IR 05000361/2012008: Difference between revisions

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==Dear Mr. Dietrich:==
==Dear Mr. Dietrich:==
On June 8, 2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission completed a Problem Identification and Resolution biennial inspection at your San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results that were discussed with you and other members of your staff. This inspection was an examination of activities conducted under your license as they relate to problem identification and resolution and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and the conditions of your license. Within these areas, the inspection involved examination of selected procedures and representative records, observations of activities, and interviews with personnel.
On June 8, 2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission completed a Problem Identification and Resolution biennial inspection at your San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results that were discussed with you and other members of your staff.
 
This inspection was an examination of activities conducted under your license as they relate to problem identification and resolution and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and the conditions of your license. Within these areas, the inspection involved examination of selected procedures and representative records, observations of activities, and interviews with personnel.


Based on the inspection sample, the inspection team concluded that the implementation of the corrective action program and overall performance related to identifying, evaluating, and resolving problems at San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station was effective. Licensee identified problems were entered into the corrective action program at a low threshold. Problems were effectively prioritized and evaluated commensurate with the safety significance. Corrective actions were effectively implemented in a timely manner commensurate with their importance to safety and addressed the identified causes of problems. Lessons learned from industry-operating experience were effectively reviewed and applied, when appropriate. Audits and self-assessments were effectively used to identify problems and appropriate actions. Finally, the team verified that the licensee had established a safety-conscious work environment where workers felt free to raise safety concerns without fear of retaliation. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's Agencywide Document Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Based on the inspection sample, the inspection team concluded that the implementation of the corrective action program and overall performance related to identifying, evaluating, and resolving problems at San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station was effective. Licensee identified problems were entered into the corrective action program at a low threshold. Problems were effectively prioritized and evaluated commensurate with the safety significance. Corrective actions were effectively implemented in a timely manner commensurate with their importance to safety and addressed the identified causes of problems. Lessons learned from industry-operating experience were effectively reviewed and applied, when appropriate. Audits and self-assessments were effectively used to identify problems and appropriate actions. Finally, the team verified that the licensee had established a safety-conscious work environment where workers felt free to raise safety concerns without fear of retaliation. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's Agencywide Document Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
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===Attachment:===
===Attachment:===
Supplemental Information Electronic Distribution to SONGS
Supplemental Information  
 
Electronic Distribution to SONGS  
 
ML12205A166 SUNSI Rev Compl. Yes No ADAMS Yes No Reviewer Initials HAF Publicly Avail. Yes No Sensitive Yes No Sens. Type Initials HAF SRI:DRS/TSB RI:DRS/EB1 RI:DRP/ANO OE:DRS/OB PE:DRP/PBD Acting C:DRS/TSB HAFreeman JDBraisted JRotton DGStrickland DDYou DAPowers /RA/ /E-Mail/ /E-mail/ /E-mail/ Per Telecon /RA/ 7/23/2012 7/23/2012 7/23/2012 7/23/2012 7/23/2012 7/23/2012 C:DRP/PBD Acting C:DRS/TSB RELantz DAPowers /NHT for/ /RA/ 7/23/2012 7/23/2012 Enclosure OFFICIAL RECORD COPY U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV Docket: 05000361, 05000362 License: NPF-10, NPF-15 Report: 05000361/2012008 and 05000362/2012008 Licensee: Southern California Edison Facility: San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Location: 4 miles SE of San Clemente, California Dates: May 21 through June 8, 2012 Team Leader: Harry A. Freeman, Senior Reactor Inspector Inspectors:
Dr. Jonathan D. Braisted, Reactor Inspector Jeff Rotton, Resident Inspector Duane G. Strickland, Operations Engineer David D. You, Project Engineer Approved By: Dr. Dale A. Powers, Acting Chief Technical Support Branch Division of Reactor Safety Enclosure


=SUMMARY OF FINDINGS=
=SUMMARY OF FINDINGS=
IR 05000361/2012008 and 05000362/2012008; May 21, 2012 - June 8, 2012; San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station "Biennial Baseline Inspection of the Identification and Resolution of Problems."
IR 05000361/2012008 and 05000362/2012008; May 21, 2012 - June 8, 2012; San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station "Biennial Baseline Inspection of the Identification and Resolution of Problems."


The team inspection was performed by a senior reactor inspector, a reactor inspector, an operations engineer, a resident inspector, and a project engineer. No findings of significance were identified during this inspection. Identification and Resolution of Problems The team reviewed approximately 250 condition reports, work orders, engineering evaluations, root and apparent cause evaluations, and other supporting documentation to determine if problems were being properly identified, characterized, and entered into the corrective action program for evaluation and resolution. The team reviewed a sample of system health reports, self-assessments, trending reports and metrics, and various other documents related to the corrective action program.
The team inspection was performed by a senior reactor inspector, a reactor inspector, an operations engineer, a resident inspector, and a project engineer. No findings of significance were identified during this inspection.
 
Identification and Resolution of Problems The team reviewed approximately 250 condition reports, work orders, engineering evaluations, root and apparent cause evaluations, and other supporting documentation to determine if problems were being properly identified, characterized, and entered into the corrective action program for evaluation and resolution. The team reviewed a sample of system health reports, self-assessments, trending reports and metrics, and various other documents related to the corrective action program.


On the basis of the activities selected for review, the team concluded that implementation of the problem and identification process and the corrective action program at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station was effective. The licensee had a very low threshold for identifying problems and entering them in the corrective action program as evidenced by a high number of nuclear notifications generated (roughly 45,000) per year. Items were screened and prioritized in a timely manner using established criteria and were evaluated commensurate with their safety significance. The team concluded the licensee's overall implementation of actions to correct issues and prevent recurrence of issues was effective. The licensee reviewed operating experience for applicability to station activities. Audits and self-assessments were determined to be performed at an appropriate level to identify deficiencies. On the basis of focus group and individual interviews conducted during the inspection, the team concluded that the safety-conscious work environment had significantly improved since the last biennial inspection and that workers felt free to raise nuclear safety concerns via various methods without fear of retaliation.
On the basis of the activities selected for review, the team concluded that implementation of the problem and identification process and the corrective action program at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station was effective. The licensee had a very low threshold for identifying problems and entering them in the corrective action program as evidenced by a high number of nuclear notifications generated (roughly 45,000) per year. Items were screened and prioritized in a timely manner using established criteria and were evaluated commensurate with their safety significance. The team concluded the licensee's overall implementation of actions to correct issues and prevent recurrence of issues was effective. The licensee reviewed operating experience for applicability to station activities. Audits and self-assessments were determined to be performed at an appropriate level to identify deficiencies. On the basis of focus group and individual interviews conducted during the inspection, the team concluded that the safety-conscious work environment had significantly improved since the last biennial inspection and that workers felt free to raise nuclear safety concerns via various methods without fear of retaliation.
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===A. NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings===
===A. NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings===
No findings of significance were identified.
No findings of significance were identified.


