ML18026A290

Forwards Rev 26 to Emergency Plan IAW 10CFR50.54q.Summary of Changes Listed

ML18026A290
Person / Time
Site:	Susquehanna
Issue date:	06/09/1998
From:	Byram R PENNSYLVANIA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
Shared Package
ML18026A291	List: ML18026A290
References
PLA-4915, NUDOCS 9806220319
Download: ML18026A290 (90)

Text

CATEGORY j.

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:9806220319 DOC.DATE'. 98/06/09 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKS'8'. 9 FACIL:50-387 Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Unit 1, Pennsylva 05000'387 50-388 Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Unit 2, Pennsylva 050003'88 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION BYRAM,R.G. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co.

RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk)

SUBJECT:

Forwards rev 26 to emergency plan IAW 10CFR50.54q.Summary of changes listed.

i I AA DZSTRIBUTION CODE: A045D .COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE:

TITLE: OR Submittal: Emergency Preparedness Plans, Implement'g Procedures,>Op NOTES: 0500'0387E RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL .-0 PD1-2 PD 1 1 NERSES,V 1 1

-'-R INTERNAL: AEOD/HAGAN,D 1 1 LE CENTER 0 2 2 NRR/DRPM/PERB 1 OC - STRACT 1 1 -Y EXTERNAL: NOAC 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NOTES: 1 1 D

"U

'.E

'N NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE. TO HAVE YOUR NAME OR ORGANIZATION REMOVED FROM DISTRIBUTION fISTS OR REDUCE THE NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED BY YOU OR YOUR ORGANIZATION, CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK (DCD) ON EXTENSION 415-2083 TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 10 ENCL 10

Robert G. Byram PP8L, Inc.

Senior Vice President Two North Ninth Street Generation and Chief Nuclear Officer Allentown, PA18101-1179 Tel. 610.774.7502 Fax 610.774.5019 Tel. 610.774.5151 E-mail:rgbyrampapt.corn http:ltwww.pa pl.corn/

JUN 0 9 'l998 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn.: Document Control Desk Mail Station P1-137 Washington, D. C. 20555 SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION EMERGENCY PLAN REVISION 26 Docket Nos. 50-387 PLA-4915 FILES R36 A17-13 and 50-388 Enclosed is Revision 26 to the Susquehanna SES Emergency Plan. In "accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50 54q, the changes have been made without commission approval as they do not decrease the effectiveness of the plan and the plan as changed continues to satisfy the applicable requirements of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50.

The changes are summarized below:

SECTION 5.0 EMERGENCY CONDITIONS Section 5.1.3 Editorial change replacing the words "on site" with Emergency response facilities in recognition of the fact that the EOF is not located on site.

Section 5.2.3 Editorial change to add the word "Line" to the title of the section.

Table 5.2 Licensee Action No. 3 under the Alert Classification has been revised to delete the EOF from the listing of facilities activated at the Alert Classification. The EOF is automatically staffed at the Alert, but is activated at the discretion of the Emergency Director or Recovery Manager.

980b220319 980b09 PDR ADQCK 05000387 F PDR

FILES R36, A17-13 PLA-4915 Document Control Desk Licensee Action No. 4 under the Alert Classification has been revised to reflect the provision of a dedicated individual for plant status updates to off-site authorities and periodic briefings instead of the provision of 30 minute updates.

Licensee Action No. 5 under the Site Area Emergency Classification has been revised to indicate that senior technical and management staff is available for consultation in the EOF not on site as previously indicated.

Licensee Action No. 2 under the General Emergency Classification has been revised to reflect PPRL's use of Protective Action Recommendations.

SECTION 6.0 ORGANIZATIONALCONTROL OF EMERGENCIES Section 6.0 Editorial changes to the description of the duties of the shift supervisor when acting as the Emergency Director as follows:

~ Item d. has been changed to show this responsibility as ensuring that plant personnel are notified rather than actually notifying them.

~ The title Plant Manager-Susquehanna has been changed to General Manager-Susquehanna.

The description under Phase III- Activation of Off-site NERO has been changed to reflect the practice of automatically staffing the EOF at the Alert Classification and automatic Activation at the Site Area or above classification.

Section 6.2.5 (e) and (j) Deleted reference to relief by the Dose Assessment Supervisor.

Sections 6.2 and 6.3 These sections have been changed to delete the specific listing of typical staff positions which fillemergency organization positions. A statement has been added to the text as follows:

FILES R36, A17-13 PLA-4915 Document Control Desk

~ All emergency response positions are staffed by personnel who have met the qualifications for the position as listed in the PP8cL Nuclear Department Minimum Qualifications and Training Manual" and the "Emergency Plan Training Matrix".

Section 6.2.1 Editorial change. Added the word "state" preceding the word EOC.

Section 6.3.1.1 Deleted reference to the Assistant Recovery Manager. If the recovery Manager is unable to perform their duties they will be succeeded by another qualified Recovery Manager.

Section 6.3.1.1 (j) Editorial changes in the first sentence: From "send" to "When requested" and "risk counties" to "EOC's".

Section 6.4.3 Text changed to reflect the response of federal agencies.

Table 6.2 The last column heading has been changed from "As Soon As Possible" to "Available Within 90 Minutes".

Under the Radiological Accident Assessment Bc Support of Operational Accident Assessment functional area the term "survey Team Personnel" has been replaced by "Health Physics Personnel".

Under the Radiological Accident Assessment Bc Support of Operational Accident Assessment functional area reference to Chemical Engineer, Radiochemistry radwaste Management and Decontamination available in the EOF has been deleted. These positions are not available initially in the EOF. Additionally, the number of Rad Assessment personnel shown as available in the EOF "within 90 minutes" has been changed. This change was inadvertently missed when the plan was revised to reflect the previously changed EOF organization. These adjustments do not represent a new change to the EOF organization.

Figure 6.1 Revised figure to show the recent reorganization of the Nuclear Department.

4 FILES R36, A17-13 PLA4915 Document Control Desk Figure 6.2 Revised the EOF Organization Figure changing the title of Support Services Supervisor to Support Services Manager.

SECTION 7.0 EMERGENCY MEASURES Section 7.1.1 The dispatching of additional field monitoring teams has been changed from one to four hours to upon activation of-the EOF.

Changed the number of sites where TLDs are located from 19 to 17. Also revised the method of employing both sets of TLDs.

Table 7.2 Editorial change of the title of Rad Support Manager to Dose Assessment Supervisor.

SECTION 8.0 EMERGENCY FACILITIES AND E UIPMENT Section 8.1.1 Editorial change to add the word "Emergency" to Site Area.

Section 8.1.3.1 Editorial change deleting reference to RDAS, UMC, and SDS as part of the upgrade to Plant Integrated Computer System (PICSY) on Unit 1.

Section 8.1.3.4.4 Description of the unit kitchen with appliances and sink

'emoved.

Section 8.1.3.8 Editorial change deleting reference to RDAS, SPDS and PCS as part of the upgrade to PICSY on Unit 1.

Section 8.2.2.4.2 Changed to delete reference to UHF radios as they are not available in the new EOF.

Section 8.9 Changed to reflect the upgrade to PICSY on Unit 1.

FILES R36, A17-13 PLA-4915 Document Control Desk SECTION 9.0 MAINTAININGEMERGENCY PLANNING Section 9.1.1 Changed to reflect that a review is offered to DER/BRP on dose calculation/projections protective action guides, and reportable information iristead of the review is received by DER/BRP. It is DER/BRP's option to take the review.

Table 9.1 Use of division personnel for monitoring has been deleted.

APPENDIX C The listing of typical Position Specific Procedures has been revised.

APPENDIX E The Corporate Policy Statement has been editorially revised.

Should you have questions regarding this submittal, please contact Ms. C. A. Smith at (717) 542-3233.

Sincerely, R. G. a E osure copy: NRC Region I Mr. K. M. Jenison, NRC Resident Inspector Mr. V. Nerses, NRC Sr. Project Manager

FILES R36, A17-13 PLA-4915 Document Control Desk bc: '. T. Coddington D. L. Filchner NUCSA4 GENA63 w/o attach w/o attach G. T. Jones NUCSA4 w/o attach J.. M. Kenny GENA61 w/o attach G. D. Miller GENA62 w/o attach C. A. Smith NUCWB w/o attach R. R. Sgarro GENA61 w/o attach W. F. Tabor EMC w/o attach R. R. Wehry NUCSA4 w/o attach W. W. Williams GENA61 w/o attach Licensing File GENA61 w/o attach NR Files GENA62 w/o attach WWW:wwwXtah 4915.WWW 06/09/98 8:59 AM

<,.sr ~

~l~l<<

9f sn ~, r(-

el~

NNSYLVANIAPOWER & LIGHT COMPANY SUS UEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION

,g>NQg Q

Ql

(

~a i .

P gl gfg. ~

ac s~

0

,EM'HIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN UPDATED INCLUDE REVISIONS THROUGH 24 DATE

~/9

4'ENNSYLVANIAPOWER &. LIGHT COMPANY SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION I

EMERGENCY PLAN REVISION 25 NOVEMBER 1996 P,ORC MEETING 497-01-09

t t I

SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION EMERGENCY P L'AN

'IS T OF EFFECTIVE PA'GES This list of effective pages is provided for the convenience of the 'end users of,'the, Susquehanna SES Emergency Plan. It is reprinted in its entirety and.distributed with each revision.

PAGE REVISION DATED Title 25 11/96

'able of Contents i 25 11/96 25 11/96 25 11/96 SECTION 1.0 - DEFINITIONS 25 '11/96 1-2 25 11/96 1-3 25 11/96 1X 25 11/96 1-5 25 11/96 SECTION 2.0 - ACRONYMS 2-1 25 11/96 2-2 25 11/96 SECTION 3.0-- REFERENCES 3-1 24 06/96 SECTION 4.0 - SCOPE AND CONTENTS 4-1 24 06/96 4-2 24 06/96 Figure 4.1 10/88 Figure 4.2 ~ 10/88 SECTION 5.0 EMERGENCY CONDITIONS 5-1 21 04/94 5-2 21 04/94 5-3 21 04/94 21 04/94 5-5 21 04/94 5-6 21 04/94 Table 5.1, page 1 25 11/96 Table 5.1, page 2 25 11/96 Table 5.1, page 3 25 11/96 Table 5.1, page 4 25 11/96 Table 5.1, page 5 25 11/96 Table 5.1, page 6 25 11/96 Table 5.1, page 7 25 11/96 Table 5.1, page 8 25 11/96 Table 5.1, page 9 25 11/96 Rev. 25, 11/96, LEP-1

PAGE REVISION DATED .

Table 5.1, page 10 25 11/96 Table 5.1, page 11 25 11/96 Table 5.1, page 12 25 11/96 Table 5.1, page 13 25 11/96 Table 5.1, page 14 25 11/96 Table 5.1, page 15 25 ~ 1'I/96 Table 5.1, page 16 25 11/96 Table 5.1, page 17 25 '1/96 Table 5.1, page 18 25 11/96 Table 5.1, page 19 25 11/96 Table 5.1, page 20 25 11/96 Table 5.1, page 21 25 11/96 Table 5.1, page 22 25 11/96 Table 5.1, page 23 25 11/96 Table 5.1, page 24 25 11/96 Table 5.1, page 25 25 11/96 Table 5.1, page 26 25 11/96 Table 5.1, page 27 25 11/96 Table 5.1, page 28 25 11/96 Table 5.1, page 29 25 11/96 Table 5.1, page 30 '25 11/96 Table 5.1, page 31 25 11/96 Table 5.1, page 32 25 11/96 Table 5.1, page 33 25 1'I/96 Table 5.2, page 1 25 11/96 Table 5.2, page 2 25 11/96 Table'5.2, page 3 25'5 11/96 Table 5.2, page 4 11'/96 Table 5.2, page'5 25 11/96 Table 5.2, page 6 25 11/96 Table 5.2, page 7 25 11/96 SECTION 6.0 - ORGANIZATIONALCONTROL OF EMERGENCIES 6-1 - 25 11/96 6-2 25 11/96 6-3 25 11/96 25 11/96 6-5 25 11/96 6-6 25 11/96 6-7'-8 25 11/96 25 11/96 6-9 25 11/96 6-10 25 11/96 6-11 25 11/96 6-12 25 11/96 Rev. 25, 11/96 LEP-2

PAGE REVISION DATED 6-13 25 11/96 6-14 25 11/96 6-15 25 11/96 6-16 25 11/96 6-17 25 1'1/96 Table 6.1, page 1 25 11/96 Table 6.1, page 2 25 11/96'1/96 Table 6.2, page 1 25 Table 6.2, page 2 25 11/96 Table 6.2, page 3 25 11/96 Table 6.2, page 4 25 11/96 Table 6.3, page 1 24 06/96 Figure 6.1 25 11/96 Figure 6.2 11/96 Figure 6.3 25 11/96 Figure 6.6 24 06/96 Figure 6.7 24 06/96 SECTION 7.0 - EMERGENCY MEASURES 7-1 25 11/96 7-2 '25 11/96 7-3 25 '11/96 7-4 25 11/96 7-5 25 11/96 7-6 25 11/96 7-7 25 11/96 7-8 25 11/96 Table 7.1, page 1 24 06/96 Table 7.1, page 2 24 06/96 Table 7.2, page 1 22 04/95 Table 7.2, page 2 22 04/95 Table 7.2, page 3 22 04/95 Table 7.3, page 1 20 12/93 Table 7.3, page 2 20 12/93 Table 7.3, page 3 20 - 12/93 Table 7.3," page 4 20 12/93 SECTION 8.0 - EMERGENCY FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT 8-1 25 11/96 8-2 25 11/96 8-3 25 11/96 25 11/96 8-5 25 11/96 8-6 25 11/96 Rev. 25, 11/96 'EP-3

'AGE REVISION 'ATED, 8-7 25 11/96 8-8 25 11/96 8-9 25 11/96 8-10 25 11/96 8-11 25 11/96 8-12 25 11/96 25

' 11/96 8-13 8-14 25 11/96 8-15 25 11/96 Table 8.1, page 1 17 03/93 Figure 8.1 24 06/96 Figure 8.2 12 10/95 Figure 8.3 24 06/96 Figure 8.4 11, 10/88 Figure 8.5 10/88 Figure 8.6 10/88 SECTION 9c0 -, MAINTENANCEEMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 9-1 25 11/96 9-2 25 11/96 9-3 25 11/96 25 11/96 9-5 I r

25 11/96 Table 9.1, page 1 k 25 11/96 Table 9.1, p'age 2 25 11/96 APPENDIX A - LETTERS OF AGREEINENT A-1 24 06/96 A-2 24 06/96 A-3 24 06/96 APPENDIX B - WIND ROSES'AND'DOSE/DISTANCE PLOTS B-1 15 01/92 B-2 15 01/92 B-3 15 01/92 Figure B.1 10/88 Figure B.2 10/88 Figure B.3 10/88 Figure B.4 10/88 B.5 'igure 10/88, Figure B.6 10/88 Figure B.7, 11 10/88 APPENDIX C -, SSES EMERGENCY PLAN POSITION SPECIFIC PROCEDURES (TYPICAL)

C-1 25 "

11/96 C-2 25 '1/96 25, 11/96 k'Rev.

