ML17326A575

Annual Operating Rept 1979.

ML17326A575
Person / Time
Site:	Cook
Issue date:	03/03/1980
From:	BEGOR R D, SHALLER D V, SVENSON B A INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG
To:
Shared Package
ML17326A574	List: ML17326A573 ML17326A575
References
NUDOCS 8003130424
Download: ML17326A575 (29)

Text

DONALDC.,COOKNUCLEARPLANTANNUALOPERATING REPORT1979CompiledBy:R.D.BegorStaffAs'sistant ReviewedBy:B.A.SvenssonAssistant PlantManagerApprovedBy:D.V.ShallerPlantManager TABLEOFCONTENTSTITLEPAGENUMBERINTRODUCTION PERSONNEL EXPOSURESUMMARYINSERVICE INSPECTION CHANGESTOFACILITY INTRODUCTION TheD.C.CookNuclearPlant,ownedbytheIndiana&MichiganElectricCompanyandlocatedfivemilesnorthofBridgman, Michiganconsistsoftwo1100MWepressurized waterreactors.

ThenuclearsteamsupplysystemsforbothunitsaresuppliedbyWestinghouse withaGeneralElectricturbine-generator onUnit1andaBrown-Boveri turbine-generator onUnit2.Thecondenser coolingmethodisopencycle,usingLakeMichiganwaterasthecondenser coolingsource.TheD.C.CookNuclearPlantisthefirstnuclearfacilitytousetheicecondenser reactorcontainment system,whichutilizesaheatsinkofboratediceinacoldstoragecompartment locatedinsidethecontainment.

Thearchitect/engineer andconstructor wastheAmericanElectricPowerServiceCorporation.

ThisreportwascompiledbyMr.R.D.Begor,withinformation contributed bythefollowing individuals:

D.C.PalmerPersonnel ExposureSummaryH.BolingerInservice Inspection R.S.KeithandE.A.AbshagenChangestoFacility PERSONNEL EXPOSURESUMMARYThefollowing tablerepresents atabulation onanannualbasisofthenumberofplant,utilityandotherpersonnel receiving exposuregreaterthan100Mrem/year andtheirassociated man-remexposureaccording toworkandjobfunctions.

Assignment ofpersonnel tovariousgroupings isbasedonwhattypeofworktheyaieusuallyinvolvedwith.Specifically, assignments aremadeasfollows:Maintenance Personnel

--Includesnon-exempt (non-supervisory) personnel fromtheMaintenance Department andfromtheControl6InstrumentSectionoftheTechnical Department.

Operating Personnel

-Includesnon-exempt personnel fromtheOperations Department, fromtheChemicalSectionoftheTechnical Department, fromtheQualityAssurance Department andSecurityPersonnel.

HealthPhysicsPersonnel

-Includesnon-exempt personnel fromtheRadiation Protection SectionoftheTechnical Department.

Supervisory Personnel

--Includesexempt(supervisory) personnel fromalldepartments whofunctionprimarily assupervisors ofnon-exempt personnel.

Engineering Personnel

-Includespersonnel notprimarily functioning assupervisors ofnon-exempt personnel.

Thisincludessuchpersonnel asmaintenance engineers, nuclearengineers, performance engineers andstationmanagement.

REPORTOFHUIIDEROFPERSQllllEL AIIDINI-REMBYI!ORKAf!DJOBFUHCTIOtl 1979UORK&JOBFUHCTIOHtatonEmloeesUttyEmloeesontractorersandOthersI!UMBEROFPERSONNEL

>00mRemStatonEmloeesTOTALMAN-REMtty.ContractordersEmloeesandOthersREACTOROPERATIONS

&SURVEILLANCE Maintenance Personnel Operating Personnel HealthPhysicsPersonnel Supervisory Personnel Engineering Personnel ROUTINEIIAIHTEHAHCE Maintenance Personnel Operating Personnel HealthPhysicsPersonnel Supervisory Personnel Engineering Personnel IHSERVICE INSPECTION Maintenance Personnel Operating Personnel HealthPhysicsPersonnel Supervisory Personnel Engineering Personnel SPECIALMAINTENANCE Maintenance Personnel Operating Personnel HealthPhysicsPersonnel Supervisory Personnel Engineering Personnel IIASTEPROCESSIHGMaintenance Personnel Operating Personnel HealthPhysicsPersonnel Supervisory Personnel Engineering Personnel REFUELING Maintenance Personnel Operating Personnel HealthPhysicsPersonnel Supervisory Personnel Engineering Personnel TOTALMaintenance Personnel Operating Personnel HealthPhysicsPersonnel Supervisory Personnel Engineering Personnel GPAHOTOTAL596510126987138689588842106553412847016106986514231621600016140.00100001717390511171017102320137044801818513101580112026616420342267043.16833.171l.1612.2320.97191.2980.5214.2962.0320.22815.8411.2440.5593.0250.58528.6260.0634.1310.5760.46912.0090.3626.4230.7951.19613.7160.0590.4382.3402.061138.65835.42017.00811.0005.510207.5960000.10600000.1540.1380001.0010.10700012.8025.6090000.15900000.107000014.3295.85420.1832.15900.5230.0150.10525.00202.5920.100078.86306.2544.4930171.74306.2485.3790.96057.08402.6733.043053.157012.8723.8230.121388.008031.16213.5531.186433.909 INSERVICE INSPECTION InDecember1979aninservice examination oftubingcontained withintheUnit2SteamGenerators (No.2andNo.3)wasconducted byWestinghouse Corporation duringRefueling CycleI-II.Thisexamination wasperformed tosatisfythesurveillance requirements identified inSection4.5.5oftheDonaldC.CookNuclearPlantTechnical Specifications.

Theresultsofthisinspection revealedthefollowing:

1)Atotalof644SteamGenerator tubeswereexaminedthroughthe"U"bendarea.Thisnumberisinexcessofthe3percentrequiredbyTechnical Specification andASMECodeSectionXI.2)Thisexamination revealednotubingdefectshavingapenetration greater.than20percentofwallthickness.

3)TherewerenotubespluggedinanyoftheSteamGenerators.

Evaluation oftheinservice eddycurrentexamination datawasaccomplished byaZetec,Inc.datainterpreter certified toLevelIIAusingZetecequip-mentcalibrated inaccordance withZetecprocedure.

CHANGESTOFACILITYBriefdescriptions andsummarysafetyevaluations fordesignchanges(RFC's)madetothefacilityasdescribed intheDonald-C.CookNuclearPlantFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(FSAR)arepresented'in thissection.Thesechangeswerecompleted withoutpriorNuclearRegulatory Commission approvalpursuanttotheprovisions ofTitle10,CodeofFederalRegu-lationssubsection 50.59(a).

