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Official Use Only-Sensitive Internal Information lTnited States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Protectitzg People and the Environment BRIEFING BOOK FOR COMMISSIONER PETER B. LYONS OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION FEBRUARY 3, 2009 Official Use Only-Sensitive Internal Information Official Use Only-Sensitive Internal Information On-Site Visit by Commissioner Lyons AGENDA. Executive Summary FACILITY DATA Facility Location Map and Directions . Facility Data . Facility Unique Features FACILITY PERFORMANCE Reactor Oversight Process Info . Current Issues FACILITY MANAGEMENT DATA Facility Organization Biographical Data of Principal Managers NRC OVERSIGHT DATA Resumes of Resident Inspectors . Official Use Only-Sensitive Internal Information TAB . 1 . 2 . 3 . 4 . 5 . 6 . 7 . 8 . 9 Feb 2. 2009 5:00p.m. 6:31 p.m. 7:00p.m. 8:00p.m. Feb 3. 2009 8:00a.m. 8:30a.m. 9:00a.m. 9:30a.m. 11:30 a.m. 12:15 p.m. 1:00 p.m. 1:30 p.m. 4:00p.m. 4:30p.m. 6:59p.m. 8:23p.m. Official Use Only-Sensitive Internal Information Agenda for Commissioner Peter Lyons' Visit to Oconee Nuclear Station -February 3, 2009 Depart Washington Dulles Airport on United Airlines Flight 8071 Arrive at Greenville-Spartanburg Airport Leave Greenville-Spartanburg via Budget Rent A Car Arrive at Hampton Inn, Clemson, SC Travel to Oconee Nuclear Station via rental car Arrive at Oconee Nuclear Station (Oconee Office Complex Bldg 8032) Meet with NRC resident inspector and branch chief Meet with licensee for discussions involving:
- National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)-805 Transition
- Tornado/High Energy Line Break (HELB) TAB 1
- Protected Service Water (PSW)/Natural Phenomenon Barrier System Plant tour with plant management, NRC branch chief, resident inspector, and the Commissioner's Technical Assistant (TA)
- Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF)
- Unit 3 Control Room North Wall
- Reactor Protective System/Engineered Safeguards Protective System (RPS/ESPS)
Digital Upgrade discussion in the control room Working lunch with licensee managers
- Jocassee Dam Pre-brief Depart for World of Energy visit Depart from World of Energy and travel to dam Tour dam Return to site Depart Oconee Nuclear Station and travel to Greenville-Spartanburg Airport via rental car Depart Greenville-Spartanburg Airport on United Airlines Flight 8070 Arrive Washington Dulles Airport Official Use Only-Sensitive Internal Information Official Use Only-Sensitive Internal Information Executive Summary Purpose of the visit/meeting
- Tour Oconee Nuclear Station and Jocassee Dam
- Meet with plant management, NRC branch chief, and resident inspection staff Issues to be addressed (See TAB 6)
- Current plant issues and planned plant modifications Persons to meet Region II personnel (See TAB 9)
- Eric Riggs, Resident Inspector
- Jonathan Bartley, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 1 Oconee personnel (See TAB 8)
- David Baxter, Oconee Site Vice-President
- Preston Gillespie, Oconee Station Manager
- Michael Glover, General Manager of Oconee Nuclear Plant Projects
- Scott Batson, Oconee Engineering Manager
- Rich Freudenberger, Oconee Safety Assurance Manager Activities on site
- Tour facility with plant management, NRC branch chief, resident inspector, and Commissioner's TA
- Tour Jocassee Dam Message to be communicated by the Commissioner
- Important to keep Tornado/HELB modifications on track
- Important to focus on Nuclear Performance Plan Licensee's briefing topics for the Commissioner
- NFPA 805 Transition
- Tornado/HELB
- PSW /Natural Phenomenon Barrier System
- SSF
- Unit 3 Control Room North Wall
- RPS/ESPS Digital upgrade Licensee Ownership Information TAB 1 Duke Energy Carolinas owns and operates the two-unit McGuire and the three-unit Oconee nuclear stations.
In addition, Duke Energy Carolinas operates and has a partial ownership interest in the two-unit Catawba Nuclear Station. Official Use Only-Sensitive Internal Information Official Use Only-Sensitive Internal Information TAB 1 Recent Oconee Management Changes (See TAB 7) Dhiaa Jamil succeeded Brew Barron as Chief Nuclear Officer effective February 17, 2008; Gary Peterson became Vice President, Fleet Performance Oversight and Strategy; Bruce Hamilton succeeded Gary Peterson as Vice President, McGuire Nuclear Station effective January 1, 2008; and David Baxter succeeded Bruce Hamilton as Vice President, Oconee Nuclear Station. Effective October 2008, Preston Gillespie left his role as Operations Superintendent at Catawba to become the Oconee Station Manager. ROP Assessment-Significant ROP Inspection Findings (See TAB 5) Plant performance for 2008 was within the Licensee Response Column of the NRC's Action Matrix for Units 1, 2 and 3. All Performance Indicators (Pis) and findings are GREEN. Note: A Regulatory Conference was held with Duke on January 22, 2009, for the Unit 1 loss of inventory event. A caucus was held on January 28, 2008, to finalize the significance determination.
[PREDECISIONAL INFORMATION-Preliminary results, including addressing the licensee's comments on the risk, are that the finding will be WHITE. This would put Unit 1 in the Regulatory Response Column.] Potential Discussion Topics (See TAB 6) Flood Action Plan The NRC is evaluating an "inadequate protection" issue related to a past finding involving a breached flood barrier of the Oconee safe shutdown facility (SSF). NRR is assessing the options regarding a final response to the licensee's 50.54(f) response.