===B. Licensee-Identified Violations===
===B. Licensee-Identified Violations===
None
None


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The team reviewed approximately 250 nuclear notifications including associated root cause, apparent cause, and direct cause evaluations, from approximately 94,000 that had been issued between June 18, 2010, and June 8, 2012, to determine if problems were being properly identified, characterized, and entered into the corrective action program for evaluation and resolution. The team reviewed a sample of system health reports, operability determinations, self-assessments, trending reports and metrics, and various other documents related to the corrective action program. The team evaluated the licensee's efforts in establishing the scope of problems by reviewing selected logs, work requests, self-assessment results, audits, system health reports, action plans, and results from surveillance tests and preventive maintenance tasks. The team reviewed work requests and attended the licensee's daily action review committee pre-screening and the management review committee meetings to assess the reporting threshold, prioritization efforts, and significance determination process, as well as observing the interfaces with the operability assessment and work control processes, when applicable. The team's review included verifying the licensee considered the full extent of cause and extent of condition for problems, as well as how the licensee assessed generic implications and previous occurrences. The team assessed the timeliness and effectiveness of corrective actions, completed or planned, and looked for additional examples of similar problems.
The team reviewed approximately 250 nuclear notifications including associated root cause, apparent cause, and direct cause evaluations, from approximately 94,000 that had been issued between June 18, 2010, and June 8, 2012, to determine if problems were being properly identified, characterized, and entered into the corrective action program for evaluation and resolution. The team reviewed a sample of system health reports, operability determinations, self-assessments, trending reports and metrics, and various other documents related to the corrective action program. The team evaluated the licensee's efforts in establishing the scope of problems by reviewing selected logs, work requests, self-assessment results, audits, system health reports, action plans, and results from surveillance tests and preventive maintenance tasks. The team reviewed work requests and attended the licensee's daily action review committee pre-screening and the management review committee meetings to assess the reporting threshold, prioritization efforts, and significance determination process, as well as observing the interfaces with the operability assessment and work control processes, when applicable. The team's review included verifying the licensee considered the full extent of cause and extent of condition for problems, as well as how the licensee assessed generic implications and previous occurrences. The team assessed the timeliness and effectiveness of corrective actions, completed or planned, and looked for additional examples of similar problems.


The team also reviewed corrective action documents that addressed past NRC-identified violations to ensure that the corrective action addressed the issues as described in the inspection reports. The inspectors reviewed a sample of corrective actions closed to other corrective action documents to ensure that corrective actions were appropriate and timely. The team considered risk insights from both the NRC's and San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station risk assessments to focus the sample selection and plant tours on risk significant systems and components. The team selected the following risk significant systems:  safety and non-safety related inverters and battery chargers, and emergency core cooling systems pumps.
The team also reviewed corrective action documents that addressed past NRC-identified violations to ensure that the corrective action addressed the issues as described in the inspection reports. The inspectors reviewed a sample of corrective actions closed to other corrective action documents to ensure that corrective actions were appropriate and timely.
 
The team considered risk insights from both the NRC's and San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station risk assessments to focus the sample selection and plant tours on risk significant systems and components. The team selected the following risk significant systems:  safety and non-safety related inverters and battery chargers, and emergency core cooling systems pumps.


The samples reviewed by the team focused on, but were not limited to, these systems. The team also expanded their review to include five years of evaluations involving the inverters and battery chargers to determine whether problems were being effectively addressed. The team conducted a walkdown of these systems to assess whether problems were identified and entered into the corrective action program.
The samples reviewed by the team focused on, but were not limited to, these systems. The team also expanded their review to include five years of evaluations involving the inverters and battery chargers to determine whether problems were being effectively addressed. The team conducted a walkdown of these systems to assess whether problems were identified and entered into the corrective action program.
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b.
b.


Assessments 1. Assessment - Effectiveness of Problem Identification The team concluded that the licensee identified issues and adverse conditions in accordance with the licensee's corrective action program guidance and NRC requirements. The team noted that licensee personnel had a very low threshold for entering issues into nuclear notification system (corrective action program) as evidenced by the more than 94 thousand notifications issued during the two year review cycle. The team did not identify any deficiencies in the area of problem identification for the samples reviewed.
Assessments 1. Assessment - Effectiveness of Problem Identification  
 
The team concluded that the licensee identified issues and adverse conditions in accordance with the licensee's corrective action program guidance and NRC requirements. The team noted that licensee personnel had a very low threshold for entering issues into nuclear notification system (corrective action program) as evidenced by the more than 94 thousand notifications issued during the two year review cycle. The team did not identify any deficiencies in the area of problem identification for the samples reviewed.


2.
2.


Assessment - Effectiveness of Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues   The team concluded that the licensee in general effectively prioritized and evaluated conditions adverse to quality. The team found that even with the high number of notifications initiated on a daily basis, licensee's daily action review committee pre-screening and the management review committees effectively assessed each condition adverse to quality. The team reviewed a number of notifications that involved operability reviews to assess the quality, timeliness, and prioritization of operability assessments. In general, both immediate and prompt operability assessments reviewed were adequately completed in a timely manner.
Assessment - Effectiveness of Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues The team concluded that the licensee in general effectively prioritized and evaluated conditions adverse to quality. The team found that even with the high number of notifications initiated on a daily basis, licensee's daily action review committee pre-screening and the management review committees effectively assessed each condition adverse to quality. The team reviewed a number of notifications that involved operability reviews to assess the quality, timeliness, and prioritization of operability assessments. In general, both immediate and prompt operability assessments reviewed were adequately completed in a timely manner.


3.
3.


Assessment - Effectiveness of Corrective Action Program   Overall, the team concluded that the licensee had an effective corrective action program where conditions adverse to quality were promptly identified, prioritized, evaluated, and corrected in a timely manner commensurate to safety significance.
Assessment - Effectiveness of Corrective Action Program Overall, the team concluded that the licensee had an effective corrective action program where conditions adverse to quality were promptly identified, prioritized, evaluated, and corrected in a timely manner commensurate to safety significance.


The team identified two adverse trends indicative of the program's effectiveness that were resolved by the licensee over the inspection period. The first trend involved a large number of deficiencies identified for failure to adequately control contractors. The licensee initiated process changes in the Fall of 2011 that reduced the number of errors significantly. The second trend involved work hour rule violations. Again, the licensee initiated process changes and significantly reduced the number of violations and eliminated repetition of minimum days off violations.
The team identified two adverse trends indicative of the program's effectiveness that were resolved by the licensee over the inspection period. The first trend involved a large number of deficiencies identified for failure to adequately control contractors. The licensee initiated process changes in the Fall of 2011 that reduced the number of errors significantly. The second trend involved work hour rule violations. Again, the licensee initiated process changes and significantly reduced the number of violations and eliminated repetition of minimum days off violations.
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b.
b.


