IR 05000352/2006003
Download: ML062060615
Text
July 24, 2006
Mr. Christopher M. CranePresident and CNO Exelon Nuclear Exelon Generation Company, LLC 200 Exelon Way Kennett Square, PA 19348
SUBJECT: LIMERICK GENERATING STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTIONREPORT 05000352/2006003, 05000353/2006003
Dear Mr. Crane:
On June 30, 2006, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed aninspection at your Limerick Generating Station Units 1 and 2. The enclosed integrated reportdocuments the inspection findings which were discussed on July , 2006, with and other members of your staff. This inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety andcompliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. This report documents one NRC-identified finding of very low safety significance (Green). Thisfinding was determined to involve a violation of an NRC requirement. However, because of thevery low safety significance and because it is entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV), in accordance with Section VI.A.1of the NRC's Enforcement Policy. If you contest the NCV in this report, you should provide aresponse within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN.: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C.
20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Limerick facility.In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, itsenclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in theNRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the C. Crane2NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website athttp://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,/RA/James M. Trapp, ChiefProjects Branch 4 Division of Reactor ProjectsDocket Nos: 50-352; 50-353License Nos: NPF-39; NPF-85
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000352/2006003, 05000353/2006003
w/Attachment:
Supplemental Information
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
...................................................iii
REPORT DETAILS
..........................................................1
REACTOR SAFETY
.........................................................11R01Adverse Weather Protection .......................................1
1R04 Equipment Alignment ............................................1
1R05 Fire Protection..................................................2
1R06 Flood Protection Measures ........................................41R07Heat Sink Performance ...........................................5
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program ...........................51R12Maintenance Effectiveness ........................................81R13Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control .............91R15Operability Evaluations ...........................................91R19Post-Maintenance Testing .......................................101R22Surveillance Testing ............................................11
1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications ....................................11
1EP6Drill Evaluation
RADIATION SAFETY
.......................................................122PS2Radioactive Material Processing and Transportation
OTHER ACTIVITIES
.......................................................144OA2Identification and Resolution of Problems ...........................144OA3Event Followup ................................................17 4OA5Other........................................................18 4OA6Meetings, Including Exit..........................................18
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
................................................A-1
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
...........................A-2
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
..........................................A-2
LIST OF ACRONYMS
.....................................................A-11
EnclosureiiiSUMMARY
- OF [[]]
FINDINGSIR 05000352/2006-003, IR 05000353/2006-003; 04/01/2006 - 06/30/2006; Limerick GeneratingStation, Units 1 and 2; Licensed Operator Requalification ProgramThe report covered a 3-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announcedinspections by a health physics inspector, a security inspector, and operations inspectors.
Inspectors identified one Green non-cited violation (NCV). The significance of most findings is
indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609,
"Significance Determination Process" (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may
be Green or be assigned a severity level after
- NRC 's programfor overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in
NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing FindingsCornerstone: Barrier IntegrityGreen. The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of 10CFR55.59(a)(2)(ii) for an inadequate annual operating test that was administered at Limerick.
Exelon procedures and commitments made by the licensee in 1991 require questions on
job performance measures (JPMs) to explore the differences, if any, in task
performance between Limerick and Peach Bottom. At least three of the five JPMs had
significant differences in the way the task is performed at Limerick versus the same task
at Peach Bottom. These three JPMs should have had questions to explore these
differences, but did not. Exelon has entered this issue into their corrective action
program for resolution. The inspectors determined that the inadequate annual operating test administered atLimerick was more than minor because it was associated with the human performance
attribute and affected the barrier integrity cornerstone objective to provide reasonable
assurance that physical design barriers (fuel cladding, reactor coolant system, andcontainment) protect the public from radio nuclide releases caused by accidents or
events. The finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the inadequate
annual operating test did not have an adverse impact on operator actions such that
safety related equipment was made inoperable during normal operations or in response
to a plant transient. (Section 1R11) B. Licensee-Identified Violations.None.
EnclosureREPORT
- DETAIL [[]]
SSummary of Plant StatusUnit 1 began this inspection period at full rated thermal power and operated at full power for theentire report period except for a planned maintenance shutdown to repair the 1A recirculationpump seal. The shutdown commenced on May 17, 2006. The unit returned to full power
operation on May 22, 2006. Unit 2 began this inspection period at full rated thermal power and operated at full power for theentire report period except for a planned power reduction to 65 percent on May 26, 2006 for
completion of summer readiness activities. Unit 2 returned to 100 percent power on
May 28, 2006.1.
SAFETYCornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity1R01Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01 - 1 sample) a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed Exelon's overall preparations and protection for summerweather. On June 8, 2006, the inspectors walked down portions of the service water
system (including running service water pumps), circulating water pumps, station aircompressors, main turbine lube oil cooling system, generator hydrogen cooling system,and the recirculation pump motor generator lube oil cooling system. These systemswere selected because they could be affected by warm weather and could affect plant
operations as an event initiator. The inspectors conducted a review of GP-7.1,
"Summer Weather Preparation of Operation." This inspection satisfied one inspection
sample for review of risk significant systems. All documents reviewed for each section
of this inspection report are listed in the Attachment. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R04Equipment Alignment (71111.04) .1 Partial Walkdown (71111.04Q - 3 samples) a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors performed a partial walkdown of the following systems to verify theoperability of redundant or diverse trains and components when safety equipment wasinoperable. The inspectors attempted to identify any discrepancies that could impact
the function of the system, or increase risk. The inspectors reviewed applicableoperating procedures, walked down control systems components, and verified that
2Enclosureselected breakers, valves, and support equipment were in the correct position to supportsystem operation. The inspectors also verified that Exelon had properly identified andresolved equipment mitigation problems that could cause initiating events or impact the
capability of mitigating systems or barriers and entered them into the corrective actionprogram. *Unit 2 "D2" Core Spray System Room Cooler
HV211 Maintenance* Unit 2 Drywell Cooling System with Two Fans Out-of-Service
- Unit
- 1 RCIC System Following Sight Glass Corrective Maintenance .2 Complete System Walkdown (71111.04A - 1 sample) a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors completed one complete walkdown of the emergency service water(
ESW) system to verify the functional capability of the system. The inspectors usedExelon procedures, drawings, and other documents listed in the Attachment to verify
proper system alignment. The inspectors also verified ESW electrical powerrequirements, operator workarounds, and associated support system status. Operatingpumps were examined to ensure that any noticeable vibration was not excessive,
bearings were not hot to the touch, and the pumps were properly ventilated. The walkdowns also included evaluation of system piping and supports against thefollowing considerations:*Piping and supports did not show evidence of water hammer*Oil reservoir levels appeared normal
- Hangers were functional
- Component foundations were not degradedThe inspectors reviewed outstanding maintenance work orders to verify that thedeficiencies did not significantly affect
IRs) related to the ESW system to verify that Exelonidentified and appropriately resolved any equipment alignment problems. b. FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R05Fire Protection.1Fire Protection - Tours (71111.05Q - 9 samples) a.Inspection Scope The inspectors conducted a tour of the nine areas listed below to assess the materialcondition and operational status of fire protection features. The inspectors verified that
3Enclosurecombustibles and ignition sources were controlled in accordance with Exelon'sadministrative procedures, fire detection and suppression equipment was available for
use, and that passive fire barriers were maintained in good material condition.
