IR 05000352/2006004
| ML063040467 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Limerick  |
| Issue date: | 10/31/2006 |
| From: | James Trapp Reactor Projects Region 1 Branch 4 |
| To: | Crane C Exelon Generation Co, Exelon Nuclear |
| References | |
| IR-06-004 | |
| Download: ML063040467 (29) | |
Text
October 31, 2006
SUBJECT:
LIMERICK GENERATING STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000352/2006004 AND 05000353/2006004
Dear Mr. Crane:
On September 30, 2006, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Limerick Generating Station Units 1 and 2. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results which were discussed on October 10, 2006, with Mr. C. Mudrick and other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
James M. Trapp, Chief Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos: 50-352; 50-353 License Nos: NPF-39; NPF-85 Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000352/2006004 and 05000353/2006004 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000352/2006-004, 05000353/2006-004; 07/01/2006 - 09/30/2006; Limerick Generating
Station, Units 1 and 2; Routine Integrated Report.
The report covered a 3-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced inspections by an emergency preparedness inspector and reactor inspectors. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 3, dated July 2000.
NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
Licensee-Identified Violations
.
None.
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
Unit 1 began this inspection period operating at 100% rated thermal power. On September 2, 2006, reactor power was reduced to 65% to perform post summer readiness maintenance and returned to 100% power later in the day. Unit 1 remained at or near 100%
reactor power for the rest of the period.
Unit 2 began this inspection period operating at 100% rated thermal power. On September 8, 2006, reactor power was reduced to 65% power to perform post summer readiness maintenance. On September 9, reactor power was restored to 100%. Unit 2 remained at or near 100% reactor power for the rest of the period.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection
.1 Site Readiness
(1 sample)
a. Inspection Scope
On July 17 and 18, the inspectors reviewed Limerick Generating Stations preparation and response to abnormally high ambient temperatures in the area. The inspectors reviewed operator logs, surveillance tests, and related issue reports. The inspectors also conducted walkdowns of various areas, including the main control room, and reviewed various station procedures including E-5, Grid Emergency. These inspection activities constitute completion of one site readiness sample. Documents reviewed during this inspection period are listed in applicable sections of the Attachment.
- Station Preparation and response to abnormally high ambient temperatures on July 17 and 18.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Summer Seasonal Readiness
(2 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed Exelons overall preparations and protection for warm weather this quarter. The inspectors walked down portions of the emergency service water spray pond (ultimate heat sink) system during a heat wave and evaluated the Unit 1 and 2 main generator during a PJM grid maximum emergency generation alert. These systems were selected because their safety functions could be affected by warm weather. Documents reviewed for each applicable section of this report are listed in the
. This inspection satisfied two inspection samples for review of risk significant systems.
- System Review - Emergency Service Water Spray Pond (Ultimate Heat Sink)temperature during heat wave
- System Review - Unit 1 and 2 Main Generator during a PJM Grid Maximum Emergency Generation Alert
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R04 Equipment Alignment
.1 Partial Walkdown
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of plant systems to verify operability of redundant or diverse trains and components when safety equipment in the opposite train was either inoperable, undergoing surveillance testing, or potentially degraded.
The inspectors used plant Technical Specifications (TSs), Exelon operating procedures, plant piping and instrumental drawings (P&IDs), and the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) as guidance for conducting partial system walkdowns. The inspectors reviewed the alignment of system valves and electrical breakers to ensure proper in-service or standby configurations as described in plant procedures and drawings.
During the walkdown, the inspectors evaluated material conditions and general housekeeping of the system and adjacent spaces. The inspectors reviewed the following plant system alignments:
- 2B Core Spray (CS) During the 2A CS System Outage Window
- U2 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) after Maintenance and Surveillance Test
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Complete Walkdown
The inspectors conducted one complete walkdown of the Unit 1 loop B core spray system. The inspectors chose this system for inspection due to the fact that loop A of the core spray system was out-of-service for a planned maintenance period. The core spray system is an important safety-related system that provides core make-up in the event of a loss-of-coolant accident.
The inspectors used plant TS, Exelon operating procedures, P&IDs, and the UFSAR as guidance for conducting the complete system walkdown. The inspectors reviewed the alignment of system valves and electrical breakers to ensure proper in-service or standby configurations as described in plant procedures and drawings. During the walkdown, the inspectors evaluated material conditions and general housekeeping of the system and adjacent spaces. The walkdown included evaluation of system piping, supports, and component foundations to ensure they were not degraded.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
==1R05 Fire Protection Fire Protection - Tours (71111.05Q - 9 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
==
The inspectors conducted a tour of the nine areas listed below to assess the material condition and operational status of fire protection features. The inspectors verified that combustibles and ignition sources were controlled in accordance with Exelons administrative procedures, fire detection and suppression equipment was available for use, and that passive fire barriers were maintained in good material condition. The inspectors also verified that compensatory measures for out-of-service, degraded, or inoperable fire protection equipment were implemented in accordance with Exelons fire plan.
