ML20004F430

Forwards Various Documents Re Phillipine Reactor.Ucs Speech & Clippings,Congressional Ltrs & Petition for Rehearing Encl

ML20004F430
Person / Time
Site:	05000574
Issue date:	04/28/1981
From:	Foote V CENTER FOR DEVELOPMENT POLICY
To:	James Shea NRC OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS (OIP)
Shared Package
ML20004F431	List: ML20004F430
References
NUDOCS 8106180338
Download: ML20004F430 (31)

Text

. .

A Board of f" ' ' '

U w-Thomas R. Amber enter Tor . eve o ament .]o.1cy -

Anome, Asar and Boon Stephen Baddle Coaeuham. Pnudelphe Jack Blum Anomey Sum and hash E.agente Bradford Loucata Awmandna. Va Mary Anna Conwen s = = Cone Mao = Ca April 28, 1981 Marlon Edey Leagw of Connevanon vown wouunyon.D C.

Theodore Jacobe Anomej seoup. Go6assen. Jacobs.

hw and P""'

James R. Shea, Director

, ,",,0 Office of International Programs

• U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

,,,,,,,, M*d' Commission s, e rore , n.a.ons Comr nee Washington, D. C. 20555 und.av Matti n Cemer Descia wasnwon D C.

Dear Jim Shea:

Ward Morehoisse Prei. dent Couned on amemanonal and Pubbc Altar. I enclose Various reports, Clippings, and letters

%p*',,d L*",

E on the Philippine reactor that I thought may be of wain *ce D C- interest to you.

Artetotle Stelmanidte Ann c s.+ c, .s,. 3 The fight goes on!

Arisie hl wmer. wannervan. D C Sincerely, Advisory Board Robert Alvaraa d- D t,,v,,,,,,,,,%W Virginia B. Foote Gordon Aderne Prowet Deecice Cmi nn Ec- Pnorttie, VBF/hms Barry Commoner

"" C'","L'"JM

Enclosures:

Congressional letters Joseph T. Eldridge Bob Pollard speech & clips

"*" " *T,,C Petition for rehearing of Philippine case l

Richard Femandem Meusier. Onned Church of Chrs Alan McGowan

Presserit Scwnnsts Insmute i

ke Putec intorwenon Martin M. McLaughlin l Se sce Feho.

Owrwu D veogrnem Cound l Neil McMullen imemasonal Divmon.

Saocns' Pta9mmg Annoaanon Francea E. Neely l Lees.aove Secre'ary Fnenas Commmee on Nanne t egn. anon John Nicolopoulos Start Masw of Greece te ins Unned Nancris Richard Pollock bectu. Crmca! Mais Jack Sangster Newd tarecue Fes em Ne. Pnennes .

Al6ce Tepper Martin l Deector Cw.c.ce Econen c Pnews M """ 8 3, "c*3d'"*" 9IC loMt- St bWW g~D< hect'b eY.YiNSC 2hv:& Sr., MS. Washington. D.C. 20002 (202) 547-6406

81061803 %

ADDRESS OF ROBERT D. POLLARD, NUCLEAR SAFETY ENGINEER UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS ON THE

, EATAAi4 NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ROTARY CLUB OF MANILA -

March 19, 1981 President Balatbat, distinguished members of the Rotary Club, ladies and gentlemen:

I am honored and pleased to have the opportunity to' address the Rotary Club of Manila, My last c' sit to the Philippines was in 1964 and the circumstances were much dif f erent. I rode a crippled nuclear powered C

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submarine into Subic Bay and spent much of my time in Subic repairing it. I did not have a chance to see very much of your beautiful country. However , a t leas t that time , we Americans took our nuclear reactor back home with us.

I will be speaking today about the nuclear power plant now under construction in Bataan. You may be wondering why I have come around the world to share my concerns with you about this first Filipino nuclear power reactor. As an American, I feel some responsibility to you since it was my government which has promoted and financed the introduction of nuclear power in the Philippines . Also my organization, the Union of Concerned Sciantists , has played an active role in the controversy which has emerged over the Bataan reactor here and in the United States .

a u-3 In 1975, long bef ore the Puno Co= mission was created and long bef ore the Three Mile Island accident ,

my colleague , Daniel Ford , and I both wrote to President Itarcos regarding the serious saf 2ty defects in the Westinghouse-designed Bataan reactor. In July 1979, 1 first met with Senator Ta5ada in Washing ton. He asked me to come to the Philippines to give testimony to the Puno Cdamission. The Commission apparently was in a hurry to finish its job and would not wait f or my appearance until September, which was the earliest I could travel to the Philippines. I d id ,

however, prepare a detailed affidavit which became part of the record of the Puno Commission's inquiry.

In February 1981, I mot again with senator Tanada in Washington. The Senator asked me to review the sparse materials provided to him by the Philippine Minister of Energy concerning the safety features which were to be added to the Bataan reactor as a result cf the renegotiation between Westinghouse and the Na tional Power Corporation. Senator Tanada asked me to answer this question - "Are these additional safety features adequate to protect health and safety of the public?"

Just a week ago in Washington, I obtained more detailed inf ormation on the safety-related changes in the design of the Bataan reactor. This inf ormation, which is f reely available to public in the United States ,

is precisely the same info mation tha t Senator Ta6ada

3_ .

was denied access to by the Minister of Energy on grounds that the new contract between Westinghouse A'

I and the NPC was confidential. ,

Since arriving in the Philippines , my colleague, Attorney Jacob Scherr and I have had an opportunity to visit the site of the Bataan reactor and to meet with officiais of the Nati'onal Power Corporation and the Philippine Atomic Energy Commission, including Mr; Josue D. Polintan, Manager, Nuclear Power Department , NPC; Mr. Jose C. Torres , Manager, Technical Services , Nuclear Power Department , NPC; and Mr. Zoilo M. Bartolome, Com-

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missioner , PAEC. I would like to th'ank the NPC for sharing .

with us more inf ormation about the plant and for the kind hospitality they have extended to us.

{

Before addressing the safety of the Bataan reactor, l I would like to make some general remarks about the l

hazards of nuclear power. The mes t important factor that must be emphasized is that nuclear power is an inherently dangercus technology. Its use demands an l unprecedented level of perfection in the choice of the i site , the Jesign of the plant , and the construction and operation of the plant itself. The price of a mistake is too high. Although a nuclear explosion is not possible, the consequences of an accident which releases even a

. fraction of the radioactive materials in the reactor

! are not s.ignificantly smaller, The many s tudies pa rf ormed by the U.S . governmen t predict that a nuclear accident

8 s would result in the death of 3,300 people due to radia-tion within a f ew weeks or months , the death of 45,000

' more due to cancer in the following 10 to 40 years , and ,

almost a quarter of a million cancer cases in the same period that are not f atal if proper medical treatment is available. /*These casualty figures are based'upon the assumption that all people within five miles of the reactor and all people downwind f or 25 miles are evacuated within a few hours. If this is not accomplished , the casualties would be even higher. Ab'out 3000 square miles of land would require decontamination to make it habit-able. All the buildings in this area would have to be ,

sandblasted to remove radioactive contamination. All streets would have to repaved. All surf ace soil and vegetation would have to be scrapped away and buried in some remote unpopulated location. There is no credible technical dispute about these consequenet:s . Rather, the dispute centers on how of ten such an accident will occur. Another more honest way of stating the question is -- Is it ever acceptable to kill tens of thousands of people and make some part of the world uninhabitable?