The inspectors also verified that compensatory measures for out-of-service, degraded,
or inoperable fire protection equipment were implemented in accordance with Exelon's
fire plan. * Auxiliary Equipment and Remote Shutdown Panel Rooms* Unit 2 283' Elevation
- Emergency Service Water and Residual Heat Removal Service Water SprayPond Pump House* Unit 1 Drywell During "A" Recirculation Pump Seal Replacement
- Main Control Room and Peripheral Rooms
- Unit 2 217' Elevation
- Unit 2 253' Elevation
- Unit 1 Emergency Diesel Generator Compartments and Corridor
- Unit 2 Emergency Diesel Generator Compartments and Corridor b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified..2Fire Protection - Drill Observation (71111.05A - 1 sample) a.Inspection ScopeThe inspector observed a fire drill on the back shift of June 21, 2006. The inspectorevaluated the fire brigade performance during the drill. Specifically, the inspectorobserved: *Five fire brigade (FB) members responded to the fire area in the expected timeframe *Each FB member donned the applicable turnout gear
- Self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBAs) were available and properly worn
- FB Leader exhibited command of the fire brigade, had a copy of the pre-fire plan,and utilized pre-fire plan strategies *FB leader maintained command and control
- FB leader maintained communications with the Main Control Room
- Fire hoses were capable of reaching fire hazard and were laid appropriately
- The fire brigade used the "two person rule"
- FB brought sufficient fire fighting equipment to scene
- FB checked for and retrieved victims
- Drill personnel followed the scenario and all drill objectives were met*All equipment was returned to the locker
- Exelon performed a post-drill critique
4EnclosureThe inspector completed an independent assessment of the Emergency Action Level(EAL) classification made by the Shift Manager in response to the postulated fire
scenario. In addition, the inspector verified that a random sample of
- SC [[]]
BA gear used
by the Fire Brigade was properly maintained in accordance with Exelon's program. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R06Flood Protection Measures (71111.06 - 2 samples).1External Flooding a.Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the design, material condition, and procedures for coping withexternal flooding on June 27 and 28, 2006, after days of heavy rain. The inspectors
reviewed the applicable design documents, including applicable sections of the Updated
Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), and station procedures, including Exelon
procedure SE-4-3, "Flooding External to the Power Block." The inspectors also
performed a walkdown of the site perimeter and monitored the Schuylkill River level atthe river water intake pump house to ensure the plant operation would not be impacted. The river water level did not reach the pump motor floor level. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified..2Internal Flooding a.Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed selected plant design features and Exelon procedures intendedto protect the Unit 2 Safeguards Systems Access Room on the 217' elevation from
internal flooding events. The inspectors reviewed various design documents, the
Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), and abnormal operating procedures.
The inspectors conducted various walkdowns of the area and reviewed Exelon drawings
to identify areas and equipment that may be affected by internal flooding. In addition,
the inspectors reviewed issue reports and corrective actions regarding previous flooding
issues to verify the adequacy of the corrective actions. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.
5Enclosure1R07Heat Sink Performance (71111.07A - 1 sample) a. Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed the results of Exelon's inspections of the D23 intercooler waterheat exchanger and the jacket water heat exchanger conducted in conjunction with the
two-year overhaul of the diesel generator. As both heat exchangers were opened for
cleaning and inspection, the inspectors conducted a walk down on June 6, 2006 to verify
the cleanliness of the tubes and physical condition of the portions of the heat
exchangers that are in contact with emergency service water. The inspectors also
reviewed the results of performance and monthly surveillance tests to assess thecapability of the heat exchangers to operate as designed. The inspector reviewedExelon's response to Generic Letter (GL) 89-13 and their implementation of a testing
and maintenance program for safety related heat exchangers to meet the requirements
of
- GL 89-13. b. FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R11Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71111.11 - 1 quarterly sample).1Biennial Review a.Inspection ScopeThe following inspection activities were performed using
NUREG-1021, Revision 9,"Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors," Inspection Procedure
71111.11, "Licensed Operator Requalification Program," and NRC ManualChapter 0609, Appendix I, "Operator Requalification Human Performance Significance
Determination Process (SDP)," as acceptance criteria. The inspectors reviewed documentation of operating history related to fuel handlingLimited Senior Reactor Operators (LSROs) since the last requalification program
inspection. The inspectors also discussed facility operating events with the residentstaff. Documents reviewed included
- LS [[]]
ROs to ensure that
operational events were not indicative of possible training deficiencies.The inspectors reviewed one set of five job performance measures (JPMs) and thewritten exam administered during this current
- LS [[]]
RO exam cycle, as well as the exams
administered the previous cycle to ensure the quality of these exams. Limits on testitem repetition did not exceed the criteria established in the Examination Standards and10
- CFR 55.59. During this inspection, the inspectors observed the administration of operatingexaminations to all five licensed
LSROs on the refueling floor as well as classroom
6EnclosureJPMs at Limerick. The operating examinations consisted of one set of five JPMsadministered to each individual. In addition, inspectors observed the administration of
the written exam to the five
JPMs and
the written exam on June 1,
LSROs regarding the facility's policies and practicesfor administering examinations as well as the method and effectiveness of the Licensee
Feedback System.The inspectors reviewed the Exelon's program for maintaining active
LSROs. Inspectors assessed the facility and operatorlicensee's compliance with the requirements for maintaining license conditions in
accordance with 10 CFR 55.53. Inspectors reviewed medical records for three (of five)
of the
- LS [[]]
ROs as part of this process. In addition, inspectors reviewed reactivation
records for all five existing
- CFR requirements.The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the facility licensee's process for revisingand maintaining its
LSRO exam, there were no remediation
records that needed review.The inspection assessed whether pass rates were consistent with the guidance of
- NR [[]]
CManual Chapter 0609, Appendix I, "Operator Requalification Human Performance
Significance Determination Process (SDP)." The inspector verified that:*Individual failure rate on the walkthrough test (JPMs) was less than or equal to20%. (Failure rate was 0.0%)*Individual failure rate on the written exam was less than or equal to 20%. (Failure rate was 0.0%).*More than 75% of the individuals passed all portions of the exam (100% of theindividuals passed all portions of the exam). b.FindingsInadequate Annual Operating Test Administered at LimerickIntroduction: The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of10CFR55.59 (a)(2)(ii) in that Exelon did not include questions on the annual operating
tests to explore the differences between JPMs performed at Limerick versus the same
tasks at Peach Bottom.
7EnclosureDescription: The
PECO) dated December 10, 1991. Since the Senior Reactor Operators - Limited to Fuel Handling (LSROs) are licensed to
move fuel at both Limerick and Peach Bottom stations, this letter specifies the following:
"Pursuant to
CFR 55.59 (c)(4)(I) licensed operators must
successfully complete a requalification program that includes an annual operating test.
In 10 CFR 55.4, the definition for cases where a license is issued for operation of two or
more facilities, facility means all facilities identified in the license. Therefore, anoperating test, as described in 10 CFR 55.45, requires that the test be applicable to all
of the units for which the
- LS [[]]
ROs are licensed. The annual operating test Philadelphia
Electric Company administers to the
- LS [[]]
ROs consists of Job Performance Measures
(JPMs) tailored to the knowledge, skills and abilities required to perform refuelingactivities. The operating tests administered to multi-site licensed
- JPM [[was administered and the same task atthe other facility. This will ensure that the operating test suffices as an examination foreach facility." Inspectors observed the 2006 annual operating examination at Limerick. The inspectorsnoted that no questions were asked at the conclusion of the]]
JPM to explore the
differences between performing the task at Limerick and how that same task would
have been performed at Peach Bottom. At least three of the five JPMs had significant
differences in the way the task was performed at Limerick versus the same task at
Peach Bottom. These three JPMs should have had questions to explore these
differences, but did not. The failure to ask questions has resulted in an operating test
that only suffices as an adequate annual examination for Limerick.Exelon implemented the commitment to ask followup questions in Exelon procedure
AA-131, "Senior Reactor Operator - Limited Requalification Training." Section
4.10.2 of this procedure states "The annual operating examinations administered to the
- JPM was administered and thesame task at the other similar facilities. This shall be done to ensure that the operatingtest suffices as an examination for each facility for which the individual holds a license." The 2006
LSRO exam did not satisfy the requirements of this procedure.Analysis: The inspectors determined that the inadequate annual operating testadministered at Limerick was more than minor because it was associated with the
human performance attribute and affected the barrier integrity cornerstone objective to
provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers
(fuel cladding, reactor coolant system, and containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. The finding was evaluated using the
Operator Requalification Human Performance
MC 0609 Appendix I). The SDP,
Appendix I, Block 10, requires the inspectors to determine if more than 20% of the
individual operating test items reviewed by the inspector were unacceptable. In this
case, the inspectors determined that at least 3 out of 5 (60%) of the JPMs administeredon the examination were unacceptable because they had tasks that were performed
8Enclosuredifferently at Peach Bottom and Limerick and no followup questions were asked toexplore these differences. This has resulted in an annual operating examination that
does not test both facilities. Therefore the answer to Block 10 was affirmative andindicates a finding of very low safety significance (Green).Enforcement:
- LS [[]]
RO's are licensed. Exelon
procedure
- JPM [[wasadministered and the same task at the other similar facilities. This shall be done toensure that the operating test suffices as an examination for each facility for which theindividual holds a license." Contrary to the above, on May 30, 2006, the inspectorsidentified that Exelon administered an inadequate annual operating examination to its]]
LSROs because no followup questions were asked to explore differences in how the
task that was just performed at Limerick would have been performed differently at
Peach Bottom. Because this finding was of very low safety significance and has been
entered into the corrective action program under issue report 496375, this violation is
being treated as an
NCV 05000352, 05000353/2006003-01: Inadequate Annual Operating TestAdministered at Limerick).2Resident Inspector Quarterly Review a.Inspection Scope On June 27, 2006, the inspectors observed a licensed operator requalification simulatorscenario. The scenario included a reactor scram with a failure of control rods to insert
and shutdown the reactor, one main steam isolation valve failed closed, the main
generator tripped, and a subsequent loss of turbine bypass valve capability. The inspectors assessed the licensed operator performance and the training evaluator's
critique. The inspectors discussed the results with operators, operations management,
and training instructors. The inspectors also referred to the simulator scenario document
and the emergency operating procedures listed in the Attachment. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R12Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12 - 3 samples) a.Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the three samples listed below for items such as: (1) appropriate work practices; (2) identifying and addressing common cause failures;
(3) scoping in accordance with
MR);
9Enclosure(4) characterizing reliability issues for performance; (5) trending key parameters forcondition monitoring; (6) charging unavailability for performance; (7) classification andreclassification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(1) or (a)(2); and
(8) appropriateness of performance criteria for structures, systems, and components(SSCs)/functions classified as (a)(2) and/or appropriateness and adequacy of goals and
corrective actions for SSCs/functions classified as (a)(1). Items reviewed included the
following:* Maintenance Rule Reviews Completed Late,
ST-2-042-645-1, IR 254625
- 2A Primary Containment Instrument Gas Compressor Tripped Due to Low Level,IR 501737 b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R13Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13 - 6 samples) a.Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the following six activities to verify that station personnelperformed the appropriate risk assessments prior to removing equipment for work.
The inspectors verified that Exelon performed risk assessments as required by
CFR 50.65 (a)(4), and that the assessments were accurate and complete.
