ML090270050

302 Simulator Scenarios (Draft)

ML090270050
Person / Time
Site:	Brunswick
Issue date:	11/10/2008
From:	NRC/RGN-II
To:	Progress Energy Carolinas
References
50-324/08-302, 50-325/08-302
Download: ML090270050 (100)

Text

Draft Submittal (Pink Paper)

SIMULATOR SCENARIOS

Brunswick 2008 NRC Scenario 1 Page 1 of26 Facility: BRUNSWICK Scenario No.: 1 Op Test No.: Nov. 2008 Examiners: Operators: (SRO)

(RO)

(BOP)

Initial Conditions: The plant is operating at 100% power, End of Cycle.

No equipment is out of service Turnover: Following shift turnover, Reduce power and place the 2C Condensate Pump in service and remove the 2A Condensate Pump. The 2A Condensate pump is experiencing high vibrations and will be placed under clearance by the WCC for maintenance.

Critical Task: See Scenario Summary Event Malf. No. Event Event Description No. Type*

1 N/A R-SRO Reduce power to <92% power in order to swap Condensate Pumps.

H-RO 2 N/A N-SRO Swap Condensate Pumps per 20P-32 section 8.5.

N-BOP 3 EE030M C-RO 2XB power failure. (TS)

C-SRO 4 NB007F I-SRO A Reactor Water Level Instrument failure. (TS)

I-RO 5 K4517A Off C-BOP TBCCW Pump Trip C-SRO 6 MS031F C-BOP MTLO controller failure

/ C-SRO 7 MS017F M-ALL Turbine high vibration requiring turbine trip and scram resulting in an ATWS condition requiring entry to LPC.

8 K5416A Off C-ALL EHC pump trip and failure of standby pump causing bypass valve failure.

9 K2119A Off C-RO SLC pumps will not start due to switch failure.

C-SRO 10 RD036F C-RO Scram discharge volume drains fail closed.

C-SRO 11 K1208A Off C-BOP E11-F024A will initially trip on thermal overload when opened.

C-SRO 12 N/A M-ALL Torus temperature rises requiring reactor pressure reduction or emergency depressurization due to HCTL.

Brunswick 2008 NRC Scenario 1 Page 2 0'26 SCENARIO DESCRIPTION Unit 2 is operating at maximum power, End Of Cycle.

Event 1 - Direction in the turnover has the crew remove the A condensate pump from service which requires a power reduction to less than 92% power in accordance with ENP-24.

Event 2 - Swap condensate pumps in accordance with 20P-32.

Event 3 - 2XB will fail. The crew will respond per APPs and refer to TS to declare RHR BLoop inoperable (3.5.1 Action A) and PCIV's 3.6.1.3 Action A (8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> to isolate the affect flowpath) and B (2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> to isolate the affected flowpath).

Event 4 - Level transmitter C32-LT-N004A will fail downscale. Refer to Tech Spec and determine must be tripped in 7 days (3.3.2.2 and TRM Table 3.3.2.2-1). Crew should select level instrument B per 20P-32.

Event 5 - The B TBCCW pump will trip. AOP-17 should be entered and the standby pump started to recover system pressure.

Event 6/7/8 - The main turbine lube oil controller will fail closed causing the lube oil to heat up and vibrations to occur on the main turbine. This will require the main turbine to be tripped and the reactor to be scrammed. Most control rods will fail to insert on the scram. The crew will respond to the ATWS per EOP-01-LPC. When the scram occurs, the running EHC pump will trip and the standby EHC pump will also trip.

Event 9 - When SLC initiation is attempted, neither SLC pump will start due to switch failure.

The crew will enter LEP-03 and align for alternate boron injection using CRD.

Event 10 - When scram jumpers are installed the scram discharge vents and drains will fail to open which will result in inability to insert control rods by resetting RPS and inserting additional manual scrams.

Event 11 - Suppression pool temperature will rise requiring entry into EOP-02-PCCP and lowering water level per LPC Table 3. When RPV level is lowered to TAF, reactor power will still be above the APRM downscale set point. Suppression pool cooling is required due to elevated suppression pool temperature. Suppression pool cooling is limited to RHR A. The E11-F024A will initially trip on thermal overload when opened. If the crew requests, the thermal overload can be reset and the valve can then be opened, after actions are taken to reduce reactor pressure.

Event 12 - Suppression pool temperature will continue to rise, and eventually approach the Heat Capacity Temperature Limit. Reactor pressure can be reduced per the guidance of LPC pressure leg to maintain (and actually gain) margin to the HCTL. Otherwise Emergency Depressurization will be required. When pressure has been lowered to avoid HCTL, the scram discharge volume vents and drains will be repaired. Control rods can then be inserted by manual scram. When level is restored above TAF, RHR Loop A placed in suppression pool cooling. When all control rods are inserted and suppression pool cooling initiated, the scenario may be terminated.

Brunswick 2008 NRC Scenario 1 Page 3 of26 PROGRESS ENERGY CAROLINAS BRUNSWICK TRAINING SECTION 2008 NRC EXAM SCENARIO #1

Brunswick 2008 NRC Scenario 1 Page 4 0'26 Simulator Setup Initial Conditions:

IC ENP-24 for IC 14 Rx Power 100%

Core Age EOC Events' Event # Trigger Description 1 NA Reduce power from 100% to 92% using recirc 2 1 Manual Swap Condensate pumps (Start 2C, Secure 2A).

3 2 Manual 2XB power failure 4 3 Manual Reactor Water Level Instrument Failure (C32-LT-N004A) 5 4 Manual TBCCW pump trip 6 5 Manual MTLO controller failure Turbine high vibration causing the crew to scram the plant with an 7 6 Auto ATWS condition 8 7 Auto EHC pump trip with failure of standby to auto start 9 NA SLC switch failure 10 7 Auto Scram Discharge Vents and Drains fail closed 11 8 Auto Thermal overload on RHR 24 valve 12 NA ED I Depressurize the Reactor Malfunctions Summary MS017F 4 Turbine Bearing Vibration 0 5 5min 6 on MS017F 5 Turbine Bearing Vibration 0 5 5min UA231-6 6 on MS017F 6 Turbine Bearing Vibration 0 5 5min UA231-6 Main False True 9 RPOO5F ALito Scram Defeat Fal True 13

Brunswick 2008 NRC Scenario 1 Page 50'26 Remoes t S ummary Mult. Current Target Remote ID Description Trig ID Value Value LOCA Load Shed Sel Sw, 2C Condensate EE_LSHED3 Enabled Disabled 1 Pump Unit Trip Load Shed Sel Sw, 2C EE_UTSHED3 Enabled Disabled 1 Condensate Pump RH ZVRH24AT E11-F024A Full Flow Test ON OFF 8 LOCA Load Shed Sel Sw, 2A Condensate EE_LSHED1 Disabled Enabled 10 Pump Unit Trip Load Shed Sel Sw, 2A EE_UTSHED1 Disabled Enabled 10 Condensate Pump EP IAEOPJP1 Bypass LL3 Group I Isol Off On 12 MS VMS5005D MVD-5005 Mn Stm Dm Hdr Isolation 0 1 14 EP IACS993U DW CLR A&D Overide - Normal/Run Normal Run 15 EP IACS994U DW CLR B&C Overide - Normal/Run Normal Run 15 EP IASW5997 SW-V106 LOCA Override Normal Bypass 15 EP IASW5998 SW-V103 LOCA Override Normal BJlPass 15 Switches Summary Target Override Switch ID Description Trig Position Value K4517A TBCCW Pmp B On Off On 4 K4517A TBCCW Pmp B On On Off 4 Q4517LG4 TBCCW Pmp B Off G On/Off Off 4 Q4517RR4 TBCCW Pmp B On R On/Off Off 4 7 on Scram button A K5416A Hyd Fluid Pmp A HFPM-A Off On (K2501A=True) 7 on Scram button A K5416A Hyd Fluid Pmp A HFPM-A Auto Off (K2501A=True) 7 on Scram button A K5416A Hyd Fluid Pmp A HFPM-A On Off (K2501A=True) 7 on Scram button A K5417A Hyd Fluid Pmp A HFPM-B Off On (K2501A=True) 7 on Scram button A K5417A Hyd Fluid Pmp A HFPM-B Auto Off (K2501A=True) 7 on Scram button A K5417A Hyd Fluid Pmp A HFPM-B On Off (K2501A=True)

Annunciators:

Current Target Remote ID Description Trig Value Value 8 on 24 valve to open A-01 5-9 RHR A Valves Overload Off On (Q1207RRN=True)

Special Instructions:

Load Scenario file, 2008 Scenario 1.scn, if required.

Ensure ENP-24 for IC-14 at P603 panel.

Brunswick 2008 NRC Scenario 1 Page 60f26 Shift Briefing Plant Status The plant is operating at -100% power, End of Cycle.

Equipment Out of Service No equipment is out of service Plan of the Day Following shift turnover, Reduce power to 92% and place the 2C Condensate Pump in service and remove the 2A Condensate Pump. The 2A Condensate pump is experiencing high vibrations and will be placed under clearance by the WCC for maintenance.

Brunswick 2008 NRC Scenario 1 Page 70f26 Scenario Information Examiner Notes Procedures used in Scenario Event 1

• ENP-24

• 20P-02 Sect. 7.1 Event 2

• 20P-32, Section 8.5 Event 3

• 2APP-UA-18 2-2, Sub E8 Fdr to MCC-2XB Bkr Trip

• 2APP-UA-25 1-8, Ctmt Atmos Rad Mon Dnscllnop

• 201-50.4, 4160V Emergency Bus E-4 Electrical Load List

• TS 3.5.1 1 3.7.1 1 3.6.2.31 3.6.1.3/3.4.2 Event 4

• 2APP-A-07 4-2, FW Ctl Sys Trbl

• 20P-32

• TS 3.3.2.2 Event 5

• OAOP-17, TBCCW System Failure

• 2APP-UA-03 2-4, TBCCW Pump Disch Header Press Low

• 20P-44 Sect. 8.1 Event 6

• 2APP-UA-23 1-6, Turb or RFP Brg Temp High Event 7

• 2APP-UA-23 6-1, Turb or RFP Vibration High

• ENP-24

• OEOP-01-RSP

• OEOP-01-LPC Event 8

• Power leg of level power control Event 9

• OEOP-01-LEP-03, Alternate Boron Injection Event 10

• OEOP-01-LEP-02, Alternate Rod Insertion Event 11

• OEOP-01-PCCP

• Suppression Pool Cooling Hard Card

• 2APP-A-01 5-9, RHR A Valves Overload Event 12

• HCTL graph Critical Tasks

• Emergency Depressurization when exceeding the HCTL, or reduce reactor pressure to maintain a safe margin to the HCTL.

• Implement Alternate Boron Injection using CRD.

• Perform alternate rod insertion using RMCS.

Brunswick 2008 NRC Scenario 1 Page 8 of26 EVENT 1 SHIFT TURNOVER, REDUCE POWER The crew will have to reduce power to less than or equal to 92% power.

Malfunctions required: None.

Objectives:

SCO - Directs power to be reduced in order to swap Condensate Pumps.

RO - Performs power reduction in accordance with ENP-24.

Success Path:

Power reduced to less than or equal to 92% power.

Simulator Operator Actions:

D If contacted as the NE for power reduction guidance, inform crew to use ENP-24 guidance.

D If contacted as the NE to monitor power reduction, inform crew that you will monitor core performance on the computer.

D If contacted as the Load Dispatcher, acknowledge report that Brunswick U2 will be lowering power.

D If contacted as the NE for guidance on operation above the MELL line, inform crew to insert rods per ENP-24 to get below the MELLL.

Required Operator Actions Reactivity Manipulation - Reduce Power to 92% to be able to swap Condensate pumps.

SRO D Directs power to be reduced in accordance with ENP-24 using recirculation flow in order to swap Condensate Pumps.

D Directs RO to insert control rods to get below the MELL line.

RO D Reduces power using ENP-24 using recirculation flow to 92% power.

D May reference 20P-02 section 7.1.

