Exposure Regulatio..s , Fosition 3 ?:per, Aug. 15, 1980.

" Instruction Ccncerning Risk from Occupatien21 Radiation Exposure"

RC Task )H 902-1 (M.ay 1980) .

" Proposed Federal Radiation Protection Guidance for Occupational Exposure-Background Report" Of fice of Radiation Propr ams.EFA (Aug.' 950)

'~? apers by T. i.nderson and R. Wilson discuss Ontario Hydre's exp#r-ience in epidemiology of utility workers.

e k

n s

f l

Occupktional Risks of Ontario Hydro's 3- Atomic Radiation Workers in Perspective i

! R. Wilsen and' .

4 t:S. Kcehl Health and Safety Of dsf on

• Ontario Hydro i

O t

L i

].

e-e ..w.. vy---,,--w,.-.,...,%-,m._,.,y,.w,w_,,,.,,.r,.__,...-,_-.+,m._,_.,-,%,.,m,-,.._,...,,,-ye,-....r-,.w.,y.,w,,r-w.~-. - , , . . .w--, ~ . _ , - ~

Table of Contents 1.0 Introduction 2.0 Ontario Hydro Nuclear Program 3.0 Occupational Safety fleasures 4.0 Occupational Accident Experiences 4.1 Fatal Accidents 4.2 Permanent & Temporary Disabilities 5.0 Risk From Exposure to Ionizing Radiation 6.0 Epidemiology Study Results 7.0 Summa ry 8.0 Acknowledgement 9.0 References 10.0 Figu res 10.1 CANDU-PHW Reactor Flow Diagram 10.2 Fatal Accident R'ates for Canadian Industries 10.3 Fatal Accident Rates for. American Industries 10.4 Fatal Accident Rates for Canadian Utilities 10.5 Fatal Accident Rates for American Utilities 10.6 Fatal Accident Rates for Work Classifications in Ontario Construction 10.7 Fatal Accident Rates for Work Classifications in Ontario Mining  :

10.8 Fatal Accident Rates of idajor bark Groups in Ontario Hydro

. . _ = - .. . . . _, .- ._ . _ - . .-

f Table of Contents Continued 10.9 Permanent Disability Rates of Major Work Groups in Ontario Hydre 10.10 Temporary Disability Rates of Major Work Groups in Ontario Hydro Compared to American and Canadian Industries 11.0 Tables 11.1 Ontaric Hydro Muclear Prograin 11.2 Equivalent Fatal Accident Rate of nuclear Generation Division Work Groups 11.3 Adjusted Equivalent Fatal Accident Rate for i

j Uuclear Generation Division Work Groups

11. ( Loss of Life Expectancy Associated with Various Occupations According to Reissland .

11.5 Mortality Ratios for Various Occupations Having a Ratio Greater Than 150 for Malignancies 11.6 Occupations in Which Excess Cancer Incidence Has Been Reported

(

11.7 Standardized Hortality Ratios for Various l

i Occupations for Lung Cancer Deaths i

l 11.8 Excess Mortality Frem I .

All Causes in Hi roshima and Nagasaki (1950-1972) 11.9 Ontario Hydro Standardized Mortality Ratio 4

t' l

1. 0 Introducti on

" Facts are chiels that winna ding", is an old Scots proverb. Transl ated it means that facts are men that cannot be knocked over or that facts ultimately must endure. It is a concept that is embodied in the scientific method, but it is a concept diat is being sorely tested in today's society. Newhere is it being tested more vigorously than in matters associated with nuclear power and, more specifically, in the tcpic of the effects of 104 level radiation. There is widespread public belief that nuclear power station work is a high risk occupation. The facts do not substantiate such a belief.

This paper presents inforcation on the occupational risk experience, actual and esticated, of a group of workers numbering over 5,000'who are enpaged in Ontario Hydro's nuclear pover program. Some of these workers have been associated with nuclear power since the late 195C's although the bulk of the experience has been in the last ten years.

1, 2.0 Ontario Hydro Nuclear P rogram Ontario Hydro's program to generate electricity from nuclear gewer is -

based on the CANDU-PHW reactor. This acronym comes f rom the words " Canada Deuterium Uranium-Pressurized Heavy Water" and indicates that the reactor uses deuterium oxide (heavy water) as a moderator, natural uranium as a fuel and pressurized heavy water as a coolant.

The reactor vessel (calandria) is a cylindrical tank (see Figum 1) filled with heavy water moderator. Several hundmd tubes (called pressum tubes) containing the uranium fuel pass through the tank. Heavy water coolant is pumped past the uranium fuel within the pmssure tube to remove heat produced by the fission process. This heat is used to boil ordinary water in boilers to produce steam.