When Exelon performed emergent work, the inspectors verified that the plant risk was
promptly reassessed and managed. The inspectors also verified the appropriate use of
Exelon's risk assessment tool and risk categories.* Unit 2 Drywell Coolers
IR 482059
- Increasing Trend in Unit 1 Reactor Pressure, IR 478119
- Unit 1 Reactor Protection System Half-Scram due to
- APRM 2 Loss ofPower to Voter Module*Unit 1 'B' Core Spray Injection Line Surge Chamber Low Level Alarm,
IR 503311
- '1A'
IR 502769 b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R15Operability Evaluations (71111.15 - 6 samples) a.Inspection ScopeFor the six operability evaluations described in the issue reports listed below, theinspectors evaluated the technical adequacy of the evaluations to ensure that Exelon
10Enclosureproperly justified Technical Specification (TS) operability and the subject component orsystem remained available such that no unrecognized increase in risk occurred. Theinspectors reviewed the
- UFS [[]]
AR to verify that the system or component remainedavailable to perform its intended function. In addition, the inspectors reviewed
compensatory measures implemented to ensure that the compensatory measuresworked as stated and the measures were adequately controlled. The inspectors also
reviewed a sample of issue reports to verify that Exelon was identifying and correcting
any deficiencies associated with operability evaluations.* Unit
IR 473549*Unit 2 Jet Pump Performance Degradation, IR 478379
- HV-051-1F016A Exceeded Max Allowable Stroke Time, A1560534
- ESW Check Valve Has Excessive Leakage, IR 487356
- OPRM Function Not Full Tested During Calibration/Functional Surveillance Test,IR 490107*Drywell Unit Cooler 202V212 Tripped on Magnetics, IR 473983 b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R19Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19 - 6 samples) a. Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed the six post-maintenance tests listed below to verify thatprocedures and test activities ensured system operability and functional capability. The inspectors reviewed Exelon's test procedures to verify that the procedures
adequately tested the safety functions that may have been affected by the maintenance
activity, that the applicable criteria in the procedure were consistent with information in
the applicable licensing basis and/or design basis documents, and that the procedurehad been properly reviewed and approved. The inspectors also witnessed the test or
reviewed test data to verify that the test results adequately demonstrated restoration ofthe affected safety functions. *
- IIB [[, Channel 'D' Response Time Test"*ST-6-052-232-1, "B Loop Core Spray Pump, Valve, and Flow Test" FollowingCore Spray Planned Maintenance Outage*Post Maintenance Testing Following Hand-Switch Replacement for Unit 2Standby Liquid Control System Valve 6B *D14 Initial Start After Diesel Overhaul and Generator Bearing Replacement,]]
ST-6-049-230-1, "RCIC Pump, Valve, and Flow Test" Following PlannedMaintenance
11Enclosure b. FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R22Surveillance Testing (71111.22 - 6 samples) a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors witnessed six surveillance tests and/or reviewed test data of the selectedrisk-significant structures, systems, and components (SSCs) listed below to assess, asappropriate, whether the
UFSAR, and other design documents and Exelon procedures. The inspectors also
determined whether the testing effectively demonstrated that the
- ST -2-074-426-1, "Calibration/Functional Check of Average Power Range Monitor1"*ST-2-041-800-1, "RPS Main Steam Line Isolation Valve Closure, Division
ST-6-092-317-1, "D13 Emergency Diesel Generator (Fast Start) Test Run"
- ST-2-074-100-1, "Logic System Functional Test of
- RPS [[]]
APRM/OPRM 2-out-of-4Voter"*ST-6-055-230-2, "HPCI Pump, Valve and Flow Test," After Maintenance Outage
- ST-2-055-101-1, "Unit
- 1 HPCI [[Logic System Functional IsolationLogic Test" b. FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R23Temporary Plant Modifications (71111.23 - 3 samples) a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed the three temporary modifications listed below and theassociated 10]]
- UFS [[]]
AR and
Technical Specifications to verify that the modification did not affect operability oravailability of the affected system. The inspectors ensured that each modification was in
accordance with the modification documents and reviewed post-installation and removal
testing to verify that Exelon adequately verified the actual impact on permanent systemsby the tests. *ECR 05-00599, Temporary
TC 1-06-263-2, Temporary Change to Daily Surveillance Log Procedure
2Enclosure(ST-6-107-590-2) for Removal of
ECR 06-00258, U1 'A' & 'C' Phase Main Transformer Sudden Pressure RelaysTrip Defeated Due To Ground b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness 1EP6Drill Evaluation (71114.06 - 1 sample) a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors evaluated an emergency preparedness drill on June 6, 2006. The inspectors reviewed the scenario to identify the timing and location of classification,
notification, and Protective Action Requirement (PAR) development activities.
During the drill, the inspectors observed classification, notification and
TSC). The inspectors reviewed
checklists and forms used for classification and notification activities, and verified that
they adequately supported the activities described Exelon's Standardized Radiological
AA-1000. The inspectors observed the post-drill critique held inthe TSC and found it to be effective in identifying weaknesses and deficiencies
observed during the exercise. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.2.RADIATION
PS2Radioactive Material Processing and Transportation (71122.02 - 6 samples) a. Inspection ScopeDuring the period of June 26-30, 2006, the inspector conducted the following activities toverify that Exelon's radioactive material processing and transportation programs
complied with the requirements of 10 CFR 20, 61, 71; and Department of Transportation
(DOT) regulations 49 CFR 170-189.
13EnclosureRadioactive Waste Systems WalkdownThe inspector walked down accessible portions of the radioactive liquid processingsystems with the Radwaste Systems Engineer and a Radwaste Chemistry Specialist onJune 29, 2006. During the tour, the inspector evaluated if the systems and facilitieswere consistent with the descriptions contained in the Updated Final Safety Analysis
Report (UFSAR) and the Process Control Program (PCP), evaluated the general
material conditions of the systems and facilities, and identified any changes to thesystems. The inspector reviewed the current processes for transferring radioactive
resin/sludge to shipping containers, and the subsequent de-watering process. Also during this tour, the inspector walked down portions of radwaste systems that areno longer in service or abandoned in place, and discussed the status of administrative
and physical controls for these systems including components of the radwasteevaporators and centrifuges. The inspector visually inspected various radioactive material storage locations with thesite Shipping Specialist, including areas of the Radwaste Building and yard locations, to
evaluate container material conditions and inventories. Waste Characterization and ClassificationThe inspection included a selective review of the waste characterization andclassification program for regulatory compliance, including:*the radio-chemical sample analytical results for various radioactive wastestreams*the development of scaling factors for hard-to-detect radionuclides from radio-chemical data*the methods and practices to detect changes in waste streams
- the characterization and classification of waste relative to
DOT shipment subtype per 49 CFR 173Shipment PreparationThe inspection included a review of radioactive waste program records, shipmentpreparation procedures, training records, and observations of jobs-in-progress,
including:*reviewing radioactive material shipping logs for calendar years 2004, 2005, and2006 *verifying that training was provided to appropriate personnel responsible forclassifying handling, and shipping radioactive materials, in accordance with
Bulletin 79-19 and
NRC (or agreement state) license authorization wascurrent for shipment recipients for recent shipments
14Enclosure*observing technicians performing a waste transfer and de-watering of sludgefrom the waste sludge tank to a high integrity container (HIC), on June 28, 2006 *verifying compliance with the relevant Certificates-of-Compliance and relatedprocedures for shipping casksShipment RecordsThe inspector selected and reviewed records associated with five Type B shipments ofradioactive material made since the last inspection of this area. The shipments were
Nos.
MW-05-018, and MW-05-019.
