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Exhibit 7 Callaway Plant Performance Summary
	ML031320812
Person / Time
Site:	Callaway
Issue date:	05/09/2003
From:	; NRC Region 4
To:	;
References
	FOIA/PA-2003-0180
	Download: ML031320812 (10)
	v • d • e

EXHIBIT 7 PRE C86NAL CALLAWAY PLANT PERFORMANCE

SUMMARY

- UPDATED 02-13 Assessment Period: January 2002 through December 2002 I Operating Summarv The plant began and ended the assessment period at 100 percent power. During the assessment period the following power changes took place:

On January 31 the plant was taken off line to inspect and remove the intemal floating cover in the condensate storage tank. The plant was restarted February 15 and returned to 100 percent power.

On October 23 the licensee began refueling Outage 12. On November 26, the licensee closed the main generator output breaker ending the refueling outage.

Total outage duration was 34 days.

On December 14 the unit experienced an automatic reactor trip on Over Temperature/Delta Temperature (OTDT). The trip occurred while completing a power reduction from 100% to 85% to secure a condensate pump for maintenance.

The pump was repaired and the gain to the OTDT trip setpoint was adjusted. The unit was restarted on December 17. The unit remained at full power for the remainder of the assessment period.

II Performance Overview A. Current Overall Assessment Plant performance for the most recent quarter was in the Regulatory Response Column of the Action Matrix, as a result of one White finding in the Mitigating Systems cornerstone in January 2002 due to the motor-driven auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pump being inoperable.

A substantive cross-cutting issue was identified during the midcycle performance assessment in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution.

B. Previous Assessment Results

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Plant performance in the first quarter 2002 was in the Degraded Cornerstone Response Column of the Action Matrix, as a result of a White finding in the Mitigating Systems cornerstone in June 2001 ( inoperability of one train of the essential service water system) and the above mentioned white issue. The licensee was in the Regulatory Response Column during the second and third quarters of 2002 as the result of the white finding for the AFW pump.

1ll Inspection and Performance Indicator Results A. Results by Strateqic Performance Areas and Cornerstones Reactor Safety Initiating Events Inspection Findings:

One Green finding was identified during the most recent quarter, and no findings were identified during the previous three quarters.

(Self Disclosing) A noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criteria 111, Design Control, occurred when the licensee failed to maintain control of the over temperature-delta temperature delta flux penalty circuit amplifier gain. The finding contributed to an unplanned reactor trip, an initiating event (IR 02-06 / December 14, 2002).

Performance Indicators: All three performance indicators were green throughout the assessment period.

Mitigating Systems Inspection Findings:

O=rJe course of the assessment period, the inspectors ide ntifie ANW-5 lndings involving mitigating systems. Most of the findings occurred early in the assessment period or were existing conditions that were identified and documented during the period.

a. (NRC, White) Between January 1992 and January 31, 2002, several opportunities were missed to promptly identify and correct a significant condition adverse to quality involving foreign material in the auxiliary feedwater system and condensate storage tank. The failure to promptly identify the degraded condition resulted in the failure of an auxiliary feedwater pump (IR 02-07 / February 27, 2002).

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b. (Self Disclosing) A noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, occurred when the licensee failed to take corrective action to ensure that abnormally high vibration on both motor driven trains of the auxiliary feedwater system was corrected. During the past 12 years, the licensee had identified this condition five times. The licensee did not determine the actual cause of auxiliary feedwater piping vibration and consequently did not take appropriate corrective action (IR 01-07/

February 8, 2002).

c. (NRC) A noncited violation of Technical Specification 3.0.3 occurred five times during the time that the Essential Service Water pump was inoperable (February 9-15, 2001), three of which exceeded the one hour requirement for initiating actions identified in Technical Specification 3.0.3 (IR 02-08 / March 13, 2002).

d. (NRC) It was determined that the licensee failed to promptly identify the need for and implement corrective action to address the flow anomaly condition of the auxiliary feedwater system Train B that existed between February 2000 and March 28, 2001, where the flow through the recirculation valve was below the required flow. The condition existed between February 2000 and March 2001 (IR 02-08 / March 13, 2002).

e. (Licensee) Calculations for auxiliary feedwater pump net positive suction head did not account for nitrogen saturated water. The failure of calculational methods to verify the adequacy of net positive suction head requirements for the auxiliary feedwater pumps was a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion IlIl (IR 02-07 / February 27, 2002).

f. (NRC) The screws that held the overspeed trip switch intact were found to be loose and the emergency diesel generator had to be removed from service for repair. Repair consisted of tightening the screws that held the switch in place. No other repair action was taken nor was a root cause analysis conducted even though this was the second time this had occurred (IR 02-02 / April 9, 2002).

9. (Self Disclosing) A leather weld rod pouch lodged inside the fill valve to the condensate storage tank could have adversely affected the auxiliary feedwater system if the pouch became dislodged while filling the tank (IR 02-02 /April 23, 2002).

h. (NRC) Two licensee calculations contained incomplete and incorrect methods of evaluating degraded voltage conditions. Calculation E-B-21, "LSELS Degraded Voltage Setpoint Calculation," Revision 0, did not consider the voltage requirements for non-motor loads in determining the degraded voltage relay setting. In addition, Calculation ZZ-214, "Motor Operated Valve Feeder Cable Voltage Drops," Addenda 1, Revision 2, for determining minimum voltage to motor-operated valves, did not consider 3

the effect of motor starting currents in circuit elements upstream of the motor control centers (JR 02-04 / May 24, 2002).

i. (NRC) Requirements in Procedure EDP-ZZ-04023, "Calculations', Revision 14, were not applied correctly to the diesel generator steady-state loading calculation contained in Callaway Drawing E-21005, List of Loads Supplied by Emergency Diesel Generator," Revision 25 (IR 02-04 / May 24, 2002).

j. (NRC) Calculation E-B-21, LSELS Degraded Voltage Setpoint Calculation," Revision 0, used to determine the degraded voltage relay dropout setting, referred to superseded calculations for important design inputs, and had not been updated to reflect plant configuration and loading changes (IR 02-04 / May 24, 2002).

k. (NRC) A noncited violation of Operating License Condition 2.C(5)(c) occurred when the licensee failed to take compensatory action when the 3-hour rated fire doors that separated the two trains of control room air conditioning were unlatched and not closed (IR 02-02 / June 25, 2002).

Performance Indicators: All five performance indicators were green throughout the assessment period.

Barrier Integrity Inspection Findings: