Information Notice 1990-69, Adequacy of Emergency and Essential Lighting

Adequacy of Emergency and Essential Lighting

ML031130214
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant
Issue date:	10/31/1990
From:	Rossi C E Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
IN-90-069, NUDOCS 9010250054
Download: ML031130214 (10)

UNITED STATESNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONOFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATIONWASHINGTON, D.C. 20555October 31, 1990NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 90-69: ADEQUACY OF EMERGENCY AND ESSENTIAL LIGHTING

Addressees

All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear powerreactors.

Purpose

This information notice is intended to alert addressees to a possible problemconcerning the adequacy of emergency and essential lighting at commercial powerreactor facilities. It is expected that recipients will review the informationfor applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, toavoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in this informationnotice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action orwritten response is required. i

Description of Circumstances

On March 3, 1989, Unit 3 at the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station experi-enced a reactor/turbine trip, main steam isolation, containment isolation, andsafety injection as a result of a grid-induced load rejection event. Thisevent included three significant system failures: (1) half of the steam bypasscontrol system malfunctioned; (2) the atmospheric dump valves (ADYs) failed tooperate from the control room and the remote shutdown panel; and (3) theemergency lighting in the main steam support structure (MSSS) failed, hamperingthe operators in their attempt to cope with the ADY failures. Being unable tomaintain pressure control on the secondary side by operating the ADVs from thecontrol room or the remote shutdown panel, plant personnel attempted to establishlocal (manual) control of the ADYs in the MSSS. When operators first enteredthe MSSS, they found no direct lighting. Normal lighting was lost due to theloss of power to the non-Class 1E electrical busses in the plant. The emergencylighting was not properly positioned in the north MSSS room (containing theADVs for the No. 1 steam generator) to provide adequate lighting for theoperators to perform their required activities and was not functioning at allin the south MSSS room (containing ADVs for the No. 2 steam generator).Because of a burned-out light bulb, plant personnel could not restore essentiallighting (from Class 1E power sources) in the south MSSS room."C-( 01200543 IN 90-69October 31, 1990 During the NRC inspection (50-530/89-13) conducted by an augmented inspectionteam (AIT) sent to examine the event at Palo Verde, the staff found deficien-cies in the licensee's maintenance and testing of emergency and essentiallighting. The team discovered that plant personnel had waived the quarterlypreventive maintenance (PM) tasks on the MSSS emergency and essential lightsfor five consecutive quarters. By grouping the lights in the MSSS with thelights in the containment building, which were inaccessible during poweroperations, the PM tasks were waived for the MSSS lights during each of theseperiods along with the containment lights. NRC inspections further revealedthat the licensee, prior to the performance of the 8-hour lighting unit dis-charge test, performed preventive maintenance (i.e., battery replacement,addition of electrolyte, cleaning of battery terminals, and battery charging)on the lighting unit battery. This preventive maintenance practice resultedin not verifying the performance of the 8-hour emergency lighting units in theWas found" condition. The inspections also revealed that the licensee hadfailed to implement the relevant portions of its quality assurance program foremergency lighting. Because of these failures, the emergency lighting was notproperly tested, and deficiencies were not properly corrected.After the event, plant personnel reconstructed the design bases of thelighting system and conducted walkdown inspections of the emergency and essen-tial lighting in the plant. In some instances, the licensee found the lightingto be inadequate to perform the required tasks because the original design didnot require emergency lights or because the emergency lights provided inade-quate illumination. In addition, the licensee identified many areas thatrequired the installation of or modification to lighting to meet the licensee'sdesign bases and the requirements in 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix R.Background:At Palo Verde, the essential lighting system is an integral part of the normallighting system that provides illumination if the normal lighting system fails.The essential lighting system is rated non-Class lE but is powered fromClass lE sources. The system provides lighting in the control room, in theshutdown panel area, in the main walkways and stairs, in the Class lE switchgearrooms, in areas having Class lE equipment, and in areas used for the safeshutdown of the reactor. Upon loss of the normal lighting system, the essentiallighting system provides adequate illumination for the safe shutdown of thereactor. The system receives power from two redundant and independent Class 1Eac busses. Each redundant Class 1E ac bus supplies power to 50 percent of theessential lighting in the vital areas. The diesel generators provide backuppower.

