ML20040B115

Proposed Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law on Issues Raised in Reopened Restart Proceeding.Certificate of Svc Encl

ML20040B115
Person / Time
Site:	Three Mile Island
Issue date:	01/15/1982
From:	Bradford L, Clewett J CLEWETT, J., THREE MILE ISLAND ALERT
To:
References
NUDOCS 8201250173
Download: ML20040B115 (70)

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{ ,1 TMIA 1/15/82 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )

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METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-289

) (Restart)

(Three Mile Island Nuclear ) -(Rec +ened Proceeding)

Station, Unit No. 1) )

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TABLE OF CO?!TFNTS l I. INTRODUCTIdN 1 II. THE DISCOVERY OF CHEATING AT THREE MILE ISLAND 7 1 III. LICENSEE APPROACH TO CHEATING AND RUMORS OF CHEATING BEFORE THE O AND W AFFAIR 9 A. The 1979 Cheating Incident Involving VV and O 11 B. Rumors Heard By Mr Polon (*lNt?) 20 C. Attitudes Towards Weekly Requalification Training Tests 21 IV. LICENSEE REACTION TO THE O AND W AFFAIR 25 The Wilson Inynstigation 30 G and H 35 W and GG 4f Allegations Concerning Mr. U 40 V. "EC STAFF INVESTIGATION OF PHEATING 59 VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR A POTENTIAL RESTAPT 63 A. STAFFING 63 B. CERTIFICATION 65 VII. FACTUAL

SUMMARY

66 VIII. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 67 I

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TMIA 1/15/82 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )

)

METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-289

) (Restart)

(Three Mile Island Nuclear ) (Reopened Proceeding)

Station, Unit No. 1) )

TMIA'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON ISSUES RAISED IN REOPENED TMI-l RESTART.PROq,EEDING I. INTRODUCTION.

1. _This proceeding arises as a part of the hearings which

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the Commission instituted for the purpose of deciding whether Three Mile Island Unit 1, the reactor not involved in the March 28, 1979 accident, should be restarted. The Commission, in an Order dated July 2, 1979, required the Licensee to keep TMI-1 shut down until the Commission had a " reasonable assurance" that TMI-l "can be operated without endangering the health and safety of the public."

2. In a subsequent Order of August 9, 1979, the Commission gave notice that there would be a hearing to determine whether TMI-l shou,ld be allowed to restart. That Order specified a number of l

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issues for resolution, including various issues relating to management competence. These concerns were fleshed out more fully in the Commission's Order of March 6, 1980, which directed the Board to examine various broad issues, such as "whether facts revealed by the accident at Three Mile Island Unit 2 present questions concerning management competence which must be resolved j before Metropolitan Edison can be found competent to operate Unit 1 1

j safely." CL1-80-5, 11 N.R.C. 408 (L980). These issues were liti-

gated during the hearings, and are addressed in our Partial Initial Decision of August 27, 1981.

j 3. However, just prior to the issuance of that decision, i

circumstances arose which could bear in a general way oa the proper i resolution of various management issues. It developed that two of i

! Licensee's shift supervisors had cheated, extensively on the NRC

' licensing examination given in April of 1981. We issued our de-i cision, but retained jurisdiction over issues which might be i af fected by cheating on the part of Licensee personnel, including the issues of "manag'ement integrity, the quality of its operating

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j personnel, its ability to staff the facility adequately, its training and testing program, and the NRC process by which the operators would be tested and licensed." PID, at $45.

4. In an Order dated August 20, 1981, we asked the parties for views on whether to reopen the record to take evidence on matters related to cheating on tests at TMI. Two intervenors, the Aamodt family and Three Mile Island Alert (TMIA), asked for the record to be reopened, and the Licensee did not oppose

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, reopening the record. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the i l

NRC staff also showed interest in the question. l S. On September 14, 1981, we decided on our own motion to reopen the proceeding, because it was our view that the information available at that time could directly affect issues addressed in the PID. At that time we appointed Judge Gary L. Milhollin as i

l Special Master to conduct the reopened proceedings.

6. At a prehearing conference on October 2, 1981,' the Board adopted certain issues to be litigated in the reopened proceeding, based upon recommendations from the parties, and its own deli-

, berations. The broad issue to be litigated is as follows:

The broad issue to be heard in the reopened proceeding is the effect of the information on cheating in the NRC April examination on the management issues considered or left open in the Partial Initial Decision, recognizing that, depending on the facts,-the possible nexus of the cheating incident in the NRC examination goes beyond the cheating by two I particular individuals any way involve the issues of Licensee's management integrity, the quality of its operating personnel, its abil-l ity to staff the facility adequately, its training and testing program, and the NRC

process by which the operators would be tested i and licensed.

7. Within that broad issue, we adopted these particular 4

isses to be. litigated:

I 1. The extent of cheating by TMI-l operator license candidates on the NRC license examinations in April 1981, and on any other Licensee- or NRC-

administered examinations, including but not 4

limited to the following: the Kelly examinations '

i (including Category T), in April 1980; Category T 1 make-up examinations subsequently administered by the company; the ATTS mock examinations in early April 1981; and such other examinations 4 as the Special Master may deem relevant. These latter shall include any other Licensee-admin-i istered qualification or mock exam or NRC-administered exam since the accident at TMI-2.

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g 2. The adequacy of the Staff's investigation of, and NRC response to, the cheating incident and rumors of cheating in the April 1981 NRC examinations.

3. The adequacy of Licensee's investigation of, and Licensee's response to, cheating or possible cheating in the examinations listed in Issue 1 above.

4. [ Proposed Issue 4 was combined with Issue 31.

5. The extent of Licensee management knowledge of, encouragement of, negligent failure to prevent, and/or involvement in cheating in the above mentioned NRC and Licensee examinations.

6. The existence and extent of Licensee management involvement in cheating as alleged by the Aamodts ,

in Paragraph 7 in response to the Board's Order of August 20, 1981 [This paragraph stated that the Aamodts have been aware of other cheating l in tests at TMI-l since the TMI-2 accident,

! and that they were prepared to present a witness to testify to this.]

7. The existence and extent of mTnagement constraints

( on the NRL investigation of cheating and rumors of cheating in the NRC April 1981 examinations.

I 8. The adequacy of Licensee management response to the incident in July 1979 referred to in the OIE investigation report and involving one of l the two operators terminated as a result of cheating on the NRC April 1981 examinations.

9. The adequacy of Licensee's plans for improving the administration of future Licensee qualification examinations for Licensed operators and candidates for operator licenses, including the need for independent administration and grading of such examinations.

10. The adequacy of the administration of NRC licensing examinations for TMI-l personnel, including proc-toring, grading, and safe-guarding the integrity of examination materials; the adequacy of the staff's review of the administration of Licensee's

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! I Category T examinations; and the adequacy of the Staff's plan for retesting operators and monitoring its NRC examinations to assure proper adherence to NRC testing requirements in order to assure that the procedures of the NRC examina-tions, because of the nature of the questions, cannot be defeated by cheating, the use of crib sheets, undue coaching or other evasive devices.

11. The potent,ial impact of NRC examinations, including retests, and operator terminations on the adequacy of staffing of TMI-l operations.

12. The sufficiency of management criteria and pro-a cedures for certification of operator license candidates to the NRC with respect to the integrity of such candidates and the sufficiency of the procedures with respect to the competence of such candidates.

4 Board Memorandum and Order, October 14, 1981

) 8. The Special Master also specified various minimum evidentiary presentations he would require of the NRC Staff and the Licensee. Special Master's Memorandum and Order, November 8, 1981. ,

9. Confidentiality was an issue early in the proceeding.

A desire not to disclose the names of the three individuals known to have cheated (Messrs. O, W, and VV) led to a decision by the Special Master to allow discovery to proceed using a letter system of identifying them and others whose training and testing records might be discussed on the record. 'This lettering system created some problems for the intervenors, because the Licensee assigned letters to a broad range of its employees, including the Manager of Operations at TMI-1, the Supervisor of Technical Training and i members of the training department, the Vice President and Director

of Technical Assurance, and a variety of other people above the operator level, and because the Licensee in discovery responses sometimes referred to such individuals by name and sometimes by letter. Nonetheless, the scheme worked in an acceptable fashion, and with the concurrence of the Special Master, the parties sub-sequently agreed to use the lettering scheme in the hearings, with some changes, including the removal of confidentiality for senior management personnel and the provision to the parties of a key identifying for their use the names of lettered individuals.

10. Another procedural matter was the question of se-questration. The Aamodts and TMIA jointly sponsored a motion concerning sequestration of Licensee's witnesses, to avoid tainting their testimony with a knowledge of what testimony had previously been received. This led to discussion and agreement among the parties on sequestration, and to an Order of the Special Master, dated November 12, 1981. Other than one incident which could be argued to be a violation of at least the spirit of the agree-ment, Tr. 26,712 (P), Licensee appears to have abided by this agreement.

11. On November 10, 1981, the hearings began, consuming 18 hearing days before adjourning on December 10, 1981.

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II. THE DISCOVERY OF CHEATING AT THREE MILE ISLAND )

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12. The circumstances which prompted the reopening of this proceeding are as follows. On April 21 thorugh 24, 1981, the NRC administered licensing examinations to all reactor operators (RO's) and senior reactor operators (SRO's) at Three Mile Island.

Because of the large number of candidates, the examinations were administered in two sections, "A" and "B." Each section was further divided into smoking and non-smoking rooms. Messrs. O 1 and W, both Shif t Supervisors at TMI, took the RO and SRO examina-tions in the non-smoking room, on April 23 and 24. They shared a i .

] table together during both tests. Staff Ex. 26.

, 13. On July 15, 1981, the Operator Licensing Branch (OLB)

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was informed by Mr. Monte Davis, a consuTtant who was grading the SRO portion of the "B" examination, that he had iden'tified rampant similarities on the examinations of Messrs. O and W. Id.

14. The RO "B" examinations which had already been graded by OLB on July 10, 1981, were reviewed by O.ffice of Inspection and Enforcement investigators at a later date, and were found to contain a similar pattern of similarities. Id.

15. On July 27, 1981, the Office of Inspection and Enforcement interviewed both O and W. Both denied any knowledge of cheating, although both acknowledged that portions of their examinations l

were almost identical. Both refused to sign statements until they had consulted with attorneys. Id.

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16. Both O and W continued to deny knowledge of cheating in interviews on July 30. But on July 31, Mr. O, while being interviewed by Mr. Viutor Stello, the Director of OIE, admitted that he had been aware that Mr. W was copying from his test during the April 1981 NRC examination, and that he made no effort to stop him. He said that during the RO examination, he had seen Mr. W reaching over and taking his answer sheets. During the SRO examination Mr. O again shared a table with Mr. W and again Mr. O noticed Mr. W take his papers, but did nothing. Id.

17. That name day, July 31, 1981, Mr. W was informed that O had admitted facilitating cheating on the April 1981 NRC exam-ination, and had implicated him. Mr. W then admitted that he had cheated on the NRC examination, and that he had also cheated on the April 1981 ATTS " mock" examination. He went on to say that he had occasionally assisted Mr. O, who had orally sought Mr.

W's help four or five times during each of the two NRC examina-tions. In one insta.nce W recalls passing an answer on a slip of paper to Mr. O. Id.

18. In the wake of the discovery of cheating by Mr. O and Mr. W, all of the reactor operators and reactor operator candidates who had taken the April 1981 URC examination were required to take another NRC examination given in October of 1981, and the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board decided to reopen the record of this proceeding to determine the implications of the cheating at Three Mile Island.

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l j- III. LICENSEE APPROACH TO CHEATING AND RUMORS OF CHEATING BEFORE THE O AND W AFFAIR.

19. The most important issues in the reopened proceeding i are those that relate to TMI management -- whether management i

j was involved in cheating, actively or negligently, and whether i

i management responded adaquately to cheating or rumors of cheating.

} These issues are important because they go to the basic issue i

of whether management can be trusted to run the plant safely.

