ML12339A223

12Q0108.10-R-002, Revision 0, Seismic Walkdown Report in Response to the 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic for the Braidwood Station, Unit 2. Part 1 of 5

ML12339A223
Person / Time
Site:	Braidwood
Issue date:	11/16/2012
From:	Delaney M Exelon Generation Co, Stevenson & Associates
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
RS-12-159 12Q0108.10-R-002, Rev 0
Download: ML12339A223 (124)

Text

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 180-Day Response to 50.54(f) Letter NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic November 27, 2012 Page 5 Enclosure 2 Seismic Walkdown Report In Response To The 50.54(f) Information Request Regarding Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic for the Braidwood Station, Unit 2 Report Number: 1200108.10-R-002, Revision 0 (616 pages)

SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT IN O TO THE 50.54(M IFORMATUON REQUEST REGARDING FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC for the BRAIDWOOD NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT 2 35100 South Route 53, Braceville, Illinois, 60407 Facility Operating License No. NPF-77 NRC Docket No. STN 50-457 Correspondence No.: R8412-159 Exelon Exelon Generation Compo"y LLC (Exeto)PO Box 805M Chicago. IL 60080-m3 Pe&pwaedby:

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Jdky S& Clark I-~~SitM~1 t/13/2012*11/1302012 11/1302012 11/13=2012 1111302012 DI J-A. Ma,' U g 0 'V R Document Title: SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT IN RESPONSE TO THE 50.54(f) INFORMATION REQUEST REGARDING FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC for the BRAIDWOOD NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT 2 Document Type: Report Report Number: 12Q0108.10-R-002 Project Name: NTTF R2.3 Seismic Walkdowns for Exelon -Braidwood Job No.: 12Q0108.10 Client: " Exelon This document has been prepared in accordance with the S&A Quality Assurance Pro-gram Manual, Revision 17 and project requirements:

Initial Issue: Revision 0 Prepared by: Marlene Delaney A( Date: 11/13/2012 Reviewed by: Tony Perez Date: 11/13/2012 Approved by: Tony Perez Date: 11/13/2012 Revision Record: Revision Prepared by/ Reviewed by/ Approved by/ Description of Revision No. Date Date Date DOCUMENT CONTRACT NO.APPROVAL SHEET 12QO108 Stevnson & Associafts Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Contents L ist o f T a b le s ...........................................................................

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iii Executive Summary...................................................

iv I Introduction

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1-1 .1 P u rp o s e ...................................................................................................................

-1.2 Background

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........1-1 1 .3 P la n t O v e rv ie w .......................................................................................

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1-1 1.4 Approach ...................................................

1-2 1.5 Conclusion

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1-2 2 Seismic Licensing Basis .....................

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2-1 2 .1 O ve rv ie w ............................................................................................................

..2-1 2.2 Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) ................................

2-1 2.3 Design of Seism ic Category I SSCs ........................................................................

2-1 3 Personnel Qualifications

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3-1 3.1 Overview .................................................

3-1 3 .2 W a lkdow n P e rso nne l ...............................................................................................

3-1 3.2.1 Stevenson

& Associates Personnel

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3-2 3.3 A dditional P erso nnel ..........................

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3-3 4 Selection of SSCs .....................................................................................................

4-1 4 .1 O v e rv ie w .................................................................................................................

4 -1 4.2 SWEL Development

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4-1 4.2.1 SWEL 1 -Sample of Required Items for the Five Safety Functions

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4-1 4.2.2 SW EL 2 -Spent Fuel Pool Related Items .... .. .............

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4-3 5 Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys ..............................

5-1 5.1 Overview .................................................

5-1 5 .2 S e ism ic W a lkd ow ns ........ .......................................................................................

5-1 5.2.1 Adverse Anchorage Conditions....

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5-2 5 .2 .2 V isua l Inspectio ns .................................................

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5-2 5.2 .3 C onfiguration V erification

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5-2 5.2.4 Adverse Seism ic Spatial Interactions

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5-3 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 5.2.5 Other Adverse Seismic Conditions

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5-4 5.2.6 Conditions Identified during Seismic Walkdowns

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5-4 5 .3 A re a W a lk-B ys .........................................................................................................

5 -4 5.3.1 Seismically-Induced Flooding/Spray Interactions

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5-5 5.3.2 Seismically-Induced Fire Interactions

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5-6 5.3.3 Conditions Identified during Area Walk-bys ...................................................

5-6 5.4 Supplemental Information on electrical cabinet internal inspections

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5-6 6 Licensing Basis Evaluations

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6-1 7- IPEEE Vulnerabilities Resolution Report .................................................................

7-1 8 Peer Review ....................................................................................................................

8-1 9 References

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9-1 Appendices A Project Personnel Resumes and SWE Certificates

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A-1 B Equipment Lists .......................................................................................................

B-1 C Seismic Walkdown Checklists (SWCs) ...................................................................

C-1 D Area Walk-By Checklists (AWCs) ............................................................................

D-1 E Plan for Future Seismic Walkdown of Inaccessible Equipment

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E-1 F Peer Review Report ..................................................................................................

F-1 G IPEEE Vulnerabilities

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G-1 ii Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 List of Tables Table 2-1. List of Codes, Standards, and Specifications

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2-3 T a ble 3-1. P e rsonnel R o les ......................................................................................

3-1 Table 5-1. Anchorage Configuration Confirmation

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5-3 Table 5-2. Conditions Identified during Seismic Walkdowns

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5-8 Table 5-3. Conditions Identified during Area Walk-Bys ................

... .......5-9 T a b le B -1. B a se List 1 .....................................................................................

....... B T able B-2. B ase List 2 ......................................................................

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..B -18 T a ble B -3 .S W E L I ................................................................................................

B -2 0 T a ble B -4 .S W E L 2 ...............................................................................................

B -2 7 Table C-1. Summary of Seismic Walkdown Checklists

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....... C-2 Table D-1. Summary of Area Walk-By Checklists

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D-2 Table E-1. Inaccessible and Deferred Equipment List ....................................................

E-2 Table E-2. Supplemental Cabinet Internal Inspection List ........................

E-4 Table G-1. IPEEE Improvements Status...

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G-2 iii Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Executive Summary The purpose of this report is to provide information as requested by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in its March 12, 2012 letter issued to all power reactor licensees and holders of construction permits in active or deferred status. (Ref. 6) In particular, this report provides information requested to address Enclosure 3, Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, of the March 12, 2012 letter. (Ref. 6)Following the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant resulting from the March 11,2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and subsequent tsunami, the NRC established the Near Term Task Force (NTTF) in response to Commission direction.

The NTTF issued a report -Recommendations for Enhancing Reactor Safety in the 2 1 st Century: The Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident -that made a series of recommendations, some of which were to be acted upon "without unnecessary delay." (Ref. 11) On March 12, 2012, the NRC issued a letter to all power reactor licensees in accordance with 1 0CFR50.54(f).

The 50.54(f)letter requests information to assure that certain NTTF recommendations are addressed by all U.S. nuclear power plants. (Ref. 6) The 50.54(f) letter requires, in part, all U.S.nuclear power plants to perform seismic walkdowns to identify and address degraded, non-conforming or unanalyzed conditions and to verify the current plant configuration is within the current seismic licensing basis. This report documents the seismic walkdowns performed at Braidwood Generating Station Unit 2 in response, in part, to the 50.54(f)letter issued by the NRC.The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), supported by industry personnel, cooperated with the NRC to prepare guidance for conducting seismic walkdowns as required in the 50.54(f) letter, Enclosure 3, Recommendation 2.3: Seismic. (Ref. 6) The guidelines and procedures prepared by NEI and endorsed by the NRC were published through the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) as EPRI Technical Report 1025286, Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, dated June 2012; henceforth, referred to as the "EPRI guidance document." (Ref. 1) Exelon/Braidwood has utilized this NRC endorsed guidance as the basis for the seismic walkdowns and this report. (Ref. 1)The EPRI guidance document was used to perform the engineering walkdowns and evaluations described in this report. In accordance with the EPRI guidance document, the following topics are addressed in the subsequent sections of this report.* Seismic Licensing Basis* Personnel Qualifications

• Selection of Systems, Structures, and Components (SSC)* Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys* Seismic Licensing Basis Evaluations

• IPEEE Vulnerabilities Resolution Report* Peer Review iv Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Seismic Licensing Basis The Seismic Licensing Basis is briefly described in Section 2 of this report. The maximum horizontal and vertical ground accelerations at the foundation level are 20% of gravity for the safe shutdown earthquake (SSE). (Ref. 2 section 3.7.1.1)Personnel Qualifications Personnel qualifications are discussed in Section 3 of this report. The personnel who performed the key activities required to fulfill the objectives and requirements of the 50.54(f) letter are qualified and trained as required in the EPRI guidance document.(Ref. 1) These personnel are responsible for:* Selecting the SSCs that should be placed on the Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL),* Performing the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys,* Performing the seismic licensing basis evaluations, as applicable,* Identifying the list of plant-specific vulnerabilities identified during the IPEEE program and describing the actions taken to eliminate or reduce them," Performing the peer reviews Selection of SSCs Selection of SSCs is discussed in Section 4 of this report. The process used to select the items that were included in the overall Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL) is described in detail in the EPRI guidance document, Section 3: Selection of SSCs. (Ref.1) The SWEL is comprised of two groups of items, which are described at a high level in the following subsections.

Sample of Required Items for the Five Safety Functions

-SWEL 1 Screen #1 narrowed the scope of SSCs in the plant to those that are designed to Seismic Category I requirements because they have a seismic licensing basis.Screen #2 narrowed the scope of SSCs by selecting only those that do not regularly undergo inspections to confirm that their configuration continues to be consistent with the plant licensing basis.Screen #3 narrowed the scope of SSCs included on SWEL 1 as only those associated with maintaining the five safety functions.

These five safety functions include the four safe shutdown functions (reactor reactivity control, reactor coolant pressure control, reactor coolant inventory control, and decay heat removal, which includes the Ultimate Heat Sink), plus the containment functions.

Screen #4 was a process intended to result in a SWEL 1 that sufficiently represented the broader population of plant equipment and systems needed to meet the objectives of the 50.54(f) letter. The following five sample attributes were used:* A variety of types of systems* Major new or replacement equipment* A variety of types of equipment* A variety of environments v

Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Equipment enhanced due to vulnerabilities identified during the IPEEE program Spent Fuel Pool Related Items -SWEL 2 Screen #1 and Screen #2 were used to narrow the scope of spent fuel pool related SSCs to those that have a seismic licensing basis and those that are appropriate for an equipment walkdown process. Screen #3 was a process intended to result in SWEL 2 that sufficiently represents the broader population of spent fuel pool Seismic Category I equipment and systems to meet the objectives of the 50.54(f) letter, and included the following sample selection attributes:

• A variety of types of systems 0 Major new or replacement equipment* A variety of types of equipment 0 A variety of environments Screen #4 identified items of the spent fuel pool that could potentially cause a rapid drain-down of the pool, even if such items are not Seismic Category I. Rapid drain-down is defined as lowering of the water level to the top of the fuel assemblies within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> after the earthquake.

Any items identified as having the potential for rapidly draining the spent fuel pool were to be added to SWEL 2.For Braidwood Unit 2, the SWEL is comprised of:* SWEL 1 resulted with 106 items for walkdown." SWEL 2 resulted with 23 items for walkdown.* No items associated with spent fuel pool rapid drain-down are included on SWEL 2.Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys Section 5, Appendix C, and Appendix D of this report documents the equipment Seismic Walkdowns and the Area Walk-Bys.

The online seismic walkdowns for Braidwood Unit 2 were performed during the week of July 30, 2012. During the walkdown activities, the walkdown team consisted of two (2) Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs), a station Equipment Operator, and various station personnel.

The seismic walkdowns focused on the seismic adequacy of the items on the SWEL.The walkdowns focused on the following: " Adverse anchorage conditions

• Adverse seismic spatial interactions

• Other adverse seismic conditions (e.g., degradation, configuration, etc.,)Area Walk-Bys were conducted in each area of the plant that contained an item on the SWEL (generally within 35 feet of the SWEL component).

The Area Walk-By was performed to identify potentially adverse seismic conditions associated with other SSCs located in the vicinity of the SWEL item. The key examination factors that were considered in the Area Walk-Bys included the following:

• Anchorage conditions (if visible without opening equipment) vi Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.1O-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159* Significantly degraded equipment in the area" Potential seismic interaction" A visual assessment (from the floor) of cable/conduit raceways and HVAC ducting (e.g., condition of supports or fill conditions of cable trays)* Potential adverse interactions that could cause flooding/spray and fire in the area" Other housekeeping items, including temporary installations The seismic walkdown team inspected 111 of the 129 components on the SWEL (comprised of SWEL 1 and SWEL 2). Walkdowns for 18 components were deferred due to accessibility issues such as being located in containment or energized equipment.

The 18 remaining items will be inspected during a unit outage or another time when the equipment is accessible, as required.

Anchorage verification was required for a minimum of 33 components. (Ref. 1) A total, of 40 anchorage configurations were confirmed to be installed in accordance with the station documentation and an additional 3 anchor configurations will be confirmed as the 18 deferred items are inspected.

Following the completion of the online seismic walkdowns, the industry was made aware-that the NRC staff had clarified a position on opening electrical cabinets to inspect for other adverse seismic conditions.

Supplemental inspections of 38 electrical cabinets are planned and will be completed, as required, during a unit outage or another time when the equipment becomes accessible.

The list of electrical cabinets along with the milestone completion schedule is provided in Table E-2.During the seismic walkdowns at the Braidwood Unit 2 eleven (11) Issue Reports (IRs)were issued. After evaluation through the CAP, it was determined that none of the issues identified in the IRs were adverse seismic conditions.

Seismic Licensing Basis Evaluations The EPRI guidance document, Section 5: Seismic Licensing Basis Evaluation provides a detailed process to perform and document seismic licensing basis evaluations of SSCs identified when potentially adverse seismic conditions are identified.

The process provides a means to identify, evaluate and document how the identified potentially adverse seismic condition meets a station's seismic licensing basis without entering the condition into a station's Corrective Action Program (CAP). In lieu of this process, Exelon/Braidwood utilized the existing processes and procedures (Site CAP Expectations) to identify, evaluate and document conditions identified during the Seismic Walkdowns.

In accordance with Exelon/Braidwood processes and procedures, all questionable conditions identified by the SWEs during the walkdowns were.entered into the station CAP to be further evaluated and addressed as required.

The SWEs provided input to support the identification and evaluation (including seismic licensing basis evaluations, as required) of the potentially adverse seismic conditions entered into the CAP. The station corrective action program is a more robust process than that provided in the EPRI guidance document; in part, ensuring each condition is properly evaluated for conformance with design and licensing bases and corrected as required.Conditions identified during the walkdowns were documented on the Seismic Walkdown Checklists (SWCs), Area Walk-By Checklists (AWCs), and entered into the CAP. For those conditions that required, seismic licensing basis evaluations were completed and vii Braidwood Station Unit 2 I2Q0108.1O-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 documented within the IR. Tables 5-2 and 5-3 in the report provide the IR, a summary of the condition, and the action completion status.IPEEE Vulnerabilities IPEEE vulnerabilities are addressed in Section 7 and Appendix G of this report. No vulnerabilities were identified as a result of the effort that addressed the Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE). (Ref. 3 and 5) However, plant improvements were identified in section 7 of Reference

3. Table G-1 provides the list of plant improvements, the IPEEE proposed resolution, the actual resolution and resolution date.Peer Reviews A peer review team consisting of at least two individuals was assembled and peer reviews were performed in accordance with Section 6: Peer Reviews of the EPRI guidance document.

The Peer Review process included the following activities:

• Review of the selection of SSCs included on the SWEL* Review of a sample of the checklists prepared for the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys" Review of licensing basis evaluations, as applicable" Review of the decisions for entering the potentially adverse conditions into the CAP process" Review of the submittal report* Provided a summary report of the peer review process in the submittal report Section 8 of this report contains a summary of the Peer Review. The Peer Review determined that the objectives and requirements of the 50.54(f) letter are met. Further, it was concluded by the peer reviews that the efforts completed and documented within this report are in accordance with the EPRI guidance document.Summary In summary, seismic walkdowns have been performed at the Braidwood Generating Station Unit 2 in accordance with the NRC endorsed walkdown methodology.

All potentially degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed conditions identified as a result of the seismic walkdowns have been entered into the corrective action program.Evaluations of the identified conditions are complete and documented within the CAP.These evaluations determined the Seismic Walkdowns resulted with no adverse anchorage conditions, no adverse seismic spatial interactions, and no other adverse seismic conditions associated with the items on the SWEL. Similarly, the Area Walk-Bys resulted with no adverse seismic conditions associated with other SSCs located in the vicinity of the SWEL item(s).The Seismic Walkdowns identified eleven (11) minor conditions.

Other than these minor conditions, the Seismic Walkdowns identified nodegraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed conditions that required either immediate or follow-on action. No planned or newly identified protection or mitigation features have resulted from the efforts to address the 50.54(f) letter.Follow-on activities required to complete the efforts to address Enclosure 3 of the 50.54(f) letter include inspection of 18 items deferred due to inaccessibility along with viii Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.1O-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 supplemental inspections of 38 electrical cabinets.

Area Walk-Bys will be complete, as required, during these follow-on activities.

All IPEEE plant improvements and associated actions are complete.ix Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q01 08.1O-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 I Introduction

1.1 PURPOSE

The purpose of this report is to provide information as requested by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in its March 12, 2012 letter issued to all power reactor licensees and holders of construction permits in active or deferred status. (Ref. 6) In particular, this report provides information requested to address Enclosure 3, Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, of the March 12, 2012 letter. (Ref. 6)

1.2 BACKGROUND

Following the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant resulting from the March 11, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and subsequent tsunami, the NRC established the Near Term Task Force (NTTF) in response to Commission direction.

The NTTF issued a report -Recommendations for Enhancing Reactor Safety in the 2 1 st Century: The Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident -that made a series of recommendations, some of which were to be acted upon "without unnecessary delay." (Ref. 11) On March 12, 2012, the NRC issued a letter to all power reactor licensees in accordance with 10CFR50.54(f).

The 50.54(f)letter requests information to assure that certain NTTF recommendations are addressed by all U.S. nuclear power plants. (Ref. 6) The 50.54(f) letter requires, in part, all U.S.nuclear power plants to perform seismic walkdowns to identify and address degraded, non-conforming or unanalyzed conditions and to verify the current plant configuration is within the current seismic licensing basis. This report documents the seismic walkdowns performed at Braidwood Generating Station Unit 1 in response, in part, to the 50.54(f)letter issued by the NRC.The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), supported by industry personnel, cooperated with the NRC to prepare guidance for conducting seismic walkdowns as required in the 50.54(f) letter, Enclosure 3, Recommendation 2.3: Seismic. (Ref. 6) The guidelines and procedures prepared by NEI and endorsed by the NRC were published through the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) as EPRI Technical Report 1025286, Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, dated June 2012; henceforth, referred to as the "EPRI guidance document." (Ref. 1) Exelon/Braidwood has utilized this NRC endorsed guidance as the basis for the seismic walkdowns and this report. (Ref. 1)1.3 PLANT OVERVIEW The Braidwood nuclear power plant consists of two nearly identical generating units, and two pressurized water reactors (PWR) (NSSS) and turbine-generators furnished by Westinghouse Electric Corporation (Westinghouse).

The reactor containments are of post-tensioned concrete construction with a carbon steel liner. Sufficient free volume is provided to contain the energy released in a major accident without need for "pressure 1-1 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q01 08.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 suppression" devices. Sargent & Lundy was responsible for containment design. (Ref. 2 section 1.1)The Braidwood Station is located in northeastern Illinois, near the town of Braidwood and near the Kankakee River. Cooling for the plant is provided by a large man-made cooling pond of approximately 2500 acres constructed over a previously strip-mined area. Essential service cooling is provided by a 99-acre auxiliary cooling pond which is integral with the main pond. The fuel loading dates for the two units were October 1986 and December 1987 for Units 1 and 2, respectively.

The corresponding dates for commercial operation were July 1988 and October 1988. (Ref. 2 section 1.1)1.4 APPROACH The EPRI guidance document is used for the Braidwood Generating Station Unit 2 engineering walkdowns and evaluations described in this report. In accordance with Reference 1, the following topics are addressed in the subsequent sections of this report:* Seismic Licensing Basis* Personnel Qualifications

• Selection of SSCs* Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys* Licensing Basis Evaluations

• IPEEE Vulnerabilities Resolution Report* Peer Review

1.5 CONCLUSION

Seismic walkdowns have been performed at the Braidwood Generating Station Unit 2 in accordance with the NRC endorsed walkdown methodology.

All potentially degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed conditions identified as a result of the seismic walkdowns have been entered into the corrective action program.Evaluations of the identified conditions are complete and documented within the CAP.These evaluations determined the Seismic Walkdowns resulted with no adverse anchorage conditions, no adverse seismic spatial interactions, and no other adverse seismic conditions associated with the items on the SWEL. Similarly, the Area Walk-Bys resulted with no adverse seismic conditions associated with other SSCs located in the vicinity of the SWEL item(s)..The Seismic Walkdowns identified eleven (11) minor conditions.

Other than these minor conditions, the Seismic Walkdowns identified no degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed conditions that required either immediate or follow-on action. No planned or newly identified protection or mitigation features have resulted from the efforts to address the 50.54(f) letter.Follow-on activities required to complete the efforts to address Enclosure 3 of the 50.54(f) letter include inspection of 18 items deferred due to inaccessibility along with supplemental inspections of 38 electrical cabinets.

Area Walk-Bys will be complete, as required, during these follow-on activities.

1-2 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 2 Seismic Licensing Basis 2.1 OVERVIEW This section of the report summarizes the seismic licensing basis for the Braidwood Generating Station Unit 1 and Unit 2. The safe shutdown earthquake and a summary of the codes, standards, and methods used in the design of Seismic Category I SSCs are presented.

This section does not establish or change the seismic licensing basis of the facility and is intended to provide a fundamental understanding of the seismic licensing basis of the facility.2.2 SAFE SHUTDOWN EARTHQUAKE (SSE)The maximum horizontal and vertical ground accelerations at the foundation level are 20% of gravity for the safe shutdown earthquake (SSE). (Ref. 2 section 3.7.1.1)2.3 DESIGN OF SEISMIC CATEGORY I SSCs A full description of the Safe Shutdown Earthquake along with the codes, standards, and methods used in the design of the Seismic Category I SSCs for meeting the seismic licensing basis requirements is provided in the following Braidwood Station UFSAR sections:* 3.2 Classification of Structures, Components, and Systems* 3.7 Seismic Design* Attachment 3.7A -Reevaluation and Validation of the Byron/Braidwood Seismic Design Basis* 3.8 Design of Category I Structures

• 3.9 Mechanical Systems and Components

• 3.10 Seismic Qualification of Seismic Category I Instrumentation and Electrical Equipment

3.2 Classification

of Structures, Components, and Systems These UFSAR sections should be referred to for a detailed understanding of the seismic licensing basis.Summary of Seismic Design The site response spectra, which are defined at the ground surface, are given in section 2.5.2 of Reference 2 and are shown in UFSAR Figures 2.5-47 and 2.5-48 for the Braidwood site. Foundation level response spectra and time histories were generated by a deconvolution procedure described in section 3.7.1.2 of Reference

2. The maximum horizontal and vertical ground accelerations at the foundation level are 20% of gravity for the safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) and 9% of gravity for operating basis earthquake (OBE). The comparisons between the free field seismic design motion 2-1 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 applied at the surface and the corresponding foundation (rock) spectra for 2%, 3%, 4%, 5%, and 7% damping ratios are shown in UFSAR Figures 3.7-21 through 3.7-40 for the Braidwood site. (Ref. 2 section 3.7.1.1)During the review of the FSAR for an Operating License, the Byron/Braidwood seismic design was reevaluated using the Regulatory Guide 1.60 spectra without the application of a deconvolution analysis.

UFSAR Attachment 3.7A contains the specific NRC questions/responses on seismic design. These questions and responses document the historical evolution of certain aspects of the Byron/Braidwood seismic design. UFSAR Attachment 3.7A also provides the details and results of this reevaluation.

It is concluded that the present seismic design of Byron/Braidwood is conservative.

Based on the reevaluation described in UFSAR Attachment 3.7A, the Byron/Braidwood seismic design basis is acceptable and will therefore be used for all future seismic evaluations.(Ref. 2,section 3.7.1.1)Seismic Class I structures are designed for seismic forces calculated from the aforementioned spectra using a response spectrum method of analysis.

The directional combination rule uses three components of earthquake motions (two horizontal directions with vertical direction) combined by the square-root-sum-of-the-squares (SRSS) method. For evaluation of Seismic Class I components, In Structure Response Spectra (ISRS) are used. For horizontal directions, ISRS are generated using an input acceleration time history at the base (foundation) of mathematical models that represent the plant structures. (Ref. 3)To determine the foundation (rock) level motion, the soil rock profile above the foundation was modeled as a one-dimensional continuous shear layer system. The ground surface spectra consistent time histories were applied at the ground surface and the foundation level motion was obtained using the SHAKE program. For all of the structures founded on rock, the foundation level motion was used directly to excite the fixed base model. (Ref. 3)Summary of Codes and Standards The information presented below has been extracted from the section 3.8 of Reference 2. This section summarizes the codes, specifications, standards of practice, and other accepted industry guidelines which are adopted to the extent applicable, in the design and construction of the following:

• Containment

-the applicable codes, standards, and specifications for the containment are 1 through 23 in Table 2-1 below.* Containment Internal Structures

-all of the items listed in Table 2-1 below are applicable for the containment internal structures.

