ML20237K175

Transcript of 850926 Investigative Interview of Jp Thorpe in Newport,Mi Re 850702 Reactor Operator Error at Plant

ML20237K175
Person / Time
Site:	Fermi
Issue date:	09/26/1985
From:	Thorpe J DETROIT EDISON CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20237J518	List: IA-86-245, Discusses 850912 Interview of AB Davis Re 850702 Operator Error at Facility.Davis Would Have Recommended Postponement of NRC Vote for Full Power License If Known of Premature Criticality IR 05000341/1985007 ML20237J515 ML20237J542 ML20237J566 ML20237J587 ML20237J620 ML20237J639 ML20237J686 ML20237J708 ML20237J722 ML20237J726 ML20237J741 ML20237J781 ML20237J797 ML20237J810 ML20237J839 ML20237J848 ML20237J890 ML20237J911 ML20237J920 ML20237J948 ML20237J973 ML20237J979 ML20237J991 ML20237K175 ML20237K193 ML20237K199 ML20237K212 ML20237K218 ML20237K226 ML20237K238 ML20237K250 ML20237K263 ML20237K290 ML20237K304 ML20237K316 ML20237K345 ML20237K353 ML20237K370 ML20237K384
References
FOIA-86-245 NUDOCS 8708270081
Download: ML20237K175 (32)

Text

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA' i

2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3

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4 In the Matter of:

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5 INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEW

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_____________).

a The Deposition ofGOE_N P. THORPE)taken 9

10 pursuant to Notice before me, Elizabeth Diaan Ferguson-Evans, 11 Notary Public in and for the. County of Wayne, (acting in Monroe 12 County), at Fermi II Nuclear Power Plant, 6400 North Dixie Righway, s

13 Newport, Michigan, 48166, on Thursday, September 26, 1985, 14 c - ancing at about 2:25 p.m.

15 j

APPEARANCES:

16 UNITED STATES NDCLEAR REGULATORY C0001ISSION 17 Office Of Investigations Field Office:

Region'III ta 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137 19 (Ry James N. Ea.1kman, Esq.)

20 Appearing on behalf of United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission 21 22 23 24 (continued) f 25 a

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA l

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2 j NUCLEAR REGOLATORY COMMISSION l

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_.._________-_I 9

The Deposition of OHN P. THORP taken 10 i pursuant to Notice before me, Elizabeth Diann Ferguson-Evans, l

fNotaryPublicinandfortheCountyofWayne, (acting in Monroe 11 12 County), at Fermi II Nuclear Power Plant, 6400 North Dixie Highway 7 13 Newport, Michigan, 48166, on Thursday, September 26, 1985,.

i l

14 commencing at about 2:25 p.m.

l 15 I

y APP 0ARANCES:

16 h UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION li 17 i Office Of Investigations lI l

Field Offices Region III 799 Roosevelt Road 18 i

Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137 19 (By:

James N. Kalkman, Esq.)

i 20 Appearing on behalf of United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission 21 f

22 23 24 (continued)

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1 1

l

't APPEARANCES:

(continued)

I I

2 JOHN H. FLYNN, ESQ.

Senior Staff Attorney-3 Legal Department ll 2000 Second Avenue

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Detroit, Michigan 48226 4

5 Appearing on behalf of Detroit Edison, 6

PETER MARQUARDT, ESO.

I General Attorney 7 f Nuclear Environmental i

l 2000 Second Avenue 8

Detroit, Michigan 48226 3

s 9

Appearing on behalf of Detroit Edison

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10 THOMAS RANDAZZO, ESQ.

6400 North Dixie Highway 11 Newport, Michigan 48166 n

Appearing on behalf of Detroit Edison 12 "

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l 15 [l, Elizabeth Diann Ferguson-Evans, CSR-1347 dl Certified Shorthand Reportar l

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! WITNESS PAGE 2

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3 !i JOHN P. THORPE l

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Examination By Mr. Kalkman 4

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'1 Newport, Michigan 2

Thursday, September 26, 1985 1

l st about 2:25 p.m.

3 L

4 1

5 MR. KALKMAN:

For the record, this is I

i 6

the interview of John Thorpe, who is employed by the l

7 Detroit Edison Company; the location of this interview is 8

the Fermi II Nuclear Power Station, Newport, Michigan.