D Request peer checker.

D Reduce flow on one RR Pump (-2%) at a time to stay within mismatch criteria (3.5x1 06 Mlbs jet pump flow).

D Continues alternating Recirc pump reductions until 92% power.

D Verifies operation on the Power to Flow map.

D Recognizes operation above the MELL line and informs SCO.

D Inserts control rods using ENP-24 to get below the MELL line. (Should only need to insert one control rod)

D Turns control rod power on.

D Selects control rod in accordance with ENP-24 sheet.

D Continuously drives rod in using RMCS.

BOP D Plant monitor NOTES: 1) =

S Satisfactory; U - Unsatisfactory; =

N/O Not Observed All Unsatisfactory ratings require comments; a comment sheet is attached.

2) * = Critical Task/Step

Brunswick 2008 NRC Scenario 1 Page 9 of26 Applicants Actions or Behavior:

NOTES: 1) =

S Satisfactory; U - Unsatisfactory; =

N/O Not Observed All Unsatisfactory ratings require comments; a comment sheet is attached.

2) * = Critical Task/Step

Brunswick 200B NRC Scenario 1 Page 100'26 EVENT 2 SWAP CONDENSATE PUMPS After power has been reduced to less than 92% the crew will swap condensate pumps.

Malfunctions required: None Objectives:

SCO - Directs starting of the 2A Condensate Pump and securing the 2C Condensate Pump.

BOP - Starts the 2A Condensate Pump and secures the 2C Condensate Pump.

Success Path:

2A condensate pump running and the 2C condensate pump shutdown.

Simulator Operator Actions:

D When contacted as RW to place an additional CFD and/or COD in service report that this had already been completed.

D If contacted as the TB AO report that the prestart checks for the 2A Condensate pump are complete.

D When contacted as the TB AO to disable the LOCA and Unit Trip Load Shed switches acknowledge request, initiate trigger 1 and inform control room that the LOCA Load Shed and Unit Trip Load Shed switches are disabled for the 2C Condensate pump.

D When contacted as the TB AO to enable the LOCA and Unit Trip Load Shed switches acknowledge request, initiate trigger 10 and inform control room that the LOCA Load Shed and Unit Trip Load Shed switches are enabled for the 2A Condensate pump.

D When contacted as the RW operator to secure CFD and/or COD from service, acknowledge the request.

Required Operator Actions Normal Ops -Swap Condensate pumps in accordance with 20P-32 Section B.S.

SRO D Directs BOP to swap Condensate Pumps in accordance with 20P-32.

RO D Performs plant monitoring.

NOTES: 1) =

S Satisfactory; U - Unsatisfactory; =

N/O Not Observed All Unsatisfactory ratings require comments; a comment sheet is attached.

2) * = Critical Task/Step

Brunswick 2008 NRC Scenario 1 Page 11 0'26 BOP o Swaps condensate pumps in accordance with 20P-32, Section 8.5.

o Notifies RW operator to place an additional CFD in service.

o Notifies RW operator to place an additional CDD in service, if needed.

o Notifies TB AO to perform prestart checks for the 2C Condensate pump (ensures proper motor oil level and motor cooling).

o Place 2C condensate pump mode selector switch in MAN.

o Notifies TB AO to place Unit Trip Load Shed and LOCA Load Shed selector switches to DISABLED for the 2C Condensate Pump.

o Makes a PA announcement for starting 2C condensate Pump.

o Starts the 2C Condensate Pump.

o Observes discharge valve opens for the 2C Condensate Pump.

o Observes condensate discharge pressure has stabilized.

o Stops the 2A condensate Pump o Places 2A condensate pump mode selector switch in AUTO.

o Notifies TB AO to place Unit Trip Load Shed and LOCA Load Shed selector switches to ENABLED for the 2A Condensate Pump.

o Notifies RW operator to remove the additional CFD and/or CDD from service.

o Informs SCO that Attachment 8 needs to be completed.

Applicants Actions or Behavior:

NOTES: 1) =

S Satisfactory; U - Unsatisfactory; =

N/O Not Observed All Unsatisfactory ratings require comments; a comment sheet is attached.

2) * = Critical Task/Step

Brunswick 2008 NRC Scenario 1 Page 12 of26 EVENT 3 2XB POWER FAILURE The main feeder breaker to 2XB will trip. The crew will respond per APPs and refer to 001-50.4 to determine TS. Should declare RHR B Loop inoperable (3.5.1 Condition A), RHRSW BLoop Inop (3.7.1 Condition B), RHR BLoop SPC Inop (3.6.2.3 Condition A), PAM Instrumentation for PCIV Position Indication (Condition A - 30 days), PCIV's 3.6.1.3 Condition A (8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> to isolate the affected flowpath that has one of two isolation valves Inop), Condition B (2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> to isolate the affected flowpath that has two out of two valves Inop), and Condition C (8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> to isolate the affected flowpath that has one out of one valves Inop). Primary containment atmosphere particulate monitor (CAC-1260) will be lost per TRM 3.4 Condition A requires it to be restored in 31 days.

Malfunctions required:

2XB feeder breaker over current trip causing a loss of all loads on MCC 2XB.

Objectives:

SCO - Determine actions required for LCO per Technical Specifications.

Success Path:

Technical Specification / TRM

• 3.7.1, Declare One RHR SW subsystem Inop (Condition B, 7 days)

• 3.5.1, Declare RHR B Loop inoperable (Condition A, 7 days)

• 3.6.2.3, Declare One RHR SPC subsystem Inop (Condition A, 7 days)

• TRM 3.4 One drywell radiation monitor inoperable (Condition A, 31 days)

• 3.3.3.1, PAM Instrumentation - PCIV Position Indication (Condition A - 30 days)

• 3.6.1.3, PC IV's

• Condition A - 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> to isolate the affect flowpath (E11-F024B, E11-F027B, E41-F079, E51-F066, and B32-V30). Valves F024 and 27 are closed.

• Condition B-2 hours to isolate the affected flowpath (E11-F016B and F021 B).

Valves are closed.

• Condition C - 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> to isolate the affect flowpath (E 11-F007B, FO 11 B, F020B, and F103B). Valves F007, 11, and 103 are closed.

Simulator Operator Actions:

D Insert trigger 2 at the discretion of the lead evaluator.

D If contact as the RB AO, wait one minute and report that MCC 2XB looks normal except that there is no power at the MCC.

D If contacted as the Outside AO, report that the 480V MCC 2XB Feeder Breaker A02 at E8 is tripped on over current. (white trip flag protruding from the breaker)

D If contacted as Chemistry, wait two minutes and report that the CAC-1260 Analyzer has lost power.

D Acknowledge request as I&C to do troubleshooting/repair for the electrical failure.

NOTES: 1) . S = Satisfactory; U - Unsatisfactory; N/O = Not Observed All Unsatisfactory ratings require comments; a comment sheet is attached.

2) * = Critical Task/Step

Brunswick 2008 NRC Scenario 1 Page 13 of26 Required Operator Actions SRO o Refer to 001-50.4 load list to assess effects of loss of MCC 2XB o Direct I/C to investigate loss of MCC 2XB.

o Refer to Tech Specs.

RO o Plant Monitoring.

BOP o Report loss of MCC 2XB and refer to APPs.

o Dispatch AO to investigate MCC 2XB condition.

o Dispatch AO to investigate MCC 2XB feeder breaker at E8.

Applicants Actions or Behavior:

NOTES: 1) =

S Satisfactory; U - Unsatisfactory; =

N/O Not Observed All Unsatisfactory ratings require comments; a comment sheet is attached.

2) * = Critical Task/Step

Brunswick 2008 NRC Scenario 1 Page 140f26 EVENT 4 REACTOR WATER LEVEL INSTRUMENT FAILURE (C32-LT-N004A)

Malfunctions Required:

Failure of level transmitter N004 downscale.

Objectives:

SCO - Direct required channel be placed in trip condition per Technical Specifications in accordance with 01-18.

RO - Recognize level instrument failure.

Success Path:

The crew will respond per APP and TS and determine the channel must be placed in a trip condition within 7 days. The crew should select level B to match conditions with the switch alignment.

Simulator Operator Actions:

D At the discretion of the lead evaluator insert trigger 3 to fail N004 level instrument.

D If contacted as the AO to verify Circuit 3 on panel V10A and Circuit 10 on panel 4B, report that the breakers are on.

D If contacted as I&C to investigate, acknowledge the request.

D If contacted as I&C to disarm Annunciator input, acknowledge the request.

Required Operator Actions SRO D Refer to TS 3.3.2.2 and TRM Table 3.3.2.2-1.

D Determine C32-LT-N004A must be placed in a trip condition within 7 days.

D May direct WCC to pull the required fuses per 01-18.

D 001-18 gives guidance on how to place in a trip state.

D Direct transfer of level select to B.

D If procedure is used to transfer, then a step in the procedure will have to be noted because the N004A is failed and con not read within two inches of the N004B.

RO D Report C32-LT -N004A is downscale.

D Perform actions of APP.

D May dispatch AO to confirm Circuit 3 on UPS panel V10A is ON.

D May dispatch AO to confirm Circuit 10 on 125V DC panel 4B is ON.

D Transfer level select to B to match conditions with the switch alignment.

BOP D Perform plant monitoring.

NOTES: 1) =

S Satisfactory; U - Unsatisfactory; =

N/O Not Observed All Unsatisfactory ratings require comments; a comment sheet is attached.

2) =

• Critical Task/Step

Brunswick 2008 NRC Scenario 1 Page 15 of26 Applicants Actions or Behavior:

NOTES: 1) S = Satisfactory; U - Unsatisfactory; N/O = Not Observed All Unsatisfactory ratings require comments; a comment sheet is attached.

2) =

• Critical Task/Step

Brunswick 2008 NRC Scenario 1 Page 160'26 EVENT 5 TBCCW PUMP TRIP Malfunctions Required:

Trip of the 2B TCC pump and override of lights.

Objectives:

SCO - Direct shift response to TBCCW failures per AOP-17.

BOP - Respond to a partial loss of TBCCW per AOP-17.

Success Path:

The B TCC pump will trip and pressure will lower. A TCC low pressure alarm will be received. Starting the 2C TCC pump on U2 will restore pressure to normal. Both the APP and the AOP direct starting a standby TCC pump.

Simulator Operator Actions:

D At the discretion of the lead evaluator, initiate trigger 4 to fail the 2B TCC pump.

o If directed as the TB AO to investigate the 2B TCC pump trip, wait 2 minutes and report motor feels much hotter than normal, the breaker is tripped on magnetics.

Breaker will not reset if asked.

D If contacted as Unit 1 the 2C TCC pump is not being used on Unit 1.

J D If contacted as the RB AO, inform the control room prestart checks of the 2C TCC pump are complete.

D If directed to investigate as I&C acknowledge the request.

Required Operator Actions SRO D Enter and direct activities of AOP-17 for the trip of 2B TCC pump.

D Direct 2C TCC pump start.

D Direct maintenance to investigate 2B TCC pump.

RO D Perform plant monitoring.

BOP D Perform actions of APP and/or AOP.

D Verifies U1 not using the 2C TCC pump.

D Places 2C TCC pump mode select switch in operate.

D May request AO to perform prestart checks of 2C TCC pump.

D Makes PA announcement of starting 2C TCe pump.

D Starts 2C TCC pump.

D Dispatch AO to check breaker for 2B TCC pump.

NOTES: 1) S = Satisfactory; U - Unsatisfactory; N/O = Not Observed All Unsatisfactory ratings require comments; a comment sheet is attached.

2) * = Critical Task/Step

Brunswick 2008 NRC Scenario 1 Page 170'26 Applicants Actions or Behavior:

NOTES: 1) =

S Satisfactory; U - Unsatisfactory; =

N/O Not Observed All Unsatisfactory ratings require comments; a comment sheet is attached.

2) * = Critical Task/Step

Brunswick 2008 NRC Scenario 1 Page 180'26 EVENT 6/7 MTLO CONTROLLER FAILURE/TURBINE VIBRATIONS HIGH Malfunctions Required:

Main Turbine lube oil cooler controller fails closed. When high temperature alarm annunciates activate trigger to accelerate turbine vibrations.

