ML20050B802
| ML20050B802 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 04/05/1982 |
| From: | GENERAL ATOMICS (FORMERLY GA TECHNOLOGIES, INC./GENER |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML13323A262 | List: |
| References | |
| GA-C16708, GA-C16708-V01, GA-C16708-V1, NUDOCS 8204070433 | |
| Download: ML20050B802 (19) | |
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GA-C16708
- I l INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION l OF
'l SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION UNITS 2 & 3 I. SEISMIC DESIGN l AND QUALITY ASSURANCE I PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS I
- g VOLUME 1 EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
I PREPARED FOR I gE southero caittornia Edison company l
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APRIL 5,1982
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TECHNOLOGY I .oesc~ orc < - moecco .
D DO K O O 1 P PDR
I G A-C16708 l INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION OF ll l SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION UNITS 2 & 3 lI l SEISMIC DESIGN
!g AND i QUAUTY ASSURANCE ll PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS ll fg VOLUME 1 j EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
PREPARED FOR ll gE southern caittornia Edison company lI 1
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j GENERAL ATOMIC PROJECT 2408 APRIL 5,1982
. rogany JL PINES TECHNOLOGY lE A [HV!510N Of LENE RAL ATCV;C COVF'ANY m.t -
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l I EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
INTRODUCTION l
l General Atomic Company was engaged by Southern California Edison Company (SCE) to conduct an independent review of the seismic design for j SCE's San Onofre Units 2 and 3, including an assessment of the effectiveness of the quality assurance program for design.
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The program was structured to verify that the design process adequately converted the seismic design basis specified in the Final Safety Analysis g Report (FSAR) into design documents that were transmitted to the constructor E or the fabricator. All procedures used in the design process were reviewed l
l to determine that the basic process was adequate. A selection of points was reviewed to ensure that the procedures were indeed implemented as they I should have been. Finally, a selection of design documents, which are the products of the design process, was technically reviewed. This entire pro-l gram taken together gave a discerning basis on which the adequacy of the seismic design was judged.
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Two aspects of the construction process were also reviewed.
for field audits and the as-built configuration of a segment of pipe were The plan reviewed.
I In this program, 40 manuals and 2100 documents were reviewed, and some 33,000 checks were made of procedural implementation. Over a four-month j period, approximately 177 man-months were applied to this program.
I i General Atomic through its Torrey Pines Technology Division, is quali-fled to perform this evaluation for SCE. General Atomic has be .1 in the W
nuclear power plant industry for over 20 years and has a large staff of capable, experienced technically trained personnel. Also, General Atomic I 1 l
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I 1 operates under the first NRC approved quality assurance program and the seismic design evaluation for SCE was conducted under the provisions of this program.
General Atomic Company and all its personnel involved in this program are independent of SCE and San Diego Gas & Electric Company (SDG&E), the major owners of San Onofre Units 2 and 3. Revenues from SCE and SDG&E are not a significant portion of General Atomic's revenues. No person working on this program has a significant financial interest in SCE or SDG&E nor does any person on this program have any family members presently employed by SCE or SDG&E or engaged directly or indirectly in the design or construction of the San Onofre Units 2 and 3.
I The report consists of three volumes. This first volume, the Executive Summary, contains a complete overview of the program, a description of work performed, and the major conclusions drawn. Volume II, Program Results, presents a thorough description of the program, particularly of the actual work performed, the questions raised during the review, the resolution of __
these questions, and the final conclusions associated with each part of the program. Volume III, Potential Finding Reports, consists of two books. It is a compilation of all of the questions raised and Corrective Action Plans developed, along with the review of each plan. This document does not include program discussion, descriptions of the work, or any conclusions.
During the course of the program, any question that resulted in the identification of a valid deviation, as defined in the applicable procedure, was classified as either a Finding or an Observation. A Finding is a devi-ation that could result in a substantial safety hazard or an indication that there is a repetitive or generic deviation that could create a substantial safety hazard. An Observation is a deviation that could not create a sub-stantial safety hazard. Each Observation and Finding is discussed in the appropriate section, together with its implication on the Task conclusion.
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SCOPE The overall purpose of this program was to conduct an independent review of the seismic design of San Onofre Units 2 and 3 from NRC-approved design bases to implementation by the constructor or fabricator. This effort also included review of the effectiveness of the applicable portions
-g of the quality assurance (QA) program and the walkdown of a segment of pipe.