20. It is no secret that "information flow" has been a major issue with regard to management competence and integrity.

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I Ks:the' House of ' Representatives Committee on Interior and Insular 1

i Affairs concluded:

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... the record indicates that TMI managers presented State and Federal o(ficials misleading i statements (i.e. statements that were inaccurate

and incomplete) that conveyed the impression the i accident was substantially less severe and the j situation more under control than what the j managers themselves believed and what was in

fact the case.

1 j Reporting, of' Inform'ation Concer'ning the Accident at Three Mile f Island, U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs ("Udall Report") (March 1981) . Although we did i

i not conclude in the Partial Initial Decision that TMI management 1

! intentionally withheld information, the crucial nature of i.

information flow renders it of paramount importance to consider I

whether Licemsee management adequately investigated cheating and rumors of cheating, and whether they were candid in dealing with the NRC and the public.

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21. In order to consider the implications of the various a 1 cheating incidents and rumors of cheating, it is important to

, have a working definition of the meaning of the term " manage- )

ment." Two main definitions of this term were offered in the hearings. Mr. Arnold, the President of GPU Nuclear, defined i

it as including all personnel in supervisory or senior profess-ional positions. This would include the shif t foreman position j and those above that position. Tr. 23,622-23 (Arnold). This i

j meaning of the term is apparently understood by the operators j as well. Tr. 26,839 (U). Another definition was offered by Mr. Ward of the NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement. He I

stated that for his purposes (and presumably for the purposes l of the NRC investigation of cheating), management refers to those who are in a position to control the actions of more than 1

one shift. This definition would " start with individual EE" i

i (that is, Mr. Ross, the Manager of Plant Operations at TMI-1) .

4 By . this definition, shif t supervisors would be excluded from -

i management, Mr. Ward added. Tr. 25,377 (Ward).

4 22. We assume that Mr. Ward's definition would include s the training department, in that the training personnel " control,"

in a very real sense, the actions of more than one shif t. In any event, we prefer Mr. Arnold's definition, which includes the

) full chain of management instead of only a part, and which avoids

} the peculiar situation of having the plant be without any management

! for two-thirds of any given day (during the 1500-2300 and 2300-0700

shifts).

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A. TIIE 1979 CIIEATING INCIDENT INVOLVING VV AND O. )

23. An early indication of the need for better procedures and i

1 a be tter attitude toward testing on the part of Metropolitan l E'dison management personnel occurred in July, 1979, when Licensee's training department received four make-up sections of the NRC required coqualification examination for Mr. VV, at that time Supervisor of Operations of TMI-2. It was discovered that two of these four sections contained handwriting other than Mr. VV's, and in f act was that of his subordinate, Mr. O. Of these, one was completely in Mr. O's hand, and the other was writ: en partly by Mr. O and partly by Mr. VV. Passing grades were assigned to Mr. VV on one of the sections which was entirely in his own hand, and on the section written par.tly by him and partly by Mr. O. Failing grades were assigned to the section Mr. VV had completed without help, and on the section written entirely by Mr. O.

24. As it was required to do, the Licensee removed Mr. VV f rom his licensed duties and placed him full time in an accele-ra ted requalification program. Upon completion of this program VV was examined in writing in both sections for which he had been given failing grades, and orally in the section written jointly by him and Mr. O, for which he had previously been given a passing grade.

25. TMI Station Manager, Mr. Gary Miller, with the concurrence of Mr. J. lie rbe in , Vice President, Genera tion , TMI, indicated i

i in a letter to the NRC that VV had f ailed only two sections of the requalification exam, and had successfully made up those

! sections. In his letter, Miller failed not only to inform the i

NRC that VV had submitted work that was not his own, but also l certified to the NRC that VV had legitimately achieved a passing j grade on the section of the exam on which VV and O collaborated.

i TMIA Exs. 65 at 14, 66, 74.

26. The f acts which lead to the 1979 incident are as follows:

1 In August, 1977, Mr. VV sat for a cross-license examination on 1

i the dif fe rences between TMI-l and TMI-2. TMIA Ex. 64; Tr. 24,366-68 (Miller) . Mr. VV passed that examination in accordance with the l

! then current NRC criterion of 70 percent overall. However, the l

Licensee had an Administrative Procedure, adopted in response i to Commission requirements, and reviewed.and approved by the l Commission, which required that when an examinee displayed weaknesses in individual areas on an exam (by achieving a grade below 80%) he be required to participate in Fundamentals and a

l Systems Review (FS R) sessions in' those areas . TMIA Ex. 65; 10 CFR 55, Appendix A. Mr. VV f ailed two areas of his cross-license i

exam by this standard and was there fore required to take FSR I training in those two areas. TMIA Exs. 64, 6 5 '.

27. Apparently, the next normally scheduled FSR sessions

! did not begin until some seven months later, in March, 1978.

4 TMIA Ex. 64. Although special tutors are at times assigned for l FSR work, and although VV was to. supervise the people who oper-I ated the TMI-2 reactor during its crucial start-up phase, this j *

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l option was not exerc.ised. Tr. 24,369 (Miller)

28. Six months later, in February, 197 8, be fore the FS R program started, Mr. VV sat for the requalification examination.

Mr. VV passed this exam, under the then applicable NRC require-ments, but by the Administrative Procedure the Licensee had adopted in response to Commission requirements, VV failed three sections one of which (Safety and Emergency Systers) he had failed on the cross-license exam. Thus, at the start of the turch 1978 FSR program, Mr. VV was required to participate in

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four FSR sections. TMIA Exs. 64, 66; Tr. 24, 373 (Miller).

29. However, Mr. VV attended few if any FSR sessions. TMIA Exs. 64, 66. In January 1979 he was sent take-home make-up examinations, which were, in Miller's words, " Clearly closed book per training." He did not complete .theq,and in March 1979, the training department sent him another copy of the exam. .The deadline for VV to complete the FSR requirement and maintain his license, was July 1979. TMIA Exs. 64, 66; 67-70, Tr. 24,375; 24,379 (Miller) . -

30. Mr. VV reached the deadline for submitting his make-up work, on July 1, 1979, the day before he was due to go on vacation.

It was late, he was at the site on his own time, and he needed to get home to rest before leaving for his vacation, but VV had not completed the requalification exam which was due that day.

Tr. 26,662-3 (VV). Mr. VV requested Mr. O, who worked for him, to complete the unfinished sections of the exam, although he was

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fully aware that the program requirements were that he complete the work alone . Tr. 26,660 (VV).

31. Both VV and Mr. O insist that O was unaware that the work VV had asked him to do would be used to fulfill VV's re- -l qualification requirements and it is possible that VV removed i

> the identifying cover sheets before giving them to O. TMIA Ex. 67-70; Tr. 26,190-91 (O) .

i 32. However, testimony of Mr. VV suggests that it was in i

fact Mr. O who submitted the completed exam. VV states that it

... was the night I submitted the exam papers on the answer sheets and it was - I do not know - 7:00, 8:00, 9:00, 10:00 o' clock at night and it was getting late and I needed some rest before I I started driving the next day." Tr. 26,662 (VV). This suggests I

that VV gave the whole package of materials to Mr. O because he himself did not have the time to complete the exam himself or to wait for Mr. O to do so.

33. The likelihood of Mr. O having turned in the examina-tion is increased by,the fact that Mr. VV's name, as it appears j on the front of Judge Milhollin's unexpurga~ted copy of Staff a

Exhibit 26, Attachment 1, which includes VV's make-up examinations appeared to Judge Milhollin to look much more like O's handwriting i

than VV's. Judge Milhollin observed:

... my examination where the name is written

in appears to be in handwriting very similar to that of the page of the exam which does not belong to VV and does not appear to be in VV's handwriting." Tr. 26,658 (Milho11in) i 34. This f act is made more interesting by VV's assertion, t '

" I wri te , I do not print," Tr. 26,653 (VV), because VV's name i

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is printed on the cover sheets of the examination. Tr. 26,658 (Milhollin). In fact, Mr. VV seems unable to unequivocally claim the printing to be his. lie states, "I believe that to be my printing," Tr. 26,659 (VV), and "I believe that that is my printing," Tr. 26,660 (VV), when confronted with the cover sheet of his exam. .

35. With the evidence before us, we cannot conclusively determine that the handwriting on the cover sheets belongs to Mr. O, or to Mr. VV,'or to someone else. We do note, as we will address in more depth below, that we are puzzled as to why the training department and Mr. Miller, active in investigating the obvious handwriting discrepancy, made no inquiry into the hand-writing on the cover sheets.

36. During the time frame in which,the exam was being graded, the training department noticed that two of the sections contained the handwriting of more than one person. There is a lack of clarity in the record as to precisely when this discovery was made, but it is inconceiva'ble to this" Board that even a marginally alert person would not have discovered the handwriting discrepancy at the time of grading the exams, given the radically different appear-ance of Mr. O's printing and Mr. VV's writing. This is especially true of Section A, where both forms of handwriting appear. Given this fact, we are surprised that grading was completed for all sections, even those displaying handwriting differences. And wecare shocked that the grade for Section A, which was written partly by Mr. VV and partly by Mr. O, was actually maintained as l

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Mr. VV's final grade for that section, as if he had achieved it '

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himself. TMIA Exs. 70, 74.

37. After the discovery of the handwriting problem, Mr. Miller 1

met first on July 5, 1979 with Mr. Zechman, the Supervisor of Training, and then, along with Mr. M. Ross, met on July 7, 1979 with Mr. O, who identified the fact that his handwriting appeared I on parts of Mr. VV's examination, but denied having known why I

Mr. VV had asked him to fill out those questions. TMIA Ex. 71, Encls. 1 and 2.

38. When VV returned from vacation, Mr. Miller confronted him with the handwriting problem. VV admitted that portions of the exam had been completed by 0, Lot said he attached no signi-1 j ficance to this, since he had not attempted to disguise it. Miller I advised him that the company would evalyate the situation and I TMIA Ex. 71, Encl.

determine what action to take. 3.

39. VV was placed in an accelerated requalification program for the two sections he had failed. TMIA Ex. 65, 72. Upon written i re-examination, he achieved a grade of 99.8%. TMIA Ex. 7 2', Enc. 1.

I J Although Mr. Zechman's memorandum notifying VV that he would 3 have to undergo accelerated requalification training referred to I only those two sections, TMIA Ex. 72, Mr. Miller stated that VV

was also examined orally on the section that he and Mr. O. colla-l borated on. Tr. 24,419 (Miller).

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40. When Mr. Miller wrote the required letter to the NRC recertifying VV, he neglected to mention that VV had not completed i .

{ the exam alone. In fact Miller submitted as VV's the 89.1% grade i

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which was the result of VV and O's combined efforts. Miller's description of the accelerated requalification program addresses only the two sections in which VV was graded less than 801.

This letter had the approval of both Mr. Herbein and Mr. Zechman.

TMIA Exs. 65, 73, 74.

41. We find this omission of pertinent information to be completely inexcusable. With the information Mr. Miller had at the time, there could have been no reason for failing to mention '

the handwriting discrepancy, and claiming Mr. VV had passed the A section with a grade of 89.11, other than a desire to deceive the NRC. Since Mr. VV did not in fact achieve that grade unaided, his renewed license was obtained under false pretense. It would appear that this deception was not intended to obtain a license for someone who is technically incompetent, but rather to cover

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up misconduct of a member of plant management. We find this behavior unacceptable.

4 2. In addition, there is a question of whether VV should have been recertified at all. Mr. Crocker of the NRC offered two reasons why VV should not have been recertified. If Licensee in fact intended to remove Mr. VV from licensed duties, it would run counter to the provisions of 10 CFR. Crocker, ff. Tr. 25,081, at 4.

Mr. Crocker cited g55.10 (a) (b) , which deals with new applications.

The comparable provision for renewals is 10 CFR 55. 3 (c) ( 3) . In fact, Mr. VV has not engaged in licensed activities since 1979.

Tr. 26,642 (VV). Secondly, licenscholders are required to have ccmpetently discharged their license responsibilities to be eli-gible for renewal . Crocker, ff. Tr. 25,081, at 4. 10 CFR 55. 33 (a) (5) .