LEP-4

PAGE REVISION . DATED:-',

APPENDIX D - EQUIPMENT INFORMATION I ISTINGS D-1 25 11/96 D-2 25 11/96 25 11/96

'-3 D-4'-5 25 11/96 25 11/96 D-6 25 11/96 D-7 25 11/96 D-8 25 11/96 D-9 25 11/96 25 11/96 D-11 25 11/96 D-12 25 11/96 D-13 25 11/96 25 11/96 D-15 25 11/96

'-16 25 11/96 APPENDIX E - CORPORATE POLICY STATEMENT E-1 25 11/96 Corporate Policy Statement, 25 11/96 (letter dated 11/22/96)

APPENDIX F - NUREG 0654 INITIATINGCONDITIONS NOT INCLUDED ON TABLE 5.1 F-1 18 05/93 F-2 18 05/93 F-3 18 05/93 APPENDIX G - SSES EVACUATIONTIME ESTIMATES G-1 15 01/92 Evacuation Time Estimates, cover page 10/88 (Report Dated 08/81)

Evacuation Time Estimates, title page 10/88 (Report Dated 08/81)

TOC 10/88 10/88 1-2 10/88 1-3 10/88 10/88 1-5 10/88 1-6 '0/88 2-1 10/88 2-2 10/88 Rev. 25, 11/96 LEP-5

PAGE REVlSION DATED; 2-3 10/88 10/88 2-5 10/88 2-6 10/88 2-7 10/88 2-8 10/88 2-9 10/88 2-10 10/88 2-11 10/88 2-12 10/88 2-13 10/88 2-14 10/88 2-15 10/88 2-16 10/88 3-1 10/88 3-2 10/88 3-3 10/88 3-4 10/88 3-5 10/88 3-6 10/88 3-7 10/88 3-8 10/88 3-9, 10/88 3-10 10/88 3-11 10/88 3-12 10/88 3-13 10/88 3-14 10/88 3-15 10/88 4-1 10/88

'4-2 10/88 4-3 10/88 10/88 4-5 10/88 4-6 10/88 4-7 10/88 5-1 10/88 5-2'-3 10/88 10/88 10/88 5-5 10/88 5-6 10/88 5-7 10/88 5-8 10/88 5-9 10/88 Rev. 25, 11/96 LEP-6

PAGE, REVISION DATED 5-10 10/88 5-11 10/88 5-12 10/88 5-13 10/88 5-14 10/88 5-15 10/88 5-16 10/88 6-1 10/88 6-2 10/88 6-3 10/88 10/88 6-5 10/88 6-6 10/88 6-7 10/88 6-8 10/88 6-9 10/88 6-10 10/88 .

Appendix A Description of Netvac title page 10/88 Report pages:

A-1 10/88

'-2 10/88 A-3 10/88 10/88 A-5 10/88 Appendix B, Roadway Network and Capacities 10/88 title page Report pages:

10/88 10/88 3 10/88-APPENDIX H - DOWNSTREAM SUSQUEHANNA RIVER WATER USAGE, H-1 15 01/92 H-2 15 01/92 H-3 15 01/92 15 01/92 APPENDIX I - POPULATION UPDATE FOR SSES EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE 15 01/92 Population Update for SSES EPZ, cover page 10/88 (Report Dated 07/82)

Population Update for SSES EPZ, title page 10/88 (Report Dated 07/82)

Report pages (Report Dated 07/82):

TOC 10/88 10/88 1-2 10/88 1-3 10/88 Rev. 25, 11/96 LEP-7

PAGE REVISION DATED 1-4 10/88 2-1 10/88 2-2 10/88 2-3 10/88 10/88 2-5 10/88 2-6 10/88 2-7 10/88 2-8 10/88 2-9 10/88 2-10 10/88 3-1 '10/88 3-2 22 '4/95 3-3 22 04/95 10/88 3-5 10/88 APPENDIX J - NUREG-0654 PLANNING STANDARD AND EVALUATION CRITERIA CROSS REFERENCE TO SSES EMERGENCY PLAN, 25 11/96 J-2 25 11/96 J-3 25 11/96 J-4 25 11/96 J-5. 25 11/96 J-6 25 11/96 J-7 25 '1/96 J-8 25 11/96 J-9 25 11/96 Rev. 25, 11/96 LEP-8,,

TA'BM:OE;CONT'ENTS:"'-';-:',.",';,.':,.:--

SECTION TITLE PAGE 1.0 DEFINITIONS 2.0 ACRONYMS 2-1

3.0 REFERENCES

3-1 4.0 SCOPE AND CONTENTS 4.1 SCOPE 4-1

'4.2 CONTETS 4-1 5.0 EMERGENCY CONDITIONS 5.1 CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM 5-1 5.2 SPECTRUM OF POSTULATED ACCIDENTS 5-3 6.0 ORGANIZATIONALCONTROL OF EMERGENCIES 6.1 NORMALOPERATING ORGANIZATION 6-3 6.2 ON-SITE EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION- (PHASE ll) 6-3 6.3 OFF-SITE RESOURCES AND ACTIVITIES- (PHASE III) 6.4 COORDINATION WITH PARTICIPATING GOVERNMENT AGENCIES 6-13 6.5 RESTORATION 6-16 7.0 EMERGENCY MEASURES 7-1 7.1 ASSESSMENT ACTIONS FOR ALLEMERGENCY CLASSIFICATIONS 7-1 7.2 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 7.3 PROTECTIVE ACTIONS 7-5 7.4 AID TO AFFECTED PERSONNEL 7-7 8.0 EMERGENCY FACILITIESAND EQUIPMENT 8.1 ON-SITE EMERGENCY CENTERS 8-1 8.2 PP8'cL OFF-SITE EMERGENCY CENTERS 8.3 COUNTY AND STATE EMERGENCY CENTERS 8-8 8.4 ASSESSMENT CAPABILITIES 8-9 8.5 PROTECTIVE FACILITIES 8-9 8.6 ADDITIONALCOMMUNICATIONSSYSTEMS 8-10 8.7 ON-SITE FIRST AID AND MEDICALFACILITIES 8-11 8.8 DAMAGECONTROL EQUIPMENT 8-11 8.9 INFORMATIONSYSTEMS 8-11 9.0 MAINTAININGEMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 9-1 9.1 ORGANIZATIONALPREPAREDNESS 9-1 9.2 REVIEW AND UPDATING 9-3 9.3 MAINTENANCEAND INVENTORY OF EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT/

SUPPLIES 9.4 EDUCATION AND INFORMATION

'UBLIC 10.0 APPENDICES A LETTERS OF AGREEMENT WIND ROSES AND DOSE/DISTANCE PLOTS SSES EMERGENCY PLAN POSITION SPECIFIC PROCEDURES (TYPICAL)

D EQUIPMENT INFORMATIONLISTINGS E CORPORATE POLICY STATEMENT F NUREG 0654 INITIATINGCONDITIONS NOT INCLUDED ON TABLE 5.1 SSES EVACUATIONTIME ESTIMATES H DOWNSTREAM SUSQUEHANNA RIVER WATER USAGE" I POPULATION UPDATE. FOR SSES EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE NUREG-0654 PLANNING STANDARD AND EVALUATIONCRITERIA CROSS REFERENCE TO SSES EMERGENCY PLAN Rev. 25, 11/96

':':'-:. -;LIST~ING OF':TABL'ES"."':".':-.- '. :..'::.': :::;-."'::;:;:.:.

TABLE TITLE 5.1'LASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS 5.2 EMERGENCY ACTIONS BASED ON CLASSIFICATION 6.1 TYPICAL STATION PERSONNEL EMERGENCY ACTIVITYASSIGNMENTS 6.2 MINIMUMON-SITE AND OFF-SITE EMERGENCY ORGANIZATIONCAPABILITIES 6.3 ADDITIONALASSISTANCE FROM OUTSIDE PP&L 7.1

SUMMARY

OF IMMEDIATENOTIFICATIONAND RESPONSE FOR ALL CLASSIFICATIONS 7.2 EMERGENCY EXPOSURE CRITERIA 7.3 PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS 8.1 RELATIONSHIP OF THE PRIMARY PARAMETER, SECONDARY DISPLAY, AND ALGORITHMS ON SPDS 9.1 TRAININGOF SUSQUEHANNA SES EMERGENCY RESPONSE PERSONNEL Rev. 25, 11/96

.....LISTING.'OF.-FIGURES.'!;-

FIGURE TITLE ~

4.1 MAP OF THE SSES VICINITY 4.2 MAP OF SSES 50 MILE INGESTION EXPOSURE ZONE 6.1 SUSQUEHANNA SES ORGANIZATION 6.2 EOF ORGANIZATION 6.3 TSC ORGANIZATION 6.6 LONG TERM RESTORATION ORGANIZATION 6.7 COMMUNICATIONSINTERFACE WITH OFF-SITE AGENCIES 8.1 MAP OF THE SUSQUEHANNA SES EMERGENCY FACILITIES 8.2 TECHNICALSUPPORT CENTER FLOOR PLAN 8.3 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITYFLOOR PLAN 8.4 LOCATION OF BACKUP EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY 8.5 SPDS/PCS DATA SYSTEMS 8.6 SIREN LOCATION Rev. 25, 11/96

1 t

h I

4" 1

5 1 LA SIFICATION SYSTEM Emergency conditions are grouped into four classifications which cover the entire spectrum of probable and postulated accidents. These classifications are Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency, and General Emergency. Action level criteria are specified for determining and declaring each emergency classification. Planning is coordinated with State and county agencies to ensure that this classification system is compatible with the system'used by those agencies. The system provides for notification of appropriate emergency response organizations and for implementation of actions immediately applicable to a specific condition. Provisions are included for upgrading the classification level and the corresponding response in the event of a change in the emergency condition.

Recognition and action level criteria are based on readily available information such as Control Room instrumentation. Immediate actions for response to conditions involving plant operating parameters, such as Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs), are detailed in the Plant Procedures.

The emergency classification system, initiating conditions, and bases for each initiating condition are defined in Table 5.1. This table demonstrates how an initiating condition leads directly to the appropriate emergency classification based on the magnitude of the event. In many cases, the proper classification is immediately, apparent Rom in-plant instrumentation. In other cases, more extensive assessment is necessary to determine the applicable emergency classification.

Continuing reassessment is required to ensure that the classification is consistent with the conditions. The emergency actions that will be taken for each of the four emergency classifications are shown in Table 5.2.

5 1.1 Unusual Event Events within this classification represent abnormal plant conditions. They do not, by themselves, constitute significant emergency conditions and have no oF-site radiological consequences. Some of these events could, however, indicate a potential degradation in the level of plant safety and/or could escalate to a more severe condition ifappropriate action is not taken.

Conditions which constitute the Unusual Event classification are outlined in Table 5.1.

The ED declares an Unusual Event as soon as it has been indicated and verified. All reasonable eForts are implemented to make this verification within 15 minutes of the initial indication of the event.

The emergency actions that will be taken by PP&L and offsite agencies for an unusual event are listed in Table 5.2. In general the table states that the plant emergency management personnel and offsite agencies will be notified by plant staff if.an Unusual Event is declared. Plant staff will Rev. 21, 04/94 5-1

request assistance as necessary to disseminate information, make critical decisions and handle the unusual event.

5.1.2 Alert This classification is characterized by events which indicate an actual degradation of the level of plant safety. It requires response by the plant emergency organization, augmentation of on-site emergency resources, and constitutes the lowest level for which oF-site agency emergency response may be anticipated.

Conditions which constitute an Alert classification are outlined in Table 5.1.

The ED declares an Alert as soon as the event has been indicated and verified. All reasonable eForts are implemented to make this verification within 15 minutes of the initial indication of the event.

The emergency actions that will be taken by PP&L'nd offsite agencies for an Alert are listeb in Table 5.2. In general the actions will be similar to an Unusual Event but will also include the dispatch of monitoring teams ifa radioactive release is involved.

5 1 3 ite Area Emer enc A Site Area Emergency is characterized by events involving actual or probable major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public. Most events within this classification constitute actual or potential for significant releases of radioactive material to the environment.

Although emergency actions involving members of the public may not be necessary, oF-site emergency response organizations should be mobilized and ready to implement protective measures.

Conditions which constitute a Site Area-Emergency are outlined in Table 5.1.

The ED declares a Site Area Emergency as soon as the event has been indicated and verified; this verification time is not expected to exceed 15 minutes.

The emergency actions taken by PP&L and oFsite agencies for a Site Area Emergency are listed in Table 5.2. In general the actions will be similar to the actions taken for an Alert with increased emphasis on information dissemination, more senior technical and management stafF on-site and additional field radiological monitoring.

514 neralEm r enc This emergency class is characterized by events, occurring or having occurred, which involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity and/or release of large quantities of radioactive material to the environment. Total activation of the on-site and off-'site emergency organizations is required for such events. Actions involving oF-site populations are probable.

Rev. 21, 04/94 5-2

C Conditions which constitute a General Emergency are outlined in Table 5.1.

The ED or Recovery Manager declares a General Emergency as soon as an event or combination of events within-this category is indicated and verified. For indications based on radiological e61uents, the verification time does not exceed 15 minutes. For less apparent indications, the ED or Recovery Manager ensures that an appropriate Alert or Site Area Emergency is in effect and determines the applicability of a General Emergency as soon as possible.

The emergency actions taken by PP&L and ofFsite agencies for a General Emergency are listed in Table 5.2. In general the actions will be similar to the actions taken for a Site Area Emergency with additional resources dedicated to the health and safety of the general public. Additional actions include the initiation of predetermined protective actions for the public.

52 PE TR FP S ATEDA IDENT The classification and corresponding protective actions relative to significant emergency conditions are based primarily on the resultant or potential radiation doses. Methods are described in this Plan and in EP-PSs for measuring, projecting and evaluating those doses.

The discrete accidents addressed in this section are those which are defined in the SSES FSAR as "design basis accidents". The following discussion of these postulated accidents and Table 5.1 identify the instrumentation and other mechanisms for prompt detection and continued assessment, and demonstrates how each accident is encompassed within the emergency classification system of this Plan.