Ten reactors.am currently in operation with twelve others under construction. Details of first in-service operation and pcwer ratings are given in Table 1. Since the first reactor unit (ifPD NGS) was declared in-service in 1962, the Huclear Genera::f on Division, which is the operatino group, has accumulated over 55 million man-hours of working in CAllDU nuclear generating stations. Radiation exposure of workers occurs largely as a result of exposure to gamma emitting radionuclide; (about 70%) and to intake of tritium (about 30%).

3.0 Occupational Safety Measures Assessment of the comparative safety of industries must take into account j

the detriment suffered by the wort force from acute events such as accidents and the detriment from chronic exposure to various physical and chenical agents. While this may seem simple in principle, it is cuite ,

difficult in practice because differing opinions are held as to the

relative importance of different types of disability, disease or death.

i

^

-3L The International Commission on Radiological Protection has proposed a method of combining the detriment from both accidents and toxic agents in an Index of HarmII). The suggested approach undoubtedly represents an__ __

advance over some of the traditional measures now employed for comparison of risk, but at present it still awaits general acceptance by those engaged in safety work.

In this report, the im~pact of accidents and the effects of chronic exposure to radiation are considered separately in the comparison of nuclear station worker safety with workers in other industries.

Accident experience is described using three commonly employed measures:

+ fatalities

~

• permanent disabilities

• temporary- disabilities While the effect of radiation exposure is considered in two ways:

• an equivalent fatal accident rate using a postulated risk per rem value

~

• in traditional epidemiological measures.

l t

l f

l

4.0 Occupational Accident Experience 4.1 Fatal Accidents The fatal accident rates in some selected Canadian (2), and American(3) industries am given in Figums 2, and 3. These an!

averages for a large number of companies engaged in similar work and are calculated quite' simply by dividing the fatal accidents in these industries by the total man-hours of all persons engaged in the industries regardless of the composition of the work force. This practice usually Teans that the risk to field staff is somewhat undemstimated, the extent of the underestimation being dependent on the composition of the work force. Fatal accident rates range between 1 and 88 per 108 man-hours.

Data for some North American Utilities including Ontario Hydro (4,5,6) are given in Figums 5 and 6. These values include operation of the utilities' facilities as well as heavy constnJction.

It is revealing to examine the spectrum of risk for specific trade groups or worker classifications within an industry or company. This has been done in Figures 6, 7 and 8, which show fatal accident rates -

for various work groups in Ontario Ocnstruction(7) , MiningIS) and, our cwn company, Ontario Hydro. The very high fatal accident rates in certain trades such as demolition (213.1 per 108 man-hours) mine shaft sinkf ag and ceveloping (71.3} and firercen (63.6) are both notable and sobering.

i 1

- In a recent Centre for Disease Control (CDC) Morbidity and Mortality Weekly ReportI9) the fatal accident rate among Louisiana workers was reviewed. It showed that the worters employed full time on 8

active oil rigs have a mortality rate between 90 - 140 per 10 man-hou rs. This means that if 100 workers joined the oil / gas drilling trade in Louisiana, an estimated 7-12 will be killed in an on-the-job accident in their working life (40 years).

The Huclear Generation Division of Ontario Hydro has worked 55 million man-hours without a fatality occurring so that by this measure, work in the nuclear industry is low risk.

4.2 Permanent and Temporary Disabilities Data describing occupational accident and' illness rates by occupation and by. industry are scarce. Even when information is available, oftentimes it is in a form that does not permit comparison of i ndustries. For example, the statistics available frcm the Canadian Electrical Association for Canadian utilities do not separate i

As a result, permanent total disabilities from f atalities.

l comparative performance in this area is difficult to establish. .

The permanent disability experience (according to the A!!SI-Z 16. 4-1977 IICI l

classification system) of major work groups in Ontario Hydro is given in Figure 9. Temporary disability experience is given in Figure 10.

l l

l

Included in Figure 10 is the disability rate for Ontario Hydro Head Office workers and workers in American and Canadian Industries. It should be noted that data for Canadian Industries (which is an average of the disability rate for all ten provinces) are not directly comparable with Ontario Hydrt's data because they include pernanent disabilities. They do, howeve.r, provide a " ball park" figure since on the basis of Ontario Hydro experience, permanent disabilities form a small fraction of the total. With this minor caveat by this reasure, work in the nuclear industry is icw risk.