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Since Mr. Miller knew that VV had not competently discharged I his responsibilities with regard to the requalification program

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and his abuse of his supervisory position, he should not have l recertified him.

43. Similarly, Mr. Hukill has said that given his knowledge of the case, VV should not have been recertified. Tr. 24,113 (Hukill).

44. A significant question in this proceeding was the extent to which the Licensee disciplined Mr. VV. It is not at all clear

! that any discipline was imposed on him. When Mr. VV returned from vacation July 9, 1979, he was assigned full time to an acce-1erated requalification program for two weeks.

45. On August 20, 1979, Miller assigned VV to a special group charged with obtaining a better understanding of the events which led to the TMI-2 accident. TMIA Ex. 54.

46. In his current position VV is responsible for " technical  !

interface" with the Department of Energy's Research and Development programs at TMI-2, and with the Bechtel companies who will do the i 1

i actual decontaminati'on of Unit 2. Mr. Arnold asserts that this 1

is a demotion and would be viewed as such by VV and the organization as a whole. Tr. 23,620-1, 23,738, 23772 (Arnold).

J Mr. Arnold also stated that it would be " exceedingly naive" of management not to

" presume" that the organization as a whole understood why the If indeed everyone thought that VV was demoted, action was taken.

and understood why, it would comport with the view espoused by Mr. Arnold that discipline should instruct the individual and in-l struct the organization. Tr. 23,738 (Arnold).

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47. However, the change appears not to have been a demotion.

Salary figures indicate that VV's salary was not decreased when the transfer occurred and has continued to rise since then.

Lic. Exs. 81A, 81B. And VV stated that his transfer was a lateral move. Tr. 26,642 (VV).

I 48. Mr. VV is not alone in not perceiving his reassignment to have been a demotion as a result of the VV/O affair. For example Mr. W stated that at least among Unit 1 operators, the VV/O affair was not common knowledge, and that he (Mr. W) does not know what i VV's current job is. Tr. 26,135 ('W) . Mr. VV himself said "... the majority of the people at the plant do not know about this incident, l ... I do not think the management really wanted to use me as an example or there would have been an article in the company news-paper to that effect." Tr. 26,675-6 (VE).

49. Even if all the operators had been aware of the 1979 cheating incident, and perceived VV's transfer as a demotion, it is not at all certain that they would conclude that the transfer resulted from the cheating. Mr .' Arnold said there were other reasons which led to VV's transfer, in particular a weakness in terms of administrative ability. Additionally, Mr. VV had made j some public statements in the wake of the TMI-2 accident that had embarrassed the company. Tr. 23,733, 23,870 (Arnold). The oper-ators were probably far more aware of Mr. VV's embarrassing comments than of his collaboration with 0. Mr. Arnold offers the assertion that the fact that Mr. VV had embarrassed the company.would make m._ .,_. .~ __. __ . . _ _ _ .. . . _ . __ _ . . , , ,.._. . _. __,. ..,. ____,.__._

the company less likely to discipline him, for fear of chilling the candor of other employees who might make statements embar-rassing to the company. Tr. 23,733-4 (Arnold). We find this self-serving statement completely incredible.

50. Although it was Mr. Arnold who brought the 1979 incident to the attention of the NRC during the recent investigations, he stated that he "may well not have" mentioned it at all, had it not involved Mr. O,who was at that point already implicated in the cheating incident and under investigation. Tr. 23,870 (Arnold).

And it certainly was not brought out beforehand. In sum, GPU management had an opportunity in 1979 to inform the entire organi-zation that cheating is unacceptable, but instead they chose to sweep this incident under the rug.

B. RUMORS !!EARD BY MR. POLON (NNN).

51. Another example of the importance that was attached to cheating before the O and W af fair focused so much attention on the Licensee involved Mr. Sandy Polon ("Mr. NNN"), the Manager;.of Employee Communications for GPU Nuclear. - Sometime before "the O and W news broke, probably in June of 1981, Mr. U informed Mr.

Polon of certain rumors that indicated there had been chcating on the April 1981 NRC exam. Commonwealth Ex. 8. Mr. Polon did not relay this information to anyone.

52. After the NRC investigation into the O and W af f air began, Mr. Polon's wife told him of other rumors which she had heard f rom the wives of Messrs. T and P. Commonwealth Exs. 8, 9.

l This information had been recounted since at leas t June of 19 81.

l Aamodt Ex. 7.

53. Shortly af ter this, Mr. Polon happened to be talking to Mr. Gifford about the cheating investigation, and happened to mention the statements made by his wife. Gif ford then told Mr.

Arnold, who asked Mr. Polon to recount the rumors he had heard. '

A't this time, for the first time, Mr. Polon divulged the rumors

that Mr. U had conveyed to him in June. Commonwealth Ex. 8.

i 54. We find the attitude of Mr. Polon, which releg'ated the account of cheating on the April NRC exam to such a low status that he did absolutely nothing to confirm or deny it, o r' to inform the appropriate people of it, is very unfortunate, particularly for one who is a manager of communications.

C. ATTITUDES TOWARD WEEKLY REQUALIFICATION TRAINING TESTS.

55. Another example of the attitude of management toward cheating is reflected in the behavio'r that was allowed to occur on the weekly tests given as part of the requalification training at TMI. As reflected in Mr. Hukill's notes, Mr. 00 informed Mr. Hukill that cheating was " widespread and accepted. " TMIA Ex.

61. Mr. Hukill made no follow up of any sort on this comment, nor did Mr. Wilson, to whom Mr. Hukill gave a copy of his notes.

Tr. 23,925, 23,952 (Hukill).

56. Upon cross-examination, it became apparent that Mr. 00

. had been referring to the weekly " quizzes" given at the end of a week of training. He stated that it was commonplace for operators to discuss the questions and answers of these weekly tests during the time they were given. Tr. 25,968-69 ('0 0). And, far from being viewed as abnormal, this behavior was " accepted" by the I

g i -

.1 operators. Tr. 25,971 (00). Mr. 00 is. unsure o'f the degree to which this is also accepted by the training department, because

"[a] lot of the training weeks were semi on our own.1 Idi However, another operator, Mr. T, makes it_ clear that this behavior also went on when the training personnel were in the ,

room. Tr. 26,608 (T). -

57. Mr. 00 admitted to personally discussing questions and answers more than once, and in particula'r recalled an fncident ~

in which he, Mr. P and Mr. O discussed a math-pr blem. Tr. 25'975- ,

76, Tr. 25,995-96. Mr. Q was not a witness to these hearings, but , ,

Mr. P was, and he agreed with Mr. 00 at least to the extent. of stating that he has been asked to clarify questions on tests, when the proctor was out of the room, and that he had done so. Tr. 4 26,702. Similarly, Mr. W and Mr.'O bEth recall convers'ation during weekly quizzes, and Mr. W admitted to having exchanged answers with other operators on take-home tests that were done ~

in the control room. Tr.'26,099, 26,153 04) : Tr. 26,232 (O). ,

And Mr. V indicated that in the three years he had been working (

for the Licensee, up until his recent departure, he had seen - '

~

this sort of cooperative ef fort on five to ten percent of the questions given. Tr. 26,306 D/ ) . ;Mr. U noted thatsthe OARP quizzes were done as group ef forts, .with the operatcrs discussing the questions until everyone understood the answer. Cooperation w

of this sort occurred in both the control room and in the class-room. Tr. 26,806-10 (U). It should be noted that all of this .

discussion of the f act that operators cheated on the weekly qtjizzoc -

s 7 l

t g _ w

'2 ' .

h

l '

. occurred after Mr. NO had " broken" the news about the weekly quizzes. Before that, the usual response was that there was no cooperation during the tests. E.g., Tr. 25,698 (GG);

Tr. 25,873_ (11).

58. Cheating on weekly quizzes might .well make operators more likely to cheat' on othcr examinations. Tr. 25,974 ('0 0).

Perhaps 'this led to the o and W incident. It is also possible that the exp' :e of cheating with your friends regularly is what led Mr. .t to say that when he was cheating on the NRC exam he Wasn' t concerned about the people behind him seeing him.  ;

Tr. 26,091 ' (W) ..

59. The training department personnel clearly must have known about.. this approach to the weekly quizzes, given the widespread nature of it, and the fact th~at it occurred while the training personnel were in the room. We note that Mr. Brown of the training d.epartment states that since 1975, when he first came to the training department, there has never been an

~

l

,open-book test. Tr. 24,739 (Brown). This. suggests either a )

m  !

't total lack of contact with reality, or a willing disregard for the stated- rules. The training department in general must be faulted-for allowing such extensive collusive test-taking to go gnremedied for so long.

- 60. A related problem concerns the Category T tests. The Coma.iusihn, in its August 9,

~ '

1979 Order, included the requirement

. that the Lic nsee augment the training of all RO's and SRO's in b- the greas.of " natural circulation and small break loss of coolant m N ' s. 3.- - -

),

' ~ ' -

~

% y _

i

! accidents including ~ revised procedures and the TMI-2 accident."

Commission Order, August 9, 1974, Order Item 1(e) . Order Item i

1(e) also required that the Licensee conduct a 100 percent re-examination of all operators in those areas. Although it may be arguable as to whether that Order Item required a good-faith ef fort to accomplish something rather than merely going through

! the motions, we nonetheless find the Licensee's actions in this i

1

! regard truly distressing. To begin with, it gave the Category T test in the same sloppy fashion that the weekly quizzes I i were given in. Tr. 25,699 (GG). For this reason they were subject l

to all of the procedural irregularities of the weekly quizzes.

Moreover, the training department didn' t bother even to rewrite the test ques tions, asking the same three simple Lessons Learned i 4

l questions over and over again. See, e.7., Lic. Exs. 66H (November i 4 26, 1980), 66I (December 19, 1980), and 66F (March 27, 1981).

More recently, the training department has rewritten the questions, but problems with the administration still remain. As Mr. 00 tostified, in the recent Category T test the instructors " horsed us up" and "more or less fed us the answers and then gave us an hour break, turned around and gave us the test." Tr. 25,983 (<00) .

f1 Mr. H confirmed that there was a four or five hour review session immediately before the test, and that the instructor, Mr. Brown encouraged the operators to memorize certain answers. Tr. 25,905 (H). ' He added that the tests, and review sessions, were similar in, November 1981 to the way they' were in July 1981. Tr. 25,907 (H).

Finally, even in light of the cheating that has come to light, the

%- -w. , -,,., --.--4 r,-.,-- - - - , y-e ,.---,-p ,-,,.-,s ,,,m,,,.cwg--,.9 ,,y, -.w-- ---g,,,.,,w -

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two administrations of the November Category T test, on November 2 and 6, involved identical testJ. Tr. 24,822 (Newton) . Mr.

Hukill stated that these tests were being given because "we are not satisfied with the Category T makeups that were given."

Tr. 24,120 (Hukill). Af ter such a long time to notice the inade-quacy of the Categor'y T testing, it is interesting that the' light should only dawn when hearings have begun. One can only wonder whether that light will long endure after the hearings are closed.

IV. LICENSEE REACTION TO THE O AND W AFFAIR.

61. In the wake of the NRC investigation of O and W, the Licensee realized it had a problem. It immediately began to address the question of cutting its losses. The first step in

~

this project was to attempt to maintain some measure of control over the unfolding events in the investigation. This led to a confrontation of sorts between the Licensee and the NRC staff l investigators. Mr. Arnold told Mr. Hukill to make a management representative available to O and W. Arnold, ff. 23,590, at 5.

This led to a conversation between Mr. Hukill and Mr. Baci in which the latter resisted the Licensee's desire. Tr. 23,995-96 (Hukill). When Mr. Hukill relayed this response to Mr. Arnold, Mr. Arnold called Mr. Stello, the Director of OIE, and informed him of his (Mr . Arnold's) view that G and W had a right to have a management representative with them, and that this needed to be clarified before the interviews started. He convinced Stello, at least for the moment. Tr. 23,655 (Arnold) .

