IR 05000334/2008004
Download: ML083170830
Text
November 12, 2008
Mr. Peter P. Sena, III Site Vice President FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company Beaver Valley Power Station Mail Stop A-BV-SEB1 P. O. Box 4, Route 168 Shippingport, PA 15077
SUBJECT: BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000334/2008004 AND 05000412/2008004
Dear Mr. Sena:
On September 30, 2008, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Beaver Valley Power Station Units 1 and 2. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection findings, which were discussed on October 30, 2008, with you and other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission=s rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
Based on the results of this inspection, this report documents one (1) self-revealing finding of very low safety significance (Green). This finding was determined to involve a violation of NRC requirements. Additionally, a licensee-identified violation, which was determined to be of very low safety significance, is listed in the report. However, because of the very low safety significance and because the issues have been entered into the corrective action program, the NRC is treating the findings as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. If you contest the findings in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Beaver Valley.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, and its enclosures, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC=s document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room). III 2 We appreciate your cooperation. Please contact me at 610-337-5200 if you have any questions regarding this letter.
Sincerely,/RA/ Ronald R. Bellamy, Ph.D., Chief Reactor Projects Branch 6 Division of Reactor Projects
Docket Nos.: 50-334, 50-412 License Nos: DPR-66, NPF-73
Enclosures:
Inspection Report 05000334/2008004; 05000412/2008004
w/Attachment:
Supplemental Information cc w/encl:
J. Hagan, President and Chief Nuclear Officer J. Lash, Senior Vice President of Operations and Chief Operating Officer D. Pace, Senior Vice President, Fleet Engineering K. Fili, Vice President, Fleet Oversight P. Harden, Vice President, Nuclear Support G. Halnon, Director, Fleet Regulatory Affairs Manager, Fleet Licensing Company K. Ostrowski, Director, Site Operations E. Hubley, Director, Maintenance M. Manoleras, Director, Engineering R. Brosi, Director, Site Performance Improvement C. Keller, Manager, Site Regulatory Compliance D. Jenkins, Attorney, FirstEnergy Corporation M. Clancy, Mayor, Shippingport, PA D. Allard, Director, PADEP C. O'Claire, State Liaison to the NRC, State of Ohio Z. Clayton, EPA-DERR, State of Ohio Director, Utilities Department, Public Utilities Commission, State of Ohio D. Hill, Chief, Radiological Health Program, State of West Virginia J. Lewis, Commissioner, Division of Labor, State of West Virginia W. Hill, Beaver County Emergency Management Agency J. Johnsrud, National Energy Committee, Sierra Club J. Powers, Director, PA Office of Homeland Security R. French, Director, PA Emergency Management Agency III 3 We appreciate your cooperation. Please contact me at 610-337-5200 if you have any questions regarding this letter.
Sincerely,/RA/ Ronald R. Bellamy, Ph.D., Chief Reactor Projects Branch 6 Division of Reactor Projects
Distribution w/encl: S. Collins, RA M. Dapas, DRA D. Lew, DRP J. Clifford, DRP R. Bellamy, DRP G. Barber, DRP C. Newport, DRP S. Williams, RI EDO R. Nelson, NRR N. Morgan, PM, NRR R. Guzman, NRR D. Werkheiser - SRI, DRP D. Spindler, RI, DRP P. Garrett, Resident OA, DRP S. West, DRS-RIII C. Pederson, DRP-RIII ROPreportsResource@nrc.gov Region I Docket Room (with concurrences)
SUNSI Review Complete: RRB (Reviewer=s Initials) DOCUMENT NAME: G:\DRP\BRANCH6\+++BEAVER VALLEY\BV INSPECTION REPORTS & EXIT NOTES\BV INSPECTION REPORTS 2008\BVREPORT_IR2008-004_REV0.DOC ML083170830 After declaring this document AAn Official Agency Record@ it will be released to the Public. To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box: "C" = Copy without attachment/enclosure "E" = Copy with attachment/enclosure "N" = No copy OFFICE RI/DRP RI/DRP RI/DRP NAME DWerkheiser/RRB for SBarber/RRB for RBellamy/RRB DATE 11/07/08 11/12 /08 11/ 12 /08 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY Enclosure U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I
Docket Nos. 50-334, 50-412
Report Nos. 05000334/2008004 and 05000412/2008004
Licensee: FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC)
Facility: Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2
Location: Post Office Box 4 Shippingport, PA 15077
Dates: July 1, 2008 through September 30, 2008
Inspectors: D. Werkheiser, Senior Resident Inspector D. Spindler, Resident Inspector J. Brand, Resident Inspector T. Fish, Sr. Operations Engineer T. Moslak, Health Physicist S. Stewart, Senior Resident Inspector K. Young, Senior Reactor Inspector
Approved by: R. Bellamy, Ph.D., Chief Reactor Projects Branch 6 Division of Reactor Projects
2 Enclosure TABLE of
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
........... 3
REPORT DETAILS
........... 4
REACTOR SAFETY
........ 4 1R04 Equipment Alignment---------------------------........ 4 1R05 Fire Protection-----------------------------.. ......... 5 1R06 Flood Protection Measures------------------------......... 5 1R07 Heat Sink Performance---------------------------..... 6 1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program-----------------........ 6 1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation----------------------...... 8 1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work Control-----------.... 8 1R15 Operability Evaluations---------------------------..... 9 1R18 Plant Modifications-----------------------------.... 9 1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing-------------------------..... 10 1R22 Surveillance Testing---------------------------........
RADIATION SAFETY
......... 11 2OS3 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation and Protective Equipment.--------.......11
OTHER ACTIVITIES
.......... 12
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification---------------------....... 12 4OA2
Problem Identification and Resolution-------------.............................. 14
4OA3 Followup of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion---------............ 18 4OA5
Other--------------------------------............. 19
4OA6 Management Meetings-----------------------.................. 21 4OA7
Licensee-Identified Violations-------------------...................... 22 ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
..............................................................A-1
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
..........A-2
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
............................................................................A-2
LIST OF ACRONYMS
.........................................................................A-8
- OF [[]]
- FINDIN [[]]
- GS [[]]
IR 05000412/2008004; 07/01/2008 - 09/30/2008; Beaver Valley Power
Station, Units 1 & 2; Problem Identification and Resolution
The report covered a 3-month period of inspection by resident inspectors, regional reactor
inspectors, and a regional health physics inspector. One (GREEN) finding was identified. The
significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using
Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609,
- NRC =s program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in
- A. [[]]
- FEN [[]]
OC failed to properly implement procedures and required actions in planning,
tagging, and electrical system operation. A series of procedural use errors in control of
maintenance, equipment control and electrical system operation resulted in the
inadvertent loss of the 1G 4160VAC (4kV) electrical bus. The licensee remediated the
operating crew and communicated station expectations regarding organizational
interfaces and procedural compliance. This was also communicated to all station crews,
maintenance, and construction services departments.