I' 2 1 Control Rod Dro Accident This accident is postulated to occur with the reactor in hot startup condition, and very conservative calculations indicate failure of about 770 fuel rods. The main steam line radiation monitors detect the significant increase in activity and initiate closure of the main steam isolation valves (MSIV). Valve closure is completed in about 5.5 seconds. During that time interval, noble gases and radioiodines are transported with the steam to the condenser. Release of radioactivity to the environment is by way of leakage from the turbine building.

Initial assessment of this accident, performed by the Plant Control Operator under the direction of the ED includes evaluation of the source term. Data are direct radiation levels at the locations of various turbine building ARMs, and an indication of the airborne radioactivity concentration from the turbine building/radwaste building vent exhaust monitor. EP-PSs provide guidance for dose projections based on the turbine building source term. Data from the continuous air monitors is supplemented by information obtained by the radiological monitoring team.

For doses in the range of the maximum estimates shown in Table 15.4-15 of the FSAR, the emergency actions include:

a) Declare an Alert b) Implement Radiologically Controlled Area Evacuation Rev. 21, 04/94 5-3

5 2.2 Fuel Handlin This accident is-postulated to occur with the reactor in shutdown condition with the vessel head removed, and results in failure of about 124 fuel rods. The, reactor building ventilation radiation monitoring system alarms, isolates the ventilation system, and starts operation of the Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS), all within about one minute. Noble gases and radioiodines are released to the reactor coolant, migrate to the secondary containment, and are released to the environment after filtration through the SGTS.

Initial assessment of this accident includes the performance of dose projections in accordance with EP-PSs. Dose projections utilize data from the reactor building vent monitor, standby gas treatment vent monitor, and meteorological instrumentation.

In the event that projected doses are in the range of the maximum estimate shown in Table 15.7-16 of the FSAR, the emergency actions include:

a) Declare either an Alert or a Site Area Emergency b) Implement Radiologically Controlled Area Evacuation c) Consider Implementation of a Site Evacuation 5.2.3 Main Steam Break This accident is postulated to occur with the reactor in operating status. The steam line break occurs outside the containment and releases steam for a period of about 5.5 seconds, until complete closure of the MSIVs. Noble gases and radioiodines in the coolant are assumed to be "released directly to the environment.

Due to the short duration and the direct release to the environment, there is no feasible mechanism to monitor the actual release. However, an estimate of the resultant doses can be made and compared to those shown in Table 15.6-9 of the FSAR for worst case conditions.

Actual doses are proportional to the fission product activity in the steam, as monitored by the oF-gas'release rate, prior to the accident. The doses in Table 15.6-9 of the FSAR are based on the assumption that the ofF-gas release rate is at the upper limiting condition for operation. Actual dose estimates, and corresponding emergency actions, may be taken, based on the off-gas release rate prior to the accident. Consideration may also be given to the relative benefit from taking or not taking specific protective action, based on the short-term duration of exposure associated with this accident.

Emergency actions for worst case conditions include:

a) Declare either an Alert or a Site Area Emergency b) Implement Radiologically Controlled Area Evacuation Rev. 21, 04/94 5-4

5.2 4 Instrument Line Break

. This accident is.postulated to occur with the reactor in operating status. A small line connected to the primary c'oolant system ruptures at a location which is outside the drywell, but inside the secondary containment. Noble gases and radioiodines are released for about ten minutes prior to shutdown of normal ventilation and initiation of the SGTS. Operator recognition of the accident is by a combination of alarms or abnormal readings from: area radiation monitors, ventilation and process radiation monitors, temperature monitors, and leak detection systems.

Emergency actions in response to the dose estimates shown in Table 15.6-4 of the FSAR include:

a) Declare an Alert b) Implement Radiologically, Controlled Area Evacuation 5 2 5 Loss f plant Accident OCA This accident is postulated to involve a complete circumferential break of a recirculating loop pipe inside the primary containment, with the reactor operating at full power. The accident results in release of a significant quantity of fission products into the primary containment, leakage into the secondary containment, and release to the environment through the SGTS. Containment failure, although not likely, must be considered possible.

The occurrence of a design basis LOCA is uniquely identified by low-low reactor water level and high dtywell pressure signals from the reactor protection system sensors and high radiation signal from the containment accident radiation monitor(s). The signals result in reactor scram and MSIV closure within 5.5 seconds. Operation of the emergency core cooling system is. initiated within about 30 seconds.

The emergency actions in response to design basis LOCA dose estimates in Tables 15.6-18 and 15.6-19 of the FSAR:

a) Declare a Site Area Emergency b) Implement Radiologically Controlled Area Evacuation 5 26 fF- Treatment stem Failure This accident is postulated to be initiated by an occurrence such as earthquake (greater than SSE design basis), explosion, or fire. The accident results in release of the stored inventory of noble gas in the system including that contained in the charcoal adsorption beds. In addition to recognition of the initiating event, the operator is provided with recognition and assessment information from alarmed instrumentation such as ARMs, off-gas system loss of flow, and vent release activity.

Rev. 21, 04/94 5-5

Emergency actions based on the maximum estimated doses shown in Table 15.7-'4 of the FSAR include:

a) Declare a Site Area Emergency b) Implement Radiologically Controlled Area Evacuation 5.2.7 Air E'ector Line Failure This accident is postulated to result &om a seismic event (greater than SSE) which is more severe than the 'design basis of the system. The noble gas and radioiodine activity from the air ejector, which is normally processed by the ofF-gas treatment system, is discharged to the environment via the turbine building ventilation system. The accident is recognized by the sounding of the off-gas system loss of flow alarm and ARMs. Assessment of the severity includes evaluation of the oF-gas activity release rate prior to the accident and results of on-site monitoring.

Emergency actions, based on the estimated doses shown in Table 15.7-7 of the FSAR include:

a) Declare an Alert b) Implement Radiologically Controlled Area Evacuation 5 2.8 Li uid Radwas e Failure This accident is postulated to be rupture of a concentrates waste tank in the radwaste enclosure.

Airborne radioactivity released during the accident passes directly to the environment via the turbine/radwaste building vent. A high water level alarm on the radwaste building sump alarms and activates the sump pumps. Radwaste building ARMs and on-site monitoring provides data for assessing the magnitude of the radiological consequences.

Emergency'actions, based on the maximum estimated doses shown in Table 15.7-10 of the FSAR, include:

a) Declare an Alert b) Implement Radiologically Controlled Area Evacuation

'ev. 21, 04/94 5-6

TABLE 5,2 EMERGENCY ACTIONS BASED ON CLASSIFICATION Page 1 of7 Classification Licensee Actions Off-Site Agency Actions I. Unusual Event I. Promptly notify plant emergency management,', 1. Notify key officials and public ifdeemed necessary personnel of event particulars and an assessment of by county/state Emergency Director.

'Class Description safety significance of the event.

and Unusual events are in process or have and occurred which indicate a potential 2. Provide assistance ifrequested and able.

degradation of the level of safety of the 2. Notify PEMA, LCEMA, CCDES and NRC of plant. No releases of radioactive "Unusual Event".

material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further and degradation of safety systems occurs.

3. Close out event with verbal summary followed by Purpose written summary via LER program prompt notification (24-hr.) provision.

Purpose of offsite notification is to (l) assure that the first step in any response and later found to be necessary has been carried out, (2) bring the operating staff 4.'f action statement (3) above is implemented, a written to a state of readiness, and (3) provide close out will be submitted to the NRC in 14 days.

systematic handling of unusual events information and decision-making. , or

5. Escalate to higher emergency classification if appropriate.

Rev. 25, 11/96

EMERGENCY ACTIONS BASED ON CLASSIFICATION Page2of7 Classifica.tion Licensee Actions Off-Site Agency Actions

2. -Alert I. Promptly notify state/local authorities and NRC of I. Provide assistance, ifrequested and able.

Alert status and reason for alert.

Class Description alld and Events are in process or have occurred 2. Augment resources by activating EOC and any which involve an actual or potential 2. Promptly notify PP&L emergency management other primary response centers.

substantial degradation of the level of personnel of event particulars and an assessment of the safety of the plant. Any releases expected safety'significance of the event. and to be limited to small fractions of the EPA.

Protective Action Guidelines exposure and 3. Alert to Standby status key emergency personnel levels. including monitoring teams and associated

3. Activate TSC, OSC, and EOF, dispatching monitoring communications.

Purpose teams ifradioactive effluent release involved.

/

/

and'.

Purpose of offsite alert is to (I) assure that and emergency personnel are readily available Prepare to provide confirmatory off-site radiation to respond ifsituation becomes more 4. Provide 30 minute plant status updates to off-site monitoring and ingestion pathway dose projections serious or to perform confirmatory authorities including periodic meteorological ifactual releases substantially exceed technical if radiation monitoring required, and (2) assessments and, ifany releases are occurring, dose specification limits..

provide offsite authorities current status estimates'for actual releases.

information. and alld

5. Maintain alert. status until verbal close-out.

5. Activate the. Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) within one hour. or and 6. Escalate to a more severe class.

Rev. 25, 11/96 =

0

EMERGENCY ACTIONS BASED ON CLASSIFICATION Page 3 of 7 Classification Licensee Actions . Off-Site Agency Actions

2. Alert (continued) 6. Close out or recommend reduction in emergency class by verbal summary to offsite authorities followed by written summary within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> of closeout or class reduction.

or

7. Escalate to a more severe emergency class..'ev.

25, 11/96

TABLE 5.2 EMERGENCY ACTIONS BASED ON CLASSIFICATION-Page4of7 Classification Licensee Actions Off-Site Agency Actions

3. Site Area Emergency 1. Promptly inform off-site authorities of site emergency 1. Provide, ifable, any assistance required.

status and reason for emergency, ifknown.

Class Description and and Events are in process or have occurred 2. Augment resources by activating primary which involve actual or likely major 2. Augment resources by activating TSC, OSC and EOF 'mergency response centers.

failures of plant functions needed for and near-site/off-site monitoring teams.

protection of the public. Any releases not and expected to exceed EPA Protective Action and Guideline exposure levels except near site 3. Assure that systems for public notification of boundary. 3. Dispatch monitoring teams and associated emergency status is in standby and initiate communications for instances where radiation releases ~

preparation for subsequent public periodic updates.

Purpose appear imminent or have occurred.

.and Purpose of the site area emergency and declaration is to (l) assure that response 4. Alert to standby status other emergency personnel centers are manned, (2) assure that 4. Provide a dedicated individual- for plant status updates and dispatch personnel to duty stations.

monitoring teams are dispatched, (3) to off-site authorities and periodic press briefings.

assure that personnel required for and evacuation of near-site areas are at duty and stations ifsituation becomes more serious, '5. Provide off-site monitoring results to licensee and (4) provide consultation with offsite 5. Make senior technical and management staff on-site others and jointly assess them.

authorities, and (5) provide updates for available for consultation with NRC and state on a the public through offsite authorities.  : periodic basis. and and 6. Continuously assess information from licensee and off-site monitoring with regard to changes to

6. Provide meteorological and dose estimates to off-site protective actions already initiated for public and authorities for actual releases via a dedicated mobilizing evacuation resources.

individual or automated data transmission.

and Rev. 25, 11/96

.0

TABLE 5.2 EMERGENCY ACTIONS BASED ON CLASSIFICATION Page 5 of 7 Classification Licensee Actions Off-Site Agency Actions

3. Site Area Emergency (Continued) 7. Provide release and dose projections based on 7. Recommend placing milk animals within affected available plant condition information and foreseeable OI'.

area radius on stored feed and assess need to extend contingencies. distance.

and and

8. Close out or recommend reduction in emergency class Provide press briefings.

by briefing of off-site authorities at EOF by phone followed by written summary within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> aAer and close-out.

9. Maintain site emergency status until close out or reduction of emergency class.

9. Escalate to General Emergency class. or

10. Escalate to General Emergency class.

Rev. 25, 11/96

TABLE 5.2 EMERGENCY ACTIONS BASED ON CLASSIFICATION Page6of7 Classification Licensee Actions Off-Site Agency Actions

4. General Emergency 1. Same as for "Site Area Emergency" classification. 1. Provide requested assistance, ifable.

Class Description and and Events are in process or have occurred 2. Recommend to the state evacuation of people within 2 2. Recommend protective actions for 10 mile EPZ which involve actual or imminent miles of the plant and shelter for people from 2 to 10 population and 50 mile EPZ agricultural products.

substantial core degradations or melting miles, unless evacuation is impractical.

with potential for loss of containment and integrity. Releases can be reasonably Note: The initial recommendations may be modified expected to exceed EPA Protective Action on the basis of subsequent plant status assessments or 3. Dispatch key emergency personnel including Guideline exposure'levels offsite for more dose projections. monitoring teams and associated communications.

than the immediate site area.

and Purpose

4. Activate other emergency services personnel and-Purpose of the general emergency dispatch to duty stations.

declaration is to (I) initiate predetermined protective actions for the public, (2) and provide continuous assessment of information from licensee and offsite 5. Provide off-site monitoring results to PP&L and or'ganization measurements, (3) initiate jointly assess these.

'r

~

additional measures as indicated by actual potential releases, (4) pravide consultation with offsite authorities and and (5) provide updates for the public through 6. Continuously assess information from licensee and offsite authorities. field monitoring teams with regard to changes to protective actions already initiated for public and evacuation resources.

and

TABLE 5.2 EMERGENCY ACTIONS BASED ON CLASSIFICATION Page 7 of 7 Classification Licensee Actions Off-Site Agency Actions

4. General Emergency (Continued) 7. Maintain General Emergency status until close-out or reduction of emergency classification.

Rev. 25, 11/96

It C

1%

't 4

Lt 0

I

6.0 ORGAifiZAIIONALCONTROL OF EMERGENCIES, J'

PPAL's Emergency Plan is based upon a four phase approach to accident response and mitigation.

n~ (Reference Figure 6.3 and Table 6.1). Phase I consists of identification of the emergency condition. initiation of prompt'corrective action and initiation of prompt notification to local, state and federal agencies as well as appropriate members of PP8.L's NERO. This initial phase is implemented by the on-shift organization. The on-shift organization has been staffed and trained to be capable of both safely operating the unit and quickly and effectively responding to an emergency condition. Initially, the Shift Supervisor, the highest ranking management individual on-shift, willassume the role of ED.

The Shift Supervisor, as ED:

a) Classifies the condition.

b) Initiates corrective actions and coordinates emergency management activities.

c) Designates a communications coordinator to notify off-site agencies and initiate call-in of selected personnel.

d) Notifies plant. personnel over the PA system for accountability and/or evacuation.

e) Designates an OSC Coordinator who organizes and directs in-plant emergency team functions.