DC-12-958 Infrareddetectors wereinstalled incertainC02protected areasoftheD.C.CookNuclearPlant.Additional alarmunitsforthenew'etectors wereinstalled ineachControlRoom.Thecontrolcircuitry logicwasmodifiedsothatboththeionization andtheinfrareddetectors mustseeafirecondition inorderforC02actuation tooccur.ThischangewillminimizefalsedumpsofC02fromdustorwindcon-ditionswhichmayexistintheseareas.ThisRFCisnotconsidered safetyrelatedbecausethechangesarebeingmadetoSeismicClassIIIequipment andwhileapplicable arenotrequiredbytheNRCfireprotection recommendations.

ThisRFCwilleliminate potential spuriousactuations oftheC02suppression systemandwasaccounted forinthefirehazardsanalysisforCookPlant.ThisRFCprovidesanadditional levelofdefenseindepthforfireprotection attheD.C.CookNuclearPlant.DC-12-1521 RFC-DC-12-1521 changedthefiresystemactuation methodfromincreasing waterpressuretolossofaironthefollowing sprinkl.er systemsservedbytheAuxiliary Buildingfireheader:1,Drummingarea(yreaction type)2.Newfuelreceiving area(@reaction type).3.Aux.Bldg.H2tubes(dry.pilot').TheAuxiliary Buildingfireheaderisnormallyfilledwithastaticheadofwater.ValvesZMO-10820isolatetheheaderfromtherestoftheplantfiresuppression waterheaderwhichisnormallypressurized.

Thesystemisdesignedsothatuponactuation ofanyauxiliary buildingsprinkler system(intheeventofafire)thestaticheadofwaterintheheaderwouldbesufficient tocreatea25psiincreasing pressuresignaltotrip

.thedelugevalvepressureswitchwhich,throughthefiresystemlogic,opensZNO-10&20andstartsafirepump.Thefire:system logicwouldthenkickinadditional pumpsasneededdepending onthewaterdemandtoextinguish afire.Theresultsofsurveillance testingofthissystemhaveshownthatthestaticheaddoesnotprovidesufficient pressureincreasetoactuatethedelugevalvepressureswitches.

Sincetheauxiliary buildingsprinkler systemsareeitherthedrypilotorpreaction type,airmustbeventedfromthedrypilotactuatorinordertoopenthedelugevalvessothatawaterflowpathtothesprinkler headsisestablished.

Theairsupplyisnormalplantair.ThesubjectRFCallowsthelossofair(decreasing airpressure) toprovidethefiresystemlogicinputtoopenZMO-10820andstartthefirepump.Thefiresystemlogicwouldthenfunctionaspreviously indicated.

Thefireprotection systemisSeismicClassIII,howeveritprovidesprotection tosafetyrelatedareasandequipment intheauxiliary buildingandhencethisRFCisconsidered tobesafetyrelated.Additionally, thesubjectRFCclosesoutanopenitemoftheNRCreviews.TheNuclearSafety8Licensing SectionhasreviewedthesubjectRFCinlightoftherequirements ofNRCBranchTechnical PositionAPCSB9.5-1andtheAEPSCdefenseindepthphilosophy.

TheresultsofthisreviewindicatethatthisRFCwillfurtherenhancetheabilityofthefiresup-pressionwatersystemtoperformitsintendeddesignfunctionwhileinnowaydegrading theremainder ofthefireprotection systemsattheDonaldC.CookNuclearPlant.RFC-DC-12-1521 doesnotcreateasubstantial safetyhazardnordoesitconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestionasdefinedin10CFR50.59.

ThisRFCwillinnowayadversely affectthehealthandsafetyofthepublic.DC-12-2111 Asecondoxygenanalyzerhasbeeninstalled tocontinuously samplethedischarge linefromtheWasteGasCompressor s.Uponasignalofhighoxygenconcentration, automatic controlfeatureswillisolatetheGasDecayTankbeingfilledandswitchtheflowautomatically tothe"standby" tank.Theaffectedcomponent isthenpurgedwithnitrogentodilutetheoxygenconcen-tration:Additional oxygensamplingiscompleted toverifythattheoxygenconcentration hasdecreased toasafelevel.ThisRFCisconsidered safety-related sinceitinvolvestheadditionofasecondoxygenanalyzertoaClassIsystemandbecausecertainsectionsofthepipeandvalvesbeingaddedaretobedesignedandinstalled asClassItomeetisolation criteriaforsuchsystems.Thesecondoxygenanalyzerservesthepurposeofsamplingcontinuously thedischarge linefromthe wastegascompressor s.Itservestostartcontroloperations toavoidthedevelopment ofexplosive mixturesinthegaseouswastedisposalsystem.Theinstallation ofthesecondanalyzerwasrequested inquestion320.2oftheFSAR(Appendix g)withadditional provisions beingmentioned inquestion320.6.Becausethenatureofthemodification itself,andbecauseofitspurpose,thisRFCdoesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestionasdefinedin10CFR50.59 norwillitendangerthehealthandsafetyofthepublic.DC-12-2115 Thethermocouple meterreadoutfortemperature indicator ITI-900ontheRefueling WaterStorageTank(RWST)wasreplacedwithamoreaccurateOmegadigitalreadoutunitforobtaining RWSTtemperature, Thelowtemperature alarmsetpointforITA-900ontheRWSTwaschangedfrom40'F.to80'F.ThisnewalarmsetpointwillbringthealarminbeforeTechnical Specifications valuesareexceeded.

Thesechangeswere.recommended forcompatibility withtheEmergency CoreCoolingSystem(ECCS)analysisreportedinAppendixItotheFinalSafetyAnalysisReport.Thenewtemperature alarmsetpointistheminimumtem-=peraturespecified intheUnit2Technical Specifications.

Thesechangesaresafety-related becausetheRWSTandassociated components areSeismicClassIandarepartoftheECCS.ThisRFCdoesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestionasdefinedin10CFR50.59.

DC-02-2121 Thefollowing modifications weremadetotheUnit<2Containment PurgeandExhaustSysteminaccordance withtherequirements oftheNRC'sBranchTechnical PositionCSB6-5:1.Installed orificeplatesanddebrisscreensontheinboardisolation valves(VCR-101throughVCR-107)atthesevencontainment purgeventilation penetrations.

2.Providedatiedownsystemwithblowoutpanelsonthepurgesystemductwork(exterior tothecontainment) whichcouldbecomemissilesanddamageClassIsafetyequipment intheareaifsuchductworkweresubjected toLOCApressures.

3.Modifiedthe14isolation valves(VCR-101throughVCR-107andVCR-201throughVCR-207)toprovidevalveclosuretimesoflessthan5seconds.