This finding is more than minor because it is similar to Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0612, Appendix E, example '3b', since the procedural use errors resulted in the loss of
the 1G Bus. Traditional enforcement does not apply because the issue did not have an
actual safety consequence or the potential for impacting NRC's regulatory function, and
was not the result of any willful violation of
IMC 609, Attachment 609.04, "Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings,"
the finding was determined to be of very low risk significance. The cause of this finding is related to the cross-cutting area of human performance, in
that
- FEN [[]]
OC's failed to follow station procedures resulting in a loss of the 1G bus
[H.4.(b)]. (Section 4OA2.1)
B. Licensee-Identified Violations A violation of very low safety significance, which was identified by the licensee, has been
reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee have
been entered into the licensee=s corrective action program. This violation and corrective actions are listed in Section
- REPORT [[]]
DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status Unit 1 began the inspection period at 100 percent power. The unit remained nearly at
100 percent power for the duration of the inspection period. Unit 2 began the inspection period at 100 percent power. On September 19, the unit was
down-powered to 25 percent for planned replacement of "A" and "C" Main Feedwater
Regulating Valve positioners and investigation of a main condenser tube leak and
returned to full power on September 22. The unit remained at 100 percent power for the
remainder of the inspection period.
1.
SAFETY Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity [R]
1R04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04)
.1 Partial System Walkdowns (71111.04Q)
a. Inspection Scope (3 samples) The inspectors performed 3 partial equipment alignment inspections during conditions of
increased safety significance, including when redundant equipment was unavailable
during maintenance or adverse conditions. The partial alignment inspections were also
completed after equipment was recently returned to service after significant
maintenance. The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the following systems,
including associated electrical distribution components and control room panels, to verify
the equipment was aligned to perform its intended safety functions: $ On July 16, Unit 2 Emergency Diesel Generator 2-1 and the blackout cross-tie 4kV breakers [ACB-2A2] and [ACB-2D12] in accordance with
- RW train was out of service for planned maintenance; and * On July 30, Unit 2 No. 2 Emergency Diesel Generator (2-2
EDG) during planned outage of the 2-1 EDG.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Complete System Walkdown (71111.04S)
a. Inspection Scope (1 sample) The inspectors completed a detailed review of the alignment and condition of the Unit 1
'B' train Quench Spray System during a planned test (1OST-13.10A, 'A' train Chemical
Injection System Valve and Pump Operability Check System) affecting the 'A' train on September 19. The inspectors conducted a walkdown of the system to verify that the
critical portions, such as valve positions, switches, and breakers, were correctly aligned in accordance with procedures, and to identify any discrepancies that may have had an
effect on operability. The inspectors also reviewed outstanding maintenance work orders to verify that the
deficiencies did not significantly affect the quench spray system function. In addition, the
inspectors discussed system health with the system engineer and reviewed the condition
report database to verify that equipment alignment problems were being identified and
appropriately resolved. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the
Attachment.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05)
Quarterly Sample Review (71111.05Q)
a. Inspection Scope (5 samples) The inspectors reviewed the conditions of the fire areas listed below, to verify compliance
with criteria delineated in Administrative Procedure 1/2-ADM-1900,
FENOC=s control of transient combustibles and ignition sources, material condition of fire protection equipment including fire detection systems, water-based fire suppression systems, gaseous fire suppression systems, manual
firefighting equipment and capability, passive fire protection features, and the adequacy of compensatory measures for any fire protection impairments. Documents reviewed are
listed in the Attachment: $ Unit 1, Normal Switchgear (Fire Area
CP-1).
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R06 Flood Protection Measures (71111.06)
a. Inspection Scope (1 sample) The inspectors reviewed one sample of flood protection measures for equipment in the
Unit 2 North Safeguards Building and its associated Pipe Tunnel Area on September 19.
This review was conducted to evaluate
- FENOC =s protection of the enclosed safety-related systems from an internal flooding condition. The inspectors performed a walkdown of the area, reviewed the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (
UFSAR),
related internal flooding evaluations, and other related documents. The inspectors
examined the as-found equipment and conditions to ensure that they remained
consistent with those indicated in the design basis documentation, flooding mitigation documents, and risk analysis assumptions. Documents reviewed during the inspection
are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R07 Heat Sink Performance (71111.07)
Annual Sample Review (7111.07A)
a. Inspection Scope (1 sample) The inspectors reviewed a thermal performance test associated with the Unit 1 'B'
Emergency Diesel Generator Jacket Water Heat Exchanger [1EE-E1B] conducted on
September 24, 2008, in accordance with 1/2 ADM-2106, "Heat Exchanger Inspection,"
Rev. 2. The review included an assessment of the testing methodology and verified
consistency with Electric Power Research Institute document
AHeat Exchanger Performance Monitoring Guidelines,@ December 1991, and Generic Letter 89-13, AService Water System Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment.@ The inspectors reviewed inspection results, related condition reports, and component leak test results against applicable acceptance criteria.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71111.11)
.1 Resident Inspector Quarterly Review (71111.11Q)
a. Inspection Scope (1 sample) The inspectors observed Unit 2 licensed operator high-intensity training in the simulator
on July 30. The inspectors evaluated licensed operator performance regarding
command and control, implementation of normal, annunciator response, abnormal, and
emergency operating procedures, communications, technical specification review and
compliance, and emergency plan implementation. The inspectors evaluated the licensee
training personnel to verify that deficiencies in operator performance were identified, and
that conditions adverse to quality were entered into the licensee=s corrective action program for resolution. The inspectors reviewed simulator physical fidelity to assure the simulator appropriately modeled the plant control room. The inspectors verified that the
training evaluators adequately addressed that the applicable training objectives had been
achieved. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Biennial Review by Regional Specialist (71111.11B)
a. Inspection Scope (1 sample) The following inspection activities were performed using
- NUR [[]]
EG 1021, Rev. 9,
Supplement 1,
ALicensed Operator Requalification Program@. The inspector reviewed documentation of operating history since the last requalification
program inspection. The inspector also discussed facility operating events with the resident staff. Documents reviewed included NRC inspection reports, and licensee
condition reports (CRs) that involved human performance issues for licensed operators
to ensure that operational events were not indicative of possible training deficiencies. The inspector reviewed four comprehensive written exams, and the scenarios and job
performance measures administered during the week of August 4, 2008 to ensure the
quality of these exams met or exceeded the criteria established in the Examination
Standards and 10 CFR 55.59. The inspector observed the administration of the
operating exams to two crews. Conformance with Simulator Requirements Specified in 10 CFR 55.46 The inspector observed simulator performance during the conduct of the examinations,
and reviewed simulator discrepancy reports to verify facility staff were complying with the requirements of 10 CFR 55.46. The inspector reviewed a sample of simulator tests
including transients, steady state, component malfunctions, and core performance tests. Conformance with operator license conditions was verified by reviewing the following records: * Seven medical records (five for Unit 1, two for Unit 2). All records were complete, restrictions noted by the doctor were reflected on the individual=s license, and physical exams were given within 24 months. * One license reactivation record. The record indicated the operator conformed to the reactivation requirements of 10 CFR 55.53. On September 3, 2008, the inspector conducted an in-office review of operator
requalification exam results. These results included the annual operating tests and the
comprehensive written exams administered in July and August 2008. The inspection
assessed whether pass rates were consistent with the guidance of NRC Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix I,
SDP).@ The inspector verified that: * Crew failure rate on the dynamic simulator was less than 20%. (Failure rate was 0.0%) * Individual failure rate on the dynamic simulator test was less than or equal to 20%. (Failure rate was 4.7%) * Individual failure rate on the walkthrough test (Job Performance Measures) was less than or equal to 20%. (Failure rate was 0.0%) * Individual failure rate on the comprehensive written exam was less than or equal to 20%. (Failure rate was 2.3%)
More than 75% of the individuals passed all portions of the exam (93% of the individuals passed all portions of the exam).
