ML17264A605

From kanterella
Revision as of 12:46, 29 June 2018 by StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
Jump to navigation Jump to search
LER 96-012-00:on 960820,feedwater Transient Occurred,Due to Closure of Feedwater Regulating Valve,Causing Lo Lo Steam Generator Level Reactor Trip.Sgs Were Restored & Missing Screw in 1/P-476 Was replaced.W/960919 Ltr
ML17264A605
Person / Time
Site: Ginna Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 09/19/1996
From: MECREDY R C, ST MARTIN J T
ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To: VISSING G S
NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned), NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-96-012, LER-96-12, NUDOCS 9609270247
Download: ML17264A605 (17)


Text

CATEGORYREGULA'YINFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM(RIDS)'lACCESSION NBR:9609270247 DOC.DATE:

96/09/19NOTARIZED:

NODOCKETg.FACIL:50-244 RobertEmmetGinnaNuclearPlant,Unit1,Rochester G05000244AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATION STMARTIN,J.T.

Rochester GasaElectricCorp.MECREDY,R.C.

Rochester GasaElectricCorp.RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFIIIATIONVISSING.G.S.

SUBJECT:

LER96-012-00:on 960820,feedwater transient occurred,due toclosureoffeedwater regulating valve,causinglolosteamgenerator levelreactortrip.SGswererestoredamissingscrewin1/p-476wasreplaced.

W/960919ltr.DISTRIBUTION CODE:IE22TCOPIESRECEIVED:LTR JENCLJSIZE:TITLE:50.73/50.9 LicenseeEventReport(LER),IncidentRpt,etc.CENOTES:License Expdateinaccordance with10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72).

Q050002440RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME PD1-1PDINTERNAL:

AEODSPD/RABILECE~NRR/DE/EELB NRR/DRCH/HHFB NRR/DRCH/HOLB NRR/DRPM/PECB NRR/DSSA/SRXB RGN1FILE01EXTERNAL:

LSTLOBBYWARDNOACMURPHY,G.A NRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL111111111111111111111111RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME VISSING,G.

AEOD/SPD/RRAB NRR/DE/ECGB NRR/DE/EMEB NRR/DRCH/HICB NRR/DRCH/HQMB NRR/DSSA/SPLB RES/DSIR/EIB LITCOBRYCE,JHNOACPOOREgW.NUDOCSFULLTXTCOPIESLTTRENCL1111111111111111111111D0UNOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:

PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE!CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK,ROOMOWFNSD-5(EXT~415-2083)

TOELIMINATE YOURNAMEFROMDISTRIBUTION LISTSFORDOCUMENTS YOUDON'TNEED!FULLTEXTCONVERSION REQUIREDTOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:

LTTR'23ENCL23 ANDROCHESTER GASANDE1ECTRICCORPORAT1ON

~89EASTAVENUF, ROCHESTER, N.Y1d6d9.0D01 AREACODE716546-27MROBERTC.MECREDYVeepresident seuc~eorOpesotions U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission DocumentControlDeskAttn:GuyS.VissingProjectDirectorate I-1Washington, D.C.20555September 191996

Subject:

LER96-012,Feedwater Transient, DuetoClosureofFeedwater Regulating Valve,CausesaLoLoSteamGenerator LevelReactorTripR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDocketNo.50-244

DearMr.Vissing:

Inaccordance with10CFR50.73,LicenseeEventReportSystem,item(a)(2)(iv),whichrequiresareportof,"Anyeventorcondition thatresultedinamanualorautomatic actuation ofanyengineered safetyfeature(ESF),including thereactorprotection system(RPS)",theattachedLicenseeEventReportLER96-012isherebysubmitted.