The inspector reviewed the following aspects of the radioactive waste packaging and
shipping activities:*implementation of applicable shipping requirements including proper completionof manifests *implementation of specifications in applicable certificates-of-compliance, for theapproved shipping casks, including limits on package contents*verification that dewatering criteria was met
- classification of radioactive materials relative to
CFR 173
- labeling of containers relative to package dose rates
- radiation and contamination surveys of the packages
- placarding of transport vehicles
- conduct of vehicle checks
- providing of emergency instructions to the driver
- completion of shipping papers
- notification by the recipient that the radioactive materials have been received b. FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.4.OTHER
- ACTIVI [[]]
TIES 4OA2Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152) .1Review of Items Entered into the Corrective Action ProgramAs required by Inspection Procedure 71152, "Identification and Resolution of Problems,"and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance
issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a screening of all items entered into
Exelon's corrective action program. Inspectors accomplished this by reviewing the
description of each new issue report, attending daily screening meetings, and accessing
Exelon's computerized database.
15Enclosure .2Semi-Annual Review to Identify Trends a.Inspection ScopeAs required by inspection procedure 71152, "Identification and Resolution of Problems,"the inspectors performed a review of Exelon's corrective action program and associated
documents to identify trends that could indicate the existence of a more significant
safety issue. The inspectors review was focused on repetitive equipment and human
performance issues. The inspectors review of issue reports nominally considered the
six-month period of January through June 2006. The review also included issues
documented within the Limerick Generating Station Performance Trending report for thefirst quarter of 2006. Specifically, the Operations and Engineering Focus Areas
identified by Exelon along with their applicable action plans, were reviewed and
evaluated against the requirements of
AA-125, "Corrective Action Program (CAP)
Procedure." This review included both issue reports identified and lower level issues
which fell below the threshold of those items normally entered into the corrective action
system.b.Assessment and ObservationsNo findings of significance were identified. The inspector observed that issues selectedfor review were appropriately categorized and prioritized in accordance with Exelon's
corrective action process. Additionally, the Operations and Engineering departments
were identifying, trending, and developing appropriate actions with regard to human
performance related issues. .3Annual Sample: Unit 1 and Unit 2 Main Control Room Annunciator Failures a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed Exelon's corrective actions in response to Issue Report (IR) 442990, "Loss of Horn (Audible) for Panels 207 thru 219 in Main Control Room."
The inspectors also reviewed Engineering Design Change Packages
(ECR 06-00034, Rev. 0 and ECR 05-00340, Rev. 2) including the vendor's
recommendation and similar design concern and its adopted resolution at Peach Bottom
Atomic station that was implemented to address the repeated loss of the Unit 2 Audible alarms. The inspector verified the wiring and the selected design modification wiring
samples in the control room to assure the design change performed consistent with the
new design change. The inspector reviewed the Main Control Room alarms' log report
after the corrective actions were completed in February 2006 to assure the issue was
adequately resolved. b.Findings and ObservationsNo findings of significance were identified.
16EnclosureThe inspector noted that the loss of repeated main control room annunciator horn (tone generator) alarm during the troubleshooting efforts was determined to be
occasional and with no set frequency. Another condition that Exelon identified included
a lock-up of the tone generator, requiring pulling fuses to reset the tone generator. Station personnel found that a transient of the appropriate magnitude and frequencygreater than 0.4 MHZ could cause the microprocessor to develop an error while loading
up the instructions to annunciate. The original design maintained the alarm relay in
normally energized mode. This design change revised the design of this relay to
energize upon alarm as consistent with single tone generator application and as
recommended by the vendor and as per the existing Peach Bottom Atomic Station
preferred method of control design configuration. This method provided the additionalbenefit of forcing the annunciator horn's internal electronics to reset each time the horn
is activated. The forced reset eliminated the issue of the annunciator horn electronics
locking up due to high frequency experienced at the switchable input terminals.
The review of the Main Control Room alarms' log report indicated no concern after the
corrective actions were completed in February 2006. The inspector found that the new
design was reasonable and had met the expectations of control room operators and that
the corrective actions had appropriately resolved the audible spurious alarm issue..4Annual Sample: Operator Workaround Review a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed Exelon's operator workaround program to verify that stationpersonnel are identifying operator workaround problems at an appropriate threshold,
have entered them into the corrective action program, and have proposed or
implemented appropriate corrective actions. The inspectors observed operators
performing routine rounds on both units, reviewed the list of operator workarounds and
challenges, reviewed selected items in the Maintenance Manpower Planning System,
and reviewed the Shift Turnover Checklists for Equipment Operator positions in Unit 1
and Unit 2. b.Assessment and ObservationsNo findings of significance were identified.
Exelon is currently not tracking any operator workarounds for Unit 1 or Unit 2, and theinspectors did not identify any equipment failures that crossed the threshold of an
operator workaround..5Radioactive Material Processing and Transportation a. Inspection ScopeThe inspector reviewed the 2005 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report, fourteenissue reports, five Nuclear Oversight Quarterly Assessment Reports, a Quality
17EnclosureAssurance Audit, and recent Yard Area Rad Material Inspection reports. Through thisreview, the inspector assessed Exelon's threshold for identifying problems, and the
promptness and effectiveness of the resulting corrective actions. This review was
conducted against the criteria contained in 10 CFR 20.11(c), Technical Specifications,
and Exelon procedures. b. Assessment and ObservationsNo findings of significance were identified.
LER 0500035301-06-001, Loss of One Offsite Circuit Due to Invalid Actuationof Fire Suppression SystemOn December 9, 2005, one of two offsite circuits tripped due to a valid actuation of the10 station auxiliary transformer protective relays. The actuation of the protective relays
resulted from a spurious actuation of the fire suppression deluge system. This eventcaused deenergization of four of eight safeguard buses and subsequent start of four
emergency diesel generators and both loops of the emergency service water system, asdesigned. Additionally, the remaining offsite source automatically reenergized the four
safeguard buses, as designed.Station personnel inspected, cleaned, tested, and returned the 10 station auxiliarytransformer to service. Exelon did not identify any equipment damage during the
18Enclosureinspection. The inspectors identified no findings in their review. Exelon documentedthis issue and its associated corrective actions in
LER is closed.4OA5Other1.Implementation of Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/165 - Operational Readiness of Offsite Power and Impact on Plant Risk a.Inspection ScopeThe objective of TI 2515/165, "Operational Readiness of Offsite Power and Impact onPlant Risk," was to gather information to support the assessment of nuclear power plant
operational readiness of offsite power systems and impact on plant risk. The inspectorsevaluated Exelon procedures against the specific offsite power, risk assessment and
system grid reliability requirements of
- TI 2515/165. They also discussed the attributeswith Exelon personnel. The information gathered while completing this
TI was forwarded to the Office ofNuclear Reactor Regulation for further review and evaluation on April 3, 2006. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.4OA6Meetings, Including ExitExit Meeting SummaryOnthe resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. C. Mudrick and other members of his staff, who acknowledged the findings.