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation (71111.12)
Routine Maintenance Effectiveness Inspection (71111.12Q)
a. Inspection Scope (2 samples) The inspectors evaluated Maintenance Rule (MR) implementation for the issues listed
below. The inspectors evaluated specific attributes, such as MR scoping,
characterization of failed structures, systems, and components (SSCs), MR risk
characterization of
SSC performance criteria and goals, and appropriateness of
corrective actions. The inspectors verified that the issues were addressed as required by
MR category (a)(1) and (a)(2) performance monitoring. MR System Basis Documents were
also reviewed, as appropriate. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. * On September 11, the restoration of the Unit 2 Emergency Diesel Generators to Maintenance Rule A2 status was evaluated; and * On September 12, a review of the failure-to-start of the Unit 1 Standby Diesel-Driven Air Compressor on January 28, 2008 and the associated maintenance rule evaluation
documented in CR 08-34465.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work Control (71111.13)
a. Inspection Scope (4 samples) The inspectors reviewed the scheduling and control of four activities, and evaluated
their effect on overall plant risk. This review was conducted to ensure compliance with
applicable criteria contained in 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4). The inspectors reviewed the
planned or emergent work for the following activities: $ On July 16, surveillance testing failure of the Unit 2 Emergency Diesel Generator (2-2 EDG) and impact on planned maintenance and Unit 2 plant risk;
$ During the week of July 28, Unit 1 and 2 work-week risk which included motor overhaul and pump work on Unit 1 'A'
EDG modification to
install air start system piping vent valves per engineering change ECP 06-0176-
01;
$ On August 20, Unit 1 risk assessment during EDG testing with the 1B station battery charger out of service; and
$ On August 24, Unit 2 risk assessment with 'B' Auxiliary Feedwater Pump,
FWS-F486 Loop 2 Feedwater Flow Channel IV Control," and failure of 2-
battery charger and associated temporary alteration installation. b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R15 Operability Evaluations (71111.15)
a. Inspection Scope (4 samples) The inspectors evaluated the technical adequacy of selected immediate operability determinations (IOD), prompt operability determinations (POD), or functionality assessments (FA), to verify that determinations of operability were justified, as appropriate. In addition, the inspectors verified that Technical Specifications (TS) limiting
conditions for operation (LCO) requirements and
- UFS [[]]
AR design basis requirements
were properly addressed. Additional documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
This inspection activity represents four samples:
$ On July 31, issues regarding Unit
- CR 08-44045; $ On August 6, issues regarding Unit 1 condensate leakage near Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feed Pump turbine trip valves and its operability, as documented in
- CR 08-44374; $ On August 21, Units 1 and 2 issues regarding Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump operability during postulated tornados and possible ventilation failure. Licensee assessment of industry operating experience (
OE) from Surry Station
documented in
POD and corrective actions regarding surveillance verification log readings and acceptance criteria for Primary Plant Demineralized Water Storage Tank Level Indicators and
associated instrument uncertainties documented in CR 08-43973.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R18 Plant Modifications (71111.18) Temporary Plant Modifications
a. Inspection Scope (1 temporary plant modification sample) The inspectors reviewed the following temporary modifications (TMOD) based on risk
significance. The
CFR 50.59 screening were reviewed against
the system design basis documentation, including the
TS. The
inspectors verified the
- TM [[]]
ODs were implemented in accordance with Administrative
10 (ADM) Procedure, 1/2-ADM-2028,
- 2QSS -42, Quench Spray Chemical Addition Pump Section Isolation Valve. This three-piece ball valve was encapsulated and leak sealed to temporarily repair a body to end-piece leak as documented in
CR
08-39799.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19)
a. Inspection Scope (5 samples) The inspectors reviewed the following activities to determine whether the post-
maintenance tests (PMT) adequately demonstrated that the safety-related function of the
equipment was satisfied given the scope of the work specified, and that operability of the system was restored. In addition, the inspectors evaluated the applicable acceptance
criteria to verify consistency with the associated design and licensing bases, as well as
TS requirements. The inspectors also verified that conditions adverse to quality were
entered into the corrective action program for resolution. The following five maintenance
activities and associated
OST-24.4, Rev. 37, "Steam Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feed Pump Test" following lubrication, tightening, and inspection of governor linkage and fastener
inspection of Unit 1 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump and turbine; * On July 17,
- 2OST [[-36.2, Rev. 54 "Emergency Diesel generator [2]]
- EGS [[*EG2-2] Monthly Test" following repair of oil leak,]]
- 1OST -30.2, Rev. 39, "Reactor Plant River Water Pump 1A Test," after planned maintenance activities; * On July 30, 2
OST-36.1, Rev. 54, "Emergency Diesel Generator [2EGS*EG2-1] Monthly Test," after planned maintenance activities and installation of air start
system piping vent valves per engineering change
OST-13.2, Rev. 27, "Quench Spray Pump [2QSS-P21B] Test" following planned maintenance activities. b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)
a. Inspection Scope (5 samples: 2 in-service testing and 3 routine.) The inspectors observed pre-job test briefings, observed selected test evolutions, and
reviewed the following completed Operation Surveillance Test (OST) and Maintenance
Surveillance packages (MSP). The reviews verified that the equipment or systems were
being tested as required by
UFSAR, and procedural requirements. Documents
reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The following five activities were reviewed:
11 $ On July 3,
- 1OST [[-24.4, Rev. 37, "Steam Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feed Pump Test [1]]
- FW [[-P-2],"]]
- OST [[-13.2, Rev. 27, "Unit 2 Quench Spray Pump [2QSS-P21B] Test;" $ On August 19,]]
- 2OST [[-24.4, Rev.63, "Steam Driven Auxiliary Feed Pump [2]]
- FWE [[*P22] Quarterly Test,"]]
OST-36.1, Rev. 55, "Emergency Diesel Generator [2EGS*EG2-1] Monthly Test."
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
2.
- RADIAT [[]]
- ION [[]]
- SAFE [[]]
TY
Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety [OS]
2OS3 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation and Protective Equipment (71121.03)
a. Inspection Scope (9 samples) During the period August 25 - 28, 2008, the inspector conducted the following activities
to evaluate the operability and accuracy of radiation monitoring instrumentation and the adequacy of the respiratory protection program for issuing self-contained breathing
apparatus (SCBA) to emergency response personnel. Implementation of these
programs was reviewed against the criteria contained in 10 CFR 20, applicable industry
standards, and the licensee=s procedures. * The inspector reviewed the operating procedures, calibration reports, and current source activities/dose rate characterizations for the in-service Shepard Model 89-400
calibrator (No. 9109) and the iDC-HF Electronic Dosimeter Calibrator. The inspector
reviewed the calibration records for the RadCal Electrometers 2025AC and 2025c
and associated ion chambers used in calibrating the Shepard calibrator. * The inspector reviewed the calibration records for selected survey meters, electronic dosimeters, and contamination monitors including small article monitors (SAM-11),
portal contamination monitors (PCM-2 &
RO-
&
DMC-2000), and whole body counting systems
(FastScan and AccuScan
- II ). * The inspector observed technicians performing a calibration of portable ion chambers, electronic dosimeters, and a Personnel Contamination Monitor (
PCM-2).
The inspector confirmed that procedural requirements were met. The inspector also
observed a technician perform daily functional checks on the Shepard 89-400
calibrator, located in the main instrument shop. * The inspector reviewed details of the neutron energy study conducted at the site and the current calibration data for neutron dosimetry that is integrated in the personnel
thermolumeniscent dosimeter (TLD).