The' program is structured to concentrate on Unit 2. It reviewed Unit 3 insofar as there were significant features unique to Unit 3.
I The program consisted of eight tasks. Tasks A, B, C, and H pertained to the design process, while Tasks D and G pertained to the construction process. The remaining two tasks (E and F) were basically administrative tasks. The six review tasks are discussed in their respective sections.
RESULTS I Design Procedure Review, Task A This task was designed to determine if SCE, Combustion Engineering Company (CE), and Bechtel Power Corporation (BPC) had design control proce-dures that addressed commiuments in the NRC-approved QA programs and identi-fied the. specific manuals and procedures that applied to the design I activities in each organization.
Design control procedures applicable to seismic design work performed by SCE, CE, and BPC were identified. These procedures were then reviewed for adequacy. The basis for adequacy was Appendix A of the PSAR and, for CE, the CE QA Topical Report. General guidance from 10CFR50 Appendix B and ANSI N45.2 was used to interpret and supplement those documents. This review principally addressed the current procedures for SCE and BPC. Two g sets of CE procedures were reviewed, namely the current set of procedures B and the procedures in effect prior to May 3, 1976. In addition, summaries of the design control process were prepared for use in Task D. Also, I
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selected design control procedure revisions over a sample of time periods were reviewed to verify that the appropriate commitments were implemented throughout the time frame. In this review, 35 manuals and procedures were reviewed. The review took approximately eight man-months.
Two observations and three Findings resulted from the review.
The three Findings related to the lack of formal procedures to meet I PSAR commitments pertaining to the CE project management coordination and design review functions. All three were satisfactorily resolved by Correc-tive Action Plans, submitted by SCE in response to these Findings, which confirmed that the required safety-related activities were properly and ade-quately carried out, even though they were not in all instances covered by formal QA procedures. In addition, the review performed in Task B sampled implementation of issues covered by the Findings and verified that the work was performed satisfactorily. Finally, the Task C review found no evidence I of an adverse impact on the design as a result of these procedural deviations.
The Observations addressed the possibility of an inadequate check list used during the review of specifications and inadequate training require-ments for a specific CE department. Both of these Observations were explored and evidence was presented to demonstrate that although procedures were not in place, the desired effect was achieved and there was not dis-cernible impact on design adequacy.
I Based on the review performed in Task A, it is concluded that SCE, CE, and BPC each had design control procedures in place during the design proc-ess. The SCE and BPC procedures are adequate. The CE procedures are ade-quate except for the area of concern identified in the above discussed Find-ings. The resulting Corrective Action Plans, when coupled with Tasks B, C, and H review, showed that the functions in question were adequately carried out, thus resolving the concern regarding the safety impact of the proce-dural deficiency. Therefore, the overall design process used on the project is satisfactory.
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Design Procedure Implementation Review, Task B Task B was designed to determine that the design control procedures in effect at SCE, CE, and BPC were implemented in the design documents related to seismic design work.
I Three hundred and twenty one points and steps in the design process were selected to be consistent with predetermined criteria and were checked I for compliance with design control procedures. In this review, over 33,000 individual checks involving 1280 documents were made. In the course of this review, 18 man-months were used.
Thirty-five Observations and one Finding resulted from this task.
The single Finding resulted from the accumulation of eight Observations that were initiated against SCE design documents for lack of strict compli-I ance with procedures. While judged independently as Observations, collec-tively they were judged a Finding because they were repetitive, similar pro-cedural violations. SCE provided an acceptabla Corrective Action Plan, demonstrating an understanding of the scope and importance of the problem and provided a resolution or justification for each of the problems. This Finding was related to the auxiliary intake structure, the only seismic Category I item designed.by SCE. Therefore, since the Corrective Action Plan was acceptable and the design review showed the work to be satisfac-tory, any concern that the lack of compliance with procedures identified here might have had a safety impact was eliminated.
The Observations from this task addressed such deficiencies as a lack of proper documentation of design input requirements, a calculation that did not identify the method of verification and design document approval forms that were not filed with the appropriate organization. These were explored and were found not to have a discernible impact on design adequacy.
Based on the review performed under this task, it was concluded that the design activities were carried out substantially in accordance with 5
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L approved procedures. The Observations found were within the limits of what can normally be expected in any major engineering project; that is, occa-
_ sional procedural violations did occur but they were not of a type that had an adverse impact on the safety of the plant. The impact of the Observa-tions associated with the auxiliary intake structure was assessed in Task C and found to be negligible. Therefore, the implementation of the design
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process used on this project is satisfactory.