• Safety-Related Structures Outside of Containment

-all of the items listed in Table 2-1 below are applicable, with the exception of Items 17 and 18.* Foundations for Seismic Category I Structures

-the applicable codes, standards, and specifications are I through 14 and 19 through 23 in Table 2-1 below.2-2 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.1O-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Table 2-1. List of Standards, Codes, and Specifications UFSAR Table 3.8-2 -List of Specifications, Codes, and Standards Specification Specification or Reference Standard Title Number Designation 1 ACI 318-71, 77, 83 Building Code Requirements for Reinforced Concrete 2 ACI 301 Specifications for Structural Concrete for Buildings 3 ACI 347 Recommended Practice for Concrete Formwork ANSI A145.1 4 ACI 305 Recommended Practice for Hot Weather Concreting ANSI A170.1 5 ACI 211.1 Recommended Practice for Selecting Proportions for Normal Weight Concrete -6 ACI 304 Recommended Practice for Measuring, Mixing, Transporting, and placing concrete 7 ACI 315 Manual of Standard Practice for Detailing Reinforced Concrete Structures 8 ACI 306 Recommended Practice for Cold Weather Concreting 9 ACI 309 Recommended Practice for Consolidation of Concrete 10 ACI 308 Recommended Practice for Curing Concrete 11 ACI 214 Recommended Practice for Evaluation of ANSI A146.1 Compression Test Results of Field 12 ACI 311 Recommended Practice for Concrete Inspection 13 ACI 304 Preplaced Aggregate Concrete for Structural and Mass Concrete 14 Report by ACI Placing Concrete by Pumping Method Committee 304 15 AISC-69,78 Specification for the Design, Fabrication, and Erection of Structural Steel for Building 16 AWS D1.1 Structural Welding Code 17 ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code,Section III ASME-1971, S73 Division 1, Subsection NE ASME-1974, S75 Division 1, Subsection NF ASME-1973 Division 2, Proposed Standard Code for Concrete Reactor Vessels and Containments Issued for Trial Use and Comments ASME-1980 Division 2, CC 6000 ASME-1992 1992 Addenda, Division 1, Section Xl, Subsection IWL, IWE 18 American Public Test Methods Sulphides in Water, Standard Methods Health Assoc. for the Examination of Water and Waste Water (APHA)19 ASTM Annual Books of ASTM Standards 20 CRSI Manual of Standard Practice MSP-1 2-3 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.1O-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 UFSAR Table 3.8-2 -List of Specifications, Codes, and Standards Specification Specification or Reference Standard Title Number Designation 21 ANSI N45.2.5 Proposed Supplementary Q.A. Requirements for Installation, Inspection and Testing of Structural Concrete and Structural Steel During Construction Phase of Nuclear Power Plants 22 CRD Chief of Research and Development Standards, Department of the Army, Handbook for Concrete and Cement Volume I and II, Corps of Engineers U.S.Army 23 ACI-349-76, 85 Code Requirements for Nuclear Safety Related Concrete Structures 24 AISI Specification for design of cold-formed steel structural members Seismic qualification of Seismic Category I instrumentation and electrical equipment is in accordance with IEEE 344-1971 or IEEE 344-1975, IEEE Recommended Practices of Seismic Qualification of Class IE Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations.(Ref. 2 section 3.10)2-4 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 3 Personnel Qualifications

3.1 OVERVIEW

This section of the report identifies the personnel that participated in the NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown efforts. A description of the responsibilities of each Seismic Walkdown participant's role(s) is provided in Section 2 of the EPRI guidance document.(Ref. 1) Resumes included in Appendix A provide detail on each person's qualifications for his or her role.3.2 WALKDOWN PERSONNEL Table 3-1 below summarizes the names and corresponding roles of personnel who participated in the NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown effort.Table 3-1. Personnel Roles Equipment Seismic N eeliomnt Plant Walkdown Licensing IPEEE Peer Name Selection Basis Engineer Operations Engineer Reviewer Reviewer Reviewer (SWE)A. Perez X K. Hull X T.K. Ram XM M. Delaney X X P. Gazda X X B. Lory X(2)W. Djordjevic X R. Richard (Exelon) X D. Shaw (Exelon X Contractor)

T. Bortolini (Exelon) X X Notes: 1. Peer Review Team member for SWEL review only.2. Peer Review Team Leader.3-1 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 3.2.1 Stevenson

& Associates Personnel The following provides a synopsis of each individual's background and experiences.

Antonio Perez, P.E.: Mr. Perez is a Senior Engineer III and serves as the General Manager of the S&A Hudson, WI office. He earned his Bachelor of Science degree in Mechanical Engineering at Michigan Technological University and is a licensed Professional Engineer in the states of Wisconsin and Minnesota.

Mr. Perez has over 15 years of experience in project management, project engineering, equipment design, and mechanical systems design and has served in the nuclear power industry for over 11 years. He has extensive experience in Program and Design Engineering and has held positions such as MOV Engineer, Responsible Design Engineer, Design Engineering Supervisor and STA Trainee in the nuclear power industry.

Mr. Perez has successfully completed the Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 -Plant Seismic Walkdowns Training Course.Kim Hull: Mr. Hull is a Senior Engineer III in the S&A Hudson, WI office. He earned his Master of Science degree in Mechanical Engineering at Michigan State University.

Mr.Hull has over 30 years of experience in the nuclear power industry and has held positions such as Shift Technical Advisor, Principal Engineer, Senior Instructor, and Mechanical Design Supervisor.

He has an extensive background in all aspects of nuclear power plant modifications with a thorough understanding of configuration control/management along with design and licensing basis of nuclear power plants. Mr.Hull has successfully completed the Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 -Plant Seismic Walkdowns Training Course.Tribhawan K. Ram, P.E.: Mr. Ram is a Senior Engineer III in the S&A Phoenix, AZ Office. He has over 28 year experience in the nuclear power industry with expertise in plant systems and design engineering.

Currently, Mr. Ram is leading the electrical engineering effort in support of Post-Fukushima Seismic Margin Analysis (SMA) for two Taiwan nuclear stations (PWR and BWR). This effort, in support of the plant Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL), consists of relay list development, relay screening (using GERS, SQURTS or other available testing data), and relay chatter analysis.

Mr.Ram was involved in resolving USI A-46 relay outliers for several plants (Dresden, Quad Cities, Millstone, Palisades, and Pilgrim).

He evaluated dozens of control circuits for relay chattering issues. To replace outliers, Mr. Ram developed and/or supervised the development of modification packages including:

replacement relay selection; relay testing specification preparation; and seismic testing facility visits for relay qualification.

As a systems manager, Mr. Ram conducted periodic system walkdowns to discover and then pursue resolutions for any design, maintenance or operational issues with equipment.

He has developed test plans for circuit breaker and other electrical equipment replacement, including involvement in test plan execution during refueling outages. Mr. Ram has interfaced, with NRC in their biennial Component Design Basis Inspections (CDBI), and with INPO in their biennial evaluations.

Mr. Ram has MS degrees in Nuclear and Electrical Engineering from the University of Cincinnati, and an MBA from Bowling Green State University.

He is a licensed Professional Engineer (electrical) in Ohio. Mr. Ram has completed a six month training course in BWR systems.Marlene Delaney, P.E., S.E.: Ms. Delaney is a Senior Engineer III in the S&A Chicago, IL Office. She has a Bachelor of Science degree in civil engineering and has more than 30 years of experience in the nuclear power plant industry.

She is a licensed Structural 3-2 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q01 08.1O-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Engineer in the State of Illinois and has a licensed Professional Engineer in several states. She is a SQUG Qualified Seismic Capability Engineer (SCE) and has completed the NTTF Recommendation

2.3 Training

Course (SWE). In addition to her involvement in design and analysis of structures, systems, and components at nuclear power plants, she has performed SQUG walkdowns at various nuclear power plants.Phil Gazda, P.E., S.E.: Mr. Gazda is a Senior Consultant and serves as the Vice President of S&A as well as the Office Manager of the S&A Chicago, IL Office. He is an advanced degree structural engineering graduate and has more than 35 years of experience in the nuclear power plant industry.

He is a licensed Structural Engineer in the State of Illinois and has a licensed Professional Engineer in several states. He is a SQUG Qualified Seismic Capability Engineer (SCE) and has completed the NTTF Recommendation

2.3 Training

Course (SWE). In addition to his involvement in design and analysis of structures, systems, and components at nuclear power plants, he has been involved in SQUG and IPEEE walkdowns and assessments at ten nuclear plants and led the ComEd team performing the SQUG program at Zion Station. Mr. Gazda has also been the moderator for three SQUG qualification training classes provided for utility engineers.

In addition, Mr. Gazda was the Project Manager for the seismic assessment of HVAC ducts at another utility based on EPRI document Seismic Evaluation Guidelines for HVAC Duct and Damper Systems Revision to 1007896.Bruce Lory Mr. Lory is a Senior Engineer III in the S&A Chicago, IL Office. He has a Bachelor of Science degree in mechanical engineering and has more than 30 years of experience in the nuclear power plant industry.

He is a SQUG Qualified Seismic Capability Engineer (SCE) and is the instructor of the Fundamentals of Equipment Seismic Qualification training course for EPRI, and is the co-instructor of the Fukushima Seismic Walkdown training course in response to NTTF 2.3. In addition, he has been involved with equipment modifications for Extended Power Uprates (EPU), as well as Seismic Qualification (SQ) and Environmental Qualification (EQ) of equipment/components at numerous nuclear power plants.Walter Diordievic, P.E. Mr. Djordjevic is a Senior Consultant and serves as President of S&A with specialization in the dynamic analysis and design of structures and equipment for seismic, blast, fluid, and wind loads. He has managed and led seismic walkdowns and fragility analyses of structures and components for use in probabilistic risk assessments.

Mr. Djordjevic has 37 years of seismic experience serving the nuclear industry.

Mr. Djordjevic performed and managed more than 20 USI A-46 and IPEEE projects in response to the requirements of Generic Letters 87-02 and 88-20. Mr.Djordjevic has a Master of Science in Structural Engineering from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

He has received industry training as a Seismic Capability Engineer (EPRI SQUG training), EPRI IPEEE Add-on, Seismic Fragility and Seismic Walkdown Engineer (SWE).3.3 ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL Exelon plant Operations staff members Messrs. R. Richard and D. Shaw reviewed the SWEL. Mr. Richard is a previously licensed Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) at Braidwood Station with numerous years of experience in various aspects of plant operations.

Mr. Shaw is a previously licensed SRO at Byron Station with numerous years of experience in various aspects of plant operations.

Various additional station personnel also provided support to the SWEL preparer to help identify major equipment or system modifications, equipment and systems located in 3-3 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 different environments, and equipment and systems that would be accessible for inspection during the plant walkdowns, in accordance with Reference 1.Exelon Engineering staff member Mr. T. Bortolini performed the IPEEE Vulnerabilities Review based, in part, on the Braidwood IPEEE submittal along with subsequent correspondence and station records. (Ref. 3) Mr. Bortolini is a Structural Engineer in the Exelon Engineering Department.

He has over 38 years of engineering experience and has worked at Braidwood since 1998. Mr. Bortolini has completed the NTTF Recommendation

2.3 Training

Course (SWE).3-4 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12QO108.1O-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-1 2-159 4 Selection of SSCs 4.1 OVERVIEW This section of the report describes the process used to select structures, systems, and components, (SSCs) that were included in the Seismic Walkdown Equipment List, (SWEL). The actual equipment lists that were developed in this process are found in Appendix B and are as follows: " Table B-I, Base List 1* Table B-2, Base List 2* Table B-3, SWEL 1* Table B-4, SWEL 2 4.2 SWEL DEVELOPMENT The selection of SSCs process described in EPRI Technical Report 1025286, Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near- Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, dated June 2012, was utilized to develop the SWEL for Braidwood Generating Station Unit 2. (Ref. 1)The SWEL is comprised of two groups of items: " SWEL 1 is a sample of items to safely shut down the reactor and maintain containment integrity" SWEL 2 is a list of spent fuel pool related items 4.2.1 SWEL 1 -Sample of Required Items for the Five Safety Functions The process for selecting a sample of SSCs for shutting down the reactor and maintaining containment integrity began with the composite Seismic Individual Plant Examination for External Events (IPEEE) Success Path Equipment List (SPEL). (Ref. 3)The IPEEE SPEL was then subjected to the following four screens to identify the items to be included on the first Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL 1): 1. Screen #1 -Seismic Category 1 As described in Reference 1, only items that have a defined seismic licensing basis are to be included in SWEL 1. Each item on the IPEEE SPEL was reviewed to determine if it had a defined seismic licensing basis. All items identified as Safety Category I, as defined in the Byron/Braidwood UFSAR Chapter 3, were identified as having a defined seismic licensing basis. (Ref. 2) Electrical enclosures containing Class 1 E devices were identified as Safety Category I. Safety Category I and Class 1 E determination was made through a review of current design and licensing basis documentation.

4-1 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 2. Screen #2 -Equipment or Systems This screen narrowed the scope of items to include only those that do not regularly undergo inspections to confirm that their configuration is consistent with the plant licensing basis. This screen further reduced the IPEEE SPEL of any Safety Category I Structures, Containment Penetrations, Safety Category I Piping Systems, cable/conduit raceways and HVAC ductwork.3. Screen #3 -Support for the Five Safety Functions This screen narrowed the scope of items included on the SWEL 1 to only those associated with maintaining the following five safety functions:

A. Reactor Reactivity Control (RRC)B. Reactor Coolant Pressure Control (RCPC)C. Reactor Coolant Inventory Control (RCIC)D. Decay Heat Removal (DHR)E. Containment Function (CF)The first four functions are associated with bringing the reactor to a safe shutdown condition.

The fifth function is associated with maintaining containment integrity.

As described in Appendix E of Reference 1, the safety function for each item on the IPEEE SPEL was identified.

It is noted that items on SWEL 1 with a specific safety function(s) are considered frontline systems. Items with a safety-function designation of 'Support System HVAC', 'Support System AC Power', 'Support System DC Power', 'Engineered Safety Features Actuation System' (ESFAS) or'Cooling Water' may be a frontline or support system. Items with a safety function designation of 'Support System HVAC', 'Support System AC Power', 'Support System DC Power', 'Engineered Safety Features Actuation System' (ESFAS) or'Cooling Water' support at least one of the five safety functions however, the specific safety function(s) is not indicated as identification of the specific safety function(s) is not required by Reference 1.The resultant equipment list after Screen #3 is defined in the EPRI guidance document as Base List 1 and is included in Appendix B. (Ref. 1)4. Screen #4- Sample Considerations This screen is intended to result in a SWEL 1 that sufficiently represents a broad population of plant Seismic Category 1 (Safety Category I) equipment and systems to meet the objectives of the NRC 50.54(f) letter. The following attributes were considered in the selection process for items included on SWEL 1: A. A variety of types of systems The system is identified for each item on SWEL 1. The equipment included on SWEL 1 is a representative sample of several systems that perform one or multiple safety functions.

Further, the systems represented include both frontline and support systems as listed in Reference 1 Appendix E: Systems to Support Safety Function(s).

B. Major new and replacement equipment 4-2 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.1O-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 The equipment included on SWEL 1 includes several items that have been modified or replaced over the past several years. Each item on SWEL 1 that is new or replaced is identified.

C. A variety of types of equipment The equipment class is identified for each item on SWEL 1. The equipment included on SWEL 1 is a representative sample from each of the classes of equipment listed in Reference 1 Appendix B: Classes of Equipment.

Where appropriate, at least one piece of equipment from each class is included on SWEL 1.Screening

1. 1, #2, and #3 resulted in no equipment in the following classes:* (12) Air Compressors

• (13) Motor Generators.

D. A variety of environments The location for each item is identified on SWEL 1. The equipment included on SWEL 1 is a representative sample from a variety of environments (locations) in the station.E. Equipment enhanced due to vulnerabilities identified during the IPEEE program The equipment included on SWEL 1 includes several items that were enhanced as a result of the IPEEE program. Each item on SWEL 1 that was enhanced as a result of the IPEEE program is identified.

F. Contribution to risk In selecting items for SWEL 1 that met the attributes above, some items with similar attributes were selected based on their higher risk significance.

To determine the relative risk significance, the Risk Achievement Worth (RAW)and Fussell-Vesely importance for a Loss of Off-Site Power (LOOP) scenario from the internal plant PRA were used. Additionally, the list of risk-significant components for the LOOP PRA were compared with the draft SWEL 1 to confirm that a reasonable sample of risk-significant components (relevant for a seismic event) were included on SWEL 1. (Ref. 7)4.2.2 SWEL 2 -Spent Fuel Pool Related Items The process for selecting a sample of SSCs associated with the spent fuel pool (SFP)began with a review of the station design and licensing basis documentation for the SFP and the interconnecting SFP cooling system. The Braidwood Generating Station Unit 2 SWEL 2 includes the second train of SFP cooling and common components not included on the Braidwood Generating Station Unit 1 SWEL 2. The following four screens narrowed the scope of SSCs to be included on the second Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL 2): 1. Screen #1 -Seismic Category I Only those items identified as Seismic Category 1(Safety Category I) are to be included on SWEL 2 with exception to the SFP structure.

As described in Reference 1, the adequacy of the SFP structure is assessed by analysis as a Seismic Category 1 structure.

Therefore, the SFP structure is assumed to be 4-3 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 seismically adequate for the purposes of this program and is not included in the scope of items included on SWEL 2.Per the Braidwood UFSAR Chapters 3 and 9, portions of the SFP SSCs are classified as Safety Category I and are screened into the SWEL 2 list. These Safety Category I SSCs include; the Spent Fuel Pit Heat Exchanger, Spent Fuel Pit Pump, Refueling Water Purification Pump OA, associated instrumentation, piping and manual/check valves. Development of the Braidwood Unit 2 SWEL 2 list excludes the components associated with the common (Unit 0) Refueling Water Purification Pump OA. Note, these pump's motors are Safety Category II, even though the Refueling Water Purification Pump OA has an ESF power source. There are no Motor, Air or Fluid operated valves in the Safety Category I SSC flow paths.2. Screen #2 -Equipment or Systems This screen considers only those items associated with the SFP that are appropriate for an equipment walkdown process.3. Screen #3 -Sample Considerations This screen represents a process that is intended to result in a SWEL 2 that sufficiently represents a broad population of SFP Seismic Category 1 (Safety Category I) equipment and systems to meet the objectives of the NRC 50.54(f)letter. The following attributes were considered in the development of SWEL 2: A. A variety of types of systems The system is identified for each item on SWEL 2. The equipment included on SWEL 2 is a representative sample of the systems associated with the SFP and its cooling system.The SFP pump, Refueling Water Purification Pump OA flow path components not included in the Braidwood Unit 1 SWEL 2 list, and SFP heat exchanger are included in the SWEL 2 list. A representative sample of instrumentation, manual valves, and check valves are also included.B. Major new and replacement equipment The equipment included on SWEL 2 should include items that have been modified or replaced over the past several years. However, a review was performed that found none of the proposed equipment on SWEL 2 has been modified or replaced.C. A variety of types of equipment The equipment class is identified for each item on SWEL 2. The equipment included on SWEL 2 is a representative sample from each of the classes of equipment listed in Reference 1 Appendix B: Classes of Equipment.

Where appropriate, at least one piece of equipment from each class is included on SWEL 2.The classes/types of equipment include; (5) Horizontal Pumps, (21) Tanks and Heat Exchangers, (18) Instrument Racks, (19) Temperature Sensors, and (0)Other. The manual and check valves are included in the "(0) Other" class.D. A variety of environments The location for each item is identified on SWEL 2. The equipment included on SWEL 2 is a representative sample from a variety of environments 4-4 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 (locations) for equipment associated with the SFP and its cooling system. All items are in the Auxiliary Building or Fuel Handling Building.4. Screen #4- Rapid Drain-Down This screen identifies items that could allow the spent fuel pool to drain rapidly.Consistent with Reference 1, the scope of items included in this screen is limited to the hydraulic lines connected to the SFP and the equipment connected to those lines. For the purposes of this program it is assumed the SFP gates are installed and the SFP cooling system is in its normal alignment for power operations.

The SFP gates are passive devices that are integral to the SFP. As such, they are considered capable of withstanding a design basis earthquake without failure and do not allow for a rapid drain-down of the SFP.The SSCs identified in this screen are not limited to Seismic Category 1 (Safety Category I) items, but is limited to those items that could allow rapid drain-down of the SFP. Rapid drain-down is defined as lowering of the water level to the top of the fuel assemblies within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> after the earthquake.

Excerpts from the Braidwood UFSAR 9.1.3.2 System Description document the design features which preclude rapid drain down of the Spent Fuel Pit.The Safety Category I spent fuel pool cooling system shown in Drawing M-63 consists of two complete cooling trains. The spent fuel pool cooling system (piping, pumps, valves, and heat exchangers) is Safety Category I, Quality Group C. The 3-inch piping from the refueling water storage tanks to the refueling water purification pump, the pump, and its associated piping and valves are Safety Category I, Quality Group C. A 2-inch Safety Category I, Quality Group C line from the discharge of the refueling water purification pump to the spent fuel pool is permanently installed.

This is the Category I water makeup circuit. The backup Safety Category I makeup system consists of piping and hoses from the Safety Category I fire protection system. The primary water makeup system non-Category I takes water from both primary water storage tanks and routes the water through the spent fuel pool water filter and then to the return header as indicated in Drawing M-63. In addition, primary water may be added to the spent fuel pool via a fire hose connection in the fuel handling building.

In summary, there are three sources of makeup water available, a primary unborated non-Category I source, a borated Safety Category I source, and an unborated fire protection Safety Category I water system. (Ref. 2, 8, 9, & 10)The spent fuel pool system piping arrangement precludes siphoning after any failure by containing a 1/2-inch diameter hole four inches below the water level. Ten feet above the active fuel corresponds to an elevation of 410'-0". Both the cooling and skimmer systems meet this requirement.

No piping in the pool extends below the 410'-0" elevation except the spent fuel pool cooling system discharge pipe. This pipe contains an anti-siphon hole near the surface of the spent fuel pool. Therefore, piping connections to the SPF explicitly contain anti-siphon features which preclude a rapid drain down of the SFP.Excerpts from the Braidwood UFSAR Section 9.1.3.3 Safety Evaluation discuss SFP Dewatering incidents.

Incident C discussed is a sluice/transfer gate failure with the transfer canal empty, an open/empty transfer tube and an empty refueling cavity. In this incident, the spent fuel pool water level would be lowered approximately 22 feet 10 inches to the bottom sill of the sluice/transfer gate. This 4-5 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 leaves at least 2 feet 6 inches of water as shielding over the active portion of the spent fuel in storage.This incident is not considered a rapid drain down transient.

The gate is a structural element, seismically designed as part of the SFP structural analysis, and is a passive barrier with no active components.

There are no rapid drain-down considerations included in the Braidwood Unit 2 SWEL 2 list.4-6 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 5 Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys 5.1 OVERVIEW Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys were conducted by two (2) person teams of trained Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs), in accordance with the EPRI guidance document during the week of July 30, 2012. The Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys are discussed in more detail in the following sub-sections.

Consistent with the EPRI guidance document, Section 4: Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys, the SWEs used their engineering judgment, based on their experience and training, to identify potentially adverse seismic conditions.

Where needed, the engineers were provided the latitude to rely upon new or existing analyses to inform their judgment.The SWEs conducted the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys together as a team.During the evaluations, the SWEs actively discussed their observations and judgments with each other. The results of the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys reported herein are based on the comprehensive agreement of the SWEs.5.2 SEISMIC WALKDOWNS The Seismic Walkdowns focused on the seismic adequacy of the items on the SWEL as provided in Appendix B of this report. The Seismic Walkdowns also evaluated the potential for nearby SSCs to cause adverse seismic interactions with the SWEL items.The Seismic Walkdowns focused on the following adverse seismic conditions associated with the subject item of equipment:

• Adverse anchorage conditions

• Adverse seismic spatial interactions

• Other adverse seismic conditions The results of the Seismic Walkdowns have been documented on the Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) provided in the EPRI guidance document, Appendix C.Seismic Walkdowns were performed and a SWC completed for 111 of the 129 items identified on the Braidwood Unit 2 SWEL. The completed SWCs are provided in Appendix C of this report. Additionally, photos have been included with most SWCs to provide a visual record of the item along with any comments noted on the SWC.Drawings and other plant records are cited in some of the SWCs, but are not included with the SWCs because they are readily retrievable documents through the station's document management system.Seismic Walkdowns are deferred for the remaining 18 items to a unit outage or appropriate time when the equipment is accessible.

These items could not be walked down during the 180-day period following the issuance of the 10CFR50.54(f) letter due to their being inaccessible.

Inaccessibility of this equipment was either based on the location of the equipment (environment that posed personnel safety concerns while the 5-1 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.1O-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 unit is operating) or due to the electrical safety hazards posed while the equipment is operating.

Appendix E of this report identifies the inaccessible equipment along with the plan for future Seismic Walkdowns.

The following subsections describe the approach followed by the SWEs to identify potentially adverse anchorage conditions, adverse seismic interactions, and other adverse seismic conditions during the Seismic Walkdowns.

5.2.1 Adverse

Anchorage Conditions Guidance for identifying anchorage that could be degraded, non-conforming, or unanalyzed relied on visual inspections of the anchorage and verification of anchorage configuration.

Details for these two types of evaluations are provided in the following two subsections.

The evaluation of potentially adverse anchorage conditions described in this subsection applies to the anchorage connections that attach the identified item of equipment to the civil structure on which it is mounted. For example, the welded connections that secure the base of a Motor Control Center (MCC) to the steel embedment in the concrete floor would be evaluated in this subsection.

Evaluation of the connections that secure components within the MCC is covered later in the subsection "Other Adverse Seismic Conditions." 5.2.2 Visual Inspections The purpose of the visual inspections was to identify whether any of the following potentially adverse anchorage conditions were present: " Bent, broken, missing, or loose hardware" Corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation* Visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors* Other potentially adverse seismic conditions Based on the results of the visual inspection, the SWEs judged whether the anchorage was potentially degraded, non-conforming, or unanalyzed.

The results of the visual inspection were documented on the SWC, as appropriate.

If there was clearly no evidence of degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed conditions, then it was indicated on the checklist and a licensing basis evaluation was not necessary.

However, if it was not possible to judge whether the anchorage is degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed, then the condition was entered into the Corrective Action Program (CAP) as a potentially adverse seismic condition.