5.0 Risk From Occupational Exposure to Ionizino Radiation The International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) have reviewed the potential ca rcinogenic effects of chemicals (ll). So far, 26 industrial chemicals have been associated with increased risk of cancer in man.

Those that have received most attention are arsenic, asbestos, benzene, chromium (trioxide and other hexavalent chromium compcunds), nickel (oxides), pet roleum products (a romatic hydroca rbons) and vinyl chloride.

Risks from exposures to such toxic agents rust be added to the risk cf acute accidents when assessing the total cccupaticnal risk of an industry.

1 This is not readily done as quantitative measures of the risk of exposure l to these oaxic agents are for the most part undetermined for a variety of reasons.

Radiation is a notable exceptien to this state of igncrance. Gver the past 30 years studies of the Japanese Ate-ic E r.b survivors and the crcups .

l

.h. . .

of. patients in the United Kingdom and Gennany treated with radiation for ankylosing spondylitis (12,13) have enabled risk estimates to be made for acute doses in the order of-100-rem.-Estimates of risk per rum at I lower doses have then been made by assuming a linear dose response curve with zero incremental effect at zero dose. Of the various estimates of risk, the ICRP recommended value of 10-4/ rem (14) has been used for purposes of estimating risk due to radiation exposure. This lies within the range of values given in the report by the Advisory Comittee on the Stological Effects of Ionizing Radiation (12). In Table 2, this risk per rem value has been applied to the average annual lifetime dose values for Work Groups in Ontario Hydro's Nuclear Generation Division to give an equivalent annual fatality risk. In this estimation, no allowance has been made for the fact that for an occupational fatality due to trauma, the loss of life is from the time of the accident, but in the case of a f atality due to a malignancy resulting from occupational exposure to 4 toxic agent such as radiation, the years of life lost are much less for two rwasons; the radiation exposure is extended in time and the latency period may vary from a few years in the case of leukaemias to tens of years for solid tumors. -

In ICRP-27(1) , it was estimated that the average period of life lost per fatal malignancy was 10-15 years, as compared to the average loss of about 30 years of life in the case of an occupational fatality due to t rauma. Based on this, a modifying factor can be derived and used to adjust the equivalent fatal accident risk of nuclear workers, thereby

I l

taking into account the fact that fewer years of life are lost due to a i malignancy. Table 3 has been constructed from the data of Table 2 by applying this modifying _ factor. _ _ _ . _

1 Possible detriment due to genetic and other effects have been ignored in this estimate of equivalent fatal accident rate. Estimates of the magnitude of these additional detriments in ICRP-27 am relatively low and their exclusion does n'ot materially affect the values derived.

The average dose for nuclear employees given in Table 2 is the average for all Atomic Radiation Workers. This means that the figure includes. some staff who have had only minor exposures. The derivation of an equivalent fatal accident risk using this average doss is felt to be compatible with the industrial practice of calculating fatal accident rates using the man-h'urso of all persons engaged in the industry.

Even the Nuclear Generation Division work group with the highest average radiation exposure, mechanical maintainers, have an equivalent fatal accident rate when estimated by this method, comparable to the average f atal accident rate for safe industries. This means th'at the total fatal accident rate for this wort group, that is the sum of the rate due to accidents plus this equivalent fatal accident rate compares favourably I with other industries even though no allcwance has been made for the possible effects of toxic acents associated with other industries.

'. .g.

By this safety measure, the risk of fatality for a nuclear station worker i s low.

Similar comparisons have been carried out by others. In an article in New Scientist (15) Reissland used a slightly different method to compare the risks of various occupations in the United Kingdom. He estimated the number of days of life expectancy lost by a person exposed to the hazards of an industry for one year and for the mmainder of his working life.

As can be seen from Table 4, which extracts some of Reissland's msults, the risk at 5 rem / year is significant but not excessive compamd tc ather i ndust ries. At average doses experienced by nuclear workers in Ontario 11ydro (Table 2) the risk by this estimation method is also low.

6.0 Epidemiolooy Study Results Traditionally, epidemiological studies of occupational groups have been employed to determine whether or not workers are at risk from toxic agents in the working envi ronment. Results from such studies have associated higher levels of cancer in the exposed working population with various toxic agents present in the work place; increased evidence of mesotheliema and lung cancer has been linked to asbestos exposure; increased respiratory, skin and liver cancers in smelter workers wem linked to arsenic trioxide exposure; nickel exposure was associated with a high incidence of mspiratory and nasal cancers; an increase in leukemia deaths among wort.e-s exposed to benzene has bes, idertified, raden ar.d ;ust

levels have been named as causative factors for lung cancer in uranium and fluorspar miners to mention but a few.