Objectives:

Respond to an abnormal turbine vibration per UA-23 6-1 and UA-23 6-3.

Success Path:

The MTLO controller on XU-2 indicates 100% output (full closed) and turbine lube oil temperature will rise. Dispatch AO and I&C to investigate.

Simulator Operator Actions:

o At the discretion of the lead evaluator, insert trigger 5 to fail the MTLO controller closed.

o If asked as the TB AO to investigate, report that the temperature control valve to the MTLO is closed. (There is no bypass valve).

o If asked as I&C to investigate acknowledge the request.

Required Operator Actions SRO o Direct actions of APP's.

o When vibrations rise to above the TSI setpoint, direct manual scram and turbine trip per the vibration APP. (As conservative decision making may insert before setpoint)

RO o Plant monitoring.

o When directed by the SRQ, insert a manual scram and trip the main turbine.

o Recognize and report an ATWS.

BOP o Recognize and report rising lube oil temperatures.

o Dispatch TB AO to investigate TCV.

o Perform actions of APP.

o Monitor turbine bearing temperatures and vibrations (PC display 630)

NOTES: 1) =

S Satisfactory; U - Unsatisfactory; =

N/O Not Observed All Unsatisfactory ratings require comments; a comment sheet is attached.

2) * = Critical Task/Step

Brunswick 2008 NRC Scenario 1 Page 190'26 Applicants Actions or Behavior:

NOTES: 1) =

S Satisfactory; U - Unsatisfactory; =

N/O Not Observed All Unsatisfactory ratings require comments; a comment sheet is attached.

2) =

• Critical Task/Step

Brunswick 2008 NRC Scenario 1 Page 20 0'26 EVENT 8/9 A TWS ACTIONS Malfunctions Required:

EHC pump trips with a failure of the standby pump which causes bypass valve failure, Scram discharge volume vents and drain fail closed on the scram, SLC switch is failed in the off position.

Objectives:

SCO - Direct actions for a reactor scram with MSIV's closed per EOP-01-RSP.

Direct actions to control reactor power per EOP-01-LPC.

RO/BOP - Perform immediate actions for a reactor scram.

Control reactor pressure during an ATWS per EOP-01-LPC.

Success Path:

Controls reactor pressure using the SRV's. Performs actions of LPC, recognizes failure of SLC and performs alternate boron injection.

Simulator Operator Actions:

o If crew does not trip the main turbine by the time SLC initiation is directed, initiate trigger 9 to trip the main turbine.

o If requested to perform alternate boron injection using CRD, acknowledge the request. (boron will not be injected during this scenario) o Acknowledge request as I&C to investigate failure of EHC pumps.

o Acknowledge request as I&C to investigate failure of SLC.

Required Operator Actions SRO DEnter RSP and transition to LPC.

o Direct mode switch to shutdown when steam flow < 3 Mlbs/hr.

o Direct use of SRV's to stabilize, then control pressure (800 - 1000#)

o Direct ARI initiation.

o Direct Recirc Pump speeds reduced to 10%.

o Direct Recirc Pumps Tripped.

o Direct SLC initiation.

o Direct Alternate boron injection with LEP-03.

o Direct ADS inhibited.

o Direct RWCU isolation.

o Direct alternate rod insertion per LEP-02.

NOTES: 1) S = Satisfactory; U - Unsatisfactory; N/O = Not Observed All Unsatisfactory ratings require comments; a comment sheet is attached.

2) =

• Critical Task/Step

Brunswick 2008 NRC Scenario 1 Page 21 of 26 RO o Place mode switch to shutdown when steam flow < 3x10 6 Ib/hr.

o Initiates ARlo o Places Recirc Pump speeds reduced to 10%.

o Trips Recirc Pumps.

o Initiates SLC.

D Recognizes failure of SLC and reports to SCO.

D Performs Alternate boron injection with LEP-03.

o Direct AO to perform LEP-03, Section 1, Alternate Boron Injection using CRD o Isolates RWCU.

o Closes RWCU Outboard Isol Valve G31-F004.

o Performs alternate rod insertion per LEP-02 using RMCS section.

D Insert IRMs o When < range 3 on IRMs insert SRMs.

o Start both CRD pumps.

o Place CRD Flow Controller to Manual o Throttle open flow controller to establish ~ 260 drive water psid o Bypass RWM o Selects control rods and drives in using Emerg rod in notch override.

o Performs alternate rod insertion per LEP-02 using Reset RPS and initiate manual scram section.

o Mode switch to shutdown when < 3x10 6 Ib/hr.

o Request jumpers for LEP-02 Section 3.

BOP o May report loss of EHC I Bypass valves o Operates SRV's to stabilize, then control pressure (800 - 1000#)

o Places ADS in inhibit.

Applicants Actions or Behavior:

NOTES: 1) S = Satisfactory; U - Unsatisfactory; N/O = Not Observed All Unsatisfactory ratings require comments; a comment sheet is attached.

2) * = Critical Task/Step

Brunswick 2008 NRC Scenario 1 Page 22 0'26 EVENT 10/11 ATWS ACTIONS - CONTINUED Objectives:

SCO - Direct actions to lower reactor vessel level when the conditions of Table 3 are met per EOP-01-LPC.

RO/BOP - Control reactor level during an ATWS per EOP-01 LPC.

Start up RHR in Suppression Pool Cooling mode per OP-17.

Success Path:

Continues actions in the LPC procedure, terminate and prevent injection, drive rods using RMCS. Establish suppression pool cooling.

Simulator Operator Actions:

o If requested to defeat Group I LL3, wait 2 minutes, initiate trigger 12 and inform the SCO that the jumpers are installed.

o If requested to install LEP-02, Section 3 jumpers, wait 5 minutes, insert trigger 13 and inform the SCO that the jumpers are installed.

o If requested as I&C to investigate the failure of the scram discharge volume vents and drains, acknowledge the request.

o If requested to open the MVD-5005, wait 5 minutes, initiate trigger 14 and inform the control room that the valve is open.

o If requested to defeat Drywell Cooler LOCA Lockout, wait three minutes, initiate trigger 15 and inform the SCO that the jumpers are installed.

o If directed as the AO to investigate the E11-F048A breaker, wait until reactor pressure is being lowered because of HCTL and then report nothing appears wrong at the breaker except that the position indicating lights are off.

o If requested as maintenance to inspect the E11-F024A valve, wait until reactor pressure is being lowered because of HCTL and report it is tripped on thermals.

o If directed as the AO/Maintenance to attempt to reset the thermals for the E11-F024A, then delete the following commands:

o Malfunction - E11-F048A Full Flow Test o Lights - Red and Green lights for E11-F024A o Annunciator - RHR Valves Overload Required Operator Actions SRO o Direct Group 10 switches to override reset o Direct terminate and prevent HPCl/Feedwater (CS/RHR when LOCA signal received).

o When level reaches +90 inches, evaluate Table 3:

o If not met, establishes a level band of LL4 to +90 inches.

o When met, direct injection be or remain terminated.

o When Suppression Pool is greater than 95° F, enters PCCP and directs Suppression Pool Cooling.

o Directs Drywell cooling restored per SEP-10.

DEvaluate T AF and LL4 indicated levels using Caution 1 graphs.

o Direct injection established to maintain RPV level LL4 to TAF (or the level at which APRMs indicate downscale) o Direct attempt to reset breaker for E11-F024A valve.

NOTES: 1) S = Satisfactory; U - Unsatisfactory; =

N/O Not Observed All Unsatisfactory ratings require comments; a comment sheet is attached.

2) * = Critical Task/Step

Brunswick 200B NRC Scenario 1 Page 23 of26 RO o Continue to Drive rods using RMCS.

o Monitor APRMs for downscale.

o Inhibit ARI after scram jumpers installed.

o Places ARI Initiation Switch to INOP o Places ARI Reset Switch to RESET and maintains for 5 seconds.

o Verifies red TRIP light above ARI Initiation is OFF o Reset RPS when scram jumpers installed.

o Ensures Dish Vol Vent & Drain Test switch is in Isolate.

o Confirms Disch Vol Vent Valves V139 and CV-F010 are closed o Confirms Disch Vol Drain valves V140 and CV-F011 are closed.

o Resets RPS.

o Place Disch Vol Vent & Drain Test switch to Normal o Recognize/report failure of scram discharge volume vents and drains.

BOP o Places Group 10 switches to override / reset o Terminate and prevent injection to RPV.

o Places HPCI Aux Oil Pump to Pull to Lock.

o Places startup level control valve in service.

o Close FW-V6 and VB.

o Ensure FW-V177 closed.

o Open FW-V10.

o Selects FW control mode to 1 Element.

o Ensures MSTR RFPT SP/RX LVL CTL in manual and SULCV closed.

o Continue to control RPV pressure using SRV's, steam line drains.

o Places suppression pool cooling in service on A Loop.

o Opens SW-V101.

o Closes SW-V143.

o May verify adequate suction source and start a CSW Pump.

o Starts RHR SW Pump(s) o Adjusts E11-PDV-F06BA to achieve -4000 gpm per RHR SW pump running.

o Supplies cooling water to vital header ensures open either SW-V111 or SW-V117.

o Operates THINK switch to make up spray logic.

o Starts RHR pump o Attempts to open E11-F02BA.

o Recognizes/reports failure of E11-F024A.

o May direct AO to reset the thermals for the E11-F024A breaker.

o When reset, throttles open E11-F024A (establishes flow in green band for 1 pump or ~11500 gpm for 2 pump operation) o Closes E11-F04BA.

NOTES: 1) =

S Satisfactory; U - Unsatisfactory; =

N/O Not Observed All Unsatisfactory ratings require comments; a comment sheet is attached.

2) =

• Critical Task/Step

Brunswick 2008 NRC Scenario 1 Page 24 0'26 Applicants Actions or Behavior:

NOTES: 1) S = Satisfactory; U - Unsatisfactory; N/O = Not Observed All Unsatisfactory ratings require comments; a comment sheet is attached.

2) * = Critical Task/Step

Brunswick 2008 NRC Scenario 1 Page 25 of26 EVENT 12 EMERGENCY DEPRESSURIZATION Malfunctions Required:

Objectives:

SCO - Direct actions to control Suppression Pool temperatures per EOP-02-PCCP.

Direct actions to ED the RPV per EOP-01-LPC BOP - Operate ADS/SRVs to ED the reactor per EOP-01-LPC.

Success Path:

Reduce reactor pressure to prevent exceeding the HCTL. If the HCTL is exceeded then perform ED. When actions are taken to reduce reactor pressure due to HCTL, the SDV vents and drains will be repaired and rods can be inserted. When all rods are inserted and level is be controlled above TAF the scenario may be terminated.

Simulator Operator Actions:

D When actions are taken to reduce reactor pressure due to HCTL or emergency depressurization is performed, delete the following commands:

D Malfunction - RD036F, Scram Disc Vol Drn Fails Closed D Malfunction - RP010F, ATWS 3 (Make sure RPS is reset before deleting)

Inform the SCO that a loose wire was found on the SDV vent and drain logic and have been fixed.

D If contacted as the RB AO, acknowledge request to secure Alternate Boron Injection.

Required Operator Actions SRO D Direct reactor pressure to be reduced to maintain margin to the HCTL or Direct ED if HCTL is exceeded.

D Exit LPC and enter RVCP when all rods are in.

D Direct securing Alternate Boron Injection.

D Direct level restored to 170 - 200 inches after rods are all in.

RO D Continues to drive rods using RMCS D Confirms Disch Vol Vent & Drains are open.

D Inserts a scram after discharge volume has drained for -2 minutes.

D Reports all rods in.

D Directs AO to secure Alternate Boron Injection.

BOP D Maintains reactor pressure as determined by the SCO to maintain pressure in the safe region of the HCTL.

D Performs ED when directed by the SCO.

D Opens all seven ADS valves.

D Confirms red light on 7 ADS Valves and pressure reduction.

D Maintains level as directed by the SCO.