5.2.3 Configuration

Verification In addition to the visual inspections of the anchorage as described above, the configuration of the installed anchorage was verified to be consistent with existing plant documentation for at least 50% of the items on the SWEL.Line-mounted equipment (e.g., valves mounted on pipelines without separate anchorage) was not evaluated for anchorage adequacy and was not counted in establishing the 50% sample size.Examples of documentation that was considered to verify that the anchorage installation configurations are consistent with the plant documentation include the following:

5-2 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.1O-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159* Design drawings* Seismic qualification reports of analyses or shake table tests* IPEEE or USI A-46 program documentation, as applicable The Table C-1 of Appendix C indicates the anchorage verification status for components as follows: N/A: components that are line-mounted and/or are not directly anchored (with separate anchorage) to the civil structure and therefore do not count in the anchorage confirmation total Y: components that are anchored to the civil structure which were confirmed to be consistent with design drawings and/or other plant documentation N: components that are anchored to the civil structure for which anchorage drawings were not identified and/or retrieved See Table 5-1 below for the accounting of the 50% anchorage configuration confirmations, and the individual SWC forms in Appendix C for the specific drawings used for each anchorage verification confirmation.

Table 5-1. Anchorage Configuration Confirmation No. of SWEL N/A Items Required to SWEL Items Confirm? Items Confirmed (A) (B) (A-B)/2 Total 129 64 33 431 Notes: 1) Three (3) anchorage verifications have been deferred and will be completed as outlined in Appendix E 5.2.4 Adverse Seismic Spatial Interactions An adverse seismic spatial interaction is the physical interaction between the SWEL item and a nearby SSC caused by relative motion between the two during an earthquake.

An inspection was performed in the area adjacent to and surrounding the SWEL item to identify any seismic interaction conditions that could adversely affect the capability of that SWEL item to perform its intended safety-related functions.

The three types of seismic spatial interaction effects that were considered are as follows:* Proximity* Failure and falling of SSCs (Seismic II over I)* Flexibility of attached lines and cables Detailed guidance for evaluating each of these types of seismic spatial interactions is described in EPRI guidance document, Appendix D: Seismic Spatial Interaction.

The Seismic Walkdown Engineers exercised their judgment to identify seismic interaction hazards. Section 5.2.6 provides a summary of issues identified during the Seismic Walkdowns.

5-3 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.1O-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 5.2.5 Other Adverse Seismic Conditions In addition to adverse anchorage conditions and adverse seismic interactions, described above, other potentially adverse seismic conditions that could challenge the seismic adequacy of a SWEL item could have been present. Examples of the types of conditions that could pose potentially adverse seismic conditions include the following: " Degraded conditions" Loose or missing fasteners that secure internal or external components to equipment* Large, heavy components mounted on a cabinet that are not typically included by the original equipment manufacturer

• Cabinet doors or panels that are not latched or fastened* Other adverse conditions Any identified other adverse seismic conditions are documented on the items' SWC, as applicable.

5.2.6 Conditions

Identified during Seismic Walkdowns Table 5-2 provides a summary of the conditions identified during the equipment Seismic Walkdowns.

The equipment Seismic Walkdowns resulted in a total of six (6) conditions identified which were entered into the station's CAP. The conditions were assessed and it was concluded that the conditions would not prevent the associated equipment from performing its safety-related function(s).

The conditions identified by the SWEs during the equipment Seismic Walkdowns were concluded to not be adverse seismic conditions.

5.3 AREA WALK-BYS The purpose of the Area Walk-Bys is to identify potentially adverse seismic conditions associated with other SSCs located in the vicinity of the SWEL items. Vicinity is generally defined as the room containing the SWEL item. If the room is very large (e.g., Turbine Hall), then the vicinity is identified based on judgment, e.g., on the order of about 35 feet from the SWEL item. This vicinity is described on the Area Walk-By Checklist (AWC), shown in Appendix D of this report. A total of 42 Area Walk-bys were performed for Braidwood Unit 2. It is noted that additional area walk-bys will be completed, as required, as deferred and -supplemental inspections are completed.

The key examination factors that were considered during Area Walk-Bys include the following:

• Anchorage conditions (if visible without opening equipment)" Significantly degraded equipment in the area" A visual assessment (from the floor) of cable/conduit raceways and HVAC ducting (e.g., condition of supports or fill conditions of cable trays)* Potentially adverse seismic interactions including those that could cause flooding, spray, and fires in the area 5-4 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159* Other housekeeping items that could cause adverse seismic interaction (including temporary installations and equipment storage)* Scaffold clearances and tie offs were reviewed to meet Exelon Standard NES-MS-04.1, Rev. 6 Seismic Prequalified Scaffolds" Seismic housekeeping was examined to meet station procedure BwAP 1100-23, Seismic Housekeeping Requirements for the Temporary Storage of Materials in Category I Area.The Area Walk-Bys are intended to identify adverse seismic conditions that are readily identified by visual inspection, without necessarily stopping to open cabinets or taking an extended look. Therefore, the Area Walk-By took significantly less time than it took to conduct the Seismic Walkdowns described above for a SWEL item. If a potentially adverse seismic condition was identified during the Area Walk-By, then additional time was taken, as necessary, to evaluate adequately whether there was an adverse condition and to document any findings.The results of the Area Walk-Bys are documented on the AWCs included in Appendix D of this report. A separate AWC was filled out for each area inspected.

A single AWC was completed for areas where more than one SWEL item was located.Additional details for evaluating the potential for adverse seismic interactions that could cause flooding, spray, or fire in the area are provided in the following two subsections.

5.3.1 Seismically-Induced Flooding/Spray Interactions Seismically-induced flooding/spray interactions are the effect of possible ruptures of vessels or piping systems that could spray, flood or cascade water into the area where SWEL items are located. This type of seismic interaction was considered during the IPEEE program. Those prior evaluations were considered, as applicable, as information for the Area Walk-Bys.One area of particular concern to the industry is threaded fire protection piping with long unsupported spans. If adequate seismic supports are present or there are isolation valves near the tanks or charging sources, flooding may not be a concern. Numerous failures have been observed in past earthquakes resulting from sprinkler head impact.Less frequent but commonly observed failures have occurred due to flexible headers and stiff branch pipes, non-ductile mechanical couplings, seismic anchor motion and failed supports.Examples where seismically-induced flooding/spray interactions could occur include the following: " Fire protection piping with inadequate clearance around fusible-link sprinkler heads" Non-ductile mechanical and threaded piping couplings can fail and lead to flooding or spray of equipment" Long, unsupported spans of threaded fire protection piping* Flexible headers with stiffly supported branch lines* Non-Seismic Category I tanks The SWEs exercised their judgment to identify only those seismically-induced interactions that could lead to flooding or spray.5-5 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 5.3.2 Seismically-Induced Fire Interactions Seismically-induced fire interactions can occur when equipment or systems containing hazardous/flammable material fail or rupture. This type of seismic interaction was considered during the IPEEE program. Those prior evaluations were considered, as applicable, as information for the Area Walk-Bys.Examples where seismically-induced fire interactions could occur include the following:

• Hazardous/flammable material stored in inadequately anchored drums, inadequately anchored shelves, or unlocked cabinets" Natural gas lines and their attachment to equipment or buildings* Bottles containing acetylene or similar flammable chemicals* Hydrogen lines and bottles Another example where seismically-induced fire interaction could occur is when there is relative motion between a high voltage item of equipment (e.g., 4160 volt transformer) and an adjacent support structure when they have different foundations.

This relative motion can cause high voltage busbars, which pass between the two, to short out against the grounded bus duct surrounding the busbars and cause a fire.The Seismic Walkdown Engineers exercised their judgment to identify only those seismically-induced interactions that could lead to fires.5.3.3 Conditions Identified during Area Walk-bys Table 5-3 at the end of this section provides a summary of the conditions identified during the Area Walk-Bys.

Five (5) conditions were identified during the Area Walk-Bys and entered into the station CAP. No potentially adverse seismic conditions were identified that resulted in a seismic licensing basis evaluation.

No seismically-induced flooding or spray interactions were identified during the Area Walk-Bys.

No seismically-induced fire interactions were identified during the Area Walk-Bys.5.4 SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION ON ELECTRICAL CABINET INTERNAL INSPECTIONS Following the completion of the online seismic walkdowns, the industry was made aware that the NRC staff had clarified a position on opening electrical cabinets to inspect for other adverse seismic conditions.

The purpose for opening these cabinets is to inspect for evidence of:* internal components not being adequately secured,* whether fasteners securing adjacent cabinets together are in place, and* other adverse seismic conditions.

Appendix E of this report includes Table E-2 which identifies components in the specified equipment classes that would be considered as electrical cabinets: 1. Motor Control Centers and Wall-Mounted Contactors

2. Low Voltage Switchgear and Breaker Panels 5-6 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 3. Medium Voltage, Metal-Clad Switchgear

4. Transformers

14. Distribution Panels and Automatic Transfer Switches 16. Battery Chargers and Inverters 20. Instrumentation and Control Panels Components that are identified on Table E-1 (inaccessible and deferred components) are not listed on Table E-2 to avoid redundancy.

Table E-2 indicates internal accessibility of each cabinet. Cabinets that have been identified as requiring these supplemental internal inspections are those with doors or panels with latches or, thumbscrews and can be readily opened during normal maintenance activities.

Also provided for each cabinet is a proposed milestone schedule for performing these internal inspections and the associated station tracking number (IR number).The Seismic Walkdown Checklists (SWC) for the components identified in Table E-2 that can be opened for internal inspections will be revised at the time of the supplemental walkdown to indicate the results of these internal inspections.

5-7 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.1O-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Table 5-2. Conditions Identified during Seismic Walkdowns Actions Action Complete Item ID Description of Issue Request ID Yes/No (IR) (See Notes I & 2)A large C-clamp was found clamped to a Tube Steel 0FC8754 Hanger approximately 6' above the floor near 1FC01P 1394927 Yes Spent Fuel Pump Motor.Loose nut attached to an approximately 1/8" screw on the backside of the support channel was loose. The 2PI-0633 remaining two screws are tight. The pressure 1394916 Yes indicator weighs approximately 2 lbs. There are no immediate concerns with the loose nut.There is an open S-hook on one chain in the Battery 2DC01E Room 211 above 2DC01E. The other chain does not 1395456 Yes have an open S-hook It was observed that the handwheel for valve 1396037 2AF005H is within 1/8" from the actuator of valve (WO 2AF005G 2AF005G. Piping is observed to well-supported 1454280 Yes (lateral movement is limited and impact would be to EC rugged part of valve). 380050)Hairline cracks are visible at 10 of the 16 anchor bolts.2DO01TA The cracks are in the 1' plus thick foundation pad and 1396566 Yes do not extend to the base slab.Valve operator is in contact with grating. Investigation 1429477 2CV112E into valve movements and existing calculation being (WO Yes performed.

1584588)Notes: 1) "Yes" indicates that any corrective actions resulting from the issue are complete 2) "No" indicates that any corrective actions resulting from the issue are NOT complete.

Actions are tracked by the IR number in the station Corrective Action Program.5-8 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Table 5-3. Issues Identified during Area Walk-Bys Actions Action Complete ,Item ID Description of Issue Request Yes/No ID (IR) (See Notes 1 & 2)Area Walk-by 8 Plastic cover fell off smoke detector above U2 Fuel Handling FC HX. The detector had the number 139-1.Building El 401 1395709 Yes FC HX Room Area Walk-by 38 There were numerous seismic housekeeping Aux El 346 issues in the area: 1. staged scaffolding is Column M-23, P approximately 2" from Blockwall 2A-14A, 2. 1396891 Yes 24 (2AP38E) Scaffolding cart is approximately 2" from cable riser Near Cabinet 2AP38E and the adjacent Area Walk-by 38 cabinets, numerous components are stored in Aux El 3W46 violation of BwAP 1100-23: 1. SX drain down Column M-23, P- equipment cabinet is 9" from 2AP38 E (MCC 1396872 Yes 24 (2AP38E)'

233X1), 2. SX drain down equipment is 8" from Rack 2PL92J, 3. Vollo 20E lifting device is 11" from adjacent cabinet.Area Walk-by 35 Two 6 foot tall storage cabinets were found to Aux El 364 be approximately 2 1/2" and 1" away from a Column M-23 block wall. 1396940 Yes (2CC01PA, 2CC01 PB)Area Walk-by 20 A chainfall was found attached to a tube steel 2A/2D MSIV hanger near the ceiling at the doorway to the Room at El. 401 2A/2D MSIV Room. 1396953 Yes (2MS018D)Notes: 1) "Yes" indicates that any corrective actions resulting from the issue are complete 2) "No" indicates that any corrective actions resulting from the issue are NOT complete.

Actions are tracked by the IR number in the station Corrective Action Program.5-9 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.1O-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 6 Licensing Basis Evaluations The EPRI guidance document, Section 5: Seismic Licensing Basis Evaluation provides a detailed process to perform and document seismic licensing basis evaluations of SSCs identified when potentially adverse seismic conditions are identified.

The process provides a means to identify, evaluate and document how the identified potentially adverse seismic condition meets a station's seismic licensing basis without entering the condition into a station's Corrective Action Program (CAP). In lieu of this process, Exelon/Braidwood utilized the existing processes and procedures (Site CAP Expectations) to identify, evaluate and document conditions identified during the Seismic Walkdowns.

In accordance with Exelon/Braidwood processes and procedures, all questionable conditions identified by the SWEs during the walkdowns were entered into the station CAP to be further evaluated and addressed as required.

The SWEs provided input to support the identification and evaluation (including seismic licensing basis evaluations, as required) of the potentially adverse seismic conditions entered into the CAP. The station corrective action program is a more robust process than that provided in the EPRI guidance document; in part, ensuring each condition is properly evaluated for conformance with design and licensing bases and corrected as required.Conditions identified during the walkdowns were documented on the SWCs, AWCs, and entered into the CAP. For those conditions that required, seismic licensing basis evaluations were completed and documented within the IR. Tables 5-2 and 5-3 in the report provide the IR, a summary of the condition, and the action completion status.6-1 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 7 IPEEE Vulnerabilities Resolution Report Per the ComED Transmittal of Braidwood Station Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) Submittal Report, dated June 27, 1997 and the Staff Evaluation Report of Braidwood IPEEE dated May 30, 2001, an explicit definition of vulnerability was not provided and no vulnerabilities with respect to potential severe accidents related to external events were identified in the IPEEE submittal. (Ref. 3 and 6) However, plant improvements were identified in Sections 3 and 7 of Reference

3. Table G-1 in Appendix G lists the plant improvements, the IPEEE proposed resolution, the actual resolution and resolution date. No open items exist as a result of the seismic portion of the IPEEE program.7-1 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.1O-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 8 Peer Review A peer review team consisting of at least two individuals was assembled and peer reviews were performed in accordance with Section 6: Peer Reviews of the EPRI guidance document.

The Peer Review process included the following activities:

• Review of the selection of SSCs included on the SWEL* Review of a sample of the checklists prepared for the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys* Review of Licensing basis evaluations, as applicable

• Review of the decisions for entering the potentially adverse conditions into the CAP process* Review of the submittal report* Provide a summary report of the peer review process in the submittal report The peer reviews were performed independently from this report and the summary Peer Review Report is provided in Appendix F of this report.8-1 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 9 References Reference drawings related to SWEL items are provided in the Seismic Walkdown Checklists and if applicable, in the Area-Walkdown Checklists.

1. EPRI Technical Report 1025286, Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, dated June 2012.2. Byron/Braidwood Nuclear Stations Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), Revision 13.3. ComEd letter from H. Gene Stanley to Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, dated June 27, 1997,

Subject:

Transmittal of Braidwood Station Individual Plant Examination of External Events Submittal Report 4. Not used 5. Staff Evaluation Report of Braidwood Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE), dated May 30, 2001 6. NRC (E Leeds and M Johnson) Letter to All Power Reactor Licensees et al.,"Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task *Force Review of Insights forom the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident," Enclosure 3,"Recommendation 2.3: Seismic," dated March 12, 2012 7. BW-MISC-018 Rev. 0, "Braidwood Risk Importance to Support Development of Seismic Walkdown Equipment List".8. Drawing M-63 Sheet 1A rev. AZ, "Diagram of Fuel Pool Cooling and Clean-Up Units 1 &2" 9. Drawing M-63 Sheet 1B rev. BE, "Diagram of Fuel Pool Cooling and Clean-Up Units 1 &2" 10. Drawing M-63 Sheet 1C rev. BB, "Diagram of Fuel Pool Cooling and Clean-Up Units 1 &2" 11. "Recommendations for Enhancing Reactor Safety in the 2 1 st Century: The Near-term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident," ADAMS Accession No. ML111861807, July 12, 2011 9-1 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 A Project Personnel Resumes and SWE Certificates Resumes and certificates (where applicable) for the following people are found in Appendix A: A. Perez, Equipment Selection Engineer ........................................................

A-2 K. Hull, Equipment Selection Engineer ...........................................................

A-6 M. Delaney, SWE, Licensing Basis Reviewer ....................................................

A-9 P. Gazda, SWE, Licensing Basis Reviewer .......................................................

A-13 T. Ram, SWEL Peer Reviewer .....................................................................

A-18 B. Lory, Peer Review Team Leader ................................................................

A-20 W. Djordjevic, Peer Reviewer .......................................................................

A-24 T. Bortolini (Exelon), Licensing Basis Reviewer, IPEEE Reviewer ........................

A-28 9-2 Stev Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.1O-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 enson & Associates Antonio J. Perez, P.E.

SUMMARY

Mr. Perez has over 15 years of experience in project management, project engineering, equipment design, and mechanical systems layout for nuclear and industrial facilities.

EDUCATION B.S. -Mechanical Engineering Michigan Technological University, Houghton, MI Magna cum Laude LICENSES Professional Engineer, Wisconsin:

September 2002 Minnesota:

December 2010 PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE Stevenson

& Associates, Green Bay, WI General Manager October 2010 -Present" Responsible for interfacing with clients with a focus on continuously improving relationships.

• Responsible for managing staff resources to meet or exceed clients' needs.* Responsible for recruiting and hiring staff necessary to meet resource requirements while effectively increasing capacity." Responsible for providing Engineering Consultation services to clients.Project Manager March 2007 -October 2010" Performing Project Management tasks including development of project plans, identification of resource needs, estimating task durations, developing project schedules, and monitoring budgets." Lead design team efforts at the Kewaunee Power Station on multiple projects that include two separate Auxiliary Feedwater flow control modifications, Auxiliary Feedwater flow monitoring instrumentation modifications, and Auxiliary Building roof modifications." Supported the Calculation Reconstitution and Improvement Project at the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant by mapping calculations associated with the RHR system.Dominion Energy Kewaunee (formerly Nuclear Management Company 2001 -2005)Kewaunee Power Station, Kewaunee, WI Shift Technical Advisor (trainee)

January 2006 -March 2007* Trainee in a Senior Reactor Operator Certificate training program.Page 1 of 3 A-2 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Stevenson

& Associates Antonio J. Perez, P.E.Engineering Supervisor

-ME/CE/SE Design May 2004 -January 2006* Supervised a staff of 12 to 15 engineers (mechanical, civil, and structural design) who were charged with developing design changes, maintaining design and licensing basis documentation and supporting maintenance." Integrated the civil/structural engineering group and the mechanical engineering group into a cohesive unit that resulted in gained efficiency and a net reduction of one full time equivalent engineer.* Substantially increased the quality of engineering products developed and published by the ME/CE/SE Design Engineering group through coaching and feedback as a result of increased supervisory oversight of engineering products.* Developed a work management system for the group that provided a means for prioritizing activities, estimating the level of effort, and scheduling of activities.

This system allowed for an increased understanding of workload and became an invaluable tool for prioritizing work and managing resources.

• Increased communications within the group by holding daily 15 minute meetings where station messages were delivered and where the group's resources were assessed and redirected as necessary to meet commitments.

This resulted in an increase in morale and an increase in commitments met.* Increased communications with other departments by establishing a central point of contact for the group and by assuring that the ME/CE/SE Design Engineering group was represented at.Planning and Scheduling meetings.Motor Operated Valve Engineer June 2001 -May 2004" Established a project plan and led the implementation effort that re-organized the Motor-Operated Valve Program at KPS. This effort consisted of developing a Program Manual, developing controlled calculations, performing Design Basis Reviews, and compiling and/or establishing plant positions on known industry issues.The result of this effort was a reduction of full time equivalent engineers, from 3 to 1, required to maintain the Program." Performed and reviewed MOV safety related calculations including Minimum Required Stem Thrust, Weak Link Analysis, and Available Margin." Assisted in MOV testing by providing engineering support to maintenance personnel.

DISTRIBUTION PLANNING, INC., Grandville, MI Systems Mechanical Engineer 2000 -2001" Integrated mechanical systems and designed equipment for material handling systems." Procured equipment and coordinated delivery schedules with vendors.Page 2 of 3 A-3 Ste%Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 renson & Associates Antonio J. Perez, P.E.SMS SANDMOLD SYSTEMS, INC., Newaygo, MI Project Engineer /Manager 1998 -2000* Led multi-discipline project design teams for several projects that ranged in size from a few thousand dollars up to $2.2 million." Coordinated efforts with engineering, manufacturing, and installation groups to establish and maintain project schedules that met or exceeded the client's expectations." Procured equipment and coordinated delivery schedules with vendors." Acted as the company's liaison with clients to work through issues that arose during projects.

Provided project status updates to clients and management." Designed equipment such as sand storage bins -up to 540-ton live load capacity, bucket elevators, belt conveyors, screw conveyors, and mixers. Most of this equipment was for handling of bulk solids (foundry sand).* Analyzed and designed structural support members for various types of equipment such as vibratory conveyors, mixers, and conveyors.

Designed access structures such as stair towers, service platforms and catwalks." Calculated foundation loads and point loads of equipment support points.LIFT-TECH INTERNATIONAL, Muskegon, MI Project Engineer 1997- 1998" Performed engineering analyses, wrote critiques, and recommended design modifications of structural members for the purpose of upgrading bridge cranes and hoists." Implemented engineering design changes to enhance product development.

Page 3 of 3 A-4 Braidwood Station Unit 2 1200108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 A-5 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0.Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 KIM L. HULL BACKGROUND

SUMMARY

Accomplished Lead Engineer/

Project Manager with significant experience in commercial nuclear power industry.

Demonstrated ability to lead and contribute on cross-functional project teams. Possess strong analytical, problem resolution, collaboration, and communication skills when interacting with diverse audiences including regulatory inspectors, internal inspectors, management, and employees.

Respected trainer with ability to develop and present information and measure effectiveness through evaluation techniques.

Strengths include: Project Management Design Modifications Plant Operational Support Procurement Management/Leadership Regulatory Compliance Training/Coaching Auditing Inspections KEY ACCOMPLISHMENTS

• Served as KNPP Lead Engineer/

Project Supervisor for approximately 125 plant design changes.* Experienced in all aspects of nuclear power plant modification packages including development of calculations, design, engineering, and procurement specifications.

• Thorough understanding of configuration control, management, and preparation of 1OCFR50.59 analyses.* Participated in several regulatory and industry audits, including CDBI and INPO assessments.

• Experienced as a Technical Specialist performing NUPIC Audits.,* Well-developed communication skills for preparing technical presentations including lesson plans, project reports, and meetings in support of regulatory activities and inspections.

• Qualified Shift Technical Advisor for KNPP Operations Group (1980s).PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE STEVENSON

& ASSOCIATES

-Project Manager 2010 -Current National consulting engineering firm specializing in civil, structural and mechanical engineering for power, industrial and advanced technology facilities.

Project Manager" Development of plant specific Seismic Walkdown Equipment Lists for multiple Units in response to NRC 50.54(o requirements regarding Recommendation 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident," Enclosure 2.3, "Recommendation 2.3: Seismic."" Onsite at Kewaunee Power Station Consultant support to resolve Q-list Open Items" On-site at Kewaunee Power Station Consultant support for Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Control Modification including preparation and review of design documentation.

WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE RESOURCES

/ Nuclear Management Company DOMINION ENERGY -Kewaunee, WI 1982 to 2010 Senior Instructor (Maintenance)

(2009 -2010)* Developed lesson plans and taught Basic Systems and Continuing Training Topics for Engineering and Technical Support training program.Engineer III/Principal Engineer (2004 -2009)* Responsible for modifications and emergent issues including Steam Exclusion Boundaries, Fuel Transfer Carriage, Frazil Ice development on the KPS Circulating Water Intake, and NRC 96-06 Two Phase flow." Member of Dominion Fleet Calculation Quality Review Team and Mentor for Calculation training.* Outage nightshift Lead Mechanical Design Engineer/Back-up Supervisor.

• KPS Engineering representative on the Independent Review Team developed to address CDBI A-6 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q01 08.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 inspection findings.

Assigned to review all calculations, modification packages, 1OCFR 50.59 screenings, evaluations, and procurement packages.* Technical Instructor for Administrative Process training for new engineers.

Mechanical Design Supervisor (2002 -2004)* Supervised nine engineers, analysts, and technicians assigned to the KNPP Mechanical Design Group.* Provided Mechanical Design Oversight for all vendor activities impacting KNPP Mechanical Design Bases." Provided support for emergent plant issues, NRC Inspections, and Physical Change Packages.* Subject Matter Expert Instructor for 10CFR 50.59 process training for new engineers.

Principal Engineer (Analytical Group SGR Project) (1998 -2002)" Contract Manager for Steam Generator Replacement (SGR)." Responsible for coordination of SGE design, fabrication and installation contracts.

• Provided outage schedule development, coordination, and work process integration between Bechtel and KNPP.* Coordinated contractor mobilization, badging, and plant specific training.* Technical Specialist for Quality Assurance audits of vendors." SGR Shift Manager for night shift* Responsible Engineer for SGR related Physical Change Packages." Responsible for SGR budget development up to 1998.* Prepared, reviewed, and awarded Bechtel Installation contract.* Participated in review and award of Ansaldo Fabrication contract.* Served on team toreview and award Westinghouse Design contract.* Selected to work at Arkansas Nuclear One for their steam generator installation.

Senior Engineer (Analytical Group) (1994-1998)" Responsible Engineer for Physical Change Packages." Member KNPP Engineering Reorganization Team.Recognized Technical Expert for KNPP systems.Senior Project Supervisor (1992-1994)

• Provided project management and engineering services for KNPP DCR packages." Supervisor of KNPP NPM Project Attendants responsible for modification package organization and close out.Nuclear Services Supervisor (1991-1992)

• Supervised initial Steam Generator replacement project effort.* Provided specification development for services and major plant components.

Prior to 1992 -Held engineering positions from Associate Engineer to Nuclear Design Engineering Supervisor.