ThesubjectRFChasbeeninitiated tomeetthecommitments inAppendixgoftheFSAR(guestions 022.4and022.13)andrequirements ofBranchTechnical PositionCSB-6-4,"Containment PurgingDuringNormalPlantOperation."

Thechangesenhancethereliability oftheinvolvedsystemsanddonotpreventthesystemsfromperforming theirintendedsafetyfunction.

Thechangesdonotconstitute anunreviewed questionasdefinedin10CFR50.59.

DC-12-2158 RFC-DC-12-2158 installed anautomatic composite samplerontheturbineroomsumpdischarge line.Installation ofthiscomposite samplerallowsforthecollection andanalysisofsumpdischarge samplesduringperiodsofprimary-to-secondary steamgenerator tubeleakage.Thisrequestforchange(RFC)revisesaSeismicClassIIIsystemwhichisnotrequiredforthesafeshutdownoftheunit,andthusisconsidered tobeanon-safety relatedchange.Thesubjectsamplerisbeinginstalled inaccordance withNRCquestion320.8totheFSAR.RFC-DC-12-2158 doesnotcreateasubstantial safetyhazardnordoesitconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestionasdefinedin10CFR50.59.

ThisRFCprovidesfordesignchangeswhicharewithinthelimitsofoursafetyanalysisandhencewillhavenoadverseeffectonthehealthandsafetyofthepublic.DC-12-2166 Unit82OnlBlockanddrainvalveswereaddedtothefollowing systemsonUnit82oftheD.C.CookNuclearPlant:l.2.3.4.5.Emergency CoreCoolingSystem.PrimaryWaterSystemComponent CoolingWaterSystem.IceCondenser Refrigeration System.Demineralized (Makeup)WaterSystem.Thesevalveswereaddedtofacilitate pneumatic testingofseatleakageonthecontainment isolation valvesinthesesystems.ThistestingisrequiredbyUnit2license'condition 3,1inaccordance withthecommittment madeinresponsetoguestions 022.7and022,15contained inAppendixgtotheFSAR.ThisRFCissafetyrelatedbecauseitrequiresmodifications tobemadetosomecontainment penetrations whichareSeismicClassIandarerequiredtobeisolatedundercertaindesignbasisaccidentconditions.

Themodifications arebeingmadeinaccordance withthedesignbasisforcontainment isolation aspresented in'.theFSAR.ThisRFCdoesnotcreateasubstantial safetyhazardnordoesitconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestionasdefinedin10CFR50.59.

DC-02-2181 AllUnit82Pressurizer Level,SteamGenerator Level(narrowrange)andReactorCoolantPressure(widerange)transmitters werereplacedwithITTBartonrequalified transmitters tofulfillthecommitment madeinresponsetoguestion022.8inAppendixgtotheFSAR.ThechangerequiredbythisRFCinvolvesthereplacement of17ClassIEsignaltransmitters.

Thereplacement isthe.resultoftheSeismicandEnvironmental Requalification programconducted byMestinghouse ElectricCorporation.

Althoughthischangeissafetyrelated,therequiredseismicanalyseshavebeencompleted onthenewreplacement sensors,theirsupportsandtubing.ThisRFCisnotconsidered tobeanunreviewed safetyquestioninaccordance with10CFR50.59 (2)(a),andwillnotadversely affectthehealthandsafetyofthepublic.DC-01-2193 OntheUnitPlEmergency DieselGenerators, thecontrolcircuitry andthefeedbreakercontrolcircuitry weremodifiedtoelectrically removethe"non-essential" tripcircuitsfromservicewheneverthedieselgenerator isrequiredforaccidentconditions (SafetyInjection orblackout).

The"non-essential" tripcircuitsremainoperableduringSurveillance Testinguntilanemergency signalisreceived.

Duringtheaccidentmodethe"essential" tripcircuits(EngineOver-speedandGenerator Differential) willremaininservicetotripthedieselshouldanyessential tripcondition arise.Thechangesincorporated bythisRFCaresafetyrelatedinthattheDieselGenerators areSeismicClassIequipment andareservedbyClassIEcable.Thesechangesdonotrepresent anunreviewed safetyquestioninaccordance with10CFR50.59a(.2) andfurther,theyrepresent anupgradeinsafetyinthatadditional protection isaffordedbytheenhancement ofDieselGenerator availability duringaSafetyInjection Signal,Hence,thesechangesshallnotaffectthehealthandsafetyofthepublic.DC-02-2202 Backupmoldedcasecircuitbreakersand/orfuseswereaddedfor600VESSandNon-ESSelectrical equipment insidetheUnit82Containment oftheD.C.CookNuclearPlant.Theadditionofredundant circuitbreakerswillreducetheprobability ofpenetration damageduringafault.RFC-DC-02-2202 proposestheinstallation ofabackuporredundant setofbreakersand/orfusestoprotectthe600voltESSandNon-ESSelectrical equipment inthecontainment buildingbecausefailureofasinglecircuit 10'breakertoopenduringafaultmaycausetheelectrical penetration tobedamaged.ThisRFCisincompliance with"additional condition (m)"toUnit82Operating License.Sincetheinstallation ofthisequipment addsaredundancy forpro-tectionofsafetyrelatedequipment, itdoesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestionasdefinedin10CFRSection50.59.DC-01-2207 AllUnit81reactorcoolantwiderangepressure, pressurizer pressureandSteamGenerator waterleveltransmitters werereplacedwithrequalified transmitters manufactured byITTBartontoprovideupgradedenvironmental qualification.

Thismodification involvesSiesmicClassIcomponents.

Thechangeissafetyrelatedbecausetheservicesinvolvedaretoberelieduponforlongtermmonitoring following adesignbasisaccident.

Inaddition, thesteamgenerator leveltransmitter providesoneofseveralredundant signalstoinitiatereactortripandstart-upoftheauxiliary feedwater systemuponalossofnormalfeedwater orfeedlinebreak.TheNRCwasinformedofthischangeinaletterdatedMay4,1979fromMr.G.P.MaloneytoMr.HaroldR.Denton(AEP:NRC:00142).

ThisisthesamechangeinUnit1aswasmadeinUnit2underRFC-DC-02-2181.

ThisRFCdoesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestionasdefinedin10CFR50.59 andwillnotendangerthehealthorsafetyofthepublic.DC-12-2222 Unit82OnlThesourceofpowertotheTurbine.DriyenAuxi,ltary Feedwater pumps(TDAFP)discharge valvesandtripandthrottlevalveswaschangedfromACtoDCpower.Thiswasaccomplished bytheadditionofan"N"trainbatteryasthenewpowersupplyforthesevalves.The250VDC"N"trainbatterysystemconsistsofonebattery(onesetof120leadacidcells);twobatterychargers, eachsuppliedfromaseparatesafetytrain.a-c bus;andtwostandbycircuitsfromtheexistingABandCDplantbatteries.

