ML19262C065

Further & Final Amended Contentions by Newberry Township TMI Steering Committee Et Al Re Licensee Emergency Plan,Section 4.Urges Posting of Evacuation Routes W/Distinctive Symbol in Order to Alleviate Confusion.Certificate of Svc Encl

ML19262C065
Person / Time
Site:	Three Mile Island
Issue date:	01/11/1980
From:	Cunningham J AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED, FOX, FARR & CUNNINGHAM
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
Shared Package
ML19262C061	List: ML19262C060 ML19262C065
References
NUDOCS 8001280221
Download: ML19262C065 (13)

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.i In the Matter of 3

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METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY,  : Docket No. 50-289

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FURTHER AND FINAL AMENDED CONTENTIONS OF NEWBERRY TOWNSHIP TMI STEERING COMMITTEE, ET AL.

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TO THE METROPOLITAN EDISON EMERGENCY PLAN Contention Number 3 il l! Evacuation planning done by Metropolitan Edison Company and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is inadequate to insure the safety of the pub-lic, particularly those persons who live within a five-mile radius of the plant. Operation of TMI Unit No. I should not be resumed until a plan is in place for the evacuation of the public in the maximum area which could be

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affected by the Accident and the plan submitted by Metropolitan Edison Com-l l pany to that end is deficient as follows:

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!l (1) Section 4.3.1, the Metropolitan Edison Emergency Plan, herein referred to as "energency plan" incorporates actions to be taken by off-site authorities in the event of an emergency situation. The plan assumes that off-site authorities will

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provide assistance to the plant site in the event of an  !

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emergency. However, the plan does not indicate a contract

] between any fire fighting-authorities and/or police authori-ties for protection and' security during an emergency. Without 0

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I such contractual understandings being in place it is it i

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I questionable that during a crisis situation such off-l site authorities will know exactly what is expected of

.j them. Detailed understandings should be drawn between  ;

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the local police and fire fighting authorities and other

! l l key off-site authorities and agencies in order to insure i

f j orderly support in the event of an emergency. The absence

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c of such documentation and understandings between Metropoli-

>l tan Edison Company and off-site authorities will create a deficiency in the emergency plan itself.

(2) Section 4.4.1.1 of the emergency plan provides that emergency directors shall have the responsibility for declaring an unusual event. The Section continues to state that the emergency directors' training shall stress the need to analyze minor events in light of their potential for fur-ther degradation of the level of safety of the plant but no-where does it stress in the plan what type of training would i I

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] be provided to the emergency director in order to insure his

'l correct response to unusual events. The plan should indicate i

i l the type of training program to be provided to the emergency I

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(3) Section 4.1.4 provides that in those cases where h

radiation monitors are off scale,calcuations will use con-ii I

.; tingency dose release factors where it appears that a general .

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! emergency situation exists. Under no circumstances should 1815 331

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i' inadequate measuring devices be utilized by the licensee to measure the amount of radiation being released from the plant site. It is presently written in Section 4.4.1.4 of the plan indicating that there will be cases where radia-l 0 >

. tion monitors are off scale. It is intervenor's contention l

l that all monitors surrounding the plant site be capable of l accurately measuring radiation releases regardless of the i quantity of the release. I I

(4) Section 4.4.2.2 of the emergency plan regarding I

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emergency events is unacceptable in its present form. This j l

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I Section states that it shall be for the purposes of relating I

the state's emergency classification system defined in Section 4.4.1 of the emergency plan a direct correlation between the i I

BRP's emergesny event and Met-Ed's alert, site emergency and general emergency characterizations. The intervenor's posi-tion with regard to this matter is first that there shou!d l

i i not even be a need to make a correlation between the different  !