Tornado Mitigation As a result of a 95002 supplemental inspection of two White Mitigating System tornado-related findings in 2001, it was determined that Oconee has a number of tornado-related vulnerabilities that collectively represent a deficient tornado mitigation strategy.
HELB Mitigation Following a 1998 self-assessment of Oconee's licensing basis for HELB events outside containment, Duke notified the NRC in January 1999 that it was initiating a project to reconstitute the design and licensing basis for HELBs outside the reactor building.
NFPA 805 Transition Oconee is one of two pilot plants that are in the process of transitioning to NFPA 805 for fire protection.
NRR is planning an on-site review, in February 2009, of Oconee's license amendment request (LAR) submittal.
Digital Computer Based Reactor Protective System (RPS)/Engineered Safeguards Protective System (ESPS) Duke submitted a LAR that would allow replacement of the current analog-based RPS/ESPS with a digital computer based RPS/ESPS.
Implementation will begin in Fall2010 or Spring 2011 following development of modification packages.
Official Use Only-Sensitive Internal Information Official Use Only-Sensitive Internal Information TAB 1 William States Lee Ill Nuclear Station Combined Operating License (COL) Application Duke Energy submitted a 10 CFR 52 application for a combined operating licensee to the NRC on December 13, 2007, which was docketed on February 25, 2008. Unit 1 Loss of Inventory Event A Regulatory Conference was held on January 22, 2009. The post-conference caucus was held on January 28, 2008, to finalize the significance determination.
The final significance determination is pending. [PREDICISIONAL INFORMATION:
Preliminary results, including addressing the licensee's comments on the risk presented at the Regulatory Conference, are that the finding will be WHITE.] Unit 3 Reactor Trip At 0834 hours0.00965 days <br />0.232 hours <br />0.00138 weeks <br />3.17337e-4 months <br /> on November 7, 2008, a Unit 3 reactor trip occurred.
The licensee's investigation determined that the trip was a result of a simultaneous shut down of the control rod drive (CRD) digital primary processors caused by an erroneous time signal from the satellite clock repeater for Unit 3. Approval for Additional Resident Inspector A temporary third resident has been authorized for the Oconee site due to the large number of planned permanent plant modifications.
IN PO Rating and Nuclear Performance Plan A two week IN PO E&A was conducted during July 2008 with the final numerical rating being an IN PO 2. As a result, the licensee has developed a recovery plan which outlines initiatives and areas of responsibility to improve overall plant performance.
Official Use Only-Sensitive Internal Information Official Use Only-Sensitive Internal Information Facility Location Map and Directions A-Greenville-Spartanburg International Airport (Aviation Or/Jetport Rd) to B-Hampton Inn Clemson (851 Tiger Boulevard, Clemson, SC 29631) 50.2 mi-about 55 mins
- Head southeast on Aviation Or/Jetport Rd (0.5 mi)
- Merge onto 1-85 S via the ramp to Greenville (37.2 mi)
- Take exit 19B for State Hwy 28 W /US-76 W toward Clemson ( 0.4 mi)
- Merge onto Clemson Blvd/SC-28/US-76
- Continue to follow SC-28 (10.9 mi)
- Turn left at SC-28/Tiger Blvd/US-123/US-76
- Destination will be on the right (1.2 mi) B-Hampton Inn Clemson (851 Tiger Boulevard, Clemson, SC 29631) to C-Oconee Nuclear Station (7800 Rochester Hwy, Seneca, SC 29672) 13.2 mi-about 22 mins
- Head west on SC-28/Tiger Blvd/US-123/US-76
- Continue to follow SC-28/US-123/US-76 (5.4 mi)
- Turn rightatSC-130 (7.1 mi)
- Turn rightatSC-183 (0.7mi)
- Turn left into plant entrance and right into Oconee Office Complex parking lot TAB2
- Park in first available parking spot. Licensee will provide transportation through security checkpoint and to personnel access portal. NRC Branch Chief and Resident Inspector will greet you at the portal. Official Use Only-Sensitive Internal Information
.-\ I Official Use Only-Sensitive Internal Information Oconee Site Map Parking for Comm. Lyons and TA _ ...... \ . \ I \ i * . *. Office
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erter at CerTiplu Satuily Gats. I OCONEE tlUCLUI STATION I till ---*-/"". ._ I : i '-**-**-**-**-**-**-**-**-** ; I Official Use Only-Sensitive Internal Information TAB2 Official Use Only-Sensitive Internal Information Facility Data Utility: Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC Location:
8 miles northeast of Seneca, SC County: Oconee County, SC Docket Nos. License Nos. Full Power License Commercial Operation OL Expiration Date UNIT 1 50-269 DPR-38 02/06/1973 07/15/1973 02/06/2033 PLANT CHARACTERISTICS Reactor Type Containment Type Power Level NSSS Vendor UNIT2 50-270 DPR-47 10/06/1973 09/09/1974 10/06/2033 All Units PWR Dry Ambient UNIT3 50-287 DPR-55 07/19/1974 12/16/1974 07/19/2034 2568 MWt (900 MWe) B&W Official Use Only-Sensitive Internal Information TAB3 Official Use Only-Sensitive Internal Information TAB4 Facility Unique Features Emergency Supply to 4160 Volt-AC Safety-Related Buses Provided from the two hydro units at the adjacent Keowee Hydro Station, the onsite emergency AC power supply is not Train separated by source. A single Keowee Hydro Unit (KHU) will supply all emergency power. Should a failure occur, the other KHU will supply power. This power is supplied to Oconee by two connections; an overhead transmission line and an underground line. [Note: gas turbines at the Lee Steam Station can also be made available (manually, via a separate overhead line) to provide power if Keowee is not available.]