Assessment   Overall, the team determined that the licensee was adequately evaluating industry-operating experience for relevance to the facility. Corrective action documents considered operating experience in the cause and resolution evaluations. The licensee had entered applicable items in the corrective action program in accordance with station procedures. Both internal and external operating experience was being incorporated into lessons learned for training and pre-job briefs.
Assessment Overall, the team determined that the licensee was adequately evaluating industry-operating experience for relevance to the facility. Corrective action documents considered operating experience in the cause and resolution evaluations. The licensee had entered applicable items in the corrective action program in accordance with station procedures. Both internal and external operating experience was being incorporated into lessons learned for training and pre-job briefs.


===.3 Assessment of Self-Assessments and Audits===
===.3 Assessment of Self-Assessments and Audits===
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The team reviewed a sample of licensee self-assessments, surveillances, and audits to assess whether the licensee was regularly identifying performance trends and effectively addressing them. The team reviewed audit reports to assess the effectiveness of assessments in specific areas. The team evaluated the use of self- and third party assessments, the role of the quality assurance department, and the role of the performance improvement group related to licensee performance. The specific self-assessment documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
The team reviewed a sample of licensee self-assessments, surveillances, and audits to assess whether the licensee was regularly identifying performance trends and effectively addressing them. The team reviewed audit reports to assess the effectiveness of assessments in specific areas. The team evaluated the use of self- and third party assessments, the role of the quality assurance department, and the role of the performance improvement group related to licensee performance. The specific self-assessment documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.


b. Assessment   The team concluded that the licensee had an effective self-assessment and audit process. Licensee management was involved with developing tactical self-assessments. The team determined self-assessments were self-critical and thorough enough to identify deficiencies.
b. Assessment The team concluded that the licensee had an effective self-assessment and audit process. Licensee management was involved with developing tactical self-assessments. The team determined self-assessments were self-critical and thorough enough to identify deficiencies.


===.4 Assessment of Safety-Conscious Work Environment===
===.4 Assessment of Safety-Conscious Work Environment===


====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
The inspection team conducted six focus group interviews with typically ten individuals per group. The focus groups consisted of workers from the nuclear boiler and condenser, design engineering, health physics, instrumentation and controls, project management, and operations organizations. Individuals were randomly selected by the NRC to assure representative outcomes for the interviews. The inspection team also conducted individual interviews. The interviewees represented various functional organizations and ranged across contractor, staff, and supervisor levels. The team conducted these interviews to assess whether conditions existed that would challenge the establishment of a safety-conscious work environment at San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station. b. Assessment    The inspection team concluded that the licensee had established a safety-conscious work environment where individuals felt free to raise safety concerns both to the licensee and to the NRC without fear of retaliation. Responses to questions and topics during the focus group sessions did not reveal any sense that safety was not the highest priority. All organizations indicated that the work environment had changed significantly from just over two years ago when the NRC identified a challenged safety-conscious work environment and issued a chilling effects letter. On the basis of focus group and individual interviews conducted during the inspection, the team concluded that the safety-conscious work environment had significantly improved since the last biennial inspection and that workers felt free to raise nuclear safety concerns via various methods without fear of retaliation.
The inspection team conducted six focus group interviews with typically ten individuals per group. The focus groups consisted of workers from the nuclear boiler and condenser, design engineering, health physics, instrumentation and controls, project management, and operations organizations. Individuals were randomly selected by the NRC to assure representative outcomes for the interviews. The inspection team also conducted individual interviews. The interviewees represented various functional organizations and ranged across contractor, staff, and supervisor levels. The team conducted these interviews to assess whether conditions existed that would challenge the establishment of a safety-conscious work environment at San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station.


{{a|OA6}}
b. Assessment The inspection team concluded that the licensee had established a safety-conscious work environment where individuals felt free to raise safety concerns both to the licensee and to the NRC without fear of retaliation. Responses to questions and topics during the focus group sessions did not reveal any sense that safety was not the highest priority. All organizations indicated that the work environment had changed significantly from just over two years ago when the NRC identified a challenged safety-conscious work environment and issued a chilling effects letter. On the basis of focus group and individual interviews conducted during the inspection, the team concluded that the safety-conscious work environment had significantly improved since the last biennial inspection and that workers felt free to raise nuclear safety concerns via various methods without fear of retaliation.
==OA6 Meetings==
 
{{a|4OA6}}
==4OA6 Meetings==


===Exit Meeting Summary===
===Exit Meeting Summary===
On June 8, 2012, the team presented the inspection results to Mr. Peter Dietrich, Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee staff acknowledged the issues presented. The inspectors asked the licensee staff whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
On June 8, 2012, the team presented the inspection results to Mr. Peter Dietrich, Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee staff acknowledged the issues presented. The inspectors asked the licensee staff whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.


{{a|4OA7}}
{{a|4OA7}}
==4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations==
==4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations==
None  ATTACHMENT:   
None  ATTACHMENT:   


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: [[contact::L. Murriel - Manager]], Business Administration   
: [[contact::L. Murriel - Manager]], Business Administration   
: [[contact::M. Pawlaczyk - Technical Specialist]], Inspections  
: [[contact::M. Pawlaczyk - Technical Specialist]], Inspections  
===NRC personnel===
===NRC personnel===
: [[contact::D. Powers - Acting Chief]], Technical Support Branch G. Warnick - Senior Resident Inspector J. Reynoso - Resident Inspector  
: [[contact::D. Powers - Acting Chief]], Technical Support Branch G. Warnick - Senior Resident Inspector J. Reynoso - Resident Inspector  
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===Opened and Closed===
===Opened and Closed===
None   
None   