2 * The inspector reviewed contamination sampling results to characterize hard-to-measure radioisotopes, to determine if the calibration sources were representative of
the radioisotopes found in the plant source term. Whole body counting system
records and procedures were reviewed to determine if this data was addressed to
ensure that hard-to-measure radioisotopes were given proper dosimetric
consideration. * The inspector evaluated the adequacy of the respiratory protection program regarding the maintenance and issuance of self-contained breathing apparatus
(SCBA) to emergency response personnel. Training and qualification records were
reviewed for control room operators from the operating shifts at each unit and for
selected radiation protection technicians who would wear
- SC [[]]
BAs in the event of an
emergency. The inspector, with the assistance of a respiratory protection technician,
functionally tested and inspected six (6)
- SC [[]]
BAs, staged for use in the fire brigade
room and the controlled area hallway. The inspector verified that the appropriate
number of
- SC [[]]
BAs were staged, and had been inspected. Maintenance and test
records were reviewed for selected
- SC [[]]
BAs. The sample results for breathing air,
used to refill the
CGA-G-7.1-1997 Grade D standards. * The inspector reviewed selected Condition Reports (CR), Nuclear Quality Assessment Quarterly reports, audit, and field observation reports to evaluate the
licensee=s threshold for identifying, evaluating, and resolving problems in implementing the radiation monitoring instrumentation and respiratory protection programs. Included in this review were
- CR =s related to radiation worker and radiation protection technician errors to determine if an observable pattern, traceable to a common cause, was evident. This review was conducted against the criteria contained in 10
CFR 20, TSs, and the
licensee=s procedures b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. 4.
- OTHER [[]]
ACTIVITIES [OA] 4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151) (8 samples total)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for Performance Indicators (PI) listed below
for both Unit 1 and Unit 2. The inspectors reviewed portions of various logs and reports
specified and PI data developed from monthly operating reports, and discussed methods
for compiling and reporting the PIs with cognizant engineering and licensing personnel.
To verify the accuracy of the
PI definitions and
guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, ARegulatory Assessment Indicator Guideline,@ Revision 5, were used for each data element. Documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment.
13 .1 Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems (6 samples) Mitigating Systems Performance Index (MSPI) (Units 1 & 2) The inspectors reviewed portions of the operations logs and raw PI data developed from
monthly operating reports, and train / system unavailability data from the 4th quarter 2007 through the 3rd quarter 2008. Inspectors also reviewed the Consolidated Data Entry
MSPI component risk coefficients for the systems listed below: * Auxiliary feedwater systems [MS08, 2 samples] - Turbine-driven and Motor-driven Auxiliary Feedwater (Units 1 & 2) * Residual heat removal systems [MS09, 2 samples] - Low Head Safety Injection & Recirculation Spray (Units 1 & 2) * Support cooling water systems [MS10, 2 samples] - River Water (Unit 1) & Service Water (Unit 2)
.2 Cornerstone: Occupational Exposure Radiation Safety (1 sample) Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness [OR01] (Site) The inspector reviewed implementation of the licensee=s Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness Performance Indicator (PI) Program. Specifically, the inspector reviewed condition reports, and associated documents, for occurrences involving locked high
radiation areas, very high radiation areas, and unplanned exposures. This review
covered the period from August 2007 through July 2008. This inspection activity
represents the completion of one sample relative to this inspection area, completing the
annual inspection requirement.
.3 Cornerstone: Public Radiation Safety (1 sample) Radiological Environmental Technical Specifications (RETS)/ Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) Radiological Effluent Occurrences [PR01] (Site) The inspector reviewed relevant effluent release reports for the period August 2007
through July 2008, for issues related to the public radiation safety performance indicator,
which measures radiological effluent release occurrences that exceed 1.5 mrem/qtr
whole body or 5.0 mrem/qtr organ dose for liquid effluents; 5 mrads/qtr gamma air dose,
mrad/qtr beta air dose, and 7.5 mrads/qtr for organ dose for gaseous effluents. This
inspection activity represents the completion of one sample relative to this inspection
area, completing the annual inspection requirement. The inspector reviewed the following documents to ensure the licensee met all
requirements of the performance indicator: * Monthly projected dose assessment results due to radioactive liquid and gaseous effluent releases; * Quarterly projected dose assessment results due to radioactive liquid and gaseous effluent releases; and * Dose assessment procedures. b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
14 4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution (71152) (4 samples total)
.1 Daily Review of Problem Identification and Resolution
a Inspection Scope As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, "Identification and Resolution of Problems,"
and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance
issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into
- FEN [[]]
OC's corrective action program. This review was accomplished by reviewing
summary lists of each
FENOC's
computerized CR database.
b. Findings Introduction. A self-revealing
- FEN [[]]
OC failed to properly implement procedures and required actions in planning,
tagging, and electrical system operation. A series of procedural use errors in control of
maintenance, equipment control and electrical system operation resulted in the
inadvertent loss of the 1G 4160VAC (4kV) electrical bus.
Description. On Jun 12, 2008, during the restoration of the Emergency Response Facility (ERF) transformer 3B, operators did not verify the normal supply breaker was closed in accordance with procedure 1/2OM-58E.4.C, Revision 10, "ERFS Transformer
3B Startup," before the alternate supply breaker was opened. This caused the 1G 4kV
bus to lose power, resulting in a partial loss of power to the ERF, Unit 2 station air
system, and Unit 1 radiation monitors.
On June 12, 2008, the '3B' ERF transformer was removed from service for planned
maintenance. To de-energize this transformer, the offsite power to the 1C and 1D 4kV
buses were powered from the Unit Station Service Transformer (USST) 1B and the 1G
4kV bus was cross-tied to the No.1 138kV bus through the 1H 4kV bus. Unit 1 entered a
planned 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> TS 3.8.1, as required. After the transformer maintenance was
completed, the transformer was returned to the operations department for restoration.
During the turnover of the work package from maintenance to operations, the Unit
Supervisor (US) was informed that Duquesne Light Company (DLC) required additional
testing of the 3B ERF transformer not detailed in the work package. The testing required
the 3B
US
contacted personnel after normal working hours to obtain sufficient details to prepare the
transformer for the
WM-1001, Revision 10, "Order Planning Process," requires detailed work scope be
provided. This is to be translated into Protective Tagging Clearances and Operational
Impact, including associated risk. The Unit Supervisor did not have sufficient detail or
the required planning as required by this procedure because the DLC testing was not
covered by the work order or addressed through protective tagging.
Based on discussions and scope of work, the US decided to partially release the
protective tagging clearance to allow
OP-1001, Revision 9, "Clearance/Tagging Program" does not have a provision to
perform a partial release of protective tags. The acceptable methods allowed by
15 procedure are Temporary Lifts or Clearance Revisions to accomplish a partial protective tagging release.
The US briefed the operators that the transformer would be restored using procedure
1/2OM-58E.4.C, Revision 10, "ERFS Transformer 3B Startup" after DLC testing was
complete and all clearances removed. There was no briefing on the use of the correct
procedure to return the 1G bus to the appropriate lineup,1/2OM-58E.4.F, Revision 5,
"Manual Hot Bus Transfer of
KV Busses."
The plant operators proceeded to restore the transformer as directed. When the
operators reached the step in 1/2OM-58E.4.C to close the 138KV Bus 2 supply to the 3B
transformer, the operators recalled that this breaker was closed during DLC testing and
concluded without verification that the breaker was still closed. The supply breaker to the 3B was actually open and had been reopened at the completion of the DLC testing.
Operators proceeded with the tagout restoration and when the cross tie breaker from the
1H bus was opened, the 1G bus inadvertently de-energized.