Keowee was originally built, operated and maintained to Duke's hydro station standards; therefore, a number of modifications/upgrades have been necessary over the last ten years (i.e., procedure upgrades, engineering analyses, maintenance program development, significant testing, circuit breaker and underground cable replacements, weld overlay/repairs to the KHU turbine blades and guide rings, and modifications pertaining to auxiliary power and over voltage/under frequency issues). Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) The SSF, which is unique to the Duke Facilities, provides an alternate and independent means to achieve and maintain a hot standby condition for any unit following postulated turbine building flood, fire, and sabotage events. [Note: The proposed Tornado/HELB mitigation strategies also take credit for the SSF.] It consists mainly of one diesel generator set, an auxiliary service water pump, and supporting equipment (all housed in an onsite seismically qualified building), three standby makeup pumps (one in each unit's reactor building), strainers, valves, and associated piping. Powered from the SSF diesel, the standby makeup pumps deliver water at approximately 26 gpm from the associated spent fuel pool to the reactor coolant pump seals. In support of primary decay heat removal, the SSF diesel supplied electric auxiliary service water pump supplies water from the condenser circulating water (CCW) cross-over header to the once-through steam generators.
The SSF is able to maintain all three units in Mode 3 (525 degrees) for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, at which point, it is assumed that the other mitigating systems will be repaired and returned to service. Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) As originally designed, long-term decay heat removal has relied on the non-safety, seismically qualified CCW piping system and its pumps to provide water to the safety-related LPSW pumps located in the turbine building basement.
During loss of offsite power events, the CCW pumps lose power; therefore, decay heat removal and cooling water for safety-related pumps rely on the use of a siphon effect (between the lake and the CCW cross-over header) to provide water to the safety-related LPSW system. Accordingly, to maintain the siphon and assure LPSW system operability, a number of modifications/upgrades were completed in recent years (e.g., installation of a QA-1 siphon vacuum system, supplying safety-related sealing/cooling water to CCW pumps, reclassifying the CCW interface boundary to QA-1, etc.). Official Use Only-Sensitive Internal Information Official Use Only-Sensitive Internal Information TAB4 Emergency Feedwater (EFW) The safety-related turbine driven EFW pump (one for each unit) and the motor driven EFW pumps (two for each unit) are located in the turbine building basement.
The turbine driven EFW pump in each unit can be aligned to either its safety-related main steam supply or to a safety-related, non-seismically qualified auxiliary steam header. The EFW system does not have a dedicated, seismically qualified source of water of sufficient capacity to bring the unit(s) to the point where low pressure injection cooldown can be initiated.
Specifically, each unit's EFW system must rely on the limited source of water in its seismically qualified upper surge tank, as well as depend on the water contained in the condenser hotwell. Cross-connect valves are, however, provided between all three units' EFW systems. Identified EFW single failure vulnerabilities have been addressed through plant modifications and licensing basis changes/clarifications.
Containment Isolation Several piping systems penetrating containment were designed without isolation valves (Main Steam), or redundant, reliable (QA Level 1) isolation devices (Main Feedwater).
Operator actions were required in some cases to prevent consequences beyond "standard" design basis accident end points. For containment integrity concerns, the licensee implemented a modification several years ago in all three units which automatically secures/isolates main feedwater upon a steam line break event. During the Spring 2002 Unit 1 refueling outage, and subsequent Unit 2 and 3 refueling outages, a new automatic feedwater isolation system (AFIS) modification was installed that secures/isolates both main and emergency feedwater to the affected steam generator. (Note: Due to a recently developed small steam line break scenario that results in a delayed feedwater isolation signal, temporary diesel air compressors are continuously run to compensate for the expected bleed off of valve operating air pressure should a coincident loss of offsite power occur.) Official Use Only-Sensitive Internal Information Official Use Only-Sensitive Internal Information TAB5 Reactor Oversight Process Info The following URLs are for the Oconee Nuclear Station (Units 1, 2 and 3) ROP Performance Summary web pages. http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/ASSESS/OC01/oco1 chart.html http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/ASSESS/OC02/oco2 chart.html http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/ASSESS/OC03/oco3 chart.html http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/ASSESS/pi summarv.html ROP Performance Status (1st Quarter 2008 -4th Quarter 2008) Performance of Oconee Units 1, 2 and 3 during 2008 was within in the Licensee Response Column of the NRC's Action Matrix. All findings and Pis over the assessment period were GREEN. Note: A Regulatory Conference was held with Duke on January 22, 2009, for the Unit 1 loss of inventory event. A caucus was held on January 28, 2008, to finalize the significance determination.
[PREDECISIONAL INFORMATION-Preliminary results, including addressing the licensee's comments on the risk, are that the finding will be WHITE. This would put Unit 1 in the Regulatory Response Column as of the 4 1 h quarter of 2008.] Official Use Only-Sensitive Internal Information Official Use Only-Sensitive Internal Information TAB6 Current Issues A. EXPECTED DISCUSSION TOPICS Flood Action Plan Using the Significance Determination Process (SDP), the staff initially evaluated a performance deficiency of a breached flood barrier to the Oconee SSF. During a re-evaluation on licensee appeal, it was discovered that the licensee had erroneously used a significantly lower random Jocassee Dam rupture frequency in their site external flooding analysis for the Individual Plant Examination of External Events. An approach using the techniques of NUREG/CR-6823, "Handbook of Parameter Estimation for Probabilistic Risk Assessment," was used to verify this. Upon further review, it was discovered that an earlier alternate approach had underestimated dam rupture frequency published in NSAC-60, "Oconee PRA; a probabilistic risk assessment of Oconee Unit 3," a document which is referenced throughout the industry by other licensees in their flooding analyses.
