ML19211A969

Amend to Petition to Intervene in Response to President'S Commission Repts on TMI Accident.Consequences of Class 9 Accident Should Be Evaluated & Supplemented to Eis. Certificate of Svc Encl

ML19211A969
Person / Time
Site:	Three Mile Island
Issue date:	11/29/1979
From:	Sholly S AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
References
NUDOCS 7912210422
Download: ML19211A969 (14)

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY CO>D1ISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC S AFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )

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MEIROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-289

) (Restart)

(Three Mile Island Nuclear )

Station, Unit No. 1) )

AMENDMEST -TO PETITION TO IhTERVENE IN RESPONSE TO THE REPORTS OF THE PRESIDENT'S COF01ISSION ON THE ACCIDEST AT THREE MILE ISLAST During the Special Prehearing Conference, the Board, without specifically ruling thereon, entertained discussion on a ti ne limit for new contentions to be raised following publication of major investigative reports into the Three Mile Island Unit 2 accident. A limit of 30 days following publication was suggested by the Licensee.

Absent speci.fic gui. dance from the Board, Steven C.

Sholly, Petitioner, hereby submits the following additional contentions in keeping with the spi.rit of the di.scussion regarding the above-mentioned time limits. These contentions raise issues addressed in the Report of the President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mi.le Island and the various Technical Staff Analysis Reports. Petitioner requests approval of the Board to admit these contenti.ons for review and comment by the Staff, the Licensee, and interested parties and Petitioners.

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Contention # 16 It is contended that Unit 1 is not adequately protected against sabotage by an " insider" , i.e., someone working on the island. It is further contended that the so-called two-man rule requiring that no one person be allowed in a Type I vital area without another person accompanying him has not yet been implemented. It is further contended that under circumstances where the Unit 2 facility will be undergoing decontamination and restoration, and at least 1,500 persons have unescorted access to the island, the internal security situation is unmanageable and represents an undue risk to public health and safety ecause certain sabotage events have the potential for severe off-site consequences. It is contended that until an adequate internal security system is established, Unit 1 should not be permitted to restart.

Basis for Contention #'16 This contention is drawn from Technical Report Number 19, Pre and Post-Accident Security Status at Three Mile Island, in Technical Staff Analvsis Renort Summarv, written by the Staff of the President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island. The President's Commission apparently commissioned a study by the Los Alamos Scienti,fic Laboratory, headed by Donald G. Rose, of the securi.ty status at 'Three.

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Mile Island. The study is summarized in the Su=arv document with the following conclusions :

A. External security has been enhanced, but internal security is poor.

B. The internal security situation is made worse by the decontamination and restoration activities at Unit 2 because 1,500 persons have unescorted access to the island, with 500 of those assigned to Unit 1.

C. The study considered sabotage to be any act resulting in the unplanned release of radioac-tivity or the compromise of plant radiological safety. The adversary was considered to be a knowledgeable insider possessing explosives.

The study concluded "that successful sabotage can be performed at either Unit 1 or Unit 2."

D. Although many successful sabotage acts would "probably not result in significant radiation release to the public", there are apparently several that would result in severe off-site consequences.

The likelihood of such sabotage attempts is unquantifiable in mathematical terms at present; however, there is a history of acts of sabotage at nuclear power plants , most recently occurring at the Surry facility at which several employees 1637 2?I8

poured caustic chemicals on fuel rods .

Further, to the best of the Petitioner's knowledge, the Licensee has not completed an evaluation of all personnel having access to the island in terms of stress fitness, psychological fitness, criminal records, and drug / alcohol abuse. It is clear from NUREG-0600 at page I-1-33 that the operational staff is under a high degree of emotional stress. It is quite probable that such stress is also present in other personnel categories, including maintenance, technicians, and supervisory personnel.

Finally, the unique circumstances surrounding the accident, the proximity of Units 1 and 2, the heightened sense of pubitc disteust of the Licensee (and the NRC and state government, for that mr.tter), and the likelihood of acts of civil disobediance s!iould the Unit I reactor be restarted, all mitigate in tavor of strengthened internal security at Three Mile Island. The conclusions of a security study done by a reputable organization such as LASL are not easily dismissed.