The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined
during the inspection.
- ATTACH [[]]
- MENT [[:]]
- SUPPLE [[]]
- MENTAL [[]]
- INFORM [[]]
- INFORM [[]]
- POINTS [[]]
- OF [[]]
- CONTAC [[]]
TExelon Generation CompanyR. DeGregorio, Site Vice PresidentC. Mudrick, Plant Manager
P. Orphanos, Director, Operations
D. DiCello, Manager, Site Radiation ProtectionT. Basso, Manager, Chemistry and Rad Waste
W. Harris, Manager, Nuclear Oversight
J. Hunter, Manager, Operations Training
P. Chase, Shift Operations Superintendent
E. Kelly, Engineering Programs Manager
CS System Manager
WAC Coordinator
R. Mandik, Emergency Preparedness
F. Burzynski, Station Fire Marshall
M. Kowalski, Maintenance Rule Coordinator
R. Harding, Regulatory Assurance
S. Gamble, Regulatory Assurance
D. Trexler, Site Engineering
N. Bartle, Site Engineering
F. Michaels, Site Engineering
C. Markle, Operations Engineer
W. Choromanski, Engineering Corrective Action Program Coordinator
C. Hanson, Equipment Operator
N. Giases, Equipment Operator
J. Schwartz, I&C Technician
R. Rhode, Instructor/Exam Development
W. Ward, Exam Development
L. Parlatore, Radwaste Physicist
E. Purdy, Radwaste Systems Engineer
C. Smith, RadWaste Specialist, Chemistry
H. Miller, RadWaste Shipper
AttachmentA-2LIST
- OF [[]]
- ITEMS [[]]
- AND [[]]
- DISCUS [[SEDOpened and Closed05000352, 05000353/2006003-01NCVInadequate Annual Operating Test Administered at LimerickOpen05000352/01-06-002LERSRV Position Indication on Remote ShutdownPanel05000352/01-06-003LERAccident Monitoring Instrument Channel InoperableClosed05000352/01-05-005LERMissed Surveillance Resulted in ConditionProhibited by]]
- OF [[]]
- REVIEW [[]]
EDSection 1R01: Adverse Weather ProtectionGP-7.1, "Summer Weather Preparation and Operation," Revision 13S10.7.C, "Service Water Flow Adjustments," Revision 20
Work Order R1008045, "Perform
HV-011-048"IR 487356, "ESW Check Valve Has Excessive Leakage"
AttachmentA-3IR 487703, "0C
IR 487893, "RHR Heat Exchanger Margin Improvement"IR 488630, "Move PM221816 to Open and Inspect Check Valve to 0628"
A1565145, "ESW Check Valve has Excessive Leakage"
ESW Increased Frequency Valve Test," Revision 15
L-S-02, "ESW Design Basis Document," Revision 13
- P& [[]]
- P& [[]]
RHR Service Water Overview," Revision 9S10.7.A, "Abnormal Service Water System Operation," Revision 33
S11.1.A, "ESW System Startup," Revision 28
Limerick Generating Station
- UFSAR , Section 9.2.2.3Operator Logs Dated May 5, 2006Section 1R05: Fire ProtectionUpdated Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 9
AOP-AA-201-003 Fire Drill Scenario No. 06-02, "F-R-181 U2 'B' Core Spray Pp Rm. Fire Area58"
Pre-Fire Plan F-D-313, "Unit 1 Diesel Generator Access Corridor and Condensate Pump
Rooms 313 and 314, Fire Area 12," Revision 5
Pre-Fire Plan F-D-317, "Unit 2 Diesel Generator Access Corridor and Condensate Pump Room,
Rooms 317 and 318, Fire Area 125," Revision 3
Pre-Fire Plan F-R-181, "Unit 2 'B' Core Spray Pump Room, Fire Area 58"
Pre-Fire Plan F-R-370, "Unit 2 Safeguard System Access Area Room 370, Fire Area 67,"
Revision 7
Pre-Fire Plan F-R-475, "Unit 2 CRD Equipment and Neutron Monitoring Areas, Rooms 475,476, 477, and 479, Fire Area 68," Revision 11
Pre-Fire Plan F-A-533, "Control Room 533 and Peripheral Rooms 530 to 535, Fire Area 24,"
Revision 8
Pre-Fire Plan F-R-574, "Unit 2 Standby Liquid Control and General Equipment Areas,
- RW [[]]
- FP [[]]
CW Area, and Main Steam Tunnel, Rooms 574 through 585, 593, and 594,
Fire Area 70," Revision 9
- SC [[]]
BA Cylinder Inspection and Functional Test", Revision 27
R1030716 01 "One Hour
- SC [[]]
BA Cylinder Inspection and Functional Test", completed June 7,
2006 and June 23, 2006
- IR 507203, "U1 and U2 Diesel Generator Corridor and Pre-Fire Plan"Section 1R06: Flood Protection Measures
SE-4, "Flood"SE-4-3, "Flooding External to the Power Block"
Limerick Generating Station Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
RCIC Flooding - Identify 42" MSO"
T-103, "Secondary Containment Control - Bases," Revision 20
SE-4-1, "Reactor Enclosure Flooding," Revision 6
AttachmentA-4Section 1R07: Heat Sink PerformanceM-C-TGSS-05, "Heat Exchanger Maintenance Practices," Revision 1M-011-001, "Preventive Maintenance Procedure for Diesel Generator Heat Exchanger Cleaningand Examination Lube Oil Cooler (E506) Jacket Water Heat Exchanger (E507) Intercooler
Water Heat Exchanger (E586)," Revision 1
ST-6-092-313-2 Attachment 1, "D23 Diesel Generator Operability Test Run," Revision 53,Dated April, 10 2006
- ST -6-092-313-2 Attachment 1, "D23 Diesel Generator Operability Test Run," Revision 53,Dated May 10, 2006
ESW/Diesel Generator Heat Transfer Test," Revision 3
