Supplemental Safety Evaluation Supporting Util Cable Separation Criteria Per Sser (NUREG-0519),App D.Addition of Zipper Tubing to Divisional Cables for Automatic Depressurization Sys Relief Valves Resolved NRC ConcernML20198B422 |
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LaSalle |
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05/15/1986 |
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NRC |
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ML20198B413 |
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RTR-NUREG-0519, RTR-NUREG-519 NUDOCS 8605210620 |
Download: ML20198B422 (4) |
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Category:SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT--LICENSING & RELATED ISSUES
MONTHYEARML20217C9121999-10-12012 October 1999 SER Input Authorizing Licensee Proposed Request to Modify Definition of Core Alteration in Section 1.0 of TS & Update Sections 3/4.1,3.4.3 & 3/4.9 to Reflect Proposed Definition Change ML20198B3801998-12-14014 December 1998 SER Accepting one-time Request for Relief from Certain Provisions of Section XI of ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code,Per 10CFR50.55a for Certain Plant Safety/Relief Valves ML20196B1441998-11-23023 November 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Response to GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Bindings of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves ML20153C7621998-09-18018 September 1998 Safety Evaluation Acceping NRC Bulletin 95-002, Unexpected Clogging of RHR Pump Strainer While Operating in Suppression Pool Cooling Mode ML20236L8041998-07-0606 July 1998 Safety Evaluation Granting Licensee 980304 Request for Second 10-yr Interval Pump & Valve IST Program Plan,Rev 2, Including Changes to 2 ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code Relief Requests Previously Submitted in Rev 1 ML20217Q7041998-05-0404 May 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Util Request to Leave Leak Chase Channels Plugged During Performance of Containment ILRT ML20203B1941997-12-0404 December 1997 Supplemental SE Accepting Proposed Changes Which Are Consistent W/Recognized Battery Stds & Station Blackout Rule ML20148T8571997-07-0303 July 1997 SER Accepting Temporary Use of Current Procedure for Containment R/R Activities Instead of Requirements of Amended 10CFR50.55a Rule to Be Reasonable ML20137D4961997-03-24024 March 1997 Safety Evaluation of Second 10-year Interval Inservice Insp Program Plan Requests for Relief CR-17 & CR-18 Commonwealth Edison Co,Lasalle County Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20135D4661996-12-0606 December 1996 Safety Evaluation Granting Relief Request RP-01 & Alternative Testing Imposed Per 10CFR50.55a(f)(6)(i) Based on Impracticality of Performing Required Testing ML20129D9401996-09-26026 September 1996 SER Accepting Licensee Cycle 8 Core Reload Design Submittal Re Application of Anfb Critical Power Correlation to Coresident GE9 Fuel as Described in TR EMF-96-021(P),Rev 1 ML20059E2871993-12-30030 December 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 57,57,45,45,93,77,152 & 140 to Licenses NPF-37,NPF-66,NPF-72,NPF-77,NPF-11,NPF-18, DPR-39 & DPR-48 Respectively ML20128E4101992-12-0101 December 1992 Safety Evaluation Accepting Relief Requests RI-22 & RI-23 from ASME Code Requirements from Hydrostatic Pressure Testing Following Replacement of RCIC Steam Supply Inboard Isolation Valve as Part of ISI Program ML20059N0301990-08-22022 August 1990 Safety Evaluation Accepting Util Response to Generic Ltr 88-01, NRC Position on IGSCC in BWR Austentic Stainless Steel Piping ML20154E5461988-09-0707 September 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 60 & 40 to Licenses NPF-11 & NPF-18,respectively ML20151X0121988-08-16016 August 1988 Safety Evaluation Re Inservice Testing Program & Requests for Relief ML20237C8761987-12-16016 December 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Facility IGSCC Insp,Per Generic Ltr 84-11 ML20237C9091987-12-16016 December 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Licensee Response to IE Bulletin 79-26,Rev 1, Boron Loss from BWR Control Blades, Per License Condition 2.C(6) ML20205R6681987-04-0101 April 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Continued Use of Static O-Ring Differential Pressure Switches ML20211P2551986-12-15015 December 1986 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util Compliance W/License Condition 2.C.