D Restores level to 170 - 200 inches.

NOTES: 1) S = Satisfactory; U - Unsatisfactory; N/O = Not Observed All Unsatisfactory ratings require comments; a comment sheet is attached.

2) =

• Critical Task/Step

Brunswick 2008 NRC Scenario 1 Page 26 of26 Applicants Actions or Behavior:

NOTES: 1) =

S Satisfactory; U - Unsatisfactory; =

N/O Not Observed All Unsatisfactory ratings require comments; a comment sheet is attached.

2) * = Critical Task/Step

ES-D-1 Scenario Outline Brunswick 2008 NRC Scenario 2 Page 1 of 2 Facility: BRUNSWICK Scenario No.: 2 Op Test No.: Draft Examiners: Operators: (SRO)

(RO)

(BOP)

Initial Conditions: The plant is operating at 100% power, Middle of Cycle.

No equipment is out of service Turnover: Transfer 2A SJAE Train to FULL LOAD and secure 2B SJAE Train lAW 20P-30.

I~t Malf. No. Event Type*

Event Description II'"

1 N/A N-SRO Transfer 2A SJAE Train to FULL LOAD, secure 2B SJAE Train N-BOP 2 NI032F I-SRO APRM 3 fails downscale; I-RO (TS) 3 CN001F R-RO Small condenser leak causes lowering vacuum. (AOP)

RO reduces reactor power with recirc flow to stabilize vacuum >25".

4 ZUA125 C-SRO Large debris causes "B" Circ. Water Screen to stop; C-BOP "CIRC SCREEN Hi DP or STOPPED" alarm; Swap Circ. Pumps per OP 5 CW023F C-SRO NSW Pump Trip, failure of STBY pump to auto start, manual start req'd;

-C-BOP (AOP-18) (TS) 6 ES002F C-SRO SRV "E" fails open. (AOP-30) Pull fuses to close SRV; C-RO Possible PCCP entry; Place torus cooling in service.

7 RW013F/15FI M-ALL Un-isolable RWCU leak, SCRAM, Loss of Vacuum; 16F (AOPs, EOPs) 8 ES028F C-SRO HPCI injection valve fails to auto open C-RO 9 N/A M-ALL Emergency Depressurization (EOPs) 10 K1507A* C-BOP Failure of two ADS valves to open, manually open two additional SRV's; K1512A Scenario ends when reactor pressure reaches 50#

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

ES-D-1 Scenario Outline Brunswick 2008 NRC Scenario 2 Page 2 of 2 Scenario Description Event 1 - BOP operator will transfer SJAE 2A to FULL load using 20P-30 Section 8.1.

Task requires some component manipulations and parameter monitoring.

Event 2 - APRM 3 will fail downscale requiring the APRM to be bypassed and T.S. evaluation.

Event 3 - A small condenser leak which will cause condenser vacuum to slowly lower. Crew should enter AOP-37. SRO should direct RO to lower reactor power to stabilize vacuum. Once power has been reduced at least 5%, vacuum will stabilize.

Event 4 - Large piece of debris will lodge in 2B CW traveling screen. "CIRC SCREEN A HIGH DP or STOPPED" will alarm on panel UA-1. Crew will reference APP and dispatch AO to investigate. AO will report that screen is jammed and will not move. Per the direction of the APP, crew will start an available CW pump and secure 2B CW pump.

Event 5 - The running NSW pump will TRIP on motor overload. The STBY NSW pump will fail to AUTO start. The BOP operator should recognize the failure and manually start the STBY NSW pump.

System parameters will return to normal. SRO should address T.S. implications. AOP-18 entry.

Event 6 - SRV "E" will fail full open. Crew will enter AOP-30. Immediate operator actions are unsuccessful in closing the SRV; pulling fuses per supplementary actions will close SRV.

Event 7 - A large un-isolable RWCU leak will occur. Crew will enter AOP-5.0 and SCCP. SRO should direct a SCRAM. Original vacuum leak will worsen causing a complete loss of vacuum. Group 1 isolation will occur due to loss of vacuum.

Event 8 - HPCI injection valve will fail to open if HPCI AUTO initiation is received. Manual operation will open injection valve.

Event 9 - Secondary containment conditions will worsen, forcing the SRO to direct an Emergency Depressurization due to high water levels.

Event 10 - Two ADS SRV's will fail to manually open. SRO should direct opening two additional SRV's.

Scenario will end when reactor pressure reaches 100#.

PROGRESS ENERGY CAROLINAS BRUNSWICK TRAINING SECTION 2008 NRC EXAM SCENARIO #2 2008 NRC Examination Scenario #2

SCENARIO DESCRIPTION Unit Two (2) is operating at maximum power, Middle Of Cycle.

BOP operator will transfer SJAE 2A to FULL load using 20P-30 Section 8.1.

After the recombiner strip heaters have been taken to OFF, the scenario will continue.

APRM 3 will fail downscale. Bypassing the APRM will be required.

Evaluate Tech Spec 3.3.1.1 and TRMS 3.3 for operability requirements.

A small condenser leak will cause condenser vacuum to slowly lower.

Crew will enter AOP-37, Low Condenser Vacuum. The SRO should direct RO to lower reactor power to stabilize vacuum. When power has been reduced 5% - 10%,

vacuum will stabilize above 25" hg.

A large piece of debris will lodge in 2A CW traveling screen.

"CIRC SCREEN A HIGH DP or STOPPED" will alarm on panel UA-1. Crew will reference APP and dispatch AO to investigate. AO will report that screen is jammed and will not move. Per the direction of the APP, crew will start an available CW pump and secure 2A CW pump.

The running NSW pump will TRIP following shaft seizure. AOP-18 entry.

STBY NSW pump will fail to AUTO start. The BOP operator should recognize the failure and manually start the STBY NSW pump. System parameters will return to normal.

SRO should address T.S. 3.7.2.

SRV "E" will fail full open. Crew will enter AOP-30.

Immediate operator actions will be unsuccessful in closing the SRV.

Pulling fuses in supplementary actions will close SRV.

A RWCU leak will develop in the Reactor Building. Crew will enter AOP-5.0 and SCCP.

Crew will unsuccessfully attempt to isolate RWCU. SRO should direct reactor scram.

Original vacuum leak will worsen causing a complete loss of vacuum.

Group 1 isolation will occur.

HPCI injection valve will fail to open if HPCI AUTO initiation is received.

Manual operation will open injection valve.

South Core Spray room will fill to the flood hi-hi alarm (max safe). South RHR room flood level hi will alarm. Crew will consider anticipate emergency depressurization.

South RHR room flood level hi-hi (max safe) will then alarm requiring emergency depressurization.

Two ADS SRV's will fail to manually open. SRO should direct opening two additional SRV's. Scenario will end when reactor pressure reaches 100# and reactor water level is above 170 inches.

2008 NRC Examination Scenario #2 2

SIMULATOR SETUP Initial Conditions IC ENP-24 for Ie 13 Rx Pwr 100%

Core Age MOC EVENTS Event Trigger Trigger Description Number 1 N/A Transfer 2A SJAE to Full Load, Secure 2B SJAE 2 1 Manual APRM 3 fails downscale, APRM bypass required 3 2 Manual Small condenser leak, lowering vacuum, power reduction 4 3 Manual eirc. Screen Stopped, Swap eirc. water pumps 5 4 Manual NSW pump trip, failure of STBY NSW pump to start 6 5 Manual 'E' SRV stuck open 7 6 Manual Unisolable RWCU leak, SCRAM, Loss of vacuum, Gp.1 isolation 8 N/A HPCI Injection valve fails to open 9 N/A Emergency Depress 10 N/A Failure of 2 ADS valves to open 2008 NRC Examination Scenario #2 3

SIMULATOR SETUP Malfunctions Summary MalflD Mult Description Current Target Rmptime Actime Dactime Trig ID Value Value CN001F LOSS OF CONDENSER VACUUM 0.00 825.00 00:03:00 2 ES002F ADS VALVE E FAILS OPEN FALSE TRUE 4 CW023F B NSW PUMP SHAFT SEIZURE FALSE TRUE 5 RW013F RWCU BRK IN TRIANGLE ROOM 70' 0.00 100.0000 00:10:00 6 NI032F APRM FAILS LO FALSE Remotes Summary RemflD Mult Description Current Target Rmptime Actime Trig ID Value Value RW_ZVRW004M G31-F004 OUTBOARD ISOL VALVE ON OFF 8 RW_ZVRW001M G31-F004 OUTBOARD ISOL VALVE ON OFF 00:00:02 9 2008 NRC Examination Scenario #2 4

SIMULATOR SETUP Override Summary TaglD Description Position/ Actual Override Rmptime Actime Dactime Trig Value Value K1504A MAN DEPRESS VLV B21-F013E ON ON 7 K1504A MAN DEPRESS VLV B21-F013E OFF OFF 7 Annunciator Summary Window Description Tagname Override Type Oval AVal Actime Dactime Trig 2-5 CW SCREEN B DIFF HIGH ZUA125 ON ON OFF 3 5-5 OT8D NSS VALVES MTR OVLD ZA255 ON ON OFF 8 Special Instructions Load scenario file, 2008 Scenario 2.scn, if required.

Ensure ENP-24 for IC-13 at P603 panel.

2008 NRC Examination Scenario #2 5

SHIFT BRIEFING Plant Status The plant is operating at 100% power, Middle of Cycle.

Equipment Out of Service No equipment is out of service Plan of the Day Maintain current power.

Following shift turnover, place 2A SJAE in full load and remove 2B SJAE from service per the direction of 20P-30 Section 8.1.

The 2B SJAE is being removed from service for periodic maintenance and will be unavailable for 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />.

2008 NRC Examination Scenario #2 6

SCENARIO INFORMATION Examiner Notes Procedures Used in Scenarios:

EVENT 1

• 20P-30 Section 8.1 Off-gas Recombiner

• 2APP-UA-45 (6-3) ICNDSR COND OUTLET VLV CO-V17 OPEN

• 2APP-UA-45 (4-3) AFTER CNDSR COND LVL HIGH/LO

• 2APP-UA-45 (3-2) RECOMBINER INLET TEMP LOW EVENT 2

• 2APP-A-06 (2-7) APRM DOWNSCALE

• 2APP-A-06 (3-7) APRM TROUBLE

• 2APP-A-06 (3-8) APRM UPSCALE TRIP/INOP

• 2APP-A-05 (2-2) ROD OUT BLOCK EVENT 3

• AOP-37 LOW CONDENSER VACUUM

• 2APP-UA-48 (5-3) AOG SYSTEM OUTLET FLOWITEMP HIGH

• 2APP-UA-48 (5-4) AOG SYSTEM BYPASS

• 2APP-UA-23 (2-1) EXH HOOD A VACCUM LOW

• 2APP-UA-23 (3-1) EXH HOOD B VACUUM LOW

• 2APP-A-5 (4-8) OPRM TRIP ENABLED EVENT 4

• 2APP-UA-01 (2-5) CW SCREEN B DIFF-HIGH OR STOPPED

• 20P-29 Circulating Water System

• AOP-37.1 Intake Structure Blockages EVENT 5

• 2APP-UA-01 (4-10) NUCLEAR HDR SW PUMP B TRIP

• 2APP-UA-01 (1-10) NUCLEAR HEADER SERV WTR PRESS-LOW

• 2APP-UA-03 (1-5) RBCCW HEAD TANK LEVEL HI/LO

• AOP-18 NSW System Failure EVENT 6

• 2APP-A-03 (1-10) SAFETY/RELIEF VALVE OPEN

• 2APP-A-03 (1-1) SAFETY OR DEPRESS VALVE LEAKING

• 2APP-UA-12 (5-4) SPTMOS DIV I

• 2APP-UA-12 (5-5) SPTMOS DIV II

• 2APP-A-2 (3-2) RHR PUMP 2A SEAL CLR FLOW LOW 2008 NRC Examination Scenario #2 7

• 2APP-A-2 (4-2) RHR PUMP 2C SEAL CLR FLOW LOW

• 2APP-A-3 (2-1) CS OR RHR PUMPS RUNNING

• AOP-30 Safety/Relief Valve Failures

• Primary Containment Control Procedure EVENT 7/8

• 2APP-UA-3 (2-7) AREA RAD RX BLDG HIGH

• 2APP-A-4 (5-3) RX BLDG FLR DRN SUMP HIGH

• 2APP-UA-3 (4-5) PROCESS RX BLDG VENT RAD HIGH

• 2APP-A-4 (1-5) RWCU FLTR DEMIN FAILURE

• 2APP-UA-23 (2-1,3-1) EXH HOOD AlB LOW VACCUUM

• 2APP-UA-23 (1-1) TURB VACCUUM TRIP

• 2APP-A-5 (5-4, 5-3) GP.I ISOL LOGIC TRIPPED

• 2APP-A-7 (3-2) RX PRESSURE HIGH

• 2APP-A-2 (6-8) RB 20/50 FT TEMP HIGH

• 2APP-UA-12 (2-3) SOUTH CS RM FLOOD LEVEL HIGH

• AOP-5.0 High Radiation

• Secondary Containment Control Procedure

• Reactor Vessel Control Procedure EVENT 9/10

• 2APP-UA-12 (1-3) SOUTH CS RM FLOOD LEVEL HI-HI

• 2APP-UA-12 (2-4) SOUTH RHR RM FLOOD LEVEL HI

• 2APP-UA-12 (1-4) SOUTH RHR RM FLOOD LEVEL HI-HI

• AOP-5.0 High Radiation

• Secondary Containment Control Procedure

• Reactor Vessel Control Procedure Critical Tasks

• Recognize failure of HPCI injection valve to auto open and take manual action to open valve.