EDUCATION Masters Program Coursework

-Mechanical Engineering; Michigan State University

-E. Lansing, MI B.S. -Mechanical Engineering

-Michigan State University

-E. Lansing, MI B.A. -Biology -Albion College -Albion, MI A-7 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 A-8 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Stevenson

& Associates MARLENE M. DELANEY PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE March 1998- Present Stevenson

& Associates Project Engineer Stevenson

& Associates is a structural/mechanical engineering firm.Job tasks as a Project Engineer include performing engineering and project engineering activities on a broad scope of projects.

Typical engineering activities include: " Seismic equipment qualification and anchorage design.* Component and support evaluations including modifications and new designs." Analysis and modification design for cable tray systems." SQUG/IPEEE evaluations and walkdowns." Reinforced concrete analysis.* Structural steel framing assessments.

• Detail fabrication drawings for steel modifications." Interface with clients on all aspects of projects.January 1981 -February 1998 Sargent & Lundy Engineers Senior Engineer, Engineer Sargent & Lundy is an engineering firm that consults primarily to the power industry.Job-tasks as a Senior Engineer included:* Performing project engineering and project management duties for numerous plant modification projects.

Responsibilities included overall project scheduling, technical supervision, and budget control.* Interfaced with clients, contractors on various projects.* Prepared conceptual design report and cost estimates for rehabilitation of hazardous waste handling facility and canal water treatment facility owned by Argonne National Laboratories.

• Field engineer at LaSalle County Nuclear Station, Enrico Fermi Atomic Power plant and Zion Nuclear Station.* Supervised and coordinated analysis of structural framing and designed modifications to such structures.

• Evaluated and designed modifications for railroad bridges.* Detailed fabrication drawings.Page 1 of 2 A-9 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 EDUCATION University of Wisconsin

-Milwaukee, Bachelor of Science in Civil Engineering, Graduated with Honors.PROFESSIONAL REGISTRATIONS Licensed Professional Engineer in the State of Wisconsin Licensed Structural Engineer in the State of Illinois Licensed Professional Engineer in the State of Illinois Page 2 of 2 A-10 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 A-11 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 A-12 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 STEVENSON

& ASSOCIATES PHILIP A. GAZDA PROFICIENCIES 0 0 S 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 Civil engineering Structural analysis and design Structural dynamics Plant betterment Specifications Project management Excellent communication, presentation and organizational skills Proven ability to function as part of a team SQUG and IPEEE assessments Strong commitment to customer service and long term relationships.

EXPERIENCE 1997 -Present Stevenson

& Associates 1995-1997 ComEd General Manager, Stevenson

& Associates

-Chicago Responsible for the day to day operation of the S&A Chicago office.Manages the engineering efforts of the Chicago office and coordinates the efforts with other S&A offices.He is a SQUG Qualified Seismic Capability Engineer.

He been involved in SQUG and IPEEE walkdowns and assessments at ten nuclear plants and led the CoinEd team performing the SQUG program at Zion Station. Mr. Gazda has also been the moderator for three SQUG qualification training classes provided for utility engineers.

In addition, Mr. Gazda was the Project Manager for the seismic assessment of HVAC ducts at another utility based on EPRI document Seismic Evaluation Guidelines for HVAC Duct and Damper Systems Revision to 1007896.Head -Maintenance Engineering Department, Zion Nuclear Power Station Managed and coordinated the activities of thirty-five Mechanical, Electrical, Structural and Program Engineers who supported the operation and maintenance of the Zion Nuclear Power Station.Support activities included engineering trouble shooting and evaluations to repair degraded electrical, mechanical and structural components/systems.

Oversaw engineering programs such as In Service Inspection, Vibration Testing, Thermographic Investigations and the Evaluation and repair of piping systems for the effects of Flow Accelerated Corrosion.

Performed administrative duties related to the management of the Maintenance Engineering Department.

Conducted and managed the Zion SQUG and IPEEE programs.1986 -1995, Associate and Senior Project Engineer Managed, coordinated and was responsible for the activities of the structural team engaged in the analysis and design of the structural 1973- 1995 Sargent & Lundy A-13 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.1O-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 and civil portions of power plants and other miscellaneous structures.

Had ultimate responsibility and ownership for the quality of the structural team and the product produced by the team. The team included hydrologists, geologists, soils engineers, architects, designers and structural engineers depending on the expertise required for each project. Responsible for coordinating the structural work with that of the Mechanical and Electrical disciplines on the project team. Established the technical approach and design criteria for the work, set schedules, and authorized drawings for construction.

1983 -1986, Project Engineer The responsibilities are essentially the same as those described for the Senior Project Engineer (see above). Reported to the Senior Project Engineer.1979 -1983, Supervising Design Engineer Supervised the team generating engineering analyses, calculations, sketches, designs and drawings for steel and concrete structures, foundations, and electrical and mechanical component supports.Reported to Project Engineer.1978 -1979, Supervising Structural Engineering Specialist Supervised the team that performed the structural analysis and design of specialized power plant structures such as containments, fuel pools, base mats, and drywells.

Reported to Project Engineer.1973 -1978, Senior Structural Engineering Specialist (1976 -1978)Structural Engineering Specialist (1973 -1976)Performed the analysis and design of power plant structures.

This work included dynamic analysis for seismic and hydrodynamic loads, finite element analysis, and reinforced concrete and steel design for structures and foundations.

Extensively involved in the analysis, design and construction of the heavy reinforced concrete structures for Illinois Power~s Clinton Station. Reported to Project Engineer.1972 -1973 Research Assistant University of Illinois Performed research at the University of Illinois for the U.S.Department of Transportation tunnel liner support system project.A-14 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.1O-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 EDUCATION* University of Illinois at Urbana, IL.M.S. Civil Engineering

• University of Illinois at Urbana, IL.B.S. Civil Engineering REGISTRATIONS 0 0 0 6 0 Licensed Structural Engineer -Illinois Licensed Professional Engineer -Wisconsin Licensed Professional Engineer -Texas Licensed Professional Engineer -Nebraska Licensed Professional Engineer -Minnesota MEMBERSHIPS

&AFFILIATIONS PUBLICATIONS

• American Concrete Institute* American Society of Civil Engineers* Structural Engineers Association of Illinois" University of Illinois Civil Engineering Alumni Association Board of Directors, 1992 -2000" University of Illinois Civil Engineering Student Mentor Program, 1993 -present* "Using Advanced Computer Technology to Consolidate Project Information" (co-author), American Power Conference, Chicago, Illinois, April, 1993* "Structural Considerations in Steam Generator Replacement" (co-author), American Power Conference, Chicago, Illinois, April 1991* "Nuclear Plant License Renewal -Structural Issues" (co-author), American Power Conference, Chicago, Illinois, April 1991* "Modifications at Operating Nuclear Power Plants" (co-author), American Society of Civil Engineers Convention, Denver, Colorado, April 1985" "Engineering of Structural Modifications for Operating Nuclear Power Plants" (co-author), Seventh International Conference on Structural Mechanics in Reactor Technology, Chicago, Illinois, August 1983 A-15 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.1O-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 A-16 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.1O-R-002 Rev; 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 A-17 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.1O-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Tribhawan Ram EDUCATION:

B.S. -Electrical Engineering, Punjab University, India, 1972 M.S. -Electrical Engineering, University of Cincinnati, 1977.M.S. -Nuclear Engineering, University of Cincinnati, 1982 M.B.A. -Bowling Green State University, 1996 PROFESSIONAL REGISTRATION:

State of Ohio PROFESSIONAL HISTORY: Stevenson

& Associates, Inc., Senior Engineer, 2011 -present Public Service Electric & Gas Co., Senior Plant Systems Engineer, Hancock Bridge, NJ, 2007 -2011 Entergy Corporation, Plymouth, Massachusetts, Senior Design Engineer, 2002-2007 Various Companies, Contract Consulting Project Engineer, 1996 -2002 Public Service Electric & Gas Co., Senior Staff Engineer, Hancock Bridge, NJ, 1983-1990 Toledo Edison Co., Toledo, Ohio, Senior Assistant Engineer, Associate Engineer, 1978-1983 PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE:

0 Electrical and Controls Design Engineering

• Plant Systems Engineering

• Transformer and Relay(s) Spec Developer* Plant Modification Engineering

• Systems and Component Test Engineering

• Factory Testing Witness* 6 Month BWR Systems Engineering Training* ETAP Trained* Arc Flash IEEE 1584 Trained Mr. Ram has over 28 years of electrical project, design and systems engineering experience in US nuclear plants. As part of the Seismic Margin Analysis (SMA) team, in 2012, Mr. Ram is leading the electrical engineering EPRI methodology effort to perform Post-Fukushima relay list development and evaluation to support Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL), including relay functional screening and chatter analysis, for Taiwan nuclear plants (both PWR and BWR). In this effort, he is preparing the final reports including recommendations to replace any bad actor relays. Mr. Ram is preparing proposals to replace these bad actors including modification package development for field replacement of these relays. He has prepared proposals to lead similar forthcoming relay evaluation efforts for several Westinghouse plants in the USA. Mr. Ram has either prepared or peer reviewed the Seismic Walkdown Equipment Lists (SWEL 1 & 2) for several Exelon Plants.A-18 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 As a senior plant systems engineer, Mr. Ram has: 1. Developed several test plans for modification packages for the replacement of low and medium voltage circuit breakers (ABB K-Line to Square D Masterpact; GE Magneblast to Wyle Siemens) and for the replacement of the entire Pressurizer Heater Bus switchgear;

2. Personally been involved in execution of these test plans during refueling outages;3. Witnessed factory testing of Pressurizer Heater Bus Switchgear;

4. Interfaced with NRC in their biennial Component Design Basis Inspections (CDBI); Interfaced with INPO in their biennial evaluations;

5. Developed and executed Performance Centered Maintenance (PCM) strategies for Motor Control Centers (MCCs) and low and medium voltage circuit breakers and switchgear; 6.Developed and executed margin improvement strategies for pressurizer heater busses, for twin units, through obtaining funds and then equipment replacement;

7. Developed refueling outage scoping for low and medium voltage circuit breakers and MCCs through working with outage group, maintenance, operations, and work MGMT; 8. Resolved breaker grease hardening issue for ABB K-Line breakers,.over a two year period, through working with maintenance and work MGMT in implementing accelerated overhauls with better grease; 9. Trained operations and engineering personnel in the Engaging People and Behavior Change process, as part of a case study team and; 10.Resolved day to day operations and maintenance issues with systems of responsibility (low and medium voltage systems)Mr. Ram has regularly participated in the EPRI annual circuit breaker user group conferences; at the 2011 meeting, he made a presentation on circuit breaker as found testing vis-6-vis protection of equipment, cables, and containment penetrations, and selective coordination preservation.

As a Senior Design Engineer, Mr. Ram has: 1. Developed specifications and procured 345/4.16/4.16 kV and 23/4.16/4.16 kV transformers (ranging up to $1.25 million);

2. Prepared a modification package to install the 23 kV/4.16 kV/4.16 kV transformer, including leading the project team to get this transformer successfully installed, tested, and placed in service; 3. Developed ETAP scenarios and performed load flow studies to successfully support the 2006 INPO evaluation;

4. Performed arc flash calculations per IEEE 1584 methodology for 4 kV, 480V Load Centers, and MCCs, enabling a justification of reduced arc flash rated clothing, thereby allowing conversion of OUTAGE PMs into ONLINE PMs and; 5. Performed single point system vulnerability analysis.As a Consulting Lead Project Engineer, Mr. Ram was heavily involved in resolution of the USI A-46 for several plants. He performed an extensive review of dozens of control circuits for relay chattering issues. To replace bad relay actors, Mr. Ram developed and/or supervised the development of many modification packages including:

selection of replacement relays (both protective and auxiliary);

preparation of relay testing specification with civil engineering input; working with and visiting seismic testing facilities for relay qualification and; developing pre and post installation instructions including test procedures.

He worked closely with teams consisting of maintenance, operations, and work MGMT during the development and implementation of these projects.

Besides the A-46 issue, Mr. Ram first developed and then was personally involved in the implementation of modification packages consisting of Cable, Conduit, Circuit Breaker and motor starter (contactor) replacements.

The following provides a list of USI A-46 resolution projects: Northeast Utilities

-Millstone Station Consumers Power Co. -Palisades Nuclear Station Boston Edison Co. -Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Commonwealth Edison Company- Dresden Station, Quad Cities Station Tribhawan Ram Page 2 A-19 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-1 2-159 STEVENSON

& ASSOCIATES 4350 DiPaolo Center, Suite H, Glenview, IL 60025 Tel: 847.795.0500 Fax: 847.795.0501 Bruce M. Lory blory@vecsa.com EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS

• B.S., Mechanical Engineering, State University of New York at Buffalo, Buffalo, NY -1982" Exelon-certified instructor-1992" ASME Training certification

-"Design and Repair of ASME Section I, IV, and VIII, Division 1 Pressure Vessels" -2000" Instructor of EPRI "Fundamentals of Equipment Seismic Qualification" course* Member of 2003-11 IEEE Subcommittee-2 on Equipment Qualification

• Member of 2003-11 IEEE 323 Working Group (Environmental Qualification)

• Member of 2003-11 IEEE 344 Working Group (Seismic Qualification)

QUALIFICATIONS Degreed Mechanical Engineer with over 30 years experience in the nuclear industry, with specific technical expertise in the field of overseeing equipment modifications for Extended Power Uprates (EPU), as well as Seismic Qualification (SQ) and Envi ronmental Qualification (EQ) of equipment/components.

Also possesses technical proficiency in design verification and project management for installation of single failure-proof cranes.PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

-EPU PROJECTS Provided staff augmentation services as utility responsible engineer, overseeing engineering activities necessary for developing engineering modifications packages for various EP U projects, including:

• Generator rewinds (LaSalle, Clinton, & Dresden), and a ssociated GE support system modifications (SLMS package, flux pro be, generator temperature monitoring, rotor torsional vibration monitoring system)* HP Turbine replacement with new ADSP advanced GE turbine design* RWCU pump replacements

• Reactor Feed Pump, Recirc Valve, and FW Reg. Valve replacements

• Stator Cooling system improvements (heat exchangers, filters, strainer)* Replacement of entire IA system with 3 independent system trains in new building.Activities included interface with Project Manager, Field Engineer, Work Planning, Construction, and Work Week Manager, as modification packages were developed, followed by implementation.

Worked within INDUS PassPort program for populating ADL, AEL, loading engineering deliverables in PassPort, ECN processing.

Performed owner's review of design descriptions, calculations, construction drawings.

etc. Reviewed FAT test plans, as well as witnessed FAT activities at OEM locations, assisted supply chain oversight of OEM milestones and auditing OEM facilities and generating nonconformances.

Provided technical interface with OEM as designs developed from mechanical

& structural engineering perspectives.

Reviewed resulting work order tasks in PassPort to get WO tasks to approved status. Produced CCNs in accordance with station procedures during installation phase to develop quick solution to engineering issues.A-20 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Bruce M. Lory PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

-SEISMIC QUALIFICATION Over 18 yea rs of exp erience in Sei smic Qualification of equip ment and components, including seismic stress analyses, equipment foundation load analyses, equipment nozzle secondary stress analyses, and selection of vendors for replacement of seismically qualified Class 1E components.

Well versed in requirements of IEEE 344-1975 for seismic qualification of Class 1E components, and use of SQUG m ethodology for demonstrating seismic adequacy of equipment.

Excellent verbal/writing skills in field of SQ and EQ testin g/analyses; responds well to organi zational challenges, and relationship building.

Member/ Chairperson of numerous EPRI EQ and SQ technical committees (see below). Proficient in PC software applications:

Microsoft Word, Excel, MS Projects and PowerPoint as well as INDUS PassPort database.Special expertise in preparation of SQ test plans, and witnessing of SQ tests; having witnessed over 100 seismic tests for numerous utilities.

Excellent knowledge of seismic and environmental testing facilities, including Wyle (Norco and Huntsville), NLI, Southern Testing Services, Nutherm, NTS Acton, EGS, and Qualtech.Served as CoinEd (now Exelon) corporate subject matter expert in SQ, providing SQ guidance and policy for all five ComEd generating stations, including on-site SQ engi neers. Developed and implemented ComEd ownership of SQ prog ram by authoring corporate procedure and SQ review checklists in 1993. Also created existing ComEd SQ standards used at all sites.Also served as subject matter expert for ComE d Corporate Engineering, providing technical guidance to Dresden, Quad Cities, and Zion sites required to complete the SQUG project. EPRI SQUG-certified Seismic Capability Engineer, and participated in all SQUG walkdowns at the three ComEd SQUG sites. Served on EPRI G-STERI, and SQURTS committees, as CoinEd employee.Specific SQ experience and special SQ projects includes: Designed temporary fix to broken auxiliary switch mounting on Merlin Gerin 4KV circuit breakers in support of restarting Dresden 2 & 3 and Q uad Cities 1 & 2 after extend ed shutdown to investigate issue. Coordinated and witnessed expedited seismic testing of temporary design fix that resulted in NRC app roval to restart affected units. Received "Engaging in Excellence" award from ComEd for solving problem (1997).* Member of EPRI SQUG mock-NRC audit team which pe rformed 1 wee k inspection of TMI SQUG program at TMI in preparation for formal NRC SQUG inspection (1998).* Expedited SQ test procedure preparation and witnessed SQ testing and HELB (EQ) testing of Magnetrol level switch needed to re place Dresden HPCI Glo-SLO obsolete level swi tch, allowing Dresden to exit 14 day LCO (1999)." Coordinated response to NRC resident inspector inquiry at Byron regarding SQ status of a racked out Westinghouse 4KV ci rcuit breaker, reviewed third party calculation justifying the configuration as seismically qua lified, interfaced with Resident Inspector at Byron, and consulted industry on the issue (2000)." Chairman of 1 day EPRI technical workshop on issue of "racked out" circuit breakers, attended by over 30 utilities and contractors, EPRI NDE Center- Charlotte, NC (1997)* Coordinated with Quad Cities SQ engineer the response to NRC con cern regarding potential contact of 125VDC batteries against hard spot on ass ociated battery racks under seismic loading. Solution involved SQ testing of non-conforming condition, SQ test procedure reviewed and SQ test witnessed as well (1998)." Member of the special root cause investigative team formed in response to NRC audit concern on seismic qualification status of commercial grade-dedicated protective relays on Quad Cities EDGs (1999).Page 2 of 4 A-21 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Bruce M. Lory PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

-ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION Possess over 15 years of EQ experience, in consulting services and in utility positions.

Prepared and reviewed over 1 00 EQ Binders to meet re quirements station-specific EQ licen sing basis requirement.).

Knowledgeable in EQ requirements for satisfying the different levels of EQ licensing basis, (1 OCFR50.49, NUREG 0588 -Category I and II, or DOR Guideline).

Prepared, reviewed over 20 EQ test pro cedures, and witnessed numerous EQ tests as part of licensee's initial EQ program origination or EQ component replacement objectives.

Well versed in EQ requirements contained in IEEE Standards 323, 382, 282, 317, and 649. Understand s differentiation between Arrhenius and Regression Line analysis methodologies for calculating thermal qualified life.Have performed many F MEAs (Failure Mode Effects Analysis) on EQ corn ponents down to part level to d etermine applicable failure mode and appropriate corresponding activation energy/regression line slope and intercept for calculating thermal qualified life of a given material.Have used Digital Engineering and Wyle Materials databases to assist FMEAs in selection of most applicable Arrhenius material properties for failure mode/part use.Member of Corporate EQ group at Commonwealth Edison (CornEd) Downers Grove, IL overseeing EQ program compliance of all 6 nuclear stations (1991-1995).

Served as backup EQ Engineer for CornEd Corporate Engineering office (1998-2000).

Specific EQ experience and special EQ projects includes:* Prepared or reviewed over 100 EQ binders over entire six site CornEd EQ program (1983-1993)

• Project Engineer overseeing staff of 5 EQ engineers prepare 88 EQ binders for Fort St. Vrain EQ program creation from scratch. Nu merous technical challenges due to high temperature MSLB profile, necessitating thermal lag anal yses and design of the rmal protection modifications.

Included lead role of defending EQ program in mock-NRC audit followed by successful NRC audit." Assisted in EQ impact evaluation for high drywell temperature excursion that o ccurred at CoinEd Dresden Nuclear Station, assessing EQ life consequences on Class 1E components (1988).* Assisted in preparation of EQ test pro cedure and witnessed EQ HELB testing of non-conforming Raychem NMCK and WCSF-N electrical splices for ComEd LaSalle County Nuclear Station in support of JCO (1986)* Member of EQ inspection team performing mock-NRC audit of Q uad Cities EQ program with respect to co mpliance to R.G. 1.97, in cluding EQ walkdown discovery of Class 1 E terminal blocks epoxy glued to junction boxes involving R.G. 1.97 instrumentation circuitry (1991)." Member of EQ assessment team performing technical review of Consumers Energy -Palisades EQ program for compliance to DOR Guidelines and R.G. 1.97 (1990)." Performed special EQ impact assessment of potentially non-EQ components installed in Class 1 E 480VAC MCCs at ComEd Braidwood Nuclear Station, reviewed over 1 50 NWRs for Stores Item # used for installation." Lead 5 EQ engineers on independent EQ asse ssment of Co mEd LaSalle County Nuclea r Station EQ prog ram re-baseline initiative to determin e remaining weaknesses in EQ prog ram and identify corrective actions needed in EQ analyses and component replacements (1997)Page 3 of 4 A-22 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Bruce M. Lory PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

-SINGLE FAILURE-PROOF CRANE DESIGN VERIFICATION Performed utility owner's (CMS Energy -Big Rock Restoration Project) design review of all crane manufacturer's design stress analyses for use of single failure-proof Containment Building Crane for dry cask activities.

Activities in cluded assisting project manager in resolving design issues which arose during seismic qualification analyses by crane vendor, resolving crane manufacturer (Ederer)NCRs, and establishing protocol fo r identification of critical characteristics for commercial grade dedication of crane for safety rela ted use. Crane expertise includes owner's review of manufacturer's design stress calculations for all operating load conditions per CMAA Spec. #70, and compliance with NUREG 0554.Project highlights included:* Visited crane manufacturer facility (Ederer) and vendor facility (Bigee) numerous times to resolve owner review comments on design stress calculations, attend project status meetings, and work with crane/vendor engineering staff towards final design resolutions." Reviewed over 30 design stress calculations for Ederer "X-SAM" single failure-proof crane trolley and hoist, including vendor bridge, column, and end truck design. Review resulted in three design changes to crane in order to comply with CMAA Spec. #70 and NUREG 0554 design margin requirements.

• Attended NRC meeting at NRR headquarters (Washington D.C.) with client to answer NRC and independent review team technical review questions on crane design and Ederer topical report." Assisted utility project manager in related engineering activities of commercial grade dedication, QA program establishment, and seismic qualification interface with Bigee Rigging.EMPLOYMENT HISTORY Stevenson

& Associates

-2008 to present EMS Inc. -2000 -2007 Commonwealth Edison, 1991-2000 ABB Impell, 1989 -1991 Sargent & Lundy Engineers, 1979 -1989 SPECIAL ACHIEVEMENTS

& AFFILIATIONS

• Presented CoinEd C-Team facility design for LOCA test chamber system to NUGEQ -1991* Inaugural Technical Program Chairman of EPRI -SQURTS program, 1993-95" Member of EPRI -G-STERI program, 1995-98" "Engaging in Excellence" award from CoinEd for designing and seismically qualifying emergency fix to broken auxiliary switch mounting on Merlin-Gerin 4KV circuit breakers -1997" "Certificate of Appreciation" , ASME PVP Division for being Technical Program Representative of the OAC Committee for the 2000 ASME PVP Division International Conference

-2000" Instructor of EPRI "Fundamentals of Equipment Seismic Qualification" training course -2011 Page 4 of 4 A-23 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Walter Djordjevic EDUCATION:

B.S. -Civil Engineering, University of Wisconsin at Madison, 1974 M.S. -Structural Engineering, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1976 PROFESSIONAL REGISTRATION:

State of California, State of Wisconsin, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, State of Michigan, State of Arizona, State of Missouri PROFESSIONAL HISTORY: Stevenson

& Associates, Inc., President 1996 -present; Vice President and General Manager of the Boston area office, 1983 -1995 URS/John A. Blume & Associates, Engineers, Boston, Massachusetts, General Manager, 1980 -1983;San Francisco, California, Supervisory Engineer, 1979 -1980 Impell Corporation, San Francisco, California, Senior Engineer, 1976 -1979 Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation, Boston, Massachusetts, Engineer, 1974 -1976 PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE: " Structural Engineering" Structural Dynamics* Seismic Engineering

• Construction

• Vibration Engineering" Expert Witness* Committee Chairman Mr. Djordjevic founded the Stevenson

& Associates Boston area office in 1983 and serves as President and General Manager. Mr. Djordjevic is expert in the field of structural engineering

-more specifically, in the areas of structural vulnerabilities to the effects of seismic and other extreme loading phenomena.

As a structural dynamicist, Mr. Djordjevic also heads the Vibration Engineering Consultants corporate subsidiary of Stevenson

& Associates for which he has overseen numerous designs of vibration sensitive microelectronics facilities for such clients as IBM, Intel, Motorola and Toshiba. He has personally been involved in such projects as resolving vibration problems due to construction activities for the Central Artery Project (Big Dig) in Boston for which he was retained by Massport.

Finally, Mr.Djordjevic has been personally retained as an Expert Witness a number of times relating to cases involving construction, structural and mechanical issues.He has performed over a thousand hours of onsite seismic and other natural phenomena (including tornados, hurricanes, fire, and flooding) inspection walkdowns to assess structural soundness'and vulnerabilities.

He has inspected microelectronics fabrication facilities, power facilities, and hazardous material government and military reservations.

He is one of the most experienced seismic walkdown A-24 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.1O-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 inspection screening and verification engineers having personally participated in seismic walkdowns at over 50 U.S. nuclear units.In recent years, he has concentrated on screening inspection walkdowns and assessments for resolution of the USI A-46 and seismic IPEEE issues, on numerous facilities.