Limerick Generic Letter 89-13 Program Implementation, Revision 6, December 2005
Philadelphia Electric Company, Response to NRC Generic Letter 89-13, "Service WaterSystem Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment", dated January 29, 1990
Philadelphia Electric Company, Supplemental Response to NRC Generic Letter 89-13, "Service Water System Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment", dated January 9, 1991
Philadelphia Electric Company, Generic Letter 89-13, "Service Water System Problems
Affecting Safety-Related Equipment" - Implementation of Actions, dated August 5, 1991Philadelphia Electric Company, Generic Letter 89-13, "Service Water System Problems
Affecting Safety-Related Equipment" - Implementation of Actions, dated January 14, 1992Philadelphia Electric Company, Generic Letter 89-13, "Service Water System Problems
Affecting Safety-Related Equipment" - Implementation of Actions, dated October 19, 1992Philadelphia Electric Company, Supplemental Response to NRC Generic Letter 89-13, "Service Water System Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment", dated January 9, 1991
Document, 2C-G501
- EDG [[]]
HX Inspection Report, dated June 5, 2006
Memo, Limerick D-22 EDG Heat Exchanger Performance Test of August 26, 2003, dated
October 23, 2003
Memo, Limerick D-22 EDG Heat Exchanger Performance Test of July 28, 2004, dated
September 10, 2004Section 1R11: Licensed Operator RequalificationProceduresT-101, "RPV Control;"T-102, "Primary Containment Control;"
T-112, "Emergency Blowdown"
T-117, "Level/ Power Control"
AA-105-102, "NRC Active License Maintenance," Revision 7M-041-201, "Reactor Cavity Work Platform (RWCP) Instructions," Revision 0
S97.0.M, "Refueling Platform Operation," Revision 18Issue Reports and Action RequestsIR 254722, "LSRO Exam Practice Position Paper"
AttachmentA-5IR 498411, "LSRO 71111.11B Inspection Comment"IR 495748, "TQ-AA-131 requires revision"
- LSRO [[]]
- 3NLS [[]]
LSRO performs as
CRB/FSP Replacement Using Combined Grapple (Alternate Path Due to Gross
Undervessel Leakage)"
- NLSROJ [[]]
- PM 2051, "Manual Operation of the Refuel Platform (LGS)"2005 Operating ExamJPM 3005, "Refuel Platform
JPM 3025, "Response to an Unanticipated Spent Fuel Pool Hi Radiation Alarm During Fuel
Handling in the Spent Fuel Pool"
JPM 3035, "Actual Dummy Fuel Movement in the Spent Fuel Pool"
- LS [[]]
- LS [[]]
- LS [[]]
- LSRO [[]]
LGS 1R11
Limerick Top 30 Cut sets for Operator actionsSection 1R12: Maintenance EffectivenessIssue Reports and Action RequestsIR 201983, "Unplanned
IR 199961, "Unplanned LCO on Core Spray"
PCIG Compressor Tripped Due to Low Oil Level"MiscellaneousExpert Panel Meeting Minutes 0409 (dated 11/18/04)Maintenance Rule Database: Reactor Protection System
AttachmentA-6Maintenance Rule Database: Primary Containment Instrument GasER-AA-310-1004, "Maintenance Rule - Performance Monitoring," Revision 3Section 1R13: Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work ControlIssue Reports and Action RequestsIR 473612, "Unable to Maintain 3455 to 3457.5
IR 478119, "Increasing Trend Noted in Unit 1 Reactor Pressure"
- RHR [[]]
ST-6-052-760-1, Unit 1 Core Spray Loop Low Level"
A1436929, "1ARHR
CN 114-85315 - Transmitter, Position, Signal Converter Obsolete"
A1561985, "Increasing Trend Noted in Unit 1 Reactor Pressure"
A1573067, "1A
- RHR [[]]
- HX Bypass Valve indication ZI-051-148A-1 Failed"MiscellaneousLimerick Generating Station Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 5.4.5Operator Logs, dated 6/25/06
IR 482059, "Unit 1 Failed Suppression Chamber Air Temperature
Recorder Point"
RT-1-100-640-1, "Monitoring for Trends in Thermal Power Calculation Inputs," Revision 3,
Completed April 20, 2006
GP-5, "Steady State Plant Operations," Revision 121
Operator Logs Dated May 4, 2006
C0217868, "ZI-051-148A-1 Failed Valve Position Indication"
Operator Logs Dated June 23, 2006
- RHR Heat Exchanger Bypass Valve PositionIndication Calibration," Revision 7Section 1R15: OperabilityIssue Reports and Action RequestsIR 388966, "2D1V212 D/W Unit Cooler Found Tripped on Thermals"IR 473549, "Unit
IR 473983, "D/W Unit Cooler 2D2V212 Tripped on Magnetics"
TI-77-201D Point Should Be Removed From Drywell Volumetric"
OPRM Function Not Full Tested During Cal/Functional ST"
A1431792, "Margin Improvement for RHR Drywell Spray Valves"A1559865, "D/W Unit Cooler 2D2V212 Tripped on Magnetics"
A1560534, "HV-051-1F016A Exceeded Max Allowable Stroke Time"MiscellaneousOperator Logs Dated April 5, 2006Prompt Investigation Report, "Unit
- 1 OP [[]]
RM Missed Surveillance Test"
AttachmentA-7Maintenance Rule Database: Residual Heat Removal SystemST-6-051-231-1, "'A'
- RPS [[]]
APRM/OPRM 2-Out-of-4 Voter,"
Revision 4, Completed May 18, 2006.