This"N"batteryisphysically andelectrically isolatedfromtheotherplantbatteries.

Liketheotherplantbatteries, itwillhaveitsownactivenormalchargerandawiredstandbycharger.Theauxiliary feedwater tosteamgenerator valvesarenormallyopen;therefore, inmostcases,theywillnotbealoadonthebattery,butifthey(oranyamongthem)happentobeclosedthebatteryhasadequatecapacity

'todrivethemopen.Theremaining loadconsistsoftheauxiliary feedwater turbinecontrolbus.TheAFWturbinecontrolbusencompasses theAFWturbinestartandtripcircuits, theoverspeed monitor,thetestvalve,andtheemergency leak-offvalve.Thebatteryissizedtoallowanticipated operation ofthevalvesandtheircontrolcircuitswiththebatterychargersandbackupfeedcircuitopen.Thebatterywillbecapableofservingtheturbinedrivenauxiliary feedpumpforaslongasthesteamsupplytotheturbineisavail-able.The"N"trainbatteryisfurtherdescribed inSection8.3.5onpage8.3.8oftheFSAR.TheNRCrequiredthatthechangefromACtoDCpowerbemadesincetheirgenericstudiesshowthattheauxiliary feedwater systemistoodependent onACpower(offsite&emergency diesel).Thereliability ofthesystemwillbeincreased byaddingdiversity tothepowersupplysuchaschangingtoDCpower.Thisrequirement hadbeenimposedbytheNRCduringtheOperating LicensereviewforD.C.CookUnit2andlicensecondition 3.Krequiresthatthischangebecompleted priortostartupfromthefirstrefueling onUnit2.ThisRFCisconsidered safetyrelatedbecausetheAuxiliary Feed-waterSystemisSeismicClassIandtheassociated electrical hardwareisClassIE.Also,theAuxiliary Feedwater Systemisrequiredtofunctionduringadesignbaseaccident.

TheNuclearSafety&Licensing Sectionhasreviewedtheengineering anddesignworkrequiredtoaffectthischangeonbothUnits1&2,andfindsitacceptable forinstallation.

RFC-DC-12-2222 doesnotcreateasubstantial safetyhazardnordoesitconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestionasdefinedinlOCFR50.59.

Thischangewillnotadversely affectthehealthandsafetyofthepublic.DC-12-2230 Additional ionization typefiredetectorswereinstalled inthefollowing locations intheAuxiliary BuildingandinboththeUnitPlandUnit>2ControlRooms:1.Sprayadditivetankroom.2.NuclearSamplingRoom.3.Reciprocating andcentrifugal chargingpumprooms.4.Safetyinjection pumprooms.5.HVACmezzanine aboveaccesscontrolarea.6.Laundryroom.7.HVACvestibules on633'levation.

8.HVACroomsabovethecontrolrooms.9.Abovecontrolroomceilings.

10.Incontrolroomsupply/return airducts,11.Unit1and2hotshutdownpanels.

12Thisadditional detection capability wasrequiredduetothefirehazardsandfireloadinginthesesafety-related areasoftheCookNuclearPlant.Theionization detectors willprovideearlywarningofthesignsofafiretherebyallowingthefirebrigadesufficient timetoproceedtotheaffectedareawhilethefireisinitsincipient stage.ThisRFCisconsidered safetyrelatedbecausethefirehazardsintheseareasinvolveClassIEcablingand/orSeismicClassIequipment.

TheNuclearSafety8Licensing SectionhasreviewedthisRFCinlightoftheNRCB.T;P.9.5-1andtheFireHazardsAnalyses.

TheresultsofthisreviewindicatethatthisRFCwillincreasethefiredetection capability andisconsistent withourcommitments totheNRC.RFC-DC-12-2230 does'notcreateasubstantial safetyhazardnordoesitconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestionasdefinedin10CFR50.59.

DC-12-2225 Unit¹2OnlAReactorCoolantPumpMotoroilspillageprotection andcontrolsystemwasinstalled onall4reactorcoolantpumpmotorsofUnit¹2.Theoilspillageprotection andcontrolsystemconsistsofapackageofsplashguards,catchbasins,andenclosures assembled asattachments totheRCPmotoratstrategic locations toprecludethepossibility ofoilmakingcontactwithhotRCScomponents andpiping.Theoilspillageprotection andcontrolsystemincludesanoil-tight enclosure aroundthehigh-pressure oilliftsystemandasetofdrippans,splash*guards,andcatchbasinsaroundthemotorlowerbracketandbearing,externalheatexchanger, andtheupperbearingoilreservoir alarmhousing.Thissystemisdesignedtocontrolbothpressureandgravitytypeoilleaksthusminimizing thepossibility ofoilignitionfromhotreactorcoolantpipingandothersources.EachReactorCoolantPump(.RCP)motorcontainsa265gallonlubricating oilreservoir coupledtotheRCPoilliftsystemwhichisnecessary fortheproperoperation ofthepump.TheRCP'sareSeismicClassI.WhilenotrequiredforsafeshutdownoftheplantnoranyECCSfunctions, theRCP'sarepartoftheReactorCoolantSystempressureboundary.

Thus,thisRFCisconsidered tobesafetyrelated.Thefirehazardsanalysisshowedthatthequantityoflubeoilrepre-sentedasignificant firehazard.Thepotential forafireisfurtherincreased sincethehotRCSpipingcouldignitetheoilshouldaleakoccur.The'gnitiontemperature oftheoilisinthesamerangeastheRCSpipingtemper-atures.Theexistingdrippanswereshowntobesufficient tocontain ordinarydripoilhowever,theoilliftsystemispressurized andapres-'surizedoilleakcouldnotbehandled,Alsoinlightof,thefactthataheavyaccumulation ofelectrical cabletraysareinthevicinityofeachpump,afireinvolving apressurized oilleakcouldpotentially havesafetysignificance.

TheNuclearSafety5Licensing SectionhasreviewedthisRFCinlightofNRCBranchTechnical positionAPCSB9.5-1andtheFireHazardsAnalysis.

Thisreviewindicates thatthischangeincreases thefireprotection capability intheCookNuclearPlantwhilenot,inanyway,degrading anysafetyrelatedsystem.TheWestinghouse scopeincludestheappropriate seismic,missileandhighenergylinebreak(LOCAandoiljet)analyses.