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==LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED==
==LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED==
===Procedures===
===Procedures===
: NUMBER TITLE REVISION SO123-IV-3.5 Security Work Hours Management 12 SO123-XV-1.20 Seismic Controls 4 SO123-XV-50 Corrective Action Program 25 SO123-XV-50.CAP-1 Writing Nuclear Notifications for Problem Identification and Resolution 7 SO123-XV-50.CAP-2 SONGS Nuclear Notification Screening 12 SO123-XV-50.CAP-3 Corrective Action Program Evaluations and Action Plans 16 SO123-XV-50.CAP-4 Implementing Corrective Actions
: NUMBER TITLE REVISION SO123-IV-3.5 Security Work Hours Management 12 SO123-XV-1.20 Seismic Controls 4 SO123-XV-50 Corrective Action Program 25 SO123-XV-50.CAP-1 Writing Nuclear Notifications for Problem Identification and Resolution  
: SO123-XV-50.CAP-2 SONGS Nuclear Notification Screening 12 SO123-XV-50.CAP-3 Corrective Action Program Evaluations and Action Plans 16 SO123-XV-50.CAP-4 Implementing Corrective Actions
: SO123-XV-50.CAP-5 Corrective Action Effectiveness   
: SO123-XV-50.CAP-5 Corrective Action Effectiveness   
: SO123-XV-52 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments 24 SO123-XV-52.1 Operability Determination and Oversight 4 SO123-XV-6 SONGS Behavorial Observation Program 19 SO123-XV-6.1 SONGS Fatigue Management 4 SO123-XV-6.2 Work Hour Controls 5 SO123-XX-5 Work Clearance Application / Work Clearance Document / Work Authorization Record (WAR) 43 SO123-XX-6 Operator Work Around Program
: SO123-XV-52 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments  
: SO123-XXIX-2.16 Nuclear Organization M&CS, Attachment 3, MPR Task Codes 10 SO23-3-3.23 Diesel Generator Monthly and Semi-Annual Testing 59 SO23-ODP-1 Operability Determination Program 1 SO23-XV-4.13 Control of Work and Storage Areas within the Protected Area 12
: SO123-XV-52.1 Operability Determination and Oversight 4 SO123-XV-6 SONGS Behavorial Observation Program 19 SO123-XV-6.1 SONGS Fatigue Management 4 SO123-XV-6.2 Work Hour Controls 5 SO123-XX-5 Work Clearance Application / Work Clearance Document / Work Authorization Record (WAR)  
: SO123-XX-6 Operator Work Around Program
: SO123-XXIX-2.16 Nuclear Organization M&CS, Attachment 3, MPR Task Codes  
: SO23-3-3.23 Diesel Generator Monthly and Semi-Annual Testing 59 SO23-ODP-1 Operability Determination Program 1 SO23-XV-4.13 Control of Work and Storage Areas within the Protected Area
===Documents===
===Documents===
: Number Title Revision/Date
: Number Title Revision/Date
: FSAR 8.2.2.1.1 Availability Considerations for SCE System April 2009
: FSAR 8.2.2.1.1 Availability Considerations for SCE System April 2009
: SOB-216 System Operating Bulletin No. 216 April 26, 2006  
: SOB-216 System Operating Bulletin No. 216 April 26, 2006
: Evaluations Number Title Revision/Date
: Evaluations Number Title Revision/Date
: ACE 201181704 Operation of the RWST Purification & Recirculation lineup is not supported by SONGS Design Basis September 30, 2010
: ACE 201181704 Operation of the RWST Purification & Recirculation lineup is not supported by SONGS Design Basis September 30, 2010
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: DCE 201165132 HPSI 2FT0321-1 Failed to Fill and Vent During Surveillance January 12, 2011
: DCE 201165132 HPSI 2FT0321-1 Failed to Fill and Vent During Surveillance January 12, 2011
: DCE 201606472 Lack of Acceptance Criteria for Safety Injection Tank Leakage in Operations Procedure October 3, 2011
: DCE 201606472 Lack of Acceptance Criteria for Safety Injection Tank Leakage in Operations Procedure October 3, 2011
: DCE 201513478 Feeder Breaker over current trip set at 180 amps - Charging Pump Motors 2(3) P190, 2(3) P191 & 2(3) P192 July 19, 2011
: DCE 201513478 Feeder Breaker over current trip set at 180 amps - Charging Pump Motors 2(3) P190, 2(3) P191 & 2(3)  
: P192 July 19, 2011
: DCE 201287222 10
: DCE 201287222 10
: CFR 50.59 Issue Resolution (DCE) February 23, 2011
: CFR 50.59 Issue Resolution (DCE) February 23, 2011
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: 201980894
: 201980894
: 201967249
: 201967249
: 201958287    
: 201958287  
: Information Request January 26, 2012 Biennial Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection - San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Inspection Report
: Information Request January 26, 2012 Biennial Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection - San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Inspection Report 2012008
: 2012008
: This inspection will cover the period from June 1, 2010, to March 25, 2012.
: This inspection will cover the period from June 1, 2010, to March 25, 2012.
: All requested information should be limited to this period unless otherwise specified.
: All requested information should be limited to this period unless otherwise specified.
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: Lists of documents should be provided in Microsoft Excel or a similar sortable format.
: Lists of documents should be provided in Microsoft Excel or a similar sortable format.
: A supplemental information request will likely be sent during the week of March 19, 2012.
: A supplemental information request will likely be sent during the week of March 19, 2012.
: Please provide the following no later than February 17, 2012:
: Please provide the following no later than February 17, 2012:  
: 1. Document Lists Note:  for these summary lists, please include the document/reference number, the document title or a description of the issue, initiation date, and current status.
: 1. Document Lists Note:  for these summary lists, please include the document/reference number, the document title or a description of the issue, initiation date, and current status.
: Please include long text descriptions of the issues. a. Summary list of all corrective action documents related to significant conditions adverse to quality that were opened, closed, or evaluated during the period b. Summary list of all corrective action documents related to conditions adverse to quality that were opened or closed during the period c. Summary lists of all corrective action documents which were upgraded or downgraded in priority/significance during the period d. Summary list of all corrective action documents that subsume or "roll up" one or more smaller issues for the period e. Summary lists of operator workarounds, engineering review requests and/or operability evaluations, temporary modifications, and control room and safety system deficiencies opened, closed, or evaluated during the period f. Summary list of plant safety issues raised or addressed by the Employee Concerns Program (or equivalent) g. Summary list of all Apparent Cause Evaluations completed during the period h. Summary list of all Root Cause Evaluations planned or in progress but not complete at the end of the period  
: Please include long text descriptions of the issues.
: 2. Full Documents, with Attachments a. Root Cause Evaluations completed during the period b. Quality assurance audits performed during the period c. All audits/surveillances performed during the period of the Corrective Action Program, of individual corrective actions, and of cause evaluations   d. Corrective action activity reports, functional area self-assessments, and non-NRC third party assessments completed during the period (do not include INPO assessments) e. Corrective action documents generated during the period for the following: i. NCV's and Violations issued to San Onofre ii. LER's issued by San Onofre f. Corrective action documents generated for the following, if they were determined to be applicable to San Onofre (for those that were evaluated but determined not to be applicable, provide a summary list): i. NRC Information Notices, Bulletins, and Generic Letters issued or evaluated during the period ii. Part 21 reports issued or evaluated during the period iii. Vendor safety information letters (or equivalent) issued or evaluated during the period iv. Other external events and/or Operating Experience evaluated for applicability during the period g. Corrective action documents generated for the following: i. Emergency planning drills and tabletop exercises performed during the period  ii. Maintenance preventable functional failures which occurred or were evaluated during the period iii. Adverse trends in equipment, processes, procedures, or programs which were evaluated during the period iv. Action items generated or addressed by plant safety review committees during the period   
a. Summary list of all corrective action documents related to significant conditions adverse to quality that were opened, closed, or evaluated during the period
: 3. Logs and Reports a. Corrective action performance trending/tracking information generated during the period and broken down by functional organization b. Corrective action effectiveness review reports generated during the period c. Current system health reports or similar information d. Radiation protection event logs during the period e. Security event logs and security incidents during the period (sensitive information can be provided by hard copy during first week on site) f. Employee Concern Program (or equivalent) logs (sensitive information can be provided by hard copy during first week on site) g. List of Training deficiencies, requests for training improvements, and simulator deficiencies for the period
b. Summary list of all corrective action documents related to conditions adverse to quality that were opened or closed during the period
: 4. Procedures a. Corrective action program procedures, to include initiation and evaluation procedures, operability determination procedures, apparent and root cause evaluation/determination procedures, and any other procedures which implement the corrective action program at San Onofre b. Quality Assurance program procedures c. Employee Concerns Program (or equivalent) procedures d. Procedures which implement/maintain a Safety-Conscious Work Environment
c. Summary lists of all corrective action documents which were upgraded or downgraded in priority/significance during the period
: 5. Other  a. List of risk significant components and systems
d. Summary list of all corrective action documents that subsume or "roll up" one or more smaller issues for the period
b. Organization charts for plant staff and long-term/permanent contractors
e. Summary lists of operator workarounds, engineering review requests and/or operability evaluations, temporary modifications, and control room and safety system deficiencies opened, closed, or evaluated during the period
: Note:  "Corrective action documents" refers to condition reports, notifications, action requests, cause evaluations, and/or other similar documents, as applicable to San Onofre.
f. Summary list of plant safety issues raised or addressed by the Employee Concerns Program (or equivalent)
g. Summary list of all Apparent Cause Evaluations completed during the period
h. Summary list of all Root Cause Evaluations planned or in progress but not complete at the end of the period  
: 2. Full Documents, with Attachments
a. Root Cause Evaluations completed during the period
b. Quality assurance audits performed during the period
c. All audits/surveillances performed during the period of the Corrective Action Program, of individual corrective actions, and of cause evaluations
d. Corrective action activity reports, functional area self-assessments, and non-NRC third party assessments completed during the period (do not include INPO assessments)
e. Corrective action documents generated during the period for the following:
i. NCV's and Violations issued to San Onofre  
 