(25)(d) Requirements Re Mods to Six Fire Door Stops ML20214U8501986-12-0404 December 1986 Safety Evaluation Re Util 861006 Response to IE Bulletin 79-26,Rev 1, Boron Loss from BWR Control Blades, to Satisfy License Condition 2.C(13).Response Acceptable ML20214T3991986-12-0202 December 1986 Supplemental Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee 860613 Analysis & Justification for Cable Separation Criteria to Resolve Deficiencies Described in Sser 7,App D ML20213G3181986-11-12012 November 1986 Safety Evaluation Accepting local-to-bulk Temp Difference of 12 F.Draft Technical Evaluation Rept Encl ML20215K8741986-10-21021 October 1986 Safety Evaluation Accepting Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Updated Through Rev 12.Changes Incorporated in Revs 11 & 12 Comply W/Tech Spec 6.8.2 ML20215K9631986-10-16016 October 1986 Safety Evaluation Granting Interim Acceptance of Process Control Program Updated Through 850718 ML20212Q7191986-08-29029 August 1986 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 27 to License NPF-18 ML20205F0791986-08-11011 August 1986 Safety Evaluation Supporting 860213 Procedures for Design of Single Angle Members for HVAC Hanger Frames for Plant. Related Info Encl ML20205C4051986-08-0707 August 1986 Safety Evaluation Supporting Facility Restart Following 860601 Feedwater Transient.Licensee Action Plan,Supplemented by Listed Actions,Adequate Basis for Restart & short-term Operation.Supporting Drawings & Matls Encl ML20206M6161986-06-23023 June 1986 Safety Evaluation Supporting Responses to Generic Ltr 83-28 Item 2.1 (Part 1) Re Equipment Classification ML20195D4121986-05-27027 May 1986 Safety Evaluation Summary of Inservice Testing Program for Pumps & Valves.Program Acceptable Subj to Listed Conditions in Encl SER ML20195D4171986-05-27027 May 1986 SER Re Pump & Valve Inservice Testing Program NUREG-0519, Safety Evaluation of Final in-plant Safety/Relief Valve Test Evaluation Rept Per SER (NUREG-0519).Design Adequate to Accommodate Loads Associated W/Activation of One or More Safety Relief Valves1986-05-19019 May 1986 Safety Evaluation of Final in-plant Safety/Relief Valve Test Evaluation Rept Per SER (NUREG-0519).Design Adequate to Accommodate Loads Associated W/Activation of One or More Safety Relief Valves ML20198B4221986-05-15015 May 1986 Supplemental Safety Evaluation Supporting Util Cable Separation Criteria Per Sser (NUREG-0519),App D.Addition of Zipper Tubing to Divisional Cables for Automatic Depressurization Sys Relief Valves Resolved NRC Concern ML20203N5531986-04-30030 April 1986 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Util IGSCC Insp Performed in Accordance W/Generic Ltr 84-11 & Satisfactory.Small Concerns Re long-term Growth of Small IGSCC Cracks Present But Not Detected During Insp Remain ML20140D6501986-03-19019 March 1986 SER Supporting Test Program,Results & Commitment for Nonqualified GE Control Switches.License Conditions 2.C.(21)(c) & 2.C.(12)(a) for Units 1 & 2,respectively,will Be Satisfied When GE Switches Removed from Engine ML20210E0961986-02-0404 February 1986 Safety Evaluation Accepting Util 851113 Proposal for Amend Changing Tech Specs to Include Previously Approved Trip Setting on Low CRD Pump Discharge Water Header Pressure & to Delete Associated Surveillance Requirement ML20137D8081985-11-18018 November 1985 Safety Evaluation Supporting Use of Mechanical Stress Improvement Process in Primary Sys Stainless Steel Piping to Modify Residual Stress Pattern at Piping Butt Welds NUREG-0889, SER Conditionally Supporting Response to Procedures Generation Package1985-10-18018 October 1985 SER Conditionally Supporting Response to Procedures Generation Package ML20137S6391985-09-30030 September 1985 Safety Evaluation Supporting Elimination of Arbitrary Intermediate Pipe Breaks.Deviation from SRP Acceptable for Piping Sys Identified in Ref 2 Except Portion of RHR Sys Made of 304SS Matl ML20129D9511985-07-16016 July 1985 Safety Evaluation Supporting Acceptance Criteria for Firecode CT Gypsum Fire Stops ML20126K9121985-07-12012 July 1985 Revised SER Re Util 831105 & 850605 Responses to Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 1.1, Post-Trip Review Program. Program & Procedures Acceptable ML20129E8881985-05-24024 May 1985 SER of Util 831105 Response to Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 1.2 Re post-trip Review Data & Info Capabilities.Capabilities Acceptable 1999-10-12