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plans and all plans should be uniform in order to insure con-tinuity and understanding. Secondly, the emergency plan indi-cates that a correlation shall be made sometime in the future, however, the euergency plan does not indicate when the correla-h tion will be made. Finally, it is intervenor's contention that l

!l l all emergency plans relating to licensee's plan at TMI should i l

be uniform in order to avoid any confusion in the event of an

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i q emergency. To the extent that plans are not uniform or as of this i

j date correlated and coordinated, intervenors feel t'.c emergency I

] plan is and shall remain defective.

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.; (5) Section 4.5.1.1 of the emergency plan, Section 2(a),

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! provides that a shift supervisor shall, in the event of any I abnormal or emergency situation, assume certain responsibilities.

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The two major responsibilities that, according to the plan, the I

i shift supervisor will have are to initiate immediate appropriate  ;

• I actions and implement proper procedures to avert the emergency I  !

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and at the same time, contact and notify the appropriate offsite

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emergency response organizations and agencies. It is intervenor's  !

position that to require a shift supervisor to perform all of these functions is to place too many responsibilities with one

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individual. It is intervenor's contention that there should be a split of responsibilties with regard to this item to insure both prompt action with regard to the event and prompt  ;.

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[ notification of the proper offsite emergency response organization. i

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(6) Section 4.5.1.1, Section 2(h) of the emergency plan providas that Site Security Force provides, on an around-the-clock basis, security services in accordance with the security plan procedures. Intervenors question whether the security force ,

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I O as now complimented is adequate to protect the plant site in the i

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event of an emergency. It is intervenor's intention that the ,

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security force as it is presently staffed is inade~quate to  !

provide the protection required in the event of an emergency -

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condition. 7 i i

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I j (7) Section 4.5.1.3, rection 1(c)(d), states that the ,

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i emergency director shall proiide liason communications with the i

l county, state and federal governments and insure that notifica-q tion and reports to these agencies are made in a timely manner

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t i support organizations. It is intervenor's contentions that this part of the plan which is critical to the coordination of l all emergency activities does not state with specificity the ,

exact time frame in which notification and communication is to ,

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be made with offsite emergency support organizations and i agencies. It is intervenor's position that this is critical l in order to insure that licensee reports and communicates any abnormal and/or emergency condition to the respective organizations in a truly timely fashion. The emergency plan as now drafted leaves too much discretion with the emergency i

director witt. regard to the contacting of these offsite agencies. I (8) Section 4.5.1.3, Section 2(f), of the emergency plan provides that in the event that a fire is of such a size as would require assistance from local fire departments, c'e shift supervisor will request such aid. Intervenors are of tiie I

position that in the event of an emergency conditicn, it is I highly doubtful that local fire departments will be able to aid 1

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I county plans, and furthermore, local offsite fir 6 departments ,

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I i are manned by volunteers and cannot be absolutely relied upon

, to come to the aid of an onsite fire. In the event of an i emergency condition, it is intervenor's contention that local firemen may be evacuating their families and have absolutely i

no duty to report when asked to by the onsite shift supervisor.  ;

It is intervenor's contention that the licensee should have adequate qualified firefighting personnel to fight fires which l might precipitate any alert, onsite emergency, or general i i j emergency condition. Without such capability, it is intervenor's I contention that the plan, as now written, is inadequate. l (9) Section 4.5.3.2 of the emergency plan indicates that with respect to the ten-mile E.P.Z., the five counties identified ,

i in this section have prepared emergency plans that are coordinated I with the state disaster operation plan and with the TMI emergency plan as well. It is intervenor's contention that this obviously cannot be the case since Revision I and Revision 0, dated  !

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October, 1979, were written well after the five county plans I i

I were adopted. Morcover, a review of the Dauphin County and  :

I York County plans indicates that there is absolutely no {

referencing to the TMI emergency plan and in fact, it appears as I

though the county plans were written in a vacuum and void with '

regard to the state disaster operations plan and the TMI emergency plan. All plans must be. inter-coordinated in order to insure that all parties participating in the emergency will ,

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know what is expected of then. Finally, it is intervenor's I

contention that most local municipalities are not aware of a

] their responsibility to develop a separate emergency plan and this raises the question of who in the emergency plan is given

the ultimate responsibility to maintain, coordinate and distribute .