Thiseventhasinnowayaffectedthepublic'shealthandsafety.Verytrulyyours,RobertC.Mecredxc:Mr.Guy'S.Vissing(MailStop14C7)PWRProjectDirectorate I-1Washington, D.C.20555U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission RegionI475Allendale RoadKingofPrussia,PA19406GinnaSeniorResidentInspector 9b09270247 9b09i9PDRADQCK05000244SPDR 1hlbII'lrI'(~S NRCFORM366(4-95)U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSIO LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)(Seereverseforrequirednumberofdigits/characters foreachblock)APPROVEDBYOMBNO.3150<104EXPIRES04/30/9BESTIMATED BURDENPERRESPONSEToCOMPLYWITHTHISMANDATORY INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST:50.0HRS.REPORTEDLESSONSLEARNEDAREINCORPORATED INTOTHEUCENSINGPROCESSANDFEDBACKTOINDUSTRY.

FORWARDCOMMENTSREGARDING BURDENESTIMATEToTHEINFORMATION ANDRECORDSMANAGEMENT BRANCHIT.6F33),U.S.NUCI.EARREGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, Dc20555.0001, ANDTOTHEPAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECTFACIUTYNAMEI1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantOOCKETNUMBERIR)05000244PAGE)3)1OF8TITLEI4)Feedwater Transient, DuetoClosureofFeedwater Regulating Valve,CausesaLoLoSteamGenerator LevelReactorTripEVENTDATE(5)LERNUMBER(6)REPORTDATE(7)OTHERFACILITIES INVOLVED(6)MONTHDAY0820YEAR96SEQUENTIAL REVISIONNUMBERNUMBER96-012-00MONTH09DAYYEAR96FACILITYNAMEFACKJTYNAMEDOCKETNUMBEROOCKETNUMBEROPERATING MODE(9)POWERLEVEL(10)20.2201(b)20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)20.2203la)(2)

(iii)20.2203(a)

(2)(iv)20.2203(a)

(2)(v)20.2203(a)

(3)(i)20.2203(a) l3)BI)20.2203(a)

(4)50.36(c)(I)50.36(c)(2)50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)50.73(a)(2)(iii)X50.73(a)(2)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)

(v)50.73(a)(2)(vii) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)50.73(a)(2)(x)73.71OTHERWSpecifyinAbstractboloorinNRCForm366ASUANTTOTHEREQUIREMENTS OF10CFR5)(Checkonoormote)(11)THISREPORTISSUBMITTED PURNAMELICENSEECONTACTFORTHISLERl12)TELEPHONE NUMBER(IoolodeAreeCode)JohnT.St.Martin-Technical Assistant (716)771-3641COMPLETEONELINEFOREACHCOMPONENT FAILUREDESCRIBEDINTHISREPORT(13)CAUSESYSTEMCOMPONENT MANUFACTURER TONPRDSCAUSESYSTEMCOMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TONPRDSSJTDR369SUPPLEMENTAL REPORTEXPECTED(14)YES(Ifyes,completeEXPECTEDSuBMISSION DATE).XNOEXPECTED6UBMIssl0NDATE(15)MONTHDAYYEARABSTRACT(Limitto1400spaces,i.o.,approximately 15single.spacedtypewritten lines)(16)OnAugust20,1996,atapproximately 1442EDST,withtheplantinMode1atapproximately 100%steadystatereactorpower,the"B"mainfeedwater regulating valvewenttothefullyclosedposition.

At1443EDST,thereactortrippedonLoLolevelinthe"B"SteamGenerator.

TheControlRoomoperators performed theactionsofprocedures E-0andES-0.1.Following thereactortrip,allsystemsoperatedasdesigned, andthereactorwasstabilized inMode3.Theunderlying causeoftheclosureofthe"B"mainfeedwater regulating valvewasdetermined tobealossofelectrical continuity, causedbyamissingscrewinthecurrent-to-pressure transducer forthe"B"mainfeedwater regulating valve.Corrective actionwastoreplacethemissingscrew.ThiseventisNUREG-1022 CauseCode(A).Corrective actiontopreventrecurrence isoutlinedinSectionV.B.NRCFORM366(4.95)

NRCFORM366A(4-95)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITYNAME(1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKET05000244LERNUMBER(6)YEARSEQUENTIAL REVISIONNUMBERNUMBER96-012-00PAGE(3)2OF8TEXTilfmorespaceisrequired, useaddidonal copiesofftVRCForm386Ai(17)PRE-EVENT PLANTCONDITIONS:

OnAugust20,1996,theplantwasinMode1atapproximately 100%steadystatereactorpower.Atapproximately 1442EDST,theControlRoomoperators receivedseveralMainControlBoardAnnunciator alarms.Thesealarmsindicated thattherewasaproblemintheAdvancedDigitalFeedwater ControlSystem(ADFCS),andthatamainfeedwater regulating valve(MFRV)wasnowinmanualcontrol.TheControlRoomoperators observedthatthe"B"MFRVhadclosedandfeedwater flowtothe"B"SGwasnotadequatefor100%steadystatepoweroperation.

TheControlRoomoperators responded tothesealarmsandattempted torestoreadequateflowtothe"B"SteamGenerator (SG)byopeningtheMFRV.Attemptswereunsuccessful, andwaterlevelinthe"B"SGwasrapidlydecreasing duetothelossoffeedwater flowtothatSG.DESCRIPTION OFEVENT'.DATESANDAPPROXIMATE TIMESOFMAJOROCCURRENCES:

August20,1996,1442EDST:Valvepositioner failure.August20,1996,1443EDST:Eventdateandtime.August20,1996,1443EDST:Discovery dateandtime.August20,1996,1444EDST:ControlRoomoperators verifybothreactortripbreakersopenandverifyallcontrolandshutdownrodsinserted.

August20,1996,1450EDST:ControlRoomoperators manuallyclosebothmainsteamisolation valvestolimitareactorcoolantsystemcooldown.

August20,1996,1453EDST:ControlRoomoperators manuallystopbothmainfeedwater pumpstolimitareactorcoolantsystemcooldown.

August20,1996,1545EDST:Plantisstabilized inMode3.EVENT:OnAugust20,1996,atapproximately 1443EDST,theplantwasinMode1atapproximately 100%steadystatereactorpower.Feedwater flowtothe"B"SGwasinadequate, andwaterlevelinthe"B"SGwasrapidlydecreasing.

Whenthe"B"SGlevelwasat20%(andstilldecreasing),

theControlRoomForemanorderedamanualreactortrip.BeforetheControlRoomoperators performed amanualreactortrip,thereactorautomatically trippedonLoLolevelinthe"B"SG((17%)NRCFORM366A(4-95)

T Adl~~~~~~~~egg~0~~~~~~~~~~jjjj~jjjjjj~'j~'~~~~~~~~~'I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~II~~~~~~I~~~'~~~~'~~~~,~'~~~II~.:~~~~~~~'~~'~~~,~~~~~~~~~I~~~~'~~~~~~~~~~~~'~~~~~~~~'~~~I~'~~~,~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~I~~~~~~~~II~~~~~~~~.I'~.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~I~I~~~~~~~I,~~~~~II~~~~~'~~~~~'~~'~~I~~,~~~~'~~~~~~~~~~~~~j~~~~~~~

1 NRCFORM366A(4-95)LXCENSEEEXTENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITYNAME(1)DOCKETLERNUMBER(6)PAGE(3)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant05000244YEARSEQUENTIAL REVISIONNUMBERNUMBER4OF896-012-00TEXTiifmorespeceisrequired, useeddiuonal copiesofPVRCF'arm366AJ(17)E.METHODOFDISCOVERY:

Thiseventwasimmediately apparentduetoMainControlBoardindication ofinadequate feedwater flowtothe"B"SG.Thereactortripwasimmediately apparentduetoplantresponseandalarmsandindications intheControlRoom.F.OPERATORACTION:Afterthereactortrip,theControlRoomoperators performed theappropriate actionsofEmergency Operating Procedures E-0andES-0.1.Feedwater flowtothe"A"SGwasstoppedtomitigatethe'ncreasein"A"SGlevel.TheMSIVsweremanuallyclosedandbothMFWpumpsstoppedtolimitfurtherRCScoo!down.