ii. LER's issued by San Onofre
f. Corrective action documents generated for the following, if they were determined to be applicable to San Onofre (for those that were evaluated but determined not to be applicable, provide a summary list):
i. NRC Information Notices, Bulletins, and Generic Letters issued or evaluated during the period  
 
ii. Part 21 reports issued or evaluated during the period iii. Vendor safety information letters (or equivalent) issued or evaluated during the period iv. Other external events and/or Operating Experience evaluated for applicability during the period
g. Corrective action documents generated for the following:
i. Emergency planning drills and tabletop exercises performed during the period  ii. Maintenance preventable functional failures which occurred or were evaluated during the period iii. Adverse trends in equipment, processes, procedures, or programs which were evaluated during the period iv. Action items generated or addressed by plant safety review committees during the period   
: 3. Logs and Reports
a. Corrective action performance trending/tracking information generated during the period and broken down by functional organization
b. Corrective action effectiveness review reports generated during the period
c. Current system health reports or similar information
d. Radiation protection event logs during the period
e. Security event logs and security incidents during the period (sensitive information can be provided by hard copy during first week on site)
f. Employee Concern Program (or equivalent) logs (sensitive information can be provided by hard copy during first week on site)
g. List of Training deficiencies, requests for training improvements, and simulator deficiencies for the period  
: 4. Procedures
a. Corrective action program procedures, to include initiation and evaluation procedures, operability determination procedures, apparent and root cause evaluation/determination procedures, and any other procedures which implement the corrective action program at San Onofre
b. Quality Assurance program procedures
c. Employee Concerns Program (or equivalent) procedures
d. Procedures which implement/maintain a Safety-Conscious Work Environment  
: 5. Other  a. List of risk significant components and systems  
 
b. Organization charts for plant staff and long-term/permanent contractors Note:  "Corrective action documents" refers to condition reports, notifications, action requests, cause evaluations, and/or other similar documents, as applicable to San Onofre.
: As it becomes available, but no later than February 17, 2012, this information should be uploaded on the Certrec IMS website.
: As it becomes available, but no later than February 17, 2012, this information should be uploaded on the Certrec IMS website.
: When these documents have been compiled (and by February 17, 2012), please download these documents onto a CD or DVD and sent it via overnight carrier to:  
: When these documents have been compiled (and by February 17, 2012), please download these documents onto a CD or DVD and sent it via overnight carrier to:  
 
   - 10 - Attachment Harry Freeman U.S. NRC Region
   - 10 - Attachment Harry Freeman U.S. NRC Region
: IV 1600 E. Lamar Blvd. Arlington,
: IV 1600 E. Lamar Blvd. Arlington,

Revision as of 15:00, 26 July 2018

IR 05000361-12-008, 05000362-12-008; 05/21/ 2012 - 06/8/2012; San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Biennial Baseline Inspection of the Identification and Resolution of Problems
ML12205A416
Person / Time
Site: San Onofre  Southern California Edison icon.png
Issue date: 07/23/2012
From: Powers D A
Division of Reactor Safety IV
To: Peter Dietrich
Southern California Edison Co
vlm/Powers D A
References
IR-12-008
Download: ML12205A416 (20)
v • d • e


Text

July 23, 2012

Mr. Peter Dietrich Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer Southern California Edison Company San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station P.O. Box 128 San Clemente, CA 92674-0128

SUBJECT: SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION - NRC PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000361/2012008 AND 05000362/2012008

Dear Mr. Dietrich:

On June 8, 2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission completed a Problem Identification and Resolution biennial inspection at your San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results that were discussed with you and other members of your staff.

This inspection was an examination of activities conducted under your license as they relate to problem identification and resolution and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and the conditions of your license. Within these areas, the inspection involved examination of selected procedures and representative records, observations of activities, and interviews with personnel.

Based on the inspection sample, the inspection team concluded that the implementation of the corrective action program and overall performance related to identifying, evaluating, and resolving problems at San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station was effective. Licensee identified problems were entered into the corrective action program at a low threshold. Problems were effectively prioritized and evaluated commensurate with the safety significance. Corrective actions were effectively implemented in a timely manner commensurate with their importance to safety and addressed the identified causes of problems. Lessons learned from industry-operating experience were effectively reviewed and applied, when appropriate. Audits and self-assessments were effectively used to identify problems and appropriate actions. Finally, the team verified that the licensee had established a safety-conscious work environment where workers felt free to raise safety concerns without fear of retaliation. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's Agencywide Document Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,/RA/

Dr. Dale A. Powers, Acting Chief Technical Support Branch Docket Nos.: 05000361, 05000362 License Nos: NPF-10, NPF-15

Enclosure:

1. Inspection Report 05000361/2012008 and 05000362/2012008 w/

Attachment:

Supplemental Information

Electronic Distribution to SONGS

ML12205A166 SUNSI Rev Compl. Yes No ADAMS Yes No Reviewer Initials HAF Publicly Avail. Yes No Sensitive Yes No Sens. Type Initials HAF SRI:DRS/TSB RI:DRS/EB1 RI:DRP/ANO OE:DRS/OB PE:DRP/PBD Acting C:DRS/TSB HAFreeman JDBraisted JRotton DGStrickland DDYou DAPowers /RA/ /E-Mail/ /E-mail/ /E-mail/ Per Telecon /RA/ 7/23/2012 7/23/2012 7/23/2012 7/23/2012 7/23/2012 7/23/2012 C:DRP/PBD Acting C:DRS/TSB RELantz DAPowers /NHT for/ /RA/ 7/23/2012 7/23/2012 Enclosure OFFICIAL RECORD COPY U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV Docket: 05000361, 05000362 License: NPF-10, NPF-15 Report: 05000361/2012008 and 05000362/2012008 Licensee: Southern California Edison Facility: San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Location: 4 miles SE of San Clemente, California Dates: May 21 through June 8, 2012 Team Leader: Harry A. Freeman, Senior Reactor Inspector Inspectors:

Dr. Jonathan D. Braisted, Reactor Inspector Jeff Rotton, Resident Inspector Duane G. Strickland, Operations Engineer David D. You, Project Engineer Approved By: Dr. Dale A. Powers, Acting Chief Technical Support Branch Division of Reactor Safety Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000361/2012008 and 05000362/2012008; May 21, 2012 - June 8, 2012; San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station "Biennial Baseline Inspection of the Identification and Resolution of Problems."