RFC-DC-12-2225 doesnotcreateasubstantial safetyhazardnordoesitconstitute anunreviewd safetyquestionasdefinedinthe10CFR50,59, ThisRFCfurtherenhancesthefireprotection systemsintheCookNuclearPlant.13DC-12-2231 Automatic fireprotection watersprinkler systemswereinstalled inthefollowing areasoftheD,C,CookNuclearPlant:a)Dieselenginedrivenfirepumprooms,b)ChargingandSafetyInjection pumprooms.c)Auxiliary BuildingElev,587'astEnd.d)Auxiliary BuildingElev.587'estEnd.e)Auxiliary BuildingElev.609'aundry Room'area.

f)ReactorCoolantPumpsinbothUnit>1andUnit~2Containments.

Thesesprinkler systemsarenecessary toprotectsafetyrelatedequip-ment/cabling fromtheeffectsofapostulated fireeitherduetotheperman-entlyinstalled combustible materials ortransient fireloadsintheaboveareas.Thus,thisRFCisconsidered tobesafetyrelated.TheNuclearSafety8Licensing sectionhasreviewedthesubjectRFCinlightoftherequirements ofNRCB.T.P.9.5-1andtheFireHazardsAnalysis.

Thisreviewindicates thatthesesprinkler systemswillimprovetheautomatic fireextinguishingcapability intheCookNuclearPlantandmeetcommitments totheNRC.Inaddition, thesprinkler systemattheReactorCoolantPumps(RCP)wereinstalled inconjunction withRFCDC-12-2225, whichprovidestheRCPMotorOilSpillageControl/Protection System,andinthismannerweareincreasing ourcapability toextinuishafireinvolving lubeoilshouldoneoccur.Thisisanaddedleveofprotection forfightingin-containment fires.RFCDC-12-2231 doesnotcreateasubstantial safetyhazardnordoesitconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestionasdefinedin10CFR50.59.

ThisRFCwillnotadversely affectthehealthandsafetyofthepublic.

.DC-12-2276 Unit82OnlLocalControlcapabilities wereprovidedfortheUnit82Emergency DieselGenerators oftheD.C.CookNuclearPlant.Thismodification providesfor:1)Starting,

stopping, controlling speedandvoltage,andstartingrequiredauxiliaries fromalocationotherthantheControlRoom;2)Isolating theexistingDieselGenerator controlsintheControlRoom;and3)ClosingtheDieselGener'ator breakerslocally.Anewsub-panel DGABX(DGCDX)wasinstalled ineachDieselGenerator room,withsimilarcontrolsandinstrumentation asthecontrolroom.Nostart-stop capability wasbuiltintothenewpanelbecausethedieselcanbestartedandstoppedfromtheexistingsub-panel DGAB(DGCD)locatedintheDieselGenerator room.Thespeedandvoltagecontrolsaswell~asmonitoring instrumentation arelocatedonthenewsub-panel DGABX(DGCDX).Also,onthenewsub-panel thereisaLOCAL/REMOTE transferswitch,totransferthevoltageandspeedcontrolfromthecontrolroomtothenewsub-panel.

Anannunciator willinformtheoperatorinthecontrolroomthattheDiesel.Generator iscontrolled locally.Theinstrumentation isnotaffectedbythetransferswitchandisoperational anytimethedieselisrunning.Duringplantnormaloperation thisLOC/REMtransferswitchisplacedintheremotepositionandtheannunciator iscleared.EThisRFCisconsidered safety-related becauseelectrical circuitsbeingmodifiedareClassIEequipment andthedieselgenerators arerequ',red-tofunctionfollowing alossofoffsitepower.Oneoftheassumptions madebyAEPSCinthedesignofthelocalshut-downsystemwasthatoffsitepowerwasavailable toenergizethesafetybuses.Aconcurrent lossoffunctionability fromthecontrolroom(cablevaultfire)andlossofoffsitepowerwasnotpartofthelocalshutdowndesignbasis.ThuslocalcontroloftheDiesel.Generators wasnotrequired.

TheNRCinLicenseCondition C.3.0.CoftheUnit82Operating Licenserequiredthatlossofoffsitepowerbeincludedinthedesignbasiswhichrequiresprovisions forlocalcontroloftheDieselGenerators.

RFC-DC-12-2276 doesnotcreateasubstantial safetyhazardnordoesitconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestionasdefinedin10CFR50.59.

DC-12-2352 AllUnit81andUnit82MainSteamFlowandPressurizer Pressurenarrowrangetransmitters werereplacedwithrequalified ITTBartonTransmitters.

Condition 4.A.totheUnitNo.2Operating License,asamendedonJune16,1978(Amendment No.6),requiredthereplacement ofallelectronic

15.Foxborotransmitters (EllGMandE13DM)usedinsafety-related circuitsinsidecontainment withtransmitters qualified bysequential environmental testinginaccordance withIEEE323-1971.

ByletterdatedJune1,1978,AEP:NRC:00021, AEPcommitted toreplacing theFoxborotransmitters usedinthe"SteamFlow"and"Pressurizer Pressure" functiononUnitNo.1withqualified transmitters.

Thereplacement transmitters areBartonModelNo.763pressuretransmitters (foruseinthe"Pressurizer Pressure" functional circuits) andBartonModelNo.764differential pressuretransmitters (forusein"SteamFlow"functional circuits).

TheseBartontransmitter Modelshavebeentestedinaccordance withIEEE323-1971andtheresultsofthetestingdocumented inWestinghouse letterNS-TMA-1950.

(SeeAEP:NRC:00095 submittal fordetailsofthetestsandtestresults.)

The"Pressurizer Pressure" and"SteamFlow"functions arenotpartoftheLongTerm-PostAccidentMonitoring (LT-PAM)Systems(asdefinedinTechnical Specification Table3.3-10(.UnitNo.2.TheBartonModelNos.763and764transmitters arefullyqualified fortheirrespective reactortripand/orESFactuation functions (shorttermqualification.)

Basedontheabove,NS&Lhasnoreasontoobjecttotheinstallation oftheBartontransmitters.

ThesubjectRFCdoesnotrepresent anunreviewed safetyquestionasdefinedinlOCFR50.59 andimplementation ofthischangewillhavenoadverseeffectonthehealthandsafetyofthegeneralpublic.DC-01-2353 Theeightpart-length controlrodswereremovedfromtheUnitPlreactor.Ananti-rotational devicewasinstalled oneachpart-length controlroddrivemechanism

(.CROM)topreventtheCRDMleadscrewsfromrotatinginthedirection whichwouldlowerthemduetogravityorvibration.