Epidemiological studies detennine a Standardized Mortality Ratio (SMR) which is the ratio of observed deaths in the study population to the expected deaths in a control population with a similar age and sex structure.

Fraser(16) has compiled Mortality Ratios based on the infonnation assembled by the Society of Actuaries on the experience of seventeen life insurance companies. This data which is from the United States of America and Canada spans a ten-year period from 1954 to 1964. Tame E is an extract of the data and gives the Hortality Ratio for various occupations having a value greater than 150 for malignancies.

Specific causal factors that give rise to these high mortality ratios have not been identified and indeed may not be associated with the work place.

There is evidence to suggest that socio-economic status and lifestyle i

interact in a synergistic way with the work envi roncent and, therefore, confoun'd the attempts to distinguish the separate effects of the work envi ronment. Nevertheless, these are the observed irortality ratios for -

i chese Canadian ano U.S. industries.

l l

!ncluded in Table 5, simply as a point of interest, is the remarkably high mortality ratio for bartenders dying of cirrhosis of the liver (nct a malignancy) . It is .ct clea r whcther tr.e , ion erv re. . :r: ..ct: ::: s l

condition or whe-he- :s a;.: -- :-

~

l the occupation.

i

• ~- - -- - _ - - .

.+..m,._ __. ..-_ .__ __

. The,U.S. National Cancer InstituteIII) has listed a number of occupational groups that have been shown to be at increased risk of cancer at specific. sites. Sore of these occupations am listed in Table 6 without identification of a specific etiologic agent.

In a mcent paper, Howe et al I17) have derived Standardized Mortality Ratics for various occupations utilizing a' system which ifnked death records with a 10". sample of the Canadian Labour force. The authors caution that the.. paper is prima rily intended to highlicht the methodology and that the results are not definitive because of various confounding factors and because the larce number of compariscns made will produce some high values by chance. They do however also point out that seme of the occupations which have high Sf'Rs for malignancies, involve exposum to dust or fumes (see Table 7).

Finally, before mvf ewing the Ontario Hydro experience, let us consider the relative risk of death due to ralignancy in the Japanese Somb survivor studies. Data based on the Life Span Study of the survivorsfl8) is given in Table P. The mortality ratios have been determined by comparing the number of deaths among males and ferales exposed to radiation, with the number of expected deaths based on Japanese natienal statistics. The increased risk of this population group which has been expcsed to acute I high doses of radiation in the 100-600 rad range is net dissimilar to that cbserved in trany occupations in Canada and the U.S.A.

P.eported elsewhere at this conferenceII9) is a description of a mortality study being carried out on Ontario Hydro Workers. The study is in its early stages and firm conclusions cannot yet be drawn for a variety of reasons:

• the healthy worker effect is undoubtedly present

• the time which has elapsed since the bulk of the work group exposu're is less than ten years (although some exposure did occur in the early sixties)

• the statistical significance of the study is' poor.

With these caveats in mind, the results shown in Table 9 do, nevertheless, give some reason for cautious optimism. The accumulated population dose

. for this group is about 25,000 man-rem so that the results cannot verify the risk per rem value derived from the study of the Japanese Bomb survivors (ie, one or two additional cancers would be statistically difficult to find). On the other hand, it is highly unlikely that a risk value which was ten times higher would not have begun to influence the f atalities due to cancer in the nuclear work force. Although it cannot be stated with any finality that the risk faced by Ontario Hydro nuclear station workers will not ultimately be comparable to the cancer risk observed among certain occupational groups in Canada and the U.S. A. The results to date, using traditional epidemiological measures of occupational risk, indicate that this risk is icw.

l

1.

13 -

7.0 Summary By any of the measures commonly used to assess occupational risk, the risk f rom both accidents and chronic effects faced by Ontario Hydro nuclear station workers is low when compared with the risk from accidents alone in

.nany other occupations in North America.

e S

i

i 8.0 Acknowledgement The authors would like to thank J.R. Strange for her assistance in preparing / compiling the industrial accident statistics used in this paper.

t 0

S

.1 I

I i

I 1 *

. - . . . , - . . ,.n. . - -

, ,, , , ,, ---._, - -..,n,-,., , , - . - . - , , - - - - , - , - - - - - . - - - . , . . - - . - . - - - - , . , , . . . - - - . . . - . + . . ,

References Continued

( 10) American National Standards Institute, Inc; American National Standard for Uniform Recordkeeping for Occupational Injuries and Illnesses, ANSI-Z16.4 - 1977, July 8,1977.