The team inspection was performed by a senior reactor inspector, a reactor inspector, an operations engineer, a resident inspector, and a project engineer. No findings of significance were identified during this inspection.

Identification and Resolution of Problems The team reviewed approximately 250 condition reports, work orders, engineering evaluations, root and apparent cause evaluations, and other supporting documentation to determine if problems were being properly identified, characterized, and entered into the corrective action program for evaluation and resolution. The team reviewed a sample of system health reports, self-assessments, trending reports and metrics, and various other documents related to the corrective action program.

On the basis of the activities selected for review, the team concluded that implementation of the problem and identification process and the corrective action program at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station was effective. The licensee had a very low threshold for identifying problems and entering them in the corrective action program as evidenced by a high number of nuclear notifications generated (roughly 45,000) per year. Items were screened and prioritized in a timely manner using established criteria and were evaluated commensurate with their safety significance. The team concluded the licensee's overall implementation of actions to correct issues and prevent recurrence of issues was effective. The licensee reviewed operating experience for applicability to station activities. Audits and self-assessments were determined to be performed at an appropriate level to identify deficiencies. On the basis of focus group and individual interviews conducted during the inspection, the team concluded that the safety-conscious work environment had significantly improved since the last biennial inspection and that workers felt free to raise nuclear safety concerns via various methods without fear of retaliation.

The licensee appropriately evaluated industry-operating experience for relevance to the facility and had entered applicable items in the corrective action program. The licensee used industry-operating experience when performing root cause and apparent cause evaluations. The licensee performed effective quality assurance audits and self-assessments, as demonstrated by self identification of poor corrective action program performance and identification of ineffective corrective actions.

A. NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

B. Licensee-Identified Violations

None

REPORT DETAILS

OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution

Main article: IP 71152

The team based the following conclusions on the sample of corrective action documents that were initiated in the assessment period, which ranged from June 18, 2010, to the end of the on-site portion of this inspection on June 8, 2012.

.1 Assessment of the Corrective Action Program Effectiveness

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed approximately 250 nuclear notifications including associated root cause, apparent cause, and direct cause evaluations, from approximately 94,000 that had been issued between June 18, 2010, and June 8, 2012, to determine if problems were being properly identified, characterized, and entered into the corrective action program for evaluation and resolution. The team reviewed a sample of system health reports, operability determinations, self-assessments, trending reports and metrics, and various other documents related to the corrective action program. The team evaluated the licensee's efforts in establishing the scope of problems by reviewing selected logs, work requests, self-assessment results, audits, system health reports, action plans, and results from surveillance tests and preventive maintenance tasks. The team reviewed work requests and attended the licensee's daily action review committee pre-screening and the management review committee meetings to assess the reporting threshold, prioritization efforts, and significance determination process, as well as observing the interfaces with the operability assessment and work control processes, when applicable. The team's review included verifying the licensee considered the full extent of cause and extent of condition for problems, as well as how the licensee assessed generic implications and previous occurrences. The team assessed the timeliness and effectiveness of corrective actions, completed or planned, and looked for additional examples of similar problems.

The team also reviewed corrective action documents that addressed past NRC-identified violations to ensure that the corrective action addressed the issues as described in the inspection reports. The inspectors reviewed a sample of corrective actions closed to other corrective action documents to ensure that corrective actions were appropriate and timely.

The team considered risk insights from both the NRC's and San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station risk assessments to focus the sample selection and plant tours on risk significant systems and components. The team selected the following risk significant systems: safety and non-safety related inverters and battery chargers, and emergency core cooling systems pumps.

The samples reviewed by the team focused on, but were not limited to, these systems. The team also expanded their review to include five years of evaluations involving the inverters and battery chargers to determine whether problems were being effectively addressed. The team conducted a walkdown of these systems to assess whether problems were identified and entered into the corrective action program.

b.

Assessments 1. Assessment - Effectiveness of Problem Identification

The team concluded that the licensee identified issues and adverse conditions in accordance with the licensee's corrective action program guidance and NRC requirements. The team noted that licensee personnel had a very low threshold for entering issues into nuclear notification system (corrective action program) as evidenced by the more than 94 thousand notifications issued during the two year review cycle. The team did not identify any deficiencies in the area of problem identification for the samples reviewed.

2.

Assessment - Effectiveness of Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues The team concluded that the licensee in general effectively prioritized and evaluated conditions adverse to quality. The team found that even with the high number of notifications initiated on a daily basis, licensee's daily action review committee pre-screening and the management review committees effectively assessed each condition adverse to quality. The team reviewed a number of notifications that involved operability reviews to assess the quality, timeliness, and prioritization of operability assessments. In general, both immediate and prompt operability assessments reviewed were adequately completed in a timely manner.

3.

Assessment - Effectiveness of Corrective Action Program Overall, the team concluded that the licensee had an effective corrective action program where conditions adverse to quality were promptly identified, prioritized, evaluated, and corrected in a timely manner commensurate to safety significance.

The team identified two adverse trends indicative of the program's effectiveness that were resolved by the licensee over the inspection period. The first trend involved a large number of deficiencies identified for failure to adequately control contractors. The licensee initiated process changes in the Fall of 2011 that reduced the number of errors significantly. The second trend involved work hour rule violations. Again, the licensee initiated process changes and significantly reduced the number of violations and eliminated repetition of minimum days off violations.

.2 Assessment of the Use of Operating Experience

a. Inspection Scope

The team examined the licensee's program for reviewing industry-operating experience, including reviewing the governing procedure and self-assessments.

A sample size of 14 operating experience notifications that had been issued during the assessment period were reviewed to assess whether the licensee had appropriately evaluated the notifications for relevance to the facility. The team then examined whether the licensee has entered those items into its corrective action program and assigned actions to address the issues. The team reviewed a sample of root cause evaluations and corrective action documents to verify if the licensee had appropriately included industry-operating experience.

b.

Assessment Overall, the team determined that the licensee was adequately evaluating industry-operating experience for relevance to the facility. Corrective action documents considered operating experience in the cause and resolution evaluations. The licensee had entered applicable items in the corrective action program in accordance with station procedures. Both internal and external operating experience was being incorporated into lessons learned for training and pre-job briefs.

.3 Assessment of Self-Assessments and Audits

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed a sample of licensee self-assessments, surveillances, and audits to assess whether the licensee was regularly identifying performance trends and effectively addressing them. The team reviewed audit reports to assess the effectiveness of assessments in specific areas. The team evaluated the use of self- and third party assessments, the role of the quality assurance department, and the role of the performance improvement group related to licensee performance. The specific self-assessment documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Assessment The team concluded that the licensee had an effective self-assessment and audit process. Licensee management was involved with developing tactical self-assessments. The team determined self-assessments were self-critical and thorough enough to identify deficiencies.

.4 Assessment of Safety-Conscious Work Environment

a. Inspection Scope

The inspection team conducted six focus group interviews with typically ten individuals per group. The focus groups consisted of workers from the nuclear boiler and condenser, design engineering, health physics, instrumentation and controls, project management, and operations organizations. Individuals were randomly selected by the NRC to assure representative outcomes for the interviews. The inspection team also conducted individual interviews. The interviewees represented various functional organizations and ranged across contractor, staff, and supervisor levels. The team conducted these interviews to assess whether conditions existed that would challenge the establishment of a safety-conscious work environment at San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station.

b. Assessment The inspection team concluded that the licensee had established a safety-conscious work environment where individuals felt free to raise safety concerns both to the licensee and to the NRC without fear of retaliation. Responses to questions and topics during the focus group sessions did not reveal any sense that safety was not the highest priority. All organizations indicated that the work environment had changed significantly from just over two years ago when the NRC identified a challenged safety-conscious work environment and issued a chilling effects letter. On the basis of focus group and individual interviews conducted during the inspection, the team concluded that the safety-conscious work environment had significantly improved since the last biennial inspection and that workers felt free to raise nuclear safety concerns via various methods without fear of retaliation.

4OA6 Meetings

Exit Meeting Summary

On June 8, 2012, the team presented the inspection results to Mr. Peter Dietrich, Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee staff acknowledged the issues presented. The inspectors asked the licensee staff whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations

None ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel

P. Dietrich - CNO D. Bauder - VP, Station Manager T. McCool - Plant Manager
R. Corbett - Director, Performance Improvement
R. St. Onge - Director, Regulatory Affairs
D. Yarbrough - Director, Operations
J. Madigan - Director, Nuclear Safety Culture
B. Sholler - Director, Maintenance
B. Winn - Director, Finance Management
E. Avella - Director, Project Management Organization
J. Pyles - Director, IT/BI
R. Davis - Director, Nuclear Training
T. Gallaher - Manager, CAP
L. Mosher - Manager, Corporate Communications
K. Johnson - Manager, Design Engineering
O. Thomsen - Manager, Nuclear Fuels
M. Stevens - Nuclear Engineer, Inspections
J. Demlow - Supervisor, Chemistry
R. McWey - Manager, Project Oversight
M. DeMarco - Liaison, SDG&E
A. Martinez - Manager, Self-Assessments
L. Kelly - Manager, Compliance
M. Cuarenta - Technical Specialist, CAP
J. Bashore - Contractor C. Cates - Manager, Site Recovery
D. Abell - CAPCO Program Owner C. Hurn - ARC/MRC Program Owner D. Piper - Technical Specialist, Security
L. Murriel - Manager, Business Administration
M. Pawlaczyk - Technical Specialist, Inspections

NRC personnel

D. Powers - Acting Chief, Technical Support Branch G. Warnick - Senior Resident Inspector J. Reynoso - Resident Inspector

LIST OF ITEMS

OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED

Opened

None

Opened and Closed

None

Closed

None

Discussed

None

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Procedures

NUMBER TITLE REVISION SO123-IV-3.5 Security Work Hours Management 12 SO123-XV-1.20 Seismic Controls 4 SO123-XV-50 Corrective Action Program 25 SO123-XV-50.CAP-1 Writing Nuclear Notifications for Problem Identification and Resolution
SO123-XV-50.CAP-2 SONGS Nuclear Notification Screening 12 SO123-XV-50.CAP-3 Corrective Action Program Evaluations and Action Plans 16 SO123-XV-50.CAP-4 Implementing Corrective Actions
SO123-XV-50.CAP-5 Corrective Action Effectiveness
SO123-XV-52 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
SO123-XV-52.1 Operability Determination and Oversight 4 SO123-XV-6 SONGS Behavorial Observation Program 19 SO123-XV-6.1 SONGS Fatigue Management 4 SO123-XV-6.2 Work Hour Controls 5 SO123-XX-5 Work Clearance Application / Work Clearance Document / Work Authorization Record (WAR)
SO123-XX-6 Operator Work Around Program
SO123-XXIX-2.16 Nuclear Organization M&CS, Attachment 3, MPR Task Codes
SO23-3-3.23 Diesel Generator Monthly and Semi-Annual Testing 59 SO23-ODP-1 Operability Determination Program 1 SO23-XV-4.13 Control of Work and Storage Areas within the Protected Area

Documents

Number Title Revision/Date
FSAR 8.2.2.1.1 Availability Considerations for SCE System April 2009
SOB-216 System Operating Bulletin No. 216 April 26, 2006
Evaluations Number Title Revision/Date
ACE 201181704 Operation of the RWST Purification & Recirculation lineup is not supported by SONGS Design Basis September 30, 2010
ACE 200638791 Letdown Control Valve 3LV0110B Failed to Limit Letdown Flow During Power Reduction Transient January 26, 2011
ACE 201572878 Submerged Perimeter Paging Cables August 26, 2011
ACE 201010231 Non-Cited Violation For Less Than Adequate Response To Westinghouse Nuclear Safety Advisory Letter (NSAL) 09-8
ACE 201393414 Green NCV - Seasonal Readiness Program April 28, 2011
ACE 201448584 Auxiliary Feedwater Pipe Trench Drainage June 14, 2011
ACE 201577458 3K006 Speed Swings September 22, 2011
ACE 201299452 Missed Tech Spec SDM Surveillance March 9, 2011
ACE 201286253 Investigation of U3C15 Transformer Configuration March 4, 2011
ACE 200895372 Unplanned Unit 2 Power Reduction to Remove Shells from Condenser Waterboxes December 30, 2010
DCE 201165132 HPSI 2FT0321-1 Failed to Fill and Vent During Surveillance January 12, 2011
DCE 201606472 Lack of Acceptance Criteria for Safety Injection Tank Leakage in Operations Procedure October 3, 2011
DCE 201513478 Feeder Breaker over current trip set at 180 amps - Charging Pump Motors 2(3) P190, 2(3) P191 & 2(3)
P192 July 19, 2011
DCE 201287222 10
CFR 50.59 Issue Resolution (DCE) February 23, 2011
DCE 201205222 Potential Non Compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.75 December 22, 2010
DCE 201638629 Technical Specification LCO 3.8.1, Condition "A" Not Met October 24, 2011
CCE 201396878 Station Management expressed a concern that the Predictive Maintenance (PdM) Watchlist has more vibration identified items on the list than other stations
Licensee Event Reports Number Title Revision/Date
LER 3-2011-001 Missed Tech Spec SDM Surveillance March 26, 2011
LER
2-2011-002 Dual Unit Automatic Trip on High Pressurizer Pressure Due to Grid Disturbance November 1, 2011