Seismic Design Technical Review, Task C r- The objective of this task was to review the seismic design of selected L, safety related structures, components, and systems of San Onofre Units 2 and 3 for compliance with NRC-approved design bases and methodology specified in FSAR Sections 3.7 and 3.8.
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The scope of this task included preparation of seismic design chain networks for major safety systems of San onof re Units 2 and 3, preparation of the selection plan for use in choosing the features to be reviewed, selection of the features, preparation of the review procedure, and perform-ance of the detail technical design review of the selected features.
In the course of this technical review, approximately 500 documents were reviewed associated with the 22 features, and approximately 85 man-months were applied.
The list of the 22 features reviewed, along with the number of docu-ments involved in the review of each feature, and the number of Findings and Observations associated with each feature, are shown in Table 1. All Find-ings and Observations that resulted from the technical review are discussed below. Overall, no concerns were found in the technical review that indi-
, cated the safety functions could not be accomplished.
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Each of the features for which there were Observations or Findings are discussed below. There were no Observations or Findings associated with the review of the small-bore piping (Feature 7), the valves (Feature 9), the 6
I I TABLE 1 I TECHNICAL FEATURES REVIEWED l
No. Documents Feature Involved Observations
- 1. Reactor Containment Building 31 3
- 2. Auxiliary Intake Structure 5 2
- 3. Refueling Water Storage Tank 5 3
- 4. Low-Pressure Safety Injection Pump 10 1
- 5. Safety Injection Tank 11 1
- 6. Major Piping 54 12
- 7. Small-Bore Piping 6 0
- 8. Pipe Supports and Snubbers 101 5
- 9. Valves 43 1
- 10. Instrument Racks and Panels 25 1
- 11. Switchgear and Power Panels 3 3
- 12. Electrical and Control Cables 1 0 I 13. Dynamic Analysis of Reactor Coolant System 34 0
- 14. Reactor Coolant Pump and Supports- 22 2
- 15. Reactor Vessel Support 15 1
- 16. Fuel Element Crid Spacers 11 0
- 17. Reactor Coolant System Cold Leg (Piping) 6 1
- 18. Diesel Cenerator Fuel Oil Storage I 19.
Tank Two Locally Mounted Instruments 5
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0 I 20. Cable Tray and Conduit Raceway Support Systems 32 1(a)
- 21. Control Panel 2CR57 6 2
- 22. Segment of Reactor Containment Building Internal Structure 47 2 I
- In addition to the Observation, there was also a Finding. This is
- the only feature against which a finding was logged.
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electrical and control cables (Feature 12), the dynamic analysis of the reactor coolant system (Fecture 13), the fuel element grid spacers (Feature 16), the diesel generator fuel oil storage tank (Feature 18), and the two locally mounted instruments (Feature 19).
1 Reactor Containment Building, Feature 1. Three Observations resulted from this review. The first pertained to the values for soil springs and the input data. The second pertained to the orientation of beam elements I defined by local coordinates, and the third pertained to a base mat tracking technique identified during the independent analysis. All three of these Observations were satisfactorily shown to have no adverse impact on the adequacy of the seismic analysis of the reactor containment building.
Auxiliary Intake Structure, Feature 2. Two Observations resulted from this review. The first had to do with an erroneous parameter and a numerical error in the structural analysis calculations. The second concerned the I loads used in the design of the conduit section.
ther review indicated that the correction of these errors did not signifi-In both Observations, fur-cantly reduce the design margin of the structure.
Refueling Water Storage Tank, Feature 3. Three Observations resulted from this review. The first concerned a small (10%) error in the nozzle load included in the design specification. This did not significantly affect the design. The second concerned the procedures and calculations used to deter-mine the allowable buckling stresses of the tank. Although the ASME code procedures were improperly applied, analysis with proper procedures proved that the tank design was adequate. The third Observation involved the development of stresses in the tank structure due to gross movement of the I stored liquid during a seismic event (slosh). Again analysis with accept-able procedures showed that although the allowable buckling stresses are exceeded at the base of the tank, chese stresses will remain below minimum l buckling values based on evidence from tests and analysis of actual seismic data on tanks. It was also recognized that the buckling phenomenon is basi-l cally a stability consideration and is not a mode of failure that would result in loss of fluid.