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I any ch:tnges , amendments, or new ' material to the various county l agencies. Whose responsibility is it to inform local government

! that, for example, the TMI emergency plan has been revised since 3

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,1 October of 19797 Based upon these deficiencies, it is the  !

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I intervenor's contention that because of the above enumerated j

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reasons, the emergency plan as now written is inadequate.

(10) Section 4.5.4 of the emergency plan anticipates that i

the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency will conduct and ,

I participate in annual training exercises that involve state, {

county and local government agencies, and that the testing of communications, radiological monitoring instrumentation and {

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warnit < systems will be conducted. It is intervenor's contention that at the present time, such communication, radiological

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monitoring instrument.ation and warning systems are not in place l

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j in any of the local surrounding communities. The plan does

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not indicate who is responsible for the purchasing of the I

l communication, radiological monitoring instrumentation and 3 warning systems. Is this burden to be shouldered by the local il i j community, the county, the state government or the licensee?

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I ii It is intervenor's contention that while emergency plans I

i; may, in theory, set forth a plan of training, that it cannot e

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realistically be put into action because the plan assumes insite i

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'! placement of communications systems, radiologiccl monitoring

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! instrumentation and warning systems. It is intervenor's

, position that until such systems are in place and it is deter-

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mined who is to burden the cost of placing such systems the

plan is inadequate and unacceptable.

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(11) Section 4.6.4.l(2) of the emergency plan provides that the responsibility for actions to protect persons in offsite area rests with the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and

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that the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency shall be the agency with which the responsibility rests for the placing in effect of protective action options such as evacuation, sheltering and thyroid prophylaxis. This same section indicates that in the event of a general emergency precautionary measures may I

, be taken such as sheltering, evacuation and evacuation of '

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certain sectors based upon wind speed and direction. It is '

l intervenor's contention that the precautionary measures cited i

in the emergency plan have not been coordinated with the local

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county plans to any measurable extent. For example, in the I l f county plans, there is no indication of how counties would .

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i it instruct its local civil defense directors to evacuate only ,

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certain sectors. This is but one example of a lack,of.

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coordination between the emergency plan and the various

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]a county plans, it is intervenor's position that this lack of coordination is symptomatic of the emergency plan as 4 now submitted. The emergency plan submitted by the licensee l

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should encompass a total coordination of all the emergency I

plars formulated by federal, state and county agencies.

This lack of coordination creates as deficiency which has to ,

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be remedied. l (12) Section 4.6.6.1 of the emergency plan deals with  !

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l early warnings and information for transient areas. It is intervenor's position that the methods depended upon in the emergency plan to warn the population at risk, are at the present time, not in place. For example, Section 2 of this particular section of the emergency plan states that a siren alert system could be activated by counties in order to warn I

the populace of an impending danger. As has been indicated earlier in the intervenor's contention with regard to emergency l

planning, there are not enough civil defense warning sirens in order to adequately assure that all members of the community I l are within hearing distance of the siren. Moreover, Section 5 l

l of this subsection of the emergency plan indicates that i

vehicles with loudspeakers could be dispatched to broadcast I

{l warning messagese The problem with this approach is that it would take time to recruit volunteers to man the vehicles and

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'!l j secondly, there are many miles of roads which would have to

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, were informed of the impending emergency condition. It is J

intervenor's contention that until the emergency plan specifi-

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cally states that a siren alert system is in place and that b '

the warning emitted by the siren alert system can be heard

! at any. point in the counties surrounding the plant site j that the emergency plan as drafted is unacceptable.

i 4 (13) Section 4.8.0 of the emergency plan generally l

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deals with maintaining emergency preparedness. Licensee sets forth a series of proposed programs to be coordinated  ;

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! between itself and the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency in order to secure adequate emergency preparedness i in the event of an accident. The general problem with this plan is that it assumes that civil defense officials will contact local officials of the training programs and that jj local officials will voluntarily participate in the pro- .

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l!' grams presented by the licensee. Participation by both

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l county and local civil defense directors is not mandatory, I but instead is voluntary and thus does not guarantee that '

I local community civil defense directors or even county i

1 civil defense directors will be prepared in the event of I l i

'I an emergency. Finally, the emergency plan does r.at speci-

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fically state a date on which the prcgrass will take place

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a but simply recites that there will be an annual meeting.  !

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e 1 It is intervenor's position that specificity in an emergency plan such as the one presented by licensee is required in order to insure implementation of a program set forth therein.

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' Therefore, it is intervenor's contention that the programs a *

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l cited in this section of the emergency plan be presented and

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I coordinated by the licensee and be required to be mandatory I

upon county and local civil defense directors in order to maintain emergency preparedness. l t

Intervenor is also concerned with regard to maintaining  ;

i emergency preparedness.Section 4.8.1.2(5) requires that a major radiation emergency drill appropriate to a site or general emergency shall be conducted at least once per calendar year. ,

i Moreover, the emergency plan provides that once about every five years a joint exercise appropriate to a site or general emergency that involves federal, state and county emergency  :

response personnel, organizations and agencies will be conducted.

l 1 The plan states the scope of the exercise will test as much of the emergency plans as is reasonably achievable, however, the emergency plan does not indicate that evacuation of the l

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local community will be attempted. It is intervenor's contention i

i that in order to determine whether the emergency plan as j regards evacuation of persons is sound a test will have to be '

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made to determine if the routing of traffic if feasible or

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/ not. Moreover, the requirement of evacuating a populace from i

an area will provide the offsite emergency ager.c;es with.

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valuable information regarding the time necessary and required in order to effect an evacuation of the populace. Finally, it is intervenor's contention that an extensive emergency radiation a drill such as the one envisioned in Subsection 5(b)(1) should be required to be conducted on a once-a year basis in order to

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I insure emergency preparedness. Because of these reasons, it b ,

i is intervenor's position that the emergency preparedness section i l of the emergency plan is insufficient.

i i e Finally, it is the suggestion of the intervenors that the i t

! licensee in its emergency plan propose that all major federal interstate highways and state highways and legislative routes l i;  :

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indicated in the county plan as routes of evacuation be clearly i marked as such in a permanent fashion such as is done, for

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example, in the State of Florida with regard to evacuation routes l in the event of hurricanes. The posting of such evacuation routes i l with a distinctive symbol would, in the event of an emergency,  !

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about as the result of not hav ,ing said routes marked.

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' Submitted,by: ,

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.' C u i,ngham , E s'q . ~~ ,

[ FOX, FARR & CUNNIt3GROI ,

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2320 N. Second Street ,

Harrisburg, Pi 17110 (717) 238-6570 a Counsel for Newberry Township.

TMI Steering Committee, et al.

Jated: .lanuary 11, 1980

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i UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  !

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD '

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! In the Matter of:  : '

METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY,  : Docket No. 50-289 et al.  :

(Three Mile Island Nuclear  : Restart Station, Unit No. 1)  :

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that a copy of Further Amended Contention Number 3 was mailed First Class, postage prepaid, this lith day of January , 1980, to the following:

Secretary of the Commission U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

• ATTN: Chief, Docketing Service Section Ivan W. Smith, Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Doctor Walter H. Jordan 881 West Outer Drive Oakridge, Tenn 37830 Doctor Linda W. Little 5000 Eermitage Drive Raleigh, NC 27612 George F. Trowbridge, Esq.

SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE 1800 M. Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036 James A. Tourtellotte Office of Executive Legal Director U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 ,

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Jordan D. Cunningham, Esq.