'f) Notifies the Plant Manager-Susquehanna SES or his designated alternate, informs him of the situation, and requests relief if appropriate. For conditions under an Unusual Event the Shift Supervisor is likely to remain as ED through termination of the condition, due to probable short duration or low severity of the event.

g) Ensures that on-site emergency response individu'als and groups are notified, using the PA system or direct communications. Depending on the nature and severity of the condition, TSC staffing niay be called out.')

Ensures, that. initial dose projections are done and makes resulting recommendations regarding off-site protective actions.

i) Ensures that off-duty station personnel are notified to assist as necessary with emergency activities. These notifications are made, via the radio 'paging system or by telephone backup, to individuals designated for off-duty availability status to fill key emergency'esponse positions. Those key positions are ideritified in Sections 6.2 and 6.3. Other ofF-duty personnel are called in as required.

Rev. 25, 11/96 6-1

C I,

I Upon activation of Phas6 II, additional personnel are available, and control and dissemination of in-plant teams shifts from the OSC to the TSC. 1

- (Reference Figure 6.3 and Table 6.2) Upon notification by the on-shift organization, the Plant Manager-Susquehanna SES or his designated alternate, reports to the site to assume the role of ED. Support coordinators and staffs in areas of technical assessment, radiological assessment and operational coordination also report to,the site. These individuals form'the nucleus of the ED's Team and activate the TSC. The TSC is fully functional within 30 to 60 minutes of initial notification. As the Plant Manager-Susquehanna SES and his support coordinator's arrive, they are briefed by the Shift Supervisor and then, in turn, assume responsibility from the Shift Supervisor for. their particular areas of expertise. Emergency management activities, including communications, are under the control of the Emergency Director or his designated alternate; dose projection and assessment activities are directed by the Radiation Protection Coordinator; technical expertise is directed by the Tech Support Coordinator, the Operations Coordinator oversees Operations activities and the Damage Control Coordinator oversees in-plant damage control actions. The TSC takes over all emergency 'eam management and support activities &om the on-'shift organization, &eeing 'them to'evote their efforts towards establishing and maintaining the plant in a safe, stable condition, h

(Reference Figure 6.2 and Table 6.2)..

staffs the Emergency Operations Facility to provide in-depth technical and off-site This'rganization radiological assessment.

I The Emergency Ope'rations Facility is activated automatically<at an Alert or higher emergency classification.'pon activation of the Emergency Operations Facility, personnel shall, report to the EOF and.be prepared to take over management of the emergency from the TSC at a Site Area

. Emergency or higher classification. When the initial emergency classification is a Site Area Emergency or higher, the EOF will take over the management of the emergency within 90 minutes of'the declaration of a Site Area Emergency. At the discretion 'of the Emergency Director or Recovery Manager, the EOF can be activated and take over management of the emergency earlier.

Functional operation will include:

~ Management of overall emergency response

~ Coordination of radiological and environmental assessment

~ Determination of recommended protective actions'

~ Coordination of emergency response activities with ~Federal,= State, local county'nd

'unicipal agencies '

This phase leads ultimately to the return to'service of the unit. The organizational and philosophical concepts that are utilized during this phase are highly dependent upon the nature of the emergency." The restoration phase does not begin until there is complete Rev. 25, 11/96 6-2

assurance that the plant is in a stable shutdown condition and that there are no inadvertent or unplanned significant release of radioactivity to the environment.

The normal Operating Organization during working hours is illustrated in Figure 6.1. Minimum shift response during off-hours is as follows:

1 Shift Supervisor (SRO) 1* Unit Supervisor (SRO) 1 Assistant Unit Supervisor (SRO/RO) 2~ Plant Control Operators (RO) 2~ Nuclear Plant Operators 1* Auxiliary System Operator 1 Shift Technical Advisor 1* Health'Physics Technician 1 Chemistry Technician 1 Security Shift Supervisor 1 Assistant Security Shift Supervisor 8 Security Officers

• perunit The Shift Supervisor assumes the role of ED until he is relieved by the Plant Manager-Susquehanna SES, or his designated alternate. Typical alternate is the Manager - Nuclear Maintenance. When the TSC is activated, and the Shift Supervisor is relieved, the Shift Supervisor reassumes responsibility for plant operating functions in the control room.,

The Shift Supervisor ensures that the Plant Manager-Susquehanna SES, or designated alternate, is promptly notified of an emergency condition.

The ED assumes full responsibility for the implementation and administration of the Emergency Plan and is responsible for assuring continuity of resources until he relinquishes those responsibilities to the Recovery Manager. The responsibility and authority of the ED are set forth in Appendix E.

The ED cannot relinquish any of the above responsibilities until the arrival of and assumption of responsibilities by the Recovery Manager at the EOF; At that time, he may relinquish any of the above responsibilities ~gag those related to maintaining the Unit in a safe shutdown condition with adequate core cooling and no uncontrolled radioactive material releases.

Rev. 25, 11/96 6-3

1 ~

, lf the ED, cannot performthis function during the emergency, he will be succeeded by the Operations Coordinator until another qualified Emergency Director arrives to, assume this'esponsibility.

, Functional responsibilities of the ED include:

a) Immediately upon notification of an existing or potential emergency, report to the Control Room and initiate assessment activities, including classification of the emergency and dose projections ifappropriate.

r b) Unilaterally implement the immediate on-site corrective and protective actions to bring the incident under'control and mitigate its effects.

c) Assure that appropriate notifications and recommendations to state and local agencies are made within 15'minutes.

d) Assure that appropriate notifications and recommendations to the- NRC are made immediately after notification to state and local agencies, but not later than one hour after declaration of an emergency classification.

e) Augment the on-site NERO with duty roster personnel and other available station staff members as dictated by the emergency condition.

'I f) Continue reassessment of emergency status and make appropriate recommendations including protective actions to. off-site organizations.

'I g) Ensure that information released is accurate and released through the proper channels.

h) Activate Emergency Facilities described in Section 8.0.

r i) Assign technical liaison to EOCs ifrequested.

A P j) Communicate with and provide information to the Recovery Manager and the Public Information Manager.-

k) Issuance of Radioprotective Drugs in accordance with prescribed procedures and should include consultation with the Radiation Protection Coordinator and .medical

'onsultants.

1) Taking essential corrective action'which may involve the risk of emergency radiation exposure to NERO personnel. Table 7.2 provides the basic criteria for this decision.

') Request Federal assistance to augment'NERO capabilities-as necessary.

should be coordinated with PEMA and/or DEP/BRP.

Such requests

'ev. 25. 11/96

This position is filled by the Day Shift Supervisor or a designated alternate. Typical alternates are SRO qualified personnel.

Responsibilities:

a) Assist the Shift Supervisor in directing the'Control Room and in-plant operational activities.

b) Advise the ED on plant operations. ~

This position is initially filled by a Plant Control Operator. When the TSC is activated this position is typically filled by simulator instructors &om the Susquehanna-Training Center.

j F Responsibilities P

a) Make proper notification to off-site organizations.

b) Initiate call-in procedures as requested by the ED.

4 c) Function as liaison for emergency-related communications between the ED and on-site and off-site emergency groups.

d) Maintain commum'cations with the NRC.

e) Maintain records concerning the emergency.

This position is filled by qualified Health Physics personnel when the TSC is activated.

Responsibilities:

a) Communicate radiological data to the NRC via the Health Physics Network.

This position is filled by the Health Physics Supervisor; Typical alternates for this position are the qualified Health Physics personnel.

Responsibilities:

a) Perform dose projections.

Rev. 25, 11/96 6-5

a ~

b) Provide radiological advice to the ED concerning on-site erne'rgency'activities.

c) Provide protective action recommendations to the ED.

4 d). Maintain communication with and provide information 'to the Dose Assessment Supervisor.

e) Maintain communication with and provide radiological information to DEP/BRP until relieved by the Dose Assessment Supervisor.

f) Provide on-site radiation monitoring personnel for effluent release assessment.

r a

Provide radiation monitoring personnel for emergency team efforts.

I')

h) Direct personnel and area contamination control and decontamination activities.

i) . Provide dose projections to the Dose Assessment Supervisor.

r j) 'erform initial off-site environmental assessment until relieved by the Dose Assessment Supervisor.

, r This position is filled by System Engineering supervisory personnel.

Responsibilities:

I a) Analyze mechanical, electric'al, and instrument and control'roblems;'determine alternate solutions, design and coordinate the installation of short-term modiQcations. 'I b) Analyze thermohydraulic and thermodynamic problems and develop solutions.

c)'Assist in the development of'procedures necessary for conducting emergency operations.

d) Analyze conditions and develop guidance for the ED and operations personnel.

e e) Resolve questions concerning Operating License requirements with NRC representatives.

f) Maintain lead technical responsibility, coordinating dissemination of technical work assignments to EOF.

g) Maintain communication: udth and provide technical information to DEP/BRP Technical.

r Rev. 25, 11/96 6-6

This position is filled by the Supervisor - Site Support. Typical alternates are Site Support m'anagement personnel.

Responsibilities t

a) Coordinate provisions for transportation, food, and other logistical support for emergency personnel.

b) Provide personnel and work schedules for relieving emergencyt personnel.

I 'I It

'c) Act as liaison with outside groups in providing additional resources such as manpower, equipment, supplies, and transportation.

'I This position is filled by the Manager - Nuclear Security. The typical alternate for this position is a Security Supervisor.

Responsibilities:

a) Maintain plant security and institute appropriate contingency measures.

b) Account for personnel in accordance with EP-PS's.

This position is filled by the'Assistant Unit Supervisor. If the AUS is unavailable the Shift Supervisor will designate a replacement.

Responsibilities:

C a) Direct the activities of the in-plant" Emergency Teams such a's damage control, fire brigade and first aid and rescue until relieved by the TSC.

The fire brigade leader is the Assistant Unit Supervisor. Howevert; the coordination of various team activities is the responsibility of the OSC Coordinator.

b) Coordinating the'availability and assignment of personnel supporting activities for the ED and other NERO managers until relieved by the TSC.

,r Rev. 25, 11/96 6-7

7 The Damage Control Team Coordinator position is filled by'Maintenance supervisory personnel.

A typical alternate mould be th'e Maintenance Production Services Supervisor. '

'esponsibilities:

a) Ensure damage control resources are allocated on the right priorities by assigning tasks to available resources.

b) Dispatch in-plant teams.

c) Communicate with Operations and the Technical Support Coordinator.

This position is filled by a Maintenance Engineer.<

1 t

Responsibilities: 4 k

a) Maintain radio communications with all in-plant teams.

h b) Maintain an up-to-date status of in-plant radiological conditions.

t c) Track dose levels of in-plant team members.

~ I The Maintenance Coordinator position is filled by Maintenance Management personnel; The I&C Coordinator position is filled by I&C Management personnel.

Responsibilities: I a) Organizing, briefing, dispatching, and directing, as necessary, the on-site damage control teams.

b) Providing personnel assistance and support to in-plant teams as necessary.

')

'upporting technical group activities and operations as necessary.

\

The Chemistry Coordinator position is filled by an ANSI qualified chemist. A typical alternate for this position would be a Senior Chemist.

Rev. 25; 11/96 6-8

'L Responsibilities.

h a) Assemble and direct the activities of chemistry personnel to assure information on plant status is accurate and a; ailable.

Notification of the Recovery Maiiager is, made for,all levels of emergencies by the Communicators in the Control Room or TSC. An on-call duty roster is kept in the CR and TSC..

N At the discretion of the Recovery Manager, the EOF can be activated at an Unusual Event.

~

Activation of the EOF is automatic at an Alert, Site Area Emergency, or General Emergency classification. NERO is notified of the facility activation by the Alternate Security Control

. Center using the Telenotification System.

This position is filled by the Vice President-Nuclear Operations.

1 The typical alternate is the Manager-Independent Evaluation Services.

If the Recovery Mahager cannot perform this function during the emergency, he will be succeeded by the Assistant Recovery Manager.

Responsibilities:

,i(

a) Providing continuous coordination and evaluation of PAL activities during an emergency having or potentially having environmental consequences.

b) Managing overall PP&L emergency response and assuring, continuity of resources.

c) Acting as lead interface with off-site government agency officials.

d) Assure appropriate notifications and recommendations to offsite organizations are timely.

e) Continue reassessment of emergency status and make appropriate recommendations including protective actions to off-site organizations.

f) . Ensure that information released is accurate and made through proper channels.

g) Directing the activities of all other EOF managers.

Rev. 25, 11/96 6-9

r t a

h) Request Federal assistance to augment NERO capabilities'as necessary. Such requests

'hould be coordinated with PEMA and/or DEP/BRP.

i) Notify PEMA Emergency Operations Center of Protective Action Recommendations.

I j) Send a representative to the State and risk counties. If conditions result in implementation of the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan, assign a representative to the Federal Re'sponse Center, to the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center, and to.the Joint Information Center (most likely the PIM).

This position is filled by personnel qualified for the position of Recovery Manager.

C I

. Responsibilities:

a) Provide assistance as requested by the Recovery Manager.

b) Take over the position of Recovery Jvianager should'the Recovery Manager be unable to perform his duties during an emergency.

s This position is typically filled by Nuclear Engineering supervisory personnel.-

Responsibilities:

a) Manage engineering support resources in the EOF.

b) Provide technical support to aid in decision making process.

This position is typically fitted by the Manager-Nuclear Training.,A typical alternate for this position is the Senior Project Engineer-Nuclear Training.,

Responsibilities: . a t

a) 'rovide analysis of in-plant data to the Recovery, Manager.

V b) Oversee formal communications leaving the EOF.

c) Oversee proper facility set up.

~

d) Provide administrative support.

Rev. 25,' l/96 6-10

e) Oversee security.

This position is filled by the Supervisor-Operations Technology. A typical alternate is the Supervisor - Radiological Services-Nuclear.

Responsibilities:

a) Evaluating the magnitude and effects of actual or potential radioactive releases from the plant.

b) Recommending appropriate off-site protective measures to the Recovery Manager.

c) Recommending appropriate emergency classifications to the Recovery Manager.

d) Communicating with the Radiation Protection Coordinator in the TSC and with ~

DEP/BRP radiological personnel.

e) Controlling field monitoring teams.

This position is typically filled by engineering disciplines.

Responsibilities:

a) Assume responsibility from the TSC for oK-site notifications.

b) Transmit information about the emergency to off-site organizations.

r c) Function as liaison for questions received from other organizations.

d) Maintain a record of emergency notifications.

This position is filled by personnel &om the Nuclear Licensing Group.

a) Support the Recovery Manager with the off-site agency interface.

b) Provide technical assistance to the off-site agencies.