IN 90-69October 31, 1990 The emergency lighting system receives dc power from two redundant Class lEbatteries through inverters and provides illumination for the control room,the auxiliary electrical equipment rooms, the stairways, and the points leadingto plant exits. The system is normally deenergized and is automaticallyenergized upon loss of ac power to the normal system. The emergency lightingsystem is also composed of 8-hour and li-hour (individually battery-powered)emergency lighting units. The 8-hour emergency lighting units are designed tomeet the technical requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R, Section III.J whichrequires that emergency lighting units with at least an 8-hour battery powersupply be provided in all areas needed for operation of safe shutdown equipmentand in access and egress routes thereto. The li-hour emergency lighting unitsare installed to meet the requirements of the Life Safety Code. These lightingunits are generally installed in plant locations to accommodate the safeevacuation of personnel in the event of a fire in such areas.Discussion:During the Palo Verde event, the inadequate lighting conditions significantlycomplicated the licensee's efforts to cope with the initial failure of theADVs, which delayed the commencement of the controlled removal of decay heat ascalled for by the emergency operating procedures.It is important to note that adequate PM and routine testing programs foressential and emergency lighting systems are helpful in ensuring adequateillumination for the operation of safe shutdown equipment. Emergency lightingis a key fire protection feature associated with supporting post-fire safeshutdown operations. The exercise of good engineering design practices thatconform to industry standards ensures the ability of the lighting system toprovide adequate station lighting in all vital areas during all types ofaccident or transient conditions. The implementation of an effective PM andtesting program which demonstrates lighting system operability is important.Emergency lighting PM programs recommended by manufacturers generally includeroutine monitoring of the battery condition for each lighting unit, periodicload testing to verify that the lighting unit and its associated charger arefunctioning properly, and a periodic "as found" 8-hour lighting unit dischargetest. In addition, the Palo Verde event identified that the inadvertentrepositioning of the emergency lighting fixtures can cause inadequate illumina-tion and that routine verification of emergency lighting fixture orientationcan ensure that emergency lighting is effective.

IN 90-69October 31, 1990 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Ifyou have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact oneof the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate NRR project manager.Charles E. Rossi,'rectoorDivision of Operational Events AssessmentOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical Contacts: N. K. Trehan, NRR(301) 492-0777S. R. Peterson, NRR(301) 492-3062Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

Attachment 1IN 90-69October 31, 1990 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUEDNRC INFORMATION NOTICESInformation Date ofNotice No. Subject Issuance Issued to90-6890-6790-66Stress Corrosion Crackingof Reactor Coolant Pump BoltsPotential Security EquipmentWeaknessesIncomplete Draining andDrying of Shipping CasksHigh Radiation HazardsFrom Irradiated IncoreDetectors and CablesRecent Orifice PlateProblemsPotential for Common-ModeFailure Of High PressureSafety Injection Pumps orRelease of Reactor CoolantOutside Containment DuringA Loss-Of-Coolant AccidentManagement Attention to theEstablishment and Main-tenance of A NuclearCriticality Safety Program10/30/9010/29/9010/25/9010/5/9010/5/9010/4/9010/3/9088-63,Supp. 190-6590-6490-63All holders of OLsor CPs for pres-surized waterreactors (PWRs).All holders of OLsor CPs fornuclear powerreactors andCategory I fuelfacilities.All holders of OLsfor nuclearpower reactorsand all registeredusers of NRCapproved wasteshipping packages.All holders of OLsor CPs for nuclearpower reactors.All holders of OLsor CPs for nuclearpower reactors.All holders of OLsor CPs for pres-surized-waterreactors.All fuel cyclelicensees possess-ing more thancritical massquantities ofspecial nuclearmaterial.OL = Operating LicenseCP = Construction Permit