__ _ _ _ . - ~ - . _ _ _ -- - - - - - - . - _ - - --

1 i

i a

1

$ 62. Thereupon,' Mr. Hukill contacted O and W to arrange i

j for the interviews. As soon as they showed up, Mr. Hukill j told them they could have a management person with them. Bo th l agreed. Tr. 24,098 (Hukill).

1 i i 63. After O and W confessed, the Licensee moved to distance '

itself from them. In the words of Mr. Arnold, their actions j

"took them to where we could not do anything to help or protect j them from their actions. " Tr. 23,787 (Arnold) . (This is in stark I

contrast, apparently, to several incidents discussed presently, J

where management obviously is trying to help and protect its J

j employees from their actions, rather than being fully forthcoming.)

{

In meetings with O and with W, Mr. Arnold relieved them of their l

j employment with the Licensee. TMIA Exs. 51, 52. -

64. Interestingly, no one in L'icentee management ever asked either Mr. O or Mr, W why they cheated. Tr. 23,783-85 j (Arnold) ; Tr. 24,123 (Hukill). Mr. Arnold said that there was i

no particular benefit to be gained by asking them, since the Licensee had to address all possible reasons for their actions.

Tr. 23,784-85 (Arnold) . We find this just a bit peculiar, since

, there is no way in which the Licensee could possibly know it had addressed all possible reasons, and indeed as a matter of 1

intelligent allocation of resources it would seem important to

) know which reasons led O and W to their actions. If Licensee were actually interested in preventing cheating we think it would

have made a point to inquire of Mr. O and Mr. W why they found,;

i it necessary to cheat. -

1 g

-r, , _ - - _ . .

65. With Mr. O and Mr. W at a distance, Licensee could now focus in ernest on damage control. This involved, first of all, getting some idea of how much other damage there was to control. Mr. Arnold apparently made it known that he wanted to be apprised of any information anyone had regarding cheating.

This led to at least one set of circumstances being brought forth, the rumors which Mr. Polon (NNN) had heard during the past month or two. In the wake of this, Mr. Arnold interviewed Messrs. U, T and Polon. It was not possible to tell whether Mr. U was telling the truth or not, so Mr. Arnold handed the matter over to Mr. John Wilson, in-house counsel, who was appointed to do an investigation into the extent of cheating. Commonwealth Exs. 8, 9.

66. In addition to Mr. Arnold's efforts, Mr. Hukill interviewed all of the licensed operators. One of the aspects of this series of interviews was to see if there were any indications of cheating that were clear and unmistakable. He also described the O and W affair and his views on cheating, and staffing. He also apparently addressed the question of morale, and a recent bonus that the operators had been given because they were in a "down mode." Hukill, ff. Tr. 23,913, at 10; Tr. 23,961 (Hukill);

Tr. 25,912 (H).

67. These interviews revealed the comment by Mr. 00, that cheating was commonplace and accepted. This item is discussed above, in our account of cheating on the weekly requalification training tests.

68. Mr. Rukill's notes indicate that at least one person came forward in response to Mr. Hukill's queries about cheating, with a partial confession of wrongdoing. TMIA Ex. 60. This involved Mr. Henry Shipman, Senior Operations Engineer at TMI-1.

l bk. Shipman took the April 1981 NRC exam in the non-smoking room.

He took both the RO and SRO A section of the exam. At some time during the two day exam (he cannot remember when) , Shipman left the room to get cof fee. While at the cof fee pot he met another individual, presumably from the smoking room (he cannot remember whom), also getting coffee. The unnamed individual asked Shipman a question (he cannot remember which question) which he assumed was on the NRC exam. Shipman responded with the answer. Both individuals returned to their respective exam rooms. S ta f f Ex.

28 at 5, and Encl. 3.-

69. Mr. Shipman apparently told no one of the incident even af ter he became awar.e that an investigation was being conducted 1 l

into the possibility that cheating had occurred during the April l

l NRC exam. He eventually disclosed this information to Mr. Hukill, Vice President of TMI-1, during an interview on October 7, 1981.

He told Mr. Hukill that while he had recognized at the time that his action was improper, he had not felt the incident significant enough to constitute cheating until bk. Hukill pointed out the seriousness of his actions. Shipnan, Staff. Ex. 28, Encl. 3, at 2.

T r '. 23,959 (HUkill). But upon being asked by Mr. Hukill if he

knew of, or had f acilitated cheating, he responded by relating the incident. Tr. 26,553 (Shipman), Staff Ex. 28, Encl. 3 at 2.

From his observation of Shipman's demeanor during his interview of him, Mr. Hukill remarked: "It was almost as if he (Shipman) accepted it as normal, "

... ir. 23,988 (Hukill) . Shipman later testified that at the time of the incident, while he had not felt that it was " normal," he had assigned little significance to it.

Tr. 26,367 (Shipman). Shipman was interviewed twice by Mr. Hukill and once by Mr. Arnold in an unsuccessful effort to get him to reveal futher details of the incident, and shed some light on the identity of the other individual involved. Mr. Arnold and Mr. Hukill believed Shipman. Tr. 23,907 (Hukill), Tr. 23,696-97 (Arnold). Judge Milhollin expressed puzzlement at Shipman's inex-plicable "...

f ailure to remember the identity or anything about the person or ques tion. " Tr. 23,988 (Milhollin). Mr. Baci, one of the OIE investigators, expressed the consensus opinion of the investigative team, that Mr. Shipman was not being truthful when he said he could not remember the identity of the other person, or any other details involved in the cheating incident at the coffee pot. Tr. 25,368-71 (Baci, Ward).

70. Mr. Hukill told the people he interviewed that he was not interested in rumors. Tr. 23,942. To the extent rumors were to be investigated by the Licensee , they would be done by Mr. Wilson. In order to facilitate Mr. Wilson's investigation, Mr. Hukill f urnished him with a copy of the notes that he had taken during his interviews. TMIA Ex. 60. Tr. 23,952 (Hukill).

l l

i I

a A. THE WILSON INVESTIGATION. j l

71. When it appeared that the NRC's restart hearings were about to be reopened on cheating issues, the Licensee undertook to review other examinations that might be considered during the hearings to see how much additional evidence of cheating there might be. This review was done by the Licensee's in-house counsel, Mr. John F. Wilson, with help from an assistant professor of engineering at Pennsylvania State University, Capitol Campus, Fk . Edward V. Trunk. Mr. Trunk, along with another assistant professor at PSU, Mr. Donald L. Miller, reviewed a given set of tests by spreading them out on a long table and examining them for similarities. When similarities among the examination papers of particular individuals were identified, Mr. Wilson and his associate, Mr. Richard D. Lloyd, would aItempt to identify expla-nations for those similarities other than cheating. See generally, Tru nk , ff. 24,8 31, a t 3-4 ; Wilson, ff. 24,478, at 1-4.

72. We are concerned with the degree to which Mr. Wilson's investigation of parallelisms noted by be. Trunk seems to have been designed more to create alibi's for instances of parallelism than to locate genuine instances of collusion on examinations.

This problem can best be seen by reviewing some of the parallelisms noted by Mr. Trunk.

73. Mr. Trunk noted tha t in general, the examinations contained unusually varied answers (which would, of course, not indicate any. collusion). Trunk, ff. 24,831, at 5. There was, however,

one glaring exeption to that. Operators G and H were found to have a remarkable series of parallelisms in answers to questions.

Some of these, we feel, legitimately yield to Mr. Wilson's ef forts to explain them away, but others do not.

74. The earliest test on which Mr. Trunk found parallels between G and H is the requalification training test of November 2, 1980. Licensee Exs. 66A (G) and 66B (H). Mr. Trunk found parallelisms on two answers , In one, G and H had identical short answer responses that were uniquely worded in comparison with those of other examinees. (Liquid and Gas Releases question 1). In the o the r , G and H wrote an almost absolutely identical paragraph.

(Fluid Flow, Thermodynamics and Heat Transfer question 2) Lic. Ex. 70E.

75. Mr. Trunk also noted considerable similarity between G's and H's answers on the requalification training test given on November 26, 1980. Lic. Exs. 66 G (H), 66 H (G). In this test, while there were no similarities of any kind noted among the responses of any of the other examinees, there were no less than seven separate questions to which G and H gave the same answers.

( ATOG question 3; Lessons Learned questions 1, 2; Accident Miti-gation questions 3a, 3b, 4a, 4b). Licensee Ex. 70A, Appendix B.

Moreover, the Special Master, the Commonwealth and TMIA noted additional parallelisms in G and H's answers on this test (ESAS questions la, lb; ATOG question 2). Tr. 24,509-12, 24,600-01 (Wilson) ; Tr. 24,863-4, 24,879-80 (Trunk). These questions represent almost half of the point value of the test - 14.5 points out of a total of 30.5 points. Lic. Ex. 66H.

- . - -- 7 M

h

76. On a second.requalification training test, given as a take-home test due March 27, 1981, Mr. Trunk noted parallelisms  ;

between G and H on five questions (Lessons Learned questions 1 i i

and 2; ESAS questions 1 and 2; Accident Mitigation question 3a) .

Lic. Exs. 66E (G), 66F.(H), 70A, Appendix B. These questions are t worth 8 points out of a total of 13.5 for this test. Lic. Ex. 66E.

Mr Trunk also found parallelisms on 2 questions on a subsequent  :

make-up test on " Category T," da ted June 25, 1981 (Lessons Learned questions 1 and 2). Lic. Ex. 66C, 66D, 70A, Appendix B.  !

f Thus there are a total of 16 instances noted by Mr. Trunk of [

parallelism between G and H, and at least 3 such instances noted i by others.

77.

Although Messrs. G and H are by far the most conspicuously parallel pair of examinees, other than Q.and W, of course, Mr. i

' Trunk did find other examples of potential collusion. The only I such example we find relevant l

to the matters at hand here con-

• r corns Messrs. GG and W, on a make-up test on Category T. On that t i

test, W and GG had 2 ' answers in which long sentences were abso-i lutely identical. Lic. Exs. 66L (W), 66 M (G), 70A, Appendix B.

t i

78. We are reasonably convinced, even though Mr. Trunk cer-a tainly did not find all examples of parallelism, and even though -

it is impossible to be certain that there are not examples that j have not been discovered, that Mr. Trunk and his associate Mr. Miller made a reasonably effectiv'e generally creditable effort .

to locate examples of parallelism on tests.'  !

1 i

79. The other ha'lf of the process, to be done by Mr. Wilson, was to determine the validity or lack of validity of the examples of parallelism. This process, if it is to be done properly, involves two tasks: seeking evidence that tends to show that an explanation other than cheating exists for a given parallelism; and seeking evidence'that tends to show that cheating may in fact have existed. If this investigation were to be valid, it would have had to search for both incriminating and exculpating evidence. However, Mr. Wilson chose to look only for evidence tending to bolster explanations other than cheating. Although this effort is useful, it is not enough, for a purely one-sided effort is unlikely to ferret out the truth. In a company that claims not to tolerate misconduct, this attitude and approach by Mr. Wilson of fer insight into whether~those claimed ideals are put into practice.

80. For example, Mr. Wilson spared no effort in attempting to dismiss the possibility of cheating. Concerning the paralellisms between GG and W, for instance, Mr. Wilson went to great lengths to try to find some materials that could possibly have been a basis for memorized answers. He " scoured" a stack of NUREG +

materials eight inches high. He checked the file cabinet of the consultant who had originally given the test in question. He even contacted the home office of this consultant, in Idaho, and got them to search their files. Tr. 24,570-71 (Wilson). Similarly, after Mr. H said he thought a certain answer had been put on the I

d 1

l

blackboard, Mr. Wilson told him to think about it some more and to "try to find something," leading Mr. H.to check his fellow l workers' lecture notes to see if they listed that answer.

Tr. 25,944 (H).