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217C9121999-10-12012 October 1999 SER Input Authorizing Licensee Proposed Request to Modify Definition of Core Alteration in Section 1.0 of TS & Update Sections 3/4.1,3.4.3 & 3/4.9 to Reflect Proposed Definition Change ML20217F9091999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for LaSalle County Stations,Units 1 & 2.With ML20217A1691999-09-22022 September 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Engine Sys,Inc Controllers,Manufactured Between Dec 1997 & May 1999,that May Have Questionable Soldering Workmanship.Caused by Inadequate Personnel Training.Sent Rept to All Nuclear Customers ML20212C4501999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1999 for LaSalle County Station,Units 1 & 2.With ML20210R0671999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1999 for LaSalle County Station,Units 1 & 2.With ML20210C1681999-07-0909 July 1999 Seventh Refueling Outage ASME Section XI Summary Rept ML20209H1501999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for LaSalle County Station,Units 1 & 2.With ML20195J7871999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for LaSalle County Station,Units 1 & 2.With ML20209E1431999-05-31031 May 1999 Cycle 8 COLR, for May 1999 ML20195B2591999-05-19019 May 1999 Rev 66a to CE-1-A,consisting of Proposed Changes to QAP for Dnps,Qcs,Znps,Lcs,Byron & Braidwood Stations ML20206N2071999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for LaSalle County Station,Units 1 & 2.With ML20205L8421999-03-31031 March 1999 Rev 2 to EMF-96-125, LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 8 Reload Analysis ML20205L8301999-03-31031 March 1999 Administrative Technical Requirements App B (Amend 26) LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 8 COLR & Reload Transient Analysis Results, for Mar 1999 ML20205R2721999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for LaSalle County Station,Units 1 & 2.With ML20205L8391999-03-22022 March 1999 Rev 2 to 960103, Neutronics Licensing Rept for LaSalle Unit 2,Cycle 8 ML20204C8141999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for LaSalle County Station,Units 1 & 2.With ML20199E4601998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1998 for LaSalle County Station,Units 1 & 2.With ML20207C7371998-12-31031 December 1998 Annual Rept for LaSalle County Station for Jan 1998 Through Dec 1998 ML20205M7061998-12-31031 December 1998 Unicom Corp 1998 Summary Annual Rept. with ML20198B3801998-12-14014 December 1998 SER Accepting one-time Request for Relief from Certain Provisions of Section XI of ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code,Per 10CFR50.55a for Certain Plant Safety/Relief Valves ML20206N2261998-12-0909 December 1998 LER 98-S03-00:on 981116,protected Area Was Entered Without Current Authorization for Unescorted Access Due to Programmatic Deficiency Error.Changed Badge Control Process ML20197K0981998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1998 for LaSalle County Station,Unts 1 & 2.With ML20196B1441998-11-23023 November 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Response to GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Bindings of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves ML20196A4191998-11-19019 November 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting QA TR CE-1-A,Rev 66 Re Changes in Independent & Onsite Review Organization by Creating NSRB ML20195D3191998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1998 for LaSalle County Station.With ML20154H6781998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1998 for LaSalle County Nuclear Power Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20153D0191998-09-18018 September 1998 Part 21 Rept Re Defect in Gap Conductance Analyses for co- Resident BWR Fuel.Initially Reported on 980917.Corrective Analyses Performed Demonstrating That Current Operating Limits Bounding from BOC to Cycle Exposure of 8 Gwd/Mtu ML20153C7621998-09-18018 September 1998 Safety Evaluation Acceping NRC Bulletin 95-002, Unexpected Clogging of RHR Pump Strainer While Operating in Suppression Pool Cooling Mode ML20153C6771998-09-17017 September 1998 Part 21 Rept Re Defect Relative to MCPR Operating Limits as Impacted by Gap Conductance of co-resident BWR Fuel at Facilities.Operating Limit for LaSalle