Licensee will possibly object to this contention as being outside the scope of this proceeding. In the interest of avoiding delay accompanied by filing answers to objections, Petitioner offers the following'as the nexus between the accident and the restart hearing. The Commission's Order and' 1637 249

Notice of Hearing dated 9 August 1979 at page 4 discusses the unique circumstances at Three Mile Island which require the resolution of certain safety concerns prior to restart.

While sabotage was not among those concerns listed in the Commission's Order, the Order stated that these safety" concerns result from:

"(1) potential interaction between Unit I and the damaged Unit 2, (2) questions about the management capabilities and technical resources of Metropolitan Edison, including the impact of the Unit 2 accident on these, (3) the potential effect of operations necessary to decontaminate the Unit 2 facility on Unit 1, and (4) recognized deficiencies in emergency plans and station operating procedures."

It is clear from the LASL study su:mnary that the situation at Unit 2 clearly impacts on the overall internal security situation at Three Mile Island, and that the existing security mechanisms in force will be greatly strained with the extra numbers of persons on the site as a result of the decontamination activities at Unit 2. In fact, the LASL study cites the current situation as unmanageable. There is a clear relationship between the Unit 2 accident at Three Mile

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Island and the issue of internal security.

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Contention # 17 It is contended that in the light of the Unit 2 accident, which has been declared by the NRC Staff to be a Class 9 accident, it is no longer credible to conclude that Class 9 accidents have an acceptably low frequency of occurrence. In addition to the specific circumstances of the Unit 2 accident, it is contended that there are many clear and close analogues to the Unit 2 accident which would be Class 9 accidents and could have environmental and radiological impacts in excess of those experienced in the case of the Unit 2 accident. It is therefore contended that the impact of Class 9 accidents, having been dealt with in a cursory manner in the Three Mile Island Environmental Impact Statement (NUREG-0552) , must be thoroughly described and evaluated for environmental impact in a supplement to the Final Environmental Impact Statement, as provided for under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. Inasmuch as Class 9 accidents are by their very nature both quantitatively and qualitatively different and their effects on the public health and safety could by the NRC's own admission be severe, it is additionally contended that the evaluation of Class 9 accidents under NEPA must be completed prior to restart in order to assure adequate protection for public health and safety. The clear and close analogues to the Unit 2 accident which should, 1637 251

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at a minimum, be evaluated as described neretofore in this contention are as follows. These accidents postulate a recurrence of a Unit 2 TMI-type Class 9 accident and then assume an additional action, malfunction, or circumstance.

A. Deliberate venting of the containment building to control hydrogen gas concentrations , with the release, as a result, of the radioactivity in gaseous and particulate form which is in the containment. This venting could be assumed to be deliberate, or could be assumed to be necessary due to the failure of a hydrogen recombiner and the need for action before the second redundant recombiner could be installed.

The deliberate venting of the containment could also be considered to be the result of a deliberate act of sabotage.

B. Given the facts associated with diesel generator inoperability as presented in Section 4.17, pages I-4-74 through I-4-76, of NUREG-0600, assume loss of site power.

C. Assume the accident occurs in the same manner, but at a time when the plant is approaching a refueling shutdown with a full core inventory of fission products such as would be found after the first part of the core had undergone its total pexosure in the core.

D. Begin with the accident as described in "C."

immediately above and vent the containment as in " A." above.

E. Assume the other reactor at the site is operating at full power when the accident occurs and assess the impact. of the lack of additional personnel and facilities which were available because Unit 1 was shutdown at the time of the Unit 2 accident.

F. Assume that the valve used to vent the make-up tank at 0700 hours0.0081 days <br />0.194 hours <br />0.00116 weeks <br />2.6635e-4 months <br /> on 30 March 1979 sticks and fails to close on remote command, thus; venting radiation continuously to the environment.