Rev. 25, 11/96 6-11

tp

• 4 ' V

/

The ED ensures that the MOC (Figure 6.2) is promptly notified and provided with available details of the emergency. The MOC staff. provides information regarding the'emergency and items of public interest to municipal groups, initiates appropriate news releases, and responds to questions from the media officials. After the Recovery Manager assumes control of the EOF,, the Public Information Manager reports to the Recovery Manager.

This position is filled by the Special Assistant to the President - Susquehanna. Typical alternate is the Senior Public Information Specialist.

Responsibilities:

a) Serving as official company spokesperson.

')

Preparing and disseminating SSES information to the public'via the news media'.

c) Interpreting plant status information for the news media and other agencies.

d) Arranging for news media conferences.

e), .Rumor control.

f) Establishes interfaces and coordinates news releases with the federal and state agencies in the MOC.

I The ED ensures that appropriate off-site emergency support groups are contacted to provide the type and level of assistance which may be necessary to deal .with the existing emergency condition. Organizations that may be contacted for assistance during an emergency condition at

'SES are listed in Attachment A, Letters of Agreement. Methods available for contacting these groups include direct telephone communications with individual'organizations,'se of .

'upport the 911 telephone system for emergency services, and message'relay through LCEMA or CCDES.

An emergency at SSES may require additiohal technical services and equipment. This type of

'ssistance may be obtained &om the organizations listed in Table 6.3.,

I Rev. 25, 11/96 "6-12

The ED, and upon EOF activation, the RM, ensures that off-site authorities are notified and apprised of emergency events at SSES.

Notification of an Unusual Event is primarily'to ensure that the authorities are cognizant of the details of events which may arouse public'concern 'and initiate inquiries, by news media or members of the public.

LCEMA and CCDES provide for: '

Planning and.coordination with municipal, State, and Federal authorities.

~ Initial response to notification by SSES.

~ Alert and warning of local populations within the 10 mile EPZ.

~ Evacuation and other protective measures for local populations within the 10 mile EPZ.

~ Emergency services.,

~ Situation analysis.

~ Operation of county EOC.

I LCEMA and CCDES also provide direction for the local organizations which are assigned action or support responsibilities under their plans.

The primary method of notification to LCEMA and CCDES is via,the Centrex Telephone Network (CTN). Secondary methods are radio and regular telephone.

I PEMA provides for:

~ Issuance of planning guidance.

~ Coordination of State response to nuclear incidents.

~ Coordination of multi-county Emergency Response Planningi

~ Operation of PEMA EOC.

~ Provision for emergency public information.

'ev. 25, 11/96 6-13

~ Coordination of State agencies and departments DEP/BRP provides for:

~ Technical consultation on Radiological and Plant conditions.

r P

~ Accident assessment.

~ Recommendations for protective actions.

~ Recomm'endations for protection of potable water and food.

~ Recommendations for recovery and re-entry (off-site).

~ Operation of DEP/BRP EOC.

1 Initially, SSES notifies PEMA, who, in turn, notifies DEP/BRP. DEP/BRP calls back to SSES to obtain radiological and plant condition information and establishes a communication link with SSES via CTN. Ifthe emergency warrants, DEP/BRP responds to the EOF; i I The primary method 'of notification to PEMA is via the Centrex Telephone Network (CTN).

CTN communications between SSES and DEP/BRP are 'used for transmitting radiological and technical information/recommendations. "

As detailed in the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP), the Federal government maintains extensive capabilities to assist states and licensees in responding to radiological emergencies. The ED,,and upon EOF activation, the RM are authorized to request Federal assistance. Such requests should be coordinated, with PEMA and/or DEP/BRP.

~ - designated Lead Federal Agency (LFA) under the FRERP.

The primary method of notification to the NRC is via the Emergency Notification System (ENS).

Upon notification of an emergency classification, the NRC will enter one of several response modes based on the severity of the event. Response modes, include:

Normal (Increased Regional Monitoring)

'tandby Initial Activation Expanded Activation-In the Normal and Standby modes, NRC site presence is provided by the Resident Inspectors who typically observe activity in the Control Room and TSC. On Initial Activation, a site team will be dispatched with 15-25 individuals that can arrive at the site within several hours.

Re'v. 25, 11/96 6-14

Response assignments are primarily at the EOF, with a few individuals located at the MOC, TSC, Control Room and OSC. If conditions warrant, the NRC can go to Expanded Activation, wher'e the NRC Lead for the response is shifted from NRC Headquarters Operations Center to the NRC" Leader of the Site Response Team. Assigned locations are similar to the initial site team.

DQE - provides radiological monitoring and assessment assistance.

The'primar'y method of notification to DOE is by telephone, although assistance is typically requested through the Lead Federal Agency (NRC) or through the State (DEP/BRP). Initial DOE response is by a Radiological Assistance Program (RAP) team dispatched from the Area Office. This team of 4-6 people can arrive within*eight hours and- would DOE'rookhaven operate primarily out of the EOF.

If the situation necessitates additional technical assistance, DOE can set up and staff a Federal Radiological Monitoring and,Assessment Center (FRMAC) in the vicinity of SSES. A FRMAC, which draws DOE resources and. personnel &om its Nevada Operations Of6ce, can be operational within about 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. The location of such a center would be selected based on actual radiological'deposition patterns. The Federal FRMAC team is initially managed by DOE, with personnel also provided by NRC, EPA, USDA, HHS, and other, agencies. The State and PP&L would assign personnel to the FRMAC to coordinate monitoring activity. As many as 200 people could be assigned to a fully functioning FRMAC.

Z~ -, responsible for coordinating all Non-technical Federal respons'e.

I Ifthe emergency situation has warranted implementation of the Federal Plan (FRERP), FEMA:

will set up and staff a Federal Response Center (FRC) in the vicinity of SSES. The location of such a center would be selected based on current needs'and conditions.'ccess to all Federal non-technical assistance is through the FRC; where representatives of participating agencies are

,based. As many as 100'people could be assigned to a fully functioning FRC.

In addition to NRC, DOE, and FEMA, 14,other Federal agencies are available to provide assistance under'the Federal Plan (FRERP). The extent of participation depends on the nature and inagnitude of the event. A full listing of these agencies and description of their missions is found in the Federal Plan (FRERP).

Additional information on available resources can be found in NUREG-1442/ FEMA-REP-17, "Post-Emergency Response Resources Guide."

The Federal Plan (FRERP) provides for each participating agency to be represented at a Joint Information Center, along with the State and the facility licensee. For Susquehanna, it is Rev. 25, 11/96 6-15

~ l' expected that these parties will.agree to utilize PP&L's MOC,to fulfill this on-scene Joint.

Information Center role.

A. Lodging and Food Service - Lodging and food service for personnel operating from the FRMAC, FRC, and JIC are available from local commercial resources in the Wilkes-Barre Hazieton, and Bloomsburg areas. 4

.B. Communications - Capability provided. by DOE and FEMA, supplemented by standard telephone'service to be established when facilities are selected, are adequate for the FRMAC arid FRC.

C. Security - Security arrangements for the FRMAC and FRC can be made by the DOE and FEMA, respectively, with local resources.

D." Transportation - Federal response personnel will provide their own transportation by' renting commercially available vehicles.

E. ~

Airport -'Wilkes-Barre/Scranton International Airport,'Avoca;,Pennsylvania.

1 1

The PP&L NERO continues to provide appropriate emergency response functions until such time as Ne emergency has been terminated or the PP&L Corporate Leadership Council (CLC) has approved the implementation of a long-range restoration organization. Termination &om an emergency condition is through joint evaluation by the organizations involved. In the. case of a severe emergency involving oK-site consequences, this would include the Recovery Manager, DEP/BRP, and NRC. The Sr. Vice President-Nuclear requests that the PP&L Corporate Leadership Council establish a restoration organization when the following guidelines have been met:

N

~ In-plant systems are stable, adequate core'cooling established and contingency systems

'nd plans available.

/

In-plant radiation levels are stable or are decreasing with time. I I

~ Releases of radioactive material to the environment are under control or have ceased.

~ . Any fire, flooding or similar emergency conditions are under control or have ceased.

Although planning'for restoration varies according to the emergency, a long-term restoration organization that is'general in nature has been defined. The'restoration organization is a project-type organization with their major activities conducted from the EOF. 'his organization is dep'icted in Figure 6.6 and major responsibilities'are defined below.

Rev. 25, 11/96 6-16 r

-Ad lg d ffl I g* & PP&Lq lld*d manage SSES restoration operations.

'I, Id q .Ad lg d g g PP&L q Ilf*d plant operations*including security.

- A designated manager from PP&L qualified to manage a

\

technical group.

-Ad lg'dd g q lllld g*d dl waste and radiological control aspects.

- A d* lg *d g q Ilfl d dl g I I I* f PPEcL, NSSS supplier, and construction forces on proposed plant modifications or other construction support.

- Advisory support consists of senior representatives of the NSSS supplier, the NRC, and special consultants.

'q

- A designated manager to coordinate plans and schedules for the Restoration Manager.

- A designated manager who is responsible for providing administrative,'ogistic, communications and personnel support.

- A designated manager qualified to manage public relations activities.

During restoration operations, the radiation exposure limits"of 10CFR20 apply. Compliance with

-those, limits are the responsibility of the 'Restoration Manager via the applicable Health Physics organization.

At the time of declaring. that an em'ergency has entered the restoration phase, the Restoration Manager is responsible for providing noti6cation to all applicable agencies.

Restoration actions that plan for, or may result in, radioactive release are evaluated by the Restoration Manager as far in advance of the event as is possible. Such events and data are reported to the appropriate off-site emergency response organizations and agencies prior to initiating release. g Rev. 25, 11/96 6-17

~

~

'.".: "",= ".",-rMINIMVM':ON'-',SITE',~AND':OFF,.;;:SITE:.EMERGENCY. ORGANIZATIONCA'PABILITIES N!AJOR AS SOON AS FUNCTIONAL POSITION TITLE AVAILABILITY REASONABLY AREA ~ LOCATION MAJOR TASKS OR EXPERTISE ON SHIFT 30-60 MlN. POSSIBLE Damage Control OSCnSC Overall Coordination OSC Coord.

Radio Comm.

Mgmt. of Damage Control Damage Control Teams Team Coord.

TSC Radio Comm.

Chemistry Sampling Chemistry Tech.

Mechanical Repair Mech. Maintenance 1 Electrical Repair Elec. Maintenance 1 l&C Repair l&C Tech.

Radwaste Ops... Radwaste 0 erator 1 Fire Fi htin Local Support Rescue/First Aid Local Support Site Access Control On Station Security, Comm., Security SS 1 8 Personnel Personnel Accountability Security Ass't SS 1 Accountability Security Controlr 2 Emerg. Sec. Mgmt. Security Officers 8 TSC Securi Coord.

Technical Control Room Engrg. 8 Eval. Shift Tech. Adv.

Assessment and TSC Mgmt. of Support Tech. Support Operations Support Resources Coordinator Operations Coord.

EOF Mgmt. of Support EOF Support Supv.

Resources

• Available from Nuclear Engineering in Allentown Rev. 25, 11/96 Page 1

ON-'SITE.:AND.,OFF,,-'.SITE'EMERGENCY-

-'@'"""--'"-"-'"-":='"":""';-~".:~";!5tllNIMUIN ORG'ANIZATION CAPABILITIES MAJOR AS SOON AS FUNCTIONAL POSITION TITLE AVAILABILITY REASONABLY AREA LOCATION INAJOR TASKS OR EXPERTISE ON SHIFT . 30-60 MIN. POSSIBLE Technical- TSC Engineering Eval. 8 Reactor Assessment 8 Operations Support. Engr. /Thermal .1 Operations Support Hydraulics 1 (Cont'd.) l8C Engr. 1 Chemistry/ 1 Radiochemistry Mechanical Engr. 1 Overall Plant Design 1 Mechanical Systems 1 EOF Engineering Eval. 8 Overall Plant Design Operations Support Fire Protection Chemical Engr./

Radiochemistry Radwaste Mgmt./ .

Decontamination Plant Maintenance Vendor/AE Su ort'Shift Plant Operations and Control Room Establish and maintain Supv.(SRO) 1 Assessment of and/or Plant safe. shutdown condition Unit Supv.(SRO) 1 Operational Aspects Proper Control Room Operator 2 (RO)

Non-Licensed Operators Emergency Direction Control Room Overall Emergency Shift Supv.

and Control TSC Management 8- Emergency Director EOF Coordination Recovery Manager

• Available from Nuclear Engineering in Allentown.

. Rev. 24 06/96 Page 2

TABL'E 6.2 (Continued)

MINIMUMON-SITE AND::,OFF-SITE EMERGENCY ORGANIZATIONCAPABILITIES MAJOR AS SOON AS FUNCTIONAL POSITION TITLE AVAILABILITY REASONABLY AREA LOCATION NIAJOR TASKS OR EXPERTISE ON SHIFT 3040 MIN. POSSIBLE Radiological EOF Accident Assessment 8 Plant Operations/

Accident Characteristics Refueling Ops.

Assessment 8 Fire Protection Support of Chemical Engr./

Operational Accident Radiochemistry Assessment (cont'd) Radwaste Mgmt./

Decontamination/

Rad Control/HP Plant Maintenance 1 EOF Off-Site Dose Gale. and Rad Assessment Staff 3 Assessment

• Available from Nuclear Engineering in Allentown.

Rev. 24 06/96 Page 4

SUSQUEHANNA SES ORGANlZATION Senior Vice President Nuclear Vice President Nuclear Operations . ~

Plant Manager-Susquehanna SES Manager Nudear Manager Nudear Manager Nuclear Manager Outages Maintenance Plant Services Operations Supervisor Plant Supervisor Maintenance Supervisor Maint. Supervisor ENuents Day Shift Supervisor Scheduling Production/Outage Production Sewices Management Susquehanna ro u ion Supewlsor Site Supervisor Reactor NSS Functional Team Suppolt Selvlces Engineering Supeivsr Maint.

Supewisor Services upervisor r u ion re i e ain .

Supeivisor Health Operations Supervsr Maint. Functional Team Physics En ineerin Plannin Su elvlsor ion Manager Nuclear u Supewisor Chemistry Supewsr Maint.