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{ Low Pressure Safety Injection Pump, Feature 4. One Observation resulted from this review concerning the adequacy of the specified seismic accel-eration to be used for component testing. It was found that the pump stresses for the clearly conservative value of acceleration would not result in exceeding allowable values.
Safety Injection Tank Feature 5. One Observation pertained to a discre-pancy in the calculated moment of inertia for the concrete floor slab. It was found that the use of the correct moment of inertia in the calculation f
l did not result in stresses exceeding design allowable values.
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Major Piping, Feature 6. Twelve Observations resulted from this review.
One involved a failure to incorporate the effects of a change notice in the piping analysis. Two addressed the omission of piping specialty weights or use of incorrect values for piping weights. Two involved problems with data input for the computer evaluation of seismic anchor movement loads. Three pointed out inconsistencies between the input isometric sketches and the resulting computer model for the pipe runs represented by those sketches.
Three involved documentation errors. One involved the techniques used in calculating seismic loading on valves. All of these Observations were l determined to have no adverse impact on the adequacy of the design since they do not materially change the stresses or pipe-support loads reported in the various piping analysis packages.
In the course of this review the method of accounting for differences I
between Units 2 and 3 regarding piping was explored. As a result of this review it was concluded that the design of both Units 2 and 3 were adequate.
I Pipe Supports and Snubbers, Feature 8.
l Five Observations resulted from this review dealing with documentation assumptions used in specific calculations and specific input data. None of these Observations materially affect the adequacy of the pipe supports.
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I Valves, Feature 9.
One Observation resulted from this review. This noted that CE procured valves were specified for a seismic acceleration limit of l 3-g, compared with the 5-g levels specified for BPC-supplied valves. This difference was carefully explored and ascertained to have no safety l significance. '
d Instrument Racks and Panels, Feature 10. One Observation resulted from the lack of reference to relay contact chatter monitoring during the seismic m qualification test in the specification. However, review of the test data indicated that the relays functioned properly during testing.
I Switchgear and Power Panels, Feature 11. Three Observations resulted from this review. 'Ivo of these concerned documentation that did not af fect over-all design adequacy. The third Observation regarded the validity of extra-polating the test data for multipanel installations. It was determined that this extrapolation had no adverse effect on design adequacy.
Reactor Coviant Pump and Supports, Feature 14. Two Observations resulted from this review. The first concerned the lack of seismic qualification
- requirements for snubber appurtenances. Later examination indicated that j
these were not required during or after the design basis event, thus the impact of this perceived deficiency is negligible. The second Observation l involved I.he stresses for the column anchor clevises in the pump skirt. It was determined that a nonconservative analysis technique was used to evalu-ate these stresses. However, independent analysis of all clevises designed
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using this method showed the design to be adequate. Therefore, the use of this method had no adverse impact on the design adequacy.
Reactor Vessel Support, Feature 15. One Observation resulted from this I
i review concerning an incorrect allowable value. It did not, however, materially affect the conservative design margins.
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i Reactor Coolant System Cold Leg (Piping), Feature 17. One Observation was written concerning the method used to combine stresses. Using clearly con-servative methods, however, did not significantly reduce the design margin.
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f Cable Tray and Conduit Raceway Support Systems, Feature 20. One Observation and one Finding resulted from this review. The Observation concerned load l combinations used in the analysis. A clearly conservative method of load combinations, however, indicated no adverse effect on the overall design adequacy. The Finding pertained to the design of concrete anchor inserts I
l associated with diagonal brace connections. A Corrective Action Plan was prepared to resolve this Finding. The actions proposed are satisfactory. (
Control Panel 2CR57, Feature 21. Two Observations resulted from this l review. The first addressed the fact that the procurement specifications required no panel wiring to be considered during seismic testing. However, l the seismic test report clearly showed that the wiring was properly included, and this weakness in the specification had no effect on the design adequacy. The second Observation concerned dynamic interaction between this I panel and other panels to which it was connected.
sis it was concluded that the acceleration levels that could exist at the After significant analy-panel during the DBE were adequately less than the specified maximum; there-I l
fore, the seismic qualification criteria were met.