Unit 2 & Quad Cities Unit 2 Will Be Revised as Listed ML20151W0241998-08-31031 August 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1998 for LaSalle County Station.With ML20237E2921998-08-21021 August 1998 Special Rept:On 980811,channel 5 of Lpms Became Inoperable. Caused by Channel Failed pre-amplifier Located Inside Primary Containment at Inboard Side of Electrical Penetration E-19.Initiated Repairs of Channel ML20237E2331998-08-21021 August 1998 Revised Pages of Section 20 of Rev 66 to CE-1-A, QA Topical Rept ML20237B4861998-07-31031 July 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1998 for LaSalle County Nuclear Power Station Units 1 & 2 ML20236V7701998-07-31031 July 1998 Revised LaSalle Unit 1 Cycle 8 COLR & Reload Transient Analysis Results ML20236P8231998-07-14014 July 1998 Special Rept:From 980614-17,various Fire Rated Assemblies Were Inoperable for Period Greater than Seven Days.Caused by Test Equipment Being Routed Through Fire Doors.Established Fire Watches & on 980619 Assemblies Were Declared Operable ML20236N6751998-07-0909 July 1998 Part 21 & Deficiency Rept Re Notification of Potential Safety Hazard from Breakage of Cast Iron Suction Heads in Apkd Type Pumps.Caused by Migration of Suction Head Journal Sleeve Along Lower End of Pump Shaft.Will Inspect Pumps ML20236L8041998-07-0606 July 1998 Safety Evaluation Granting Licensee 980304 Request for Second 10-yr Interval Pump & Valve IST Program Plan,Rev 2, Including Changes to 2 ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code Relief Requests Previously Submitted in Rev 1 ML20236P3611998-06-30030 June 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1998 for LaSalle County Nuclear Power Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20249C4891998-06-22022 June 1998 Special Rept:On 980522,Fire Detection Zone 1-31 Was Noted out-of-service for More than 14 Days.Detection Sys Was Taken out-of-service on 980508 to Prevent False Alarms During Hot Work Activities.Sys Was Returned to Operable Status 980528 ML20248M3101998-05-31031 May 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1998 for LaSalle County Nuclear Power Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20236V7771998-05-31031 May 1998 Rev 1 to 24A5180, Supplemental Reload Licensing Rept for LaSalle County Station Unit 1 Reload 7 Cycle 8 ML20217Q7041998-05-0404 May 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Util Request to Leave Leak Chase Channels Plugged During Performance of Containment ILRT ML20247M4491998-04-30030 April 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1998 for LaSalle County Station ML20216F4941998-03-31031 March 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1998 for LaSalle County Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20217N6581998-03-30030 March 1998 Special Rept on Fire Detection,Deluge Sys & Fire Rated Assemblies During Period of 980303-25.Established Fire Watches Until Affected Equipment Is Returned to Operable Status ML20216D9511998-02-28028 February 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1998 for LaSalle County Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20247M4631998-02-28028 February 1998 Rev Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1998 for LaSalle County Station ML20203D7241998-02-20020 February 1998 Special Rept:On 980118,Fire Detection Zones 1-18 & 2-18 Taken out-of-svc to Prevent False Alarms During Hot Work Activities on Auxiliary Electric Equipment Room Ventilation Sys.Fire Watches Will Remain in Place ML20202G9851998-01-31031 January 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Jan 1998 for LaSalle County Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20199K1651998-01-23023 January 1998 Rev 65h to Topical Rept CE-1-A, Comm Ed QA Tr 1999-09-30
[Table view] |
Text
[ UNITED STATES 8' N NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION n j WASHINGTON, D. C. 20655
\ ***# / SUPPLEMENTAL SAFETY EVALUATION REGARDING CARLE SEPARATION LASALLE COUNTY STATION UNIT 1 DOCKET N0. 50-373
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By letter dated February 21, 1986, Commonwealth Edison (licenseel submitted an analysis for the reactor protection systems cable separation to resolve the deficiencies described in Appendix D (trip reporti to Supplement No. 7 to the Safety Evaluation Report, NUREG-0519, (SSER #7). This concern was identified as a license condition for Unit 2, Item 2.C.(10).