• Perform Emergency Depressurization when two plant areas exceed max safe water level.

• Recognize failure of two ADS valves to open and manually open two additional SRV's.

2008 NRC Examination Scenario #2 8

EVENT 1 SHIFT TURNOVER I SJAE TRAIN MANIPULATIONS The crew places 2A SJAE in full load per SCO direction Malfunctions required: None Objectives:

• Directs BOP to place 2A SJAE in full load and remove 2B SJAE from service per 20P-30 section 8.1.

BOP

• Places 2A SJAE in full load and removes 2B SJAE from service per 20P-30 section 8.1.

• Monitors reactor plant during evolution Success Path:

2A SJAE in full load, 2B SJAE secured, vacuum steady Simulator Operator Actions:

o If contacted as the Auxiliary Operator, respond that you are standing by and ready to assist during the evolution.

2008 NRC Examination Scenario #2 9

EVENT 1 SHIFT TURNOVER I SJAE TRAIN MANIPULATIONS Required Operator Actions Normal Operations - Transfer 2A SJAE to full load and secure 2B SJAE SRO o Direct BOP operator to place 2A SJAE in full load and secure 2B SJAE BOP o Place 2A SJAE in full load and removes 2B SJAE from service per 20P-30, section 8.1 as follows:

o Verify Auxiliary Operator available to respond to valve or breaker problems that could be encountered during the transfer.

o DEPRESS OFFGAS TRAIN A(B) MASTER SWITCH, FULL LOAD pushbutton.

o CHECK SJAE Off Gas Rad Monitors A&B o DEPRESS OFFGAS TRAIN B(A) MASTER SWITCH, OFF/RESET pushbutton.

o CLOSE the following condensate system valves:

• SPE COND INL VALVE

• AFTERCONDSR COND OUTLET VALVE

• SJAE INTERCONDSR COND OUTLET VALVE o PLACE recombiner electric strip heaters to OFF o ENSURE condenser vacuum is stable RO o Monitor reactor plant parameters during evolution.

2008 NRC Examination Scenario #2 10

EVENT 1 SHIFT TURNOVER I SJAE TRAIN MANIPULATIONS APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR:

2008 NRC Examination Scenario #2 11

EVENT 2 APRM 3 FAILS DOWNSCALE I TECH SPEC The crew responds to annunciator "APRM DOWNSCALE".

Malfunctions required:

• APRM 3 fails downscale Objectives:

SRO

• Direct actions in response to an APRM failure

• Evaluates Tech Spec 3.3.1.1 Reactor Protection System Instrumentation BOP/RO

• Respond to APRM failure

• Execute applicable APP's Success Path:

Bypass APRM 3 per the Annunciator Panel Procedure Simulator Operator Actions:

o WHEN directed by the lead examiner, activate TRIGGER 1 (APRM 3 fails downscale) o If contacted as I&C to assist with APRM troubleshooting, acknowledge request.

2008 NRC Examination Scenario #2 12

EVENT 2 APRM 3 FAILS DOWNSCALE I TECH SPEC Required Operator Actions SRO D Direct RO/BOP to enter and execute applicable APPs D Direct RO to bypass APRM 3 D Refer to T.S. 3.3.1.1 D Refer to TRMS 3.3 D Contacts I&C for support D Evaluate Tech Spec 3.3.1.1 Reactor Protection System Instrumentation D Determine APRM #3 is inoperable D Determine 3 of 4 required channels still operable for Function 2 D Establish tracking LCO for 3.3.1.1. Function 2 APRMs BOP D Monitor plant parameters RO D Execute APP A-5(2-7) "APRM DOWNSCALE" D Monitor APRM indications D Recognize APRM #3 downscale D Verify APRM DNSC light ON D Verify ROD OUT BLOCK annunciator illuminated D Compare APRM #3 indication to other APRMs D Notify Unit SRO D Bypass the affected APRM 2008 NRC Examination Scenario #2 13

EVENT 2 APRM 3 FAILS DOWNSCALE I TECH SPEC APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR:

2008 NRC Examination Scenario #2 14

EVENT 3 SMALL CONDENSER LEAK I LOWERING VACUUM I POWER REDUCTION The crew responds to lowering condenser vacuum.

Malfunctions required:

D Condenser leak Objectives:

• Direct actions in response to lowering condenser vacuum

• Respond to lowering condenser vacuum

• Respond to lowering condenser vacuum

• Reduce reactor power, as directed by SRO, to stabilize vacuum above 25" Success Path:

Reduce reactor power approx. 10% to stabilize condenser vacuum above 25" Hg Simulator Operator Actions:

D WHEN directed by lead examiner, activate TRIGGER 2 (Condenser Leak)

D IF asked as the Rad Waste Operator to maintain hotwellievel using manual hotwellievel control, respond in the affirmative.

D IF contacted as Ops Center to assist with vacuum leak search, acknowledge request.

D IF contacted as chemistry to perform actions for 15% power reduction, acknowledge.

D IF contacted as HP to assist in SJAE room entry, acknowledge request.

D IF contacted as AO to check closed MVD-5023, acknowledge request.

2008 NRC Examination Scenario #2 15

EVENT 3 SMALL CONDENSER LEAK I LOWERING VACUUM I POWER REDUCTION Required Operator Actions Reactivity Manipulation - lower reactor power with recirc. to maintain condenser vacuum.

SRO o Direct crew to enter and execute AOP-37 Low Condenser Vacuum o Direct RO to reduce reactor power until vacuum stabilizes above 25" Hg BOP o Enter and execute AOP-37 Low Condenser Vacuum o Direct Radwaste to maintain hotwell level between -7 and +7 inches in manual hotwell level control o Verify proper SJAE operation RO o Enter and execute AOP-37 Low Condenser Vacuum o Reduce reactor power as required to maintain condenser vacuum greater than 25" Hg.

2008 NRC Examination Scenario #2 16

EVENT 3 SMALL CONDENSER LEAK I LOWERING VACUUM I POWER REDUCTION APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR:

2008 NRC Examination Scenario #2 17

EVENT 4 LARGE DEBRIS IN CIRC SCREEN 2A 1 SWAP CIRC WATER PUMPS The crew responds to a jammed circ water traveling screen and swaps CW pumps Malfunctions required:

• Annunciator UA-01 (2-5) CW Screen B Diff-High or Stopped Objectives:

• Supervises the swapping of circ water pumps BOP

• Recognizes the requirement to swap circ water pumps and takes action to do so.

RO

• Monitors reactor plant parameters Success Path:

Circ water pump 2B removed from service and another available circ pump placed in service.

Simulator Operator Actions:

o WHEN directed by the lead examiner, activate TRIGGER 3 (Annunciator - CW Screen A Diff-Hi or Stopped UA-01 12-5) o IF contacted as the Outside Operator to check the status of the 2A CW Screen, report the screen is stopped and jammed with a large immovable piece of debris.

Report all other screens are operating and free of debris.

o IF contacted as maintenance to assist with screens, acknowledge request.

2008 NRC Examination Scenario #2 18

EVENT 4 LARGE DEBRIS IN CIRC SCREEN 2A I SWAP CIRC WATER PUMPS Required Operator Actions SRO D Direct RO/BOP to enter and execute Annunciator Panel Procedure D Direct RO/BOP to enter and execute AOP-37.1 Intake Structure Blockages BOP D Execute APP UA-01 (2-5) CW Screen B Diff-Hi or Stopped D Direct aux operator to check status of 2B CW screen D When informed of CW screen status:

D Shutdown 2B Circ. Pump D Start an available Circ. Pump RO D Monitor plant parameters 2008 NRC Examination Scenario #2 19

EVENT 4 LARGE DEBRIS IN CIRC SCREEN 2A I SWAP CIRC WATER PUMPS APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR:

2008 NRC Examination Scenario #2 20

EVENT 5 NSW PUMP TRIP I FAILURE OF STBY PUMP TO START The crew responds to the trip of a NSW pump and the failure of the auto pump to start.

Malfunctions required:

• 'B' NSW Pump shaft seizure

• Failure of STBY NSW pump to start Objectives:

• Direct actions for loss of NSW

• Evaluates Tech Specs 3.7.2 Service Water System and Ultimate Heat Sink

• Respond to the trip of a NSW pump

• Respond to the failure of an automatic action

• Monitor reactor plant parameters Success Path:

STBY NSW pump started and NSW system pressure returned to normal band Simulator Operator Activities:

D WHEN directed by lead examiner, activate TRIGGER 4.

(NSW pump trip)

D IF contacted as Outside AO to investigate NSW pump and breaker, acknowledge request.

D IF contacted as maintenance or I&C to investigate trip, acknowledge request.

2008 NRC Examination Scenario #2 21

EVENT 5 NSW PUMP TRIP I FAILURE OF STBY PUMP TO START Required Operator Actions SRO o Direct entry into AOP-18 NSW System Failure o Evaluate Tech Spec 3.7.2 Service Water System and Ultimate Heat Sink o Determine 2B NSW pump inoperable o 3.7.2 Condition B. One required NSW pump inoperable for reasons other than condition A o Required Action B.1 Restore required NSW pump to Operable status in 7 days BOP o Monitor NSW system parameters o Recognize lowering NSW system pressure o Enter and execute AOP-18 NSW System Failure o Recognize trip of B NSW pump o Recognize the failure of the STBY NSW pump to start o Start the STBY NSW pump o Verify NSW system pressure returns to normal band o Refer to APP UA-01 (4-10) NUCLEAR HEADER SW PUMP B TRIP RO o Monitor reactor plant parameters 2008 NRC Examination Scenario #2 22

EVENT 5 NSW PUMP TRIP I FAILURE OF STBY PUMP TO START APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR:

2008 NRC Examination Scenario #2 23

EVENT 6 SRV 'E' FAILS OPEN The crew responds to an inadvertent stuck open SRV Malfunctions required:

• ADS valve 'E' fails open Objectives:

SCO

• Direct actions in response to a stuck open SRV BOP/RO

• Respond to a stuck open SRV Success Path:

'E' SRV is closed by pulling fuses per the supplementary actions of AOP-30.

Simulator Operator Actions:

D WHEN directed by the lead examiner, activate TRIGGER 5.