The following provides a partial list of recent projects: American Electric Power -D.C. Cook Station Boston Edison Co. -Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (SPRA)Commonwealth Edison Company- Braidwood Station PM, Byron Station" M , Dresden Stationp M , Quad Cities StationPM Consumers Power Co. -Palisades Nuclear StationPM Entergy -Arkansas Nuclear One Florida Power & Light -Turkey Point Station New York Power Authority

-James A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation

-Nine Mile Point Station PM Northern States Power Co. -Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Northern States Power Co. -Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Omaha Public Power District -Fort Calhoun Station (SPRA)Public Service Electric & Gas -Salem Nuclear Station Rochester Gas & Electric -R.E. Ginna Station Wisconsin Electric -Point Beach Nuclear StationPM (SPRA)Wisconsin Public Service -Kewaunee Nuclear Power PlantPM (SPRA)PM Indicates projects where Mr. Djordjevic served as Project Manager Hanford Reservation Savannah River Plant Reservation Rocky Flats Reservation Tooele US Army Depot Anniston US Army Reservation Umatilla US Army Reservation Newport US Army Reservation Aberdeen US Army Reservation He is a member of the IEEE 344 Standards Committee, Chairman of the ASCE Working Group for Seismic Evaluation of Electrical Raceways, and Chairman of the IES Committee for Microelectronics Cleanroom Vibrations Representative projects include overseeing the SEP shake-table testing of electrical raceways, in-situ testing of control panels and instrumentation racks at various nuclear facilities, equipment anchorage walkdowns and evaluations at various nuclear facilities.

He is the principal author of the CERTIVALVE software package to evaluate nuclear service valves, and contributing author in the development of the ANCHOR and EDASP software packages commercially distributed by S&A.Mr. Djordjevic is expert in the area of seismic fr agility analysis and dynamic qualification of electrical and mechanical equipment.

He has participated in and managed over twenty major projects involving the evaluation and qualification of vibration sensitive equipment and seismic hardening of equipment.

As demonstrated by his committee work and publications, Mr. Djordjevic has participated in and contributed steadily to the development of equipment qualification and vibration hardening methodology.

Walter Djordjevic Page 2 A-25 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 PROFESSIONAL GROUPS Member, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Nuclear Power Engineering Committee Working Group SC 2.5 (IEEE-344)

Chairman, American Society of Civil Engineers Nuclear Structures and Materials Committee, Working Group for the Analysis and Design of Electrical Cable Support Systems Member, American Society of Mechanical Engineers Operation, Application, and Components Committee on Valves, Working Group SC-5 Chairman.

Institute of Environmental Sciences, Working Group foe Standardization of Reporting and Measuring Cleanroom Vibrations PARTIAL LIST OF PUBLICATIONS 1979 ASME PVP Conference; San Francisco, California, "Multi-Degree-of-Freedom Analysis of Power Actuated Valves", Paper No. 79-PVP-1 06.1983 ASME PVP Conference, Portland, Oregon, "A Computer Code for Seismic Qualification of Nuclear Service Valves", Paper No. 83-PVP-81.

1983 ASME PVP Conference, Portland, Oregon, "Qualification of Electrical and Mechanical Equipment at Rocky Flats Reservation Using Prototype Analysis".

1984 ANS Conference, "Qualification of Class 1 E Devices Using In-Situ Testing and Analysis." 1986 Testing of Lithography Components for Vibration Sensitivity, Microelectronics, Cahners Publishing 1990 Nuclear Power Plant Piping and Equipment Confer ence, "Development of Generic Amplification Factors for Benchboard and Relay Cabinet Assemblies", Paper No. 106, Structures and Components Symposium, held by North Carolina State University 1991 Electric Power Research Institute, "Development of In-Cabinet Response Spectra for Benchboards and Vertical Panels," EPRI Report NP-7146 Walter Djordjevic Page 3 A-26 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Certificate of Completion Walter Djordjevic Successfully Completed Training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 -Plant Seismic Walkdowns Bruce M. Lorf- Instructor NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Course Date: 06/26/12 A-27 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.1O-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 THOMAS J. BORTOLINI, S.E., P.E.QUALIFICATIONS Proven civil engineer with extensive and diverse responsibilities in project management and structural engineering.

Major strengths in design, organization, team building, and budget cost control. Well organized, adaptable to change, and demonstrated communication and leadership skills.EXPERIENCE EXELON CORPORATION, Braidwood, Illinois 1998 to Present Structural Design Engineer Responsible for engineering of structural modifications and technical interfaces with architect/engineers: " Responsible for Security modifications

• ISFSI modifications

• New plant buildings" Tank foundation modifications

• Single failure-proof crane modifications

• ISI examinations

• Responsible Engineer for concrete containment and containment metal liner COMMONWEALTH EDISON, Zion, Illinois 1995 to 1998 Project Team Leader. Staff Engineer (1995 to 1996 and 1997 to Present)Responsible for project management and engineering of structural modifications and technical interfaces with architect/engineers:

• Implemented department goal of using in-house engineering, relying less on A/Es as lead structural engineer for design of $1.5 million instrument air project.* Tailored vehicle barrier system at $300,000 under projected costs." Designed spare main transformer foundation so that it could be moved on or off a rail car expeditiously, reducing downtime by over 50%." Developed new piping configuration and oversaw A/E piping analysis for overpressure protection of various piping systems.Assistant Outage Director of Engineering (1996 to 1997)Responsible for resolution of emergent engineering issues that affect outage critical path (special 8-month assignment).

• Identified, prioritized, disseminated, and followed through on all emergent engineering issues for over 120 engineers averting significant time delays and costs.* Interacted with other Assistant Outage Directors to obtain support required by engineering groups." Performed peer reviews of station tests and procedures leading to successful test completions.

A-28 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 THOMAS J. BORTOLINI, Page 2 EXPERIENCE (Cont'd)VECTRA TECHNOLOGIES INC., Lincolnshire, Illinois 1987 to 1995 (Formerly IMPELL Corporation)

Supervising Engineer (1991 to 1995)Responsible for project management and engineering of multiple structural modifications.

• Managed numerous concurrent on-site engineering modifications at Commonwealth Edison's Zion Station in support of department profit and sales goals." Site structural lead for $5 million emergency diesel generator controls modification." Played key roll as site support engineer for $10 million service water modification.

• Supported installation of the $5 million boric acid modification by resolving field installation problems with no schedule impact.Engineering Site Coordinator (1989 to 1991)Responsible for acquiring engineering projects by demonstrating ability to resolve complex technical issues while fostering client teamwork.

Knowledgeable of all on-site activities and key interface with engineering groups and station manager.* Responsible for starting field engineering office and generating

$1.0 million in additional engineering services." Supervised six engineers and met quality, budgets, and schedules." Supported office projects with field support resulting in reducing costs due to minimal redesigns.

Project Engineer (1987 to 1989)Responsible for issuing engineering modifications and resolving field interferences.

• Oversaw the design of control room ductwork, conduit supports, and suspended ceiling grid within schedule and budget." Coordinated and facilitated on site construction of control room ductwork and ceiling grid meeting client's expectation.

SARGENT AND LUNDY ENGINEERS, Chicago, Illinois 1974 to 1987 Senior Structural Engineer (1981 to 1987)Managed the design of structural steel framing.* Supervised work of 20 structural engineers performing gallery steel framing final load check.* Resolved field interferences with the installation and reinforcement of structural members while assigned to Cincinnati Gas and Electric's Zimmer Station, resulting in minimal craft downtime.Structural Engineer (1974 to 1981)Analyzed and designed concrete and steel structural members.A-29 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 THOMAS J. BORTOLINI, Page 3 EDUCATION Graduate course work completed towards a Masters in Design and Construction Engineering University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio Bachelor of Science, Civil Engineering, Valparaiso University, Valparaiso, Indiana PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS Registered Structural Engineer, State of Illinois Registered Professional Engineer, State of Illinois A-30 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159.I ECY,,C POWER eiI RESEARCH INSTITUTE Certificate of Completion Thomas Bortolini Training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3-Plant Seismic Walkdowns June 27, 2012 Date if,004. 4 a Robert K. Kassawara EPRI Manager, Structural Reliability

& Integrity A-31 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 B Equipment Lists Appendix B contains the equipment lists that were developed during SWEL development.

Note that because no Rapid Drain-Down items existed for Braidwood Generating Station Unit 2, there is no Rapid Drain-Down Equipment List.The following contents are found in Appendix B: SWEL Approval Signature Page ....................................

B-2 T a b le B -I , B a se List 1 ...................................................................................

B -3 Table B-2, Base List 2 ..............................................................................

B-18 T a ble B -3, S W E L 1 .....................................................................................

B -20 T a ble B -4 , S W E L 2 .........................................

............................................

B -27 Explanation of SWEL Item Substitution During the walkdowns at Braidwood Unit 2, it was identified that Valve 2SX101A was no longer installed at the plant. It had been removed during a plant modification.

As a result, this component is removed from the SWEL. An adequate quantity of components from Equipment Class 07 (fluid operated valves) are on the SWEL and the SWEL meets the requirements of Reference 1 (EPRI guidance).

During the oversight review of the SWEL for Braidwood Unit 2, it was identified that no components from Equipment Class 11 (chillers) were on SWEL. Braidwood has one Category I chiller and this was added to the SWEL and will be walked down in October 2012.These changes were discussed with Braidwood personnel including Mr. Thomas Bortolini, Mr. Joseph Bannerman, and Mr. Ralph Richard.B-1 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 SAStevenson

& Associates Seismic Walkdown Interim Report, Revision 1 In Response to NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Braidwood Generating Station -Unit 2 Kim L. Hull Equipment Selection Preparer 09/18/2012 date Tony Perez Equipment Selection Reviewer James Kuchenbecker~tion Operations Staff Member Refer to Attachment 3 for synopsis of Station Operations role and responsibility.

09/19/ 2012 date date date B-2 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Table B-1. Base List 1 ID Description System Building Elevation Location OCCOIP OPM02J OVCO I AA 0VC01AA, OVC01CA OVCO iFA OVCO IFA 0VC01JA 0VC01SA OVCO ISA OVCO2CA OVCO2FA OVC03CA OVC05YA OVC05YC OVC06YA OVC06YC OVC08Y COMPONENT COOLING PUMP ASMBLY MAIN CONTROL BOARD CONTROL ROOM HVAC SYST CHLD WTR COOLING COIL& CABINET MCR SUPPLY FAN OA ASMBLY OA MCR HVAC SUP FLTRS CONT RM HVAC LOCAL CONT PAN ASMBLY CONTROL ROOM HVAC SYSTMAKE UP AIR FILTER UNIT TRAIN B RTRN FAN OB INLT DAMPER CONTROL ROOM HVAC RETURN FAN ASMBLY CONTROL RM REC CHARCOAL FILTER A TRAIN ASMBLY MAKE-UP FILTER FAN ASMBLY ISOLATION DAMPER BUTITERFLY TRAIN B RECIRC CHARCOAL ABSORBER OB INLT DAMPER OB VC ABSORBER OUTLET DAMPER A ISOL DAMPER TRAIN B RECIRC CHARCOAL ABSORBER OB DISCH DAMPER TRAIN B MAKEUP AIR FLTR UNIT FAN OB DISCH FLOW CONTROL CC CC ns ns Sx VC vc VC VC VC VC VC VC VC VC VC VC VC VC vc~VC VC VC VC yC VC VC VC Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux 364 364 451 451 346 451 451 451 451 451 451 451 451 463 463 ns ns 451 426 ns 426 463 ns ns ns ns ns ns ns 364-L-17 Main Control Room Main Control Room I2TLOCAWTED SW OF M- 16 ns ns ns as ns ns 451-L-10 451-L-26 ns 463-L-24 ns ns ns ns ns n$118 ns 463 ns n8 ns'is ns ns ns ns Table B-1 Page 1 of 15 B-3 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 ID Description System Building Elevation Location OVC09Y TRAIN B EMERGENCY MAKEUP INTAKE FROM T11RB BLDG VC Aux as as OVCI5J MCR U-1 HVAC START PNL VC Aux 451 ns OVCI6J MCR U-2 HVAC START PNL VC Aux 463 ns OVCI7YA ISOLATION DAMPER OPPOSED BLADE VC Aux ns ns OVCI7YB TRAIN A RTRN FAN OA DAMPER VC Aux sns OVC24Y TRAIN A MAKEUP AIR FLTR UNIT FAN OA DISCH FLOW CONTROL VC Aux ns ns OVC25Y TRAIN A EMERGENCY MAKEUP INTAKE FROM THE TURB BLDG VC Aux ns ns OWOO ICA CHILLED WATER SYS CONTROL ROOM REFRIGERATION UNIT OA WO Aux 383 ns OWOOICB CHILLED WATER SYS CONTROL ROOM REFRIGERATION UNIT OB WO Aux 383 .s OWOO IPA OA CONTROL ROOM CHILLED WATER PUMP ASMBLY WO Aux 383 383-N-8 0WO01PB OB CONTROL ROOM CHILLED WATER PUMP ASMBLY WO Aux 383 .383-N-9 0WO 14MA SEPARATOR AIR M- 118 WO Aux 383 +04 OWO4MB SEPARATOR AIR M-118 WO Aux 383 +04 2AF006A AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PMP 2A SX SUCT VLV ASMBLY AF Aux 383 ns 2AF006B AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PMP 2B SX SUCT VLV ASMBLY AF Aux 383 IN PP RM 2AFO17A AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PMP 2A SX SUCT VLV ASMBLY AF Aux 383 ns 2AFO17B AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PMP 2B SX SUCT VLV ASMBLY AF Aux 383 IN PP RM 2AFOIAA FEED PUMP LUBE OIL COOLER AF Aux ns ns 2AFOIAB AF PP LUBE OIL COOLER AF Aux as ns 2AF01EA-1 BATT CHARGER (#1) FOR 2B AUX FEED PUMP AF Aux ns 2AFO1EA- 383 A BATTERY I AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP AF Aux 8ns 2AF0IEA- 383 B BATTERY IA AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP 2B AF Aux ns 2AFOIEB-1 BATT CHARGER (#2) FOR 2B AUX FEED PP AF Aux as ns 2AFO0EB- 383 A BATTERY 2 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP 2B AF Aux 383-L-19383 B BATTERY 2 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP 2B AF Aux ns 2AFO1J AUX FEEDWATER PUMP 2B STARTUP PANEL ASMBLY AF Aux 383 383-M-16 2AF01PA PUMP AUX FEEDWATER, MOTOR DRIVEN ASMBLY AF Aux 383 as 2AF01PA- 383 A AUX FEEDWATER PUMP 2A AUX LUBE OIL PUMP AF Aux ns 2AF01PA- 383 L AUX FEEDWATER PUMP 2A MAIN LUBE OIL PUMP AF Aux ns 2AF01PA- 2A AUX FW PUMP MOTOR AF Aux 383 ns Table B-1 Page 2 of 15 B-4 Braidwood Station Unit 2 1200108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 ID Description System Building Elevation Location M 2AFOflPB 2AFO1PB-A 2AFO 1PB-2B AUX FW PUMP AUX LUBE OIL PUMP AUXFW UMP2B NGAUX START RLY BATT I AF Aux 383 383 ns ns AF Aux AF Aux ns ns L 2AP12E 2AP05E 2AP23E 2AP25E 2AP27E 2AP3OE 2AP38E 2CCP12 2CCP13E AUX FEEDWATER PUMP 2B MAIN LUBE OIL PUMP UNIT AUX. POWER TRANSFORMER 24 1 -1 EQ 4160 VOLT ESF SWITCH GEAR 241 EQ 480V ESF SUBSTATION BUS 23 IX ASMBLY EQ SWGR 232X 480 VOLT ESF ASMBLY 480V AUX BLDG ESF MCC 231XI XFORMER 480V AUX BLDG ESF MCC 232X1 ASMBLY 480V AUX BLDG ESF MCC 231X2 ASMBLY EQ 480V AUX BLDG MCC 232X2 ASMBLY EQ 480V AUX BLDG ESF MCC 231X5 ASMBLY ASSY- 480V AUX BLDG MCC 233X1 CC HEAT EXCHANGER EQ MOTOR COMPONENT COOLING PMP 2B AF AP AP AP AP AP AP AP AP AP AP AP AP AP AP AP AP AP AP CC CC CC Aux Out-side Au Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Auxc Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux 383 383 401 42 426 426 426 426 426 426 364 364 383 414 414 426'426 426 426 346 364 364 364 ns 383 ns IRAI SYRP 426-N-28 426 426-P-26 426-N-27 426-P-27 426-N-29 ns 383-M-20~364-N-23 383-P-19 4 14-R-24 426-R-24 426-R-24 426-Q- 19 426-Q- 9 ns ns 364-N- 19 Table B-1 Page 3 of 15 B-5 Braidwood Station Unit 2 1200108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 ID Description System Building Elevation Location 2CCOIT 2CC053 2CC9412A 2CC9412B 2CC9422A 2CC9422B 2CC9437B 2COO1J 2CO02J 2CO03J 2CO04J 2CO 17JA 2COI7JB 2CO 19JA 2CO191B 2CO20J 2CVO1FA 2CVO IFB 2CV0IPA 2CVO I PA-A 2CV01PB 2CVO1PB-A 2CV02A 2CV02F 2CV02P-C 2CV02SA 2CV02SB 2CV03SA 2CV03SB 2CV04AA 2CV04AB 2CVI 12B 2CV 12C 2CVI12D SURGE TANK COMPONENT COOLING INSIDE CNMT PEN CLG SUPPLY ASMBLY CC FROM RH HX 2A OUTLET ISOL ASMBLY CC FROM RH HX 2B OULET ISOL VALVE ASMBLY RH lX 2A OUTLT RLF VLV RH HX 2B OUTLT RLF VLV CC FROM EXCESS LETDOWN HX ISOL VLV ASMBLY DG 2A RM FP CTRL PANEL DG 2A DAY TANK ROOM FP CONTROL PANEL DG 2B ROOM FP CONTROL PANEL DG 2B DAY TANK ROOM FP CONTROL PANEL DG 2A & DAY TANK FIRE DAMPER PANEL DG 2B & DAY TANK FIRE DAMPER PANEL LSCR & CAB TUN FIRE DAMPER PANEL LSCR FIRE DAMPER CONTROL PANEL UCSR FIRE DAMPER CONTROL PANEL 2A CV SEAL WATER INJECTION FILTER 2B CV SEAL WATER INJECTION FILTER PUMP,2A CENTRIFUGAL CHARGING ASMBLY PUMP, CNTRFGL CHG PP AUX OIL PP PUMP,2B CENTRIFUGAL CHARGING ASMBLY PUMP, CNTRFGL CHG AUX OIL PP SEAL WATER HEAT EXCHANGER SEAL WATER RETURN FILTER PD CHARGING PUMP FLUID DRIVE OIL COOLER 2A CV PUMP GEAR OIL COOLER 2B CV PUMP GEAR COOLER 2A CV LUBE OIL COOLER 2B CV PUMP LUBE OIL COOLER LETDOWN HT EXCH 2A LETDOWN Hf EXCH 2B VCT OUTLT ISOL VLV C/S AT 2PM05J ASMBLY VCT OUTLT ISOL VLV C/S AT 2PM05J ASMBLY RWST TO CHG PMPS SUCT VLV C/S AT 2PM05J ASMBLY CC CC CC CC CC CC CC CO CO CO CO CO CO CO CO CO CV CV CV CV CV CV CV CV CV CV CV CV CV CV CV CV CV CV Aux Cont Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux 426 377 364 364 364 364 364 401 401 401 401 401 401 401 463 426 as ns 364 364 364 364 383 ns 364 364 364 364 364 383 383 426 426 364 426-P-12 OMB+13'+13'as 364 V 19 PENETRATION P-22 ns us ns as ns as ns as ns as ns as ns as ns as ns 364 AUX 364 364 AUX 364 ns as VCT VLV AISLE VCT VLV AISLE+/-12' CWA 0 Table B-1 Page 4 of 15 B-6 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 ID Description System Building Elevation Location 2CiV1E 2CV8100 2CV8105 RWST TO H PP $UCT VLY CS AT P0JAM SEAL WTR RTRN CNMT ISOL VLV ASMBLY" INE C`NMT IOLgf VIV LY/S AT 2PM05J ASfULY CT-IIfl 1rIMP (-NNT 1NOT0 VT V ('/(Z AT 9PMO~1 A'MRT V CV CV CV CV Aux Aux Aux Aiiv 375 375 375 CWA +10 ON N. WALL+21 PIPE CHASE CWA PEN.71 CWA P-71 ZkVI 111 2CV8114 2CV8123 2CV8145 2CV8355A 2CV8355C 2CV8804A 2DC02E 2DC04E 2DC05EA 2DC06EA 2DC11J 2DGO 1KB 2DGOISB 2DG04EB CHG PMP MINIFLOW ISOL VLV C/S AT 2PM05J ASMBLY SEA WT RRN NMTISL VEV C/ AT 2PM05J ASNIBLY SOV 2A CV PP ESF M1NIFLOW ISOL VLV RLF VLV PZR AUXILIARY SPRAY VLV C/S AT 2PM05J ASMBLY RCP 2A SEAL INJECTION ISOl VLV C/S 2PMOAl ASMBLY RCP 2C SEAL INJECTION ISOL VLV C/S 2PM05J ASMBLY RH FIX 2A TO CV PMP SUCT ISOL VLV; C/S AT 2PMO6J ASMBLY 125V BATTERY 212 DIV. 22 2 BATTERYC 212 DIV. 22 BATTERY CHARGER 212 DIV. 22 125V DC ESF DIST. CENLE 211 125V DC ESF DIST. PNL 212 125V DC ESF DIST PNL 212 125V DC FUSE PANEL -DIV. 22 DIESEL ENGINE GENERATOR SKID 2B AIR COMPRESSOR PACKAGE IB AIR COMPRESSOR PACKAGE I B DIESEL GENERATOR 1A SYNCHRO-CHECK RELAY BOX CV CV CV CV CV CV CV CV CV CV CV CV CV DC DC DC DC DC DC DC DC DC DC DG DG DG DG DG AUX Aux Aux Aux Aux Cont Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Mix Aux 364 377 364 364 ns 412 364 364 364 364 364 364 451 451 451 451 451 451 451 451 451 451 401 ns 401 401 426 426 ns OMB +18'PEN 28 ns ns ns ns OMB CWA PW41 +27 AB CWA PEN-33; (374)AB CWA PN45; (374)AB CWA PEN-53; (374)AB CWA PEN-33; (374)+2 211 BATTERY RM 212 BATTERY RM ns ns ns ns ns ns ns ns'Is ns ns ns ns ns Table B-1 Page 5 of 15 B-7 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 ID Description System Building Elevation Location 2DO01PA 2DO01PB 2DOO1PC 2DO0IPD 2DOOITA 2DO0 1TB 2DO02TA 2DO02TB 2DO1OT 2FC009 2FC012 2FT-0121 2FT-0132 2FT-0 139 2FT-0688 2FT-0689 2FT-AF01 2FT-AFO 12 2FT-AFO13 2FT-AF0 14 2FT-AFO15 2FT-AF016 2FT-AFO17 2FT-AF018 2IPOIE 2IPO1J 21P02E 21P02J 21P03E 21P03J 21P04E 21P04J 21P05E 2LP06E 21P07E 20 GPM TRANSFER PUMP 2A 20 GPM TRANSFER PUMP 2B 20 GPM TRANSFER PUMP 2C 20 GPM TRANSFER PUMP 2D DIESEL OIL STORAGE TANK DIESEL OIL STORAGE TANK 2B 500 GAL DAY TANK 2A 500 GALLON DAY TANK 2B 500 GAL DIESEL OIL DAY TANK ISOLATION VALVE ISOLATION VALVE CHARGING LINE D/P CELL FLOW XMITFR LETDOWN FLOW D/P CELL LOOP FILL HEADER FLOW XMITTR RESID HT EXCH 2B CCW OUT DP FLOW XM1TTR RESID HX 2A CCW OUT DP FLOW XMITTR SG 2A AUX FEED PUMP 2A FLOW XMR AF TO SG 2A FLOW TRANSMITTER AF TO SB 2B FLOW TRANSMITTER AF TO SG 2B FLOW TRANSMITTER AF TO SG 2C FLOW TRANSMITTER AF TO SG 2C FLOW TRANSMITTER AF TO SG 2D FLOW TRANSMTITER AF TO SG 2D FLOW TRANSMITTER INSTRUMENT BUS 211 TRANSFORMER

-DIV. 21 120VAC INSTRUMENT BUS DISTRIBUTION PANEL 211 -DIV. 21 INSTRUMENT BUS 212 TRANSFORMER

-DIV. 22 120 VAC INSTRUMENT BUS DISTRIBUTION PNL 212 -DIV. 22 INSTRUMENT BUS 213 TRANSFORMER

-DIV. 21 120 VAC INSTRUMENT BUS DISTRIBUTION PANEL 213 -DIV.21 INSTRUMENT BUS 214 TRANSFORMER

-DIV. 22 120 VAC INSTRUMENT BUS DISTRIBUTION PANEL 214 -DIV 22 INSTRUMENT BUS 211 INVERTER -DIV. 21 INSTRUMENT BUS 212 INVERTER -DIV. 22 INSTRUMENT BUS 213 INVERTER -DIV. 21 DO DO DO DO DO DO DO DO DO FC FC ns ns ns CC CC AF AF AF AF AF AF AF AF AP IP AP IP IP IP IP IP IP IP I P Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Con Con ns ns ns Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux 373 373 373 373 373 373 401 401 383 377 377 ns ns as 364 364 364 364 364 ns ns ns 364 364 451 451 451 451 451 451 451 451 451 451 451 Diesel Oil Storage Tk Rm 2A Diesel Oil Storage Tk Rm 2B Diesel Oil Storage Tk Rm 2A Diesel Oil Storage Tk Rm 2B Diesel Oil Storage T1 Rm 2A Diesel Oil Storage Tk Rm 2B Diesel Oil Day Tank Rm #2 Diesel Oil Day Tank Rm #1 Oil Day Tank Room #I EL. 388 EL. 392 ns LOCAL MOUNT LOCAL MOUNT ns ns as ns as ns ns ns ns ns ns ns ns ns ns MEER ns ns as ns ns Table B-1 Page 6 of 15 B-8 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 ID Description System Building Elevation Location 21P08E INSTRUMENT BUS 214 INVERTER -DIV. 22 IP Aux 451 ns 2IY-067 RH HX #2A OUT P TRANSDUCER RH Aux 364 ns 21Y-0607 RH HX #2B OUT lIP TRANSDUCER RH Aux 364 ns 2L-94A CNTIMETSMPLVE WTC ASI Cont ns n 2LS-0941A 2B CONTAINMENT RECIRCULATION SUMP LVL LIGHTS SI Cont ns ns 2LT-0459 LEV..... TRANSMITTER .Y con 377 2PL50J 2LT-0460 PRZR LEVEL D/P TRANSMITTER RY Con 377 (LM) +06 42LT0461 P L D .........