In the letter of February 21st, the licensee indicated that it had committed to review the NRR staff trip report (Appendix D) concerning cable separation at LaSalle, (TIA-83-76) and Sections 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, and 4.5 of that report.
The. trip report indicated that the cable installation at the local instru-ment racks, cable spreadino room, control room panels, remote shutdown panel, and ADS relief valves lacks the reouired independence between Reactor Protec-tion System (RPS) subchannels and thereby may be challenged via Class IE or associated IE cables from the same division. This may occur as a result of routing cables from the same division with cables emanating from separate subchannels of the RPS.
2.0 DISCUSSION AND EVALUATION As a result of a site visit on September 28, 1983, various cable separation concerns identified by the NRC staff were examined at the local instrument racks, cable spreading room, control room panels, remote shutdown panel, and automatic depressurization system relief valves. The trip report pro-vides detailed information in support of the findings and positions presented in SSER #7 regarding cable separation in Unit 1. By letter dated November 15, 1983, the licensee had committed to take appropriate action to resolve all the identified cable separation deficiencies by modifications, and analysis and ,iustification for lesser separation. The licensee submitted in its letter of February 21, 1986, the RPS cable separation criteria with the modifications and analysis for these deficiencies described in SSER #7.
The following bases are used by the licensee to analyze all cables associ-ated with the RPS systems.
A. RPS cables of each channel are routed in separate raceways outside of control panels. The separation of RPS cables from cables associated with safety-related divisions and nonsafety-related cables inside control panels may be less than required by Regulatory Guide (R.G.)
8605210620 860515
{DR ADOCK 05000373 PDR
1.75. An analysis was performed to .iustify the lesser separation of RPS cables from other cables inside of control panels. This analysis is discussed in Section 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 below.
B. All cables used to interconnect RPS are the same high cuality as that used in Class 1E circuits, associated circuits, and nonsafety-related circuits. These types of cable comply with the requirements of R.G.
1.75 and have been proven to be highly fire retardant by testing.
C. The cables that are a concern to this analysis are confined to control and instrumentation circuits which, by their very nature, are low energy circuits. Control circuits are generally 120 Vdc or 125 Vde, whereas the cable insulation ratino for these applications is 600 volts.
D. There are no power cables in contact with the control and instrumenta-tior, cables that are in question. Also, there are no high energy sources located within control panels that contain RPS cables.
2.1 Reactor Protection System Seoaration The required independence between RPS subchannels is challenged by safety-related or nonsafety-related cables inside enclosures (cabinets or panels).
These concerns were identified in Sections 4.1 and 4.3 of the trip report (Appendix D). The following discussions demonstrate that the independence of RPS circuits / channelization inside control panels is maintained to per-form their safety functions.
- 1. One division of the safety-related or nonsafety-related cables is terminated with one division of RPS cables inside the enclosure. The physical separation criteria between safety-related (or nonsafety-related) cables and RPS cables deviate from requirements of R.G.1.75.
Therefore, the NRC staff has analyzed failure sequences which would have to occur to result in potential damaaing effects to the RPS cables as a result of faults in safety-related or nonsafety-related cables.