Electrical Functional Security-earn Supervisor Electrical on Manager Nuclear ro u Rev. 25 06/96 l8 C Functional Team Procurement Supervsr Maint. Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Supervisor I8C Units t and 2 Emergency Plan Balance of Plant Supervisor SUSQUEHANNA SES ORGANIZATION

I

~ ~

4' P

l l

q

EOF ORGANlZATION-ASSISTANT RECOVERY RECOVERY MANAGER MANAGER ENGINEER. DOSE LIAISON PUBLIC EOF SUPPORT SUPPORT ASSESSMENT SUPPORT INFO RMAT(ON SUPERVISOR SUPERVISOR SUPERVISOR SUPERVISOR MANAGER DOSE PUBLIC NUCLEAR FUELS COUNTY EOF ASSESSMENT- OFFICIALS ENGINEER LIAISONS COMMUNICATOR STAFFER(S) CONTACTS ELECTRICAL FIELD TEAM NEP DUTY MOC SUPPORT DIRECTOR PLANNER COMMUNICATOR ENGINEER MECHANICAL ADMIN. TECHNICAL SUPPORT RAD ASSISTANTS BRIEF ERS ENGINEER

. MONITORING TEAM GOVERNMENT AGENCIES SYSTEMS LEAD SECURITY NEWS MANAGER ENGINEER ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING TEAM

'UPPORT Rev. 25 11/96 EOF DATA LINK SERVICES Susquehanna Steam Electric Station SUPERVISOR Units 1 and 2 Emergency Plan RAD LIAISON EOF ORGANIZATION FIGURE 6.2

4 1

/

t I

uf j

1 t

7.0 EMERGENCY MEA'SURES Provisions are made for assessment through the course of an emergency to ensure effective coordination, direction and upgrading of emergency activities in a timely manner. The actions are described in detail in EP-PSs. P 'ssessment Continuous assessment of the status of plant systems and radiological conditions is provided by instrumentation and is supplemented by routine surveillance functions. The occurrence of 'lant

- an Unusual Event is recognized by instrument alarms or indications, surveillance results, or other observation of an off-normal condition by an individual at the station.

Assessment actions are described below. For an Unusual Event, one or more of the actions listed below will be initiated; for higher emergency classifications, actions are continued, intensified, and increased in 'frequency'.

l

~ Perform surveillance of in-plant instrumentation.

~ Initial and continued observation of off-normal. conditions.

~ Obtain assistance from off-duty personnel and/or off-site support groups.

Perform dose calculation activities. Correlate with field team data.,

~ Deploy field radiological monitoring teams to perform direct radiation measurements and air sampling.

~ Perform sampliiig and analysi. of environmental media.

~ Deploy on-site damage control'teams.

~ Perform reactor coolant sampling and analysis.

The ED is responsible for initiating off-site dose calculation and assessment activities. These activities are performed by health physics technicians who report to the control room. Data &om the vent eQluent monitors and the meteorological towers serve as inputs for the off-site dose calculation methods.

The ED is 'responsible for calling in personnel to the TSC to perform off-site dose assessment activities. The Radiation Protection Coordinator-reports to the TSC within 30-60 minutes of notification.

Rev. 25, 11/96 7-1

Field monitoring teams are directed to selected monitoring location(s) by the Radiation Protection Coordinator, Dose Assessment Supervisor, Dose Assessment Staffer, or Field Team, Director via radio communication. The results of the teams'urveys are used to update projected f

and dose calculational assumptions. This process is reiterated through the duration o the 'oses release in order to maintain an updated status of dose rates and accumulated dose within the =

pathway of the plume.

The initial field monitoring team(s) are staffed as required within 30-60 minutes. Additional team(s) are dispatched within one to four hours.

Each radiological- monitoring team is supplied with a survey meter and low volume air sampler.

TLDs are located at 19 sites around the station to provide early information on accumulated off-site doses. Two sets of TLDs are provided at each of these sites; one set for very early collection/exchange and readout and one set for dose accumulation during the period of release.

The ED and Recovery Manager recommend appropriate protective actions to PEMA Operations Center, Harrisburg, based upon the results of the off-site dose assessment activities.

The SSES on-site meteorological measurement system is based upon an on-site 300'rimary meteorological tower located to the east southeast of the station. The primary tower provides measurements of wind speed, wind direction, and wind variability at its 10 and,60-meter levels, temperature differential between the 10 and 60-meter levels, and ambient temperature and dew

'oint at the 10-meter level. Precipitation is measured at ground level. In case of primary tower failure, a 10-meter on-site backup meteorological tower will provide measurements of wind speed, wind direction, and wind variability.

In 1985, two permanent supplemental towers were installed in the river valley near. the station to provide additional meteorological data to more accurately model the effects of surrounding terrain on atmospheric dispersion and transport. One tower is located UPRIVER approximately 1.2 miles NNE, of the station off Route 11 towards Shickshinny; the second tower is located DOWNRIVER approximately 3.6 miles SW of the station offRoute 93 just east of Nescopeck.

Both the UPRIVER and DOWNRIVER towers measure wind speed, wind direction, and sigma theta at the 33 foot level. The DOWNRIVER tower also measures temperature and dew-point temperature at a height of approximately 6.6 feet.

Meteorological validation of the UPRIVER supplemental tower data was terminated on October

,,1, 1994 due to excessive tree and vegetation growth impacting the wind speed and wind direction sensors. The meteorological data collected Rom the DOWNIUVER tower is used. only to support assessment and restoration efforts in the 'event there is an accidental release of radioactive material from SSES.

The meteorological systems are instrumented to provide continuous data to the control room and to the Unit One PCS and Unit Two PICSY for utilization in the TSC and EOF., Data which enter Rev. 25, 11/96 '-2

1 the Unit One PCS and Unit Two PICSY are viewable through various display formats and are also transmitted to the NRC via ERDS. Digital dataloggers are present at all of the SSES meteorological towers. All data is stored locally and is available for acquisition by interrogation across telephone lines. Primary and backup tower strip chart recorders are located in'the control room.

II Site specific, meteorological information for emergency dose assessment purposes can be obtained by contacting either the SSES Contract Meteorologist or the National Weather Service Station using the phone numbers provided-in the SSES Emergency Telephone Directory.

\

In the event of an unplanned'adioactive release &om either the reactor building vents, the turbine building vents. or the standby gas treatment vent; gross noble gas, I-131, and gross particulate readings are available from the System Particulate Iodine Noble Gas (SPING) vent monitors.

The following Health Physics considerations are taken into account: selection of the accident type to closely approximate the isotopic mix and average gamma energies of the release occurring, radioactive decay from time of reactor shutdown, plume decay-in-transit and iodine and particulate depletion due to precipitation.

A dose calculation model is used to make current, site specific estimates and predictions of atmospheric eQluent transport and diffusion during and immediately following ah accidental airborne radioactivity release. The purpose. of the prediction is'o provide an input to the assessment of the consequences of accidental radioactive releases to the atmosphere and to aid in the implementation of emergency response decisions.

r The dose calculation model used is a fast running, time-dependent, variable trajectory'plume segment "B" model with the following capabilities:

I NOTE: A class. "B" model js a numerical model which represents the actual spatial and temporal variations of plume distribution, Computes atmospheric dispersion at the site based on atmospheric stability as a function of site specific terrain conditions with 15-minute upgrades of source term and meteorological conditions.

Provides estimates of deposition and relative concentration of radioactivity within the plume exposure and ingestion EPZs for the duration of the release.

I

~ Incorporated in the calculations is wet; and dry deposition which enables dose estimates from three pathways - plume, ground shine, and ingestio'n.

Rev. 25, 11/96 7-3

h II I The dose program complies with the "Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective ~

Actions for Nuclear Incidents," (EPA-400), adopting the dose, calculation methodology in ICRP

. ¹26/30. The following calculational options are available:

~ ~ TEDE (Total Effective. Dose Equivalent) integrated doses consisting of the sum of

'external doses from plume shine, 50 year committed effective dose equivalent from

'L inhalation (CEDE), and 4.day ground shine doses.

~ EDE and CDE dose rates'for field team management.

J

~ Fifty year thyroid committed dose (CDE), from inhalation of radioactive materials.'

Population dose (person rem) out to 50 miles.

~ Summary print'of projected doses for each of four projection times.

~ Integrated ground dose for projected times specified by the user.

I The, dose calculation program is a stand alone program running on PCs located in the TSC and EOF.

Estimates of downstream river water. concentrations are made by employing effluent sample analysis or discharge monitor data, discharge flow rates and river elevation readings. The river concentrations.'

elevation is used.to estimate the travel time to the point of interest. The calculated'egree of mixing, together with the discharge monitor data and the discharge flow rates are used to calculate downstream Detailed operating procedures and plant procedures are utilized by the plant operating personnel to assist, them in recognizing emergency events and taking the corrective actions necessary to place the plant in a safe condition. Table 7.1 shows personnel available to respond to an emergency. Additionally, EP-PSs describe subsequent and supplemental corrective actions for the scope of potential situations within each of the emergency classifications. These procedures are designed to guide the actions of the personnel to correct or mitigate the condition as early. and as near to the source of the problem as feasible.

Some, essential corrective actions may-involve the risk of em'ergency exposure to NERO personnel. Such actions could involve preventing the release of large quantities of radioactive material, reducing damage to major equipment or life saving actions. Table 7.2 specifies the limits for emergency exposure and other relevant criteria to be considered. The ED is responsible for all corrective actions taken to mitigate the'consequences of the accident on'-site.

Rev. 25, 11/96

l ~*

tl Protective-actions are implemented to prevent or mitigate consequences to individuals during or after a radiological incident. Protective actions within the SSES site boundary're the responsibility of the ED, but may include assistance by off-site organizations., Protective actions outside the SSES site boundary are primarily. the responsibility of State'nd local emergency organizations, but may include coordination of activities, dissemination of appropriate data, and

, recommendations by the ED, or Recovery Manager.'rotective action recommendations are outlined'in Table 7.3.

The primary protective measure for on-site personnel in an emergency is prompt evacuation Rom areas which may be affected by significant radiation, contamination, or airborne radioactivity.

Respiratory protective equipment and clothing are provided at the plant and in the various emergency equipment kits for personnel who may be'required to perform emergency activities.

Control of in-plant conta'mination is in accordance with SSES Health Physics procedures: In the

- event of radioactive contamination outside fenced security areas, but within the exclusion area,

'ccess to such areas is controlled by PPEcL with as'sistance from the, PSP..

This category refers to.evacuation from one area to another area within the same building. The initiation of a Local Area Evacuation results Rom ARM or CAM alarm(s) sounding'in the same area within a building or from observed conditions such as smoke or toxic gas, which may indicate a possible habitability problem. The initial response for individuals is to evacuate to an unaffected- area of the building, notify the plant Control Room of the conditions, and await further instruction. The ED assesses the situation, activates appropriate procedures to rectify the .

conditio'n and informs the personnel when to return to their respective work area via the PA system. 4 P

'The initiation of a Radiologically Controlled Area Evacuation results from ARM, CAM, or other applicable monitor alarms, (i.e., fire alarms). Notification for personnel to proceed with a Radiolo'gically Controlled Area Evacuation is announced over the plant PA system. 'The initial mandatory response by individuals is evacuation to an unaffected area. In this case, however, the nearest such area may not be in the same building, and multiple ARM, CAM, or Qre alarms are probable.

The decision to implement a Radiolo'gically Controllhd Area Evacuation is the responsibility of the ED. Factors to be considered include the apparent levels of radiation and/or airborne radioactivity, involved and the exposure to personnel that would result from evacuating to Assembly Areas. In the event of multiple fire alarms within the Radiologically Controlled Area, Rev. 25, 11/96 7-5

P V

'I lt with no.potential hazard to personnel, such as workers in unaffected areas, the ED may deem it prudent not to evacuate such personnel and allow work to continue.

4 e f

h Accountability of on-site personnel during an emergency is accomplished through the use of the physical security system and procedures. The physical security system clearly establishes who is within the protected area. Personnel are summoned to accountability areas during an emergency via an alert sigrial transmitted over the PA system. The names of the personnel reporting in are

'compared to those logged through the security system in order to ensure total accountability.

Site Evacuation requires that all individuals within the SSES.site, except for Control Room

, operations personnel and others with specific emergency assignments," leave the'site. Ifoff-site assembly is required by the ED, personnel will go to the. Remote Assembly Area. The Primary'emote Assembly Area is the Susquehanna Energy Information Center (NE Sector), as shown in Figure 8.1. The alternate Remote Assembly Area is the West Building (WSW Sector). Security personnel and assembly area leaders will coordinate assembly and accountability at Remote-Assembly Areas.

Implementation of a Site Evacuation is the responsibility of the ED. That decision is based on the severity of the incident, the likelihood of escalation, and the radiation and airborne radioactivity levels throughout the station. Notification is made via the PA system.

Accountability is accomplished in passage through the security gate and supervisory checks at the assembly area. Personnel and vehicle contamination surveys. are performed at the Remote Assembly Area, using portable survey instruments.

t OI ~

'The responsibility for actions to protect off-site individuals 'rests with the, Commonwealth of

'ennsylvania.-

tt DEP/BRP is responsible for evaluating information obtained &om SSES and other sources and recommending appropriate off-site protective actions'to PEMA. Such recommendations include:

~ Shelter for affected populations

~ Evacuation of affected populations

~ Administration of thyroid prophylaxis

~ Control of contaminated agricultural products

~

The principal off-site local coordinating agency is LCEMA. Since the. area and population inside the ten-"mile EPZ are partially within Columbia County, parallel emergency response functions are provided by CCDES. Upon notification by PEMA'of'a situation which may require protective actions for off-site populations, LCEMA and CCDES initiate appropriate actions. If Rev. 25, 11/96 7-6

/

PEMA has lost communication or is'otherwise unavailable, it is possible that the ED or Recovery Manager may contact LCEMA and CCDES directly with protective action recommendations. If .

permits, LCEMA and CCDES obtain a review and verification by PEMA of

'ime recommendations made by the ED or Recovery Manager.

W I

LCEMA and CCDES protective actions include:, /

~ Prompt alerting of the population within ten'miles of the SSES through the use of the

, Public Notification System described in Section 8.0.

~ 'ransmission. of specific instructions to potentially affected populations via the Emergency Alert System.

~ Assistance for evacuation of the population within the ten-mile EPZ.

~ ='Reception and mass care centers for evacuated individuals.

Appendix G includes the estimated times to evacuate all or. segments of the population &om the 10-mile EPZ, identifies potential problem areas and'provides contingencies for dealing with adverse conditions. It was-utilized in the development of detailed evacuation plans by PEMA, LCEMA, and CCDES.

All reasonable measures are taken to maintain the radiation exposure of emergency personnel who provide r'escue, first aid, decontamination, ambulance, or medical treatment services within applicable limits specified in 10CFR20. Table 7.2 summarizes the emergency exposure criteria for entry or re-entry into areas for purposes.of undertaking protective or corrective actions.

Methods and conditions for permitting'.volunteers to receive emergency radiation exposures are described in EP-PSs, and provide for expeditious decisions with consideration to known and reasonable balance of associated risks.