Appropriate actionsweretakentorestorelevelinthe"B"SGandtominimizelevelincreaseinthe"A"SG.ThesettingforliftingoftheSGatmospheric reliefvalves(ARV)wasloweredfrom1050PSIGtominimizeasubsequent RCSheatup(andpreventPRZRoverpressure).

Theplantwasstabilized inMode3.Subsequently, theControlRoomoperators notifiedhighersupervision andtheNRCper10CFR50.72(b)(2)(ii),non-emergency fourhournotification, atapproximately 1755EDSTonAugust20,1996.G.SAFETYSYSTEMRESPONSES:

AIIsafeguards equipment functioned properly.

Bothmotor-driven AFWpumpsstartedwhen"B"SGleveldecreased below17%afterthereactortrip.Theturbine-driven AFWpumpstartedasperdesign,duetoastartingsignaIfromAMSAC.Mainfeedwater isolation occurredonhighlevelinthe"A"SG(i.e.,)85%narrowrangelevel).III.CAUSEOFEVENT:A.IMMEDIATE CAUSE:Theimmediate causeofthereactortripwasdueto"B"SGLoLolevel((17%),causedbyinadequate feedwater flowtothe"B"SG.B.INTERMEDIATE CAUSE:Theintermediate causeoftheinadequate feedwater flowtothe"B"SGwastheclosureofthe"B"MFRV,causedbythecurrent-to-pressure (I/P)transducer notresponding totheinputdemandsignal.Thisresultedinlossofinputdemandsignaltothe"B"MFRVvalvepositioner.

NRCFORM366A(4-95)

II NRCFORM366A(4-95)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITYNAME(1)DOCKETLERNUMBER(6)PAGE(3)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant05000244YEARSEQUENTIAL REVISIONNUMBERNUMBER5OF896-012-00TEXTllfmorespeceisrequired, useedditionel copiesofNRCForm386'A/(17)ROOTCAUSE:Theunderlying causeofthelossofinputdemandsignaltothe"B"MFRVvalvepositioner wasalossofelectrical continuity fromtheterminalblocktothecircuitboardontheterminalblockinsidethecurrent-to-pressure transducer (I/P-476) thatsuppliesairpressuretothe"B"MFRV.Thislossofcontinuity wastheresultofamissingscrewwhichcausedanunreliable inputsignalconnection, resulting inlossofthesignaltothetransducer, andcausedtheoutputairsignaltodecreasetominimum.Onminimumairpressure, theMFRVgoesfullyclosed.ThebasicdesignoftheRosemount Model3311I/Ptransducer (I/P-476) issignificantly different whencomparedtootherinstrumentation.

Themountingofthecircuitboardtotheterminalblockisunique,andspecialinstructions orguidancewereabsentinthemanufacturer's technical manual.Fourscrewsareinstalled intheterminalblockintheseRosemount transducers.

Twoareusedforfieldwireconnections, andtwoareusedtoholddowntheterminalblockconnection board.ThiseventisNUREG-1022 CauseCode(A),"Personnel Error".AHumanPerformance Enhancement System(HPES)evaluation wasinitiated forthisevent.TheHPESevaluation concluded that,intheeventascrewwasdiscovered missingontheterminalblockforthesetransducers, ithadbeenapreviously acceptedpracticeforInstrument andControl(I(AC)technicians nottoreplacethescrew,andtoreconnect anywiringontoadifferent screw,aslongasitwasthesameelectrical point,sameterminalblock,andsameterminalnumber.Thispracticedoesnotaffectelectrical continuity fortransducers ofadifferent design,sincenoscrewsontheterminalblockholddowntheterminalblockconnection board.However,onRosemount transducers, ailfourscrewsarerequiredfortheirspecificfunction.

Thiserrorwasacognitive error,inthattheIRCtechnicians didnotunderstand thedetailedfunctionofeachscrew,anddidnotrecognize thattheirpracticecouldcauseunreliable connections inthetransducer.

Thiserrorwasnotcontrarytoanyapprovedprocedures andisnotcoveredindetailinanyprocedure.

Therearenounusualcharacteristics ofthelocations foranyofthesetransducers.