(ADS valve E fails open)

D If contacted as operator to pull fuses, wait until torus temperature reaches 95F and then activate TRIGGER 7and immediately DELETE the malfunction from TRIGGER 5 2008 NRC Examination Scenario #2 24

EVENT 6 SRV IE' FAILS OPEN Required Operator Actions SRO D Direct entry into AOP-30 Safety/Relief Valve Failure DEnter PCCP if torus temp reaches 95F D Direct BOP to place torus cooling in service per PCCP/Hard Card or OP-17.

RO D Enter and execute AOP-30 Safety/Relief Valve Failure D Verify SRV is open using available indications D Cycle 'E' SRV control switch several times leaving control switch in CLOSE or AUTO D Direct support personnel to pull applicable fuses per Attachment 1 of AOP-30.0 D Monitor tailpipe temperatures on XU-73 D When informed that fuses have been pulled, verify SRV is closed BOP D Enter and execute AOP-30.0 D If directed by SRO, place torus cooling in service per PCCP using the hard card directions or OP-17.

D Monitor plant parameters 2008 NRC Examination Scenario #2 25

EVENT 6 SRV 'E' FAILS OPEN APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR:

2008 NRC Examination Scenario #2 26

EVENT 7 & 8 UNISOLABLE RWCU LEAK I SCRAM I LOSS OF VACUUM The crew will respond to an un-isolable RWCU leak in secondary containment.

Malfunctions required:

• RWCU leak Triangle Room 77ft

• RWCU isolation valve failures

• Vacuum Loss

• HPCI Injection valve failure to open Objectives:

• Direct response to un-isolable primary system breach in secondary containment

• Direct execution of applicable AOPs & EOPs BOP/RO

• Respond to un-isolable primary system breach in secondary containment

• Recognize and respond to component malfunctions

• Execute AOP and EOP actions as directed by SRO

• Perform SCRAM actions

• Control reactor parameters post SCRAM Success Path:

Crew enters and executes AOP-5.0 and SCCP, attempts to isolate RWCU, inserts reactor scram, recognizes Gp.1 isolation, recognizes failure of HPCI injection valve, maintains reactor water level above LL3, controls reactor pressure with SRVs.

Simulator Operator Actions:

o WHEN directed by lead examiner, activate TRIGGER 6 o WHEN crew inserts a SCRAM, increase TRIGGER 2 malfunction setting (vacuum leak) to maximum.

2008 NRC Examination Scenario #2 27

EVENTS 7 &8 UNISOLABLE RWCU LEAK I SCRAM I LOSS OF VACUUM Required Operator Actions SRO D Direct entry into AOP-5.0 High Radiation D Diagnose source of radiation as RWCU leak D Direct RO to trip and isolate RWCU D Enter and execute SCCP D Direct a reactor scram D Direct cooldown at normal cooldown rates D* Enter and execute RVCP D Direct RO/BOP to stabilize reactor pressure below 1050 psig D Verify Instrument operability per Caution 1 D Verify group isolations, ECCS initiations and DG starts as appropriate D Direct RO/BOP to restore and maintain reactor water level 170"-200" using systems available in Table 1 D Recognize Group 1 isolation due to loss of vacuum D Recognize failure of HPCI injection valve to open and direct RO/BOP to manually open valve.

D Contact support personnel for assistance with RWCU isolation valve failures RO D Monitors reactor plant parameters D Enter and execute AOP-5.0 High Radiation D Diagnose source of radiation as RWCU leak D Trip and isolate RWCU as directed by SRO D Recognize RWCU isolation valve failures and report to SRO D Insert Reactor scram as directed by SRO D Complete scram actions D Recognize Gp.1 isolation (vacuum loss) and report to crew D Maintain reactor pressure with SRVs as directed by SRQ D Maintain reactor water level as directed by SRO D Perform reactor cooldown as directed by SRO D Recognize failure of HPCI injection valve to open and open manually D Recognize and report to SRO alarm A-2 RB 50/20 ft Temp Hi 2008 NRC Examination Scenario #2 28

BOP o Enter and execute AOP-S.O High Radiation o Evacuate Unit 2 Reactor Bldg per AOP-S.O o Direct AO to close PIV-33 RB Sprinkler Shutoff Valve per AOP-S.O o Direct E&RC to take applicable AOP-S.O actions o Check area radiation readings at back panels o Diagnose source of radiation as RWCU leak o Trip and isolate RWCU as directed by SRO o Recognize RWCU isolation valve failures and report to SRO o Complete scram actions o Recognize Gp.1 isolation (vacuum loss) and report to crew o Maintain reactor pressure with SRVs as directed by SRO o Maintain reactor water level as directed by SRO o Perform reactor cooldown as directed by SRO o Recognize failure of HPCI injection valve to open and open manually o Recognize and report to SRO alarm A-2 RB SO/20 ft Temp Hi o Recognize and report to SRO alarm UA-12 South Core Spray Flood Level Hi 2008 NRC Examination Scenario #2 29

EVENT 7 & 8 UNISOLABLE RWCU LEAK I SCRAM I LOSS OF VACUUM APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR:

2008 NRC Examination Scenario #2 30

EVENT 9 & 10 EMERGENCY DEPRESSURIZATION I ADS VALVE FAILURES Required Operator Actions:

SRO o Continue reactor cooldown per SCCP direction o Consider anticipation of Emergency Depressurization per SCCP o Direct Emergency Depressurization when RHR RM FLOOD LEVEL HI-HI alarm (Two plant areas with radiation levels above Max Safe - South CS and RHR) o Direct RO/BOP to open 7 ADS valves o If informed by RP/BOP that 2 SRVs failed to open, direct opening additional SRVs until 7 SRVs are open.

o Direct opening of 2 additional SRVs when informed of ADS valve failures BOP o Continue reactor cooldown as directed by SRO o Recognize and report South CS and South RHR Room Flood Hi-Hi alarms o Open seven ADS valves as directed by SRO o Recognize failure of 2 ADS valves to OPEN and report to SRO o Open 2 additional SRVs as directed by SRO o Maintain reactor water level as directed by SRO RO o Continue reactor cooldown as directed by SRO o Recognize and report South CS and South RHR Room Flood Hi-Hi alarms o Open seven ADS valves as directed by SRO o Recognize failure of 2 ADS valves to OPEN and report to SRO o Open 2 additional SRVs as directed by SRO o Maintain reactor water level as directed by SRO 2008 NRC Examination Scenario #2 32

EVENT 9 & 10 EMERGENCY DEPRESSURIZATION I ADS VALVE FAILURES APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR:

2008 NRC Examination Scenario #2 33

Simulator Operator Activities:

WHEN directed by the lead examiner, place the simulator in FREEZE.

CAUTION DO NOT RESET THE SIMULATOR PRIOR TO RECEIPT OF CONCURRENCE TO DO SO FROM THE LEAD EXAMINER 2008 NRC Examination Scenario #2 34

ES-D-1 Scenario Outline Brunswick 2008 NRC Scenario 3 Page 1 of 2 Facility: BRUNSWICK Scenario No.: 3 Op Test No.: Draft Examiners: Operators: (SRO)

(RO)

(BOP)

Initial Conditions: Reactor power is 60% with power ascension in progress per GP-04 Turnover: GP-04 is complete thru step 5.2.21. Continue with step 5.2.22 to place the second reactor feed pump is service in accordance with 20P-32.

I::"~nt Malf. No. Event Event Description I No. Type*

1 N/A N-- BOP Place second reactor feed pump in service SRO 2 N/A R-RO Raise reactor power to 70% with recirc.

SRO 3 RD001M C-RO Control rod drift TS - SRO (TS) 4 ES022F I-BOP Inadvertent RCIC Initiation TS - SRO (TS) 5 RD187F C-RO CRD pump trip; start STBY CRD pump SRO 6 IAUPB2A6 C-BOP Power loss to Main Stack Rad Monitor; SBGT system failure to start SRO 7 NB006F M-AII Main steam line leak in primary containment I SCRAM I 5 rod ATWS RPOO8F 8 K1227A C-BOP Drywell Spray required; spray valve failures prevent sprays K1J36A SRO 9 N/A M-AII Emergency Depressurization with low power ATWS

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

ES-D-1 Scenario Outline Brunswick 2008 NRC Scenario 3 Page 2 of 2 Scenario Description Event 1 - Following shift turnover the BOP operator will place the second reactor feed pump in service.

Event 2 - When the second reactor feed pump is in service, the RO will be directed to raise reactor power to 70% using recirc. per the nuclear engineers direction.

Event 3 - A fully withdrawn control rod will drift full in. The crew will enter AOP-2.0 Control Rod Malfunction/Misposition. AOP-2.0 will direct response per 2APP-A-05 (3-2) ROD DRIFT. The RO should attempt to arrest the drifting control rod.

Event 4 - An inadvertent RCIC initiation will occur. The crew will respond by verifying no initiation signal is present and securing RCIC. If injection occurs, crew will enter AOP-3.0 Positive Reactivity Addition.

Event 5 - The running CRD pump will trip. The crew should respond by placing the STBY CRD pump in service in accordance with the OP.

Event 6 - Power to the Main Stack Radiation Monitor will be lost resulting in a Gp. 6 Isolation.

SBGT system will fail to start as required. The crew must diagnose the failure of SBGT and start manually to maintain secondary containment integrity.

Event 7 - A main steam line leak inside primary containment will cause drywell pressure and temperature to rise. The crew should scram the reactor before 1.7 psig or an auto scram will occur.

Five control rods will fail to insert following the scram requiring entry into LPC and PCCP.

Event 8 - Containment parameters will worsen requiring drywell and torus sprays. A combination of failures will prevent drywell sprays from occurring.

Event 9 - Drywell temperature will approach or exceed 300F with no drywell sprays available.

SRO will direct an Emergency depressurization.

PROGRESS ENERGY CAROLINAS BRUNSWICK TRAINING SECTION 2008 NRC EXAM SCENARIO #3 2008 NRC Examination Scenario #3

SCENARIO DESCRIPTION Following shift turnover the BOP operator will place the second reactor feed pump in service.

When the second reactor feed pump is in service, the RO will be directed to raise reactor power to 70% using recirc. per the nuclear engineers direction.

A fully withdrawn control rod will drift full in. The crew will enter AOP-2.0 Control Rod Malfunction/Misposition. AOP-2.0 will direct response per 2APP-A-05 (3-2) ROD DRIFT.

An inadvertent RCIC initiation will occur. The crew will respond by verifying no initiation signal is present and tripping RCIC. If injection occurs, crew will enter AOP-3.0 Positive Reactivity Addition.

The running CRD pump will trip. The crew should respond by placing the STBY CRD pump in service in accordance with OP-8.0.

Power to the Main Stack Radiation Monitor will be lost resulting in a Gp. 6 Isolation.

SBGT system will fail to start as required. The crew must diagnose the failure of SBGT and start manually to maintain secondary containment integrity.

A main steam line leak inside primary containment will cause drywell pressure and temperature to rise. The crew may scram the reactor before 1.7 psig or an auto scram will occur. The crew will enter RVCP and PCCP.

Five control rods will fail to insert during the scram requiring entry into LlPC.

Containment parameters will worsen requiring drywell and torus sprays. A combination of failures will prevent drywell sprays from occurring.

Drywell temperature will approach or exceed 300F with no drywell sprays available.

SRO will direct an Emergency depressurization from LPC. This will require termination and prevention of injection to the reactor prior to opening ADS valves.

With 7 ADS valves open, the crew will inject to the reactor once reactor pressure is less than 120 psig. When injection has been restored to the vessel and level is being maintained above 170 inches the scenario will end.

2008 NRC Examination Scenario #3 2

SIMULATOR SETUP Initial Conditions IC ENP-24 for IC 9 Rx Pwr 60%

Core Age BOC EVENTS Event Trigger Trigger Description Number 1 N/A Place second reactor feed pump in service 2 N/A Raise reactor power to 70% with recirc.