- Auxiliary Equipment Room
- Unit 2 Safeguard System Isolation Valve Area
- EDG Fuel Oil Tank Enclosure
- Unit 1 Cable Spreading Room
- Unit 2 Cable Spreading Room
- Unit 2 HPCI
- Room13.2 KV Switchboard Room 336
- 12 Diesel Generator Room & Fuel Oil & Lube Oil Tank Room
- Unit 2 HPCI and Core Spray Injection Valve Room
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
==1R07 Heat Sink Performance Biennial Heat Sink Performance (71111.07B - 2 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
==
Based on safety significance and prior inspection history, the inspector selected the following heat exchangers to evaluate Exelons means (inspection, cleaning, maintenance, and performance monitoring) of ensuring adequate heat sink performance:
- Unit 1 D core spray unit coolers (1DV211 & 1HV211)
- Unit 2 B residual heat removal (RHR) heat exchanger (2BE205)
The inspectors assessed the external condition of the above heat exchangers in the field, reviewed the eddy current, surveillance test and inspection results, and reviewed the applicable system health reports to confirm that results were acceptable and that design basis assumptions for flow rate, plugged tube percentage, and heat transfer capability had been met. The inspector discussed heat exchanger practices, including the specifications and procedures for heat exchanger maintenance, with the Generic Letter 89-13 program engineer, applicable system engineers, and chemistry personnel.
The inspector assessed the internal condition of the Unit 2 A reactor enclosure cooling water (RECW) heat exchanger and observed its inspection. The inspectors reviewed applicable issue reports (IRs) to confirm that identified problems and degraded conditions had been resolved properly.
The inspectors assessed the condition of the spray pond (ultimate heat sink) and intake structure while two spray networks were in service and reviewed two evaluations of spray pond sediment depth (before and after a Fall 2005 dredging). The chemical treatment programs for the spray pond were reviewed to verify that potential bio-fouling mechanisms were being addressed, including ongoing treatment and monitoring. The review included discussions with chemistry personnel and the RHR service water system engineer.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program
Resident Inspector Quarterly Review
a. Inspection Scope
On August 9, 2006, the inspectors observed two licensed operator requalification simulator scenarios. The inspectors assessed the licensed operator performance and the training evaluators critique. The review included the satisfactory completion of all critical tasks that measure operator actions required to ensure the safe operation of the reactor and the protection of the nuclear fuel and primary containment. The inspectors discussed the results with operators, operations management, and training instructors.
The scenarios were as follows:
- Simulated security event and a small break loss of coolant accident
- Simulated failure to scram scenario with an inadvertent safety relief valve opening
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
.1 Routine Maintenance Effectiveness Inspection
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated Exelons work practices and follow-up corrective actions for selected systems, structure, or component (SSC) issues to assess the effectiveness of Exelons maintenance activities. The inspectors reviewed the performance history of those SSCs and assessed Exelons extent-of-condition determinations for those issues with potential common cause or generic implications to evaluate the adequacy of Exelons corrective actions. The inspectors assessed Exelons problem identification and resolution actions for these issues to evaluate whether Exelon had appropriately monitored, evaluated, and dispositioned the issues in accordance with Exelon procedures and the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65, Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance. In addition, the inspectors reviewed selected SSC classification, performance criteria and goals, and Exelons corrective actions that were taken or planned, to verify whether the actions were reasonable and appropriate. The inspectors reviewed the following issues:
- Reactor Protection System (System 42) Problems and Issues. The following problems and issues were documented as part of Exelons corrective action program (CAP) in the following IRs: 429654, 515974, 520173, 469101, and 522098
- Control Enclosure Chilled Water (System 090) Problems and Issues. The following problems and issues were documented as part of CAP in the following IRs: 474188 and 497626
- Back-up Diesel Fire Pump (System 22B) monitoring criteria and maintenance rule scoping error. The following problems and issues were documented as part of Exelons CAP in the following IRs: 534181 and 346867
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Triennial Periodic Evaluation Inspection
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed and assessed the effectiveness of Exelons 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(3) periodic evaluation, and the adjustments or corrective action performed since the last inspection. The periodic evaluation covered the period from March 2004 to February 2006, and the inspectors confirmed that it met the periodicity requirements, and that it adequately evaluated performance monitoring activities, associated goals, and preventive maintenance activities.