Consequently, an internal NRC backfit assessment/flood action plan was implemented.
A 50.54(f) letter was issued on August 15, 2008, concerning this "inadequate protection" issue. On November 5, 2008, NRC and Licensee Management met to discuss: concerns with the SSF licensing basis with respect to flooding, as addressed in the related 50.54(f) letter; short-term interim measures for ONS operation; and a long-term solution to the question of flood protection at the ONS site. Current concerns are that the SSF is the only mitigating system that is currently protected from this event; however, it is only protected to a flood height of 5 feet and can only mitigate the effects of this event for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> before the SSF standby makeup systems will deplete the spent fuel pool water inventories.
Additionally, the licensee's response to the 50.54(f) letter was insufficient.
NRR met with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) on December 1, 2008, to discuss generic issues related to the Jocassee dam inundation study performed by Oconee. A technical exchange meeting was held December 4, 2008, to work out details on the probabilistic and consequence analyses.
Licensee tours of the Jocassee Dam were provided to the Regional Administrator on December 10, 2008, and to NRR and Regional management (Skeen, Galloway and Wert) on January 8, 2009. NRR is currently assessing the options regarding a final response to the licensee's 50.54(f) response.
Tornado Mitigation As a result of a 95002 supplemental inspection of two White Mitigating System tornado-related findings in 2001, it was determined that Oconee has a number of tornado-related vulnerabilities that collectively represent a deficient tornado mitigation strategy.
Duke has subsequently provided its resolution to this matter by proposing the use of two redundant and largely separate tornado mitigation systems (i.e., the SSF and a planned PSW system). The licensee has already started civil/site work on the PSW system and the Unit 3 control room wall missile protection modifications are also underway.
Duke has also informed the NRC that difficulty in meeting the Standard Review Plan TORMIS risk acceptance criteria (1.0E-6) will result in the need for more missile protection than originally thought. The Tornado Mitigation LAR was submitted June 26, 2008, and has been accepted (Rare Circumstances) by NRR. Official Use Only-Sensitive Internal Information Official Use Only-Sensitive Internal Information TAB6 HELB Mitigation Following a 1998 self-assessment of Oconee's licensing basis for HELB events outside containment, Duke notified the NRC in January 1999 that it was initiating a project to reconstitute the design and licensing basis for HELBs outside the reactor building.
The NRC staff is concerned that the analyses that were completed by Duke in 1973 for addressing postulated high energy pipe failures in the auxiliary building do not adequately consider and address the potential consequences of postulated HELB events. Duke analysis of 1973 did not adequately consider issues such as physical arrangement of structures, systems and components (SSCs) in the penetration rooms, the lack of separation, the absence of barriers for preventing pipe whip, jet impingement, and migration of steam and water, and the proximity of important SSCs to postulated pipe break locations.
For example, a postulated feedwater line break in the auxiliary building could impact both trains of HPI/LPI, RCP seal injection and thermal barrier cooling, letdown, EFW, vital batteries, and numerous electrical penetrations.
Oconee's Unit 1 HELB mitigation LAR (which includes the use of existing safety systems, along with the SSF and planned installation of the PSW system and main steam isolation valves) was submitted June 26, 2008, and accepted (Rare Circumstances) by NRR. ALAR for Unit 2 was submitted in December 2008 and a Unit 3 LARwill be submitted in June 2009. NFPA 805 Transition Oconee is one of two pilot plants that are in the process of transitioning to NFPA 805 for fire protection.
LAR No. 2008-01, to adopt NFPA 805, was submitted for all three Units on May 30, 2008. On October 31, 2008, the licensee submitted, as a supplement to the LAR, the fire probabilistic risk assessment model, change evaluations, and proposed modifications.
NRR is planning an on-site review of the submittal in February 2009. Digital Computer Based Reactor Protective System (RPS)/Engineered Safeguards Protective System (ESPS) By letter dated January 31, 2008, Duke submitted aLAR that would allow replacement of the current analog-based RPS/ESPS with a digital computer based RPS/ESPS.
By letter dated April 24, 2008, the NRC staff stated that Duke had provided sufficient information to accept the LAR and start a comprehensive review of the LAR. The letter identified six issues (discussed with Duke in a March 18, 2008, public meeting) that presented significant challenges to completing a comprehensive review of the LAR. Four members of NRR/EICB visited Oconee the week of May 19, 2008, and resolved these issues. Implementation is scheduled to begin in Fall 2010 or Spring 2011 following development of modification packages.
William States Lee Ill Nuclear Station Combined Operating License (COL) Application Duke Energy submitted a 10 CFR 52 application for a combined operating licensee to the NRC on December 13, 2007, which was docketed on February 25, 2008. A public seeping meeting was also held on May 1, 2008, near the proposed site location.
The license application references the Westinghouse AP1 000 as the reactor type and two reactors are planned for the site. The location is just south of the North Carolina/South Carolina border near Gaffney, S.C. The site can be reached by taking 1-85 from Charlotte, N.C. to exit 96 (approximately 50 miles), then going south about 1 0 miles. Official Use Only-Sensitive Internal Information Official Use Only-Sensitive Internal Information TAB6 Unit 1 Loss of Inventory Event On April 12, 2008, Oconee Unit 1 shut down for refueling.
On April 15, 2008, Unit 1 had restored level, from a mid loop operation to install cold leg nozzle dams, to below the reactor vessel flange. The head was detensioned in preparation for removal. As part of main generator voltage regulator modification testing, a main generator lockout signal was generated while the switchyard was back-feeding all Unit 1 electrical loads through the main transformer and the associated auxiliary transformer.