Segment of Reactor Containment Building Internal Structure, Feature 22. Two
( Observations resulted from this review. The first Observation pointed out an error in the moment-of-inertia calculation for a concrete .3am. However, this beam had been deleted from the installation; the calculation error therefore has no effect on design adequacy. The second Observation involved a failure to reflect the final reactor coolant pump support load figures in l
the completed calculations for these supports. However, the seismic review m demonstrated that inclusion of the final values resulted in stresses within l
l allowable limits.
l This fecture was also selected with the intent of representing differ-ences between Units 2 and 3. In this area a right-hand /left-hand symmetry l is established for the two units. The procedures and calculations employed were not affected by the right-hand /left-hand orientation. Thus, the calcu-lations are relevant to either unit.
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u Overall Conclusion, Task C Based on the review performed under this task and taken with the review performed under Tasks A and B, the seismic design of San Onofre Units 2 and
{ 3 is adequate.
Audit Plan Review, Task D A
Task D was designed to determine that SCE and BPC performed audits at the site and at fabricator's shops to implement seismic design documents and to evaluate the effectiveness and results of such audits. CE audits were not included in this review since CE had no responsibility for site audits, and the CE fabricators were audited by SCE. The work focused on a review of e
{ audits that addressed site or fabricator's activity on seismically qualified component systems and structures. In the course of this review, seven man-months were used.
The preparation of procedures, the performance of reviews of audit plans, schedules, and implementation were included in the task.
Eight documents were reviewed to assess the procedural requirements for planning and scheduling audits. The one Finding in this task concerned the r
L fact that the procedures did not specifically require planned periodic audits to determine the effectiveness of the QA program. The SCE Corrective
{ Action Plan, with supporting documentation, indicated that although not spe-cifically stated as an objective, audits did assess the adequacy of control beyond simply determining compliance or noncompliance with specific require-ments. It also indicated that the procedure now includes this requirement.
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Therefore, this Finding was satisfactorily resolved, L
r A review of BPC and SCE records verified that audit plans were prepared L and scheduled in accordance with procedural requirements.
Audit reports were examined to determine if the audits were in fact carried out and to identify deficiencies uncovered in these audits tnd r
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I evaluate the resolution of the deficiencies. A total of 279 audit reports were reviewed, resulting in five Observatons and one Finding.
The Finding addressed the issua of maintenance of permanent records of audit nonconformances classified as minor. SCE's Corrective Action Plan provided information, however, showing that all deficiencies reported on BPC
.I audit checklists were, in fact, maintained in the SCE permanent records system. This Finding was thus satisfactorily resolved.
Two of the Observations dealt with apparently ineffective corrective actions. However, investigation of these indicated no adverse impact on safety. The remaining three Observations dealt.with procedural violations.
Again, investigation of these indicated no adverse affect on safety.
It has been concluded therefore that SCE and BPC did audit site and
= supplier activities in the area of implementation of seismic design docu-ments and that the program is documented by procedures responsive to
- Appendix B and by records of audics, schedules, plans, audit reports, and follow-up reports. It is concluded that this audit program is adequate.
Pipe Segment Walkdown, Task G The objective of this task was to visually verify the proper instal-lation of a segment of pipe that was reviewed in Task C. Approximately 300 f t of piping in the Safety Injection System, involving 37 pipe-support draw-ings and 4 piping isometrics drawings, were inspected. Approximately one I man-month of effort was expended.
Two Observations resulted. The first Observation concerned an as-built drawing error in the location of a clevis to which a strut was attached and the clearance between the lugs on the pipe and the steps on the support that ,
i exceeded specified tolerances. Calculations by BPC and TPT showed these ,
i conditions to be acceptable. The second Observation involved a drain line
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installation that was not in conformance with standard practice. However, a l
j BPC calculation verified that the as-built configuration was acceptable. j l
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W The walkdown showed the installation of this pipe segment to be adequate.
Independent Calculations, Task 1 v
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The objective of Task H was to perform independent calculations using alternative analytical techniques on selected features of San onofre Units 2 and 3 to verify the design adequacy of the selected features and to compare the results with original calculations for consistency.
u Independent analyses were carried out for the low pressure safety
[ injection (LPSI) pump support mot it and the safety injection tank. This effort required three man months.
L A modal analysis of the support mount of the LPSI pump was performed.
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The calculations showed the design of the pump support to be adequate. The analysis indicated a fundamental natural frequency of approximately 20 Hertz, which differed substantially from the 112 Hertz originally calculated by BPC and which was lower than the CE-specified minimum requirement of 33 Hertz for the pump support. However, further review indicated that this still met the basic reqirements for a rigid mount and therefore the design is, in fact, adequate.
An independent seismic analysis of the safety injection water tank was performed.