=Thimbleplugswereinstalled inplaceofeachpart-length controlrodtopreventanythermalorhydraulic problemsassociated withthepart-length removal.ThePartLengthRodsonDonaldC.CookUnitNo,1willberemovedbasedonthefollowing:

1.NocreditistakenintheSafetyAnalysisperformed byExxonandWestinghouse fortheirpresence.

2.Thereactor's Operating LicenseandTechnical Specifications pre-empttheiruse,3.Unit1hassuccessfully load-followed andcontrolled artificially largeXenonoscillations withouttheuseofthePartLengthRodsinCycles1and2.4.ThePart.LengthRodshavebeenremovedfromUnitNo.2.5.The.rodswillbestoredin'.thespentfuelpoolshouldfuturechangesinlicensing requirements oroperating considerations permittheiruse.

16TheFSARwillbeamendedtoeliminate references totheuseofpart-lengthcontrolrodsinUnit1,aswasdoneforUnit2inAmendment 78.ATechnical Specification changerequestwillbesubmitted totheNRCtoeliminate Technical Specification 3/4.1.3.6 whichrequiresthatallthepart-length controlrodsbefullywithdrawn inModes1and2.ThisRFCdoesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestionasdefinedin10CFR50.59 andwillnotendangerthehealthorsafetyofthepublic.DC-01-2354 Thefollowing modifications weremadetotheUnit81Containment Purge.and ExhaustSystem:2.3.Installed debrisscreensontheinboardisolation valvesatthesevencontainment purgeventilation penetrations.

Providedatiedownsystemwithblowoutpanelsonthepurgesystemductworkexteriortothecontainment whichcouldbecomemissilesanddamageClassIsafetyequipment intheareaifsuchductworkweresubjected toLOCApressures.

Installed quickreleasevalvesintheairlinesatthosecontainment purgeisolation valveswhichdonotmeeta5-secondclosuretimefollowing acontainment isolation signal.RFCDC-01-2354 callsformodifications totheUnit1Containment PurgeSupplyandExhaustSystemtocomplywiththeNRC'sBranchTechnical PositionCSB6-4.Thesemodifications weremadetoUnit2asindicated inourresponsetoguestion022.4and022.13inAppendixgtotheFSAR.ThegenericNRCletterofNovember28,1978requiredthatalloperating plantswhodesiretocontinuepurgingbemodifiedtocomplywithB.T.P.CSB6-4orjustifyotherwise.

TheNRCisconcerned abouttheabilityofthePurgeSystemisolation valves=to closeunderthedynamicforcesassociated withaLOCA.ThePurgeSystemisolation valvesareSeismicClassIandarerequiredtofunctionduringadesignbasisaccident.

Assuch,thisRFCisconsidered tobesafetyrelated.TheNuclearSafety8Licensing SectionhasreviewedthisRFCinlightofourpastNRCcorrespondence andmeetingsonthismatter,.Thi,sRFCis,consistent withthecommitments madeinourJanuary4,1979lettertotheNRC(AEP:NRC:00114).

RFCDC-01-2354 doesnotcreateasubstantial safetyhazardnordoesitconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestionasdefinedin10CFR50.59.

17DC-02-2355 Thetemporary anti-rotationaI devicesonthepartlengthcontrolroddevicemechanism (CRDM)leadscrewswerereplacedwithpermanent devicesonUnit~2oftheD.C.CookNuclearPlant.Planstoinstallthepermanent deviceswerereportedtotheNRCinlettersAEP:NRC:00117 andAEP:NRC:00190 concerning FSARAmendment No.83.Theinstallation ofthepermanent devicesisexpectedtosaveconsiderable outagetimeandhumanradiation exposureduetoelimination oftheneedforperiodicinspections.

ThisRFCissafetyrelatedbecausecontrolrodassemblies areSeismicClassI,havethepotential forinterfering withotherSiesmicClassIsystems,andaredescribed intheFSAR.ThestressanalysisistobeprovidedbyWestinghouse.

ThisRFCdoesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestionasdefinedin10CFR50.59 andwillnotendangerthehealthorsafetyofthepublic.DC-12-2361 Thefollowing modifications weremadetotheContainment Recirculation SumpinbothUnitsoftheD.C.CookNuclearplant;1.Removaloftheperforated platebelowthesumpoutletpipes.(8lockage ofthisplatewasshowntoproduceswirlwhichmaybeundesirable.)

2.Extension oftheexistingventpipetoanelevation abovethemaximumlevelpossibleinthecontainment duringanaccident, 3.Modification ofthesecondary sumprooftoincorporate aslopedrooftoallowmoreeffective ventingoftheprimarysump.'.8oringventholesinthetopcoveroftheprimarysumpupstreamofthecranewall toallowairtoescapefrombeneaththiscover.5.Modification ofthesumpinlettoincorporate bothcoarseandfinescreens.Thesemodifications areaddressed inanAldenResearchLaboratory (ARL)report,"Hydraulic ModelInvestigation ofVortexing andSwirllljthinaReactorContainment Recirculation Sump."Inaddition, acommitment wasmadetoperformthesemodifications duringthefirstandfourthRefueling OutageonUnit82andUnit41respectively (AEP:NRC:00110)..

ThisRFCcallsforvariousstructural modifications andadditions tothecontainment recirculation sump.Sincethesumpisanintegralcomponent oftheEmergency CoreCoolantSystem(ECCS)andassuchisSeismicClassI,theRFCwasdeemedtobesafetyrelated.Evenwithouttheproposedmodifications, thesumpwasshowntoperformacceptably asdemon-stratedbymodeltestingperformed byAldenResearchLaboratory (ARL).However,ARLdidsuggestcertainchangeswhichwouldfurtherimprovethesumpperformance andthoserecommendations arethebasisfortheRFC.Thesechangeswillimprovethealreadysatisfactory performance ofasafetyfunctionandassuchdonotconstitite anunreviewed safetyquestionasdefinedinlOCFR50.59.

DC-12-2385 A"unittrip"uponlossofbothmainfeedwater pumpswasinstalled onbothUnitsoftheD.C.CookNuclearPlant.Asignalderivedfromthefeedpumpturbinestopvalveclosuretripcircuit(lossoffeedpump)wasprovidedtotriptheMainTurbinedirectly, ATurbineTripabove105power(reactorandturbinepower)willalsoresultinatripoftheReactor.Thisnewtripsignalwasaddedtoprovideadditional marginintheSteamGenerator secondary sidewaterinventory intheeventofalossofthemainfeedwater pumps.ThecircuitinvolvedisnotClassIEandthemechanical equipment involvedisSeismicClassIII.TheReactorTripcircuit(above10Ãpower)derivedfromaTurbineTrip,andviceversa,alreadyexists.TgedirectReactorTripsignalswhichcanbederivedfromalossofsecondary heatsinktransients are:1.Low-LowSteamGenerator waterlevel.2.LowSteamGenerator waterlevelincoincidence withsteamflow/feed flowmismatch.