This caused a slow transfer from the aux transformer to backup transformer (CT1) from the switchyard.
The resulting electrical transient caused a momentary loss of power to the running pumps performing shutdown cooling (SOC) and, due to one complication, a relief valve in the letdown purification system opened and remained open as designed.
This transient caused a loss of inventory (LOI) from the reactor coolant system (RCS) to the miscellaneous waste holdup tank (MWHUT). The operators quickly recognized the LOI and entered the appropriate procedures.
They had the relief valve isolated and makeup water going into the RCS within 17 minutes. During the RCS level transient, level dropped from 70 inches above hotleg midloop to approximately 55 inches. Approximately 2000 gallons were transferred from the RCS to the MWHUT. The root cause of the generator lockout was determined to be a failure of the procedure pre parers and reviewers of IP/0/B/2005/001, "Main Generator Automatic Voltage Regulator (AVR) Maintenance and Channel Transfer," to recognize the system interaction between the AVR trip circuitry and the backcharge power path; therefore, steps to isolate actuation of the K31 relay were not included in the procedure.
A Significance and Enforcement Review Panel was conducted on Wednesday, November 12, 2008, and a "Greater than Green" preliminary determination letter was sent to the licensee on November 21, 2008. Note: A Regulatory Conference was held with Duke on January 22, 2009, and a caucus was held on January 28, 2008, to finalize the significance determination.
[PREDECISIONAL INFORMATION Preliminary results, including addressing the licensee's comments on the risk, are that the finding will be WHITE. This would put Unit 1 in the Regulatory Response Column.] Unit 3 Reactor Trip At 0834 hours0.00965 days <br />0.232 hours <br />0.00138 weeks <br />3.17337e-4 months <br /> on November 7, 2008, a Unit 3 reactor trip occurred.
The Events Recorder and Operator Aid Computer (OAC) first-out alarms were "reactor trip confirm" signals out of the Control Rod Drive (CRD) system. The transient response of the unit was normal and operator actions were appropriate with no complications.
The licensee's investigation determined that the trip was a result of a simultaneous shutdown of the CRD digital primary processors P1 and P2 which caused the system to go to a fail-safe condition as designed which ultimately energized all rods. The shutdown of the processors was caused by an erroneous time signal from the satellite clock repeater for Unit 3, which is used for a time stamping function in the CRD system. The bad time signal also caused a reset of the Unit 3 control room clock and OAC time stamp. On Sunday, November 9, 2008, the Plant Operations Review Committee convened (Senior Resident attended) and made the decision to restart Unit 3 following the disconnection of the clock input to the CRD system as there are no other external synchronous inputs to the CRD system that could have the same effect. Subsequent to the implementation of the modification, Unit 3 was returned to power operations on November 9, 2008. The same modification was also performed on Unit 1 (Unit 2 was not affected).
Approval for Additional Resident Inspector A temporary third resident has been authorized for the Oconee site due to the large number of permanent plant modifications associated with Tornado/HELB issues, NFPA 805 implementation, conversion to a digital Reactor Protection System/Engineered Safeguards Protective System, and the addition of Main Steam Isolation Valves. These modifications are both complex and important to safety. The third resident will provide additional oversight of the modification work and will coordinate inspection efforts of specialist inspectors from Region II. Official Use Only-Sensitive Internal Information Official Use Only-Sensitive Internal Information TAB6 IN PO Rating and Nuclear Performance Plan (b )(4) B. OTHER TOPICS OF INTEREST Labor/Management Issues None License Renewal Activities None Escalated Enforcement.
Non-Green Findings and Non-Green Performance Indicators Other than the Unit 1 loss of inventory event discussed above, there has been no escalated enforcement or the identification of any Greater than Green findings or performance indicators within the last year. Open Investigations Two items are under Office of Investigations (01) review. One involves the discovery of an illegal substance inside the Protected Area at Oconee Nuclear Station. Another involves personnel at McGuire Nuclear Station that were aware of illegal drug use, but failed to report this information to the licensee.
Open Allegations Two allegations are open. One involves the discovery of an illegal substance inside the Protected Area. Another involves personnel at McGuire that were aware of illegal drug use, but failed to report this information to the licensee.
Both are being investigated by 01. Congressional Interest None Harassment and Intimidation Issues None 2.206 Petitions None Official Use Only-Sensitive Internal Information Recent News Articles On Januarv 23. 2009 Official Use Only-Sensitive Internal Information (b )(4) (b )(4) (b )(4) (b )(4) Official Use Only-Sensitive Internal Information TAB6 Official Use Only-Sensitive Internal Information TAB6 On Januarv 12. 2009 (b )(4) (b )(4) On December 1, 2008 (b )(4) Official Use Only-Sensitive Internal Information Official Use Only-Sensitive Internal Information TAB6 On November 26. 2008 (b )(4) On November 17.2008 (b )(4) On November 12,2008 (b )(4) Official Use Only-Sensitive Internal Information Official Use Only-Sensitive Internal Information TAB 7 Facility Organization OVERVIEW OF DUKE ENERGY Duke Energy Carolinas Duke Energy Carolinas' operations include nuclear, coal-fired, natural gas, and hydroelectric generation.
This diverse fuel mix provides nearly 21 ,000 megawatts (MW) of safe, reliable and competitively priced electricity to more than 2.3 million electric customers in a 24,000 mile service area of North Carolina and South Carolina.
Generation Assets Duke Energy Carolinas generates energy primarily from three nuclear generating stations with a combined net capacity of 6,996 MW, eight coal-fired stations with a combined capacity of 7,699 MW, thirty-one hydroelectric stations with a combined capacity of 2,693 MW, and six combustion turbine stations with a combined capacity of 2,861 MW. Duke Energy Carolinas owns and operates the two-unit McGuire and the three-unit Oconee nuclear stations.