IN 90-69October 31, 1990 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Ifyou have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact oneof the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate NRR project manager.Charles E. Rossi, DirectorDivision of Operational Events AssessmentOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical Contacts:N. K. Trehan, NRR(301) 492-0777S. R. Peterson, NRR(301) 492-3062Attachment:List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCESC/OGCB:DOEA:NRR*CHBerlinger10/18/90RPB:ADM*TechEd10/18/90AD/AD45*BABoger10/09/90D/PD5 PD5:DRSP:NRR*JEDyer *SRPeterson10/09/90 09/24/90OGCB:DOEA:NRR*PCWen09/24/90SELB:DST:NRR*NKTrehan09/24/90C/SELB:DST:NRR*FRosa09/25/90C/SPLB:DST:NRR*CMcCracken10/03/90D/DST: NRR*AThadani10/03/90DOCUMENT NAME: IN 90-69 IN 90-XXOctober xx, 1990 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Ifyou have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact oneof the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate NRR project manager.Charles E. Rossi, DirectorDivision of Operational Events AssessmentOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical Contacts:N. K. Trehan, NRR(301) 492-0777S. R. Peterson, NRR(301) 492-3062Attachment:List of Recently Issued NRC Information NoticesDocument Name:INADQUATE LIGHTING*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCESD/DOEA:NRRCERossittcol/o9 J I RPB:AD A D/A5A9"eCHB e TEd j h ABoger EDyer10/10/990 O M l 91O/q /9,*OGC :DOEA:F R *SELB:DST:NRR *C/SELB:DST:yRg /SPLB:DST:NRRPCWen NKTrehan FRosa ( IWCMcCracken09/24/90 09/24/90 09/25/90 ' 1 og /90*PD5:DRSP:NRRSRPeterson09/24/90 /t10(s

IN 90-XXSeptember xx, 1990 Discussion:During the Palo Verde event, the inadequate lighting conditions significantlycomplicated the licensee's efforts to cope with the initial ADVs failure.However, the plant personnel were eventually able to open two ADVs and,thereby, commence a controlled removal of decay heat as called for by theemergency operating procedures.Other plants may also have inadequate PM programs for the emergency and theessential lighting systems and may provide inadequate illumination for theoperation of safe shutdown equipment. This event also points out that theinadvertent repositioning of emergency lighting units can cause inadequateillumination. By verifying the orientation of these units, the licensees canensure that the lights are positioned properly.Emergency lighting is a key fire protection feature for the operation of thesafe shutdown equipment. Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 requires 8-houremergency lighting units in areas used for the operation of safe shutdownequipment and in access and egress routes thereto. The staff relies on theexercise of good engineering design practice and design criteria that conformto industry standards to ensure the ability of the lighting system to provideadequate station lighting in all vital areas during all types of accident ortransient conditions and in the access routes to and from these areas.This information notice requiresyou have any questions about theof the technical contacts listedno specific action or written response. Ifinformation in this notice, please contact onebelow or the appropriate NRR project manager.Charles E. Rossi, DirectorDivision of Operational Events AssessmentOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical Contacts:N. K.(301)Trehan, NRR492-0777S. R. Peterson, NRR(301) 492-3062Attachment:List of Recently Issued NRC Information NoticesDocument Name:INADQUATE LIGHTINGD/DOEA:NRRCERossi09/ /90OGCB:DOEA:NRRPCWen Fcv'09/a4/9OC/OGCB:DOEA:NRRCHBerlinger09/ /90SELB:DST:NRRNKTrehanJLS09/ A/90RPB:ADMTechEd09/ /90C/SELB : IRRFRo094S9AD/AD45BABoger09/ /9OqJ2sD/DST:NRRrt t'AThadani09/ /90D/PD5JEDyer09/ /90PD5:DRSP:NRRSRPeterso eo9,o/90C/S P s13 sT :PJRCe EmcctfcKW

Document Name:INADQUATE LIGHTINGRequestor's ID:WERTMANAuthor's Name:peter wenDocument Comments:S34 information notice