Personnel contamination in emergency situations is controlled to the extent feasible by 'the normal methods of using protective clothing and surveying for contamination following the

- removal of such clothing. Personnel decontamination areas are available in-plant and decontamination efforts involving significant amounts of contamination are performed under the

'irection of Health Physics personnel.

At least two persons who are qualified in first aid methods are on-site at all times. First aid to injured personnel can be performed in conjunction with any necessary decontamination methods. -

if immediate treatment of the injury is vital, that treatment takes precedence over 'owever, decontamination. This'hilosophy also extends to off-site emergencyassistance involving radioactive contamination. For that purpose, measures are established to ensure timely off-site medical treatment.

I Rev. 25, 11/96 7-7

~ ~

Arrangements and agreements have been made for the transportation and treatment of patients from SSES, who may have injuries complicated with radioactive contamination or who may have been involved in a radiation incident. I Rev. 25, l 1/96 7-8

TABLE 7.2 EMERGENCY EXPOSURE CRITERIA, .

exposure to the whole body and/or specific organs should not exceed the following

'lanned recommendations of the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements and the Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents (EPA-400).

Guidance on dose limits for workers performing emergency services is summarized in tabular format below.

NOTE: These limits apply to doses incurred over the duration of an emergency, treated as a once in a lifetime exposure, and not added to occupational exposure accumulated under non-emergency conditions.

Doses to all workers during emergencies should, to the extent practicable, be limited to 5 REM.

There are some emergency situations for which higher exposure limits may be justified.

Justification of any such exposure must include the presence of conditions that prevent the rotation of workers or other commonly used dose reduction methods.

NOTE: Exposure of workers that is incurred for the protection of large populations may be considered justified for situations in which the collective dose avoided by the emergency operation is significantly larger than that incurred. by the workers involved.

Persons undertaking any emergency operation in which the dose will exceed 25 REM to the whole body should do so only on a voluntary basis and with full awareness of the risks involved, including the numerical levels of dose at which acute eFects of radiation will be incurred and numerical estimates of risk of delayed efFects.

Guidance on Dose Limits for Workers Performin Emer en Services 5 rem All 10 rem Protectin Valuable Pro ert Lower Doses Not Practicable 25 rem Life saving or protection of large Lower Doses Not Practicable o ulations

>25 rem Life saving or protection of large Only on a voluntary basis to persons populations fully aware of the risks involved (see attached tables a Sum of external e6ective dose equivalent and committed effective dose equivalent to non pregnant adults from exposure and intake during an emergency situation. Workers performing services during emergencies should limit dose to the lens of the eye to three times the listed value and doses to any other organ (including skin and body extremities) to ten times the listed value. These limits apply to all doses from an incident, except those received in unrestricted areas as members of the public during the intermediate phase of the incident.

Rev. 22, 04/95 Page 1

Additional General Criteria

~ Only volunteers are given planned emergency exposure.

~ Attached tables provide information concerning acute and delayed health effects.

~ Whenever practical, consideration is given to dividing exposure among as many personnel as possible.

~ Potassium Iodide utilization for iodide prophylaxis requires the approval of the Emergency Director or the Recovery Manager in consultation with the Radiation Protection Coordinator or the Radiation Support Manager and medical consultants, if available. It is recommended that potassium iodide only be administered in situations where potential exposure of the thyroid is anticipated to exceed 25 rem.

~ All reasonable measures must be taken to control contamination and internal exposure.

~ Persons performing emergency activities should be familiar with exposure consequences.

~ Women capable of reproduction should not take part in these actions.

~ Retrospective doses are evaluated on an individual case basis.

~ To the extent reasonable, persons with high lifetime cumulative radiation exposure should not take part in these actions.

~ As in the case of normal occupational exposure, doses received under emergency conditions should be maintained as low as reasonably achievable.

Health Effects Associated with Whole Bod Absorbed Doses Received Within a Few Hours Body Absorbed Dose Early Fatalities>> Prodromal Effects<'> 'hole rad (percent) (percent affected) 050 100 15 140 150 50 200 15 85 250 98 300 50 400 85 460 95 Risks will be lower for protracted exposure periods.

Supportive medical treatment may increase the dose at 'which these &equencies occur by approximately 50 percent.

Forewarning symptoms of more serious health effects associated with large doses of radiation.

Rev. 22, 04/95 Page 2

Approximate Cancer Risk to Average Individuals from 25 Rem Effective Dose Equivalent Dl' I Average Years of Life Lost if Age at Exposure Approximate Risk of Premature Death Premature Death Occurs ears deaths er 1,000 ersons ex osed ears 20 to 30 9.1 24 30 to 40 7.2 19 40 to 50 5.3 15 50 to 60 3.5 Rev. 22, 04/95 Page 3

~ ~

. 8.0 'MERGENCY FACILITIES:AND':EQUIPMENT-';-'~""'; ".;; '*.:"

The Station Control Room is the primary, location for the initial assessment and coordination of corrective actions for all'emergency conditions. The Control Room is equipped with the display and controls for all critical plant systems, radiological and meteorological monitoring systems,,

and all staiion corruuunication systems. Reference Appendix D.

Off-site emergency functions initially served by the Control Room are transferred to the TSC or EOF for, an Alert, a Site Area, or a General Emergency as deemed appropriate by the ED. The primary consideration is to ensure that the number of personnel involved with the emergency in the Control Room shall not impair the safe and orderly shutdown of the reactor or the operation of plant safety systems.

I The OSC is the primary on-site assembly area for operations support team personnel during an emergency. It occupies 340 square feet adjacent to the Control'Room on El. 729'-1" of the control structure. C The OSC is utilized initially as the, central location for the assembly, accountability, and dispatching of on-shift emergency team personnel required to perform such functions as: fire fighting, first aid, search and rescue, damage control, and on-site radiation monitoring. If and when the TSC's activated, all non-operations support team personnel assemble and are.

accounted for at their individual assembly areas. TSC personnel assess the need for emergency team personnel.and based on this assessment, dispatch team personnel &om their assembly area or via call-in to perform TSC team functions. Long term retention of additional personnel to support in-plant team functions willbe in the Maintenance and INC assembly areas. These areas will be monitored continuously for habitability. If these areas become uninhabitable, retained personnel will be directed to alternate holding areas. Control and dispatch of these teams is the responsibility of the TSC Radioman.- The OSC continues to manage operations support personnel, even after the TSC is activated.

Equipment required for these teams to perform their functions, as ou'tlined in Appendix D is stored and maintained in the Control Room,'echnical Support Center and Health Physics access control points.

During normal plant operations, this area serves as an, operations staff work area for shift changeover purposes as well as shift work assignment area. The Non-Emergency use of the OSC does not degrade its primary purpose.

Rev. 25,'l l/96 8-1

OSC personnel are pro'tected from radiological hazards. including direct shine 'and airborne activities for postulated accident conditions to the'same,degree as Control R'oom personnel.

criteria"are specified iri General Design Criterion 19, Standard Review Plan 6.4, and 'pplicable NUREG-0737, Item II.B.2.

a The radiation dose to personnel occupymg the OSC is the same as the Control Room personnel.

The doses from controlling accidents are summarized in Chapter 15.0 of the FSAR.

To ensure adequate radiological protection of the OSC personnel, a commercial grade monitor alarms on high gross gamma radiation dose rates.

r The OSC HVAC system is a part of 'the Control Room HVAC system which is described in FSAR Section 9.4.1.

I Shielding requirement foi'the OSC is the same as for the Control Room for total dose to occupants from 'direct shine and airborne. Exposure does not exceed 5 Rem whole body for the duration of the accident. This is in accordance with General Design Criterion 19, USNRC Standard Review Plan 6.4, and NUREG-0737, Item II.B.2. Duration of occupancy and method of analysis is the same as that used for the Control Room. 4, No toilet facilities are provided in the OSC. Facilities are available in the Control Room and at grade level of the control structure for washing and toilet accommodations.

l

'he OSC communication system includes priority access voice links-hotlines, the plant PA system and telephone lines tied through the plant switchboard.

The riormal telephone service for the OSC uses the plant ETN and CTN systems. Both systems have the capability to reach on- and off-site locations.

Rev. 25, 11/96 8-2,

~ ~

Priority access voic~ communication links with automatic signaling is provided in the OSC. The

. OSC hotline connects with the TSC or the Control Room.'

I The PA system is part of the plant PA system. The system provides two-way communications at handset stations. Each station may originate and receive communications by switching to either a page channel or to one of five non-interfering party line channels.

The TSC is 'a controlled access area which provides working space and facilities for 25 NERO

. personnel. These personnel provide*guida'nce to plhnt operations personnel for management of emergency conditions and accident mitigation.

The TSC is located in the existing Control Room mezzanine above the Control Room at '.

elevation 741'-1" of the control structure and occupies approximately 2500 square feet. The TSC is within approximately two minutes travel time of the Coritrol Room by elevator or stairs.

The TSC facilities may be used for normal daily activities which do not degrade TSC emergency preparedness. The TSC= provides office space for Operations and Technical personnel. The facilities may also be used as a research or reference area by other station personnel.

The TSC includes areas for work,, conferencing (NRC & PP&L), document control, monitoring. Housed components are SPDS, UMC, PICSY SDS, video copier, RDAS and'omputer

'. (printer/terminal), and SPING monitor panel. (Reference Figure 8.2).

If, Automatic wet pipe sprinklers on an ordinary hazard pipe schedule are provided.

The TSC is part of the control structure which is a Seismic Category I structure, as defined in NRC Regulatory Guide 1,29. It is designed in accordance with Chapter 3.0 of the FSAR.

Rev. 25, 11/96 8-3

~ ~

TSC personnel are protected from radiological hazards, including direct shine and airborne activities for postulated accident conditions to the same degree as control room personnel.

Applicable criteria are specified in General Design Criterion 19, Standard Review Plan 6.4, and NUREG-0737, Item II.B.2.

The radiation dose to personnel is the same as the Control Room personnel. The doses &om, controlling accidents are summarized in Chapter 15.0 of the FSAR.

~ ~

II Commercial'grade monitors a'e provided to alarm on high gross gamma radiation dose rates., In addition, airbor'ne radioactivity concentrations are monitored by portable monitors. -Iodine detection capability'is provided.

The TSC HVAC system is'a part of the Control Room HVAC system which is described in FSAR Section 9.4.1.

Shielding is the same as for the Control Room for total dose to occupants.Rom direct shine and airborne. Exposure will not exceed 5 Rem whole body for the duration of the accident. This is in accordance with General Design Criterion 19, USNRC Standard Review Plan 6.4, and NUREG-0737, Item II.B.2. Duration of occupancy and method-of analysis is the same as for the control room.

I No sleeping accommodations'or toilet facilities are provided.Use of the plants existing facilities at gr'ade level of the control structure for washing and toilet accommodations is available. There is a unit kitchen with appliances and'sink. Self-contained breathing apparatus are available..

The TSC communications system is comprised of three telephone networks (ETN, 'CTN, and FTS), VHF, and UHF radios, and the plant PA sys'em. They provide reliable primary and back-up communication links to emergency response facilities on- and off-site.

Rev. 25, 11/96 8-4

The TSC uses the CTN v=te~ as primary communications with the ETN system a"ailable at various locations and the 1'TS 2000 reserved for federal government agencies.

The TSC has a four-channel 450 MHz UHF and a two-channel 150 MHz VHF radio system with digital voice privacy c'apability. The VHF radio is an emergency backup. for communication with LCEMA and CCDES, and to communicate ivith the field monitoring teams. The UI-IF provides primary and backup security, emergency, operational and maintenance 'adio communication links.

The system provides two-way communications at handset stations. Each station may originate and receive 'communication by switching to either a pager channel or to one of five non-interfacing 'party-line channels.

The TSC is part of the existing power block as described in Chapter 8.0 of the FSAR.

The TSC utilizes the same field sensors and signal conditioning equipment which is provided to monitor plant systems. TSC. instrumentation is identical to the field instrumentation used,to

,operate the plant. A detailed description of this instrumentation is provided in Chapter 7.0 of the FSAR.

I The TSC includes human factors engineered man-machine capabilities to allow personnel to determine:

~ plant conditions during normal operation

~ plant steady-state conditions prior to an accident transient conditions producing an initiating event

~ plant system dynamic behavior during an accident

~ projected behavior and effects of offsite airborne radioactivity releases..

I The man-machine interface is provided by devices tied to the SPDS, PCS, PICSY, and RDAS in the TSC monitoring area: (Reference Figure 8.2).

a) Two CRTs housed'in the SPDS console.

I 1 Rev. 25, 11/96 8-5 I

b) Two PCS UMCs which have graphic and parameter displays depicting the conditions of the plant systems.

.c) Video copiers for hard copy output of SPDS, PICSY, and PCS data.

The TSC contains up-to-date records and references for use during e'mergency conditions.

(Reference Appendix D). Records are updated and managed by the Susquehanna Records Management System (SRMS) utilizing Plant Administrative Procedures.

The TSC is located within a plant vital area and is subject to the vital area access controls as identified in FSAR Section" 13.6.

For an Unusual Event, the Susquehanna Energy Information Center, located on U.S. Route 11, is utilized as the Media Operations Center. For other event classifications, the East Mountain Business Center, Plains Township, will be activated as the Media Operations Center.

The EOF is an emergency resporise facility which provides continuous management of PP&L activities during radiological emergencies which may have oQsite impact.

The EOF is located on East Mountain Road in Plains Township, off PA Route 115 (five miles north of exit 36 of the Northeast Extension of the Pennsylvania Turnpike and one mile, south of exit 47A of Interstate 81). As the EOF is located beyond 10 miles &om the. site, the NRC Commission approval was required prior to the relocation. This was granted April 17, 1996 (see REFERENCES, Section 3.19).

The non-emergency activities of the EOF are such that its mam function is not degraded.

The EOF is a one-story, rectangular structure.'he building was constructed using standard building codes.

Rev. 25, 11/96 8-6

~ ~

Reference Figure 8.3.

a) Automatic wet pipe sprinklers on an ordinary hazard. pipe schedule are provided throughout the building.

I The EOF is classified as a structure, the failure of which would not result in release of significant radioactivity, and is not required for reactor shutdown. This structure is classified as Non-Category I..

The EOF is located outside the EPZ, therefore, no special habitability needs are required.

The EOF communica'tions system is comprised of three telephone networks (ETN, CTN, and FTS), VHF and UHF radios, and a.PA system. They provide a reliable primary and back-up communications network.

The EOF uses a combination of the CTN and ETN systems with the FTS-system available for

'ederal governmental agencies.