To aid in determining the effectiveness of Exelons (a)(3) activities, four maintenance rule in-scope SSCs that had experienced degraded performance or condition were reviewed, based on SSC performance or condition, plant specific risk assessment, past inspection results, and operating experience. The following SSCs were reviewed:
- Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) (Sys 72)
- Nuclear Boiler, Safety Relief Valves (SRVs) (Sys 41A)
- Toxic Gas (Sys 78G)
- Fire Protection (Sys 22A)
The inspectors conducted the review to verify that: required SSCs were included in the scope of the program; that performance of SSCs was being effectively monitored against Exelon established goals which took into account industry operating experience where practical; that goals and performance criteria were appropriate; that balancing of reliability and availability was given adequate consideration; that corrective action plans were adjusted appropriately when performance of SSCs did not meet established goals; that the monitoring was sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that SSCs are capable of fulfilling their intended functions; that monitoring plans were closed appropriately; that performance of SSCs was being controlled effectively through the performance of appropriate preventive maintenance; and that problem identification and resolution of maintenance rule related issues were addressed.
The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the selected SSCs, interviewed the maintenance rule coordinator and system engineers, and reviewed documentation for the applicable systems. The documents that were reviewed are listed in the
.
The inspectors reviewed a sample of condition reports (CR) related to maintenance effectiveness and to selected SSCs to ensure that problems were identified at an appropriate threshold, characterized, and that adequate corrective actions were implemented.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of Exelons maintenance risk assessments required by paragraph a(4) of 10 CFR 50.65. This inspection included discussion with control room operators and risk analysis personnel regarding the use of Exelons online risk monitoring software. The inspectors reviewed equipment tracking documentation and daily work schedules, and performed plant tours to gain reasonable assurance that actual plant configuration matched the assessed configuration. Additionally, the inspectors verified that Exelons risk management actions, for both planned and/or emergent work, were consistent with those described in ER-AA-600-1042, On-line Risk Management. Risk assessments for the following out-of-service systems, structures, and/or components were:
- Replacement of the D12 EDG Jacket Water Pressure Switch; IR-507509
- Unit 1 D Core Spray Response Time Exceeds Administrative Limit IR-508628
- Emergency Service Water Valve (011-1010) Freeze Seal to Replace Leaking Valve; Action Request (AR)1565145
- Unit 1 5C Feedwater Heater Drain Valve Failed Closed; IR-519860
- Unexpected Response During Step 4.4.2.2 of ST-2-042-634-1, Feedwater/Main Turbine Trip System Actuation - Reactor Vessel Water Level - High Level 8"
- Emergency Diesel Generator Low Sulfur Fuel Oil, IR-534647 and IR-534386
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R15 Operability Evaluations
a. Inspection Scope
For the five operability evaluations described in the issue reports listed below, the inspectors evaluated the technical adequacy of the evaluations to ensure that Exelon properly justified TS operability and the subject component or system remained available such that no unrecognized increase in risk occurred. The inspectors reviewed the UFSAR to verify that the system or component remained available to perform its intended function. In addition, the inspectors reviewed compensatory measures implemented to ensure that the measures worked and were controlled adequately. The inspectors also reviewed a sample of issue reports to verify that Exelon was identifying and correcting any deficiencies associated with operability evaluations.
- D14 EDG Does not Begin to Roll Within 200 Seconds (IR 513031)
- Unit 2 T-103 Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) Entry for High Temperature in the HPCI Pipeway (IR 515891)
- 2A Standby Liquid Control System (SLC) Heat Trace Energized Causing High Suction Temperatures (IR 516360)
- Emergency Service Water System (ESW) Check Valve has Excessive Leakage (AR A1565145)
- 2A Core Spray System High Pressure Alarm During Pump Start (IR 523035 and IR 523020)
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the six post-maintenance tests listed below to verify that procedures and test activities ensured system operability and functional capability.
The inspectors reviewed Exelons test procedures to verify that the procedures adequately tested the safety functions that may have been affected by the maintenance activity and that the applicable criteria in the procedure were consistent with information in the licensing basis and design basis documents. The inspectors also witnessed the test or reviewed test data to verify that the test results adequately demonstrated restoration of the affected safety functions.