That is the fundamental ques tien involved in the decision l

• - U . S . NRC , Rea c t or S a f e ty S tud y , WAS H- 1400, October 1975.

to design and build a nuclear power plant.

Even Dr. Edward Teller, a prominent proponent of nuclear power, admits that "a single major mishap in '

a nuclear reactor could cause extreme damage ... because of the radioactive contamination." In 1969, he said ,

"So fat, we have been extremely lucky ..." S in ce then ,

we have had many instances of what the nuclear industry refers to as -- incidents , transients , events, excur-sions , and learning experiences. Some have been very close calls which proved that no design can provide foolproof protection against mistakes which human beings make. - - "

The consequences of the 1974 fire in the Browns Ferry plant in Alabama stemmed from an insdequate design, but human error also contributed to the accident. The usual practice of usi.ng a lighted candle to check f or air leaks started the fire. The telephone number pos ted f or reporting fires to the main control room was incorrect.

The fire-fighting system could not be turned on manually because a matal plate installed over the switch to pro-tect it during plant construction had not been removed.

The fire hose used by the plant had a different size

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thread than that used by the local fire department and this handicapped fire fighting eff orts . The fire disabled all the safety systems and the plant came within an hour of suffering a major catastrophe.

In' the summer of 1976, an operator error resulted

in draining water from the reactor cooling system in the Zion plant, a Wes tinghouse reactor near Chicago.

The same operator error simultaneously disabled all ,

the instrumentation provided to detect the loss of water. A senior technical advisor in the U. S. Nuclear Regula tory Commission (U.S.NRC) , Dr. S tephen Hanauer, recommended a reevaluation of all plants to eliminate this type of deficiency. Although the loss of water was stopped in time at Zion, he said that next time some similar unforeseen event may result in an accident.

That reevaluation is still going on. It has become one of the unresolved safety issues affecting Westinghouse .

plants.

Finally, two years ago, the Three Mile Island (IKI) plant suffered the worst accident in the his tory of commercial reactors in the United States. Although the accident was complex , it started from routine main-tenance which shut off the normal water flow to tha steam generators. One valve on the reactor cooling system. stuck open; two other valves were shut which should have been open. The reactor operators , misled by their training and instruments , took precisely the wrong actions. Prior to the TMI accident, the U.S .NRC had called such- accidents " incredible". It was believed that the probability of such an accident was so low that protection against it was not needed.

Despite this history of frequent accidents , which

. . . ~ _._. __ _. _. - ~ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - _ _ _

the Puno Commission said "is an ominous sign tha t safety is not assured", the construction of the Bataan plant is continuing. Based on the many studies of the THI accident and the safety improvement now known to be needed , my detailed knowledge of Westinghouse plants in the U.S. , and all the information I now have about the Bataan plant, I have reached the following conclusions:

1

• 1 The Bataan olant could not be licensed  ;

in the United Stdtes because it lacks some important safety featuress In a letter last November to Senator Tanada , the Minister of Energy said that the NPC was required to comply with a total of 146 nuclear safety requirements of U.S . NRC. But that figure was exaggerated by the listing of 102 U.S. nuclear regulatory guides that should have been incorporated into the original construction permit which was issued by the PAEC on April 4,1979, just one week af ter the Three Mile Island accident in Pennsylvania . However, some of these 102 requirements obviously were not included in the original Westinghouse-NPC contract because they had to be added to the new contract. Of the remaining 44 requirements , only twenty (20) are mentioned in the new contract. In one ins tance ,

some of the requirements concerning steam generator cor-rosion are discussed only f or the purpose of saying they will not be met. Of those requirements resulting from the TMI accident , less than half are being incorporated in the new contract. For one requirement , the new price

of $1.9 billion f or the Bataan plant covers only the studies necessary to determine the extent of the changes that are needed. Actually, making these changes so this ,

plant could be licensed in the U.S. will require further increeses in the price of the plant above $1.9 billion.

2. Many of the mdior. reasons _why the Puno Commission recommended a halt in the cens-truction remain as valid today as they were in 1979.

The Puno Commission said that the Bataan plant design was an old design plagued with unresolved safety ,

issues like other Westinghouse designs. However, the renegotiated contract contains no provisions that would lead to the resolution of even a single unresolved safety issue. The Puno Commission said that the Bataan nuclear plant design naeds fundamental changes and additional safegua rds . Yet, the renegotiated contract describes no fundamental design changes and few additional safe-guards. ,

3. The information provided to President Marcos in August 1980, upon which he based his decision to resume construction , was inaccurate and incomplete.

On August 15, 1980, PAEC Commissioner Bartolome wrote President Marcos that a total of 102 U.S. NRC regu-latory guides "were required of NPC by PAEC bef ore

._- _ . _ _ _ _ . ._ _.- ~ _. _ _ - . ._ _ . _ _ _ _ _ __ . _ __ . - _ _ _ __ . - . _ _

9-PAEC issued a construction permit f or PHPP-1." This -

is not accurate. Five of these 'old regulatory guides are discussed in the renegotiated contract. The subjects are: instrumentation needed to assess plant conditions during and following an accident; periodic tes ting of the emergency di2sel generators; periodic testing of the emergency power and plant protection systems; fire protection; and qualification testing of vital electrical equipment to demonstrate that it can operate in the i

hostile environment ccused by an accident. In one ins-tance , the renegotiated contract actually provides that the regulatory guide requirements necessary f or adequa te fire protection will not be met if these would delay --

construction of the plant. Furthermore , the fire protect-ion requirements discussed in the new contract are known to be inadequate. Theref ore , in the U. S. , both plants under construction and in operation are being forced to l

add new fire protec tion features beyond those specified in the regulatory guide.

Commissioner Bartolome did not tell President Marcos that more than half of the TMI lessons learned l

requirements have not been added to the Bataan plant des ign. All of these TMI requirements are vitally im-portant to safety. In the U. S. , all plants und er cons-truction have been f orced to incorport ce all of these

. design requirements. For somt reasons , this apparently is not being done f or the Bataan plant.