3.Pressurizer Pressure-high.4.Overtemperature AT.5.LowSteamlinepressure.

6.Containment Pressure-high.Theloss(orpartialloss)ofsecondary heatsinktransients whichareanalyzedintheFSARarethelossofnormalfeedwater, lossofload,loadrejection, turbinetrip,mainsteamisolation valveclosure,feed-watersystemmalfunction, mainfeedwater linebreakaccident, andmainsteamlinebreakaccident.

Anyoneoftheabovereactortripsignalsmeetstherequirements ofthesafetyanalysisandarerequiredtobeoperable'y ourTechnical Specifications.

Thesafetyanalysisshowsthatforalossofnormalfeedwater (mainfeedpumptrip)thereisadequate 19.secondary sidewaterinventory topreventunacceptable safetyrelatedconsequences andthattheauxiliary feedwater systemprovidesthenecessary heatsinktoremovedecayheat.Theadditionofthisnewtripsignalshouldprovideaddedmargintothealreadyadequatesecondary waterinventory duringamainfeedpumptriptransient andassuchthereisnosafetyanalysisrequirement forthistriptooccur(nocreditistakenforit).Low-lowsteamgenerator waterlevelorlowsteamgenerator waterlevelcoincident withsteamflow/feed flowmismatchtypically indicatethelossofmainfeedpumpsandprovideadequatetripsignalsaspartoftheReactorPro-tectionSystem.Thisnewtripcircuitbeinginstalled underRFC-OC-12-2385 isnotpartoftheReactorProtection System,however,itdoes,ineffect,provideanadditional ReactorTripSignalwhenthereactorandturbinepowerareabove10KandassuchRFC-DC-12-2385 isconsidered tobesafetyrelated.TheNuclearSafetyandLicensing SectionhasalsoreviewedRFC-OC-12-2385inlightoftherecentanalysisperformed asaresultoftheTHI-2accident.

Thisanalysisshowsthatintheunlikelyeventofalossofmainfeedwater andthesimultaneous lossofauxiliary feedwater withthereactorinitially at100Kpower,thesecondary sidewaterinventory wouldboiloffinapproximately 42to45minutes.Areactortripwouldoccurinapproximately 11to13secondsonSF/FFmismatchcoincident withlowS/Gwaterlevel.Thislongperiodoftimeforboiloff'isattributed tothelargesecondary sidewaterinventory whichexistsinthesteamgenerator.

RFC-DC-12-2385 hasnosignificant effectonmitigating theconsequences ofsuchatransient atCookPlantandatbestwillresultinanearlierTurbine/Reactor trip.Ifthisnewtripcircuitdidnotfunction, thesafetyanalysisrequirements aremetwiththeReactorProtection tripcircuitsdescribed above.Assuch,theeffectofRFC-DC-12-2385 ontheconsequences oflossofnormalfeedwater transients isintheconservative direction.

TheNuclearSafetyandLicensing Sectionhasnoreasontoobjecttotheinstallation ofthisnewtripcircuit,underRFC-DC-12-2385.

Trippingthereactorsoonerforalossoffeedpumpeventisintheconservative direction bypreserving someadditional secondary sidewaterinventory forthisparticular transient.

ThispositiveaspectleadsustoconcludethatRFC-OC-12-2385 hasnonegativeeffectonplantsafety.RFC-OC-12-2385 doesnotcreateasubstantial safetyhazardnoritconstitutes anunreviewed safetyquestionasdefinedin10CFR50.59.

ThisRFCwillnot,inanyway,adversely effectthehealthandsafetyofthepublic.OC-12-2387 TheSafetyInjection actuation logicwas'odified toremove"lowpressurizer waterlevel"asacoincident parameter with"lowpressurizer pressure."

SafetyInjection willnowbeactuatedbya2outof3signalfrompressurizer pressureonly.

20Thismodification assuressafetyinjection actuation forPressurizer steamspacebreaksandothersmallbreakLOCA's.Thenewactuation methodisboundedbythecurrentaccidentanalysescontained intheFSAR.Atwooutofthreelogicisnecessary toavoidspuriousactuations ofsafetyinjection inaccordance withapplicable criteria.

Theabovemodifications tothelogicwererequiredbytheNRCinactionitem3ofIE8ulletin79-06A,Revision1following theTNI-2accident.

LicenseAmendment No.29forUnit1,andAmendment No.11forUnit2wereissuedbytheNRCandincorporated thelogicchangesmadeunderthisRFCintotheCookPlantTechnical Specifications.

ThisRFCissafetyrelatedbecausethelogicmodifications arebeingperformed ontheRPS/ESFAS (ReactorProtection System/Engineered SafetyFeaturesActuation System)circuits'whichareClassIE.ThisRFCdoesnotcreateasubstantial safetyhazardnordoesitconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestionasdefinedin10CFR50.59.

DC-12-2392 TheEmergency DieselGenerator breakercontrolcircuitry wasmodifiedtoassurebreakerclosing.IfalossofnormalpoweroccurswhileoneDieselGenerator outputbreakerislockedout,theDieselGenerator Enginewillautomatically start.Aftersensingthe4KVlossofvoltageontheoppositebus,thebreakerwhichwaslockedoutwillcloseintothedeadbusautomatically afterthecontrolswitchisremovedfromlock-outandplacedintothe"aftertrip"orneutralposition.

Intheeventthatthebreakercontrolswitchisinthelock-outposition(thiscondition isalarmed),

thesecircuitmodifications willallowtheoperatortoclosethebreaker,therebyenergizing theESFbuseswiththedieselgenerator running.Thismodification eliminates theneedfortheoperatortostopthediesel,closethebreakerandrestartthedieselunderthiscondition.

ThisRFCaddsanadditional levelofdefenseformanualcontrolofthedieselgenerator circuitsandisnotrequiredbytheNRC.ThisRFCissafetyrelatedbecausemodifications aretobemadetothedieselgenerator circuitswhichareClassIE.ThisRFCdoesnotcreateasubstantial safetyhazardnordoesitconstitite anunreviewed safetyquestionasdefinedin10CFR50.59.

DC-12-2395 RFC-DC-12-2395 modifiedtheReactorprotection SystemSafeguards actuation andresetcircuit.ThesubjectRFCincludes:

1.Providing sealedcoverswhichblockoperatoraccesstotheresetswitch.2.Alarmingtheresetcondition ofanysafeguards outputsignalwhetherornotautomatic safetyactuation signalsareblockedbythisaction.3.HardwireatripclosesignalfromContainment isolation

-PhaseAdirectlytoeachContainment purgesupplyandexhaustisolation valvesuchthataContainment Ventilation Isolation signalcanbeover-ridden,thepurgevalvesre-opened, andasubsequent PhaseAsignalwillautomatically tripthevalvesclosed.