RY Con 377 2PL52J 2LT-0501 SG LOOP 2A W-RNG LEVEL D/P XMTTR FW Con 377 2PL50J 2LT-0502 SG LOOP 2B W-RNG LEVEL D/P TRANSMITTER FW Con 377 2PL67J 2LT-0503 SG LOOP 2C W-RNG LEVEL D/P TRANSMITITER FW Con 377 2PL75J 2LT-0504 S/G LOOP 2DA LEVEL D/P TRANSMITTEDRG FW Con 377 2PL52J 2LT-0517 S/G LOOP 2A LEVEL D/P XMTTR W/FILLED LEG FW Con 401 2PL69J 2LT-0518 S/G 2A LEVEL LOOPiP TRASMITR W/FILED LEG FW Con 412 LM 2LT-0519 SIG LOOP 2A LEVEL D/P XMYTR W/FILLED LEG FW Con 412 2PL57J 2LT-0527 S/G LOP 2 LVL D/P TRANSMITTER W/FILLED LEG FW Con 377 2PL75J 2LT-0528 S/G 2B LEVEL D/P TRANSMITEMR W/FILLED LEG FW Con 412 L'M S L2PL7J 2LT-0537 S/G LP 2C LVL D/P TRANSMITTER W/FILLED LEG FW Con 377 2PL75J 2LT-0538 S/G 2C LEVEL LOOP D/P XMTTR W/FILED LEG FW Con 412 LM 2LT-0539 S/G LP 2C LVL D/P TRANSMITTER W/FILLED LEG FW Con 412 2PL71J 2L-047 S/ L 2 LL /PTANMITE WFELE LG WCon 40)1 2PL69JF 2LT-0548 SIG 2D LEVEL LOOP D/P XMTYIR W/FILLED LEG FW Con 412 LM 2LT-0549 S/G 2DLOOP2 LEO L DiP TRANSMITTER W/FILED LEG FW Con 412 2PL57J 2LT-0556 S/G LOOP 2A LEVEL D/P TRANSMITITER W/FILLED LEG FW Con 412 2PL561 2LT057 /G2BLEEL P /PTRNSFTMR

/FLLD EGFWCon 4)12 2PL72J 2LT-0558 SIG LOOP 2C LEVEL D/P TRANSMITFER W/FILLED LEG FW Con 412 2PL72J 2L-059 S/ OO 2 LVE /PTRNSITE WFILE LGFW Con 412 LM RWST 2LT-0930 REF WTR STG TK LEVEL D/P XMTTR SI Tunnel +05 T 379 0 0 Table B-1 Page 7 of 15 B-9 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 ID Description System Building Elevation Location 2MS001A 2MSOOIB 2MSO0IC 2MSOO1D 2MSO 13A 2MS013B 2MS013C 2MSO13D 2MS014A 2MS014B 2MS014C 2MS014D 2MS015A 2MS015B 2MSOI5C 2MS015D 2MSO16A 2MSO16B 2MSO 16C 2MSO16D 2MS017A 2MS017B 2MS017C 2MS017D 2MS018A 2MS018B 2MSOI8C 2MS018D 2NI-3 1B 2NI-32B 2NRIIE 2NRI3E MS ISOL VLV LOOP 2A ASMBLY MS ISOL VLV LOOP 2B ASMBLY MS ISOL VLV LOOP 2C ASMBLY 2D MSIV S/G 2A 1235 PSIG RELIEF S/G 2B 1235 PSIG RELIEF S/G 2C 1235 PSIG RELIEF S/G 2D 1235 PSIG RELIEF S/G 2A 1220 PSIG RELIEF S/G 2B 1220 PSIG RELIEF S/G 2C 1220 PSIG RELIEF S!G 2D 1220 PSIG RELIEF S/G 2A 1205 PSIG RELIEF S/G 2B 1205 PSIG RELIEF S/G 2C 1205 PSIG RELIEF S/G 2D 1205 PSIG RELIEF S/G 2A 1190 PSIG RELIEF S/G 2B 1190 PSIG RELIEF S/G 2C 1190 PSIG RELIEF S/G 2D 1190 PSIG RELIEF 2A S/G MAIN STEAM SAFETY RELIEF 2B S/G MAIN STEAM SAFETY RELIEF 2C S/G MAIN STEAM SAFETY RELIEF 2D S/G MAIN STEAM SAFETY RELIEF S/G 2A PORV ASMBLY S/G 2B PORV ASMBLY S/G 2C PORV S/G 2D PORV ASMBLY SOURCE RANGE SOURCE RANGE POSTACCIDENT NEUTRON DETECTOR POSTACCIDENT NEUTRON DETECTOR MS MS MS MS MS MS MS MS MS MS MS MS MS MS MS MS MS MS MS MS MS MS MS MS MS MS MS MIS ns ns NR NR Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux ns ns Cont Cont Aux 377 377 377 377 401 401 401 401 401 401 401 401 401 401 401 401 401 401 401 401 401 401 401 401 401 401 404 401 ns ns ns ns 2PM06J (377 MSIV)2PM06J; (377 MSIV)2PM06J; (377 MSIV)377 MSIV A' SAFETY VALVE RM B' SAFETY VALVE RM C' SAFETY VALVE RM D' SAFETY VALVE RM A' SAFETY VALVE RM B' SAFETY VALVE RM C' SAFETY VALVE RM D' SAFETY VALVE RM A' SAFETY VALVE RM B' SAFETY VALVE RM C' SAFETY VALVE RM D' SAFETY VALVE RM A' SAFETY VALVE RM B'SAFETY VALVE RM C' SAFETY VALVE RM D' SAFETY VALVE RM A' SAFETY VALVE RM B' SAFETY VALVE RM C' SAFETY VALVE RM D' SAFETY VALVE RM ns ns ns ns ns 1s ns ns 2PAOIJ PROTECTION SYSTEM CABINET (I&E Prot. Cab. CH 1)2PA02J PROTECTION SYSTEM CABINET (I&E Prot. Cab. CH 2)PA 451 Aux. Elect. Equip. Rm (AEER)451 Aux Elect Equip. Rm (AEER)PA Aux Table B-1 Page 8 of 15 B-1 0 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 ID Description System Building Elevation Location 2PA03J PROTECTION SYSTEM CABINET (I&E Prot. Cab. CH 3)2PA04J CONTION SYSTEM CABINET (I&C rot Cab. CH 4)2PA06J CONTROL SYSTEM CABINET (I&C Rack Ctrl. Cab. Grp. 2)2PA0J PO &CRC OT R A PA PA PA Aux Aux Aux 451 451 451 451 Aux. Elect. Equip. Rm (AEER)Aux. Elect. Equip. Rm (AEER)Aux. Elect. Equip. Rm (AEER)!AUX. ri1c (AEER)2PA12J SAFEGUARDS TEST CABINET TRAIN B PA Aux 451 Aux. Elect. bqmp. Km 4A51?P Aux. Elect. Equip. Rm (AEER)Aux. Elect. Equip. Km 451 1APP IVA1A1 rbnVTRnT 4ZVQTPXICAn11TWT41PT1TMV 11 PA Ai 2PA52J 2PL05J 2PL07J RX VESSEL LEVEL CHANNEL B HJTC CABINET REMOTE CONTROL PANEL (Remote Shutdown Panel)IA DG IDGOIKA CONTROL PANEL IB DG IDG01KB PA ns ns Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux 451 383 383 383 401 4011 Aux. Elect. Equip. Rm (AEER)ns ns us ns Table B-1 Page 9 of 15 B-1 1 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12QO108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 ID Description System Building Elevation Location 2PL1OJ 2PL50J 2PL52J 2PL56J 2PL57J 2PL66J 2PL67J 2PL69J 2PL71J 2PL72J 2PL75J 2PL77JC 2PL79JB 2PL84JA 2PL84JB 2PL85JB 2PL86J 2PL97J 2PMO1J 2PM04J 2PM05J 2PM06J 2PM07J 2PMI 1J 2PMI2J 2PT-0455 2PT-0456 2PT-0457 2PT-0458 2PT-0514 2PT-0515 2PT-0516 2PT-0524 2PT-0525 2PT-0526 FIRE HAZARDS PANEL LOCAL INSTRUMENT PANEL LOCAL INSTRUMENT PANEL RX2 CNMT LOC INST PNL RX2 CNMT LOC INST PNL LOCAL INSTRUMENT PANEL LOCAL INSTRUMENT PANEL RX2 CNMT LOC INST PNL RX2 CNMT LOC INST PNL RX2 CNMT LOC INST PNL LOCAL INSTRUMENT PANEL LOCAL CONTROL PANEL LOCAL CONTROL PANEL LOCAL CONTROL PANEL LOCAL CONTROL PANEL LOCAL CONTROL PANEL LOCAL CONTROL PANEL LOCAL CONTROL PANEL MAIN CONTROL BOARD MAIN CONTROL BOARD MAIN CONTROL BOARD MAIN CONTROL BOARD MAIN CONTROL BOARD MAIN CONTROL BOARD MAIN CONTROL BOARD U2 PRESSURIZER PRESS CHANNEL 455 PZR PRESS. PROT. CHANNEL II PRZR PRESSURE TRANSMITI'ER PRZR PRESSURE TRANSMITTER STM GEN LOOP 2A STEAM PRESS PR STM GEN LOOP 2A STEAM PRESS PR STM GEN LOOP 2A STEAM PRESS PR STM GEN LOOP 2B STEAM PRESS PR STM GEN LOOP 2B STEAM PRESS PR STM GEN LOOP 2B STEAM PRESS PR ns ns ns PL PL ns ns PL PL PL ns Us ns us ns ns ns ns ns ns ns as ns aS ns RY RY RY RY MS MS MS MS MS MS Aux Cont Cont Con Con Cont Cont Con Con Con Cont Aux Aux Aux Aux ns Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Cont Cont Cont Cont Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux 426 377 377 412 412 377 377 401 412 412 377 377 377 364 364 as 364 364 451 451 451 451 451 451 451 ns ns 377 ns as ns as ns 377 ns ns 377-R-42 ns ns ns 377-R-32 377-R-33 ns ns ns 377-R-27 2B MSIV RM 2A MSIV RM ns ns as ns ns Main Control Room Main Control Room Main Control Room Main Control Room Main Control Room Main Control Room Main Control Room ns ns 377-R-26 IPL75J Locally mounted Locally Mounted ns Locally Mounted 2B MS1V Ra; 2PL77JC Locally mounted Table B-1 Page 10 of 15 B-1 2 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 ID Description System Building Elevation Location 2PT-0535 2PT-0544 2PT-0536 2PT-0546 2PT-0936 2PT-405 2PT-407 2RCO1BB 2RC01BD 2RCO IPB 2RC01PD 2RDO1E 2RD05E 2R-1101PA-A 2RHO IPB-A 2RH02AB 2RH607 2RH10X6f STM GEN LOOP 2C STEAM PRESS PR STM GEN LOOP 2D STEAM PRESS PR SM GEN LOOP 2D STEAM PRESS PR CONT PRESS XMTTR LOOP C RC HOT LET WIDE RANGE PRESSURE TRANSMITTER LOOP C RC HOT LET WIDE RANGE PRESS TRANSMIMITTER STEAM GENERATOR 2B STEAM GENERATOR 2D REACTOR COOLANT PUMP 2B REACTOR COOLANT PUMP 2D 2A MG SET RX TRIP BREAKERS PUM, RSIUA HA1WT REMOVAL ASMflLY Ms MIS Ms MS MS MS SI Re RC RC RC RC RC RC RC~RC RD RC RD RD Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Con Cont Con Cont Cont Cont Cont Cont Cont Cont Cont Corn Aux nx ns Aux 377 ns ns ns ns 451 451 ns ns ns 45 ns ns ns 390 390 390 390 rns 451 451 ns 2346 346 346 346 364 364 357 357<Locally mounted 2B MSIV Rm; 2PL77JC Locally Mounted Locally Mounted Locally Mounted ns+04+04 2PL75J 2PL66J 2PL75J 2PL66J ns ns.s ns ns ns Ms ns ns ns us ns 357 S 357 V 2BARU HX RM +10'(2PM06J)2B HX RM+10'NW COR OF 2A EX RM RH PUMP 2A SEAL COOLER RH PUMP 2B SEAL COOLER RESIDUAL HEAT EXCH 2B RH RH RH RH RH RH R-H RH Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL HX 2B FLOW CONT VLV ASMBLY Table B-1 Page 11 of 15 B-1 3 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 ID Description System Building Elevation Location 2RH611 RHR PUMP 2B MINFLOW ISOL VLV ASMBLY 2RH8701A RC LOOP 2A TO RH PMP 2A SUCT ISOL VLV ASMBLY 2RH8701B 2RH8702A 2RH8702B RC LOOP 2A TO RH PMP 2A SUCT ISOL VLV ASMBLY RC LOOP 2C TO RH PMP 2B SUCT ISOL VLV ASMBLY RC LOOP 2C TO RH PMP 2B SUCT ISOL VLV ASMBLY 2RH8716A RH HX 2A DISCH CROSSTIE VLV ASMBLY 2RH8716B 2RY01S 2RYO 1T 2RY32MA 2RY32MB 2RY455A 2RY455B 2RY455C 2RY456 2RY8028 2RY8046 2SIOIT 2SI05TA 2SI05TB 2SI8801A 2SI8801B 2SI8811A 2SI8811B RH FX 2B DISCH CROSSTIE VLV ASMBLY PRESSURIZER ASMBLY PRESSURIZER RELIEF TANK ASMBLY PRESSURIZER PORV ACCUM 2A PRESSURIZER PORV ACCUM 2B PZR PORV (C/S AT 2PM05J) ASMBLY PZR SPRAY VLV (C/S AT 2PM05J) ASMBLY PZR SPRAY VLV (C/S AT 2PM05J) ASMBLY PZR PORV (C/S AT 2PM05J) ASMBLY PW TO PRT CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VLV U-2 PRT 2RY0IT PW SUP CHK VLV REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK ASMBLY SUMP CNMT RECIRC SUMP CNMT RECIRC CHG PUMP TO COLD LEG INJ ISOL ASMBLY CHG PUMP TO COLD LEGS INST ISOL VLV ASMBLY CNMT RECIRC SUMP 2A ISOL VLV ASMBLY CNMT RECIRC SUMP 2B ISOL VLV ASMBLY RH RH RH RH RH RH RH RY RY RY RY RY RY RY RY RY RY SI SI SI SI SI SI SI Aux Cout Cont Cont Cont Aux Aux Cont Cont Cont Cont Cont Cont Cont Cont Cont Cont FI Cont Corn Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux 357 377 377 377 377 364 364 426 377 426 426 461 390 390 451 387 ns 401 377 377 375 375 364 364 343 343 374 346 346 C/S @ 2PM06J N.W CORNER OF 2B RH HX ROOM PEN 68 OMB IMB +10' NEAR D LOOP;IMB OMB PEN 75 (2PM06J)+ 10' IMB (2PM06J)CWA +I1'PEN AREA C/S@ 2PM06J CWA +11' NEAR S. WALL C/S @ 2PM06J ns ns OMB OMB ABOVE PZR IMB NEAR ID RCP 1MvB NEAR ID RCP TOP OF PZR P44 (25' ABOVE SI8840)ns OUTSIDE IMB 1IMB ORC PEN 26 CWA ORC PEN 26 CWA ns as 2A CS PP RM ABOVE GRATING 2B RH PP ROOM ABOVE GRATING+05 (EOP VLV)7' DOWN S VLV PIT 7' DOWN S VLV PIT 2SI8812A SI PMP 2A SUCT FROM RWST ISOL VLV ASMBLY SI 2SI8812B 2SI8840 2SXOOIA 2SX001B SI PP 2B SUCT FROM RWST ISOL VLV ASMBLY MOV U-2 RH HXS TO 2A/2C LOOP HL ISOL VLV ESSENTIAL SERVICE VIR PMP 2A SUCT VLV ASMBLY ESSENTIAL SERVICE WTR PMP 2B SUCT VLV ASMBLY SI SI Sx Sx Table B-1 Page 12 of 15 B-14 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 ID Description System Building Elevation Location 2SX01AB 2SXOIFA 2SXOIFB 2SXOIPA 2B SX PUMP LUBE OIL COOLER 2B SX PP DSCH STRN PUMP. 2A ESSENTIAL SER WTR ASMBLY Sx SX Sx SX SX Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux 330 330 330 330 330 AUX 330 AUX+03+03 ns ns 330 ns 2SX02K 2SXI 12A 2SX1 14B 2SX 169A 2SX 173 2TE-0463 2TE-0465 2TE-0604 2TE-0674 DIESEL DRIVEN AF PUMP RT ANGLE GEAR LUBE OIL CNMT CHILLER 2A INLT ISOL VLV ASMBLY ASSY -AOV 2A CNMT CHLR 2WOOICA SX RTRN VLV DG 2A SX VLV ASMBLY SX SUP VLV TO ENG DRIVEN CLG WTR PMP FOR 2B AUX FEED PMP ASMBLY PZR RELIEF DISCH RTD PZR SAFE DISCH RTD RHR LP 2A RETURN RTD CC HX DISCH RTD 100 OHMS PLATINUM TEMP ELEM Sx SX SX ax SX SX SX Sx SX RY RY RY CY RH RI-CC Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux ns 383 401 401 401 401 401 401 383 383 439 435 435 439 364 375 364 ns 383-M-18 401 S22+NMT CHLR RM+7 Aux Auxn Cont Cont Aux+7 401 P 26 401 P 29+10'AFPMPRM

+7 AF PMP RM 447-R-25 435-R-24 438-R-23 442-R-25 364-S-23 ns 2TE- 390 RC022B RC WIDE RANGE LP 2A TEMP RC Con +03 2TE- 390 RC023B RC WIDE RANGE LP 2B TEMP RC Con +03 Table B-1 Page 13 of 15 B-15 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 ID Description System Building Elevation Location 2TE- 390 RC024A RC WIDE RANGE LP 2C TEMP RC Con +03 2TE- 390 RCO24B RC WIDE RANGE LP 2C TEMP RC Con +05 2TE- 390 RC025A RC WIDE RANGE LP 2D TEM RC Con +03 2TE- 390 RC025B RC WIDE RANGE LP 2D TEMP RC Con +03 2VAOIJ ESS SERV WATER PMP IA CUB COOLER LOCAL PNL VA Aux 330 ns 2VAO1SA COOLER ESSENTIAL SERV WATER PUMP 95-10 VA Aux 330 330-17-M 2VAO1SB COOLER ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER PUMP 95-10 VA Aux 330 330-21-P 2VA02J ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER 2B CUBICLE COOLER LOCA VA Aux 330 0 2VAO2SA 2A RRR PUMP ROOM CUB CLR ASMBLY VA Aux 346 346-23-U 2VA02SB 2B RHR PUMP ROOM CUB CLR ASMBLY VA Aux 346 346-23-Y 2VA03J RH PUMP2A CUB CLR LOCAL PANEL VA Aux ns ns 2VA04J RH PUMP 2B CUB CLR LOCAL PANEL VA Aux 346 ns 2VA04SA 2A SI PP CUB CLR VA Aux 364 us 2VA04SB 2B SI PP CUB CLR VA Aux 364 ns 2VA06SA COOLERCENTRIFUGAL CHARGING PUMP 2A VA Aux 364 364-19-V 2VA06SB CCOLER AUX'BLDG HVAC SYS CEN CHG PP 2B 95-7 VA Aux 364 364-21-Y 2VA08S AUX BLDG HVAC SYSTEM D-D AF PUMP-2B CUBICLE CLR VA Aux 383 383-M-20 2VA 10J CENT CHARGING PUMP CUBICLE COOLER LOCAL PANEL VA Aux 364 ns 2VAIIJ CENT CHARGING PUMP CUBICLE COOLER LOCAL PANEL VA Aux 364 us 2VDOICA DIESEL GENERATOR ROOM VENT FAN ASMBLY VD Aux 401 401-28-Q 2VDOICB 2B DG ROOM HVAC FAN ASM13LY VD Aux 401. ns 2VDO1JA DIESEL GEN ROOM HVAC SYSTEM ANN PANEL 2A VD Aux 401 401-26-Q 2VDOIJB DIESEL GEN ROOM HVAC.SYSTEM ANN PANEL VD Aux 401 ns 2VD04J 2A DG RM HVAC DMPR START PNL VD Aux 401 ns 2VD05J 2B DGRM HVAC DMPR START PNL VD Aux 401 ns 2VEOIC MISC ELECT EQUIP ROOM VENT FAN ASMBLY VE Aux 451 ns 2VE0IJ MEER VENTILATION SYSTEM ANN. PANEL ASMBLY VE Aux 451 451-Q-27 2VE02C BATITERY RM 212 EXHAUST FAN VE Aux ns ns 2VE03C BATTERY RM 211 EXHAUST FAN VE Aux 451 as 2VE04C ASSY -U-2 MISC ELEC EQUIP RM DIV 21 EXH FAN VE Aux 463 +22 2VEO4J MISC ELEC EQUIP RM DAMPER STARTER PANEL VE Aux 451 ns 2VE05C ASSY -U-2 MISC ELEC EQUIP RM DIV 22 EXH FAN VE Aux 463 +13 Table B-1 Page 14 of 15 B-16 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 ID Description System Building Elevation Location 2VP01AB CNMT ESSL SERVICE WATER COIL 2A (RCFC) VP Cont 377 ns 2VPO1AB CNMT ESS'L SERVICE WATER COIL 2B (RCFC) VP Cont 377 ns SCVP 377 as 2VPO lAD CNMT ESS'L SERVICE WATER COIL 2D (RCFC) VP Cont 377 ns 2VP01CB PRIM. CNMT VENT SYSTEM RCFC FAN, MOTOR VP Cont 377 ns 2VPO1CB PRIM. CNMT VENT SYSTEM RCFC FAN, MOTOR VP Cont 377 ns 2VOIC RI.CNT EN YSEMRCCFA, OTRVP Cont 377 ns 2VPO1ICD PRIM. CNMT VENT SYSTEM RCFC FAN, MOTOR VP Cont 377 ns 2VOI IV2 EF WR OM ANAMBYVX Aux 426 us 2VXO0J ESF/BAT`TERY ROOM VENTILATION SYS ANN PANEL VX Aux 426 426-P-28 2V0J IC ETLAIN YTM N PNLVX Ax426 426-30-P 2VX04C ESF SWGR ROOM DIV 21 VENT FAN CABLE 1VXOO1 ASMBLY VX Aux 426 426-Q-28.3 2VX7J ES SGRRM IV2211ADMPR SARERPAELVX Aux 426 ns 2VX08J ESF SWGR RM DIV 21 HVADAMPER STARTER PANEL VX Aux 426 ns 2WO006A~~~$Q RecoYINFnCG A2 hle T IL NTIO L ASBLY; 10" WOQu 401l ORC2 PEN$ 6+61 Reactor CNMT Fan CLRS 2B/2D CHLR WTR INLT CNMT ISOL VLV ASBLY; 375 2WO006B 10" WO Aux ORC PEN 10 2WO020B CNMT FAN COOLERS 2B1/2D CHL WTR OUTLET CNMT ISOL ASMBLY; 10" WO Aux 375 CWA PEN 8 2WO056A Reactor CNMT Fan CLS 2B/2D Chiller WTR Outlt CNMT ISOL VLV ASSY; 10" WO Cont 401 PEN 5 +61 2W0056B Reactor CNMT Fan CLS 213/2D) Chiller WTR OUTLT CNMT ISOL VLV ASSY; 10" WO Cont 401 PEN 8 Table B-1 Page 15 of 15 B-1 7 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Table B-2. Base List 2 ID Description Building Elevation Column No OFC001 REFUEL WTR PURIF PMPS DISCH TO FUEL CASK FILL AUX 401 15 Y OFC002A REFUEL WTR PURIF PMPS DISCH TO SPENT FUEL PIT AUX 385 15 X OFC003 REFUELING WTR PURIF PMP OB SUCTION ISO VLV 364 12 S OFC004 REFUELING WTR PURIF PMP OB DISCH CHECK AUX 364'+8' 12 S OFC006A REFUELING WTR PURIF PMPS SUCT HDR INST ROOT TO OPI-FC003 364 12 S OFC007A REFUELING WTR PURIF PMP OA DISCH INST ROOT TO OPI-FC005 AUX 364 12 S OFC011 REFUELING WTR PURIF PMP OA CASING DRN 364 12 S OFC012 REFUELING WTR PURIF PMPS SUCT HDR INST ISOL TO OPI-FC003 AUX 364 17 Q OFC013 REFUELING WTR PURIF PMP OA DISCH INST ISOL TO OPI-FC005 AUX 364 17 Q OFC03PA PUMP REFUELING WTR PURIFICATION OA ASMBLY AUX 364 12 S OFC8754 SPENT FUEL PIT HX RTRN ISOL FH 401 18 Y OFC8763 REFUELING WTR PURIF PMP OA DISCH CHECK AUX 364+18' 12 S OFC8790 SPENT FUEL PIT HX TO BORON RECY HOLDUP TANKS ISOL FH 401 18 Y OHS-FC002 REFUELING WATER PURIF PUMP OA AUX 364 12 S OLS-FC010 SPENT FUEL POOL LEVEL SWITCH 418 20 X OPI-FC003 REFUELING WTR PURIFICATION PUMP OA SUCT PRESS OPI-FC005 RFLG WTR PURIF PUMP OA DISCHARGE GAUGE AUX 364 17 S OTEW-FC007 RFLG WTR PURIF PUMP OA DISCH 0TI-FC007 REFUELING WTR PURIFICATION PUMP OA DISCH TEMP IND AUX 364 12 S OTIS-0626 SPENT FUEL POOL TEMP INDICATING SWITCH FH 426 20 X 2FC004A SPENT FUEL PIT HX TUBE SIDE VENT FH 401 20 Z 2FC004B SPENT FUEL PIT HX SHELL SIDE VENT FH 401 19 Y 2FC005 SPENT FUEL PIT PMP CASING DRN FH 401 19 Y 2FC006 SPENT FUEL PIT PMP CASING VENT FH 401 19 Y 2FC007 REFUELING W-TR PURIF PMP SUCT FROM U-2 REFU CAVITY DRN/TST CONN AUX 364 23 V 2FC008 SFP FLT DEMIN LOOP RTRN TO U2 REFUEL CAV DRN/TEST CONN AUX 364 24 U 2FC009 REFUELING WTR PURIF PMP SUCT FROM U-2 REFUEL CAV CNMT ISOL CNMT 377 2 R 2FC010 REFUELING WTR PURIF PMP SUCT FROM U-2 REFUEL CAV CNMT ISOL AUX 364 23 V 2FC011 SFP FLT DEMIN LOOP RTRN TO U-2 REFUEL CAV CNMT ISOL AUX 364 24 U 2FC012 SPENT FUEL PIT FLT DEMIN LOOP RTRN TO U-2 REFUEL CAV CNMT ISOL CNMT 377 25 R 2FC013 REFUELING WTR PURIF PMP DISCH TO SFP FLTR DEMIN LOOP AUX 401 19 S 2FC01A SPENT FUEL PIT HEAT EXCHANGER FH 401 19 Z Table B-2 Page 1 of 2 B-1 8 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 ID Description Building Elevation Column No 2FC01P PUMP,SPENT FUEL PIT 12X14-14 FH 401 19 Z 2FC021 SPENT FUEL PIT PMP DISCH INST ISOL TO 2PI-627 FH 401 19 AA 2FC022 SPENT FUEL PIT PMP SUCT INST ISOL TO 2PI-633 FH 401 19 AA 2FC02M SPENT FUEL PIT PUMP START-UP STRAINER 2FC030 REFUEL WTR PURIF PMP SUCT FROM U-2 REFUEL CAVITY CNMT OUTSIDE DRN 364 23 V 2FC033 REFUEL WTR PURIF PMP SUCT FROM U-2 REFUEL CAVITY CNMT INSIDE DRN 2FC036 REFUEL WTR PURIF PMP RTRN TO U2 REFUEL CAVITY CNMT OUTSIDE VENT AUX 364 24 U 2FC03F SPENT FUEL PIT STRAINER 2FC8756 SPENT FUEL PIT PMP SUCTION FH 401 19 Y 2FC8757 SPENT FUEL PIT PMP SUCT INST ROOT TO 2PI-633 FH 401 19 AA 2FC8758 REFUELING WTR PURIF PMP SUCT FROM U-2 RWST AUX 364 23 V 2FC8761 SPENT FUEL PIT PMP DISCH INST ROOT TO 2PI-627 FH 401 19 Y 2FC8762A SPENT FUEL PIT HX INLET FH 401 19 Z 2FC8762B SPENT FUEL PIT HX OUTLET FH 401 20 Z 2FC8765 SPENT FUEL PIT FLTR DEMIN LOOP RTRN TO SPENT FUEL PIT FH 401 18 Z 2FC8766 SPENT FUEL PIT FLTR DEMIN LOOP RTRN TO U-2 RWST CHECK VLV 2FC8792A SPENT FUEL PIT HX TUBE SIDE DRN FH 401 20 Z 2FC8792B SPENT FUEL PIT HX SHELL SIDE DRN FH 401 20 Z 2FC8793 SPENT FUEL PIT PMP DISCH CHECK 401 19 Y 2FC8794 SPENT FUEL PIT FLTR DEMIN LOOP INLT ISOL FH 401 19 Y 2FI-0631 FC DEMIN FLOW INST AUX 383 15 P 2HS-FC001 SPENT FUEL PIT PUMP FH 401 2PI-0627 2FC01P DISCHARGE PRESSURE GAUGE, 0-160 PSIG FH 401 19 BB 2PI-0633 SFP PMP SUCTION PRESSURE INDICATOR FH 401 19 BB Table B-2 Page 2 of 2 B-1 9 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Table B-3. SWEL 1 Seisic Sfety New or IPEEE ID DESCRIPTION CLASS BUILDING ELEVATION LOCATION SYSTEM Replace Enhance- Comments Cat 1 ? Function(s)