3 1 Manual Control Rod drift 4 2 Manual Inadvertent RCIC initiation 5 3 Manual CRD pump trip; start STBY CRD pump 6 4 Manual Loss of power to Mn Stack Rad Mon I SBGT system failure 7 5 Manual Main steam leak in primary containment I Scram I 5 rod ATWS 8 N/A Drywell sprays required; spray valve failures 9 N/A Emergency depressurization required; ATWS conditions 2008 NRC Examination Scenario #3 3

SIMULATOR SETUP Malfunctions Summary MalflD MultlD Description Current Target Rmptime Actime Dactime Trig Value Value RD001M 30-119 CONTROL ROD DRIFT FALSE TRUE ES022F RCIC INADVERTANT START FALSE TRUE 2 RD187F A CRD PUMP SHAFT SEIZURE FALSE TRUE 3 NB006F B MSL BREAK 0.00 10.0000 00:20:00 5 Remotes Summary Remf ID Mult Description Current Target Rmptime Actime Trig ID Value Value RH_ZVRH16BT DW SPRAY VLV E11-F016B ON OFF 8 RD_RDELDIS 30-19 ELECTRIC DISARM ROD ARM DISARM 5 RD_RDELDIS 30-19 HYDRAULIC DISARM ROD ARM DISARM 5 EPJAEOPJP1 BYPASS LL3 GP.1 ISOL (SEP-10) OFF ON 7 ED-IAUPB2A6 UPS LOAD BKR PNL 2A SMPL SKD CLOSE OPEN 4 2008 NRC Examination Scenario #3 4

SIMULATOR SETUP Override Summary Annunciator Summary Window Description Tagname Override Type Oval AVal Actime Dactime Trig 5-8 RHR B VALVES OVERLOAD ZA358 ON ON OFF 8 1-2 CRD HYD TEMP HIGH ZA512 OFF OFF OFF 1 Special Instructions Load scenario file 2008 Scenario 3.scn, if required.

Ensure ENP-24 for IC-9 at P603 panel.

Ensure GP-04 open and signed off through step 5.2.21 Ensure GP-04 alternate power verifications signed off through 60% power 2008 NRC Examination Scenario #3 5

SHIFT BRIEFING Plant Status Reactor power is 60% with power ascension in progress per GP-04.

GP-04 is complete thru step 5.2.21.

Alternate power verification for 60% power is complete.

Equipment Out of Service None Plan of the Day Following shift turnover, place the second reactor feed pump in service.

After second feed pump is in service, raise reactor power to 70% with recirc.

2008 NRC Examination Scenario #3 6

SCENARIO INFORMATION Examiner Notes Procedures Used in Scenarios:

EVENT 1

• OGP-04 Increasing Turbine Load to Rated Power

• 20P-32 Section 5.7 Condensate and Feedwater System EVENT 2

• 20P-02 Section 5.3 Reactor Recirculation System EVENT 3

• AOP-2.0 Control Rod Malfunction I Misposition

• 2APP-A-05(3-2) CONTROL ROD DRIFT

• 2APP-A-05 (5-2) ROD OUT BLOCK EVENT 4

• AOP-3.0 Positive Reactivity Addition

• 20P-16 Section B.7 RCIC System

• 2APP-A-3 (4-5) RCIC BAROM CNDSR VAC TANK LVL HI

• 2APP-A-3 (3-5) RCIC TURBINE STM LINE DRN POT LEVEL HI

• 2APP-A-3 (3-4) RCIC PP DISCH FLOW LOW

• 2APP-A-3 (5-4) RCIC TURBINE TRIP EVENT 5

• AOP-2.0 Control Rod Malfunction I Misposition

• OP-B.O Section B.17 CRD Hydraulic System

• OP-2.0 Section B.7 Recirculation System

• 2APP-UA-17 (6-1) BUS E3 4KV MOTOR OVLD EVENT 6

• 2APP-UA-3 (5-4) PROCESS OG VENT PIPE RAD HIHI

• 2APP-UA-3 (6-4) PROCESS OG VENT PIPE RAD HI

• 2APP-UA-3 (6-3) PROCESS OG VENT PIPE DNSC/INOP

• 2APP-UA-3 (6-10) RX BLDG ISOLATED

• 2APP-UA-5 (3-5) SBGT A FAILURE

• 2APP-UA-5 (4-6) SBGT B FAILURE

• 2APP-UA-5 (6-7) RX BLDG STATIC PRESS DIFF LOW 2008 NRC Examination Scenario #3 7

EVENT 7

• AOP-14 Abnormal Primary Containment Conditions

• Reactor Scram Procedure

• Reactor Vessel Control Procedure

• Level/Power Procedure

• Primary Containment Control Procedure

• LEP-02 EVENT 8

• Level/Power Procedure

• Primary Containment Control Procedure

• SEP-02

• SEP-03 EVENT 9

• Level/Power Procedure

• Primary Containment Control Procedure Critical Tasks

• Attempt to spray the drywell; recognize spray system failures

• Perform Emergency Depressurization when it is recognized that drywell temperature cannot be restored and maintained below 300F.

2008 NRC Examination Scenario #3 8

EVENT 1 PLACE SECOND REACTOR FEED PUMP IN SERVICE The BOP operator places the second feed pump in service per OP-32.

Malfunctions required:

• None Objectives:

• Direct BOP operator to place the second RFP is service per OP-32.

• Place a second RFP is service per the direction of OP-32

• Monitor reactor plant parameters during RFP startup.

Success Path:

Two RFPs in service with balanced injection flows.

Simulator Operator Actions:

D If asked as the RW operator to monitor COD flows and place additional demins in service as needed, acknowledge request.

D If asked as the RW operator to monitor COD effluent conductivity, acknowledge request.

2008 NRC Examination Scenario #3 9

EVENT 1 PLACE SECOND REACTOR FEED PUMP IN SERVICE Required Operator Actions Normal Operations - Placing a second RFP is service.

SRO o Direct BOP operator to place the second RFP is service per OP-32.

BOP o Place the second RFP in service per OP-32 Section 5.7.

o Notify Radwaste operator to monitor CDD flows o Ensure RFP B LP SUPPLY VL V 'V1' is open o Slowly raise RFPT B speed until speed is > 2550 rpm o When RFPT B speed is > 2550 rpm, match DFCS and SPEED outputs to within 100 rpm o Notify Radwaste operator to monitor CDD effluent conductivity o Verify speed signals within 100 rpm and place MAN/DFCS control switch to DFCS o Slowly raise RFPT speed until RFP discharge pressure is approx. equal to reactor pressure o Open RFP B DISCH VLV 'V4' o Slowly raise speed on RFP B to match demand signal of RFP A o Depress RFP B AIM pushbutton to place RFP B in AUTO o When RFP B flow is greater than 3.3E6, place RFP B RECIRC VLV 'V47' to close o When RFP B RECIRC VLV closes, adjust level setpoint to 187 inches o If desired, balance RFP flows by adjusting flow BIAS settings RO o Monitor reactor plant parameters during evolution 2008 NRC Examination Scenario #3 10

EVENT 1 PLACE SECOND REACTOR FEED PUMP IN SERVICE APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR:

2008 NRC Examination Scenario #3 11

EVENT 2 RAISE REACTOR POWER TO 70% WITH RECIRC SYSTEM The crew will increase recirc flow to raise reactor power to 70%.

Malfunctions required:

• None Objectives:

SCO

• Direct RO to raise reactor power to 70% per guidance of the Reactor Engineer.

BOP

• Monitor plant parameters during evolution RO

• Raise reactor power by increasing recirc flow lAW OP-02 Reactor Recirc System Success Path:

Reactor power raised to 70% using recirc flow.

Simulator Operator Actions:

• None 2008 NRC Examination Scenario #3 12

EVENT 2 RAISE REACTOR POWER TO 70% WITH RECIRC SYSTEM Required Operator Actions Reactivity Manipulation - Raise reactor power by adjusting recirculation flow SRO o Direct the RO to raise reactor power to 70%

BOP o Monitor plant parameters during the evolution RO o Raise reactor power by increasing reactor recirculation flow lAW OP-02.

o Request peer checker o Increase flow on one RR pump at a time to stay within mismatch criteria.

o Continue alternating RR pump speed increases until reactor power is 70%

o Monitor power/flow map o Monitor plant parameters 2008 NRC Examination Scenario #3 13

EVENT 2 RAISE REACTOR POWER TO 70% WITH RECIRC SYSTEM APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR:

2008 NRC Examination Scenario #3 14

EVENT 3 CONTROL ROD DRIFT The crew responds to a drifting control rod.

Malfunctions required:

• Drifting control rod Objectives:

• Direct actions in response to a drifting control rod

• Evaluate Tech Specs

• Respond to a drifting control RO

• Respond to a drifting control rod Success Path:

The drifting control rod is fully inserted, valved out of service and electrically disarmed.

Simulator Operator Actions:

o WHEN directed by the lead examiner, activate TRIGGER 1 (Control Rod Drift) o WHEN drifting rod has been fully inserted, REMOVE drift malfunction.

o If asked as the RBAO to investigate HCU for control 30-19, acknowledge request.

o If asked as the aux operator to valve out accumulator and disarm control rod, WAIT 2 minutes and activate TRIGGER 6.

2008 NRC Examination Scenario #3 15

EVENT 3 CONTROL ROD DRIFT Required Operator Actions SRO o Direct entry into AOP-2.0 Control Rod Malfunction/Misposition o Evaluate Tech Spec 3.1.3 Control Rod Operability o Condition C. One or more control rods inoperable for reasons other than Condition A or B o Required Action C.1 Fully insert inoperable control rod (3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />) o Required Action C.2 Disarm the associated CRD (4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />)

BOP o Monitor plant parameters RO o Enter and execute AOP-2.0 o Perform the actions of APP-A-05 (3-2) ROD DRIFT o Determine which control rod is drifting o Select the drifting control rod and determine direction of drift o Attempt to arrest the drift by giving a withdraw signal o If rod continues to drift in, apply an RMCS insert signal and fully insert to position 00.

o Monitor core parameters 2008 NRC Examination Scenario #3 16

EVENT 3 CONTROL ROD DRIFT APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR:

2008 NRC Examination Scenario #3 17

EVENT 4 INADVERTENT RCIC INITIATION The crew responds to an inadvertent RCIC initiation and possible injection.

Malfunctions required:

• Inadvertent RCIC initiation Objectives:

SRO

• Direct actions in response to an inadvertent RCIC initiation and potential positive reactivity addition BOP

• Respond to an inadvertent RCIC intiation and potential positive reactivity addition

• Respond to an inadvertent RCIC intiation and potential positive reactivity addition Success Path:

Verify RCIC initiation signal not present and trip RCIC.

Simulator Operator Actions:

o WHEN directed by the lead examiner, activate TRIGGER 2.

(RCIC Initiation) o If crew has not recognized RCIC initiation within 5 minutes, call control room as RBAO and ask why RCIC is running.

o If contacted as I&C to assist with troubleshooting, acknowledge request.

2008 NRC Examination Scenario #3 18

EVENT 4 INADVERTENT RCIC INITIATION Required Operator Actions SRO o Direct crew to verify no RCIC initiation signal is present o Direct crew to trip RCIC following verification of false initiation o Direct crew to enter and execute AOP-3.0 Positive Reactivity Addition, if required o Evaluate Tech Spec 3.5.3 RCIC System o Condition A. RCIC System Inoperable o Required Action A.1 Verify by administrative means HPCI System is OPERABLE (Immediately) o Required Action A.2 Restore RCIC to OPERABLE status (14 days)

BOP o Verify false RCIC initiation signal (No LL2 signal present) o Trip RCIC by pushing the RCIC trip pushbutton o Enter and execute AOP-3.0 Positive Reactivity Addition, if required o Reference 2APP-A-3 (3-5) RCIC Turbine Stm Line Drn Pot Level Hi o Reference 2APP-A-3 (4-5) RCIC Barom Cndsr Vac Tank Lvi Hi RO o Monitor for RCIC injection o Enter and execute AOP-3.0 Positive Reactivity Addition, if required o If necessary to prevent a scram, reduce reactor power o Notify Reactor Engineering 2008 NRC Examination Scenario #3 19

EVENT 4 INADVERTENT RCIC INITIATION APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR:

2008 NRC Examination Scenario #3 20

EVENT 5 CRD PUMP TRIP The crew responds to a CRD pump trip.