It is also of great concern to me tha t s ome of l

- gy . -

tha inf ormation provided by PAEC to the Puno Commission, upon which the Commission concluded that the plant would be " reasonably safe", is simply wrong. The PAEC 8 s description of the arrangement and operation of the valves used to protact the reactor against rupture from high pressures is alarmlng. It demoastrates an almost I

total lack of knowledge of this important aspect of plant design. The PAEC des cribes as "normally open" exactly the same valve which is in f act normally closed but stuck open during the IKI accident. PAEC also des-cribes these important valves as being " connected in series" with other valves , when in reality, the valves are , and must be , connected in parallel. This aspect of the design is relatively simple to understand and, therefore , PAEC8s confusion is very disturbing. It does not give me assurance that other, more complex aspects of the design are fully understood.

4 Wes tinnhouse has been _e.iven the f inal authority to decide how U.S.NRC safety re-ouirements should be met.

The Puno Commission f ound that Uestinghouse had ,

demonstrated a " lack of immediate concern over the safety of the plant." It then recommended that, if the project continues , "Wes tinghouse should . . . manifest and demons trate that it shares the genuine concern of the government to safeguard the welf are of (the Philippina) people ...."

_ 11 I have found no indication in the documents I have read that Wes tinghouse has changed its priorities . Wes-tinghouse does hot provide all tha safety features it ,

is required to provide *.a the U. S. Furthermore, the renegotiated contract contains a provision which permits Westinghouse alone to interpret all requirements issued after October 1, 1973. In the event of disputes concern-ing the proper design necessary to meet a requirement, Westinghouse has the final word unless the Philippine g overnment is willing to pay "the then prevailing com-mercial rates" s as the contract phrases it, to have its interpretation of a safe plant built. .

The renegotiated contract also provides for a bonus payment to Westinghouse if the plant is completed in less than 50 months frem September 1930. This provi-l sion, together with the provision giving Westinghouse the final word on the safety design, makes it even more likely that necessary safety features will not be included in the Bataan plant.

5. There has been no detailed , indeoendent review of the Bataan clant des ign by technical experts of the U.S. HRC.

Many organizations and individuals in the United l

S tates , including the Union of Concerned Scientists ,

Natural Resources Lefense Council, Center f or Developcent

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policy, C' enter f or Law and Social Policy, and Congressman

- ~ 12 -

Clarence Long , have argued tha t the U. C. Government l should not permit the export of nuclear reactors which have not undergone safety review in the United States.

Yet the U. S. Government has so f ar specifically refused to review the design of the Bataan plant or to consider the severe hazards to the health and safety of the Filipino people. In granting the export license last May, the U.S. NRC ruled that assuring the safety of the design of the Bataan plant was the Philippines ' problem.

6 Even without an accident which harms the health and safety of _the_ Filipino people, the Bataan plant is likely to cose -

serious economic problems for the Philip-eines.

An accident at the Bataan reactor plant of the sama magnitude as the one two years ago at Three Mile Island would deal a severe blow to the Philippine economy. The latest estimate of the cest of cleaning up TMI is ever

$1 billion. It is not known when, or even if,the plant can be put hato operation again. At present, none of the highly radioactive waste have been removed from the is land . The most optimistic date for completion of the clean up is 1988, seven years from now, and the cuner of the Three Mile Island nuclear plant is already on the brink of bankruptcy.

Let us assume , f or the sake of argument , that the Philippines will be lucky. Assu=2 that , despite a lack

of experience in nuclear plant operation and regulation and a plant design without the safety features required in the United States , no accident happens in the Bataan ,

plant . I still believe that the croject is not a wise investment. Westinghouse plants in the United States are now breaking down with alarming regularity. The main steam turbines , which drive the electrical generator, are developing cracks af ter only a few years operation.

Westinghouse and the electric companies are now engaged in developing complex inspection methods to detect the cracks and measure their size. Calculations are then being done to determine whether the. turb.ine can be safely ,

operated with- the cracks present. Unfortunately, chase inspections and calculations are not foolproof. Within the last year, two Westinghouse turbines have come apart.

In the Yankee Rowe Plant , repairs took over eight months.

In the other case, the Indian Point 3 Plant is still shutdown af ter two months with no reliable estimate of j when die plant can restart.

1 l Another problem p'laguing Westinghouse reactors l

in the U. S. is corrosion of the steam generators. The l

l steam generators are large components which serve to l

l . transfer heat from the reactor to produce the steam for i

l the electric turbines. There are thousands of small tubes in the stea= generators which are supposed to i

prevent seepsje of the radioactive reactor cooling water l into the's team. The problem is that the tubes are cor-l l roding and leaking. The result is that Wes tinghouse l

1

piants that are only six or seven years old have had' to shutdown f or extensive repairs or replacements of the steam generatorsJ These repairs take nine months to a year to complete , expose workers to unusually high radiation doses , and cost close to the original cost of the entire plant.

The point is that even without a maj or accident, theta is good reason to expect that the Bataan plant will not be a reliable source of electricity and will require frequent and expensive repairs. In f act ,

repair and modification of existing nuclear power plants in the U.S. is rapidly becoming the major portion of the nuclear industry 8s business in the United States.

The Lataan nuclear plant has already become one o f the most expensive nuclear reactors in the world.

The original Westinghouse proposal in 1974 quoted a price of $500 million for two plants at the Bataan s ite. In seven years, the cost for the one plant now under construction has multiplied more than seven times to $1.9 billion!

Assuming no further increase in price of the plant, I have calculated that the cost of electricity from the Bataan reactor will be approximately $.09/Kw-hour.

This figure does .not include the expenses of radioactive waste disposal and decommissioning of the plant. It assumas that the Bataan plant will operate at 707 of its capacity, while the average Westinghouse reactor in the U.S. only operates at 637. of capr eity. In

contrast, the cost of electricity from a coal-fired plant ($ 05/Kw-hr.) would be 457, less than that for the Bataan reactor. Even an oil-fired plant would be less expensive ($ .07 /Kw-br. ) , a t current oil prices of

$30 per barrel.

The Bataan reactor was supposed to help make the Philippines less dependent on foreign sources of energy, by reducing consumption of imported oil. In f act , the Bataan reactor would make the Philippines more dependent.

The Bataan reactor would trdp the Philippines in almost total.reilance upon Westinghouse and the U.S; for uranium

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fuel, maintenance, spare parts , and perhaps disposal of radioactive wastes. Are you prepared to further increase-your energy dependence upon e foreign nation? Would it not be wiser to invest this same money in developing

your own energy resources in the Philippines , such as l

oil, coal, geothermal, hydropower, and solar?

l The cost of nuclear power has soared so high that it may be cheaper for the Philippines to abandon the Bataan reactor, rather than completing its construction.

l A well-regarded energy economist has computed that it l is less expensive La the United States to f orego further work on a nuclear plant which is 30% - 40% constructed l

and to replace it with a coal-fired facility. This is true even if none of the costs of a partially-constructed

! nuclear plant are not recovered by selling off the com-ponents.-

{

l Let me turn now to the questions of radioactive waste disposal and decommissioning, Each year for 30 years , the Bataan reactor would l l

produce around 30 tons of rdghly radioactive spent fuel.