? ment?(08) Motor-Operated and Support 0SX007 0 CC HX OUTLT VLV ASMBLY Solenoid-Operated Auxiliary 346 346 10-18/ SX Y System Y Valves Cooling Water (08) Motor-Operated and Support 0SX146 U-0 CC HX OUTLET HDR ISOL ASMBLY; 30" Solenoid-Operated Auxiliary 346 346 15-23/ SX Y System Valves Cooling Water CONTROL ROOM HVAC SYST LOCAL CONT (20) Instrumentation and OVC01JB PANEL ASMBLY Control Panels and Auxiliary 451 451 U-2 HV VC Y VC Cabinets CONTROL RM REC CHARCOAL FILTER A (10) Air Handlers Auxiliary 451 451 U-1 HV VC y Support TRAIN ASMBLY System HVAC (20) Instrumentation and Support OVC16J MCR U-2 HVAC START PNL Control Panels and Auxiliary 463 451 U-2 AU VC Y System HVAC Cabinets I 2AF005C S/G 2C FLOW CONT VLV ASMBLY (07) Fluid-Operated Auxiliary 364 364 21-26/ AF Y DHR Valves 2AF005G S/G 2C FLOW CONT VLV ASMBLY (07) Fluid-Operated Auxiliary 364 36421-26/

AF Y DHR Valves AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PMP 2A SX SUCT (08) Motor-Operated and 2AF006A VLV ASM3LY Solenoid-Operated Auxiliary 383 All AF Y DHR Valves AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PMP 2A SX SUCT (08) Motor-Operated and 2AF017A VLV ASMBLY Solenoid-Operated Auxiliary 383 All AF Y DHR Valves Support 2AF01EA-A BATTERY 1 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP (15) Batteries on Racks Auxiliary 383 All AF Y System DC Y Power AUX FEEDWATER PUMP 2B STARTUP PANEL (20) Instrumentation and 2AF01J AUX Control Panels and Auxiliary 383 All AF Y DHR ASMBLY Cabinets I 2AF01PA PUMP AUX FEEDWATER, MOTOR DRIVEN (05) Horizontal Pumps Auxiliary 383 All AF Y DHR PRA:F-V=7.83E-02 ,RAW=18.14 ASMBLY 2AF01PA-A AUX FEEDWATER PUMP 2A AUX LUBE OIL (05) Horizontal Pumps Auxiliary 383 All AF Y DHR PUMP Support 2AP05E EQ 4160 VOLT ESF SWITCH GEAR 241 (03) Medium Voltage Auxiliary 426 426 ESF SW AP Y System AC Switchgear Power EQ 480V ESF SUBSTATION BUS 231X (02) Low Voltage Support 2AP10E EQ 4w Voltag Auxiliary 426 426 ESF SW AP Y System AC ASMBLY Switchgear Power Support 2AP13E EQ UNIT SUBSTATION 232X TRAN 480V ESF (04) Transformers Auxiliary 426 426 ESF SW AP Y System AC Table B-3 Page 1 of 7 B-20 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Seismic Safety New or IPEEE ID DESCRIPTION CLASS BUILDING ELEVATION LOCATION SYSTEM Replace Enhance- Comments Cat 1? Function(s)

? ment?(01) Motor Control Support 2AP22E 480V AUX BLDG ESF MCC 231X3 ASMBLY Centers Auxiliary 383 383-M-20 AP Y System AC Power (01) Motor Control Support 2AP27E EQ 480V AUX BLDG MCC 232X2 ASMBLY Centers Auxiliary 426 426-R-24 AP Y System AC Y Power)Motor Control Support 2AP30E EQ 480V AUX BLDG ESF MCC 231X5 ASMBLY (01)etr Auxiliary 426 426 GENERA AP Y System AC CentersPoe F~ower 2P2L (01) Motor Control Support 2AP32E EQ 480V AUX BLDG MCC 232X5 ASMBLY Centers Auxiliary 426 426 GENERA AP Y System AC Power Support 2AP38E ASSY -480V AUX BLDG MCC 233X1 (01) Motor Auxiliary 346 34615-23/

AP Y System AC Y Cer Power 2A COMPONENT COOLING W'rR PUMP Support 2CC01PA ASMBLY (05) Horizontal Pumps Auxiliary 364 364 15-21/ CC Y System Cooling Water Support 2CC01PB EQ MOTOR COMPONENT COOLING PMP 2B (05) Horizontal Pumps Auxiliary 364 364 15-21/ CC Y System_Cooling Water (08) Motor-Operated and Support 2CC9412A CC FROM RH HX 2A OUTLET ISOL ASMBLY Solenoid-Operated Auxiliary 364 364 17-19/ CC Y System Valves Cooling Water 2CC9438 CC FROM RC PMPS THERMAL BARRIER ISOL (0) Other Cont 377 OMB cc Y CF VLV ASMBLY (0)IOther

_ Cont_377_OMB CCYCF 2CV01PA PUMP,2A CENTRIFUGAL CHARGING ASMBLY (05) Horizontal Pumps Auxiliary 364 364 2A CV. CV Y RCIC 2CV01PA-A PUMP, CNTRFGL CHG AUX OIL PP (05) Horizontal Pumps Auxiliary 364 364 2A CV CV Y RCIC 2CV02SA 2A CV PUMP GEAR OIL COOLER (21) Tanks and Heat Auxiliary 364 364 2A CV CV Y RCIC Exchangers 2A CVCVYRCIC RWST TO CHG PMPS SUCT VLV C/S AT (08) Motor-Operated and 2CV112D 2PM05J ASMBLY Solenoid-Operated Auxiliary 364 364 U-2 AR CV Y RCIC Valves RWST TO CHG PMPS SUCT VLV C/S AT (08) Motor-Operated and 2CV112E Solenoid-Operated Auxiliary 364 364 U-2 AR CV Y RCIC 2PM05J ASMBLY Valves CHG LINE CNMT ISOL VLV C/S AT 2PM05J (08) Motor-Operated and 2CV8105 ASMBLY Solenoid-Operated Auxiliary 375 364 U-2 AR CV Y CF Valves CHG LINE CNMT ISOL VLV C/S AT 2PM05J (08) Motor-Operated and 2CV8106 ASMBLY Solenoid-Operated Auxiliary 375 364 U-2 AR CV Y CF ASMBLY_ _ Valves CV PMP MINIFLOW ISOL VLV C/S AT 2PM05J (08) Motor-Operated and 2CV8110 V MP Solenoid-Operated Auxiliary 364 364 U-2 AR CV Y RCIC ASMBLY Valves I I I I Table B-3 Page 2 of 7 B-21 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 New or IPEEE ID DESCRIPTION CLASS BUILDING ELEVATION LOCATION SYSTEM Seismic Safety Commenl Cat 1? Function(s)

Replace Enhance- Cmet RH HX 2A TO CV PMP SUCT ISOL VLV; C/S (08) Motor-Operated and 2CV8804A AT 2AM0 J A MBLY Solenoid-Operated Auxiliary 364 364 U-2 AR CV Y DHR 2CV8804AAT 2PM06J ASMBLY .Valves Support 2DC03E BATTERY CHARGER 211 DIV. 21 (16) Battery Chargers Auxiliary 451 451 U-2 DI DC Y System DC and Inverters Power Support Y 2DC01E 125V BATTERY 211 DIV. 21 (15) Batteries on Racks Auxiliary 451 211 Battery Room DC Y System DC Y Power 2DC04t(16)

Battery Chargers Supp 2DC04E BATTERY CHARGER 212 DIV. 2 (6 Inverters Auxiliary 451 451 U-2 DI DC Y System DC Power Support 2DC05E 125V DC ESF DIST CENTER 211 (14) Distribution Panels Auxiliary 452 452 U-2 D21 DC Y System DC Y Power Support Y 2DC06E 125V DC ESF DIST CENTER 212 (14) Distribution Panels Auxiliary 451 451 U-2 D22 DC Y System DC Y Power Support 2DC06EA 125V DC ESF DIST PNL 212 (14) Distribution Panels Auxiliary 451 451 U-2 DI DC Y System DC Power Support 2DC0OJ 125V DC FUSE PANEL -DIV. 21 (14) Distribution Panels Auxiliary 451 451 U-2 DI DC Y System DC Power Support 2DG01KA 2A DIESEL GENERATOR SKID (17) Engine-Generators Auxiliary 401 401 2A DG DG Y System AC PRA:F-V=4.06E-01 ,RAW=16.59 Power DIESEL GENERATOR 2A SYNCHRO-CHECK (20) Instrumentation and Support 2DG04EA RELAY BOX Control Panels and Auxiliary 426 426 ESF SW DG Y System AC Cabinets _ Power (21) Tanks and Heat Support 2DO01TA DIESEL OIL STORAGE TANK (21) rAuxiliary 373 383 U-2 DI DO Y System AC Exchangers Power 2FT-AF012 AF TO SG 2A FLOW TRANSMITTER (18) Instruments on Auxiliary 364 36421-26/

FT Y DHR Racks Auxiliar 364 36_12/_ Y_ DHR Support 21P01E INSTRUMENT BUS 211 TRANSFORMER

-DIV. (04) Transformers Auxiliary 451 451 U-2 DI PI Y System AC 21 SytmA 21_ Power 120VAC INSTRUMENT BUS DISTRIBUTION .Support 21P01J PA N T BUS -ISIV.U21N (14) Distribution Panels Auxiliary 451 451 U-2 AU IP Y System DC PANEL 211 -DIV. 21 Power Support 21P02E INSTRUMENT BUS 212 TRANSFORMER

-DIV. (04) Transformers Auxiliary 451 451 U-2 DI PI Y System AC 22 Power Table B-3 Page 3 of 7 B-22 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Seisic Sfety New or IPEEE ID DESCRIPTION CLASS BUILDING ELEVATION LOCATION SYSTEM Seismic Safety Replace Enhance- Comments Cat 1? Function(s)

? ment?INSTRUMENT BUS 213 TRANSFORMER

-DIV. Support 21P03E 21 (04) Transformers Auxiliary 451 451 U-2 DI PI Y System AC Power INSTRUMENT BUS 214 TRANSFORMER

-DIV. Support 21P04E 22 (04) Transformers Auxiliary 451 451 U-2 DI PI Y System AC Power (16) Battery Chargers Support 21P05E INSTRUMENT BUS 211 INVERTER -DIV. 21 and Batters Auxiliary 451 451 U-2 DI IP Y System DC and Inverters

Power iSupport 21P06E INSTRUMENT BUS 212 INVERTER -DIV. 22 (16) Battery Chargers Auxiliary 451 451 U-2 DI IP Y System DC and Inverters Support 21P07E INSTRUMENT BUS 213 INVERTER -DIV. 21 (16) Battery Chargers Auxiliary 451 451 U-2 DI IP Y System DC and Inverters Power Support 21P08E INSTRUMENT BUS 214 INVERTER -DIV. 22 and Battery Chargers Auxiliary 451 451 U-2 DI IP Y System DC and Inverters Power 21Y-0606 RH HX 2A OUT I/P TRANSDUCER (18) Instruments on Auxiliary 364 364 17-19/ IY Y DHR Racks (18) Instruments on 21Y-0607 RH HX #2B OUT I/P TRANSDUCER Racks Auxiliary 364 364 17-19/ IY Y DHR 2LT-0459 PRZR LEVEL D/P TRANSMITTER (18) Instruments on Cont 377 2PL50J LT Y RCIC Racks 2LT-0517 S/G LOOP 2A LEVEL D/P XMTTR W/FILLED (18) Instruments on Cont 401 2PL69J LT Y DHR LEG Racks 2LT-0527 S/G LOOP 2B LEVEL D/P TRANSMITTER (18) Instruments on Cont 377 2PL75J LT Y DHR W/FILLED LEG Racks ____ 37_PL5_T___

2MS001C MS ISOL VLV LOOP 2C ASMBLY (07) Fluid-Operated Auxiliary 377 377 U-2 MS MS Y DHR Valves (08) Motor-Operated and Y 2MS018C S/G 2C PORV -Solenoid-Operated Auxiliary 404 401 U-2 MS MS Y DHR Valves (08) Motor-Operated and y 2MS018D S/G 2D PORV ASMBLY Solenoid-Operated Auxiliary 401 401 U-2 MS NS Y DHR Valves PROTECTION SYSTEM CABINET (l&E Prot. (20) Instrumentation and 2PA03J Cab.ECH 3) Control Panels and Auxiliary 451 451 U-2 AU PA Y ESFAS Y Cab. CH 3) Cabinets J PROTECTION SYSTEM CABINET (SSPS Cab. (20) Instrumentation and 2PA09J Control Panels and Auxiliary 451 451 U-2 AU PA Y ESFAS Y Train A) Cabinets (20) Instrumentation and 2PA27J AUX SAFEGUARD RELAY CABINET (A) Control Panels and Auxiliary 451 451 U-2 AU PA Y ESFAS Y Cabinets Table B-3 Page 4 of 7 B-23 Braidwood Station Unit 2 1200108.1O-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Seimic Safty New or IPEEE ID DESCRIPTION CLASS BUILDING ELEVATION LOCATION SYSTEM Seismic Safety eweEComments Cat 1? Function(s)

? ment?(20) Instrumentation and 2PL07J 2A DG 2DG01KA CONTROL PANEL Control Panels and Auxiliary 401 401 2A DG PL Y ESFAS Y Cabinets (20) Instrumentation and Support 2PL08J 2B DG 2DG01KB Control Panels and Auxiliary 401 401 2B DG PL Y System AC Y Cabinets Power (20) Instrumentation and 2PM05J MAIN CONTROL BOARD Control Panels and Auxiliary 451 451 MAIN C PM Y ESFAS Y Cabinets (20) Instrumentation and 2PM06J MAIN CONTROL BOARD Control Panels and Auxiliary 451 451 MAIN C PM Y ESFAS Y Cabinets (20) Instrumentation and 2PM07J MAIN CONTROL BOARD Control Panels and Auxiliary 451 451 MAIN C PM Y ESFAS Y Cabinets (20) Instrumentation and 2PM11J MAIN CONTROL BOARD Control Panels and Auxiliary 451 451 MAIN C PM Y ESFAS Y Cabinets 2PT-0455 U2 PRESSURIZER PRESS CHANNEL 455 (18) Instruments on Cont 377 2PL50J PT Y RCPC 2PT_0455 U2 PRESSURIZER PRESS CHANNEL 455 Racks 2PT-0457 PRZR PRESSURE TRANSMITTER (18) Instruments on Cont 377 377-R-26 PT Y RCPC Racks 2PT-0514 STM GEN LOOP 2A STEAM PRESS PR (18) Instruments on Auxiliary 377 377 U-2 MS PT Y DHR Racks 377_U-2 MSPTYDHR 2PT-0546 STM GEN LOOP 2D STEAM PRESS PR (18) Instruments on Auxiliary 377 377 U-2 MS PT Y DHR Racks 377_U-2 MSPTYDHR 2PT-0935 CNMT PRESS XMTTR (18) Instruments on Auxiliary 451 4 PT Y CF Racks ______(20) Instrumentation and 2RD05E RX TRIP BREAKERS Control Panels and Auxiliary 451 451 U-2 DI RD Y RRC Y Cabinets 2RHO1PA PUMP,2A RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (06) Vertical Pumps Auxiliary 346 346 21-25/ RH Y DHR____ASMBLY________

______________

______2RH01PA-A RH PUMP 2A SEAL COOLER (21) Tanks and Heat Auxiliary 346 34621-25/

RH Y DHR Exchangers Auilar_36_462125_RYH 2RH610 RHR PUMP 2A MINFLOW VLV ASMBLY (07) Fluid-Operated Auxiliary 357 364 2A RHR RH Y DHR Valves RC LOOP 2C TO RH PMP 2B SUCT ISOL VLV (08) Motor-Operated and 2RH8702A Solenoid-Operated Cont 377 OMB PEN 75 SX Y DHR ASMBLY Valves (08) Motor-Operated and 2RH8716B RH HX 2B DISCH CROSSTIE VLV ASMBLY Solenoid-Operated Auxiliary 364 364 U-2 AR RH Y DHR Valves Table B-3 Page 5 of 7 B-24 Braidwood Station Unit 2 1200108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Seismic Safety New or IPEEE ID DESCRIPTION CLASS BUILDING ELEVATION LOCATION SYSTEM Cat SaFety Replace Enhance- Comments Cat 1? Function(s)

? ment?Support 2RY32MA PRESSURIZER PORVACCUM 2A (21) Tanks and Heat Cont 426 OMB RY y System Exchangers Compressed A~ir Support 2RY32MB PRESSURIZER PORV ACCUM 2B (21) Tanks and Heat Cont 426 OMB RY y System Exchangers Compressed Air 2RY455A PZR PORV (C/S AT 2PM05J) ASMBLY (07) Fluid-Operated Cont 461 ABOVE PZR RY Y RCPC PRA:F-V=2.21E-01 ,RAW=1.2 Valves 2SI8801A CHG PUMP TO COLD LEG INJ ISOL ASMBLY (07) Fluid-Operated Auxiliary 375 383 U-2 AR S Y RCIC Valves Auxiliary 375____ 383_U-2_ASIY__I 2SI8801B CHG PUMP TO COLD LEGS INST ISOL VLV (07) Fluid-Operated Auxiliary 375 383 U-2 AR SI Y RCIC ASMBLY Valves (08) Motor-Operated and Support 2SX004 CC HX 2 INLT VLV ASMBLY Solenoid-Operated Auxiliary 330 330 13-18/ SX Y System cooling Valves water (08) Motor-Operated and Support 2SX005 U-0 CC HX INLET VLV ASMBLY Solenoid-Operated Auxiliary 330 330 18-223/ SX Y System Valves Cooling Water Support 2SX01AA 2A SX PUMP LUBE OIL COOLER (21) Tanks and Heat Auxiliary 330 330 13-18/ SX Y System Cooling Water Support 2SX01PA PUMP, 2A ESSENTIAL SER WTR ASMBLY (05) Horizontal Pumps Auxiliary 330 330 13-18/ SX Y System PRA:F-V=6.37E-02 ,RAW=3.27 Cooling Water Support 2SX01PA-C PUMP, 2A SX AUX LUBE OIL PP (05) Horizontal Pumps Auxiliary 330 330 13-18/ SX Y System Cooling Water ESSENTIAL SERVICE WTR PMP 2A (08) Motor-Operated and Support 2SX033 CROSSTIE VLV ASMBLY Solenoid-Operated Auxiliary 330 330 13-18/ SX System Valves Cooling Water (07) FSupport 2SX169A DG 2A SX VLV ASMBLY Fluid-Operated Auxiliary 401 401 2A DG SX Y System cooling PRA:F-V=2.72E-02 ,RAW=7.06 BValves water 2TE-0604 RHR LP 2A RETURN RTD (19) Temperature Sensors Auxiliary 364 364 U-2 AR TE Y DHR 2TE- (19) Temperature RC022A RC WIDE RANGE LP 2A TEMP Sensors Cont 390 3 TE Y DHR ESS SERV WATER PMP 1A CUB COOLER (20) Instrumentation and Support 2VA01J LOCALPNL Control Panels and Auxiliary 330 330 13-18/ VA Y System Cabinets _ _-_Cooling Water Support 2VA01SA COOLER ESSENTIAL SERV WATER PUMP 95 (05) Horizontal Pumps Auxiliary 330 330 13-18/ SX Y System 10________ _____________________________

_______________

______ ___________________

____ Colin Waer____________

Co___lin_____Water__

Table B-3 Page 6 of 7 B-25 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12QO108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Seisic Sfety New or IPEEE ID DESCRIPTION CLASS BUILDING ELEVATION LOCATION SYSTEM Seismic Safety Replace Enhance- Comments Cat 1? Function(s)

? ment?2VA02SA 2A RHR PUMP ROOM CUB CLR ASMBLY (10) Air Handlers Auxiliary 346 346 21-25/ VA y Support System HVAC 2VA06SA COOLERCENTRIFUGAL CHARGING PUMP (10) Air Handlers Auxiliary 364 364 2A CV VA Y Support 2A System HVAC CENT CHARGING PUMP CUBICLE COOLER (20) Instrumentation and 2VA10J LOCAR P UMP Control Panels and Auxiliary 364 364 2A CV VA Y RCIC LOCAL PANEL Cabinets 2VDO1CA DIESEL GENERATOR ROOM VENT FAN (09) Fans Auxiliary 401 401 2A DG VD Y SupportPRA:F-V=1.87E-02,RAW=5.0 ASMBLY System HVAC (20) Instrumentation and Support 2VD04J 2A DG RM HVAC DMPR START PNL Control Panels and Auxiliary 401 401 2A DG VD Y System HVAC Cabinets System HVAC CNMT ESS'L SERVICE WATER COIL 2D Support VP1AD (RCFC)(10)

Air Handlers Cont 377 (No Data) VP Y System HVAC ESF SWGR RM DIV 22 HVADAMPER (20) Instrumentation and Support 2VX07J STARTER PANEL Control Panels and Auxiliary 426 426 ESF SW VX System HVAC VX07J_ STARTERPANEL_

Cabinets System HVAC CHILLED WATER SYS CONTROL ROOM RCPC,RCIC,D Added as a result of oversight OW001CA REFRIGERATION UNIT OA HRFAuxiliary 383 All VC review Table B-3 Page 7 of 7 B-26 Braidwood Station Unit 2 1200108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Table B-4. SWEL 2 Seismic Associated ID DESCRIPTION Class BUILDING ELEVATION LOCATION SYSTEM Cat1? with Rapid Comments Draindown?