( 11) B ridbord, K. , Decoufl e, P. , F raumeni, J.F. H oel, D.G. , H oove r, R.N. ,

Rall, D.P., Saffiotti, U., Schneiderman, M.A. and Upton, A.C.

Estimates'of the Fraction of Cancer in the United States Related to Occupational . Factors, NCI, NIEHS, NIOSH, September,1978.

( 12 ) NAS/NRC (1980) National Academy of Sciences - National Research C ounci1.

The Effects on Populations of Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation (BIER III Report) (U.S. Government Printing

. Office, Washington).

( 13) United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects'of Atomic i.

Radiation. Sources and Effects of Ionizing Padiation, United Nations, New York,1977.

( 14) International Commission en Radiological Protection ICRP Publication 26, Pergamon P ress, January,1977. -

(15) P,eissland, J., Harries, V., A Scale for Measuring Risks, New Scientist, September 13, 1979.

9.0 Refe rences ,

(1) International Commission on Radiological Protection ICRP Publication 27, Problens Involved in Developing an Index of Harm, Pe rgamen P re ss , May, 1977.

(2) Labour Canada, Program Research and Development Division, Ottawa, Personal Communication.

(3) The H5tional Safety Council Accident Facts, Chicago, 1970-79.

( 4) The Canadian ~ Electrical Association Work Injuries Statistics, Mont real , 1970-79.

.(5) ,

Accident Statistics for American Utilities, Personal Communication.

(6) Ontario Hydro Annual Corporate Safety Statistics,. Toronto, 1970-79.

(7) Construction Safety Association of Ontario, Personal C ommunicati on.

(8) Mines Accident Preventien Association of Ontario, Annual Reports ,

1970-78.

(9)* U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centre for Disease Control. Morbidity and itortality 'aeekly Reoort, Vol. 29, Uc. 20, r M ay 2 3, 1.30.

References Continued t16) Fraser, R.D., Towards the Establishment of Priorities for Research and Ac_ tion in the Field of Occupational Accidents and Mortality: A Review of Provincial, National and International Data. Depa rt:nent of Economics, Queen's University, July 1980.

(17) Howe, G.R., Lindsay, J., Miller, A.B., A National System for Menitoring Occupationally Related Cancer Norbidity and Mortality, Unpublished Paper, Toronto,1980.

(18) Seebe, G.'d. , Kato, H. , Land, C.E. , Studies of the Morta11ty of A-Bomb Survivors, No. 6, Mortality and Radiation Dose 1950-1974, Radiat. Res. 75, 138-201 (1978).

( 19 )' Anderson, T.W. , Onta rio Hydro Mortality 1970-1978 (fifth annual report), University of Toronto.

-,r ,m y -

w

i 1

I l

l 1

EIGURE 1 STEAM PIPES f CANDU Reactor y ^

Flow Diagram r O  ; e ,

^-

G. 3,:.='$

/ ,;.

' miQ.

STEAM  ;

c'  : - GENERATORS .

b-T~

' t/

PRIMARY PUMPS g

j

=

PRESSURIZER = -

=

E _

E .

3

^

! = i A

f

=":

E L E A\

2 m

/ x, ,/

E s

E

=

_ ._s = =

j -.

c E

-=

E 6_y g g g-mc-g

-g - -- -

7, er w -- g E

E E E l

i =

l slw

'l'

'h' HEADERS

,fj ,

HEADERS E

% IV 4/ N!!

Lt=r '

- i r M J 7 y q k

i i-  !

- E E CALANDRI A E s E E y=-

g g g g _

=

= = E _

~'

. -E E

= a mm.asmas ammes mens 5

. . . . . . . . . . . . . g g

i REACTOR E

E -

E ' M 5

-_' - amn- unusamme

' .. . y . ...

FUEL: _

'. LIGHT WATER STEAM .: -

F J y C LIGHT WATER CONDENSATE MODERATOR PUMP

$ HEAVY WATER COOLANT 'k ^

C HEAVY WATER MODERATOR hj' lERATOR MOD

^% l HEAT

1 FIGURE 2

Fatal Accident Rates for Canadian industries (1975-1978)*

i N

3.0 AGRICULTURE .

~ -

cg mi ' Q

,.z.m; Y, Qg k,,y . 's44. gigy, m;.5 aj4 {.&. FORESTRY ,

'~

((E

)j ~g7 c.,t ;

lig, 30 >;7pjdl: ' ', ,

) g3 x.s i

,f

,' jj 26.0 : MINING isy . .