The safe disposal of this radioactive waste is by no means assured. According to a paper presented by PASC in 1977, since the Philippines is in a volcanic belt and has no stable salt rock formar >ns, the long* term storage and disposal of nuclear wastes from the Bataan reactor will depend on the establishment of an [nternational burial site. Yet the prospects of any cpuncry agreeing .

to become the world 8s nuclear garbage du=p remain very slim! The Puno Commission took note of the f act that no progress has been made in finding a final repository for the vas tes that wouid 'be generated.

Assuming that a safe solution to the radioactive waste dilemma is found , you can be assured that it will be extremely expensive. The Japanese a'rd no'w paying thc ' French $750 for the reprocessing of each kilogram of their spent fuel and the temporary storage of the remaining high levei liquid radioactive wastes.

If the Bataan reactor were operative today, it would cost the Philippines s ome $20 million each year for a similar arrangement. However, it is important to keep' in mind that the French will be shipping the wastes back to Japan in ten years for final disposal.

Many people hold the mis ta ' , belief that a

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17 -

l nuclear plant 3 onco construction is co=pleted , can remain in operation indefinibely. The fdbt is that the Bataan

, plant, like all nuclear power plants , is designed to l operate for only 30 or so years.

! Over time , radioactive contamination will build up in di e plant. The radiation levels can reach such l

l high lev'ls that it will not be safe to allow workers to r

perform the necessary maintenance and testing. In addi-tion, the reactor vessel is bombarded by intense radiation and the steel will become so brittle that the plant can-not be operated safely. At the end of its life, the plant must be decontaminated and dismantled or entombed.

To this date, no large nuclear plant has been decommissioned in the United States.

1 In sum, the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant will NOI be safe; it will NOT be reliable; and it will NOT be inexpens ive . At best, the Bataan reactor will be a very costly way to increase your energy dependence upon foreign countries. At worst, it may result in a catastrophe that could render an important portion of your nation uninhabitable.

The Philippines can still turn its back on nuclear The American people also have been misled about power.

the hazards and' economics of nuclear power, but you now

.have the benefits of the painful lessons we are learning in the United States. Your own error so f ar will not be without ~ cos t , but the cost of going forward 'with the Bataan reactor would surely be much greater.

Th2 question facing you transcends political con-s idera tions . It is a catter of the health, safety, and well-being of die present and future generations of Filipinos. It is a question that, I believe, must be -

faced squarely now, for with each day that construction continues , the options become fewar and more expensive.

I recommend that you seriously consider abandoning the Bataan nuclear power plant. Based upon my analysis ,

I have concluded thet this is the correct course of action. In any event , the Philippines should enlist a panel of independent scientists and experts to assist you in making a decisien that is in the best interes ts of all the Filipino people. ,

Thank you.

/m-0 4

San Francisco, CA February 17, 1981 Mr. Lindsay Mattison Center For Development Policy

1. 2?S, 4th S t. N.E.

Washington D.C. 20002

Dear Mr. Mattison:

Senator Raul Manglapus came to San Francisco yesterday for a final conference with me before I leave for Manila next Thursday. February 19.

He brought with him the good news that once more you are (tYS N going to help us, by shouldering the transportation expenses of -- '

Bob Pollard who has agreed to address a public forum in Manila g ,1]

sometime on the third week of March. He will discuss anong other

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things, the safety of the Bataan Reactor, an'd more specifically the additional safeguards which Westinghouse had agreed to incor-porate to the reactor at an additional cost of $700 million.

I believe it will be a great service to our people to bring r

home to them the grave dangers that they will face with the con-struction of a nuclear reactor which has not been tested by the NRC or by anyone with enough nuclear experience and expertise, add on a site whose seismic and safety problems have not been fully resolved, and when until now our Government has not found a safe place for the final disposal of the radioactive waste.

I believe too that this project could make even our Govern-l ment see the need for exercising extreme care and prudence in this matter, by hiring an independent team of nuclear scientists to examine not only the safety of the nuclear reactor and its additional safeguards, but also the safety of the site before continuing the construction of the plant. Everything of course would depend upon the soundness, clarity and force of the position paper to be presented.

Hoping for your continued interest and cooperation in our struggle, I remain l Gratefully yours,

^ -

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enter tor eve _O'Jment }O IC}7 Stephen Biddle

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AP ril 2' 1981 Eugente faa.dford 6 4 .. A. .m. 4.

Mary Ann. Coleell

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M.rton Edey L +e- n - ~ . 5' * **

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Dear Member of Congress:

Theod ne J.: ebe w ..n On March 20, 1981 the Export-Import Bank submitted to

' *'l. %..'.% Ccngress the statement of a proposed financial guarantee to viu u.i the National Power Corporation of, the Philippines for

"";;';'lC; $104,000,000. This guarantee is to finance the total U.S.

c. i x. cy cost of $122,600,000 which is part of an $800,000,000 cost s r... 'C'.'..'M I *.! overrun for the Philippine nuclear power plant, PNPP-1.

Lendemy M.tal.on

' ,'at ;, p This cost overrun and the safety of the nuclear project w.,d M.,en .e continue to be of great concern to the Center for Development r.a .. t. a . .. .. .~. i

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Policy (CDP), the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) and the E si . ., . , Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC). We urge that Ex-Im us,w .-. i .,m. be required to supply Congress with a full explanation of Anssosle i .n d 3 this guarantee prior to a funal decision.

At s. s, it v. 4 % 1.n.

, , , , , ,Aane,28,il As you know, the Philippine reactor has been plagued with safety problems. In June 1979 President Marcos suspended 3

construction and ordered the establishment of a special com-Advisor > Board mission to review the safetI of the site and the desi9 n of the plant. The commission found the design outdated and unsafe.

"DC.It'", The Ex-Im submission to Congress is misleading in that it r , ,.. . .m m , r.,

implies all safety related requests made by the Commission

c. .u ... .

"*'ddd"'

i, have been satisifed. In fact, this is not the case, a <,. , *'.", C".""""."'/

. The Philippine Atomic Energy Comission has adopted J' .S.

I d'**** NRC standards and the public expects this reactor to meet

! i'f."i".?E'd"d'  ? these standards. Yet, this reactor still could not be built

"^^~'" in the U.S. as it does not include all post-1973 requirements n,,,.. $',"d [.""*"d"..

and less than half of the requirements resulting from TMI Ai.n seco..n have not been addressed. Incredibly, the cost of this 620

'*;gr-['7, megawatt reactor has scared from $1.1 billion to $1.9 billion, M m := >t M a .. ,niin making PNPP-1 one of the most expensive reactors in t he world.