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Basis for Contention v 17 The discussion of Class 9 accidents in the Final Environ-mental Impact Statement on Three Mlle Island (NUREG-0552) is contained on pages VI-2 and VI-3. NUREG-0552 notes that Class 9 accidents involve failures more severe than the design basts. It further states that although their conse-quences could be severe, the probability of their occurrence is so small that their environmental risk ts extremely low.

The reasons given for the confidence in this low environmental risk are defense in depth (multiple physical barriers),

quality assurance, continued surveillance and testing, and conservative design.

It is now clear that the basis for this discussion and degree of conftdence in the low probability of Class 9 accidents and their off-stte consequences no longer exists as a result of the Unit 2 accident. Multiple physical barriers were defeated by operator actions during the Unit 2 accident resulting in the release of over 10 million curies of radioactivity to the environmen'c. Design conserv-atism ts certainly lacking in certain areas of the plant ,

particularly in those areas cited by the Commission in its Order and Notice of Hearing dated 9 August 1979 at page 3. The quality assurance and surveillance and testing

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programs at Three Mlle Island have been brought under scrutiny 1637 253'

by the President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mlle Island and have been found to be defictent.

In answers to other Class 9 contenttons, the Licensee has objected to a re-evaluation of Class 9 accidents on the grounds that the consequences of the only existing Class 9 accident were less than certain unspecified accidents of lesser class ~es and that other accident sequences which might be classified as Class 9 are hypothetical and need not be constdered.

This response ignores the issue. Class 9 accidents are by their very nature unique--they are quantitatively and qualitatively different from other types of accidents.

In other accident classes, plant safety systems are assumed to work as designed and only a single-failure event ts considered credible. Only in a Class 9 accident is the plant assumed not to work as designed. The consequences of Class 9 accidents may well be equal to or less than certain lesser accidents, but this is no reason for falling to evaluate them. Clear and close analogues to the Unit 2 accident are hypothetical only to the extent that they have not yet occurred. The same could have been said of the Unit 2 accident prior to March 28, 1979. Labelling an accident sequence hypothetical does not lessen Lts changes of occurring.

The Lessons Learned Task Force Status Report, NUREG-0578, states at page A-37, "It can also be shown, however '

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the potential releases from postulated accidents may be several orders of magnitude higher than was encountered at TMI." It is therefore clear that Class 9 accidents have the capability of producing more serious off-site consequences than were experienced at Three Mlle Island.

Such consequences should, as a result of their environmental importance, be evaluated in a supplement to the TMI EIS.

The Licensee has pointed out, without specLfic reference, that the Unit 2 accident resulted in lower doses to the public from radiation exposure than certain other lesser accidents, principally in Class E. It is unclear exactly what accidents are being cited by the Licensee. In Table 20 of the TMI FES (NUREG-0552) on page VI-6, the man-re n dose to the population within 50 miles of TMI frem the most serious accident, a large break LCCA, is given as 1000 man-rems. The man-rem dose to the same population from the Unit 2 accident is cLted by the President's Commission Staff as being 2000 man-rems. It is clear that such an accident should be evaluated in terms of its environmental impact, and so should other similar accidents.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

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DATED: 29 November 1979

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Steven C. Sholly 304 South Market Street Mechanicsburg, PA 17055 (717) 766-1857 1637 2$5

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGUI.ATORY CCSD11SSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC Sate.1Y AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )

MEIROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY Do WM t }

(Three Mlle Island Nuclear )

Station, Unit No. 1) )

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE This is to certify that I have served upon the following individual a single copy of AMENDMENT TO PETITION TO INIERVENE IN RESPONSE TO THE REPORTS OF THE PRESIDENI'S COMMISSION ON 2)

THE ACCIDENI AT THREE MILE ISLAND this 3Dth day of November 1979 in accordance with the terms set forth in the Licensee's offer to the Board in its communication of 13 November 1979 regarding duplication and filing of documents in this proceeding:

Three Mile Island Observation Center Middletown, Pennsylvania Attention: Mr. John Wilson Steven C. Sholly