In addition, Duke Energy Carolinas operates and has a partial ownership interest in the two-unit Catawba Nuclear Station. New Nuclear Generation Duke Energy submitted a 10 CFR 52 application for a combined operating licensee to the NRC on December 13, 2007, which was docketed on February 25, 2008. A public seeping meeting was also held on May 1, 2008, near the proposed site location.
The license application references the Westinghouse AP1 000 as the reactor type and two reactors are planned for the site. The location is just south of the North Carolina/South Carolina border near Gaffney, S.C. The site can be reached by taking 1-85 from Charlotte, N.C. to exit 96 (approximately 50 miles), then going south about 1 0 miles. Official Use Only-Sensitive Internal Information I MANAGER BUSINESS Cecil Turner Official Use Only-Sensitive Internal Information I MANAGER SAFETY ASSURANCE Rich Freudenberger I SUPERINTENDENT OPERATIONS Eddie Anderson DUKE ENERGY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION ORGANIZATIONAL CHART CHAIRMAN, CHIEF EXECUTIVE
& PRESIDENT Jim Rodgers (704) 382-5959 I CHIEF NUCLEAR OFFICER Dhiaa Jamil (704) 382-2200 I SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT NUCLEAR OPERATIONS Ronald Jones (704) 382-5149 I VICE PRESIDENT OCONEE NUCLEAR SITE Dave Baxter (864) 885-4460 I I MANAGER STATION ENGINEERING MANAGER OCONEE Scott Batson Preston Gillespie I I I SUPERINTENDENT MANAGER WORK CONTROL RADIATION PROTECTION Bob Medlin Vacant GENERAL MANAGER OF PROJECTS Mike Glover I TRAINING MANAGER Dean Hubbard I MANAGER CHEMISTRY Gary Barker Official Use Only-Sensitive Internal Information TAB 7 I MANAGER SITE SERVICES Larry Crouse I SUPERINTENDENT MAINTENANCE Phillip Culbertson Official Use Only-Sensitive Internal Information TAB8 Biographical Data of Principal Managers Dhiaa M. Jamil Group Executive and Chief Nuclear Officer Dhiaa Jamil is Group Executive and Chief Nuclear Officer for Duke Energy. He is responsible for the safe and efficient operation of the company's three nuclear generating Catawba, McGuire and Oconee nuclear stations.
He was named to his current position in January 2008. Mr. Jamil has more than 25 years of experience in the energy industry.
Most recently, Mr. Jamil served as Senior Vice President of nuclear support. He led the organization responsible for plant support, major projects and fuel management for Duke Energy's nuclear fleet. In addition, he was responsible for regulatory support, nuclear oversight and safety analysis functions.
He joined Duke Power in 1981 as a design engineer in the design engineering department.
After a series of promotions, he was named Electrical Systems Engineering Supervisor of Oconee Nuclear Station in 1989 and Electrical Systems Engineering Manager in 1994. He was named Maintenance Superintendent of McGuire Nuclear Station in 1997, Station Manager in 1999, and Site Vice President of McGuire Nuclear Station in 2002. In that role, Mr. Jamil was responsible for all aspects of the safe and efficient operation of the nuclear site. He was appointed Site Vice President of Catawba Nuclear Station in 2003. Mr. Jamil received a Bachelor of Science degree in Electrical Engineering from the University of North Carolina at Charlotte.
He is a registered Professional Engineer in North Carolina and South Carolina.
He has completed the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (IN PO) Senior Nuclear Plant Management course and received Duke Energy's technical nuclear certification.
He has served as a senior member of the Institute of Electrical
& Electronics Engineers (IEEE) and has completed a year assignment as a member of the Council of the National Academy for Nuclear Training.
He is a former member of Dominion Energy Management Safety Review Advisory Committee, TVA Nuclear Safety Review Board, and Pacific Gas & Electric Nuclear Safety Oversight Committee.
He also served on the board of directors of the York County, S.C. Chamber of Commerce.
Mr. Jamil is currently a member of the board of directors of the Charlotte Research Institute and serves on an advisory board for the School of Engineering at the University of South Carolina.
He is a member of IN PO's Executive Advisory Group, the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) New Plant Oversight Committee, and the NEI Nuclear Strategic Issues Advisory Committee Steering Group. I (b )(6) Off1c1al Use Only-Sensitive Internal Information Official Use Only-Sensitive Internal Information TAB8 Ronald A. Jones Senior Vice President -Nuclear Operations Ron Jones is senior vice president of nuclear operations for Duke Energy. He provides oversight for the safe and reliable operation of the three Duke Energy-operated nuclear Catawba, McGuire and Oconee. He was named to his current position in January 2006. In addition to this role, Jones assumed responsibility for the nuclear fleet support and major projects organizations in February 2008. Jones has more than 27 years experience in the nuclear field. He joined Duke Power in 1980 as an engineer at Catawba Nuclear Station. He received his senior reactor operator license in 1987. After a series of promotions, he was named manager of maintenance engineering in 1988; superintendent of instrument and electrical in 1991; superintendent of operations at McGuire Nuclear Station in 1994; station manager of Catawba Nuclear Station in 1997; station manager of Oconee Nuclear Station in 2001; and vice president of Oconee Nuclear Station in 2002. Thel(b)(6) !graduated from Virginia Tech in Blacksburg, Va., with a Bachelor of Science degree in Electrical Engineering.