The cascading procedure errors that occurred that led to the loss of the 1G bus were
incomplete details in the work package as required by
WM-1001, the partial release
of the protective tagout to perform the testing was not allowed by
OP-1001, and
failure to follow the transformer restoration required by 1/2OM-58E.4.C by ensuring
closed the normal supply breaker to transformer 3B.
Corrective actions included a Section Human Performance Success Clock reset,
Operations Management to conduct discussions with operators on the event and
reinforce expectations, Construction Services and Operations Work Management
planners to review the event and applicable procedures with emphasis on organizational
interface and individual responsibilities, and to incorporate switch yard maintenance activities in Readiness Review meetings.
Analysis, This finding is more than minor because it is similar to Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0612, Appendix E, example 3b, since the procedural use errors resulted in
the loss of the 1G 4kV bus. Traditional enforcement does not apply because the issue
did not have an actual safety consequence or the potential for impacting NRC's
regulatory function, and was not the result of any willful violation of NRC requirements.
In accordance with IMC 0609, Attachment 0609.04, "Phase 1 - Initial Screening and
Characterization of Findings," the finding was determined to be of very low risk
significance (Green). The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance
(Green) because the finding was not a design or qualification deficiency, did not
represent a loss of system safety function or loss of a single train for greater than its
allowed technical specification time, and did not screen as potentially risk significant due
to seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating events. Because this finding is of very
low safety significance and has been entered into
- FEN [[]]
OC's corrective action program,
the violation is being treated as a non-cited violation (NCV).
The cause of this finding is related to the cross-cutting area of human performance, in
that
- FEN [[]]
OC failed to follow station procedures resulting in a loss of the 1G 4kV bus
[H.4.(b)].
16 Enforcement. Technical Specification 5.4.1.(a), "Procedures", requires that written procedures be implemented as recommended in Appendix 'A' of Regulatory Guide 1.33,
including Control of Maintenance, Equipment Control and Operation of the Electrical
System. Contrary to this requirement, on June 12, 2008,
- FEN [[]]
OC failed to properly
implement procedures and required actions in planning, tagging, and electrical system
operation which resulted in a loss of the 1G 4kV electrical bus. Because this deficiency
is considered to be of very low significance (Green), and was entered into the corrective
action program (CR-08-41733), this violation is being treated as an
NCV 05000334/2008004-01, Procedure Use Errors Result in Loss of an Electrical Bus) .2 Semi-Annual Trend Review (71152)
a. Inspection Scope (1 sample) The inspectors reviewed site trending results that were complete and available for the
time frame January through June 2008, to determine if trending was appropriately
identified and evaluated by
FENOC's trending program, as
well as other programs such as self-assessments, quality assurance reports, activity
tracking reports, and other program reports that provide useful information, to verify that
existing trends were appropriately captured and scoped by applicable departments,
consistent with the inspectors' assessment from the daily CR and inspection module
reviews, and not indicative of a more significant safety concern. Additionally, the
inspectors verified the performance of site trending against
LP-2001, Rev. 18,
"Corrective Action Program," and
LP-2018, Rev. 03, "Integrated Performance
Assessment /Trending."
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.3 Annual Sample Review (71152)
Review of Emergency Diesel Generator K1 Relay Issues (1 sample)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors selected condition reports (CR) 07-28237, 07-28510, and 07-29477 as a
problem identification and resolution (PI&R) sample for a detailed follow-up review.
EDG 2-2 to flash the generator field due
to a K1 relay failure during a surveillance test on October 10, 2007. CR 07-28510
documented that a new K1 relay was found defective during a quality control (QC)
inspection on the Unit
CR 07-29477 documented
identification of an over heated wire connection found on the Unit 2 rectifier selector
switch (S1) for EDG 2-2.
The inspector assessed
- FEN [[]]
OC's problem identification threshold, cause analyses,
extent of condition reviews, operability determinations, and the prioritization and timeliness of corrective actions to determine whether
- FEN [[]]
OC was appropriately
identifying, characterizing, and correcting problems associated with these issues and
whether the planned or completed corrective actions were appropriate to prevent
17 recurrence. Additionally, the inspectors interviewed cognizant plant personnel regarding the identified issues. Specific documents reviewed are listed in the attachment to this
report.
b. Findings and Observations No findings of significance were identified. The inspectors determined that
- FEN [[]]
OC
properly implemented their corrective action process regarding the initial discovery of the
above issues. The CR packages were complete and included cause evaluations,
operability determinations, extent of condition reviews, corrective actions and planned corrective actions. Additionally, the elements of the CR packages were detailed and
thorough. Corrective actions were timely and appropriate to prevent recurrence of the
above issues. Corrective actions addressed immediate equipment concerns as well as
improvements to procurement requirements and specifications for future component
purchases. The inspectors determined that corrective actions included replacement of
the Unit 2 K1 relays during refueling outage 2R13 (May 2008) with new style relays. Unit
K1 relays are scheduled to be replaced during the next refueling outage. Temporary
modifications are in place for Unit 1 to ensure operability of the current K1 relays until their replacement. Also, the inspectors reviewed recent completed EDG surveillances
and noted no subsequent K1 relay failures. The inspectors determined that adequate
tracking mechanisms are in place to ensure all corrective actions will be completed. Review of Radiation Monitoring Systems Reliability Issues (1 sample)
a. Inspection Scope As a result of the licensee identifying declining reliability trends, increased maintenance, and obsolescence for various instruments comprising the licensee's radiation monitoring
system, the inspector reviewed the licensee's actions taken to address these issues. The
licensee generated CR 08-32745 to address the declining health indicator for the
radiation monitors and the need for additional management review and actions.
The inspector reviewed radiation monitoring system (System No. 43) quarterly health
reports, relevant Latent Issues Review Reports, self-assessment of equipment failures
report, action plans to improve equipment reliability, and related condition reports. Additionally, an inspector attended the Plant Health Committee meeting, held on
September 30, 2008, that addressed management authorizing actions to improve
radiation monitoring system reliability. The inspector interviewed cognizant managers, system engineers, and control room
operators regarding radiation monitoring system performance issues, and walked down
selected instrumentation to verify equipment operability and assess instrument material condition.
b. Findings and Observations No findings of significance were identified. The inspectors determined that problems with
radiation monitoring equipment were identified in a timely manner, in that condition
reports were conservatively generated, and compensatory actions were appropriately
implemented. Additionally, the causes of component failures and spurious alarms have
been appropriately evaluated, and corrective actions have been developed,
18 commensurate with the system significance of the individual instrument. Plant radiological conditions and effluent release pathways were being properly monitored
through the use of in-place instrumentation and sampling programs. A well defined
strategy has been developed to correct repetitive component failures and spurious
alarms. This strategy includes upgrading components of selected monitors, replacing
obsolete instruments with current technology, and abandonment of unnecessary
monitors/channels.
Issue Followup of 2FWE-P23B Water Intrusion into Oil System (1 sample)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors selected
PI&R sample for detailed
follow-up.
MDAFW) pump outboard seal leak-off drain being plugged, the potential of water in the
oil, and pump inoperability. CR 07-12720 documents five gallons of water subsequently discovered in the pump oil reservoir. An operator discovered the condition by identifying
a high lube oil reservoir level during rounds on January 15, 2007.
The inspector assessed
- FEN [[]]
OC's problem identification threshold, root cause analysis,
extent of condition review, operability determination, and the prioritization and timeliness of corrective actions to determine whether
- FEN [[]]
OC was appropriately identifying,
characterizing, and correcting related issues associated with this event. The inspector
reviewed completed corrective actions and their effectiveness in preventing recurrence.
Additionally, the inspectors interviewed cognizant plant personnel regarding the identified
issues.
b. Findings and Observations No findings of significance were identified. The inspectors determined that
- FEN [[]]
OC
properly implemented the corrective action process regarding initial discovery and
subsequent investigation. The CRs and root cause were complete and of sufficient
detail. They included cause evaluations, operability determinations, extent of condition reviews, immediate and planned corrective actions. Corrective actions were timely and
appropriate to prevent recurrence of the above issues. Corrective actions addressed
immediate equipment concerns as well as improvements to procedures and the training
of personnel. The licensee determined the cause to be a valve out of position due to
improper procedure use. This caused boric acid, intended for the Unit 2 steam
generators, to accumulate and plug a seal leak-off drain, resulting in water intrusion into
the Unit 2 'B'
- MDA [[]]
FW pump oil reservoir. The inspectors determined that appropriate
immediate corrective actions were taken for the water intrusion event and the
assessment of boric acid impact on the system condition. Long-term corrective actions
include changes to chemical addition procedures, training on use of human error
prevention tools, and improvements to the leak-off drainage system. The inspectors
determined that adequate tracking mechanisms are in place to ensure all corrective
actions will be completed.
4OA3 Followup of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion (71153) (2 samples total)
.1 Event Followup (1 sample)
19 Loss of Emergency Sirens Due to Power Outages Caused by High Winds - Sept. 15 Inspectors observed station response to 55 of 119 alert notification sirens being
inoperable due to loss of power resulting from high winds. The high winds were a result
of remnants of Hurricane Ike passing through the surrounding 10 mile emergency
planning zone of the station. High winds did not adversely affect plant operation.
Inspectors verified that appropriate compensatory actions (backup route alerting) were
implemented and that a prompt recovery plan was developed. Inspectors reviewed
station procedures, emergency action levels and reporting requirements and determined
appropriate actions were taken. The licensee reported this event (EN 44487) to the
CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). All sirens were returned to service.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Review of Licensee Event Reports (LERs) (1 sample) (Closed) LER 05000412/2008-001-00. Unplanned Actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System During Plant Startup On May 24, 2008, Unit 2 experienced an unplanned Engineered Safety Feature P14
actuation due to high steam generator water level during a plant startup, resulting in an
automatic start of two auxiliary feedwater system pumps. This is an expected, but unplanned response to a P14 actuation. This event is reportable under 10CFR50.73
(a)(2)(iv)(A) as a condition that resulted in actuation of the emergency feedwater system.
Since the condition was valid and the auxiliary feedwater system is considered an emergency feedwater system that does not normally run, this event is reportable. The
most probable cause of the high level and P14 actuation was inadequate steam
generator level control using the bypass regulating valve at low power and the main
turbine unlatched. The
NCV (NCV 05000412/2008003-04, Failure to Properly Implement Abnormal Operating Procedure
during Plant Startup) in NRC inspection report 05000334 & 412 / 2008003. The
inspectors reviewed this
LER is
closed.
4OA5 Other
.1 Units 1 and 2 Extended Power Uprate (EPU) Closeout (IP 71004)
a. Inspection Scope On July 19, 2006, the NRC approved the Beaver Valley license amendment regarding an
8-percent
- ADAMS [[]]
ML062020066) and issued
the associated Safety Evaluation (ADAMS ML061720376). The inspectors have
observed and reviewed selected activities throughout the phased EPU implementation
between both units. The inspectors have determined, based on a sample review of
these activities and comparison of records and tests with the current licensing
documents, that licensee commitments have been met regarding the Unit 1 and Unit 2
EPU within its approved
20 implementation timeline. Documents reviewed and a consolidated list of
inspection.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Licensee Contract Expiration (IP 92709)
a. Inspection Scope The Inspectors implemented inspection activities to evaluate the adequacy of licensee
strike contingency plans in preparation for the International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers (IBEW) contract expiration at midnight September 30, 2008. The
- IB [[]]
EW
represents over 400 hundred personnel onsite, including operators, maintenance, and
radiation protection personnel. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's plan regarding
qualified personnel for safe operation of the station, security, and conformance with
existing regulation and TSs.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.3 Independent Effectiveness Assessment of the Training Required by the
EA-07-199 (Order) that
formalized commitments made by
- FEN [[]]
NRC's May 14, 2007 Demand for
Information (DFI). The Order required, in part, that the licensee conduct regulatory sensitivity training for
selected
FENOC employees to ensure those employees identified and
communicate information that has the potential for regulatory impact at any
- FEN [[]]
OC
nuclear site or within the nuclear industry to the NRC. This requirement was inspected
and documented in
IR05000346/2007005 also
lists all required Order actions. As part of the NRC's ongoing activities to monitor the licensee's implementation of the
Order, the inspector interviewed ten individuals who had received the training in
November 2007 to determine how effective the training had been in delivering its
message. The inspector posed four questions to each individual: 1. What did you take
away from the training? 2. Has it changed your daily work activities? 3. Do you have
any specific examples? 4. Has the training changed how you interact with your peers? In addition, to determine if the licensee was following its Business Practice, the inspector
reviewed the assessment forms generated when an issue was brought to
- FEN [[]]
OC's
Regulatory Affairs group for evaluation.
21 b. Findings and Observations Based on the documentation reviews and observations, the inspectors concluded that:
The training was effective at instilling within the FirstEnergy management an enhanced awareness/sensitivity to issues and the need to ensure that any issues that could
potentially impact Davis-Besse, Perry, or Beaver Valley are promptly brought to
- FEN [[]]
OC's
attention. Each of the ten individuals interviewed indicated that they were much more
sensitive to ensuring all potentially affected organizations or individuals are aware of
issues and ongoing activities, with specific emphasis in those issues potentially affecting
the nuclear facilities. Each individual indicated that asking who else needs to be aware of an issue has become a standard practice in day to day activities. While there were
few examples of specific issues actually being brought to Regulatory Affairs' attention,
individuals identified numerous items where they or others had raised the questions of
who else needs to be aware of the issue. All individuals indicated that it has become an
expected practice during peer meeting/interactions to question the extent to which
potentially impacted organizations have been informed of issues. Issues raised to the Regulatory Affairs organization are appropriately reviewed for
applicability to the nuclear facilities. Further, in a proactive move, the Regulatory Affairs organization has implemented a practice of attending meetings where issues that could
affect other nuclear facilities would likely arise. These results are being documented in inspection reports for Davis-Besse
(05000346/2008004), Perry (05000440/2008004) and Beaver Valley (05000334 and
No findings of significance were identified. 4OA6 Management Meetings .1 Licensed Operator Requalification
The inspector presented the inspection results of 1R11.2 to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on August 7, 2008. The licensee
acknowledged the conclusions and observations presented. No proprietary information
is presented in this report.
.2 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation and Protective Equipment The inspector presented the inspection results of 2S03 to Mr. Kevin Ostrowski, Director
of Site Operations, and other members of
- FEN [[]]
OC staff, at the conclusion of the
inspection on August 28, 2008. The licensee acknowledged the conclusions and
observations presented. No proprietary information is presented in this report.
.3 Quarterly Inspection Report Exit On October 30, 2008, the inspectors presented the normal baseline inspection results to
Mr. Peter Sena, Beaver Valley Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee
staff. The licensee acknowledged the conclusions and observations presented. The
2 inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not retained at the conclusion of the inspection period.