81. By contrast, Mr. Wilson did not undertake action that might indicate culpability on the part of operators with parallel answers. Thus, although Mr. Wilson asked G and H if they recol-lected where they had sat (they said they did not) he didn't ask anyone else in the same room if they knew where G and H sat Tr. 24,508 (Wilson). He made no effort to discover whether Mr. H, for example, might have consistently done poorly on tests (so as to perceive a motive to cheat) . Tr. 24,526 (Wilson). And he made no attempt to inquire into G's or H's reputation with other people in the plant. Tr. 24,533 (Wilson 1

82. Not only does Mr. Wilson seem disposed not to seek out evidence tending to support the notion that operators cheated, but he seems disposed to ignore or downplay such evidence if it should arise. For example, Mr. Wilson was asked about a state-men t by Mr . U that might tend to support the notion that G and H cheated, namely that weekly quizzes were poorly administered, creating doubt in people's minds that they should do their own work. He replied that he thought Mr. U had overstated conditions, ,

and with no basis, suggested that Mr. U's comments applied only to pre-Kelly examination quizzes. Tr. 24,612-14 (Wilson).

83. Although we have some problens with the degree of imbalance in Mr. Wilson's approach, it produced some materials, such as n

)

lesson plans and anawer keys, that could in some cases offer an alternative explanation to collusion, such as memorization or copying directly from the materials themselves. In some cases these materials at least raise enough doubt about the likelihood of parallelisms resulting from cheating that we are willing to dismiss them. This still, however, leaves us with a series of parallelisms that in all likelihood did result from cheating.

G and H

84. One of the most interesting parallels noted by Mr. Trunk is in the explanation of Bernoulli's equation given by G and H on the November 2, 1980 test. Messrs. G's and H 's virtually-identical descriptions follow:

G H Bernellis [ sic] equation is Bernoullis equation is the general energy equation, the general energy equation, it states that the total it states that the total internal energy of a system internal energy of a system is equal to the gravitational is equal.to the gravitational potential energy potential energy of the system plus total kinetic energy plus the total kinetic energy of the system plus the of the system plus the system internal energy system internal energy Lc. Ex. 66 A Lic. Ex. 66B

Bo th G and H stated at the hearings that they mewarized their definition. G felt he probably got it from one of H's textbooks, and H felt it was almost certainly written on the blackboard by an instructor. Tr. 25,816 (G); Tr. 25,938 (H). Licensee, in its proposed findings, states that G as well as H said that the description of the equation was put on the blackboard. We assume this to be a typographical error rather than a deliberate attempt to deceive, since we can find no such statement in the record. In any event, even though G and H of fer dif fering sources for the material, they both claim to have memorized this answer from somewhere.

85. We think that a more probable explanation is that one of them copied from the other. To begin with, this example is only one of many involving G and H. Moreo ver g there is the fact that the sentences are so parallel, even down to grammatical errors.

If G and H had memorized a definition put on the blackboard, or from a textbook, it is very unlikely that it would be phrased as a run-on sentence; or that it would refer to the " system" (rather than " system's") internal energy.

86. The Licensee argues in its proposed findings that the existence of a second sentence in H's answer makes copying un-likely - if G had copied the first he would have copied the second, and if H knew the second he wouldn' t have to copy the first.

However, this reasoning is a bit too facile. To begin with, Mr. G has testified that he has an abbreviated style of answering questions and that he does not elaborate. Tr. 25,787 (G).

l Therefore he may well have thought it unnecessary to add H's 1

second sentence. The fact that H's cecond sentence addresses the second part of the question is not dispositive either - as Mr. G said in testimony, "I flunk a lot of tests because I forget to answer questions." Since both parts of the question were in a single sentence, G may not have read it. In addition, the transfer of information could have been oral rather than visual.

There has been testimony to the effect that operators discussed questions and answers to quizzes while taking them, and indeed that such collaboration was " commonplace and accepted," and that it occurred both in the exam room and on shif t when "take-home" quizzes were answered. E . g. , Tr. 25,968-70 (00); Tr. 26,232-33 (O);

Tr. 26,701-02 (P) ; Tr. 26,809-14 (U); Commonwealth Ex. 9, p. 2.

In an atmosphere like that, and with a question where G and H were, uniquely, extremely parallel in their answers, we think it most likely that G and H collaborated on this answer.

87. Aside from the question of G's and H's actions, there in the question of the extent and nature of Mr. Wilson's investi-gation of this matter. Although he was on notice of the problems with weekly quizzes , Commonwealth Ex. 9 at 2, he didn't pursue the question of whether they sat near each other or whether there was talking during the test. He appears to have been ready to accept any explanation other than cheating, or,. where there is none, a simple unsworn oral denial of wrongdoing. Mr. Wilson reflected this attitude on the stand. When he was confronted with the written conclusion of Fk. Trunk that this parallelism l

i

l 1

i and the other parall.elism on the same test, " appear to indicate that some cooperative effort did take place," Mr. Wilson responded:

"The mere coincidence of response is, of course, a fact .... On the surface I cannot take to task Professor Trunk's conclusion, I

l b'ut he did not have the opportunity either to interview these individuals which I did."

Tr. 24,627 (Wilson)[ Emphasis added).

These individuals appeared, of course, in the hearings. We note i

that Judge Milhollin found neither of them to be credible witnesses.

88. On the next test, dated November 26, 1980, Lic. Exs. 66G, 66 H, Mr. Wilson's efforts to discover alternative possibilities yielded some fruit, since some parallelisms were also strongly a

parallel or identical, to material handed out. None theless ,

J many unexplainable parallelisms remain.

89. On ATOG question 3, which asked,for the requirement for natural circulation, Mr. H's answer is absolutely identical to the handout that Mr. Wilson discovered,and Mr. G's answer almost identical. TMIA Ex. 75, Attachment.A. This may make it

somewhat less likely*that G and 11 copied from each other, but t

i if anything makes it more likely that they copied from the handout, especially in the case of the identical answers. Still, this seems to us the sort of answer which might be susceptible to memorization, and in any event 'the evidence does not seem 1

clear enough to conclude that G and H definitely cheated on this question. This conclusion also holds true for the case of Messrs.

S and Y, who had the same answers as, respectively, H and G.

Lic. Exs. 66I, 66 J. Thus weiare left in a neutral position as l 1

l l

f

to this example, wi.th insuf ficient evidence to conclude one way or the other.

90. Another area in which doubts have been raised is the Lessons Learned section. Question 1 asked for 2 major weaknesses the Lessons Learned Task Force had noted. Both G and H replied

" Human factors, operational safety." Lics. Exs. 66G, 66H.

They also shared this answer on the subsequent test, on March 27',

19 81, when the same question was repea ted. Lic. Exs. 66E, 66F.

In Mr. Wilson's review of these examples, he notes that H may have merely repeated this answer the second time, but offers no explanation at all for the first time around. Mr. G told Mr. Wilson that he must have thought those were the most important answers and that perhaps they were drummed into him. Mr. Wilson couldn't find any handouts but found a lesson plan of five items which he claimed included the two provided by G and H . TMIA Ex. 75; Id, Appendix B. The i tems on the lesson plan are:

1. Man-machine interface

2. Training

3. Operator qualification

4. Emergency Opera ting procedures

5. Human element in design, operation and regulation of system safety.

Id.

From our review of these items it is unclear that the two responses of G and H are included as separate items (rather than both as aspects of item 5) and in any event, it is quite clear that they are not listed as G and H wrote them. Moreover, G and H were marked partially wrong on this question the seccnd time l

l l

1 I

j they answered it this way. TMIA Exs. 77,78. This certainly diminishes the credibility of the claim that this was memorized

, from handout materials.

1 i 91. Parallelism also exists on the second question of the

! Lessons Learned section, on both the November 26, 1980 and the March 27, 1981 tests. However, G and H appear not to have been 4

j unique in this regard - Mr. Wilson stated that he found the same 4

.l j answer on roughly thirty tests. Tr. 24,524 (Wilson) . This sub-i stantially diminishes the chance that G and H cheated on this

! question, and we conclude they did not. We note that Mr. Brown l

j (CC) of the training department later stressed that this wide-spread answer was in fact incorrect. Tr. 24,663-75 (Brown).

j This does not, however, reflect poorly on G and H or Mr. Wilson, j but rather on Mr. Brown and the training department, if this j

amounts to marking incorrect a widely taught answer.

i

92. The next set of parallelisms between G and H occurs in i

the Accident Mitigation section of that exam, on question 3a.and l

question 3b, which ask for the names of, respectively, narrow-range and wide-range pressure instruments. G and H both correctly answer 3b with the term "bourdon tube," although Mr. .G spells it i

wrong. Lic Exs. 66G, 66H. bbre significantly, both G and H I

put the wrong answer, " forced balance," for 3a. G also adds

the trade name "Rosemont. " It appears that both of these men j are still profoundly confused as to the distinction between these i

two instruments, even af ter repeated tests with the same question (See Lic. Exs. 66E, 66F (March 27, 1981)), and an investigation i

j of sorts into their responses. It is not a difficult distinction.

I -

l

, l'

-_.,...=_.-_ - - - - . - - - _ _ . _ ... ..- - -.. _- . - _ . _ _ - .

I r

A Rosemont device is an instrument in which pressure affects the 4

proximity of the plates of a capacitor, so that capacitance '

j varies as a function of pressure. A bourdon tube is a curved 4 i

! hollow tube that tends to straighten out and move a linkage arm

! t j as pressure is applied within it, thereby actuating a feedback t

circuit that applies such force as necessary to keep the arm f

i j from moving. The current required for this " force balance" is proportional to the pressure measured. Tr. 24,786-87 (Brown) ;

] Lic. Exs. 82A, 82B.

93. While the apparent inability of Messrs. G and H to master l this information is of considerable concern to the Boa'rd, and f

1 l while we view this as casting considerable doubt on the competence l of these two operators, we cannot say that the evidence proves i that they cheated on these questions, om either the November 1980 3

or March 1981 tests.

94. The final pair of questions on which G and H show  ;

parallelisms are questions 4a and 4b of the Accident Mitigation i section of the test. Question 4b, which inquires as to the i method for removing hydrogen from the reactor building, is a straightforward question as to which we do not-feel the parallelisms i I

between G and H are evidence of cheating. j

95. Question 4a, however, is another matter. This question I i <

i asked for a discussion of how hydrogen gas is generated following i I

l a loss-of-coolant accident. While other answers to this question were quite varied (see, e.g., Lic. Exs. 66I (S), 66J (Y)), G and

.i i  !

1 l

l l .

H each had "From aluminum, Zirc [or Zr) water reaction." In 4

addition to the basic fact of parallelism, these answers are j interesting in that they both contain the same error - listing i

aluminum by itself, without listing the other half of the reaction, NaOH. In Mr. Wilson's discussions with them, neither could offer l

! any basis for having responded as they did. TMIA Ex. 75. In 1

his testimony, Mr. Wilson had nothing else to add, other than the totally unsupported claim that "the way they were exposed 1

j to information" in training somehow affected their answers (but i

j no one else's), and the assertion that G and H express themselves "in an ordinarily identical manner." Tr. 24,527, 24,530 (Wilson).

H has no explanation for this answer. Tr. 25,893-4 (H). G l offers the explanation that he took a short-cut and put down half the answer, and later asserts that alumknum "could oxidize e

by itself and give off hydrogen," although he adds that.it would do so at an extremely slow rate. Tr. 25,754, 25,796 (G). We j do not find the attempted explanations of this incident persuasive.

4 j G and H each put down a bizarre answer, that suggests that aluminum I reacts with itself to create hydrogen. Moreover, they do so in

! the same unique verbal context: "From aluminum." We conclude t

that this example appears to be the result of collusion on the i

{ test of November 26, 1980.

I j 96. Further examples of parallelism noted by others.

l The Special Master, Judge Milhollin, noted that both G and H i

made the same error on ESAS question lb on the November 26, 1980 i

j test. Tr. 24,511-12 (Wilson). Both erroneously stated that l

i

)

i is  !

. 1 2

__.__.J

certain monitors were located in the control room. Mr. Wilson stated that he didn't think the answers should be considered

] parallel, because the wording used was different. We reject this reasoning. The fact that they both made exactly the same substantive error strongly suggests that there was collusion here.

97. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania noted yet another parallelism on this test, on ATOG question 2. There is an inter-esting grammatical error here, in that both G and H use the word " control" in a redundant sense in giving answers to the question "What five (5) things must we control to control the heat transfer process?" Tr. 24,600-01 (Wilson); Tr. 24,863-65, 24,879-80 (Trunk). We feel that our information is insufficient to clearly decide if this example constitutes cheating, but the

grammatical errors raise a strong possibility.

98. Finally, TMIA pointed to an additional similarity on '

this test, on ESAS question la, which Mr. Trunk had failed to notice. Tr. 24,509-10 (Wilson). Because this parallelism also appeared on the March 27, 198 test of G and H, it will be reviewed in conjunction with that discussion.

, 99. On the take-home test of March 27, 1981, there were parallelisms as well. The parallelisms on the Lessons Learned section, questions 1 and 2, have been discussed above.

100. Two ESAS questions on this test show strong parallelisms, but they are probably not the result of cheating. Both question 1 and question 2 are long lists of equipment, susceptible to memo-1 ri'zation, and we think G and H may well have both memorized i

f l

l .-

j .. - . <.- ~. - - _ _ - . _

t this material in thi-s order. They both got part of question two r

incorrect, by listing valves "MUV 25,26." It appears that these  :

I  !

l systems were changed since the November 26, 1980 test in which I >

i G and H had both received credit for listing those valves, on i

[

the same question, which G and H answered in an identical fashion (

i

] as well. The fact that communication of the change in the status (

t

of these systems appears not to have reached G and H until after i i

I l the March 27, 1981 test raises doubts as to the effectiveness of i i

training, although others seem to have received the word with no problem. The fact that G and H, uniquely, did not, is puzzling, j and one could speculate as to why (H didn't get the word, and G, f i i i

who doesn' t study as much as others (Tr. 25,870 (H)), relied on t H's answer to be correct) , but we do not feel this situation is ,

i j clear enough to conclusively show that G.and H cheated on this l t

question.

[;

! 101. The final parallelism noted by Mr. Trunk on this test  !

t concerns the Accident Mitigation question on hydrogen production, f I '

j to which G and H had earlier responded by stating only half the equation, " aluminum". This time they jointly responded by giving the other half of the equation, "NaOH." Lic. Exs. 66E, 66F. ,

, Mr. Wilson claimed that both G and H had seen the correction of l r

{ their previous error, where the instructor wrote "NaOH" next to f

i i " aluminum", and therefore thought that was the right answer. l TMIA Ex. 75. Mr. H, for his part, seems to have thought that l NaOH would produce hydrogen all by itself. Tr. 25,904 (H).

e I

r

! /

I I

. . _ . . ~ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _= . . . - _ . - _ , . . _ - . _ _. . _ . . . . _ . . . . _ ,,

1 102. Finally,.there is the last test in which Mr. Trunk noted similarities, the June 25, 1981 Category T make-up. In this

test Mr. Trunk found similarities in two cases, each involving l

{

very short answers. One of these asked for the two section j headings, other than " Operations", in the Lessons Learned Task {

. Force report, so that the correct response, " Design" and " Regulation" i 1

l can hardly be expected to have varied greatly. G stated that

, i I

there was "no other answer. " TMIA Ex. 75. The second noted i parallelism is with two very short answers where there appear to be no other correct answers. We concluded that none of the I parallelisms on this test are the result of cheating.

103. Thus, we are left with a large number of unexplained ,

t parallelisms, many of which clearly indicate collusion between G  !

and H. Mr. Wilson offers no basis for ignoring these, but that is not for want of trying. On the March 27, 1981 take-home test he states that G and H didn't cheat because if they had, there i

not only would have been more similarities, but they would have  ;

passed. On the November 26, 198O test Mr. Wilson concludes solely from the denials of the operators that cheating did not occur.

, Wilson, ff. Tr. 24,478, at 8-9. i l

I 104. To begin with, not all cheating need be as blatant i i as that of O and W. The fact that parallelisms only appear on a  ;

! third or half of the questions rather than almost all of them {

4 doesn't mean no cheating existed. It is entirely possible that i 1 i G and H only copied when one of.them was unsure of himself. j i

i i

r

~ - -

i I p

Secondly, it is absurd to conclude that cheating guarantees success. Under cross-examination, Mr. Wilson was unable to explain why collusion between G and H would enable them to pass.

Tr. 24,537-8 (Wilson). And as Mr. Trunk admitted, when asked 1

about this assertion: "I don't know if there is any correlation,

{ to be honest." Tr. 24,869 (Trunk).

1

105. Thus, we are left with the conclusion that the Wilson-1 Trunk investigation, in spite of an apparent desire to avoid I

doing so, has uncovered clear evidence that Messrs. G and H j

engaged in collusion during Licensee-administered tests.

).

f W and GG j 106. Although the total number is much less than in the ,

4 case of G and H, Mr. Trunk discovered some striking parallels beteen the answers given by Mr. W and Mr7 GG, a Shift Foreman at TMI-1.

On the requalization examination given on December 19, 1980, in the Lessons Learned section, question one asked for two s

major areas of weakness noted by the Lessons Learned Task Force.

The answers of GG and W were essentially identical.

GG W 4 _

Non safety related systems Non safety related sytems affecting safety related systems affecting safety related systems (challenges the system) and (challenges the system) and Operator actions which operator action which compounded the challenges compounded the challenges i to the safety systems. to the safety systems.

i i

TMIA Ex. 85 TMIA Ex. 83.

i l

i l '7 i

l l

l. . _ _ ___ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - . _ - - - . - - - _ , _ _ , , _ . . _ . _ - - . _ . . - _ < _ - . ...___,._m - , _ - . _ , _

,m, ,- , , , , _ , , , , - _

107. The second question in that section asked for the primary deficiency in the general area of operational safety.

Once again, GG and W have essentially identical answers:

GG W Operations training allowing Operator training allowing actions which chellenged the actions which challenged the automatic actions of the automatic actions of the safety related systems. safety related systems.

TMIA Exh. 85. TMIA Exh. 83.

108. These answers are clearly the work of copying. Either Mr. GG copied from W. or vice versa. Mr. Wilson undertook an investigation of these parallelisms, and was forced to conclude that they were "so similar" that "without an acceptable explanation f rom W and GG, cheating appeared to be the only possible explanation. "

Wilson, ff. Tr. 24,478, at 11-12. lie attempted to find lessons for these questions to see if an alternative explanation could be found. As noted above, he " scoured" a stack of UUREG material, he searched the file cabinet of the consultant who had given the test, and he called the home office of the consultant and had them search his files. Tr. 24,570-71 (Wilson).

109. Having found no lesson plans, Mr. Wilson interviewed GG, who denied cheating, but had no explanation other than W copying without him noticing. Mr. Wilson, incredibly, accepts this explanation with nothing more. Ile made no effort whatsoever to contact W, who had left the company. Wilson, ff. Tr. 24,478, at

p. 12. This is in stark contrast to the efforts he made to locate

!?

_. . .- - - = _ _ - _ - - - - . .. -_ . . . _ - . - - -.

I i

the lesson plans. It is also interesting that Mr. Wilson fails

to mention the answer key, which does. exist, and which is l nothing at all like GG's and W's answers (see p. , supra).

1 j 110. On the stand, Mr. GG continued to assert that he I i i had not copied. Tr. 25,695 (GG). However, he noted that it [

was possible that Mr,. W copied from him, because "I do not feel j the seriousness of this exam was felt by anybody in the room, -

i the instructor included." Tr. 25,695 (GG). This is a peculiar I explanation, and suggests that Mr. GG as well may'not have taken i I

~

the test seriously enough, and either copied from W or allowed -

t

W to copy from him.  !

j 111. This likelihood is increased by W's testimony, which is that he "may have" discussed the first answer with Mr. GG, a

and may have arrived at the second answer by cooperating with '

GG. Tr. 26,144, 26,148 (if) . In response to a question as to whether he might have cooperated, he says he doesn't know if i

this might have been a take-home exam, suggesting that cooperation '

is more likely, or a'ccepted, on "take-home exams. Tr. 26,149 (W) '. t 112. In any event, since both GG and W suggest the possi-bility of collusion, and since the answer key.is so different I

from their answers, which are almost perfectly identical, we  !

I conclude that copying took place. Licensee, in its. Proposed  !

I I l- findings, offers the lame excuse that the answers written by i t

GG and W might have been written on the blackboard by the instructor, l

r and then memorized by GG and W (but no one else). (Lic. P.F. 92).

i t

i 1

0

- _ _ - - __ r- m-- ------e, - . . . . , - - - - - , . - - - - - . - - - - - - - - , , - - - - - - - . , . . . , - --.v.- --,--gw-.

i i 1

4 i

! Given the circumstances, this is far less likely than collusion  ;

by GG and W. l-1 l 113. The question remains which operator copied from the 4 L other. W's name, of course, has been tarnished by this stage  !

of the cheating investigation. However, there is evidence suggesting that GG may have copied. His answer number 1 began l I}  !

l with the word " Poor", which he then crossed out and put the I a '

answer that Mr. W had. This suggests he did not have a memorized i i i

answer ready to be put in place here, and that he may have j realized that he didn' t know the answer, so that he would have i

i j looked at Mr. W's answer. ,

114. Regardless of who copied from whom, we believe that both Mr. GG and Mr. W must have been aware of the fact that copying was going on, and we find that both Mr. GG and Mr. W

[

1 cheated on this examination, i

l ALLEGATIONS CONCERNING MR. U 115. In addition to reviewing Mr. Trunk's work, Mr. Wilson

investigated certain allegations concerning Mr. U. Mr. Wilson r concluded that there was "no basis" to disbelieve Mr. U's denials

! of cheating. Wilson, ff. Tr. 24,478, at 18. We have analyzed (

) ,

the allegations dealt with by Mr. Wilson, as well as others.  !

Our conclusions, which follow, differ from his. l 116. Mr. U is a remarkably consistent focal point for allegations L

i of cheating. Firs t of all, soon after the U'.C investigation began, i 1 i Mr. Polon's wife informed him that she had heard rumors from [

P l

i Mr. T's wife, and that she heard simila'r stories from Mr. P's wife, 49- ,

i l '~'

I

a s

who apparently heard from Mrs. T. Commonwealth Exs..8, ~ 9 ^. These ,

, rumors had been recounted since at least sometime between~the

~'

j April NRC examination and June. Aamodt Ex. 7. -

s y l 117. About a month later, apparently, Mr. Polon learned the 4

details of one of the rumors his wife had referred to before. She l apparently told him, during an effort to reconstruct the exact timing of when he had first heard rumors, that one of the rumors j that she had discussed with the wives of T and P was that Mr. U l had used crib sheets on the April NRC-exam and had written notes

! on his hand. He forwarded this information to Mr. Arnold, who gave it to the NRC. Commonwealth Exs. 8, 9. This statement about ,

I U had apparently first been made prior to June. Aamodt Ex. 7. '

f 118. As to the substance of the statement that Mr. U had crib'

~

1.

sheets in the exam, and had written on his hand, we note first of

} all that others have heard similar stories about Mr. U. Mr. O  !

I i j

stated that either Mr. A or Mr. P told him that Mr. U had used <

t

(

! crib sheets on one of the mock exams, probably the Kelly exam. I 1

Tr. 26,274-5 (O).

j

! 119. It is also interesting that the statement that U had used

}

crib sheets on the NRC exam came from the wife of T. T and U are i

I close friends, Tr. 26,819 (U), and therefore Mr. T would probably be in a position to know if Mr. U used crib sheets. And although [

Mr. T has denied talking to his wife about any rumors, he is l

undoubtedly the most logical source of this information. Tr. 26,613 (T).

.i 120. As for the test itself, Mr. U sat facing the wall, with  :

1  !

the proctor behind him and to his right. Tr. 26,817, 26,854 (U).

l .

-so-r r

- - , --. ~ , , . , - , ,----m.- - . - - . - , , - - ,,.7m - - , . . . , , , , . - , , - , , , - n--, ----------.--,4.r, - - .