,~~

'la- If the necessary safety features were included, the total

[y',,,7,[ price would increase further.

t......i._.

.a....g._....

The safety of PNPP-1 continues to be a matter of contro-u...~....'....n.,,e...- i "ln E nly ,

Versy and Cor'cern in the Philippines, as the enclosed clip-pings indicate. Surely the Filipinos deserve a product that John Nicolopoule.s wa *t ...v..

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l l Rich.,d Pollock Lw. n. , t ~. .' %s l J.: h 5.ng.s,e l .,:iv, l

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• A!&re Tepper M. hn Iin.o., C,v . m Ic i- .

j Miare.5 B. % oldm.n

&# e . ,

t .s,

' ,+ - . . , . . 225 4th Street. N E. Washington. D.C. 20002 (202)547-6406

, . . =. - - .__ . .. . .

Memb2r of Congrcss - 2 April 2, 1981 meets U.S. standards and surely they will continue to demand it.

Will Ex-Im Bank grant further loan guarantees if the plant is up-graded again? We feel strongly that the Ex-Ir. cank should inform Congress now if it intends to lend or guarantee on further modifications. Addition-ally, did Ex-Im determine that $122 million is a reasonable price for the safety modifications added thus far? Has the plant become so ex-pensive that it is no longer economical?

i finally, Ex-Im Bank has justified its nuclear lending program as necessary to compete with subsidized credit' available in several foreign countries, notibly France and West Germany. The cor. tract for PNPP-1 was won by Westinghouse Corporation with a $644 million loan and guar-antee package from Ex-Im Bank in 1976. Is there now foreign competition for the design modifications for PNPP-1 which justify Ex-Im Bank increased exposure on this project?

4 It is the hope of CDP, UCS and NRDC that you can give this matter i

your immediate attention as Congress only has,25 days to.act once Ex-Im notification is submitted.

We hope tr alk to you further.

1 i

Sincerel.,

,.. l~, N tnV Virginia B. Foote Center for Development Policy V8F/hms Enclosures ,

e m

J._

Bo:rd cf /~

Onter tor .

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i eige.., Bs..!!eed April 10, 1981 n .= . ... .

M.,, 4 . c i.-,n

. . . . n.o...

"

• a id's Senator William Proxmire

• " T, . P 5241 Dirksen Office Bullding th. n . J. i a ...

Washington, D.C.

,..4 t. . .

o. c.._

.. _ .I.?l

Dear Senator Proxmirc:

. . .',i,

C*d "*",5 o ., 6.u. , . . . . .

On March 20, 1981 the Export-Import Bank submitted to Congress the statement of a proposed financial guarantee to

"i,*,",*",'+"" the National Power Corporation of the Philippines for w "i

$104,000,000. This guarantee is tc; finance the total U.S.

. , , , S *'d "*aM ,',

, cost of $122,600,000 which is part of an $800,000,000 cost

~. ~ overrun for the Philippine nuclear power plant, PNPP-1. The cd..rd R...oa

"'U.',..'I 'i7 cost overrun brings the cost of PNPP-1 up to $1.9 billion, making it one of the most expensive reactors in the world!

An...o, si.i.... d..

""" '"' [, ' ),", This cost overrun and the safety of the nuclear project n . > - , . .

continue to be of great concern to the Center for Development Policy. We urge that Ex-Im be required to supply Congress

, with a full explanation of this guarantee prior to a final Adshory Doard decision and answer the following questions.

Hotse,# Ah rea s l T " ', 'r.' % 1.

On August 5, 1980, the Export-Import Bank denied South c d 4d. . Korea cost overrun financing for a nuclear power plant of

. .,,,, ",*.i,'",,

$11,547,660 in lonns and $10,264,586 in guarantees. The reason e.nv r. m. .,,

given by Ex-Im Bark was that South Korea should honor its

' ' ' . ' :,',' ',, ,'y ;'.

commitaent to provide all funds necessary Lo complete and Jo.eph 1 t idsidy, operate the Kori-2 nuclear power plant in the event of a cost

~

"n,,.;;",';, overrun, as stated in the original loan contract between Ex-Im n o .,d r,...

""~

,, and South Korea authorized in 1975. Why ther. seven months

^

later did Ex-Im approve another quarantee of $104.000.000 for

., P" ",,',Ga;*" , the Philippine nuclear power plant (PNPP-1)? Was there not a

"'A "~

• a 'a " clause in the original 1976 Ex-Im/ Philippines contract stating

"< L*as9a that the Philippines would provide all necessary funds to

.. .4 - ,.

hell M4 Mull,n complete and operate the project, not Ex-In Dank? If not, why not?

-r.4.~. 2. Ex-Im Bank has justified nuclear lending program as e ,.... . t s ,i, essential for competing with subsidized credit available in

. 8l ? "' 2,, ; , several foreign countries, notibly france and West Germany.

J...... s e. ..n.,.mi. The contract for PNPP-] was won by the Westinghouse Corporation 7,'l ' ; " ~, alth a $644 million loan /gisnrantee package in 1976. Is thi're g ,. s. ,,, ,.,,,u,, 6 novi foreign competition for the design modifications for PNPP-1 i~ - *-

J.. t s. ....,

which justify Ex-Im Dnnk increased exposure nn this project?

n" 3.

^h

-e -

Did [x-Im Bank dett trine that f]22 million in a

, , 3 re ',[ j,ua reanonab} e price for l hi .af bl.y nindi f i cal inem attdr.1 t hun f ai'?

Mw"*b B h e.adm..

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./

' Senator William Proxmire - 2 April 10, 1981

4. Did Ex-Im determine that with these adoitional design modifications PNPP-1 would meet current USNuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) standards, thereby satisfying the concerns of the Philippine safety commission?

5. It has been widely circulated in the Filipino press that PNPP-1 still does not meet post-1973 U.S. standards, and includes less than half the post-Three Mile Island requirements. Was Ex-Im Bank led to believe all safety questions had been resolved? Will Ex-Im Bank be asked to finance further design modifications on this elready very expensive plant? What will be the cost of bringing PNPP-1 uo to current U.S. standards?

6. Considering the average Westinghouse reactor operates at only 63%

of capacity, it has been estimated that the cost per kilowatt hour of the 620 megawatt PNPP-1 will be ! .09. In comcarison, a newly built oil-fired plant fueled at current oil prices of $30 per barrel would generate electricity at $ .07 per kilowatt hour. Do these estimates agree with Ex-Ir.: estimates? Did Ex-Im conduct a feasibility study to determine if PNPP-1 was still cost effective? ~

7. Why has the cost of PNPP-1 soared from $1.1 billion to $1.9 billion, making PNPP-1 one of the most expensive reactors in the world? Does this cost increase reflect additional safety features designed to protect the reactor against the well documented vcleanic and seismic activity of the aren? For example, does the reactor now comply with the request of the Philippine Atouic Energy Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency that the plant be able to withstand 22 feet of volcanic ash?