Thefailureofthe"B"MFRVI/Ptransducer meetstheNUMARC93-01,"Industry Guideline forMonitoring theEffectiveness ofMaintenance atNuclearPowerPlants",definition ofa"Maintenance Preventable Functional Failure".

NRCFORM366A(4-95)

II NRCFORM366A(4.95)LICENSEE%WENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITYNAME(1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKET05000244LERNUMBER(6)YEARSEQUENTIAL REVISIONNUMBERNUMBER96-012-00PAGE(3)6OF8TEXTiifmorespeceisrequired, useedditionel copiesofNRCForm366Aj(17)IV.ANALYSISOFEVENT:Thiseventisreportable inaccordance with10CFR50.73,LicenseeEventReportSystem,item(a)(2)(iv),whichrequiresareportof,"Anyeventorcondition thatresultedinamanualorautomatic actuation ofanyengineered safetyfeature(ESF),including thereactorprotection system(RPS)".The"B"SGLoLolevelreactortripwasanautomatic actuation oftheRPS,andMFWisolation andAFWpumpstartsareactuations ofanESFcomponent.

Anassessment wasperformed considering boththesafetyconsequences andimplications ofthiseventwiththefollowing resultsandconclusions:

Therewerenooperational orsafetyconsequences orimplications attributed tothereactortripbecause:oThetworeactortripbreakersopenedasrequired.

oAIIcontrolandshutdownrodsinsertedasdesigned.

oTheplantwasstabilized inMode3.TheGinnaStationImprovedTechnical Specifications (ITS)LimitingConditions forOperation (LCOs)andSurveillance Requirements (SRs)werereviewedwithrespecttotheposttripreviewdata.Thefollowing aretheresultsofthatreview:PRZRpressuredecreased below2205PSIGduringthetransient afterthereactortrip.Duringthistimeathermalpowerstep>10%occurredduetothereactortrip,whichiswithinthelimitsofITSLCO3.4.1.Therefore, compliance withITSwasmaintained.

TheRCStemperature DNBlimit(577.5degreesF)wasnotapproached.

Additional mitigation wasprovidedbyclosingtheMS)VsandstoppingtheMFWpumps.MinimumPRZRpressurewasapproximately 2092PSIG.Afterthereactortrip,theRCScooleddowntoapproximately 539degreesFandwassubsequently stabilized at547degreesF.ThecooldownwaswithinthelimitsofITSLCO3.4.3.Inaddition, therequiredshutdownmarginwasmaintained atalltimesduringtheRCScooldown.

BothSGlevelsdecreased following thereactortrip."B"SGleveldecreased below16%indicated narrowrangelevel~SR3.4.5.2statesthatinordertodemonstrate thatareactorcoolantloopisoperable, theSGwaterlevelshallbe>/=16%.Thus,the"B"coolantloopwasinoperable, eventhoughitwasstillinoperation andperforming itsintendedfunctionofdecayheatremoval.BothSGswereavailable asaheatsink,andsufficient AFWflowwasmaintained foradequatesteamreleasefrombothSGs.The"8"coolantloopwasrestoredtooperablestatuswhenSGlevelwasrestoredto>/=16%,inapproximately thirty-five (35)minutes.ThisiswithinthelimitsofITSLCO3.4.5ACTIONA.NRCFORM366A(4-95)

I NRCFORM366A(4.95)U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION FACILITYNAME(1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKET05000244LERNUMBER(6)YEARSEQUENTIAL REVISIONNUMBERNUMBER96-012-00TEXTiifmorespaceisrequired, useedditionelcopiesofNRCForm366A/(17)PAGE(3)7OF8oTheGinnaStationUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(UFSAR)transient, asdescribed inChapter15.2.6,"LossofNormalFeedwater",

describes acondition wherethereactortripsonLoLoSGlevel.ThisUFSARtransient wasreviewedandcomparedtotheplantresponseforthisevent.TheUFSARtransient isacompletelossofMainFeedwater (MFW)atfullpower,withAFWpumpsavailable one(1)minuteafterthelossofMFW,andsecondary steamrelief(i.e.,decayheatremoval)throughthesafetyvalvesonly.Theprotection againstalossofMFWincludesthereactortriponLoLoSGlevelandthestartofAFWpumps.Theseprotection featuresoperatedasdesigned.