9 Present at this interview are the 10 Detroit Edison Counsels, Mr. Marquardt, Mr. Flynn; and 11 NRC Investigator, Mr. Kalkman, t

I l

l The subject Lutter of this interview 12 l

13 concerns a Reactor Operator error, which occurred at the 14 Frami II Nuclear Power Station on July 2, 1985, 15 Mr. Thorpe, would you please stand and I

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10 raise your right band.

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E 17

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18 JOHN P.

T H O R P E, 19 af ter having first been duly sworn to tell the truth,.

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j 20 the whole truth and nothing but the truth, testified

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r 21 ij upon his oath as follows:

22 23 EXAMINATION 24 BY MR. KALKMAN:

25 Q

Mr. Thorpe, how long have you been employal by Detroit Edison?

l 4

A It would be four years now.

Q What is your title?

3 A

currently I am a systems engineer.

I IQ How long have you been in that systems engineering job?

E A

At the present time, I am transit!oning into that job E

from my past job.

Q And what was that?

E A

Shift Nuclear Enginear.

0 Mr. Thorpe, how did you become involved in conducting an 9

10 anaylsis of the operator error and on the criticality that occurred?

'2 A

Well, I guess at the time of the incident, they wrote a 1

'3 DER, and that DER was assigned to a Reactor Engineer; and i

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subsequently, it was assigned to me.

o

'S l0 Ware you a Reactor Engineer?

'6 A

Well, I worked as a Shif t Nucles.r Enginear that works 17 l

for a Reactor Enginear.

I

'E Q

Okay.

g 19 lA That is a position title.

s l

l 2D Q

Is there any particular reason that you were selected to 2'

perform the analysis?

72 A

I don't believe so.

23 Q

Did you do this analysis along with doing' shift work?

I#

A Yes.

75 Q

Bow much time did this take, the analysis take?

i l

5

A Gee, that would be hard to say.

I don't recall, but it 2

was certainly along with my normal duties on shift.

Q So you did do it at the same time or while you were on 3

shift or did you -- was it subsequent to your shift duties d

5 or subsequent to your --

l 6

A Well, I don't really recall what my shift arrangement was l

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at that time; but most of my efforts at that time were l

7 8

concentrated in doing this analysis.

9 0

Did you perform this' analysis by yourself?

10 A

Oh, no.

'l O

okay.

A Whoever I.could find that had specific information that 12 l

'3 could help me along the way.

'd 0

Do you recall who was involved?

I 15

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J ll It was more of a casual nature, you 16 17 l

know, if I needed to know, you know, for instance, 1B g

Dave Webmayer was involved in it because he was the Nuclear 19 Field Handling Supervisor -- well, not Field Handling, i

I l

. j 20 l but Nuclear Field Supervisor.

l j

O Okay.

21 1 i 22 A

And Mel Batch.

Q Who actually gave you the assignment to De'rform the 23 24 analysis?

25 A

The Reactor Engineer was Hari Arora, i

6

'1 Q

Do' you recall the date that you were given Lthis assignment?

I I

2 A

go, 3

That would have been the date after it d

happened.

I would expect that was the 2nd.

5 Q

Did you perform the analysis in one day?

6 A

No, I did not complete the analysis actually, for a couple l

7 of days.

8 Q

When did you ultimately come up with a finding?

9 A

I would expect it was around noon on the 4th of July.

~

10 Q

What was the findings?

11 A

well, the principal part of it was that the reactor had 12 been critical with the lith rod pulling out.

l

[Q During the course of your analysis, did you have any 13 1

'd discussions with Barry Myers?

l 15 A

Oh, yes, sure, hit I don't recall what subjects or any

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l 16 details.

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17 I worked. with him fairly close, so I I.

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would be talking with him quite frequently.

19 Q

Now, it is my understanding that Mr. Myers was on the shif t i{

20 when the incident occurred?

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t 22 0

Do you know why he was not asked to perform the analysis?

l 23 A

Wall, he would have been home at sleep at the time that i

24 the document was handed to the Board that reviews it to l

25 determine whose responsibility it is to resolve it.