4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations The following violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by the
licensee and is a violation of
VI of
the
NUREG-1600, for being dispositioned as a non-cited
violation (NCV). * 10 CFR 55.21, "Medical Examination," requires in part that, "A licensee shall have a medical examination by a physician every two years." This period expires at the end
of the calendar month of the two year anniversary of the previous physical. Contrary to 10 CFR 55.21, "Medical Examination," the licensee identified that two
licensed reactor operators had expired licensed operator physicals. One licensed
reactor operator had performed licensed duties for thirty two (32) hours after the
physical had elapsed. The other licensed operator had not performed licensed duties
with an expired physical. The licensee took immediate corrective actions to have the
operators examined by a physician and there were no adverse changes in the
operators' physical conditions since the last physical. Based upon this, the violation
was of very low safety significance. The licensee entered this issue into their
corrective action program as CRs 08-45075 and 08-45291. This is a licensee-
identified violation (Green),
- ATTACH [[]]
- MENT [[:]]
- SUPPLE [[]]
- MENTAL [[]]
- INFORM [[]]
- SUPPLE [[]]
- MENTAL [[]]
- INFORM [[]]
- ATION [[]]
- KEY [[]]
- POINTS [[]]
- OF [[]]
CONTACT Licensee personnel
LOR Program Administrator
R. Bologna Manger Plant Engineering
R. Brosi Director, Site Improvement
D. Canan Supervisor, Respiratory Protection
S. Checketts Operations Manager
T. Cotter Superintendent, Electrical
K. DeBerry Nuclear Engineer
M. Dzumba Systems Engineer, Radiation Monitoring Systems
R. Fedin Licensing Engineer
R. Freund Supervisor, Radiation Protection Services
B. Furdak Quality Assurance Assessor
J. Holbert Senior Radiation Protection Technician
S. Hovanec Plant/Systems Engineering Supervisor
C. Keller Regulatory Compliance Manager
EDG Systems Engineer
J. Lebda Radiation Protection Services Supervisor
RETS/REMP Program
R. Lubert Plant Engineering Supervisor
K. Lynch Design Engineer
M. Manoleras Director Engineering
J. Mauck Compliance Engineer
E. McFarland Simulator Support
K. Mitchell Sr. Nuclear Engineer
R. Moore Radiation Protection Supervisor
B. Murtagh Design Supervisor
K. Ostrowski Director, Site Operations
EDG Systems Engineer
W. Rudolph Superintendent Operations Training
R. Schilling Radiation Protection Supervisor P. Sena Site Vice President
B. Sepelak Supervisor, Regulatory Compliance
B. Tuite Training Manager
Other Personnel
NRC Region
- LIST [[]]
- OF [[]]
- ITEMS [[]]
- AND [[]]
- DISCUS [[]]
OA2.1) Closed 05000412/2008001-00
- LIST [[]]
- OF [[]]
- DOCUME [[]]
- NTS [[]]
- REVIEW [[]]
Section 1R04: Equipment Alignment Procedures 2OST-36.7, "Offsite Power Distribution," Rev. 11
Drawings 10080-RM-413-2, Rev. 13
Other
- BV [[]]
PS Maintenance log and Condition Report database for Unit 1 'B' Quench Spray
2nd Quarter 2008 System Health Report
Section 1R05: Fire Protection Procedures
CPBX-794, "Condensate Polishing Building Fire Area CP-1," Rev. 0
Other
OM-53C.4A.75.2, "Acts of Nature-Flood," Rev. 24 Drawings 8700-RC-18A, Rev. 11, 8700-RC-19A, Rev. 10, 8700-RC-19B, Rev. 8
8700-RC-30D, Rev. 7
A-3 Section 1R07: Heat Sink Performance Calculations PGT-2002-1520
Drawings 8700-RM-436-4A, Rev. 12, 8700-RM-436-4B, Rev. 12
Section 1R11: Licensed Operator Requalification Program Procedures
OP-1002, Normal Operations Conduct of Operations
Other Crew Performance Tracking Checklist
Section 1R12: Maintenance Rule Implementation Condition Reports 07-21726 07-22420 07-28237 07-29477 07-31825 06-02525
06-10449 07-31825
Section 1R13:Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work Control Condition Reports 08-42818 08-44374 08-43941
Other BV1/2 Maintenance Logs dated, July 16, July 28-31, August 20, and August 24
BV1/2 Operations Logs dated, July 8, July 16, July 28-31, August 20, and August 24
BV1/2 Maintenance Risk Profiles for weeks of July 14, July 28, August 18, and August 25
Section 1R15: Operability Evaluations Condition Reports 08-43941 08-44374 08-43995 08-44045 08-44059
Work Orders 600480693
Section 1R18: Plant Modifications Condition Reports 08-39799 08-40030 08-40492 Procedures 1/2 CMP-75-Leak Repair-1M, "On-Line Leak Repair Procedure"
Drawings RM-0085B, "Flow Dia-Containment Depressurization Sys," Rev. 29
RM-0413-002, "Valve Op No. Dia-Quench Spray System," Rev.15
A-4 Other
QSS-42," Rev. 0
Team Inc. Design package for 2QSS-42, Engineering Order Number 59249
Section 1EP6: Drill Evaluation Condition Reports 08-47496 08-47439
Section
HPP-4.01.009, Rev 2 Model 89-400, Gamma Calibration System
1/2-HPP-4.03.015, Rev 2 Portable Ion Chamber Calibration and Use
1/2-HPP-3.04.002, Rev 8 Bioassay Administration
1/2-HPP-6.02.002, Rev 7 FastScan Calibration and Routine Operations
1/2-HPP-6.02-004, Rev 7 AccuScan II Calibration and Routine Operations
1/2-HPP-4.02.018, Rev
DC-HF Calibrator Calibration and Use
1/2-HPP-4.04.023, Rev 2 Eberline Personnel Contamination Monitor (PCM-2)
1/2-ADM-1626, Rev 1 Respiratory Protection Program
1/2-HPP-3.07.003, Rev 1 Airborne Radioactivity Sampling
1/2-HPP-3.10.013, Rev 2 MSA Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus
1/2-HPP-3.10.027, Rev 1 Inspection and Repair of
RP-0009, Rev 1 Electronic Alarming Dosimeter Control
1/2-ADM-1601, Rev 18 Radiation Protection Standards
Calibration Records: SAM-11: Serial Nos. 139, 140, 290, 135
E-520 Serial No. 5123
RO-2 Serial Nos. 6266, 4522, 2727
RO-2A Serial Nos. 1174, 1549
RO-20: Serial Nos. 4176, 6141
PCM-2 Serial Nos. 536, 355, 288, 357, 588
SPM-906: Serial Nos. 071, 030, 104, 026, 103, 704, 103
DMC-2000 Serial Nos. 673242
FastScan whole body counting system
AccuScan whole body counting system
OJ134064, OJ134046
Other Documents: Unit 1 and Unit 2 Radiation Monitoring System Health 1st Quarter Report 2008
Site Radiation Monitoring System Status Report (September 2006)
Personnel Respirator Qualifications/Training Records