- D21 EDG Synchroscope Selector Switch Repair Post Maintenance Test (PMT)
- Unit 1 A CS Pump, Valve and Flow Test following planned maintenance
- Remote Shutdown Panel High Contact Resistance PMT
- Unit 1 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) Pump Valve and Flow Test Following a Planned Maintenance Outage
- Unit 2 RCIC Pump Valve and Flow Test Following the Pump Flow Controller Replacement
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors witnessed the performance and/or reviewed test data for the following six surveillance tests that are associated with selected risk-significant SSCs. The review verified that Technical Specification requirements were followed and that acceptance criteria were appropriate. The inspectors also verified that proper test conditions were established as specified in the procedures, that no equipment preconditioning activities occurred, and that acceptance criteria had been met.
- ST-6-092-312-1, D12 EDG Slow Start Operability Test Run
- RT-2-011-252-0, ESW Loop B Flow Balance
- RT-2-011-254-0, ESW Loop B D/P Flow Data Collection
- RT -2-011-256-1, Delta Pressure vs. Flow Data Collection Unit 1 B Loop
- ST-6-051-234, 2D RHR Pump, Valve, and Flow Test
- ST-6-011-231-0, A Loop ESW Pump, Valve and Flow Test
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
40A1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification (71151 - 8 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors sampled Exelon submittals for the Performance Indicators (PIs) listed below to verify the accuracy of the PI data recorded during that period. PI definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Indicator Guideline, Rev. 2, were used to verify the basis in reporting for each data element. The inspectors reviewed selected portions of operator logs, monthly operating reports, and Licensee Event Reports (LERs). Additionally, the inspectors discussed the PI data with Exelon personnel responsible for collection of the data.
Cornerstone: Initiating Events (5 samples)
The inspectors reviewed the accuracy and completeness of the data for the initiating events PIs. The inspection activity included five samples:
- Unit 1 Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours (2005 & 2006)
- Unit 2 Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours (2005 & 2006)
- Unit 1 Scrams with Loss of Normal Heat Removal (2005 & 2006
- Unit 2 Scrams with Loss of Normal Heat Removal (2005 & 2006)
- Unit 1 Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours (2005 & 2006)
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness (3 samples)
The inspectors reviewed supporting documentation from drills and tests in the second, third, and fourth quarters of 2005 and the first two quarters of 2006, to verify the accuracy of the reported data. The review of these PIs was conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71151. The acceptance criteria used for the review were 10 CFR 50.9 and NEI 99-02, Revision 3, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guidelines.
- Drill and Exercise Performance (DEP)
- Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Drill Participation
- Alert and Notification System (ANS) Reliability
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems
.1 Review of Items Entered into the Corrective Action Program
As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, Identification and Resolution of Problems, and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a screening of all items entered into Exelons corrective action program. Inspectors accomplished this by reviewing the description of each new issue report, attending daily screening meetings, and accessing Exelons computerized database.
.2 Annual Sample: Units 1 and 2 Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Level
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed Exelons corrective actions in response to Issue Report (IR)516562, Technical Specification Value for Minimum EDG Fuel Oil Level Determined to be Non-Conservative. The diesel fuel oil storage tanks provide onsite storage and delivery of fuel oil to the diesel generators, if needed, for at least seven days of continuous operation. The diesel fuel oil storage tanks are required by TSs to have a minimum of 33,500 gallons of fuel. During an update by a contract engineer to calculation LM-007 to determine the required amount of diesel fuel oil and the corresponding tank level, it was determined that the 33,500 gallon TS value was not sufficient to provide seven days of independent continuous diesel operation. The inspectors reviewed various issue reports, action requests and procedures, and performed walkdowns and interviews to determine if Exelon adequately addressed the issue. The inspectors evaluated Exelons actions that were documented in the corrective action program. The inspectors verified that operations procedures were in place to assure that a sufficient fuel oil supply could be transferred between emergency diesel generator fuel oil storage tanks to supply the diesels for seven days of continuous operation, in the event of a loss of offsite power (LOOP) and loss of coolant accident (LOCA). The inspectors reviewed the interim corrective actions to assure the new higher administrative limit of 36,312 gallons was maintained, and verified fuel oil storage tank levels were checked weekly, until Exelon completes their long term corrective actions.
b. Findings and Observations
No findings of significance were identified.
Exelon performed operability evaluation OPE-06-006 of the diesel fuel oil storage tank levels and appropriately considered regulatory requirements for a non-conservative fuel oil storage tank level TS value. Based on conservative administrative limits, manual actions, procedural guidance, and evaluation of design basis documents, Exelon correctly determined that the non-conservative diesel fuel oil level did not affect the ability of the diesel generators to perform their design function.
