ML19294B273

Forwards Documents Re Proposed Reactor Export,Including C Pell 791113 Ltr to Ctr for Development Policy

ML19294B273
Person / Time
Site:	05000574
Issue date:	01/30/1980
From:	Foote V CENTER FOR DEVELOPMENT POLICY
To:	Ahearne J NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
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ML19294B274	List: ML19294B273 ML19294B298 ML19294B301 ML19294B305 ML19294B312 ML19294B321 ML19294B329
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NUDOCS 8002280122
Download: ML19294B273 (2)

Text

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. . ORT.lM?0RT. I v.I.O. c. . 0. .0. .H,97-January 30, 1980 Chairman John Ahearne Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1717 H St., N W.

Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Mr. Ahearne:

Enclosed are some materials related to the Philippine reactor issue.

Sincerely, k

Virginia B. Foote VBF/hms Enclosures

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Dear Ms. Foote:

Thank you for your letter regarding the proposed export of a nuclear reactor to the Philippines.

I am very sympathetic tc your concern over this sale, and I do hope that it will not take place. In this connection, I have written to the Nuclear Regu-latory Commission to express my view that the Commis-sion has the necessary legislative authority to consider the health, safety and environmental aspects of this sale. A copy of my letter is enclosed.

As you may be aware, the Congress could act directly to stop this sale only in the event that the NRC cannot make a decision. In that event, the President would have to make a decision; and that decision could be subject to a Congressional veto.

With every good wish.

Ever sincerely, bN Claiborne Pell Enclosure

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Ucvember 9, 1979 Mr. Carlton Kammerer Director, Office of Congressional Affairs Nuclear Regulatory Commissien Washington, D. C. 20555

Dear Mr. Karmerer:

I appreciate the opportunity tc respond to ycur invita-tion of October 25 to corren on jurisdictional and precedural issues relating to the export of a nuclear power reactor tc the Philippine Islands. I would like to acdress several of the procedural and jurisdictional issues raised in the SRC's Order of October 19, 1979, on the proposed Westinghousa export to the Philippines.

My comments are made primarily frca the standpoint of U.S. foreign policy and national security which may be affected b.v this r" articular export and which certainiv. can be affected by how the NRC considers matters of health and safe:y ,.and environmental er.,ects in cecicing upon ruture export 1 censes.

It appears to me that the Cc= mission has substantial inferred authority, and accompanying responsibility, to con-sider these factors. In my view, the Cornission has the u .

or so c..arting :.ts sansitive and c.emancing responsibl.,ity co.. sideration of health, safety and rnvironmental aspects for major nuclear exports as to avoid the risks to U.S. foreign relations o.se.curity and foreic.n c.olicy which could arise from a dangerous accident with a nuclear reactor exported frcm the United States. At the same time, the SRC has the respensibility to minimize other risks to U.S. non-proliferation objectives.

Were NRC licensing decisicas to jeopardine the reputation of the United States as a reliable nuclear supplier, it cculd

/ diminish an important source cf the influence the United States can bring to bear in .ersuadin: c her naricns ::

ade-t e and to sue.cor t stronc ncn-::ci:fera:icn measures.

Concerning the relaticn c1 S.Z sa cr: licensing de:ici:ns to U.S. foreign policy interests, .: _s '.o secre: tha: Our foreign relations today are in a time Of turmcil anf Cha.ge, P

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particularly with the third world, or develeping naticns.

There is pressure upon the United States and other industrial countries not to raise barriers to the transfers of modern technologies which developing states hope can lift them cut of their poverty. On the other hand, it wculd be imprufen:

to ignore the potential consequences for U.S. foreign relations and policy, and perhaps even for U.S. security, were a nuclear power plant exported frcm the United States to experienca a Three Mile Island type of accider.t or worse. The voices of many countries would quickly shifu to criticism of the United States for permitting a dangerous ~ export with insufficient attention to risks to public health and safety and to the environment. We could expect strong political pressures for relief from the United States through claims for compensation and for aid in cleaning up and repa'. ring the damage caused.

Such reactions would exacerbate U.S. foreign relaticns and to might well be seized upon by hostila nations in an effort embarrass and discredit this country, and thereby to weaken our influence abroad.

Considering the serious political and foreign policy damage that could be expected from a dangerous accident with a U.S. supplied reactor, there are solid grounds for the Cem-mission carefully and diligently to inquire into the health and safety and environment effects of the pending export to the Philippine Islands, as well as similar future exports to other developing countries. In my opinion, the United States should not apply less strict criteria to our licensing of the export of nuclear power reactors than we do to licensing them for domestic use.

Beyond these general foreign policy considerations, I would like to address three of the specific issues raised in the NRC's October 19 order:

Issue 1, NRO authority and obligation to consider health, safety and environmental factors in licensing the export.

-A reading of-the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as amended and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 provide sclid basis for an inferred NRC authority and obligation to consider health, safety and environmental factors in licensing of the export. I refer to sections 103 and 104 of the A omic Energy Act of 1954. Each provides that no export license may be issued if in the opinicn of the Commission the issuance wculd be inimical to the ccamon def ense and security or to the health and safety of the public. The Nuclear Scn-Proliferation Act takes note of environmental matters in Sec:icn 10 4 '1; (3 ',

which directs the President zo' devel:p internaticnal app caches to meeting future wcrid nuclear fuel neefs, which pr:vifa for feasible and environmentally sound a, preaches' for the siting, development and managemen: cf certain uclear facill:ies.

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Section 407 also directs the President in f his renegotia-tion of agreements for nuclear cooperation, to seek cooperation between the parties in protecting the international environment from radioactive, chemical or ther=21 contamination arising from peaceful nuclear activities. Since some nuclear pcwer reactors exported to developing countries could be located.

near national boundaries and on international waters, this provision further supports the inferred NRC authority and responsibility to consider health and safety and environmental effects.

Specific Comment: Issue 3. Matters for NRC consideration.

Concerning issues for the NRC to examine with respect to major nuclear exports to the Philippine Islands, the presence of a U.S. naval installation not at a great distance from the proposed site can be expected to raise the question about the possible risks to health and safety of U.S. personnel there from a major nuclear accident. This issue should be well ventilated in the NRC's hearing.

It could also be useful to have the NRC examine the sources of emergency assistance to the Philippine Islands should a Three Mile Island type accident occur. What help could be expected from the United States and its nuclear industry, from the International Atcmic Energy Agency, and from other governments and nuclear industries? Have some con-tingency plans been made, or would the Philippines have to improvise during the frantic phase of an accident?

Issue 4. Procedural aspects.

Any substantial consideration by the NRC of health and safety considerations and environmental effects of U.S. nuclear exports abroad implies that the NRC must have open access to relevant information from the importing country. To assure such access, the NRC sI3ht consider procedures Ghich could enable it to request the appearance of representatives of the importing government and its nuclear industry at the NRC's hearings. Such appearances would be a novelty in terms of traditional Federal regulation. Nonetheless, the NRC should examine whether difficulties could be resolved in order +.o obtain the benefit of direct access to views and information from foreign principals.

Ever sincerely, li vs' i(v~ /*

01aiborne Fell Chairman, Subecmmittee on Arms Control. Oceans. Interna:icnal Operations and Environmen: