Information Notice 1990-69, Adequacy of Emergency and Essential Lighting

Adequacy of Emergency and Essential Lighting

ML031130214
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant
Issue date:	10/31/1990
From:	Rossi C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
IN-90-069, NUDOCS 9010250054
Download: ML031130214 (10)

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 October 31, 1990

NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 90-69: ADEQUACY OF EMERGENCY AND ESSENTIAL LIGHTING

Addressees

All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power

reactors.

Purpose

This information notice is intended to alert addressees to a possible problem

concerning the adequacy of emergency and essential lighting at commercial power

reactor facilities. It is expected that recipients will review the information

for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to

avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in this information

notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or

written response is required. i

Description of Circumstances

On March 3, 1989, Unit 3 at the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station experi- enced a reactor/turbine trip, main steam isolation, containment isolation, and

safety injection as a result of a grid-induced load rejection event. This

event included three significant system failures: (1) half of the steam bypass

control system malfunctioned; (2) the atmospheric dump valves (ADYs) failed to

operate from the control room and the remote shutdown panel; and (3) the

emergency lighting in the main steam support structure (MSSS) failed, hampering

the operators in their attempt to cope with the ADY failures. Being unable to

maintain pressure control on the secondary side by operating the ADVs from the

control room or the remote shutdown panel, plant personnel attempted to establish

local (manual) control of the ADYs in the MSSS. When operators first entered

the MSSS, they found no direct lighting. Normal lighting was lost due to the

loss of power to the non-Class 1E electrical busses in the plant. The emergency

lighting was not properly positioned in the north MSSS room (containing the

ADVs for the No. 1 steam generator) to provide adequate lighting for the

operators to perform their required activities and was not functioning at all

in the south MSSS room (containing ADVs for the No. 2 steam generator).

Because of a burned-out light bulb, plant personnel could not restore essential

lighting (from Class 1E power sources) in the south MSSS room.

"C-

( 01200543

IN 90-69 October 31, 1990 During the NRC inspection (50-530/89-13) conducted by an augmented inspection

team (AIT) sent to examine the event at Palo Verde, the staff found deficien- cies in the licensee's maintenance and testing of emergency and essential

lighting. The team discovered that plant personnel had waived the quarterly

preventive maintenance (PM) tasks on the MSSS emergency and essential lights

for five consecutive quarters. By grouping the lights in the MSSS with the

lights in the containment building, which were inaccessible during power

operations, the PM tasks were waived for the MSSS lights during each of these

periods along with the containment lights. NRC inspections further revealed

that the licensee, prior to the performance of the 8-hour lighting unit dis- charge test, performed preventive maintenance (i.e., battery replacement, addition of electrolyte, cleaning of battery terminals, and battery charging)

on the lighting unit battery. This preventive maintenance practice resulted

in not verifying the performance of the 8-hour emergency lighting units in the

Was found" condition. The inspections also revealed that the licensee had

failed to implement the relevant portions of its quality assurance program for

emergency lighting. Because of these failures, the emergency lighting was not

properly tested, and deficiencies were not properly corrected.

After the event, plant personnel reconstructed the design bases of the

lighting system and conducted walkdown inspections of the emergency and essen- tial lighting in the plant. In some instances, the licensee found the lighting

to be inadequate to perform the required tasks because the original design did

not require emergency lights or because the emergency lights provided inade- quate illumination. In addition, the licensee identified many areas that

required the installation of or modification to lighting to meet the licensee's

design bases and the requirements in 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix R.

Background:

At Palo Verde, the essential lighting system is an integral part of the normal

lighting system that provides illumination if the normal lighting system fails.

The essential lighting system is rated non-Class lE but is powered from

Class lE sources. The system provides lighting in the control room, in the

shutdown panel area, in the main walkways and stairs, in the Class lE switchgear

rooms, in areas having Class lE equipment, and in areas used for the safe

shutdown of the reactor. Upon loss of the normal lighting system, the essential

lighting system provides adequate illumination for the safe shutdown of the

reactor. The system receives power from two redundant and independent Class 1E

ac busses. Each redundant Class 1E ac bus supplies power to 50 percent of the

essential lighting in the vital areas. The diesel generators provide backup

power.

IN 90-69 October 31, 1990 The emergency lighting system receives dc power from two redundant Class lE

batteries through inverters and provides illumination for the control room, the auxiliary electrical equipment rooms, the stairways, and the points leading

to plant exits. The system is normally deenergized and is automatically

energized upon loss of ac power to the normal system. The emergency lighting

system is also composed of 8-hour and li-hour (individually battery-powered)

emergency lighting units. The 8-hour emergency lighting units are designed to

meet the technical requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R, Section III.J which

requires that emergency lighting units with at least an 8-hour battery power

supply be provided in all areas needed for operation of safe shutdown equipment

and in access and egress routes thereto. The li-hour emergency lighting units

are installed to meet the requirements of the Life Safety Code. These lighting

units are generally installed in plant locations to accommodate the safe

evacuation of personnel in the event of a fire in such areas.

Discussion:

During the Palo Verde event, the inadequate lighting conditions significantly

complicated the licensee's efforts to cope with the initial failure of the

ADVs, which delayed the commencement of the controlled removal of decay heat as

called for by the emergency operating procedures.

It is important to note that adequate PM and routine testing programs for

essential and emergency lighting systems are helpful in ensuring adequate

illumination for the operation of safe shutdown equipment. Emergency lighting

is a key fire protection feature associated with supporting post-fire safe

shutdown operations. The exercise of good engineering design practices that

conform to industry standards ensures the ability of the lighting system to

provide adequate station lighting in all vital areas during all types of

accident or transient conditions. The implementation of an effective PM and

testing program which demonstrates lighting system operability is important.