Air Quality Record dated 08/08/2008
Latent Issues Review Report - Radiation Monitoring System
Action Plans - Unit 1 and Unit 2 Radiation Monitor System Reliability
A-5 Condition Reports:
- SC [[]]
BAs:
08-43301 08-42311 08-40983 08-40198 08-38612 08-38170
08-35038 07-28154 07-26079 07-24636 07-20187 07-15390
08-32745
Radiation Instruments:
08-45487 05-01158 07-26771 08-41867 07-31350 07-31121
07-30988 07-30383 07-30362 07-29367
Nuclear Oversight Quarterly Assessment Report/Audit:
PA-07-03
SA-08-043, Snapshot Assessment - Radiation Monitoring System Failures
Nuclear Quality Assessment Field Observation Reports:
BV220062819
Section
NOP-LP-2001, Corrective Action, Rev. 18
Design Basis Documents
EDGs, Rev. 8
Engineering Change Packages 07-0309-01, Remove Covers on
AC Shutdown Contactors, Rev. 0
07-0315,
BV2 Temporary ECP to Modify Diesel Generator K1 Relays, Rev. 0
07-0327-01, Replace K1 Relay
PNL-2DIGEN-1A-K1, Rev. 0
07-0327-002, Replacement
EDG KI Relays, Rev. 2
07-0345-02, Temporary Mod. EDG 2-1 S1 Bypass for Rectifier Bank 1 Restoration, Rev. 0
07-0346, Temporary Mod. EDG 2-1 S1 Bypass for Rectifier Bank 1 Restoration, Rev. 0
08-0095-001, Replacement
EDG K1 Relays, Rev. 1
08-0095-002, Replacement
EDG K1 Relays, Rev. 1
Drawings 10080-E-12F, Elementary Diagram - Diesel Generator 2-1, Rev. 20
10080-E-12K, Elementary Diagram - Diesel Generator 2-2, Rev. 16
10080-E-12P, Elementary Diagram - Diesel Generator 2-1
- EXT [[]]
CONN, Rev. 11
10080-E-12Q, Elementary Diagram - Diesel Generator 2-2, Rev. 6
10080-RE-14A, Sh. 1, U-2 Wiring Diagram Emergency Diesel Generator No. 1, Rev. 19
10080-RE-14D, Sh. 4, U-2 Wiring Diagram Emergency Diesel Generator No. 1, Rev. 9
10080-RE-14K, Sh. 6, U-2 Wiring Diagram Emergency Diesel Generator No. 1, Rev. 1
10080-RE-14AD, Sh. 4, U-2 Wiring Diagram Emergency Diesel Generator No. 2, Rev. 6
10080-RE-14AK, U-2 Wiring Diagram -
DIGEN-2A, Rev. 1
10080-LSK-22-6N, Unit 2 Logic Diagram Emergency Generator Starting, Rev. 8
2001.300-000-062, Sh. 2,
HV Series Boot Exciter Interconnection Diagram, Rev. A
A-6 Drawing Update Notice 07-0327-001-001, for Drawing 10080-E-0012P
07-0327-001-002, for Drawing 10080-E-0012F
07-0327-001-004, for Drawing 2001.300-000-062
07-0327-001-005, for Drawing 10080-RE-14A
07-0327-001-006, for Drawing 10080-RE-14D
07-0327-001-007, for Drawing 10080-RE-14K
07-0327-001-009, for Drawing LSK-022-006N
07-0327-002-001, for Drawing 10080-E-0012Q
07-0327-002-002, for Drawing 10080-E-0012K
07-0327-002-004, for Drawing 2001.300-000-062
07-0327-002-006, for Drawing 10080-RE-14AD
07-0327-002-007, for Drawing 10080-RE-14AK
07-0327-002-009, for Drawing LSK-022-006N
Interim Drawing Change Notice 2-LSK-022-006N-EO2-0141-03, for Drawing LSK-022-006N
2-LSK-022-006N-EO7-0008-01, for Drawing LKS-022-006N
Completed Surveillance Procedures 1OST-36.1, Unit 1 Diesel Generator No. 1 Monthly Test, Rev. 49, Completed 06/25/08
- 2OST [[-36.1, Unit 2 Emergency Diesel Generator [2]]
- EGS [[*EG2-1] Monthly Test, Rev. 54, Completed 07/02/08]]
- 2OST [[-36.2, Unit 2 Emergency Diesel Generator [2]]
EGS*EG2-2] Monthly Test, Rev. 54, Completed 07/16/08 and 07/18/08
Condition Reports 07-28237 07-28287 07-28510 07-29510 07-29477 08-32745
07-31121 07-31112 07-31083 07-31040 07-30999 07-30988
07-30911 07-30847 07-30823 07-30484 07-30447 07-30431
07-30390 07-30362 07-30322 07-30318 07-29367 07-29335
07-29481 07-26305 08-34184 08-34809 08-35042 08-35155
08-35155 08-35674 08-36538 08-36611 08-36612 08-37021
08-37070 08-37199 08-37326 08-37619 08-37646 08-37677
08-40286 08-40489 08-41416 08-43396 08-43518 08-37304
08-37026 08-36471 07-26326
Work Orders 200285126
200286523 200286543 200287200 200287273 Other 1OM-43.1C Unit 1 Major Components of Radiation Monitoring System
- UFSAR Chapter 11, Rev 24 for Unit 1, and Rev 16 for Unit 2, entitled Radioactive Wastes and Radiation Protection Snapshot Assessment (
BV-SA-08-043), Equipment Failures versus PM Template Strategy
Latent Issues Review Report,
- BV [[]]
PS Radiation Monitoring System
Quarterly System Health Reports for System 43, Unit 1 and Unit 2 Radiation Monitoring System
Unit 1 and Unit 2 Operator Burden Reports
A-7 Improving Unit 1 Radiation Monitor Reliability Improving Unit 2 Radiation Monitor Reliability
Section
EPP/I-1a/b, Rev. 11, "Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions;"
1/2-EPP-I-2, Rev. 31, "Unusual Event;"
1/2-EPP-I-3, Rev. 29, "Alert;"
Condition Reports 08-46291
Other
- NRC [[]]
CFR 50.72 & 50.73, October 2000
Section
NRC IP 92709, Licensee Strike Contingency plans
Other Emergency Operating Procedure for Labor Action
- BV [[]]
PS Labor Action Contingency Plans; Operations, Security, Compliance
2-SPT-52-40441-3, Escalation to
MWt, Unit 2, WO 200227803
- EPU [[]]
SE, Section 4 Regulatory Commitments
EPU Implementation Plan & Power Ascension Testing (LAR 302 & 173), dated March 10, 2006
Cross-Reference of Beaver Valley (05000334/412) Inspection Reports which contain EPU-related Inspection Activities 2008004
2008003
2007003
2007002 2006008 2006005
2006004
2006003 2005008 2005006
2004006
2004005 2003005 2003003
A-8
- LIST [[]]
- OF [[]]
- ACRONY [[]]
BVPS Beaver Valley Power Station
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CR Condition Report(s)
EDG Emergency Diesel Generator
- FEN [[]]
- IB [[]]
EW International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers
IMC Inspection Manual Chapter
IOD Immediate Operability Determinations
IP Inspection Procedure
IR Inspection Report
ISI Inservice Inspection
LCO Limiting Conditions for Operations
LER Licensee Event Report
MSP Maintenance Surveillance Package
NEI Nuclear Energy Institute
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission
OST Operations Surveillance Test
PCM Personnel Contamination Monitor
PI Performance Indicator
PI&R Problem Identification and Resolution
PMT Post Maintenance Testing
POD Prompt Operability Determinations
QC Quality Control
- SC [[]]
BA Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus
SDP Significance Determination Process
- TM [[]]
- UFS [[]]