Thank you for your time and consideration of these important issues and questions.

Sincerely, Virginia B. Foote Associate Director VB."/hms

..7,.*,

.Q.

[, *g sg* E- .

CX PORT-lM PORT D A N K OF THE UNITED STATES

"#,,, W ASH ING T O N. D.C. 20571

• U T.

k .

Caest appet.ss *C uche sAs.st-vac x .w.i

Dear l'r. Chairnan:

Thank you for giving us the opfortunity te connent on certain issues relating to the Philippine nuclear power plant case rnired in s Ictter from the Center for Pevelop..cnt Policy da tef. April 2, toF1 and attached naterials.

The Philippine nucla7r power p]nnt was cricinally deri tned in necordance with U..c. !;uclear Regulatory Cor.nir. i cn O:1;C) r.uidelincs in effect as of a cut-off" date of late 167'.. or shortly before the period when 1:cs t i nc he ur.c and the Nationni Tower Corporation (!;pC) g entered into nerotia tions which culmits.ted in the award of O*s the surr2y contrnet te 1:estinghouse. Ve might point out ~~I that nc irl;. hn1r of U.S. demestic nucicar plants now in g p.

crc t w r re cemmisniened bef o re pos t -10T' rer.uln ' o ry (4 ru:d.2icen vont into effect. and the conetruction cer. tract of --

c'en* (foreirn er dor'ert ie) in b,ned , of noces:ity, en ene design cut-off date.

The Philippine Puno Cont. 2rnion jn !!ovenber 1474 found

• the thpot Toint pinnt site to be within acceptable standards -

of narety but noted that unresolved plant anfety 2snues p rnieted. In Jirht of pos t-1 r172 NRC ruidelines inclulinc '

Port +hree TU lc isInnd reconnenried rafe t;,' revi.? ions, the *

!:00 ,nd '.-lcs tinehoure suh.=cquently exami ned n)1 of these and

P.' i n tus n rub-it ted c p2nn to tho Phi l ippi na Atemic rnerr.y Comni

ri on and tb Covernment of the Philippines to upgrade the p) int in ccordance with those ruidelines and revisions j udr.ct! fea r.i b; > nnd relevant. The plan won 9pproved and the Government of the Phil i ppi nes en .".epter.ber Pfi, l'IPO, lifted its order surpendine, pinnt construction.

The extent te which PRC r.uidc} ince should be 2 nco rpora t ed into the "estine.houce contract, even usinc U.S. r.tnnd :rrin nr. n ruid< , war. <:r.ne n t i a l l y n en t tr'r to be d ec i d ed by th" pa r t i c:2 to the contrar:t acd the Covernr.cnt of tha Phi li ppi n es . 'To nnsume thet all che.r.r<;s which would be rerlui red for a nce plant yet to be constructed would, or could, be incorporated in'.o n pInn t wh:ch is nearly PO7 d ~~~~ ij N PC- , c 4

P00R BRE E I g -. - - - - .-. ,-.. - - - . , . . , . , ,

f .

-2 completed is unrealictic. It is our understanding that the project was previously already in compliance with several of the updnted reculatory guidelines, and that others were not and are not relevant te l'e:tinghouse respor.sibilities.

In any case, there rc6ulatery cuideslines which were judged by the Philippine Atomic Enercy Commission as being feasible to implement at this F07 peint in the construction progress, as well as those relevant to this proje.ct, are being followed , through amendments to the h'estinchcuse contract.

In accordance with the procedurec established by Executive Order 1?114 entitled "rnvironnentc1 Effects of Enjor Federal Actions, "a Concise Envirennental Beview of -

this nuclent project was prepared under the direction of the U.S. Perurtment of State. This document va taken into account ey the State Pepartment which then reconnended to the !!RC that the requested export licens? be grnnted. On

\

~~Eny 0., 'inFO, tho ?liC issued the license (nito takinc into

• necount the Concice Environmental Feview), nr.d its decision

, uns uph.1d by tha 'J . S . Court cf /.p}cn)s of the District of Columbia en Wrch 30. 1031.

Eximbank believes that all fenrible, practien1 and ler.nlly requirad niers have been taken, to upcrnde the de icn of the Philippine nuclent plant, nnd thn; the ecst of the U.S. itens for thene improvement ic rennenable. The Pnnk doce not believe that we choulc attenpt te cubntitute our -

judgment on r !nnt decirn for t'1e judgment of those having .

prin.nry ren};ensibility for ruch rnt terr..

Eximhank does not now forecoc any further chnnecs in pinnt countruction and hence no need fer further finnneing of conte beynnd those outidned in our letter of March 20, 1991, but it in not ponsibic new to tell if any further pir.nt chances may be mandated in the futura. "re forna bn19nce sheats, submitted by the "PC. Tre.k :t profitnble operation durinn the period of repaynent cf debt to Exinbank, nnd F.xinbank believe: the preject rc nni nn fcenible nnd vinble. Penrite the inerenced . ontn of this project, ite need as an int egrn1 and mnjor ; 9 t of the power cupply system makes its cenpletion a matter of prinary concern to the Governnant of' the Philippinan which rive it full cupport.

6 U P00R OR W

, , s; i .

$l '. .

3 .

Eximbank does not justify its current actions in relation to the additional costs of this project on the basis of foreign competition which would not be anticipated at this Inte stagesin project development. Rather Eximbank is responding to strong representations by the Government of the Philippines that if Eximbank refuses to participate to the extent it now proposes in guaranteeing the financing of a portion of the additions 1 costs, the balance of additional financing required would not become nysilabic ar.d the project might not be ecmpleted. Given the investment alrendy made in the Philippine nuclear project, and the strong desire 'of the Philippine Covernnent to ec=plete the project, Exinbank firmly believes the tdditionni requested finnneing support is a necessity.

Sincerely yours, Donald E. Stingel Director 5

The lionorable .

Stephen L. !!en1 Chni rman Subcommittee on Internationni Trade. .

~~

Investment and F.onetary Policy committee on Funkini:, Finnnce and Urban Affnirs U.". lioune of Reprerentntives t!nchine. ton , D.C. .?O515 P00RBRl81 Nil.

Times Journal (Manila)

March 20, 1981; P. 9 Safety of nuke plant doubted AN American nuclear the use of nitelear tech- out any single penon being engineer yesterday op- nology. . hurt.

posed the construction Pollard's observa- nis is a safety record of the nuclear power tions and the stand which is quite unpree--

pIant in Morong, taken by his group have dented " he said. psA 81staan, which a wond- been disputed by inter-renowned US physicist nationally-known US has pronounced safe. physicist Edv ud Teller Robert Poland of the who linked the cru-Union of Concerned saders against nuclear Scientists whose mem- technology to those bers go around the who tell " fairy tales world giving lectures just for the purpose of . -

against nuclear techno- freJihtening children."

logy, spoke before the unstructen of the Ba-Manila Rotary Club. 2aan plant was resurned ble bst year after Westmg-Pollard claimed that house spreed to the govern-the Bataan plant, which mect's dem:nd for 90 add-is now under construc, itional safety devices and tion after additional m s.

sa fe guards were d e- completed. the pbnt wil! generate 620 me-manded by the govern- g,w ig, or et,etnesiy ment from its JMtrac- which is more than one tot, Westinghous , still fourth of Luaon's present lacked enough safety peak load of 2,000 mega-features. watts.