. 4.0 MANUFACTURING

.l i ,

117.3 CONSTRUCTION j - ~ + = .,,

l 112.1 TRANSPORTA TION i 2.2 TRADE l

l 0.7 FINANCE l

l 1.2 SERVICES t

i 4.8 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 1

i i i . i i i i i i i

O 10 20 30 40 50 60 l'

Rate (Number /108 man-hours)

• 1978 statistics are preliminary 4

1 l

i '

j .

FIGURE 3 Fatal Accide,nt Rates in American Industries .

(1970-1979) i 7.Y ALL INDUSTRIES

~ '

3.2 TRADE

' 4.7 SERVICE t

4.4 MANUFA CTURING 6.1 GOVERNMENT

' A3g,y TRANSPORTATION Et PUBLIC l ~

UTILITIES i

, ~ . ,

l 29.2 AGRICULTURE

~ '

~ %)31.5 CONSTRUCTION

...-x 2.at, 3.2

p. m  ::agg3g , l yyyyyg gy,ggy,yg

. .... n , -

. .:. . , l I I s  : i I I s I e I  : i j o 10 20 30 40 50 60 l Rate (Number /108 man-hours) 1 1

I 1

i FIGURE 4

. Fatal Accident Rates for Canadian Utilities (1970-1979) 4.8 MANITOBA HYDRO j

'. j14.b HYDRO QUEBEC" Fatalities Et Permanent Total Disabilities are included in these statistics i < 110.8 BRITISH COLUMBIA HYDRO 33,g NEW BRUNSWICK ELECTRIC POWER COMMISSION _

~

• :. - s ,: *h d V -

';;} 8.9 FATALITIES

. l EI_ '

FATALITIES Et PERMANENT ONTARIO HYDRO

' O -

TOTAL DISABILITIES _

, i , , , , . , , , , , ,

O 10 20 30 40 50 60 l Rate (Number /108 man-hours) l

)

j " Hydro Quebec statistics were not available i for 1976 and 1971 i -

i

I .

FIGURE 5 Fatal Accident Rates for American Utilities (1970-1979).

4 3.5 N/AGARA MOHAWK POWER CORP.

6.0 DETROIT EDISON COMPANY 4.7 TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY 7.9 COMMONWEALTH EDISON EDISON CO. OF NEW YORK, 3.7

INCORPORA TED PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC 5.4 g gpg go.

r

VIRGINIA ELECTRIC Et i

POWER CO.

i o io 2o b N b '

d Rate (Number /108 man-hours)

i FIGURE 6  ;

Fatal Accident Rates for Work Classifications I, in Ontario Construction (1976-1979) .

I i

'*' $5$$,lhfh{ ONTARIO CONSTRUCTION i

s / '. .

.w. l

- L ' ,', 15.0 ROADS 11  ;

-t '

s

.:. x .

-:"" s ,.;........m.,...

.> .>i mqu ;~ -- -

1. ,, ' , ,, TI_ f .'. 213.1

, 6%, , ,

4

<f,,

-.n. W ., DEM,y .,O,,LI, m.ON #:i ii:

s ..,, 3_

g6

O TUNNELLING t

i '

, . 5" i PREFABRICATED STEELF , , :a l 1

~* '

p R::

16 '& CONCRETE ERECTIDNkF;W '  %^~M'O [

a u, .a"gy REINFORCING STEEL, HIGH RISE, i

"~J CONCRETE FORMING MAINS i

1 0 SIDEWALKS & PA VING 3

i  ;)27.$ ELEVATORS, FIRE ESCAPES

..,..<.<,s ...,ss ...

~

$; l - (- . - . . ^ - '*"

,':e-' ';

• a::

) ', y ; PILE D. ,R. IV. ..I.N. G,. .,D.y

. , . . ~, . RED GING '

". j*t

. . 92.'1t';

' BRICKLAYING, PL4STERING, I' '

k i 7.0 1

.- ROOFING IIEATING, PLUMBING, WIRING,

' 3.2 PAINTING, INSULATING j O'.3 CAULKING o ' ' ' ' .

{ to ~io '

so io go so Rate (Number /108 man-hours) l l 1

4 ..

i t

i FIGURE 7 i Fatal Accident Rates for Work Classifications I in Ontario Mining (1970-1978) 20.s g[gpg{@p[jgyjjgjoNmRio miNiNs 9

..,s -

. .+.:..N- -

Mve6+.#.

j  ; . M t.ti > 4 ;f9) ~_,

> s; .

j. :43,g yyggggggygg ygyggg t

,e;;l~6.8 SHOPS, SURFACE l 7.9 REDUCTION PLANTS i

i

8.1 DIAMOND DRILLING 9 1 l

1 3 .

, f: Mas.g4:.s::isig;4 g?;ga;;qqr.;.;;;,.g.ije;rsisws:.;.Mruxtw:+r : , f f .f e J-..* . ,. l 9e:r. xN;;y.r#.: . ;: my m h-i SIN ING Er. del /Egggffgj@y Q71.3 Ifp

.gpj Sy .

I II i 9.3 OPEN PIT MINING i

i ' .10.5 PROSPECTING t -

i i i i i i i i i i i i i i

! O 10 20 30 40 50 60 -

~

8 Hate (Number /10 man-houral 1

I l

i i

1 i

FIGURE 8 Fatal Accident Rate of

! Major Work Groups in Ontario Hydro 4

t i

j ......<....:....s . < . . . . . e 12 2 . 4 . . f '%. ? X

-. <, e 4

e

'.~ , ,

, s ::'~. 63.6;

' ,' :, ;~

, , #~ , : ' <, ' " ,,' ':: : 3 "f,>^:,.'z', ' 1g '

~

L. IN. EM. . E.. N. Et.. ,G.. R. O... U..,N, i.]$::j.,1' D...

M. .E,...a%., ,:.,Q((g?<

N, ,', ~, .

i 0 HANDYMEN i

16.4 ELECTRICIANS 0 RIGGERS

s

p 9.7 FORESTERS

13.5

.s. MECHA.NICS 4

i 5

0 FITTERS i

1 O NUCLEAR GENERATION DIVISION

' i i i i i i i i i i i 0 10 20 do 40 50 60 l

Rate (Number /108 man-hours) t e

4

FIGURE 9 Permanent Disability Rates of -

Major Work Groups in Ontario Hydro (1972-1979) i

'5.4 LINEMEN & GROUNDMEN O HANDYMEN l 2.0 A ELECTRICIANS .

O RIGGERS i

3.G FORESTERS U MECHANICS J _

2.6 FITTERS i

O.8 NUCLEAR GENERATION DIVISION j o io i '

to s '

Rate (Number /107 man-hours) '

i i

l 1 .

.e

^

i FIGURE 10 Temporary Disability Rates of .

Major Work Groups in Ontario Hydro (1970-1979) .

Compared to Americ,an and Canadian Industries i10.9 LINEMEN & GROUNDMEN

\ , 4.1 HANDYMEN

}16.6 ELECTRICIANS ,

)i , n.

23.6 MAINTENANCE MEN & RIGGERS l .

l ~ 6l6 FORESTERS

~

11.s MECHANICS & FITTERS ,

. 1.6 HEAD OFFICE I w.y  :

2.8 Y& NUCLEAR GENERATION DIVISION

.2 i

'$ 8 3 AMERICAN INDUSTRIES hhI CANADIAN INDUSTRIES * (1970-1978) fffhff.9 0 '

b '

k '

i '

4 '

s '

g a Rate (Number /106 man-hours) j l

• Includes Permanent Disabilities but does not include data for Northwest Territories l

I i .

j ..

l Table 1 Ontario Hydro Nuclear Program Huclear Number of Net Station Generating Reactor Capacity In-Service Station Units (Megawatts) Cates (s)

Units in Operation NPD 1 22 October, 1962 Douglas Point 1 206 September, 1968 Pickering A. 4 2060 July , 1971 June, 1973 Bruce A 4 2960 September, 1977 January, 1979 Units under Construction Pickering B 4 2054 December, 1982 April, 1984 i

Bruce B 4 3024 October, 1983 Janua ry , 1987 Darlington A 4 3524 May, 1987 August, 1990 l

i

Table 2 Equivalent Fatal Accident Rate of Nuclear Generation Division Work Groups Annual Lifetime

• Equivalent Fatal **

Average Radiation Accident Rate Work Grou_p Dose (ren/ year) (Nucber/10c l'an-hours)

All Nuclear Employees (5083 enployees) 0.51 2.6 Mechanical ??aintainers 5.8 (622 employees) ,

1.15 Operators (327 .empiqyees) 0.96 4.8 _

- Control Maintainers 2.9 (574 employees) 0.57 Service Maintainers 1.1 (700 employees) 0.21

• Ontario 'dydro's computer based dose record system as of the end of 1979.

'* Due to exposure to ionizing radiation assuming a risk per rem value of ts .