Condition Reports

(Nuclear Notifications)

200721702
201328970
201434892
200638791
200950125
200973110
201092448
201122128
200982045
201940544
200987250
201577458
200758654
201373487
201577458
201025656
201799576
200961547
201877320
201878037
201042361
200804979
201835752
200728657
200926776
201047182
201047271
201116874
201057387
201061165
201061263
201063349
201063427
201065812
201077154
201133936
201135761
201443248
201620253
201287222
201135193
201959463
201866244
201448263
201482168
201138580
201126784
201048764
201149023
201163962
201165132
201205222
201097446
201111679
201262583
201181704
201698531
201464957
201285132
201711294
201217134
201988274
201999587
201258909
201287222
201232148
201296462
201212408
201199502
201299452
201239894
201160468
201175804
201185545
201176656
201284984
201284985
201279128
201241361
201072135
201284984
201284995
201284996
201284998
201296030
201317588
201465833
201367899
201355227
201467430
201325253
201279485
201396878
201410862
201338280
201393414
201448584
201016397
201446365
201599886
201442557
200989773
200977799
200974336
201010231
201462415
201498537
201506537
201506773
201506833
201467427
201466804
201477474
201469828
201467456
201480132
201495805
201492854
201487786
201596350
201506967
201510949
201512809
201535312
201572508
201507023
201892141
201892202
201892229
201892260
201513478
201266158
201764816
201728636
201274638
201546570
201550186
200887620
200869281
200887620
201572509
201033114
201033877
201572878
201606472
201593960
201805547
201799576
200871332
201823099
201604492
201651125
201669264
201638629
201562417
201636269
201638778
200954931
200959837
201656251
201640603
201638778
201323150
201405633
201405699
201644782
201591467
201581508
201508799
201412330
201669106
201711298
201711300
201711302
201711345
201679460
201673712
201664813
201656194
201607886
201682420
201552631
201659899
201698503
201747816
201711414
201711416
201676620
201713505
201654799
201818132
201899920
201215659
201234602
201247150
201851396
201997889
201929367
201933207
201933330
201878081
201891422
201891970
201879865
200738558
201892308
201892321
201892917
201893215
201893255
201893320
201894231
201896597
201897284
201897607
201899714
201901194
201901320
201902865
201902866
201903430
201903685
201905286
201905435
201905485
201906004
201908724
201908729
201909974
201912811
201917249
201917788
201922598
201928355
201921217
201933622
201934801
201937233
201937443
201938956
201940692
201942615
201945249
201945264
201946368
201949784
201949913
201980894
201967249
201958287
Information Request January 26, 2012 Biennial Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection - San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Inspection Report 2012008
This inspection will cover the period from June 1, 2010, to March 25, 2012.
All requested information should be limited to this period unless otherwise specified.
To the extent possible, the requested information should be provided electronically in Adobe PDF or Microsoft Office format.
Lists of documents should be provided in Microsoft Excel or a similar sortable format.
A supplemental information request will likely be sent during the week of March 19, 2012.
Please provide the following no later than February 17, 2012:
1. Document Lists Note: for these summary lists, please include the document/reference number, the document title or a description of the issue, initiation date, and current status.
Please include long text descriptions of the issues.

a. Summary list of all corrective action documents related to significant conditions adverse to quality that were opened, closed, or evaluated during the period

b. Summary list of all corrective action documents related to conditions adverse to quality that were opened or closed during the period

c. Summary lists of all corrective action documents which were upgraded or downgraded in priority/significance during the period

d. Summary list of all corrective action documents that subsume or "roll up" one or more smaller issues for the period

e. Summary lists of operator workarounds, engineering review requests and/or operability evaluations, temporary modifications, and control room and safety system deficiencies opened, closed, or evaluated during the period

f. Summary list of plant safety issues raised or addressed by the Employee Concerns Program (or equivalent)

g. Summary list of all Apparent Cause Evaluations completed during the period

h. Summary list of all Root Cause Evaluations planned or in progress but not complete at the end of the period

2. Full Documents, with Attachments

a. Root Cause Evaluations completed during the period

b. Quality assurance audits performed during the period

c. All audits/surveillances performed during the period of the Corrective Action Program, of individual corrective actions, and of cause evaluations

d. Corrective action activity reports, functional area self-assessments, and non-NRC third party assessments completed during the period (do not include INPO assessments)

e. Corrective action documents generated during the period for the following:

i. NCV's and Violations issued to San Onofre

ii. LER's issued by San Onofre

f. Corrective action documents generated for the following, if they were determined to be applicable to San Onofre (for those that were evaluated but determined not to be applicable, provide a summary list):

i. NRC Information Notices, Bulletins, and Generic Letters issued or evaluated during the period

ii. Part 21 reports issued or evaluated during the period iii. Vendor safety information letters (or equivalent) issued or evaluated during the period iv. Other external events and/or Operating Experience evaluated for applicability during the period

g. Corrective action documents generated for the following:

i. Emergency planning drills and tabletop exercises performed during the period ii. Maintenance preventable functional failures which occurred or were evaluated during the period iii. Adverse trends in equipment, processes, procedures, or programs which were evaluated during the period iv. Action items generated or addressed by plant safety review committees during the period

3. Logs and Reports

a. Corrective action performance trending/tracking information generated during the period and broken down by functional organization

b. Corrective action effectiveness review reports generated during the period

c. Current system health reports or similar information

d. Radiation protection event logs during the period

e. Security event logs and security incidents during the period (sensitive information can be provided by hard copy during first week on site)

f. Employee Concern Program (or equivalent) logs (sensitive information can be provided by hard copy during first week on site)

g. List of Training deficiencies, requests for training improvements, and simulator deficiencies for the period

4. Procedures

a. Corrective action program procedures, to include initiation and evaluation procedures, operability determination procedures, apparent and root cause evaluation/determination procedures, and any other procedures which implement the corrective action program at San Onofre

b. Quality Assurance program procedures

c. Employee Concerns Program (or equivalent) procedures

d. Procedures which implement/maintain a Safety-Conscious Work Environment

5. Other a. List of risk significant components and systems

b. Organization charts for plant staff and long-term/permanent contractors Note: "Corrective action documents" refers to condition reports, notifications, action requests, cause evaluations, and/or other similar documents, as applicable to San Onofre.

As it becomes available, but no later than February 17, 2012, this information should be uploaded on the Certrec IMS website.
When these documents have been compiled (and by February 17, 2012), please download these documents onto a CD or DVD and sent it via overnight carrier to:

- 10 - Attachment Harry Freeman U.S. NRC Region

IV 1600 E. Lamar Blvd. Arlington,
TX 76011-4511
Please note that the NRC is not able to accept electronic documents on thumb drives or other similar digital media.
However, CDs and DVDs are acceptable.
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