Malfunctions required:

• 2A CRD pump shaft seizure Objectives:

• Direct response to a loss of CRD pump

• Respond to a loss of CRD pump

• Respond to loss of CRD pump Success Path:

Crew places STBY CRD pump in service lAW OP-B.O, section B.17 Simulator Operator Activities:

o WHEN directed by the lead examiner, activate TRIGGER 3 (CRD pump shaft seizure) o If asked as the aux operator to close SEAL INJECTION FLOW CONTROLLER UPSTREAM ISOLATION VALVE and BYPASS VALVE, wait 2 minutes and report closed.

o If asked as the aux operator to open SEAL INJECTION FLOW CONTROLLER UPSTREAM ISOLATION VALVE or BYPASS VALVE, wait 2 minutes and report open.

o If contacted as RBAO to perform prestart checks on the STBY CRD Pp, wait 2 minutes and report complete and SAT.

200B NRC Examination Scenario #3 21

EVENT 5 CRD PUMP TRIP Required Operator Actions:

SCO D Direct crew to enter and execute AOP-2.0 Control Rod Malfunction/Misposition D Request assistance from support personnel for assistance with troubleshooting the trip of 2A CRD pump BOP D Enter and execute AOP-2.0 D Monitor plant parameters RO D Enter and execute AOP-2.0 D Place STBY CRD pump in service lAW OP-B.O Section B.17 o Close SEAL INJ VLV 'V22' for RR pump 2A D Close SEAL INJ VLV 'V30' for RR pump 2B D Place CRD FLOW CNTRL in MAN and reduce setting to minimum D Ensure DRIVE PRESS VL V 'F003' is fully open D Ensure RBCCW system in operation D Start non-operating CRD pump D Raise CRD flow rate to 30-60 gpm by adjusting CRD FLOW CNTRL D Restore Seal Purge Flow to Recirc pumps lAW 20P-2.0 Section B.7 D Null CRD FLOW CNTRL by adjusting setpoint tape D Shift CRD FLOW CNTRL to AUTO D Adjust setpoint tatpe to maintain cooling water DP 10-26 psid D Ensure CRD flow rate 30-60 gpm D Establish drive water header DP 260-275 psid by throttling DRIVE PRESS VLV 'F003' 200B NRC Examination Scenario #3 22

EVENT 5 CRD PUMP TRIP APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR:

2008 NRC Examination Scenario #3 23

EVENT 6 LOSS OF POWER TO MAIN STACK RAD MONITOR The crew responds to a loss of power to the main stack radiation monitor with a failure of the SBGT system to auto start.

Malfunctions required:

• Power loss to Main Stack Radiation Monitor Objectives:

• Direct response to a loss of Main Stack Radiation Monitor

• Respond to a loss of Main Stack Radiation Monitor

• Respond to a failure of SBGT to auto start

• Respond to loss of Main Stack Radiation Monitor Success Path:

Crew recognizes SBGT failure and manually starts SBGT Simulator Operator Activities:

o WHEN directed by the lead examiner, activate TRIGGER 4 (Power loss to Main Stack Rad Monitor) o If asked as I&C to investigate, acknowledge request 2008 NRC Examination Scenario #3 24

EVENT 6 LOSS OF POWER TO MAIN STACK RAD MONITOR Required Operator Actions:

SCO D Direct Alarm Panel Procedure actions for loss of Main Stack Rad Monitor D Recognize failure of SBGT to start and direct manual start D Contact support personnel for troubleshooting assistance D Reference Tech Spec 3.3.6.1 and 3.3.6.2 D Reference TRM 3.4 D Reference ODCM 7.3.2 BOP D Recognize and report loss of Main Stack Radiation Monitor D Verify auto actions occur as described in Alarm Panel Procedure D Secondary Containment Isolation D SBGT system start D Recognize a failure of SBGT to start D Manually start SBGT RO D Monitor plant parameters 2008 NRC Examination Scenario #3 25

EVENT 6 LOSS OF POWER TO MAIN STACK RAD MONITOR APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR:

2008 NRC Examination Scenario #3 26

EVENT 7 MAIN STEAM SYSTEM LEAK IN THE DRYWELL I SCRAM I ATWS The crew responds to a steam leak in the drywell.

Malfunctions required:

• Main Steam leak upstream of flow restrictors

• ATWS 1

• Rod select switch failure Objectives:

• Direct response to rising drywell pressure per AOP-14 and PCCP

• Direct SCRAM / ATWS response per Reactor Scram Procedure, Reactor Vessel Control Procedure and Level/Power Control Procedure

• Respond to steam leak in primary containment

• Respond to low power ATWS condition

• Respond to steam leak in primary containment

• Respond to low power ATWS condition Success Path:

Recognize 4 rod ATWS; Execute RVCP, LPC and PCCP to address plant conditions.

Simulator Operator Actions:

o WHEN directed by lead examiner, activate TRIGGER 4.

(steam leak upstream of flow restrictors) o If asked as additional operator to install jumpers per LEP-02 Section 3, acknowledge request.

o If asked as I&C to investigate failure of Rod Select switch, acknowledge request.

o If requested to install jumpers to bypass LL3 Gp.1 Isol per SEP-1 0, wait 2 minutes and initiate TRIGGER 7.

2008 NRC Examination Scenario #3 27

EVENT 7 MAIN STEAM SYSTEM LEAK IN THE DRYWELL I SCRAM I ATWS Required Operator Actions SRO o Direct crew to enter and execute AOP-14.0 o Enter and execute Reactor Scram Procedure o Enter and execute Reactor Vessel Control Procedure o Enter and execute Level/Power Control Procedure o Direct RO initiate ARI o Direct RO place RR pumps to 10%

o Request RO report reactor power o Direct RO perform LEP-02 Alternate Rod Insertion o Direct BOP Inhibit ADS o Direct BOP perform SEP-10 Bypass Gp.1 Isolation o Direct BOP place RNA switches to OVERRIDE/RESET o Direct BOP maintain reactor water level 170-200 inches o Direct BOP maintain reactor pressure 800-1000 psig 0 Enter and execute Primary Containment Control Procedure BOP 0 Enter and execute AOP-14 0 Perform Scram actions 0 Stabilize reactor pressure below 1050 psig as directed by SRO 0 Inhibit ADS as directed by SRO 0 Perform SEP-10 Bypass Gp1 Low Level Isolation as directed by SRO 0 Place Div 1&2 RNA switches to OVERIDE/RESET as directed by SRO 0 Maintain reactor water level as directed by SRO RO 0 Enter and execute AOP-14 0 Perform Scram actions 0 Recognize 5 rod ATWS and report to SRO 0 Initiate ARI as directed by SRO 0 Place RR pump speed controllers to 10% as directed by SRO 0 Report reactor power is <2% as requested from SRO 0 Perform LEP-02 Alternate Control Rod Insertion as directed by SRO 0 Recognize failure of Rod Select switch and report to SRO 2008 NRC Examination Scenario #3 28

EVENT 7 MAIN STEAM SYSTEM LEAK IN THE DRYWELL I SCRAM I ATWS APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR:

2008 NRC Examination Scenario #3 29

EVENT 8 DRYWELL SPRAYS WITH SPRAY VALVE FAILURES The crew will attempt to spray the drywell; spray valve failures will prevent spraying.

Malfunctions required:

• 'A' RHR Loop THINK switch failure

• 'B' RHR loop Drywell Spray valve failure Objectives:

• Execute PCCP to combat degrading drywell conditions

• Execute LlPC to combat ATWS conditions

• Execute PCCP actions as directed by SRO

• Execute LlPC actions as directed by SRO

• Execute PCCP actions as directed by SRO

• Execute LlPC actions as directed by SRO Success Path:

Enter and execute LlPC and Primary Containment Control Procedure; Recognize equipment failures and take corrective actions.

Simulator Operator Actions:

D If contacted as I&C to investigate failure of THINK switch, acknowledge request.

D If contacted as I&C or operator to investigate failure of Drywell Spray valve, acknowledge request.

2008 NRC Examination Scenario #3 30

EVENT 8 DRYWELL SPRAYS WITH SPRAY VALVE FAILURES Required Operator Actions:

SRO o Execute Level/Power Control Procedure o Execute Primary Containment Control Procedure o Evaluate level instrument operability using Caution 1 o Direct BOP start all available drywell coolers o Direct BOP Spray the suppression pool per SEP-03 o Direct BOP Spray the drywell per SEP-02 o Direct BOP to place torus cooling in service per hard card o If informed by BOP/RO of THINK switch failure, contact I&C for troubleshooting assistance.

o If informed by BOP/RO of Drywell Spray valve failure, contact I&C and/or Ops for troubleshooting assistance.

BOP/RO o Maintain reactor pressure and level as directed by SRO o Place Suppression Pool cooling in service as directed by SRO o Spray the suppression pool per SEP-03 as directed by SRO o Spray the drywell per SEP-02 as directed by SRO o Ensure WELL WTR TO VITAL HDR 'V141' is closed o Ensure 'V111' or 'V117' is OPEN o Ensure RR pumps are tripped o Place drywell cooler switches to OFF o If coolers continue to run, request LOCA lockout switches o Place LPCI INITIATION OVERRIDE switch in Manual/Override o Place CNT SPRAY CNTRL switch to Manual o "A" Loop RHR - recognize failure of THINK SWITCH and report to SRO o Ensure at least one RHR pump running o Ensure TORUS CLG ISOL VLV 'F024' is closed o Confirm SAFE region of Drywell Spray Initiation graph o Verify torus level less than +21 inches o Open DRYWELL SPRAY INBD ISOL VLV 'F021' o Throttle open DRYWELL SPRAY OUTBD ISOL VLV 'F016' o "B" Loop RHR - Recognize failure of spray valve and report to SRO 2008 NRC Examination Scenario #3 31

EVENT 8 DRYWELL SPRAYS WITH SPRAY VALVE FAILURES APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR:*

2008 NRC Examination Scenario #3 32

EVENT 9 EMERGENCY DEPRESSURIZATION WITH ATWS CONDITIONS The crew will initiate emergency depressurization under ATWS conditions.

Malfunctions required:

• None Objectives:

• Execute EOPs to combat Emergency Depressurization conditions

• Execute PCCP actions as directed by SRO

• Execute LlPC actions as directed by SRO

• Execute PCCP actions as directed by SRO

• Execute LlPC actions as directed by SRO Success Path:

Terminate and prevent injection to the reactor vessel and perform emergency depressurization Simulator Operator Actions:

• None 2008 NRC Examination Scenario #3 33

EVENT 9 EMERGENCY DEPRESSURIZATION WITH ATWS CONDITIONS Required Operator Actions SRO o Execute Primary Containment Control Procedure o Recognize the inability to restore and maintain drywell average air temperature <300F o Direct Emergency Depressurization from Level Power Control o Direct BOP terminate and prevent injection to the reactor vessel o Direct BOP Open Seven ADS valves o When reactor pressure is below the minimum alternate flooding pressure (120 psig) direct slowly increase injection to the reactor vessel o Direct establish water level 170-200 inches BOP o Maintain reactor pressure and level as directed by SRO o Terminate and prevent injection into the reactor vessel as directed by SRO o Open 7 ADS valves as directed by SRO o When reactor pressure reaches 120 psig, reestablish level control as directed bySRO RO o Maintain reactor pressure and level as directed by SRO o Terminate and prevent injection into the reactor vessel as directed by SRO o Open 7 ADS valves as directed by SRO o When reactor pressure reaches 120 psig, reestablish level control as directed bySRO 2008 NRC Examination Scenario #3 34

EVENT 9 EMERGENCY DEPRESSURIZATION WITH ATWS CONDITIONS APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR:

2008 NRC Examination Scenario #3 35

Simulator Operator Activities:

WHEN directed by the lead examiner, place the simulator in FREEZE.

CAUTION DO NOT RESET THE SIMULATOR PRIOR TO RECEIPT OF CONCURRENCE TO DO SO FROM THE LEAD EXAMINER 2008 NRC Examination Scenario #3 36