Any division of RPS cables is independent and separated from the counter.-
part division of RPS cables in each enclosure at its other end and, therefore, it is concluded that the independence of RPS cables is not degraded below an acceptable level. This analysis is applicable to the enclosures, 1H22-P004, 1H22-P005, 1H22-P010, 1H22-026, 1H22-P027, IPA 13J, IPA 14J, 1H13-P601, 1H13-P603, 1H13-P608,
- 2. Single division of RPS cables is terminated in its dedicated enclosure (panel) and also there are no safety-related/nonsafety-related cables in this panel. This analysis is acceptable and is applicable to Sun-pression Pool Temperature Monitoring Power Supply Cabinet, IPLF5J and IPLF6J.
. .e
- 3. The redundant RPS cables are terminated in a particular section of a panel with a safety-related cable. This safety-related cable is a 175 Vdc control circuit and is protected by a fuse and a redundant circuit breaker in series connection. Also, a single A2 cable of RPS is reouired for the backup scram valves which is not redundant to any Al and 81 cable terminated with this panel section. Therefore, this analysis is acceptable. This analysis is applicable to Panels 1H13-P609, 1H13-P611 (8a), 1H13-P611 (9a), 1H13-P611 (9c), 1413-P635.
4 Safety-related cables are terminated in a section of the panel with redundant division RPS cables. However, these safety-related cables are alarm circuits which are low energy, and the panel is located in the control room which is considered to be a protected area.
Instrumentation cables for use in alarm circuits are rated for 600 volts with insulation tested to a minimum of 1500 volts with overall
.iacket. The electrical fault current in the alarm circuit cable is not enough to generate thermal energy over long periods of time with a failure of an isolation device to adversely affect the RPS cables.
Also, the insulation in alarm circuit cables assures adequate isolation from a voltage transient in the alarm circuit cable from adversely affecting RPS cables. Therefore, this justification of the analysis is acceptable. This analysis is applicable to Panels 1H13-P611 (8b),
1H13-P611 (9b), 1H13-P635 (2 circuits), 1H13-P636.
2.2 Separation of Safety-Related Cables to Nonsafety-Related Cables Section 4.2.(2) of the trip report (Appendix D) identified that safetv-related cables and nonsafety-related cables entering the bottom of the control room panel from the cable spreading room did not meet the minimum separation requirements. The NRC staff recommended in their trip report that the licensee examine the cable design in the cable spreadino room as related to the concern identified in Section 4.2.(2) of the trio report and demonstrate that the effects of lesser separation between safety-related cables and nonsafety-related cables is acceptable. The licensee examined and analyzed the concerns identified in the cable spreading room and these concerns were resolved by analysis, which was acceptable to the staff.
2.3 Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) Relief Valves -
Actuation Solenoids Connections The cables supplying power to the redundant solenoids mounted on the ADS valve casing are routed in separate conduits until they reach the proximity of the valves where the cables exit the conduit. From the ends of the conduits to the termination at the ADS valves, the cables are suspended in air. Section 4.5 of the trip report (Appendix D) indicates that the cable installation discussed above is considered to be in violation of the separation criteria documented in the FSAR which set forth a minimum separation requirement between redundant safety-related
l cables located in hazard zones. The staff recommended in the trio report that the safety-related cables in air be either enclosed in a stainless steel flex conduit or wrapped with asbestos zipper tubina.
The licensee in its February 21st letter indicated that all divisional cables associated with the ADS valves have been wraoped with the asbestos zipper tubing. Therefore, this concern is acceptably resolved by the addi-tion of zipper tubing to all divisional cabling associated with the ADS valves.
3.0 CONCLUSION
The staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and its justification for redundant RPS circuits separation criteria which address Sections 4.1 and 4.3 of the trip report. Rased on the review discussed above, the panel-by-panel analysis has demonstrated that the redundant RPS circuits will not be degraded below an acceptable level due to an electrical fault in the safety-related/nonsafety-related cables and is, therefore, acceptable.
The initial cable design for the ADS valves required one division of cables to be enclosed in zipper tubing and the redundant division cable to be terminated to the solenoid with no additional barrier as documented in the Final Safety Analysis Report. This concern identified in Section 4.F of the trip report is resolved by the addition of zinper tubing to all divisional cables associated with the ADS valves.
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