Tetter, who was in Mani-He also said that the la last January to prende plant would prove an over an intemational expenuve means of conference on energy, dis-ge nerating ' electricity. puted the statements of Pollard resigned those. questioning the safe-I from the US Nucipr II h,"yf*M,,',',# eEsb"iu'i Regulatory Commisstoft 200 big nuclear enerry-in 1979 apparently be- generating reactors in the cause of differences free world today working with his colleagues on in the past to years with-

?0DRBRGINX

Evening Post (Manil'a )

Sat., March 21, 1981 Page 1 r. 2 Nuc' ear p ant

. accic'ent not remote ~

An accident at the Bataan nuclear power plant in Morong, once its

enstruction is completed and it goes into' fit operation, which arould jeopardize thousands of peo.

ple and render a big part of the rountry uninhabitable, la not a re.

mote possibility.

This warning was alred yesterday by Dr. Robert Pollard, a nuclear engineer identified with the US.

based Urdon of Concerned Scies.

tists, In a press conference held at the Manila Overseas Press Club (MOPC). . open and close properly under att "No matter how good the des!gn ennditions of an secident, Po:1ard ,

'of your nuclear p!sst is, and in pointed out.

spite of the best efforts of the de- Another major problem on t dis.

signers, there could very well be an cussed in the renegotiated National accident that would jeopardize thou. Power Corporation (NPC) Westing.

sands of people and render part of house cont:tet, according to him,is:

your nation uninhabitable," Dr. "How do you protect yourieh'es Pollard said. sguinst a hydrogeu explosion in the 32128n p!8"tP UNSAFE. "This is ore of the major trea, The other day, Pollard spoke be. being ' studied now in the US be-fore the Rotary Club of Manila cause prior to the Thre Mile Island where he also deseeibed the Ba. seeident, we required protection taan reactor as " dangerously un- against enly a ver- sreau amount safe and very expensive." of hydrogen being produced," ' Pol.

He American nuclear scientist. lard said. .

• said that there are mapy features Answering questions from news.

I that were not added to the pro. men. Pollard said there are nther posed Bataan nuclear plant which require:nent, that deal with adminis-the US Nuclear Regulatory Com- trative =atters.

mission (NRC) has required of al! .. (

nuclear plants in the US. n ese SUPERVISOR $

include the following

, , These, he said, are the techd! cal t- 1. There n.ust be a modification qusMicstions o' the supervirors of to the emergency electric power the plar.?; th, training required for supplies in the plant. the p!;.nt operators; the ability to Almost all the safety systems bring to the plant experts following nuclear power p! ants, Po!!ard an accdent who could help bring the in,d, sai require electricity to ope. plant under control, and others.

rate. "and it could be that you **f, may be that these admin!s-don't have electricity available t ative requirements are beln;

'irem the transmission network handled by the NPC and, therefore, from the grid." so the plant must that mmht be the reason they are have on site emergency generators,

2. There must be a testing of not discussed in th. contract," Po-

'tla valves which protect the sys. ,

lard ea:d.

tem against high pressure. On the info .r.ation that the site d ' " " "# *I #8 ""'

TESTfNG exneriene,dn s y hi;;h . P *** intensity ear:h.

. This te,tieg is strictly requ; red in q"ake. Pobrd said, "Just becau>e ' -

the US and it ha< been shown that 10 200 year, ycu have not had an

.ome of We tin;; house's valves tvere errth @ e i, th area. dee. not

'not properly desi;;ned and could not maan that it can not happen."

I

Bulletin Today (Manila)

Saturday, March 21, 1981, P Al & 9 RP nuke plant

.w ssi a .:'

sures.

pollard said that even

==re:

world givmg lectures to propagate snett oppost-a!!owin for runaway tion to nuclear tecnno-yery expensive, :=:g aaea 1.

difications "it is un-13.,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,

the Internauonal Con-imagmable that the terence on energy m isays L..S i

exoert A 2" '"

The American nuclear authority said this ren-

:

gy, the best one w!nen I have to menuon is An American nu. called " unsafe, unrelia-f[c'tQno"m'icIin$ "".*I '"'#87 i clear a ai e ty expert ble and expensive" Ba-taan project in what face of otter cheaper a:ternative power sour

• bee d d id l questioned 'y e a terday the safe t o all ources

. the increase by $700, began to appear as a ces abundant on the is- of electricity. It is to-crusade of the Union of lands, day clearly the least ex-

' million tn the construo- Pollard said be did twn coat of the Bataan Concerned S ci entists pensive, safest and

muelear plant, saying against the prolifera- not find in the new clealest," he said, tion of nuclear plants contract adequate provi- over the past 10 this made it one of the years, he said. 200 big most expensive in the around the world. sions for the burial of p o w er generstmg nu-world. nuclear waste which he CI'*' PI '"t3 h'V' D""

At the same time, Former Sen. Lorenzo warned caused cancer Ta$ada, who has sat bT built nuclear safety engineer and other mcurable and and 1,'then remarkable the Free World Richard D. Pollard dis- Pollard during his two yet unknoe diseases. thing is that in 10 years, closed no a d e q uate Dublic appearances here '

safety measures have so far, said he would MANILA (PN A) - ~ p id t h furnish President 3far. One of the world's most al."

been written into the eminent scientists has

,in le indivi renegotiated c o n tract cos and the other offi. lauded the Philippines R e f e rring to the for the disposal of used cials with what he des. g ,

Uranium 235 which he cribed as "these vital for its decision to[e- dent in the United said has a radioactive revelations and state- '"*',[0 j ,",fp" anti g

States, Te!'er, who was lifespan of up to 250,. ments to enable them Batman in these time of the chairman of the 000 years. . to arrive at a new de. soaring ' oil pnees. world s fir s t reacter Pollard spoke for cision on the project. Dr. Eduard Teller, a s a f e g uard committee the second consecutive -

Fielding qtiestions I H u n g arian Amenean years ago, said the acci-day against what he a press confeiencet'a,nwho helped develop dent wdntd not have oc-I

' the Manila Overseas both the atomic and curred if the reacter operators haa acted pro-l Press club, Pollard hydrogen bombs des- perly by calling in a I said the cost of the cribed the d* cision as wise and said nuclear couple of nuclear engi-projects has . leaped "'

from an o r i g inal energy today is " econo- 'R a. tors are abso-Westinghouse propo- mical, cheap, practicall7 lutely safe for people l

I sal in 1974 of S500 everlastmg. because reactors are so million for two plants, , Teller was in Manila constructed that there to Pl.9 billion, or a se. recently .c cddress the are a great number of ven fold hike in only hternational Conference safety installations that l

eeven years, for only on Energy and Environ- prevent damage te peo-one plant. ment.1ie is a member ple." he sai L "If any Lately, he said he of a scientific , group one of these stops to called the Scientists function, the reactor has learned that the and Engineers for a Se* stops to (unction."

