ML18078A524

Appraises Reactor Safeguards Licensing Branch Review Guideline#23. Protec of Nuc Pwr Plants Against Industrial Sabotage by the Insider Re compartmentalization,two-man Rules,Personnel Reliability

ML18078A524
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	11/28/1978
From:	Mcewen J KMC, INC.
To:	Chilk S NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY)
Shared Package
ML18078A523	List: ML18078A521 ML18078A524
References
NUDOCS 7812210210
Download: ML18078A524 (5)

Text

r-Pi ..

• 3 c: :2 November 28, 1978 i:: :::i Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Mr. Chilk:

jC** .. *

• E

... .IL4 V*ce Pres1dt)r

On behalf of KMC, Inc. and the utilities listed in ment A we wish to apprise the Commission of the issuance of the

• Reactor Safeguards Licensing Branch Review Guideline

1. 23, dated November 6, 1978, pertaining to security provisions for nuclear power plants. Review Guideline

1. 23 (enclosed as Attachment B), "Protection of Nuclear. Power Plants Against Industrial Sabotage by the Insider," provides three options for the licensee to tect against potential sabotage acts by the insider including:

(1) compartmentalization, (2) two-man rule, or (3) personnel reiiability.

These options are not mentioned in the Commission's regulation of 10 CFR Part 73.55 and the issuance of this ment represents a preemption by the staff of decisions on making currently pending before the Commission since, in spite of the document title, our experience is*that Review Guidelines are accorded the force and effect of rules by the staff reviewers.

As such, we believe this document, rather than solving any lems, seriously aggravates reactor licensees' abilities to resolve their outstanding security plan issues prior to the existing February 23, 1979 deadline.

The first two options provided in Review Guideline

1. 23, that of compartmentalization and two-man rule, have been long standing staff suggested generic solutions to the threat of the postulated insider to commit sabotage.

These ideas were first suggested in a draft document, NUREG-0220, "Interim Acceptance Criteria for a Physical Security Plan for Nuclear Power Plants," March, 1977. It was immediately recognized by licensees and cussed with the NRC in a meeting on April 20, 1977, that neither approach provided a viable method to generically improve plant security and that these approaches introduced significant mental safety and operational problems.

In response to staff 7812210d--l0 KMC, Inc. 1747 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE. NW WASHINGTON.

0 C 20006 202. 2:?3 3, 63

.. Mr. Samuel J. Chilk November 28, 1978 Page 2 requests for alternative suggestions, a number of industry studies and presentations have been made and submitted to the staff and the Commission which demonstrated adequate provision to meet the threat of an insider could be attained without imposing these onerous staff initiated requirements.

One study of the insider threat was conducted by KMC, Inc. with the cooperation and port of 24 utilities.

The results and methodology of that study were_ presented to both the NRC staff and an ACRS subcommittee, including closed sessions to discuss plant specific details: ever, we or any of the supporting utilities have not even been advised formally or informally of the NRC's findings.

Five copies of the public version of that study are attached for your information.

The third option discussed in Review Guideline

1. 23, ing clearances, cannot be implemented due to existing restrictions on the NRC's ability to grant clearances for other than national security.

Justification for granting of security clearances does not include as a basis the protection of plants from acts of tage: hence, this option is a frivolous offer since at present it cannot be accomplished.

In a letter to the Commission dated May 3, 1978, we cated that given sufficient time the staff and licensees could develop appropriate methods for improving physical security at nuclear power plants without employing methods (e.g., two-man rule and subcompartmentalization) which detract from safety and operability.

We have made both formal and informal efforts to work with the staff to this end. We have been informed that until the staff completed its own evaluations (using a Sandia . Laboratory developed computer model), they were not in a position to engage in such discussions.

To our knowledge their tions were still incomplete at the time of issuing Review line #23. In issuance and imposition of Review Guideline

1. 23 there has been no recognition of the value impact of that decision nor opportunity for public comment. By Executive Order 12044 dated March 24, 1978, the President directed each Executive Agency to adopt procedures to improve existing and future regulations.