A Thismodification wasinstalled attheNRC'srequesttopreventmanuallyoverriding containment isolation signalstoallowcontinued purgingwithanisolation signalpresent.21ThisRFCisconsidered tobesafetyrelatedbecausethesafeguard actuation circuitsareClassIEEquipment andarerequiredtofunctionunderadesignbasisaccident.

Thesemodifications areconsistent withthedesignbasisofthesafeguards actuation circuitsfortheCookPlant.Assuch,theNS8LSectionhasnoreasontoobjectthemodifications beinginstalled underthesubjectRFC.RFC-DC-12-2395 doesnotcreateasubstantial safetyhazardnordoesitconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestionasdefinedin10CFR50.59.

ThisRFCwill,infact,preventinadvertant over-riding ofsafetyactuation signalsandwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonthehealthandsafetyofthepublic.DC-12-2406 TheSteamGenerator Lo-LoLevelReactorTrip/Auxiliary Feedwater.

pump..;startsetpoints wererevisedfrom115to15/inUnit>1andfrom17!to21%inUnit82.ReviewoftheFSARSteamLineBreakAnalysisfortheD.C.CookPlant,whichboundsthemainfeedlinebreak,showsthecontainment temperature increases tolessthan330'F,However,thecontainment temperature neverexceeds200'Fpriortoreceiving acontainment Region1highpressuretripwhichproducesareactortripandauxiliary feedwater actuation.

Acontainment temperature of200'Fcorresponds toacorrection of45inSteamGenerator Level.ThisRFCcallsforchangingthesetpoints forareactortripfromthesteamgenerator waterlevellow-lowlogicchannels.

Thismodification isnecessary inordertoproperlyaccountfortemperature effectsinthereference legduringadesignbasisaccident.

Thenon-conservative aspectofthewaterlevelsettingswerereportedgenerically totheNRCbyWesting-houseinaccordance with10CFR21.ACookspecificreviewhasdetermined thatthewaterlevelbiasindicated byWestinghouse, althoughapplicable, didnotcreateasubstantial safetyhazardnordiditconstitute anun-reviewedsafetyquestion.

Correspondingly thisRFCaddssafetymargintotheCookPlantsetpoints anddoesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestionasdefinedin10CFR50.59, 22DC-12-2440 Anacoustical monitoring systemwas.installed..on bothUni.tsof'heD.C.CookNuclearPlanttoprovidedirectandreliableindication ofthepositionofthePressurizer PORV'sandsafetyvalves.Thesystemconsistsoffouraccelerometers assensingelementsandanLEDdisplayasanoutputmonitor.TheLEDdisplayismountedintherodcontrolpanelintheControlRoom.Eachpressurizer reliefvalve(SV-45A,B,C) hasanaccelerometer strappedtoitsdischarge pipe.Thefourthaccelerometer isstrappedtothecommonheaderatthedischarge ofthePORV's.TheControlRoomdisplayhasfourseparatechannels, oneforeachaccelerometer.

Eachoutputchannelhasaseriesof10LEDdisplaylights.Thisverticaldisplayoflightsissequenced tocomeoninstepsindicating relativevalveflow.Thismodification isrequiredforcompliance withrecommendation 2.1.3.aofNUREG-0578

entitled, "TNI-2LessonsLearnedTaskForceStatusReportandShort-Term Recommendations."

TheNRC'sletterSeptember

.13,.1979assupplemented, requiredimplemented ofthis"LessonsLearned"recommen-dation.Theacousticmonitoring systemwillindicatewhetherornotthereisanyflowthroughthesevalvestherebygivingtheoperatoranearlyindi-cationofapossiblestuckopenvalve.Sincethesevalvesarepartofthereactorcoolantsystempressureboundary, astuckopenvalveisequivalent toasmallloss-of-coolant accident.

NUREG-0578 requiresthattheoperatortakeappropriate actionstoisolatethereliefpath,ifpossible, andterminate RCSdepressurization.

Henceareliableanddirectindication isneeded.ThisRFCissafetyrelatedbecausetheNRCrequiresittobeasafetygrade,ClassIE,SeismicClassIacousticmonitoring system.ThisRFCisbeinginstalled inaccordance withandsimi1'artotheapplicable criteriaaspresented intheFSAR.ThisRFCdoesnotcreateasubstantial safetyhazardnordoesitconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestionasdefinedin10CFR50.59.

DC-12-2450 Theexistingcontainment pressure.

transmitters wererespanned toincreasetherangeformonitoring ofcontainment pressures.

Thelowercontainment pressuretransmitters PPP-300,301,302and303wererespanned to-5to+12psig,(previously spanhadbeen-1to+15psig).Thelowercontainment pressuretripsetpoints remainthesameonlythetransmitter spanandindicator scaleswerechanged.Alsorespanned weretheuppercontainment widerangepressuretransmitters, PPA-310and312,to-5to+36psig(fromprevious-1to+12Psig).

v~lThismodification wasimplemented inaccordance withtherequirements

-'bfNURE6-0578, "LessonsLearned"(ACRSItem"Containment PressureIndication"

)whichrequiredthatthesensinginstrumentation becapableofmonitoring apressurerangeof-5psigto3Xcontainment designpressure.

ThisRFCissafetyrelatedbecauseitinvolvesClassIequipment whosecircuitsareClassIEandistheNRCrequirement thattheseindications besafetydoesnotcreateasubstantial safetyhazardnordoesunreviewed safetyquestionasdefinedin10CFR50.59.

changestoSeismicincompliance withgrade.ThisRFCitconstitute anDC-12-2452 Anadditional alarmwasinstalled toindicateLow-LowwaterlevelintheCondensate StorageTank.Thisalarmwillannunciate whentheremaining levelinthetankcanonlysupplyenoughwaterfor20minutesoperation oftheauxiliary feedwater pumps.Thisinstallation fulfillsacommitment madetotheNRC(AEP:NRC:00300) toimplement theLow-LowlevelalarmbyJanuary1,1980asrequiredbyNUREG-0578.

ThisRFCisnotsafetyrelatedsinceitonlyservestoalerttheoperatortothiscon'dition.

ThisRFCaddsanadditional levelofdefense-in-depthtotheengineered safetyfeaturesintheCookPlant.ThisRFCdoesnotcreatesubstantial safetyhazardnordoesitconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestionasdefinedin10CFR50.59.