Emergency lighting PM programs recommended by manufacturers generally include

routine monitoring of the battery condition for each lighting unit, periodic

load testing to verify that the lighting unit and its associated charger are

functioning properly, and a periodic "as found" 8-hour lighting unit discharge

test. In addition, the Palo Verde event identified that the inadvertent

repositioning of the emergency lighting fixtures can cause inadequate illumina- tion and that routine verification of emergency lighting fixture orientation

can ensure that emergency lighting is effective.

IN 90-69 October 31, 1990 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact one

of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate NRR project manager.

Charles E. Rossi,'rectoor

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contacts: N. K. Trehan, NRR

(301) 492-0777 S. R. Peterson, NRR

(301) 492-3062 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

Attachment 1 IN 90-69 October 31, 1990 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

NRC INFORMATION NOTICES

Information Date of

Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to

90-68 Stress Corrosion Cracking 10/30/90 All holders of OLs

of Reactor Coolant Pump Bolts or CPs for pres- surized water

reactors (PWRs).

90-67 Potential Security Equipment 10/29/90 All holders of OLs

Weaknesses or CPs for

nuclear power

reactors and

Category I fuel

facilities.

90-66 Incomplete Draining and 10/25/90 All holders of OLs

Drying of Shipping Casks for nuclear

power reactors

and all registered

users of NRC

approved waste

shipping packages.

88-63, High Radiation Hazards 10/5/90 All holders of OLs

Supp. 1 From Irradiated Incore or CPs for nuclear

Detectors and Cables power reactors.

90-65 Recent Orifice Plate 10/5/90 All holders of OLs

Problems or CPs for nuclear

power reactors.

90-64 Potential for Common-Mode 10/4/90 All holders of OLs

Failure Of High Pressure or CPs for pres- Safety Injection Pumps or surized-water

Release of Reactor Coolant reactors.

Outside Containment During

A Loss-Of-Coolant Accident

90-63 Management Attention to the 10/3/90 All fuel cycle

Establishment and Main- licensees possess- tenance of A Nuclear ing more than

Criticality Safety Program critical mass

quantities of

special nuclear

material.

OL = Operating License

CP = Construction Permit

IN 90-69 October 31, 1990 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact one

of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate NRR project manager.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contacts: N. K. Trehan, NRR

(301) 492-0777 S. R. Peterson, NRR

(301) 492-3062 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

• SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES

C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR RPB:ADM AD/AD45 D/PD5 PD5:DRSP:NRR

• CHBerlinger *TechEd *BABoger *JEDyer *SRPeterson

10/18/90 10/18/90 10/09/90 10/09/90 09/24/90

OGCB:DOEA:NRR SELB:DST:NRR C/SELB:DST:NRR C/SPLB:DST:NRR D/DST: NRR

• PCWen *NKTrehan *FRosa *CMcCracken *AThadani

09/24/90 09/24/90 09/25/90 10/03/90 10/03/90

DOCUMENT NAME: IN 90-69

IN 90-XX

October xx, 1990 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact one

of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate NRR project manager.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contacts: N. K. Trehan, NRR

(301) 492-0777 S. R. Peterson, NRR

(301) 492-3062 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

Document Name: INADQUATE LIGHTING

• SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES

D/DOEA:NRR

CERossitt

col/o9J I RPB:AD A D/A5A 9 "e *PD5:DRSP:NRR

CHB e TEd h j ABoger EDyer SRPeterson

10/10/990 l O 91O/q

M /9, 09/24/90 /

• OGC :DOEA:FR *SELB:DST:NRR *C/SELB:DST:yRg /SPLB:DST:NRR

PCWen NKTrehan FRosa ( IWCMcCracken t10(s

09/24/90 09/24/90 09/25/90 ' 1og /90

IN 90-XX

September xx, 1990 Discussion:

During the Palo Verde event, the inadequate lighting conditions significantly

complicated the licensee's efforts to cope with the initial ADVs failure.

However, the plant personnel were eventually able to open two ADVs and, thereby, commence a controlled removal of decay heat as called for by the

emergency operating procedures.

Other plants may also have inadequate PM programs for the emergency and the

essential lighting systems and may provide inadequate illumination for the

operation of safe shutdown equipment. This event also points out that the

inadvertent repositioning of emergency lighting units can cause inadequate

illumination. By verifying the orientation of these units, the licensees can

ensure that the lights are positioned properly.

Emergency lighting is a key fire protection feature for the operation of the

safe shutdown equipment. Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 requires 8-hour

emergency lighting units in areas used for the operation of safe shutdown

equipment and in access and egress routes thereto. The staff relies on the

exercise of good engineering design practice and design criteria that conform

to industry standards to ensure the ability of the lighting system to provide

adequate station lighting in all vital areas during all types of accident or

transient conditions and in the access routes to and from these areas.

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information inthis notice, please contact one

of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate NRR project manager.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contacts: N. K. Trehan, NRR

(301) 492-0777 S. R. Peterson, NRR

(301) 492-3062 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

Document Name: INADQUATE LIGHTING

D/DOEA:NRR C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR RPB:ADM AD/AD45 D/PD5 CERossi CHBerlinger TechEd BABoger JEDyer

09/ /90 09/ /90 09/ /90 09/ /9OqJ2s 09/ /90

OGCB:DOEA:NRR SELB:DST:NRR C/SELB : IRR D/DST:NRRrt t' PD5:DRSP:NRR

PCWen Fcv' NKTrehanJLS FRo AThadani SRPeterso e

09/ A/90 094S9 09/ /90 o9,o/90

09/a4/ 9O

C/S P s13 sT :PJR

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Document Name:

INADQUATE LIGHTING

Requestor's ID:

WERTMAN

Author's Name:

peter wen

Document Comments:

S34 information notice