Exelon considered NRC Administrative Letter 98-10 that allows imposing short term administrative controls for an inadequate TS while performing an evaluation for a TS change. Exelon also considered NRC Inspection Manual 9900, Technical Guidance, Licensee Technical Specifications Interpretations, which states that when an error is found in the TS, the licensee should restrict operations until an amendment is processed or other acceptable actions are taken. Exelon imposed a higher administrative limit on the diesel fuel oil storage tanks of 36,312 gallons and also increased the level verification frequency from once per month to once per week until long term corrective actions could be completed.
Inspectors reviewed Exelons operability evaluation which credits the higher tank levels, as well as manual operator actions after seven days to transfer fuel between diesel fuel oil storage tanks as described in the UFSAR sections 9.5.4.2 and 9.5.4.3. Inspectors reviewed procedure S92.3O, Transferring Diesel Oil From One Storage Tank to Another Storage Tank or Day Tank, to verify procedures were in place and were adequate to cross-tie the diesel fuel oil storage tanks.
During a review of the short term corrective actions, inspectors determined that Exelon had raised the administrative limit of the fuel oil storage tanks to 36,312 gallons, but only verified tank level using a dipstick approximately once per month. Further, Exelon had not raised the low level alarm setpoint in the control room to ensure that any draining of the tanks due to leakage would be detected prior to exceeding the new minimum tank level. The non-conservative alarm setpoint was identified in IR 518376. To address the concerns of potential tank leakage, Exelon increased the frequency of level verification by dipstick to once per week. Also, the inspectors verified current diesel fuel oil storage tank levels to ensure the level was greater than the Exelon administrative limit.
The inspector found that the new administrative limit of 36,312 gallons, verified by dipping the tank to determine level weekly, was reasonable to ensure an adequate supply of diesel fuel oil until long term corrective actions are completed.
4OA3 Event Followup
.1 (Closed) LER 05000352/01-06-002, SRV Position Indication on the Remote Shutdown
Panel Inoperable On March 19, 2006, in refueling outage 1R11, a surveillance test of the safety relief valves (SRVs) was being performed from the remote shutdown panel (RSP). Exelon discovered that the open indication lights for the RSP SRVs (C, A, and N) work the first time the SRVs are opened, but the open indication lights do not work if the SRVs are subsequently closed and re-opened from the RSP, because the bulbs burn out when they are re-opened. The loss of indication did not affect the ability of the SRVs to be operated. The cause of the event was a faulty circuit design, which appears to have existed since initial plant startup. Therefore, the station operated in a condition that was prohibited by Technical Specifications, Table 3.3.7.4-1, which requires RSP SRV position instrumentation be available in Modes 1 and 2.
This surveillance test was the first time that the SRV solenoids were operated using the handswitches at the RSP, rather than testing the handswitch and indication lights using an ohm meter with the circuit de-energized (i.e., contact resistance methodology). The testing methodology was changed based on the results of an unrelated evaluation performed by Exelon. Exelon implemented a modification to correct the faulty circuit design. The inspectors identified no new findings in their review. This condition would not have prevented the SRVs from operating as required and there was no transient requiring use of the remote shutdown panel. Lastly, this condition does not occur when the SRVs are operated from the main control room. This finding constitutes a violation of minor significance that is not subject to enforcement action in accordance with Section IV of the NRCs Enforcement Policy. Exelon documented this issue and its associated corrective actions in IR 468189. This LER is closed.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
Exit Meeting Summary
On October 10, 2006, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. C. Mudrick and other members of his staff. The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Exelon Generation Company
- R. DeGregorio, Site Vice President
- C. Mudrick, Plant Manager
- P. Orphanos, Director, Operations
- T. Basso, Manager, Chemistry and Rad Waste
- W. Harris, Manager, Nuclear Oversight
- J. Hunter, Manager, Operations Training
- P. Chase, Shift Operations Superintendent
- E. Kelly, Engineering Programs Manager
- M. Kowalski, Maintenance Rule Coordinator
- R. Harding, Regulatory Assurance
- J. Bendyk, System Engineer
- C. Bruce, System Engineer
- B. Tracy, System Engineer
- P. Hinchey, Maintenance Rule Coordinator
- W. Astbury, System Manager, ESW
- G. Sprissler, Sr. Technician, Chemistry
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Open NONE
Opened and Closed
NONE
Closed
- 05000352/01-06-002 LER SRV Position Indication on Remote Shutdown Panel