The Commission responded in 43 Federal Register 34356 that it would voluntarily implement that order and stated "the policy of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is that value impact sis be conducted for any proposed regulatory that might

'Mr. Samuel J. Chilk November 28 '* 1978 Page 3 ,--impose a significant burden on the public (where the public i's defined in its broadest sense)". In issuance of Review line #23 no value impact assessment was provided; however, we are aware of various impact studies for certain options discussed in Review Guideline

1. 23. For example, a Commission sponsored report by Science Applications, Inc., SAI 77-868-LJ, dated May 4, 1978, provides some impact estimates of implementing the two-man rule. concept. Although, by our reference we are not ascribing agreement with that report, we note that SAI estimates an initial dollar cost of $536,000 and an annual cost of about $600,000 for each older plant which adopts this option. Further, they suggest that an increase .of about 15% in total radiation exposure could be expected.

On the other side of the equation we have repeatedly expressed our view that little or no value is accrued from tion of the two-man rule for sabotage protection and that a tive safety benefit is likely. Without debating absolute numbers, we can see no way in which a staff evaluation of Review Guideline

1. 23, had they provided one, could have other than a negative value-impact in each of the areas of security, safety and ALARA. We consider the issuance of Review Guideline

1. 23 to be extremely premature and in effect bypasses the established mission method of rulemaking.

KMC, Inc. on behalf of its utility clients has participated and currently has before the Commission motions for reconsideration and rulemaking which go to the heart of this issue. These efforts include: 1. A petition for rulemaking requesting modification of 10 CFR Part 73.55(a) as it relates to the threat of the insider was filed with the Commission on June 9, 1978. By filing iri the Federal Register on July 10, 1978, the Commission permitted 60 days comment on the petition.

After expiration of the comment period, where no negative comments were received, we wrote a letter to Mr. Minogue on October 5, 1978, urging action and quested information.

By letter dated November 6, 1978, Mr. Minogue indicated the Commission would not take action until February, 1979. By delaying response on our request until after the effective 10 CFR 73.55 implementation date of February 23, 1979, the staff is in effect subverting the rulemaking process by forcing compliance with the very regulations we are attempt-ing to have changed. -

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk November 28, 1978 Page 4 2. A motion for reconsideration of the guard upgrade rule was filed with the Commission by KMC, Inc. on behalf of 21 ities on October 23, 1978. That motion requested that the mentation of that rule be delayed until the entire threat level for sabotage to nuclear power plants could be reexamined.

There has been no response to that petition.

3. KMC, Inc., with the support and sponsorship of 16 ities, participated in the R&U Clearances program hearings ing testimony on employee screening on July 10 & 12, 1978. The hearing record with board recommendations on the efficacy of clearances is scheduled to be forwarded to the Commission by December 31, 1978. In summary, we consider the actions of the staff in issuing Review Guideline

1. 23, in addition to being insensitive to the recommendations of the licensees who must implement these ments, as circumventing established rulemaking procedures and ceedings already underway by the Commission.

Accordingly, we sider it imperative that the Commission as an initial action take appropriate steps to have Review Guideline

1. 23 withdrawn and further to direct the staff to develop guidelines for coping with the postulated insider threat which are achievable, are cost beneficial, and do not detract from plant safety. We repeat our offer on behalf of ourselves and our clients to assistthe staff in this *regard. We would be pleased to meet with the Commission to provide any additional information required.

encl.

Attachment A LIST OF PARTICIPATING UTILITIES Arizona Public Service Company Baltimore Gas and Electric Company Carolina Power and Light Company Commonwealth Edison Company Consumers Power Company Duke Power Company Duquesne Light Company Florida Power and Light Company GPU Corporation Nebraska Public Power District Northeast Utilities Service Company Northern States Power Company Omaha Public Power District Portland General Electric Company Public Service Electric and Gas Company Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation Sacramento Municipal Utility District South Carolina.

Electric and Gas Company Wisconsin Public Service Corporation Yankee Atomic Electric Company