IR 05000361/2008010

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Errata for San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station - NRC Component Design Basis Inspection Report, 05000361/2008010 and 05000362/2008010
ML090080306
Person / Time
Site: San Onofre  Southern California Edison icon.png
Issue date: 01/06/2009
From: Thomas Farnholtz
Region 4 Engineering Branch 1
To: Ridenoure R T
Southern California Edison Co
References
FOIA/PA-2011-0157 IR-08-010
Download: ML090080306 (5)


Text

January 6, 2009

Ross T. Ridenoure, Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer Southern California Edison Company San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station P.O. Box 128 San Clemente, CA 92674-0128

SUBJECT: ERRATA FOR SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION - NRC COMPONENT DESIGN BASIS INSPECTION REPORT, 05000361/2008010 AND 05000362/2008010

Dear Mr. Ridenoure:

Please replace page 18 of the report with the enclosed page 18 of the Report Details section in NRC Inspection Report 05000361/2008010 and 05000362/2008010, dated October 24, 2008. This enclosed page has the cross-cutting element removed from the details section of the report for NCV 05000361/2008010-04. This typographical error was not included in the Summary of Findings section of the original report or the Plant Issues Matrix document that the NRC uses to track cross-cutting elements for each finding.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,/RA/

Tom Farnholtz, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety

- 2 - Docket: 50-361, 50-362 License: NPF-10, NPF 15

Enclosure:

Errata to page 18 of NRC Inspection Report 05000361/2008010 and 05000362/2008010 cc w/

Enclosure:

Chairman, Board of Supervisors County of San Diego 1600 Pacific Highway, Room 335 San Diego, CA 92101 Gary L. Nolff Assistant Director-Resources City of Riverside 3900 Main Street Riverside, CA 92522 Mark L. Parsons Deputy City Attorney City of Riverside 3900 Main Street Riverside, CA 92522 Dr. David Spath, Chief Division of Drinking Water and Environmental Management California Department of Health Services 850 Marina Parkway, Bldg P, 2nd Floor Richmond, CA 94804

Michael J. DeMarco San Onofre Liaison San Diego Gas & Electric Company 8315 Century Park Ct. CP21G San Diego, CA 92123-1548

Director, Radiological Health Branch State Department of Health Services P.O. Box 997414 (MS 7610) Sacramento, CA 95899-7414 Mayor City of San Clemente 100 Avenida Presidio San Clemente, CA 92672 James D. Boyd, Commissioner California Energy Commission 1516 Ninth Street (MS 34) Sacramento, CA 95814 Douglas K. Porter, Esq.

Southern California Edison Company 2244 Walnut Grove Avenue Rosemead, CA 91770 Albert R. Hochevar Southern California Edison Company San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station P.O. Box 128 San Clemente, CA 92675 A. Edward Scherer Southern California Edison Company San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station P.O. Box 128 San Clemente, CA 92674-0128 Mr. Steve Hsu Department of Health Services Radiologic Health Branch MS 7610, P.O. Box 997414 Sacramento, CA 95899-7414

Mr. Mike Short Southern California Edison Company San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station P.O. Box 128 San Clemente, CA 92674-0128

Chief, Radiological Emergency Preparedness Section National Preparedness Directorate Technological Hazards Division Department of Homeland Security 1111 Broadway, Suite 1200 Oakland, CA 94607-4052 Electronic distribution by RIV: Regional Administrator (Elmo.Collins@nrc.gov ) Deputy Regional Administrator (Chuck.Casto@nrc.gov) DRP Director (Dwight.Chamberlain@nrc.gov) DRP Deputy Director (Anton.Vegel@nrc.gov ) DRS Director (Roy.Caniano@nrc.gov ) DRS Deputy Director (Troy.Pruett@nrc.gov) Senior Resident Inspector (Greg.Warnick@nrc.gov) Resident Inspector (John.Reynoso@nrc.gov ) Branch Chief, DRP/D (Michael.Hay@nrc.gov) Senior Project Engineer, DRP/D (Don.Allen@nrc.gov ) SO Site Secretary (Heather.Hutchinson@nrc.gov ) Public Affairs Officer (Victor.Dricks@nrc.gov ) Team Leader, DRP/TSS (Chuck.Paulk@nrc.gov ) RITS Coordinator (Marisa.Herrera@nrc.gov ) Only inspection reports to the following: DRS STA (Dale.Powers@nrc.gov) S. Williams, OEDO RIV Coordinator (Shawn.Williams@nrc.gov ) ROPreports

SUNSI Review Completed: KDC ADAMS Yes No Initials: KDC Publicly Available Non-Publicly Available Sensitive Non-Sensitive S:/DRS/Reports/SO2008010 errata kdc. ML SRI: DRS/EB1 C:DRP/D C:DRS/EB1 KClayton MCHay TFarnholtz /RA/ DProulx for /RA/ 1/5/2008 1/5/2008 1/6/2008 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY T= Telephone E= E-mail F = Fax Enclosure ENCLOSURE Analysis: The team determined that the licensee's failure to identify, evaluate, or correct conditions adverse to quality was a performance deficiency that was reasonably within their ability to foresee and prevent. Specifically, in 2007, the licensee failed to recognize, evaluate, or take any action when the performance test for Station Battery 2B008 was terminated early due to test equipment issues. This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the mitigating systems cornerstone (equipment performance attribute) and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using the Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process," Phase 1 Worksheets, the finding is determined to have very low safety significance (Green) because it was not a design issue resulting in loss of function, did not represent an actual loss of a system safety function, did not result in exceeding a TS allowed outage time, and did not affect external event mitigation. This finding was reviewed for cross-cutting aspects and none were identified.

Enforcement: Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," requires, in part, that conditions adverse to quality are promptly identified and corrected. Contrary to this requirement, as of January 23, 2007, the licensee failed to identify, evaluate, or correct conditions adverse to quality involving a test equipment failure that resulted in the early termination of a required battery performance test. Because this violation is of very low safety significance and has been entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Notification NN 200060319, this violation is being treated as a NCV consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy: NCV 05000361/2008010-04, "Inadequate Corrective Actions for Battery Performance Tests Issues." 4. Failure to Follow Procedures During the Battery Performance Tests Introduction: The team identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instruction, Procedures, and Drawings," for failure to follow procedures while performing the battery performance tests. Specifically, on four occasions, performance tests for the Unit 2 station battery 2B008 were terminated early, instead of continuing the tests until reaching one of the test termination criteria in the applicable test procedure.

Description: SONGS battery performance tests were required to be performed in accordance with Maintenance Procedure SO123-1-2.6. The procedure provided three test termination criteria in step 6.3.8, which included 1) battery overall shut down voltage reached, 2) battery cell temperature exceeding 110°F, or 3) any battery intercell connection showing evidence of excessive heating. The team noted that performance tests performed on the Unit 2 station battery 2B008 in 2002, 2006, 2007, and 2008, were terminated before the minimum battery voltage was reached and without meeting either of the other two termination criteria. The Maintenance Orders for tests performed in 2002 and 2006 stated that they were terminated early because cell #14 approached reversal voltage. The 2007 test was terminated early due to "load bank not maintaining load." The 2008 test was terminated at four hours without further explanation.