Temporary Change 1-06-263-2 to
- PO [[]]
RC Meeting Minutes06-010
Maintenance Rule Database: Drywell
- HV [[]]
Section 1R19: Post Maintenance TestingGP-7, "Cold Weather Preparation and Operation," Revision 28Commitment Number T02470
M1562821, "SLCS Injection Pump Isolation Outboard Valve Control Switch"
RCIC Valve Test," Revision 40
S49.9.A, "Routine Inspection of the
HPCI Logic System Functional: Isolation Logic Test," Revision 6, performed
on 06/21/2006
HPCI Pump Suction From CST, Pump Suction From Supp. Pool and Pump
Min. Flow Auto Closure Seal-In Contact Test," Revision 1
HPCI Pump, Valve and Flow Test," Revision 52, performed on 06/20/2006
Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Section 6.3, "HPCI"
Technical Specification 3.5.1, "ECCS Operating"
S55.9.A, "Routine Inspection of
HPCI Temperature Switch has History of Being Damaged"
ID, "High Pressure Coolant Injection," Sheet 2, Revision 2
Specification
IST Pumps Unit 2," Revision 7
AttachmentA-8Specification
- ML -008, "Specification Cover Sheet," Revision 7Technical Specifications 3/4.5, "Emergency Core Cooling Systems"
- UFS [[]]
AR Section 1R23: Temporary Plant ModificationsIssue Reports and Action RequestsA1569417, "'A' Phase Transformer"
A1523835, "Drywell Ambient Air Temperature"
A1535568, "Evaluate Install of Recorder in 20-C663"
- TI -77-201D Point Should Be Removed From Drywell Volumetric"ProceduresCC-MA-112-1001, "Temporary Configuration Change Packages (TCCP)," Revision
AA-129-2118, "Management and Control of Temporary Power," Revision 2MiscellaneousE-10, "Single Line Meter & Relay Diagram 1 Generator, Transformer & 11 Unit Aux Trans."E-140, Sheet 2 of 2, "Schematic Diagram Unit Protection Relaying Groups A&B- 1 Unit," Rev.10
- XTMR [[]]
TI-77-201D from Ave Temp Calculation"
R004384, Activity 3, "Preventive Maintenance Library Work Order"
TCCP for Documentation of Temporary Recorder Installation"
50.59 Review for
AA-111-F-08, "Emergency Classification and Protective Action Recommendations,"
Revision D
AA-1000-AA-125-1002, "Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Performance -
Performance Indicator Guidance," Revision 3Section
- 61 PROGR [[]]
AA-600-1002, "Highway Route Controlled Quantity Advance Notification for
Radioactive/Waste Shipments," Revision 2
AttachmentA-9RP-AA-600-1003, "Radioactive Waste Shipments to
- BARNWE [[]]
- DEFENS [[]]
- FACILI [[]]
- ENVIRO [[]]
AA-600-1006, "Notification Requirements for Radioactive Waste Shipments Greater Than
Ten Times the Minimum Quantity of Concern," Revision 2
- LIMERI [[]]
AA-603-1001, "Inspection and Loading of Radioactive Material/Waste Shipments ,"
Revision 1
AA-126, "Radioactive Material Shipping Training," Revision 3
RW-226, "Radwaste and Radioactive Material Inspection & Loading Operations," Revision 13
M-053-003, "3-55 Transport Cask Handling," Revision 9
M-053-004, "8-120B Transport Cask Operations," Revision 6Nuclear Oversight AuditsNuclear Oversight Quarterly Assessment Reports:06-1Q, 05-4Q, 05-3Q, 05-2Q, 05-1Q for Chemistry, RadWaste, and Process Control Programs
Audit No.
LIM-06-04 (AR 4575 12-04), Chemistry, RadWaste and Process Control
ProgramShipping ManifestsShipment No.
BShipment No. MW-05-016, Irradiated Hardware, Type B
Shipment No. MW-05-017, Irradiated Hardware, Type B
Shipment No. MW-05-018, Dewatered Mechanical Filters, Type B
Shipment No.
BIssue Reports484101, 399484, 334529, 252988, 269092, 501621, 492844, 483920, 486274, 483895,467336, 464043, 456036, 451828MiscellaneousShipping Logs for 2004, 2005, and 20062005 Limerick Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report
Radwaste/Transportation Training Records for selected personnel
Small Article Monitor Calibration Records
2006 Isotopic Mix
High Level Storage Vault InventorySection
MCRD's"
AttachmentA-10A1564079, "PD-C-078-054-OP Control Room Delta Pressure Not Maintained"IR 438697, "Perform Common Cause Analysis On Fundamental Indicator Of Procedure
Compliance"
A0443722, "2A CRD Pump visual Debris Observed In Oil Sample"A0443710, "1D Circ. Pump Visual Debris Observed In Oil Sample"
A0481248, "Visible Particulates Observed in 1C Cond. Upper Motor Sample"
A0309113, "U2
- HP [[]]
CI Turbine Shaft Out Of Tolerance"
A0462370, "HV-049-1F007 Failed Closed"
A0358569, "Change Oil 2A Stator Coolant Pump Inboard Bearing"
CAP Corrective Action Closure Issues Identified"
IR 438697, " Engineering Low Level Procedure Compliance Observations"
- CA 's"ProceduresOP-AA-102-103, "Operator Work-Around Procedure", Revision 1S15.1.B, "Normal Starting of Instrument Air, Service Air or Backup Service Air Compressors"
AA-125-1005, "Coding And Analysis Manual," Revision 5Drawings8031-M-14, "P&ID Turbine Enclosure Cooling Water (Unit 1)," Revision 29E-600, Sh. 3, "Schematic Diagram Main Control Room Annunciator Audible Alarms and control
circuits 1 & 2 Units," Revision 8
E-620, Sh. 1, "Schematic Diagram Main Control Room Annunciator panel
- AC [[]]
BO3.Reactor
Control-1 & 2 Units," Revision 1
E-620, Sh. 2, "Schematic Diagram Main Control Room Annunciator panel
- BC [[]]
BO3.Reactor
Control-1 & 2 Units," Revision 31
E-8005, Sh. 1, "Internal Wiring Diagram Annunciator Terminal Cabinet 2AC893," Revision 11
E-8005, Sh. 2, "Internal Wiring Diagram Annunciator Terminal Cabinet 2BC893," Revision 8
E-8005, Sh. 3, "Internal Wiring Diagram Annunciator Terminal Cabinet 2CC893," Revision 10
E-8005, Sh. 4, "Internal Wiring Diagram Annunciator Terminal Cabinet 20C893 ," Revision 8Engineering Change RequestsECR 06-00034, Revision 0, Unit 2 Annunciator Horn Spurious Operation Eng. Change
- OA 3: Event FollowupIssue Reports and Action RequestsIR 394327, "Limerick Offsite Voltage Regulation Study Calc
IR 432427, "10 Startup Bus Deenergized Due to Fault at 10 Startup Transformer"
A1421718, "Spurious Actuation of Deluge System - 10 S/U Transformer"Section
AA-108-107-1001, "Station Response to Grid Capacity Conditions," Revision 1
AttachmentA-11OP-AA-108-107-1002, "Interface Agreement Between Exelon Energy Delivery and ExelonGeneration for Switchyard Operations," Revision
- 2 LIST [[]]
- OF [[]]
- ACRONY [[]]
MSADAMS Agencywide Documents Access Management SystemAPRMAverage Power Range Monitor
- CA [[]]
- CF [[]]
RCode of Federal Regulations
- DO [[]]
- EA [[]]
- EC [[]]
- ED [[]]
- EH [[]]
CElectrohydraulic Control System
- ES [[]]
WEmergency Service Water
- HI [[]]
- HPC [[]]
- IM [[]]
CInspection Manual Chapter
- JP [[]]
- LE [[]]
- LSR [[]]
OSenior Reactor Operators - Limited to Fuel Handling
- NC [[]]
- NR [[]]
- NSSS [[]]
- PC [[]]
- P&I [[]]
- RCI [[]]
- RH [[]]
- RP [[]]
- SCB [[]]
- SD [[]]
- SS [[]]
CStructure, System, or Component
TITemporary Instruction
- TS [[]]
- UFSA [[]]