T i

~

This would make it unlikely that the proctor would see him using j l notes, either on cards or on his hand. See also Lic. Ex. 83.

j Mr. O brought his briefcase in the exam room, and on cross-exami-l nation agreed-that when the proctor was gone from the room he could

. have access to hic briefcase. He in fact did open it during the  !

course of the exam, at least to get food out of it. After initially j stating that he didn't remember taking anything out that would help i

him on the exam, he stated "I am sure I did not take out any i

information that would assist me on the exam." Tr. 26,840-1. It is i

interesting to note that Mr. U indicates later on that crib I i

sheets would not have been any help on the April exam, because l the questions were so different from the ones usually asked.

i Tr. 26,842 (U).

, 121. Nonetheless, on the record before us, we cannot find i

is i

that Mr. U used crib sheets on the April NRC examination. Although

the possibility is definitely there, the evidence is not strong 1

} enough in our view to support the . conclusion that Mr. U cheated in this instance.

122. Another allegation about Mr. U, widely disseminated, con-cerns the placement of Mr. U in the training complex during the April NRC exams for the purpose of' aiding examinees. Mr. 00, who the Special Master considered one of the most credible wit-il nesses in the entire proceeding, stated that before the examina-tions were administered, he heard that someone would be posted i in'Mr. Husted's (DD's) office to help examinees if they had l

l l

~

~

questions. Tr. 25,986-88 (00). Other operators hearn that the individual in question was Mr. U. Tr. 26,534 (I); Tr. 26,219 (O) .

Mr. KK, a Shif t Technical Advisor who didn' t hear this situation discussed until much later, recounted that the responsibility of this person was apparently to " help research answers to ques-tions some of the people who were taking the test did not know the answer to." He heard that this was going on with at'least the knowledge of somcane higher up in the company, and that most or all of the operators who took the exam knew that someone would be there to help them. Tr. 26,487-89 (KK).

123. Mr. U arranged with Mr. Husted (DD) to be allowed to use his effice during the two days during which the "B" form of the NRC exam was to be given. He claims this was to prepare for the NRC oral examination which was scheduled to be given many months later, even though he had just finished two solid days of testing. Tr. 26,831 (U). Messrs. U and Husted both state that this arrangement was .not made until the morning of the RO "B" exam, Thursday April 23, 1981. Tr. 26,855 (U); Tr. 26,916 (DD) .

Before the examination started, Mr. U spent some time perhaps 20 to 25 minutes, in the non-smokers examination roc.,. where .

all the "B" examinees were gathered. They discussed the examina-l tion that Mr. U had taken, and "may have" discussed specific questions and answers from Mr. U's exam. Present during this discussion were Mr. O, Mr. A, Mr. Z, Mr. S, Mr. W (at least part of the time) and others. Tr. 26,880 (U). When the NRC proctor l

I

came into the room Mr. U left and went to Mr. DD's office.

Tr. 26,880. He spent most of that day and the next in that office, except for time spent to check his mail, to get cof fee, and so forth. During the day a number of people, as many as 50, came through the office,> but he is "not sure" whether people who were taking the test came into the room, and at least as far as he remembers, he didn't discuss the "B" exams with people who were '

taking them. Tr. 26,826-27 (U). Mr. T spent perhaps as many as two hours in Husted's office on Thursday, and some time there on Friday, and remembers that U was there perhaps 50% of the time.

Tr. 25,617 (T). He recalls seeing training personnel in the room then also. Tr. 26,620 (T). <

124. During the day, Mr. P, who was taking the "B" exams, -

remembers seeing Mr. U at the coffee machine on at least one, and possibly both, of the examination days. Tr. 26,705 (P).

l 125. Mr. 00 also saw Mr. U at the coffee machine. As he was preparing tea, Mr. U. appeared, fiom the dire.ction of Mr. Husted's I

office. He asked Mr. 00, "Hi. How are you'doing?" From this, and l

Mr. U's demeanor, Mr. 00 concluded that Mr. U had come up to I

give Mr. 00 a chance to ask some questions about the exam. Tr.

25,938-93, 25,998 (00) .

126. Also during this time period (on Thursday, April 23, 1981) a man who identified himself as Mr. .U called Mr. KK, an STA, while KK was on shift. The caller asked Mr. KK a question about hea't transfer, a subject Mr. KK had taught, and a subject he was l

__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ . 1

l l

l of ten asked questions about although never by phone until the phone call from "Mr. U." Mr. KK is not sure as to what question was asked of him. Mr. KK asked the caller if he were taking the NRC exam, to which he replied, "No, I'm helping O take his."

KK told the caller that he would not give him the information -

because to do so would not be right. S ta f f Ex. 27, Encl. 8.

127. With Mr. KK in the shif t supervisor's office whe'n this call came in was Mr. QQ, another STA. Mr. KK believes that the call came in on the speaker phone. Mr. QQ is unsure, and in any event could not identify the voice as belonging to Mr. U.

Id., 39 and Encl. 8.

128. After the examinaticn, several operators complained about the f act that a person was stationed near the exam room to help examinees. Tr. 26,217-18 (O).

129. Mr. U has not denied involvement in any of these matters.

He "cannot say" that he didn't call Mr. KK on the phone that day.

bbreover, he explains that if he did make such a call he right have said it was about a test question. Tr. 26,845-46 (U).

Mr. U also managed to find a question on the April, 1981 ATTS examination. which was similar to th.e example Mr. KK gave as to

.what the question asked of him might have been. S ta f f Ex. 27, at 44, and Encl. 11. Mr. U has never spoken to Mr. KK about this incident. Tr. 26,864 (U).

130. Not only did Mr. U not deny the possibility of having -

called Mr. KK, but in his interviews with NRC investigators,

+

l l

Mr. O did not deny the possibility of having provided answers to people taking the NRC test. He said that if someone nad asked him a quick question during the day of the 23rd or 24th he might have spontaneously answered. To cover this possibility, Mr. U inserted the word " knowingly" three times into the statement the NRC investigators had prepared in summary of his interview.

Thus, his statement indicates that he did not " knowingly" provide information to anyone taking the test, and that he did not

" knowingly " assis t, facilitate or encourage cheating. Staff Ex. 27, Encl. 12.

131. On the stand, Fc. U said he didn' t know if he had "un-knowingly" provided someone with answers, but that it is possible he met someone in the hall or elsewhere and spontaneously answered a question. .Tr . 2 6,83 7 (U).

, 132. We find, having carefully considered the facts of the 1

matter, that Mr. U did call Mr. KK during the time that the NRC exams were given. - As Mr. Ward- of the NRC observed, the facts suggest the " great likelihood" of the phone call. Tr. 25,381 (Ward). The f act that Mr. U spent so much energy on trying to provide exculpating evidence (the ATTS question) and so little on confronting Mr. KK concerning 'the phone call, and the fact tha t Mr . U 'is so careful to leave open the possibility that he did in fact make the call, leads us to the only logical conclu-sion, that Mr. U did in fact call Mr. KK. l I

l

,- v - - - , - - - - -

, w ,p y

133. Similarly, we are struck by the fact that Mr. U is so concerned with leaving open the possibility that he did render assistance to people taking the NRC examination. That he did do so is consistent with the statenents of several operators that he was the one stationed in the training complex to provide answers, and the tes timony of one operator that Mr. U appeared to be offering assistance to him. In addition, it should be kept in mind that numerous accounts linking Mr. U to questionable behavior have circulated in the wake of the April NRC examinations.

In light of all the facts that are known about Mr. U, and his response to the questions about his actions during the NRC exam-ination, we find that Mr. U did engage knowingly in supplying answers to examination candidates taking,the "B" examinations.

134. On the separate question of the degree of management in-volvement in this matter, we find that there is insufficient evidence to support a conclusion that upper management arranged for Mr. U6s activitibs. Given the fact that Messrs. Ross, Brown and Boltz, who were reviewing the NRC answer keys with the NRC examiner, had to seek out justifications for the changes they wanted made; they probably spent a ggod deal of time in the hall and in various offices, including Mr. Husted's, to look for sup-i portive materials, but it would be speculative to assume they therefore knew about Mr. U's activities.

i i

)

l

, 135. One additional incident of cheating which came out

)

involved Mr. WW, a TMI-l STA who was working in the shif t j supervisor's office during the administration of the Kelly exam, i

(a contractor administered requalification exam) in April 1980, 1

when he received a phone call. The caller, who did not identify ht.nsel f (although WW thought the voice was familiar) asked WW,

what are the indices on the DNB (departure from nucleate boiling) t

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curve? WW answered the question even though he was aware the 1

exam was in progress. He, frequently received such calls, and

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j at the time thought little of it. Later he heard operators l

} diccussing the exam and suspected that the question he had been asked had appeared on the Kelly exam. Thi subsequently reviewed j a copy of the exam and discovered that the information he had j provided would be useful in answering a question which had j appeared on the exam. Tr. 26,444-45 (WW). Staff Ex. 28 at 4 and l Enclosure 1.

, 136. Although he was suspicious that the caller was helping j

i someone with the exam, he made no effort to inform either the .

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l training department or GPU management of the incident and his 1

! suspicious. Nor did he inform lE investigator Richard Matakas t

l during his 23 September 1981 interview that he had received the i

call. Staff Ex. 27 at 27. Prior to this OIE interview, Mr. WW

! I j had had a discussion with Messrs. KK, QQ, and RR. They discussed !

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w in a generalized fashion the possibility of not reporting information to the NRC unless specifically asked about it.

Tr. 26,456-57 (WW). He did, however, discuss the incident with his boss Mr. P. Walsh (Mr. 50) in September, at the time of the second ole investigation. There is no indication that Mr. Walsh took any action regarding this information. Staff Ex. 28, Enclosure 1 at 2.

137. During an October 13, 1981 interview conducted by Mr. Richard Wilson, Vice President, Technical Functions, WW related the April 1980 incident. Mr. Wilson relayed the information to Mr. Arnold, who then reported it to ole.

Arnold ff. Tr. 23,590, at 10-11.

138. On October 19, 1981, ole investigators returned to TMl to conduct a third investigation into the cheating at TM1.

At that time investigator Baci, having been made aware of the April 1980 incident, was able to ask a specific question to which Mr. WW. responded by. relating the incident.

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i V. NRC STAFF INVESTIGATION OF CHEATING.

t 139. An issue in these proceedings is the adequacy of the j investigation on the part of the NRC staff. The NRC investiga-tion into the circumstances of the o and W affair was begun by the Office of Auditor and Inspector, but Chairman Palladino directed the investigation to be transferred to the Office of Inspection and Enforcement, which completed the investigation.

Staff Exs. 24, 26; Tr. 25,279-81 (Baci). The OIE investigators  ;

concentrated on establishing the facts concerning Messrs. O and W. Ward, ff. Tr. 25,274. This they did well, obtaining sworn stataments from O and W in which Mr. W admitted cheating and i

Mr. O admitted seeing Mr. W reach over and take his papers.

Staff Ex. 26, Encls. 4 and 5. - 6 140. We are less convinced, however, that the Staf f did this thorough a job of investigation concerning the other o matters brought to their attention. A casual attitude seems to us to be manifested in at least two instances. The first of these concerns the Trunk reports into parallelisms on examinations. The Staff under took no independent review of these matters, taking the Trunk reports at face value. Given the incentives facing a company in the position of the Licensee, the Staff should have given more attention to the possibility that the Trunk review, with of without the active cooperation of Mr. Trunk, might have been used to cover  !

up facts rather than revealing them. Indeed, it appears as though i the OIE investigators have never even seen all of the Trunk reports, f r

. Tr. 25,336 (Ward).  ;

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141. The second incident which disappoints us concerns Messrs. P and Husted, both of whom sat for the "B" section of the April 81 NRC exam in the smokers room. They were the only  :

candidates to take the SRO portion of the exam in that room. l The room was virtually unproctored that day since the proctor, Bruce A. Wilson, Section Leader of the Power and Research Reactor Group of the Operator Licensing Branch of NRR, was reviewing the exams with Licensee personnel in a room adjacent to the smokers .

i 1 room. v 142. Messrs. Ward, Baci and Smith interviewed Mr. P on i

L September 25, 1981. Ward was present during the entire interview, but both Baci and Smith occasionally left the room. During this interview, P complained angrily about the lack of proctoring which had left him vulnerable to allegations of cheating as it  ;

had removed a potential witness to his honesty and put him in a ,

position where he could be solicited by other examinees.  ;

Staff Ex. 27, at 40.

t i 143. The vehemence with which Mr. P expressed his l l displeasure alerted Mr. Ward "...to the possibility that he had Knowing t' hat Husted and P had been h

in fact been solicited".  !