I cost jumped anew ts cure Energy.

$2.5 b!!! ion. on the Teller, whose creden-btulders' cIaim this tials are detailed m the Who's Who in Science, dispute the argument of another group, the

- Union of Concerned l

l l

Business Day (P.anila)

Triday, March 20, 1981 Page lja Expert doubts safety .

of Bataan nuke plant A US nuclear safety engmwr has einlaced that the Ph!!appine Nuclear Power Plant propret. now under construenon in Morang. Bataan. is still .

unsafe, and mon thsa half of the requuvreents for nuclear plants imposed by the t.$ Nuclear Re:utatory Commassion are missinc Many of the mapor ransons for the suspeamos of constnsesion on the p! ant ta 1979 - and a reaerouauon of contract between Wesunghouse. PNPP.1 contractor, and the PhUlppine government to loctude added safety desagn features - still remain, according to Roberto D. Pollartt. The Nauonal Power Corp.

responded with a restated commitment to making the plant safe to all I possible aspects. The NPC tavned Po!!ard to have a "dispassionata discussion" with its e agineers on the Phuippine nuclear plant project.

5xpsrt doubts safety M.C.<._ ,[w of Bataan nuke plant Co.tr.,y t. b report e, .. t,. ~ g _.e.a.,

P hilippine Atomic Energy Coas- more, of the requirements imposed y' Ng6F o c3. . M%m %'~

misa.ca to President Marcoe. the mace h D.ree Mua Island sess-

'4:. * * 'S'

.as * '. -

redesiraod Philippine Nuclear desh only half are to be weluded la Power Plast project earnetly unde the rodeaissed Sata.a onenese

[-

e eonstruenan la Morong. Bataan is plant, t

• still not aare, Robert D. Poliant. US he PAEC. La its roccenmend -

auclear safety engineer, aald yester- ation for the resumptaon of cons.

.) '.tG..lg W.

r~ua4 day. truetloo of the plant. had said in its M Ash h ] qM .

Pouard, who has been as the report that the redesiped plant c ountry for several weeha, mid almeady ha

• an h aseenaary safery pl u during a me.eting of the Rotary faerurens Osb of Manila that he based has On h bests of Potard's fiad- E.. ,-g"r.ca r p .,

• • M 7;.O.P findings on ruearches be had inade laga, former Senator Imrenzo - O- .

on the PNPP4 protect both bare Tahada. lond one of h plaat's i and abroad, oppes to.s. yesteday art-4 Pres. [? -'Q} _1.__

an-1 M. 4 d. i L8 W J' According to PoDard, of the de ident Marece to agnan review -

requirernants that the US Neeler PNFP4's asfety aspects, and recom* Plants. However, the headass ended R e guistory Cornausmace k ed mended the immed6 ate suspenson in August 1979 and PoGard's sche.

(=nposed on the standard nuclear of construction work ta the ans' duie permitted hun to corne to the plant desis's e.f Westinghouse Inter- WITNESS. PoCard had been one of Phi:1ppion only La September.

a s tional Projects Co. (PNPP l's b witoews TaAnda was to cad to The c om rnission, headed by contractork provim,ons for only 20 ' gree testimoey during the nuclear Jusuce Minir.ar Ricardo Puno.eco-are contained la the renegotiated safety hearings beid in 1979 by the eluded after the heartags that the contreet betwese Westingbouse and Comrnissica on Nuclear Reseto' Bataan neclear plant's demsn was

. .....w._ . _ _ _ ., ,_e.

_ m ... ..

y,.afa,jija-o;o,e

, , reega,m;nd; ,

NPC restates commitment 2.cet:= ata",=

of the safety of W anclear plant" H o w e v er. Pouard noted. the

' to ens'u' re' p' g.}an' t9S Safety

• n..-

na= phni se i h -e w portant asfety feetures, and macy

. ....%,. of the major reasons for its suspen-De National Power Corp. yes. and the International Atomic Emet

• sion stHI remais I

tardsy restated its comraitment to gy Authonty, h safety of the He added that 6he nnegotiated l

making the nuclear power plaat plant itae;f ban alao been studied contrset contaans a provision unich prosect in Bataan eafe for the whole meticuloua y Jovellanos said. permita .Wesunghouns alons to country. As a result of the Tnree MCs is* Interpret all requiremaats on safety land incident, the NPC did not design tarved after Oct. 1. 1973 In a statement immaed for NFC semnp ca the costa of havirit the (the date the ongsmal contreet was I

president Gabrwl Y. Itchoa, senior d**'gn and structure of the plant re- agnedh vice-pres 4 dent for engineering Jose ansessed, he contanued. Also, engk Jovellarson. Sr. amid the preae at nue-neennt graduates have been estao- FIN AL WORD. If disputes anse, lear plant desta and safety features ovely tisiaed to take over the job Pollard said. Westinghouse win ba=e have been "confirrned by objective of running the plant when at too. the final word as stipulated in the and dwpasmonate evalustice of a into opersuon. contnet. unima the Phliippine goe host of .Faipino nad foreign nuclear Jovellanos extended aa invitat- ervarnent as wiUiar to pay pntsihng

,, pm ion to US auelear safety engineer comrnercial ratas to have sta inter-

" Time and money have not be e Robert D. Petard, who cialmned pntation of a safe piant built cons dered sa restraints"in making that the plaat was sn!! uasafe, to sit De tenegot**L*d contreet a;ao the plant afe, it was noted.. con- dows with NPC engineers and gov- imelades a provisaenfor a bonus pay-adennt the pressat high 41.9 bO- ernment nuclear esperta, and "have ment to % esunghouse if the plant is lion cost of the projoet- a depaamonate d meunmon" on his completed in less thee 50 months NPC bed approved exteneve on- observations from Sept 1950. Das provia or ste investigations, studies and ans- Potard bed naited W Bataan plus the " final word" agreement.

lynes to determme the safety of the nuclear prowet a few days ago, ae. wtB lihe!y encan that the neceamary nue. car plans sate. hrough the Phs cordiri.g to JoveLanos, for stout 20 feature, wit not be incJuded in tae ipp.no Atomic Energy Commismoa to 30 minutes, plant desigt,, Pouard eeramented.

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