Jones is a member of the American Nuclear Society and the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers; chairman of the Pressurized Water Reactors Owners Group Executive Management Group and Executive Committee; chairman of the Carolinas Nuclear Cluster; and an executive member of the Nuclear Energy Institute Nuclear Security and Workforce Working Groups. He is currently a member of the board of directors for Junior Achievement of the Central Carolinas and the Lake Norman Charter School. I (b)(6) Official Use Only-Sensitive Internal Information Official Use Only-Sensitive Internal Information David A. Baxter Site Vice President Oconee Nuclear Station TAB8 Dave Baxter is site vice president of Oconee Nuclear Station in Seneca, S.C. Baxter is responsible for the safe and reliable operation of Oconee Nuclear Station, a three-unit, pressurized water-reactor nuclear generating facility.
He directs station and facilities management, operations, maintenance, chemistry and radiation protection, engineering, nuclear and industrial safety, and business operations.
Baxter has over 28 years of experience in nuclear engineering with Duke Energy. Baxter joined the company in 1979 as a junior engineer at McGuire Nuclear Station in Huntersville, N.C. After a series of promotions at McGuire, including operations staff engineer, operations shift technical advisor, operations shift engineer and operations section manager, he was named nuclear engineering manager for modifications at Catawba Nuclear Station in 1998; and nuclear engineering manager for mechanical and civil engineering in 1999. He was named engineering division manager of Oconee Nuclear Station in 2002; and station manager in 2006. In that role, he was responsible for managing all aspects of Oconee's day-to-day operations.
He was named to his current position in January 2008. Thel(b)(e) learned a Bachelor of Science degree in Nuclear Engineering from Pennsylvania State University.
Baxter has received a U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Senior Reactor Operator License and the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations' Senior Nuclear Plant Management Certification.
He also served as a member of the B&W Owners Group Steering Committee.
He is currently a board member of the Oconee Memorial Hospital Foundation and the United Way of Oconee County. Official Use Only-Sensitive Internal Information Official Use Only-Sensitive Internal Information R. Michael Glover General Manager Nuclear Plant Projects Oconee Nuclear Station TAB8 Mike Glover is general manager, plant projects at Oconee Nuclear Station for Duke Energy. He is responsible for leading the station's plan to address recently identified improvement areas and providing senior management oversight for both Oconee special regulatory projects and the integration of Oconee major projects into the station's site processes.
He was named to his current position in October 2008. Most recently, Glover served as station manager of Oconee Nuclear Station. He managed all aspects of operation, maintenance, work control, radiation protection and chemistry activities at the station to provide safe, reliable and efficient electrical service for customers.
Glover joined Duke Power in 1975 as a junior engineer in the nuclear fuel services group. Glover received his senior reactor operator license in 1987. After a series of promotions, he was named manager of the shift engineers in 1987; unit 2 operations manager then station compliance group manager for units 1 and 2 in 1988; performance group manager in 1990; operations unit manager in 1992; electric systems support customer service manager in 1993; mechanical and electrical systems engineering manager in 1995; and operations superintendent in 1997. He was named station manager at Catawba Nuclear Station in 2001 and continued in that role until 2005. Glover transferred to Oconee Nuclear Station in the latter part of 2005 to lead the engineering organization.
In that role, he was responsible for managing activities related to system, component, and modification engineering.
Al(b)(6) I Glover graduated with honors from the University of Virginia with a Bachelor of Science degree in Nuclear Engineering.
He is a registered professional engineer in North Carolina.
Official Use Only-Sensitive Internal Information Official Use Only-Sensitive Internal Information T. Preston Gillespie, Jr. Station Manager Oconee Nuclear Station TAB8 Preston Gillespie is station manager of Oconee Nuclear Station for Duke Energy. He is responsible for managing all aspects of operation, maintenance, work control, radiation protection and chemistry activities at the station to provide safe, reliable and efficient electrical service for customers.
Gillespie joined Duke Power in 1986 as an assistant engineer at Oconee Nuclear Station in Seneca, S.C. He served in a variety of positions while at the station, including nuclear production engineer, senior engineer, shift work manager, nuclear shift supervisor, nuclear operations shift manager and shift operations manager. In 2004, he was named nuclear engineering manager at Oconee, where he managed activities for the station's engineering organization.
In addition, he was responsible for the reliable operation of electrical systems and equipment.
He was named operations superintendent at Catawba Nuclear Station in March 2007 where he was responsible for the safe and reliable operation of the station's two nuclear units. He assumed his current position at Oconee Nuclear Station in October 2008. I graduated from Clemson University with a Bachelor of Science degree in Mechanical Engineering.
Gillespie is a registered professional engineer in South Carolina.
He has held a senior reactor operator license at Oconee Nuclear Station. He is also a past recipient of the company's Robinson Award, which recognized employees for their outstanding contributions to the company's operations. (b )(6) Official Use Only-Sensitive Internal Information Official Use Only-Sensitive Internal Information Scott L. Batson Engineering Manager Oconee Nuclear Station TAB8 Scott Batson is engineering manager of Oconee Nuclear Station for Duke Energy. He is responsible for managing and directing activities at the station related to system, component, and modification engineering to provide safe, reliable and efficient electrical service for customers.
Batson joined the company in January 1985 as a junior engineer at Oconee Nuclear Station in Seneca, S.C. He has held various leadership positions at Oconee, including operations shift manager, maintenance instrument and electrical section manager, and mechanical and civil engineering manager. His most recent position as Operations Superintendent was responsible for managing all aspects of operations activities at the station and at Keowee Hydro Station. He was named to his current position in January 2008. Batson has over 22 years of experience in plant operation and engineering with Duke Energy. (b )(6) The earned a Bachelor of Science degree in Mechanical Engineering from Batson is a registered professional engineer in South Carolina.
He received a senior reactor operator license from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and a senior nuclear plant management certification from the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations.
He has also completed the Duke Energy Advanced Leadership Program. I (b )(6) Official Use Only-Sensitive Internal Information Official Use Only-Sensitive Internal Information Richard J. Freudenberger Safety Assurance Manager Oconee Nuclear Station TAB8 Rich Freudenberger is safety assurance manager of Oconee Nuclear Station for Duke Energy. He is responsible for the management of site programs and processes related to environmental health and safety, regulatory compliance, performance improvement, emergency planning and security.
Prior to joining Duke Power in 1997, Freudenberger had 12 years of commercial nuclear power experience as a resident and senior resident inspector for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission at the Maine Yankee, Crystal River, and Catawba nuclear stations.
His first position with Duke Power was in the Charlotte, N.C. office as the regulatory audit supervisor.
He was responsible for implementation of performance-based audits required by the Duke Energy Nuclear Quality Assurance program. In February 2000, Freudenberger was assigned to Oconee Nuclear Station as the secondary systems engineering supervisor.
In this role, he was responsible for the power conversion and standby shutdown systems mechanical design and licensing basis, testing support and equipment reliability.
He was named valve engineering supervisor in 2001 and was responsible for design basis, margin management and equipment reliability of valves, valve actuators and heat exchangers.
In mid-2002, Freudenberger was assigned to an operator licensing class. He successfully completed the program and was licensed as a senior reactor operator in July 2004. In November 2004, he was reassigned as the primary systems engineering supervisor.
He was responsible for the nuclear steam supply systems mechanical design and licensing basis, testing support and equipment reliability.
In December 2005, Freudenberger was assigned to lead a team of engineers and licensing personnel to address two long-standing licensing basis issues. An agreement with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for issue resolution was achieved in 2007. Freudenberger was appointed safety assurance manager of Oconee Nuclear Station in January 2008. Official Use Only-Sensitive Internal Information Official Use Only-Sensitive Internal Information Resumes of Resident Inspectors George A. (Andy) Hutto Senior Resident Inspector Oconee Nuclear Station TAB9 Andy Hutto joined the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in December 1997. He is al(b)(6) I l(b)(6) I He has been the Senior Resident Inspector at the Oconee Nuclear Station since March 2008. [(b)(6)l Mr. Hutto received his Bachelor's Degree in Biochemistry from Clemson University inl__j Subsequently, Mr. Hutto received a in Environmental Systems Engineering (nuclear core curriculum) from Clemson Mr. Hutto began his career in 1984 as an environmental engineer with the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control. His primary responsibilities included oversight of the low-level radioactive waste disposal facility at Barnwell.
Mr. Hutto joined the Charleston Naval Shipyard as a nuclear engineer in 1986. While at the shipyard, Mr. Hutto achieved qualification as a nuclear shift test engineer on several submarine reactor plant designs. Following closure of the shipyard in 1993, Mr. Hutto accepted a project manager position with the Naval Facilities Engineering Command in Charleston, where he managed environmental cleanup projects at a number of Navy and Marine Corps bases in the southeast.
In the NRC, Mr. Hutto was initially hired as a project engineer in Region II, Division of Reactor Projects.
Shortly after arriving at Region II, Mr. Hutto was assigned as resident inspector at the H. B. Robinson Plant. Mr. Hutto completed his certification as a Westinghouse Pressurized Water Reactor Operations Inspector in 1999, and in January 2003 transferred to the Oconee Nuclear Station to fill a vacant Rl position.
Mr. Hutto was promoted to the Oconee Senior Resident Inspector position in March 2008. Official Use Only-Sensitive Internal Information Official Use Only-Sensitive Internal Information Eric T. Riggs Resident Inspector Oconee Nuclear Station TAB9 Eric Ri s 'oined the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission in 2002. He is al(b)(6) I (b)(6) He has been a resident inspector at the Oconee Nuclear Stat1on s1nce December Mr. Riggs degree in Mechanical Engineering from the Pennsylvania State University After attending Pennsylvania State University, Mr. Riggs worked as a Faculty Research Assistant/Engineer at Penn State's Applied Research Laboratory.
Mr. Riggs began his career in the nuclear industry in the U.S. Navy Nuclear Power program from 1988 to 1994. While in the Navy, he served as an Engineering Laboratory Technician (ELT) instructor at the SSG prototype and the Leading EL T aboard the USS Tennessee (SSBN 734). In the NRC, Mr. Riggs was initially hired as a project engineer in Region II, Division of Reactor Projects.
Shortly after arriving at Region II, Mr. Riggs was assigned as resident inspector at the Oconee Nuclear Station. Official Use Only-Sensitive Internal Information Official Use Only-Sensitive Internal Information Geoffrey K. Ottenberg Resident Inspector Oconee Nuclear Station TAB9 l(b)(6) I o:An::; ;a;njd the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission in 2004. He is a l(b)(6) He has been a resident inspector at the Oconee Nuclear Station since ep em er ts. Mr. Ottenber received his bachelor's degree in Mechanical Engineering from the Florida State University in (b)(6) Mr. Ottenberg is a registered engineer intern in the State of Florida. After attending Florida State University, Mr. Otten berg worked as a researcher at Argonne National Laboratory on a fellowship assignment.
In the NRC, Mr. Ottenberg was initially hired as a reactor engineer in Region I, Division of Reactor Projects.
After qualifying as an inspector, Mr. Otten berg worked in Region I, Division of Reactor Safety, as a reactor inspector doing primarily Component Design Basis Inspections, and also completed a 6-month rotation as resident inspector at the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station. Official Use Only-Sensitive Internal Information