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Date: Nove=ber 30, 1979 UNITED STATES OF M! ERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY CO>S!ISSION BEFORE THE AT0!!!C S AFETY A';D LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )

!ETROPOLITM' EDISON COMPM;Y Docket . M-289

)

(Three Mile Islan'd Nuclear )

Station, Unic No. 1) )

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of Amend =ent To Petition To Intervene In Response To The Reports Of The President's Co==ission On The Accident At Three Mile Island of Steven C. Sholly, dated 29 November 1979, which was hand delivered to Licensee at Three Mile Island Observation Center, Middletown, Pennsylvania, on November 29, 1979, were served upon those persons on the attached Service List by deposit in the United States = ail, postage paid, this 30th day of Nove=ber, 1979.

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U'11TED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEF0FE THE ATOMIC S AFEn' A';D LICENSITG BOARD In the Matter of )

Docket No. 50-289 METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY (Restart)

)

(Three Mile Island Nuclear )

Station, Unit No. 1)

SERVICE LIST Ivan W. Smith, Esquire- Karin W. Carter, Esquire Chairman Assistant Attorney General Atomic Safety and Licensing Co==onwealth of Pennsylvania Board Panel 505 Executive House U. S. Nuclear Regulatory P. O. Box 2357 Cocnission Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120 Washington, D.C. 20555 Robert L. Knupp, Esquire Dr. Walter H. Jordan Assistant Solicitor Atomic Safety and Licensing County of Dauphin Board Panel P. O. Box P 881 West Outer Drive 407 North Front Street Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 Harrisburg, PA 17108 Dr. Linda W. Little John E. Minnich Atomic Safety and Licensing Chairman, Dauphin County Board of Board Panel Commissioners 5000 Hermitage Drive Dauphin County Courthouse Raleigh, North Carolina 27612 Front and >brket Streets Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17101 James A. Tourtellotte, Esquire Office of the Executive Legal Walter W. Cohen, Esquire Director Consumer Advocate U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cocsission Department of Justice Washington, D.C. 20555 14r5 Floor, Strawberry Square HL.risburg, Pennsylvania 17127 Docketing and Service Section Office of the Secretary Jordan D. Cunningham, Esquire U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attorney for Newberry Township Washington, D.C. 20555 T.M.I. Steering Committee 2320 North Second Street John A. Levin, Esquire Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17110 Assistant Counsel Pennsylvania Public Utility Theodore A. Adler, Esquire Commission Widoff Reager Selkowitz & Adler P. O. Box 3265 P. O. Box 1547 Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120 Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17105

• Person on whose behalf service is being made. Only Captificaqe of '

Service is enclosed. .

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Ellyn Weiss, Es'uire g Robert Q. Pollard

..s-L Sheldon, Har=cn'& Weiss Chesapeake Energy Alliance Suite 506 609 Montpelier S treet 1725 Eye Street,.N.W. Balti= ore, Maryland 21218 Washington, D.C. 20006 Chauncey Kepford

• Steven C. Sholly Judith H. Johnsrud -

304 South Market Street Environmental Coalition on Nuclear Power Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania 17055 433 Orlando Avenue State College, Pennsylvania 16301 Frieda Berryhill ,

Chair =an, Coalition for Nuclear Marvin I. Lewis Power Plant Postpone =ent 6504 3radford Terrace 2610 Glendon Drive Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19149 Wil=ington, Delaware 19808 Marjorie M. Aamodt Holly S. Keck R. D. 5 Legislation Chairman Coatesville, Pennsylvania 19320 Anti-Nuclear Group Representing York Jane Lee 245 West Philadelphia Street R. D. 3 Box 3521 York, Pennsylvania 17404 Etters, Pennsylvania 17319 Karen Sheldon, Esquire George F. Trowbridge, Esquire Sheldon, Har=on & Weiss Shaw, Pitt=an, Potts & Trowbridge Suite 506 1800 M Street, N.W.

1725 Eye Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 Washington, D.C. 20006

• Person on whose behalf service is being made. Only Certificate of Service is enclosed.

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