Basedontheaboveevaluation, theplanttransient ofAugust20,1996,isboundedbytheUFSARSafetyAnalysisassumptions.

oTheUFSARtransient, asdescribed inChapter15.1.2,"Increase inFeedwater FlowatFullPower",describes acondition wheretheautomatic operation ofthemainfeedwater isolation providedprotection frompotential SGoverfillanddamagetotheturbineandsteampipingduetowatercarryover.

Prudentoperatoractionprovidedthenecessary actiontoreduceSGlevel.Thehighlevelinthe"A"SGthatresultedduringthetransient isboundedbytheUFSARSafetyAnalysisassumptions.

Basedontheaboveandareviewofposttripdataandpastplanttransients, itcanbeconcluded thattheplantoperatedasdesigned, thattherewerenounreviewed safetyquestions, andthatthepublic'shealthandsafetywasassuredatalltimes.V.CORRECTIVE ACTION:A.ACTIONTAKENTORETURNAFFECTEDSYSTEMSTOPRE-EVENT NORMALSTATUS:TheSGswererestoredtooperablestatuswhenSGlevelinthe"B"SGincreased above16%level,byadditionofAFW.Subsequently, levelswererestoredtotheirnormaloperating levels.ThemissingscrewinI/P-476wasreplaced.

BothMFRVswereoperatedfullyopenandfullyclosedfromtheMainControlBoardhandcontroller toverifypropervalvepositioning andresponse.

B.ACTIONTAKENORPLANNEDTOPREVENTRECURRENCE:

oTherearesix(6)Rosemount Model3311I/Ptransducers inuseatGinnaStation.All6wereinspected.

InadditiontothemissingscrewforI/P-476,abrokenfieldwireconnection screwwasfoundinI/P-466(forthe"A"MFRV),andthefieldwirewaslandedononeoftheterminalboardscrews.Aterminalboardscrewwasmissinginthetransducer forthe"B"SGatmospheric reliefvalve,andwaslaterfoundinanearbyconduit.Theconfigurations ofallRosemount transducers wererestoredtoapprovedconfigurations.

ILCtechnicians havebeenmadeawareoftheunusualarrangement oftheterminalblockscrewsinRosemount transducers.

NRCFORM366A(4-95)

I NRCFORM366AI4-95)LICENSEEEVZRFZREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITYNAMEI1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKET05000244LERNUMBERI6)YEARSEQUENTIAL REVISIONNUMBERNUMBER96-012-00PAGEI3)8OF8TEXTilfmorespeceisrequired, useeddirional copiesofNRCForm366A/I17)Calibration procedures forall6Rosemount transducers havebeenchangedtoensurethatallfourscrewsareinplaceandwiresarelandedonthecorrectterminalpoints.NuclearTrainingWorkRequests(NTWR)havebeenwrittentoincorporate thelessonslearnedintothel&Ctrainingprogram.Vl.ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

A.FAILEDCOMPONENTS:

Thefailedcomponent (I/P-476) wasaRosemount Model3311I/Ptransducer.

PREVIOUSLERsONSIMILAREVENTS:AsimilarLEReventhistoricai searchwasconducted withthefollowing results:Nodocumentation ofsimilarLEReventswiththesamerootcauseatGinnaNuclearPowerPlantcouldbeidentified.

However,LERs93-006(duetoconnecting screwforlinkagefeedbackarm)and94-007(duetosetscrewbackingoutofvalvepositionsignaldiaphragm assembly) weresimilarevents,inthattherewasalossofabilitytocontrolaMFRVwhichresultedinareactortrip.LERs85-006,88-003,88-005,90-007,90-010,92-002,and92-003weresimilarevents(reactortripfromLoSGlevel)withdifferent rootcauses.C.SPECIALCOMMENTS:

NoneNRCFORM366AI4-95)