', 4 the only two examinees in the room, Mr. Ward reasoned that the  ;

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solicitation had to have come from Husted. He continued questioning  !

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P. stating "...the reason why you are so upset about this is it

! puts you in an awkward position when Husted asked you a question, " '

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Mr. P looked startled and started to hesitate. Ward pressed him further and suggested that they knew Husted had asked the question. At this point Mr. P admitted that Husted had asked for help, but only on one question, where Mr. Husted wanted to know what a particular concept was. Tr. 25,462-63 (Ward). In Mr. Ward's opinion, Mr. P was truthful in this account of the incident. Tr. 25,320 (Ward).

144. By the time Mr. P appeared as a witness, he had been fully informed of the details of Mr. Ward's testimony by counsel to the Licensee. Tr. 26,712 (P). With this knowledge, he reviewed the OIC account of his interview, and after clarifying two minor points he was able to attest that the report was an accurate representation of his interview by OIE. Tr. 26,690-91 (P). When confronted with Mr. Ward's testimony, P. denied having madeLthe allegation concerning Mr. Husted. Tr. 26,692-93 (P). He recalled that during the interview Mr. Baci had been the prin-cipal interrogator, while Mr. Ward had played a minor role.

l Mr. P claimed that at one point,'Mr. Ward interrupted and sug-gested that Husted had asked P a question during the exam, but that he (Ward) was not interested in that fact. Mr. P went on to state that since he thought that Mr. Ward was merely stating his opinion and that he was not interested in an answer, Mr. P "just let it slide." Tr. 26,692-93 (P). Later he elaborated a bit, explaining that Mr. Ward interrupted to say that they had heard there was = chatter on the exam, that he (Ward) would pro-pose that Husted actually asked P a question, but that he (Ward) was not interested in that. Tr. 26,759 (P).

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145. In P's statement to the NRC investigators he had said

that the absence of the proctor made him vulnerable to alle-l gations of cheating since it removed a potential witness to

his honesty, and that it also put him in the uncomfortable 4

position where he could be solicited. Staff Ex. 27, at 40. When i

j P appeared at the he,arings he said that he only intended the I

first clause of the sentence to refer to the time of the test, while the second clause, regarding solicitation, was meant to refer to the time of the NRC investigation. Tr. 26,728-29 (P).

P testified that it was only later that he became concerned about solicitation, and then only future solicitation, that in the l future he would be approached by someone, making it hard to

" blow the whistle" on them. Tr. 26,731 (P).

146. We do not find Mr. P's explanations persuasive. We note, first of all, that Judge Milhollin considered Mr. . Ward

! to be one of the most credible witnesses in the reopened pro-4 i ceeding. And, as Judge Milhollin, observed to Mr. P, Mr. Ward's statement was quite ' clear and un' ambiguous. Tr. 26,692-93 (Mil-l hollin). By contrast, Judge Milhollin found Mr. P's credibility 1

] to be quite shaky. It is indeed incredible to suppose that 1

Mr. Ward would interrupt the interrogation to make a point about a subject which would fit within his views of the scope of the

! investigation (at least if the solicitation were completed) and then immediately tell Mr. P he was not interested. It is much '

credible to suppose that Mr. Ward's account is correct: That i

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Mr. P admitted that Mr. Husted had solicited his assistance on  :

I one question. Accordingly, we find that Mr. Husted solicited the help af Mr. P during the. April 1981 NRC examinations.

147. One matter remains: why this instance of improper conduct by a member of the training department was not included in the I&E report. Mr. Ward's explanation was that this was only l an attempted act of cheating, not an act-of cheating. Tr. 25,415 r (Ward). We do not agree. We think this incident should have [

been fully considered by the NRC investigators in their investi- r gation. It constitutes a serious breach of faith by a person  !

who has a responsibility to set an example for others, and re- f flects poorly on the entire management of Metropolitan Edison.

VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR A POTENTIAL RESTART 148. Although it is clear that .theg,e have been many problems

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with cheating at TMI, the most important consideration is that of the prospective implications of the material on the record.

, There are several aspects that trouble us as we consider the possibility of allowing TMI-l to restart.

A. STAFFING 149. One crucial problem is that of staffing. If this unit  ;

is to go on line again, it must be adequately staffed with operators of competence and integrity. Considering first of all the numerical question, the Licensee is skating on very thin ice.

In accordance with the Licensee-Commonwealth Agreement, subsequently adopted as a license condition, the Licensee is required to have, as a minimum complement, 10 RO's, 5 SRO's and an additional 5 RO's with SRO training. In the recent October 1981 NRC examination, a total of 10 SRO's passed. A total of 9 RO's passed. In addition, I i

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two SRO candidates passed the RO test only. That gives the Licensee a total of 21 people, one more than the minimum required for normal operation. Staff Ex. 32.

150. Although this might be a barely adequate number for operation, we do not feel it is an adequate number for start-up, which is an especially crucial time for a reactor, especially one in the unique position.of TMI-1, which has sat idle for three years. Mr. Hukill stated that he feels a five shift rotation, regardless of the allowance for a temporary four j shift rotation, is the minimum he would accept for start-up:

the odds are that you would have somebody else sick or something, and you would immediately be in a problem, and I would think it would be very poor planning and a very poor practice to do that.

f Tr. 24,076 (Hukill). Mr. Miller is somewhat more conservative than Mr. Hukill, and would insist upon more than the minimum number of operators even for regular operation -- in defending the propriety of having maintained Mr. VV's license even though not strictly necessary, Mr. Miller stated, "you normally have to run in excess in order to take care of a problem that could occur." Tr. 24,447 (Miller). This is especially relevant ,

advice for the Licensee right now -- there have been many departures from the Licensee's complement of reactor operators recently, Tr. 23,965 (Hukill), and if even two more people leave, Licensee would be unable to co7tinue operation for more than ten days with-out special permission. PID t 583, Condition 9 (e) .

2 151. Even these numbers of licensed personnel include people

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who do not normally stand watch as operators, including three members of the training department, an STA, the Manager of Opera-

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tions, Mr. Ross (EE), and his right-hand man, Mr. Shipman (FF).

Given the problems NMI has faced, and the public-relations problems it faces, it should not be allowed to limp into service. Start-up should not occur before there is a full staff of shif t personnel.

152. In addition, several people who passed the October NRC exam have been shown to have cheated. Messrs. H and DD (Hus ted) in particular should be suspended pending a fuller investigation of their conduct, including the reqQirement of submission to and successful passing of a polygraph test. We find this a necessary s tep , and we require it.

B. CERTIFICATION.

153. A related problem is certification. The hearings have shown that Licensee is not reliable in its certification procedures.

For example, Mr. H was continuously recertified even though he failed to satisfy requirements Tr. 24,107 (Hubill). Also, Mr. Brown appears willing to ignore the appropriate and required procedures in order to certify people -- he apparently deceived Mr. Newton in

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stating that everyon,e who was to,.be certified had completed all necessary requirements, such as passing tests. Tr. 24,714 (Newton).

And Licensee apparently erroneously certified its STA's to take the October examination -- only one of four was able to pass, and Licensee is now not even offering the failing STA's for the February reexamination. TMIA Proposed Ex. 91 (See TMIA Motion to Direct Execution of Affidavit and Enter Documents Into the Record, January 1, 1982). Finally, the discrepancy should be noted between the

testimony and demeanor of Mr. G on the stand as compared. to the glowing praise offered by Mr. Hukill in offering him as an acceptable l operator for cold shutdown operation of the plant. TMIA Proposed Ex. 89 (See Motion, supra) i

l VII. FACTUAL

SUMMARY

154. The reopened hearings have shown a broad range of I

deficiencies in Licensee's management and operational staff.

i Cheating on tests, while not universal, is substantial --

i'n addition to Messrs. O and W the hearings have shown U, G, H, VV, GG, DD, FF, FF's questioner, WW's questioner, and others to have engaged in cheating on tests of one sort or another. In addition, management involvement is clear at least in the covering up of wrongdoing -- consider Miller and Herbein and Arnold in the VV/O affair (and Mr. Arnold, who states that the " threshold of conduct which is 'beyond the pale' is low," Arnold, ff. Tr. 23,590, at 3, doesn' t even think VV's actions were, wrong, Tr. 23,618 (Arnold) )

and the involvement of the Licensee management structure in the ef fort to cover up the evidence of cheating uncovered by Mr.

Trunk. There are problems with certification reliability, and critical problems in shift staffing. Above all there is the general problem of accountability to the MRC and to the public.

We are constrained to find that the Licensee has not shown the necessary qualities to be granted the privilege of operating a reopened Three Mile Island Unit 1.

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VIII, CONCLUSIONS ~DF LAW, 155. In accordance with Commission Orders CLI-79-8, CLI-80-5, and CLI-81-3, and based upon the preponderance of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence of record in this proceeding, ahd'the foregoing findings of fact related to Licensee's management competence and integrity, the Board concludes:

a. That the Licensee management has failed to demonstrate the necessary level of competence and integrity to safelytoperate Three Mile Island !! nit 1. . . _.

b. That the operational staff at Three Mile Island Unit 1 does not have the requisite levels of i

i competence and integrity to safely operate Three Mile Island Unit 1.

Respectfully submitted,

/

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/ Cl L% K Jf*Ci ? % CA Kf 'l Louise Bradford.

( $twf 1

John Clewett THREE MILE ISLANn ALFRT 315 PEFFF.R STRrrT

) Dated: January 15, 1082 HARRISBt1RG. PENMSYLVANIA 17102

j$ t s UNITED STATES OF AMERICA /

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[ll)f

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1. N 151982 > -

BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOAR }, f]-

AND THE SPECIAL MASTER g }fjj g T.n the Matter of ) * ~3

)

METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-289

) (Restart)

(Three Mile Island Nuclear )

Station, Unit No. 1) )

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of TMIA'S PROPOSED FINDINGS I OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON ISSUES RAISED IN REOPENED

.TMI-l RESTART PROCFEDING have been served on the listec individrals, by deposit in the U.S. Mail, first class postage prepaid, on or before January 15, 1982.

Judge Ga y L. Milhollin Robert Adler, Esq.

c/o Judge Ivan W. Smith . Assistant Attorney General Chairman, ASLB 505 Executive House U.S. NRC P.O. Box 2357 Washington, D.C. 20555 Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120 Ivan W. Smith, Chairman ASLB Mrs. Marjorie Aamodt .

U.S. NRC R.D. 5 Washington, D.C. 20555 Coatesville, Pennsylvania 19320 Dr. Walter H. Jordan Steven C, Sholly ASLB Union of Concerned Scientists 881 West Outer Drive - 1725 Eye St., N.W., Suite 601 Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 Washington, D.C. 20006 Dr. Linda W. Little

• George F. Trowbridge, Esq.

ASLB Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge 1800 M St., N.W.

5000 Hermitage Drive Washington, D.C. 20036 Raleigh, North Carolina 27612 Gary J. Edles, Chairman *" Counsel for NRC Staff ASLAB Office of Executive Legal Director U.S. NRC U.S. NRC Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 John H. Buck Docketing and Service Section ASLAB Ofi ce of the Secretary U.S. NRC U.S. NRC Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 Christine N. Kohl * - By Hand, January 15 1982.

ASLAB U.S. NRC Washingotn, D.C. 20555 / - F3 a

Reginald L. Go tchy Adus.% v ASLAB Louise Bradford U.S. NRC Washington, D.C. 20555 _

.Tanuary 15, 1982

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