Table 3 Adjusted

• Equivalent Fatal Accident Rate for Nuclear Generation Division Work Groups Ecuivalent Fatal Accident Rate Unad Ad Work Group (Number /10tian-hours) justed (Number /10Man-hours) justed

• All Nuclear Employees 2.6 1.1 Mechanical Maintainers 5.8 2.4 Operators 4.8 2.0 Control flaintainers 2.9 1.2 Service Maintainers 1.1 0.5 l

• Equivalent Accident Rate (based on a risk factor of 10-4) adjusted to account for reduced years of life lost in the case of malignancies.

4 _ , , _ _ _ _

Table 4 Loss of Life Expectancy (Days) Associated with Various Occupatiens According to Reissland Ace (at beginning of exposure) 20 yea rs 40 years One Year at Risk in:

Deep Sea Fishing 51.4 31.9 Coal Pinipp 5.7 3.6 3.5 2.1 Ccnst ructi on

0. 7 0. 5 All Danufacturing Radiation llork at 5 rem /yr 4.6 1.3 Radiation ~ Pork at 0.5 nemlyr 0. 4 0.1 Expcsea for P.emainder of Working Life to Risk in:

1,393 551 Deep Sea Fishing 155 61.3 Coal l'ining 93.5 37 C onst ruction All t:anuf acturing 20.4 8.1 Radiation Work at 5 rer/yr de 12 .2 Radiation Ucrk at 0.5 rea/yr 6.8 1.2

~

Table 5 Mortality Ratios for Various Occupations Havine a Ratio Greater Than 150 for Malignancies (16)

Occupation Mortality Ratios

• Cance rs All Causes Pailroad Workers 199 17 4 Laundry Workers 255 140 Hon-f*etal hine rs 18 4 259 Metal P.olishers' 179 181 Truck Drivers 213 19 3 Ga rbagemen 217 179 Liquor Salesmen 176 16 4 Taxi Drivers 162 153 Ci rrhosis All of the Liver Causes Ba rtenders 1,037 17 1

• Observed deaths expressed as a percentare of expected deaths.

l

~ ~ .

l l

i l

Table 6 Occupations in Which Excess Cancer Incidence Has Been P,eported(11)

Hortality*

Occupational Group Cancer Site (s) Ratio Chemi sts Pancreas 164 Lymphomas 179 Textile Workers Moudi & Pha rynx 177 Metal !?ine rs Lung 300 Cadmium Production Lung 235 Worke rs P rostate 412-Tire Building Bladder 188 B rai n 19 0 Furniture Workers !lasal Cavity &

Sinuses 400-500

• Observed deaths expressed as a percentage of expected deaths.

e

- - --+a. - ,m,- .- , _ _ . . , , - , , ~ - , ~----,-n --

2 Table 7 Standardized Nortality Ratios for Various occupations for Lung Cancer Deaths (Males Only) (17)

Standa rdized liartality Occupation Ratio

• B a rtende rs 240 hessenge rs . 19 0 Assemblers of Electrical Equipment 18 0 B ricklayers, Stonemasons, Tilesetters 18 0 Plumbers & Pipefitters 17 0 I'nspectors-Metal 17 0 Watchmen 13 0 i

• Observed deaths expressed as a percentaae of expected deaths.

t l

1 l

l I

i

4 TABLE 8 Cancer Mortality in Hiroshima and Nagasaki (1950-1974)

Mortality'Ratlos' for Various Dose Groups Causs of Death 1-9 rads 10 49 rads 50-99 rads 100-199 rads 400 + rads LEUKAEMIA 62 76 96 281 1250 ALL OTHER 97 101 102 114 158

^

CANCERS

' OBSERVED DEATHS EXPRESSED AS A PERCENTAGE OF EXPECTED DEATHS BASED ON JAPANESE NATIONAL STATISTICS. ,

-l, 1

l

TABLE 9 i Ontario Hydro ,,

Standardized Mortality Ratio

• NUCLEAR

• THERMAL OTHER TOTAL

)

ALL CAUSES 54 75 86 84 NEOPLASMS (76) 122 94 94 l

(CANCERS) i -

) CIRCULATION g) 3 g g (HEART, STROKE) l

! ACCIDENTS (OCCUPATION and 68 (46) 80 75 l

l IVON-OCCUPATIONAL) 1 AR OTHER 53 52 l

CAUSES (13) (46) 1 i

i

!

• OBSERVED DEATHS EXPRESSED as a PERCENTAGE of PREDICTED DEATHS

! (BASED ON CUMULATIVE EXPERIENCE 1970-1978).

PARENTHESES INDICATE RESULTS BASED on LESS THAN 10 OBSERVED DEATHS

- - ~, --