The EOF has both a four-channel 450 MHz UHF and a two-channel 150 'MHz VHF radio system.,

The VHF, system is used as an emergency backup to the'telephone system and to communicate with the field monitoring teams. The UHF radio allows EOF personnel to monitor security, emergency, operational, and maintenance communication links.

Power is supplied to the EOF via two independent underground power lines which supply the industrial park complex.

Rev. 25, 11/96 8-7

~ ~

-'he EOF includes human factors engineered man-machine interface capabilities to allow personnel to:

~ access environmental conditions

~ coordinate radiological monitoring activities

~ . recommend implementation of off-site emergency plans

~ monitor Emergency Response Data System The EOF contains up-to-date references and records." Documents are managed by DCS using plant administrative procedures.

E EOF access during an emergency i's limited to authorized personnel. Intrusion detection devices the EOF during unoccupied periods. 'onitor sufficient Both LCEMA and CCDES have EOCs which meet or exceed the minimum Federal criteria for space, communications, warning systems, self-sufficiency in supplies and accommodations and radiological protection factor. Both counties maintain full-time employees, providing 24-hour per"day coverage at, their EOC, to coordinate emergency planning and evaluation. "CTN" telephone connections exist between SSES and each County EOC.

Location of the county EOCs:

~ Luzerne County, Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania

~ Columbia County Court House Bloomsburg, Pennsylvania The State EOC is. located at the PEMA headquarters, located on Interstate Drive, one mile north of exit 24 on Interstate 81. This center is equipped with a reliable communications system which includes "CTN", telephone connections between the EOC and SSES, and ties to all area and county EOCs. During an emergency, representatives &om appropriate State agencies will

~

assemble at the State EGC to manage and support the emergency response activities. Facilities are also available at the EOF for, PEMA personnel.

Rev. 25, 11/96 8-8

~

~

This on-site system, consisting of ARMs, CAMs, and process monitors, contributes to personnel protection, equipment monitoring and accident assessment by measuring and recording radiation levels and concentrations at selected locations throughout the station. Reference Appendix D.

Fire protection at SSES is provided by a complete network of fire suppression and extinguishing systems. These systems and associated fire alarms are activated by-a variety of fire and smoke detection devices throughout the plant. Types of detectors include combustion'product, smoke, thermal, and flame. For more detail, reference the SSES FSAR and Fire Protection Review Report.

Monitors are provided for detecting and recording natural phenomena events that could 'result in

. plant damage due to ground motion or structural vibration. Reference Appendix D.

This program. establishes the pre-operational background levels, detects any gradual buildup of long-lived radionuclides, and verifies that operation of the plant has no detrimental effect on the health and safety of the public or the environment. Reference Appendix D.

Reference Appendix D.

Protective features (Reference the SSES FSAR):

a) Adequate shielding by concrete walls.

b) CREOASS.

c) ARM system indications.')

Emergency and essential lighting and power.

Rev. 25, 11/96 8-9

I I

e) Basic protection equipment for emergency teams (Appendix D), and.listings/locations of additional emergency supplies/equipment.

r Commun!cations systems.

"I t r I

Specific locations are designated for assembly and accountability of all station personnel. They are located on the basis of. logical access routes and physical sepaiation &om likely areas of radiation and/or airborne radioactivity. Reference the EP-PSs.

'I l 'I IL I

Upon declaration of a,Site Evacuation, the ED may send personnel to their homes or to Remote

-Assembly Areas. These areas are designated for assembly of personnel which can be used to, augment the plant staff. Locations were selected on the basis of:

I 1 a) Space availability for all personnel who may be within the exclusion area at the time of an evacuation.

'f b) Assurance of a controlled area for contamination surveys and for,.possible establishment decontamination stations.

I A PNS consisting of sirens with ratings ranging &om mile EPZ around SSES.

distribution within the 10-mile, EPZ. I II'I 107 dB to 125 dB exists within the ten-Siren location was determined'by a detailed study inclu'ding field surveys, actual'determination of average background noise level, and consideration of population Activation of the PNS is via radio control &om either the LCEMA Emergency Operations Center or the.PP&L Emergency Operations Facility and by telephone Rom the CCDES Emergency Center. The Nuclear Emergency Alert signal is a steady 3-5 minute wail. Public 'perations response to this signal is to proceed indoors and tune their radio or television to the Emergency .

Alert System Network serving their local area for additional information.

Testing of the system takes place annually and includes veriQcation of the system's ability to alert the general public. Reference Figure 8.6.

I I ,I Two independent telecommunications networks exist to 'provide primary and backup telephone communications between ERFs and offsite agencies. These systems are the Centrex Telephone Network (CTN) and Electronic Tandem Network (ETN).

Rev. 25, 11/96 ,

8-10

CTN extension locations include: Control Room, TSC, EOF, MOC, SOP, DEP/BRP, PEMA, LCEMA, and CCDES. This is the primary system for emergency communications.

A plant emergency alarm system provides audible warning of emergency conditions to plant personnel. The system consists of a multi-tone generator, tone selecto'r switch, area selector switch, and message tape recorder. The Emergency Alarm System is integnl to the PA System and is powered via the Vital AC UPS. The Plant Emergency Alarm System is tested at least weekly.

A first aid treatment facility, equipped with normal industrial first aid supplies, is located on the first floor of the S&A Building. Standard first aid kits are at designated locations throughout the station. Inventories are performed regularly. I i

Damage control equipment consists of normal and special purpose tools and devices used for maintenance functions throughout the station. The ED has access to keys for maintenance tool cribs, shops and "other loc'ations where damage control equipment is stoied. Inventories are performed regularly.

The purpose of the SPDS is to provide a continuous indication of the safety status of the plant.

SPDS data aids the control room, and TSC staff in rapidly detecting abnormal operating conditions, by enabling the staff to achieve a timely status assessment without surveying the entire Control Room.

.SPDS includes sensors, signals, data acquisition equipment, data preparation equipment, and data display devices. Data for Unit 1 and Unit 2 is collected separately by dedicated Data A'cquisition Systems. Unit 1 data is available in the Control Room and TSC via SPDS. Unit 2 and Common data is transmitted to the Unit 2 PICSY and is available on any PICSY SDS located in the Control Room, TSC, EOF, MOC, or General Of5ce. Unit 1 SPDS data will be installed on the PICSY SDS during the second quarter of 1998. This section willbe revised after the installation of PICSY on Unit 1.

The SSES emergency procedures were developed &om the BWR Emergency Procedure

'Guidelines (EPGs). The EPGs were developed by GE and BWR Owner's Group to comply with Action Plan Item I.C.1 item 3 as clarified by-NUREG-0737. The Ow'ner's Group performed 'ask Rev. 25, 11/96 8-11

~ ~

~

a comprehensive study to identify a minimum set of EPGs which provide coverage of plant

'afety functions and FSAR Chapter 15 events. Table 8-1 presents a list of parameters which haVe been derived from the plant emergency procedures and form the safety parameter set for the SPDS.

I Where available, inputs are taken from redundant sensors. This allows SPDS to validate critical parameters on a real-time basis. The accuracy of the data acquired is consistent with accuracy,

. needed to perform the, various emergency functions. The time resolution of eacli sensor signal depends on the potential transient behavior of the variable being measured, and'the scan rate for each variable is determined accordingly. One sample per second is the fastest that any given variable is scanned.

All signal interfaces to safety systems utilize isolation devices to prevent interference, degradation, or damage to any element of those safety systems as specified in 10 CFR 50 General Design Criteria 22, 23 and 24, and in IEEE Standard 279-1971 Sec. 4.7.

• 4 I

Once the data has been acquired, it is prepared and then output to the SPDS display. Data from the data acquisition system is stored in memory and processed before it is presented to personnel.

Sofbvare provides for data acquisition, preparation, and presentation. The data base includes raw, data converted to engineering units, validated data,'nd calculated data, which is used for trends or time derivatives.

The SPDS display is responsive to transient conditions and is suf5cient to indicate the plant status. A simple primary display, using human factors engineering criteria, gives an overall system status, and includes as a minimum the following parameters: Reactor Power, Reactor Water Level, Reactor Vessel Pressure, Drywell Pressure, and Gaseous EfQuent (noble gas). The display is easily accessible and visible. The display parameters will change colors to alert personnel of unsafe operating conditions.

This system has an availability in the 99% area above cold shutdown, and 80% area during cold shutdown. Availabilitycalculations are performed on a regular basis.

The availability of the system is enhanced by a comprehensive mairitenance program and with built-in facilities. Power supplies for SPDS are shown on Figure 8.5.

1 The PCS is used for Unit 1 emergency data configuration for the following reasons:

r Rey. 25, 11/96 8-12

~

~

~ It contains CRT graphic and trending capabilities.

~ It provides for historical data recording and retrieval.

~ It has flexibilityto permit interfacing to additional VO equipment.

~ It has a proven high degree of reliability.

It is capable of scanning and processing all of the data needed in the EOF and TSC that is not provided in SPDS. '

It is located in"a secure area within the control structure.

The data acquisition employed by the Unit 1 PCS contains most parameters required by the ERF.

The ERF data acquired by the Unit 1 PCS undergoes the normal validity and error checking applied to all PCS inputs. Isolation is applied to all safety-related signals.

Display formats needed by the ERF are generated and stored within the PCS using the existing format generators. The system to manage the data is designed such that input/output processing overhead is minimized..

Proven system and application sofbvare has been developed which performs data display and

'ystem security.'he data base includes raw data, data converted to engineering units, data checked on a real-time basis, and various types of calculated. data. The system determines the data that is displayed and the available output format.

Two CRTs tied to the Unit 1 PCS provide for display functions in the TSC. Procedures and methods for keyboard call-up and error indication of TSC functions are identical to those in use in the control room.

Data is presented in formats which are easy to understand and interpret. Variables not in a normal condition are presented with an indication of that condition. Alarms are represented by using the same color coding techniques as the control room. computer. Output formats are designed according to human factors engineering criteria, and include pattern and coding techniques.

4 4

A minimum system availability.of 97% can be guaranteed, based upon analytical calculations.

'he RDAS is used to provide Unit 1 meteorological and vent data for the following reasons:

~ Flexible architecture to allow efficient interfacing to other data sources

~ Proven high degree of reliability Rev. 25, 11/96 ~

8-13

~ Duplicate system console and controls reside in PCS room in plant.

Unit 1 data is acquired over a fiber optic data link from the PCS. This includes the meteorological, mode switch parameters, and radiological release'data. All data inputs and outputs are retained in historical files for archive or later recall and analysis.

The data can be. printed in the TSC.

Based on previous system experience.and two years of RDAS operational data, it is expected that the system should be able to achieve an availability of 98% or higher.

The purpose of ERDS is to transmit a limited set of Unit 1 plant performance parameters Rom the site to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission during an Alert or higher emergency classification.

'I Data required to support ERDS is acquired &om Unit 1 plant process computer system data bases which include SPDS, PCS and vent monitor systems. ~

ERDS does not have any capability for local data presentation of the parameters being transmitted to the NRC beyond what already, exists for the SPDS, PCS and RDAS computers.

Based on previous system experience, it is expected that the system should be able to achieve an availability of 98% or higher.

The PICSY is used for emergency data configuration for the following reasons:

~ It contains CRT graphic and trending capabilities.

~ It provides for historical data recording and retrieval.

~ It has flexibilityto permit interfacing to additional VO equipment and other sources of data.

~ Its design provides for a high degree of reliability.

Rev. 25, 11/96 8-14

~ It is capable of scanning and processing all of the data needed in the EOF and TSC.

~ It is located in a secure area within the control structure.

~ It has a redundant system design.

~ The ERDS an< SPDS fuze<'io".s are!ntegrated into its design.

~ All of the PICSY'data and functions are easily made available at locations remote from SSES.

H t

Data is acquired from VO hardware in the plant as well as over data interfaces to various other plant equipment. All data is checked for validity and errors before being displayed to the user.

Isolation is applied to all safety-related inputs. All data is archived. Both short term and long term data are available for retrieval at any PICSY SDS. Long term data is available for at least the previous fuel cycle.

Display formats needed by the ERF are generated and stored within the PCS using standard proven PICSY software. A configuration management sofbvar'e system is employed to track changes to all formats and the data base itself.

Proven system and application sofbvare has been developed which performs data display and system security. The data base includes raw data, data converted to engineering units, data checked on a real-time basis, and various types of calculated data.

User interaction from. the PICSY SDS is independent from each station and controlled by multiple copies of the identical sofbvare.

Three SDSs are available in the TSC for display of Unit 2 and Common data. Procedures and methods for call-up and error indications of TSC function are identical to those used in the control room with one exception'. Control Room CRTs are usually fitted with touch screens in lieu of track balls and keyboards.

Data is presented in formats which are easy to understand and interpret. Variables not in a normal condition are presented with an indication of that condition. Alarms are represented by using the same color coding techniques as in the control room. Output formats are designed to hum'an factors erigineering criteria, and include pattern and coding techniques. 'ccording 0 ~ ~

v A minimum system availability of 99% or greater can be guaranteed, based on analytical calculations.

Rev. 25, 11/96 8-15

1'I II

~ ~

I'I Jt lp I U I

/

I Il lh

VHF RAOIO FOR SPOS/PCS rRANSIENT INOIA TCAHS ELCVATOR HONI TORING INOIA TEAH OIRECTO PANEL STACK f REIGHT MONITOR ELI'VAfOR STATUS BOAROS RAO AREA . COHH.COORO.

EMERGENCY GL'TARS OOK CASCS OIR CTOR 0

0 000 0 0 0 0 0 SECURITY TECH/OPS HAINTENANCE 0

AOMIN. SUPPORT COOROINATOR 0 0 CONFCRENCC ARCA TELECOPY, COPY FICHE EPUIPMENI 0 0 LIBRARY PRINTS NRC CONFERENCC ROOH STORAGC CASES STO AGE FLOOR PLAN-TCCHNICAL SUPPORT CCNTCR 6 ELEVATION 741'-I" OF CONTROL STRUCTURE IPREVIOUS OBSERVATION GALLERY d TEST EOUIP ~ CONTROL C-410'EASURING RH. C-414 d COLO INSTRUMENT C-412'ALIBRATION REPAIR SHOP C-411).

NOTE: NOT ALL FURNITURE OR EQUIPHENT IS ORAMN TO SCALC.

SOMC P.A. SYSTEH COMPONENTS ARE NOT SHOHN.

FURNITURE LOCATIONS ARE SUBJECT TO CHANGEo Rev. 11, 10/88 SUSQUEHhNNA STEhM ELECTRIC SThTION UNITS I hND '2 EMERGENCY PLhN TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER FLOOR PLAN FIGURE 8. 2