2FC01P PUMP,SPENT FUEL PIT 12X14-14 (05) Horizontal Pumps FH 401 19 Z FC Y N 2FC009 REFUELING WTR PURIF PMP SUCT FROM U-2 REFUEL CAV CNMT ISOL (00) Other CNMT 377 2 R FC Y N 2FC8758 REFUELING WTR PURIF PMP SUCT FROM U-2 RWST (00) Other AUX 364 23 V FC Y N OFC012 REFUELING WTR PURIF PMPS SUCT HDR INST ISOL TO OPI-FC003 (00) Other AUX 364 17 Q FC Y N OFC006A REFUELING WTR PURIF PMPS SUCT HDR INST ROOT TO OPI-FC003 (00) Other AUX 364 12 S FC Y N 2FC011 SFP FLT DEMIN LOOP RTRN TO U-2 REFUEL CAV CNMT ISOL (00) Other AUX 364 24 U FC Y N 2PI-0633 SFP PMP SUCTION PRESSURE INDICATOR (18) Instruments on Racks FH 401 19 B8 FC Y N 2FC012 SPENT FUEL PIT FLT DEMIN LOOP RTRN TO U-2 REFUEL CAV CNMT ISOL (00) Other CNMT 377 25 R FC Y N 2FC01A SPENT FUEL PIT HEAT EXCHANGER (21) Tanks and Heat Exchangers FH 401 19 Z FC Y N 2FC8762A SPENT FUEL PIT HX INLET (00) Other FH 401 19 Z FC Y N 2FC8762B SPENT FUEL PIT HX OUTLET (00) Other FH 401 20 Z FC Y N 0FC8754 SPENT FUEL PIT HX RTRN ISOL (00) Other FH 401 18 Y FC Y N 2FC8792B SPENT FUEL PIT HX SHELL SIDE DRN (00) Other FH 401 20 Z FC Y N 2FC004B SPENT FUEL PIT HX SHELL SIDE VENT (00) Other FH 401 19 Y FC Y N 0FC8790 SPENT FUEL PIT HX TO BORON RECY HOLDUP TANKS ISOL (00) Other FH 401 18 Y FC Y N 2FC8792A SPENT FUEL PIT HX TUBE SIDE DRN (00) Other FH 401 20 Z FC Y N 2FC004A SPENT FUEL PIT HX TUBE SIDE VENT (00) Other FH 401 20 Z FC Y N 2FC005 SPENT FUEL PIT PMP CASING DRN (00) Other FH 401 19 Y FC Y N 2FC006 SPENT FUEL PIT PMP CASING VENT (00) Other FH 401 19 Y FC Y N 2FC8793 SPENT FUEL PIT PMP DISCH CHECK (00) Other FH 401 19 Y FC Y N 2FC022 SPENT FUEL PIT PMP SUCT INST ISOL TO 2PI-633 (00) Other FH 401 19 AA FC Y N 2FC8757 SPENT FUEL PIT PMP SUCT INST ROOT TO 2PI-633 (00) Other FH 401 19 AA FC Y N 2FC8756 SPENT FUEL PIT PMP SUCTION (00) Other FH 401 19 Y FC Y N B-27 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 C Seismic Walkdown Checklists (SWCs)Table C-1 provides a description of each item, anchorage verification confirmation, a list of Area Walk-By Checklists associated with each item, comments, and page numbers of each Seismic Walkdown Checklist.

C-1 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.1O-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Table C-1. Summary of Seismic Walkdown Checklists Anchorage AREA ID DESCRIPTION Configuration WALK- COMMENTS PAGE Confirmed?

BY REFUELING WTR PURIF PMPS 0FC006A SUCT HDR INST ROOT TO OPI- N/A 40 SWEL 2 C- 7 FC003 OFC012 REFUELING WTR PURIF PMPS SUCT HDR INST ISOL TO 0PI-FC003 0FC8754 SPENT FUEL PIT HX RTRN ISOL N/A 41 SWEL 2 C- 13 OFC8790 SPENT FUEL PIT HX TO BORON N/A 41 SWEL 2 C- 16 RECY HOLDUP TANKS ISOL 0SX007 0 CC HX OUTLT VLV ASMBLY N/A 37 C- 19 U-0 CC HX OUTLET HDR ISOL 0SX146 N/A 37 C- 22 ASMBLY; 30" CONTROL ROOM HVAC SYST 0VC01JB N 1C- 26 LOCAL CONT PANEL ASMBLY CONTROL RM REC CHARCOAL 0VC02FA N 14 C- 29 FILTER A TRAIN ASMBLY OVC16J MCR U-2 HVAC START PNL N 11 C- 34 CHILLED WATER SYS CONTROL ROOM REFRIGERATION UNIT OA 2AF005C S/G 2C FLOW CONT VLV ASMBLY N/A 26 C- 37 2AF005G S/G 2C FLOW CONT VLV ASMBLY N/A 26 C- 40 2AF006A AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PMP 2A SX N/A 25 C-44 SUCT VLV ASMBLY 2AF017A AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PMP 2A SX N/A 25 C- 48 SUCT VLV ASMBLY 2AFOIEA-A BATTERY 1 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER Y 24 C- 51 PUMP AUX FEEDWATER PUMP 2B 2AF01J STARTUP PANEL ASMBLY _ 24 C-_5 2AF01PA PUMP AUX FEEDWATER, MOTOR Y 25 C- 59 DRIVEN ASMBLY 2AF01PA-A AUX FEEDWATER PUMP 2A AUX N/A 25 Mounted on skid C- 63 LUBE OIL PUMP EQ 4160 VOLT ESF SWITCH GEAR ANCHORAGE 2AP05E 241 Y (LATER) 15 CHECK REQ'D EQ 480V ESF SUBSTATION BUS ANCHORAGE 2AP0E 231XY (LATER) 15 CHECK REQ'D EQ UNIT SUBSTATION 232X TRAN 2AP13E Y 16 C- 66____ ___480V ESF__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _480V AUX BLDG ESF MCC 231X3 2AP22E Y 23 C- 70 ASMBLY 2AP27E EQ 480V AUX BLDG MCC 232X2 Y 34 C- 73 ASMBLY Table C-1 Page 1 of 5 C-2 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Anchorage AREA ID DESCRIPTION Configuration WALK- COMMENTS PAGE Confirmed?

BY 2AP30E EQ 480V AUX BLDG ESF MCC 231X5 Y 33 C- 77 ASMBLY EQ 480V AUX BLDG MCC 232X5 Y 33 2AP32E 'ASMBLY Y_33 _-___2AP38E ASSY -480V AUX BLDG MCC 233X1 Y 38 C- 85 22A COMPONENT COOLING WTR 2CC01PA Y 35 C- 89 PUMP ASMBLY 2CCO PB EQ MOTOR COMPONENT COOLING Y 35 C- 93 PMP 2B CC FROM RH HX 2A OUTLET ISOL 2CC9412A N/A 36 C- 97 ASMBLY 2CC9438 CC FROM RC PMPS THERMAL N/A OUTAGE BARRIER ISOL VLV ASMBLY 2CV01PA PUMP,2A CENTRIFUGAL CHARGING y 1 C- 100 ASMBLY 2CV01PA-A PUMP, CNTRFGL CHG AUX OIL PP N 1 C- 105 2CV02SA 2A CV PUMP GEAR OIL COOLER N 1 C- 108 RWST TO CHG PMPS SUCT VLV C/S 2CV1 12D AT2M5 SBYN/A 5 C-ill1 AT 2PM05J ASMVBLY RWST TO CHG PMPS SUCT VLV C/S N/A 5 2CV1 12E ATN/AJAMLY___

__5___ C- 114 AT 2PM05J ASMBLY CHG LINE CNMT ISOL VLV C/S AT 2CV8105 PMJAMBYN/A 30 C- 119 2PM05J ASMVBLY CHG LINE CNMT ISOL VLV C/S AT 2CV8106 N/A 30 C- 122 2PM05J ASMBLY CV PMP MINIFLOW ISOL VLV C/S AT 2CV81 10 N/A 5 C- 125 2PM05J ASMBLY RH HX 2A TO CV PMP SUCT ISOL 2CV8804A N/A 5 C- 128 VLV; C/S AT 2PM06J ASMBLY 2DC01E 125V BATTERY 211 DIV. 21 Y 10 C- 131 2DC03E BATTERY CHARGER 211 DIV. 21 N 9 C- 136 2DC04E BATTERY'CHARGER 212 DIV. 22 N 10A C- 140 2DC05E 125V DC ESF DIST CENTER 211 Y 9 C- 143 2DC06E 125V DC ESF DIST CENTER 212 Y 10A C- 147 PART OF 2DC06EA 125V DC ESF DIST PNL 212 Y 10A C- 151 2DC06E _2DC10J 125V DC FUSE PANEL -DIV. 21 N 9 C- 154 2DG01KA 2A DIESEL GENERATOR SKID Y 18 C- 157 DIESEL GENERATOR 2A SYNCHRO-2DG04EA N 15 C- 162 CHECK RELAY BOX 2DO01TA DIESEL OIL STORAGE TANK Y 39 C- 165 2FC004A SPENT FUEL PIT HX TUBE SIDE N/A 7 SWEL 2 C- 169 VENT 2FC004B SPENT FUEL PIT HX SHELL SIDE N/A 7 SWEL 2 C- 172_VENT I Table C-1 Page 2 of 5 C-3 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Anchorage AREA ID DESCRIPTION Configuration WALK- COMMENTS PAGE Confirmed?

BY 2FC005 SPENT FUEL PIT PMP CASING DRN N/A 8 SWEL 2 C- 175 2FC006 SPENT FUEL PIT PMP CASING VENT N/A 8 SWEL 2 C- 178 REFUELING WTR PURIF PMP SUCT SWEL 2 FROM U-2 REFUEL CAV CNMT ISOL OUTAGE 2FC01 1 SFP FLT DEMIN LOOP RTRN TO U-2 N/A 31 SWEL 2 C- 181 REFUEL CAV CNMT ISOL SPENT FUEL PIT FLT DEMIN LOOP SWEL 2 2FC012 RTRN TO U-2 REFUEL CAV CNMT N/A OWELG2 ISOL OUTAGE 2FC01A SPENT FUEL PIT HEAT Y 7 SWEL 2 C- 184 EXCHANGER 2FC01P PUMP,SPENT FUEL PIT 12X14-14 Y 8 SWEL 2 C- 188 2FC022 SPENT FUEL PIT PMP SUCT INST N/A 6 SWEL2 C- 192 ISOL TO 2PI-633 2FC8756 SPENT FUEL PIT PMP SUCTION N/A 7 SWEL 2 C- 195 2FC8757 SPENT FUEL PIT PMP SUCT INST N/A 7 SWEL 2 C-198 ROOT TO 2PI-633 2FC8758 REFUELING WTR PURIF PMP SUCT N/A 5&30 SWEL 2 C- 201 FROM U-2 RWST 2FC8762A SPENT FUEL PIT HX INLET N/A 7 SWEL 2 C- 205 2FC8762B SPENT FUEL PIT HX OUTLET N/A 7 SWEL 2 C- 208 2FC8792A SPENT FUEL PIT HX TUBE SIDE N/A 7 SWEL 2 C- 211 DRN 2FC8792B SPENT FUEL PIT HX SHELL SIDE N/A 7 SWEL 2 C- 214 DRN 2FC8793 SPENT FUEL PIT PMP DISCH N/A 8 SWEL 2 C- 217 CHECK 2FT-AF012 AF TO SG 2A FLOW TRANSMITTER N/A 26 C- 220 INSTRUMENT BUS 211 21P01E Y9C- 226 TRANSFORMER

-DIV. 21 120VAC INSTRUMENT BUS 2IP01J N 2C- 230 DISTRIBUTION PANEL 211 -DIV. 21 N 12 INSTRUMENT BUS 212 21P02E Y1AC- 233 TRANSFORMER

-DIV. 22 INSTRUMENT BUS 213 21P03E Y9C- 236 TRANSFORMER

-DIV. 21 INSTRUMENT BUS 214 TRANSFORMER

-DIV. 22 Y 10A INSTRUMENT BUS 211 INVERTER -21P05E Y 9 C- 243 DIV. 21 1 INSTRUMENT BUS 212 INVERTER -21P06E Y 10A C- 247_____ ____ DIV. 22 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _Table C-1 Page 3 of 5 C-4 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Anchorage AREA ID DESCRIPTION Configuration WALK- COMMENTS PAGE Confirmed?

BY INSTRUMENT BUS 213 INVERTER -21P07E Y 9 C- 251 DIV. 21 INSTRUMENT BUS 214 INVERTER -21P08E Y 10A C- 254 DIV. 22 21Y-0606 RH HX 2A OUT I/P TRANSDUCER N/A 36 C- 259 21Y-0607 RH HX #2B OUT I/P TRANSDUCER N/A 36 C- 262 2LT-0459 PRZR LEVEL D/P TRANSMITTER N/A OUTAGE 2LT-0517 S/G LOOP 2A LEVEL D/P XMTTR N/A OUTAGE W/FILLED LEG 2LT-0527 S/G LOOP 2B LEVEL D/P TRANSMITTER W/FILLED LEG 2MS001C MS ISOL VLV LOOP 2C ASMBLY N/A 22 C- 265 2MS018C S/G 2C PORV N/A 22 C- 269 2MS018D S/G 2D PORVASMBLY N/A 20 C- 273 PROTECTION SYSTEM CABINET 2PA03J Y 12 C:- 277 (I&E Prot. Cab. CH 3)PROTECTION SYSTEM CABINET 2PA09J Y 12 C- 280 2__PA09J__(SSPS Cab. Train A) _ 12C_8 AUX SAFEGUARD RELAY CABINET 2PA27J Y 12 C- 285 (A)2PI-0633 SEP PMP SUCTION PRESSURE N/A 6 SWEL 2 C- 289 INDICATOR 2PL07J 2A DG 2DG01KA CONTROL PANEL N 18 C- 292 2PL08J 2B DG 2DG01KB N 19 C- 295 2PM05J MAIN CONTROL BOARD Y 13 C- 298 2PM06J MAIN CONTROL BOARD Y 13 C- 302 2PM07J MAIN CONTROL BOARD Y 13 C- 306 2PM11J MAIN CONTROL BOARD N 13 C- 309 2PT-0455 U2 PRESSURIZER PRESS CHANNEL N/A OUTAGE 455 2PT-0457 PRZR PRESSURE TRANSMITTER N/A OUTAGE STM GEN LOOP 2A STEAM PRESS 2PT-0514 N/A 21 C- 312 PR STM GEN LOOP 2D STEAM PRESS 2PT-0546 N/A 21 C- 316 PR 2PT-0935 CNMT PRESS XMTTR N/A 32 C- 319 2RD05E RX TRIP BREAKERS Y (LATER) OUTAGE 2RH01 PA PUMP,2A RESIDUAL HEAT Y 4 C-. 323 REMOVAL ASMBLY 2RH01 PA-A RH PUMP 2A SEAL COOLER N 4 C- 328 RHR PUMP 2A MINFLOW VLV 2RH610 N/A 2 C- 331 ASMBLY 2RH8702A RC LOOP 2C TO RH PMP 2B SUCT N/A OUTAGE ISOL VLV ASMBLY RH HX 2B DISCH CROSSTIE VLV 2RH8716B N/A 5 C- 335 ASMBLY I I II _Table C-1 Page 4 of 5 C-5 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Anchorage AREA ID DESCRIPTION Configuration WALK- COMMENTS PAGE Confirmed?

BY 2RY32MA PRESSURIZER PORVACCUM 2A N OUTAGE 2RY32MB PRESSURIZER PORV ACCUM 2B N OUTAGE 2RY455A PZR PORV (C/S AT 2PM05J) N/A OUTAGE ASMBLY CHG PUMP TO COLD LEG INJ ISOL 2SI8801A N/A 29 C- 339 ASMBLY 2SI8801 B CHG PUMP TO COLD LEGS INST N/A 29 C-'343 ISOL VLV ASMBLY 2SX004 CC HX 2 INLT VLV ASMBLY N/A 27 C- 346 2SX005 U-0 CC HX INLET VLV ASMBLY N/A 28 C- 350 2SX01AA 2A SX PUMP LUBE OIL COOLER N/A 27 C- 353 2SX01PA PUMP, 2A ESSENTIAL SER WTR N 27 C- 356 ASMBLY 2SX01 PA-C PUMP, 2A SX AUX LUBE OIL PP N/A 27 C- 359 ESSENTIAL SERVICE WTR PMP 2A 2SX033 N/A 27 C- 362 CROSSTIE VLV ASMBLY " 2SX169A DG 2A SX VLVASMBLY N/A 18 C-366 2TE-0604 RHR LP 2A RETURN RTD N/A 5 C- 369 2TE-RC022A RC WIDE RANGE LP 2A TEMP N/A OUTAGE ESS SERV WATER PMP 1A CUB 2VA01J Y 27 C- 372 COOLER LOCAL PNL COOLER ESSENTIAL SERV WATER 2VA01SA N 27 C- 375 PUMP 95-10 2A RHR PUMP ROOM CUB CLR 2VA02SA Y 4 C- 378 ASMBLY 2VA06SA COOLER,CENTRIFUGAL CHARGING y 1 C-382 PUMP2A CENT CHARGING PUMP CUBICLE 2VA10J N 1 C- 386 COOLER LOCAL PANEL 2VD01CA DIESEL GENERATOR ROOM VENT Y 17 C-389 FAN ASMBLY 2VD04J 2A DG RM HVAC DMPR START PNL N 18 C- 393 2VP01AD CNMT ESS'L SERVICE WATER COIL N OUTAGE 2A (RCFC)2VX07J ESF SWGR RM DIV 22 HVADAMPER Y 16 STARTER PANEL Table C-1 Page 5 of 5 C-6 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Sheet 1 of 3 Status: M N U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)Equipment ID No.: OFC006A Equipment Class: (0) Other REFUELING WTR PURIF PMPS SUCT HDR INST ROOT TO 0PI-FC003 Equipment

==

Description:==

VALVE Project: Braidwood 2 SWEL Location (Bldg, Elev, Room/Area):

Auxiliary, 364.00 ft, ALL Manufacturer/Model:

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings.

Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.Anchorage 1. Is anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50%of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

No 2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?Not Applicable

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? (Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

Yes C-7 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Sheet 2 of 3 Status: M N U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)Equipment ID No.: OFC006A Equipment Class: (0) Other REFUELING WTR PURIF PMPS SUCT HDR INST ROOT TO 0PI-FC003 Equipment

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Description:==

VALVE Interaction Effects 7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?

Yes Yes 8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?Yes 10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?Yes Other Adverse Conditions

11. Have you looked for and found no adverse seismic conditions that could Yes adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?

Rugged valve, no seismic/structural issues Comments Seismic walkdown team M. Delaney & P. Gazda 7/30/12 pm Evaluated by: Marlene Delaney Date: 10/1/2012 Philip Gazda 10/1/2012 C-8 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Sheet 3 of 3 Status: M N U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)Equipment ID No.: Equipment Class: Equipment

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Description:==

OFC006A (0) Other REFUELING WTR PURIF PMPS SUCT HDR INST ROOT TO OPI-FC003 VALVE Photos Photos OFC006A 7-30-12 AM 025 OFC006A 7-30-12 AM 026 C-9 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Sheet 1 of 3 Status: MI N U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)Equipment ID No.: OFC012 Equipment Class: (0) Other Equipment

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Description:==

REFUELING WTR PURIF PMPS SUCT HDR INST ISOL TO OPI-FC003 Project: Braidwood 2 SWEL Location (Bldg, Elev, Room/Area):

Auxiliary, 364.00 ft, ALL Manufacturer/Model:

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions maybe used to record the results of judgments and findings.

Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.Anchorage 1. Is anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50%of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

No 2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?Not Applicable

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? (Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

Yes C-1 0 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Sheet 2 of 3 Status: M N U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)Equipment ID No.: OFC012 Equipment Class: (0) Other Equipment

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Description:==

REFUELING WTR PURIF PMPS SUCT HDR INST ISOL TO OPI-FC003 Interaction Effects 7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?

Yes 8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

Seismic block walls.Overhead well-supported.

9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?Yes Yes Yes 10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?Other Adverse Conditions

11. Have you looked for and found no adverse seismic conditions that could Yes adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?

Comments Seismic walkdown team M. Delaney & P. Gazda 7/30/12 pm Evaluated by: Marlene Delaney Date: 10/1/2012 Philip Gazda 1011/2012 C-1l Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.1 0-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Sheet 3 of 3 Status: F N U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)Equipment ID No.: OFC012 Equipment Class: (0) Other Equipment

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Description:==

REFUELING WTR PURIF PMPS SUCT HDR INST ISOL TO OPI-FC003 Photos 0FC012 (AWB -GAS BOTTLE -OK PER PLANT PROCEDURE) 7-30-12 AM 023 0FC012 7-30-12 AM 021 C-12 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Sheet 1 of 3 Status: M N U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)Equipment ID No.: 0FC8754 Equipment Class: (0) Other Equipment

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Description:==

SPENT FUEL PIT HX RTRN ISOL VALVE Project: Braidwood 2 SWEL Location (Bldg, Elev, Room/Area):

FH, 401.00 ft, ALL Manufacturer/Model:

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings.

Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.Anchorage 1. Is anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50%of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

No 2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?Not Applicable

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? (Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

Yes C-1 3 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Sheet 2 of 3 Status:M N U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)Equipment ID No.: 0FC8754 Equipment Class: (0) Other Equipment

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Description:==

SPENT FUEL PIT HX RTRN ISOL VALVE Interaction Effects 7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?A large C-clamp was found clamped to TS hanger near this valve. IR 1394927 was written (since walkdown was completed, the clamp has been removed).Yes Yes Yes Yes Other Adverse Conditions

11. Have you looked for and found no adverse seismic conditions that could Yes adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?

No seismic/structural issues.Comments Seismic walkdown team M. Delaney & P. Gazda 7/30/12 pm Evaluated by: Marlene Delaney Date: 10/1/2012 Philip Gazda 10/1/2012 C-14 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Sheet 3 of 3 Status: M N U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)Equipment ID No.: 0FC8754 Equipment Class: (0) Other Equipment

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Description:==

SPENT FUEL PIT HX RTRN ISOL VALVE Photos U1-U5[,')4 I-JU-1Z VM UJb C-15 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Sheet 1 of 3 Status: M N U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)Equipment ID No.: 0FC8790 Equipment Class: (0) Other Equipment

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Description:==

SPENT FUEL PIT HX TO BORON RECY HOLDUP TANKS ISOL VALVE Project: Braidwood 2 SWEL Location (Bldg, Elev, Room/Area):

FH, 401.00 ft, ALL Manufacturer/Model:

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings.

Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.Anchorage 1. Is anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50%of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

No 2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?Not Applicable

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? (Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

Yes C-16 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Sheet 2 of 3 Status: M N U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)Equipment ID No.: 0FC8790 Equipment Class: (0) Other Equipment

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Description:==

SPENT FUEL PIT HX TO BORON RECY HOLDUP TANKS ISOL VALVE Interaction Effects 7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?

Yes 8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

Seismic block walls.9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?Yes Yes 10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?Yes Other Adverse Conditions

11. Have you looked for and found no adverse seismic conditions that could Yes adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?

No structural/seismic issues Comments Seismic walkdown team M. Delaney & P. Gazda 7/30/12 pm Evaluated by: Marlene Delaney Date: 10/1/2012 Philip Gazda 10/1/2012 C-1 7 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q01 08.1 O-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Sheet 3 of 3 Status: M N U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)Equipment ID No.: 0FC8790 Equipment Class: (0) Other Equipment

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Description:==

SPENT FUEL PIT HX TO BORON RECY HOLDUP TANKS ISOL VALVE Photos ut-Usf!ju I-3u-1Z FM u3t$C-18 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Sheet 1 of 3 Status: M N U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)Equipment ID No.: 0SX007 Equipment Class: (8) Motor-Operated and Solenoid-Operated Valves Equipment

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Description:==

0 CC HX OUTLT VLV ASMBLY Project: Braidwood 2 SWEL Location (Bldg, Elev, Room/Area):

Auxiliary, 346.00 ft, ALL Manufacturer/Model:

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings.

Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.Anchorage 1. Is anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50%of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

No 2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? (Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

Yes C-19 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.1O-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Sheet 2 of 3 Status: M N U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)Equipment ID No.: 0SX007 Equipment Class: (8) Motor-Operated and Solenoid-Operated Valves Equipment

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Description:==

0 CC HX OUTLT VLV ASMBLY Interaction Effects 7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?

Yes 8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

Yes 9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?Yes 10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?Yes Other Adverse Conditions

11. Have you looked for and found no adverse seismic conditions that could Yes adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?

Rugged valve and well-supported pipe. No structural/seismic issues.Comments Seismic walkdown team M. Delaney & P. Gazda 8/2/12 pm Evaluated by: Marlene Delaney Date: 10/1/2012 Philip Gazda 10/1/2012 C-20 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Sheet 3 of 3 Status: M N U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)Equipment ID No.: 0SX007 Equipment Class: (8) Motor-Operated and Solenoid-Operated Valves Equipment

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Description:==

0 CC HX OUTLT VLV ASMBLY Photos OSX007 8-2-12 054 OSXO07 8-2-12 056 C-21 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Sheet 1 of 4 Status: [] N U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)Equipment ID No.: 0SX146 Equipment Class: (8) Motor-Operated and Solenoid-Operated Valves Equipment

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Description:==

U-0 CC HX OUTLET HDR ISOL ASMBLY; 30" Project: Braidwood 2 SWEL Location (Bldg, Elev, Room/Area):

Auxiliary, 346.00 ft, ALL Manufacturer/Model:

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings.

Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.Anchorage 1. Is anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50%of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

No 2. Is the anchorage free of bent; broken, missing or loose hardware?Not Applicable

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? (Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

Yes C-22 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Sheet 2 of 4 Status: M N U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)Equipment ID No.: 0SX146 Equipment Class: (8) Motor-Operated and Solenoid-Operated Valves Equipment

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Description:==

U-0 CC HX OUTLET HDR ISOL ASMBLY; 30" Interaction Effects 7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

Yes Yes 9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?Yes Yes Other Adverse Conditions

11. Have you looked for and found no adverse seismic conditions that could Yes adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?

Rugged, well-supported valve Comments Seismic walkdown team M. Delaney & P. Gazda 8/2/12 pm Evaluated by: Marlene Delaney Date: 10/1/2012 Philip Gazda 10/1/2012 C-23 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.1O-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Sheet 3 of 4 Status: M N U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)Equipment ID No.: 0SX146 Equipment Class: (8) Motor-Operated and Solenoid-Operated Valves Equipment

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Description:==

U-0 CC HX OUTLET HDR ISOL ASMBLY; 30" Photos U5iA1 4b (NI'-bb~Jb)

Ui-Z-1 2 U59 0SX146 8-2-12 057 C-24 Braidwood Station Unit 2 12Q0108.10-R-002 Rev. 0 Correspondence No.: RS-12-159 Sheet 4 of 4 Status: M N U Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)Equipment ID No.: 0SX146 Equipment Class: (8) Moto EauiDment DescriDtion:

U-0 CC r-Operated and Solenoid-Operated Valves HX OUTLET HDR ISOL ASMBLY; 30" 0SX146 8-2-12 058 C-25