The independent analysis confirmed the adequacy of the design of these
'- two components. Further, the number of differences in analytical results between the independent conservative analysis and the original design analysis was minimal and these proved acceptable.
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I TOTAL PROGRMI OVERVIEW I Summary of Observations and Findings I
l Seven Findings resulted f rom the review; six were related to procedural items that were resolved satisfactorily in the Correction Action Plans and l other sections of the review. The seventh Finding concerned the design for
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which the Corrective Acton Plan outlined a program to satisfactorily '
resolve.
The 86 Observations covered a wide range of deviations from clerical l
I violations, failure to establish adequate procedures, failure to follow procedures, nueerical errors, and errors in calculation logic. In all these l concerns, however, none indicated any failure of the design to meet basic safety ebjectives. In so:,e instances, some or all of the design margin was l used, but since the bar,1c design is very conservative, the ability to per-form the required safety fun.ction was always preserved. Thus, the combi- j nation of margin and the original design organization's experience and judg- I I
l ment resulted in an adequate design in spite of minor cerors in the design system.
From another perspective,'the number of deviations that are discovered I
! in any examination depends on the depth of investigation. Deviations can always be found if the investigation probes deeply enough. 'Torrey Pines j Technology has probed very deeply into San Onofre Units 2 and 3, and devi-ations have been found. In spite of this thorough examination, no design inadequacies have been found that cculd endanger public health and safety.
CONCLUSIONS t
l The independent verification program for San Onofre Nuclear Generating i
Station Units 2 and 3 was structured to verify that the design process ade-quately converted the seismic design bases specified in the Final Safety
} Analysis Report into design documents that were transmitted to the construc-tor or fabricator. The major tasks, Tasks A, B, C, and H taken together L 15
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have provided a discerning basis to judge the adequacy of the seismic
- design. The conclusions on the seismic design are as follows:
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during the design process. In general, these procedures were ade-quate. The one exception was the lack of procedure,s at CE to assure management coordination and overall design review as com-mitted in the PSAR. This lack, however, was judged to have no p effect on the design adequacy based on additional information sub-mitted in the Corrective Action Plan and the review performed in
- Tasks B, C, and H. Thus, it is concluded that the design system or process in effect for the entire life of the San Onofre Units 2 and 3 project is in accordance with commitments and can reasonably be expected to produce an adequate design.
I l 2. The review of the implementation of this system shows that the system was, in fact, iiiplemented during the life of the project.
The one exception is the implementation of the design procedures I
l by SCE. However, this lack was judged to have no ef fect on the design adequacy, since all of the seismic Category I design work performed by SCE was reviewed and found adequate. Thus, overall, the design system or process was, in fact, adequately implemented.
I l 3. Based on the technical design review of 22 features, including the reanalysis of two features, the design system or process in place during the life of this project and its adequate implementation l
has, in fact, produced an adequate seismic design.
Therefore, the seismic design of San Onofre Units 2 and 3 is judged adequate.
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-'p Two aspectsj of the construction pcocess were reviewed.
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't b , E' i'; Task D reviewed the plan for field audits. Based on this E review it isx concluded that SCE and BPC did carry out an audit
, , program thct was properly planned and scheduled in accordance with commitments and that this program was effective as l indicated by the lack of significant unresolved
[ deficiencies.
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- 2. Task G reviewed the as-built configuration of a segment of I
pipe. Based on this review it is concluded that the instal-lation of this pipe segment is adequate with regard to seis-mic requirements.
Although the program was structured to concentrate on Unit 2, Unit 3 s
review was. included insofar as there are signficant unique features. Based on this review, the conclusions of this program are applicable to both N' Units.
The procedure review in Tasks A and D, and to some extent B, used the QA Program documents and PSAR commitments as a source of requirements.
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These requirements were interpreted it ', light of 10CFR50 Appendix B and ANSI N45.2. Although a comprehensive review of the QA Program using these docu-ments as sources of requirements was not done, the current QA Program was,in general.. responsive to 10CFR50 Appendix B and ANSI N45.2 and no deficiencies
,,t were noticed.
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, Overall, the seismic aspects of the San Onofre Units 2 and 3 project are judged adequate and no reascn has been found % prohibit issuance of the full power licer.se for t~ nits 2 and 3.
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TORREY j ( PINES TECHNOLOGY g
A Division of General Atomic Company PO Box 61608. San Diego. CA 92138 I
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