7 L

N

l Q

Did you discuss the incident with Mr. Myer4?

I

'1 l

2 A

I am sure I did.

3 Q

And what was his opinion?

Did he perceive that the d

reactor was critical?

5 A

I don't really recall.

I think that at times he believed j

l 6

that it was, and at times, he believed that it was not; and I

7 it really depended -- it was a function on what state of 8

the analysis I was in.

1 9

Q Now, you completed your analysis on the 4th of July, didn't l

10 you?

l M

A Yes.

12 Q

Did you have, in cases prior to that, that of what the 13 li outcome was going to be?

'd FA Yes, I was pretty sure which way it was going.

15 0

okay.

l 16 A

It was more a matter of establishing, you know, through 17 l

proper documentation, that everything lined up, you know.

I 18 It was a fairly thee consuming job.

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19 0

You attended a meeting on July 3rd, a staff meeting where

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' i this particular issue was discussed?

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'I 22 Q

And there were operations people at the meeting, and 23 people from Reactor Engineering and so on?

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25 Q

Could you describe that meeting?

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i A

Well --

2 0

And any input you had'at that meeting.

3 A

Well, the meeting was -- I don't recall exactly what time 4

the meeting was, but it was f airly late in the af ternoon, j

We had gotten into a room to discuss j

5 this DER, and our preliminary assessment that the reactor 6

7 was critical.

Gee, I don't know what other details,.

8 9

the discussion pretty much aligned it -- looking at the 10 charts, it does not look like a criticality; and from my perspective, that if you can conceptualize how the rods j

11 12 were moved, at what point in the charts, it would certainly f

a 13 look like they should have been critical.

l 1

t 14 D And pretty much the outcome of the N

15 ll meeting was to go back and develop the data to say more f

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I 16 conclusively one way or the other.

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17 0

Did you argue that the reactor was critical at that meeting?

I 18 A

Yes.

i 19 Q

What did you base that argument on?

20 A

Well, fairly detailed knowledge on how the Corp is loaded, 5

21 and the worth of those control rods at the peripheral i

22 locations as opposed to the anterial locations.

23 0

Were you the only person with this conclusion, this opinion, 24 or was that -- was there argument of the same opinion or 25 anything else at that meeting?

l 9

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4

'1 A

I would expect that I was probably the only one that was j

as convinced.

I don't think -- I think the.other people i) 2 '

i 1

had an opinion that it may not have been critical; it was too 3

l 4

close to call, and I think in retrospect, that; they were 5

correct.

6 It was not enough evidence in front 7

of us at the time to say one way or tho' other.

8 l 0 Well, you based your analysis or.you based your opinion i

f on engineering judgment based on your knowledge of the 9

10 Corp and so on and placement of the rods and what not?

M A

Yes.

12 0

And that is the basis of your argument, and you explained 13 that at the meeting, correct?

j hA 14 Yes.

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15 g0 So it was not just a matter of looking at these charts; it 6

was some other analysis or justification on your part to 4

i 17 argue that there was a criticality?

I.

18

!g A

That is correct.

I 19

)Q Now, is it your opinion or your impression that the operations i

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20 people disregarded your analysis?

21 j.A No, I think they have a different perspective than --

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22 0

What is that perspective?

23 A

I think they look at criticality quite differently than 24 we do; and they are trained to be looking for a certain 25 response on the chart, which certainly was not there.

I 10 l

'l Q

Okay.

2 A

Especially where'the one pen had stopped inking.

It just 3

was not there.

'I d

0 Well, the problem I have, if you are sittlag there looking 5

at the chart and the charts are inconclusive, and here 6

you have a Reactor Engineer who had performed an analysis, 7

Maybe not to the depth that is totally Convincing, but I

8 certainly you have some justification for.your argument?

9 A

well, under -- of course, that these people that are in 10 the operations are not inexperienced in criticalities; l

11 most of them, navy ships that have experienced criticalities, 12 but they are not -- it is not quite the same thing.

l!

They have an experience level to draw

'3 Il j

on this quite different than mine; and if I walked in there 14 P

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with the fully-developed package that I had later, then I

16 I think they would have been instantly convinced.

17 l

It just was not something that I could 18 g

persuade them that based on my more detailed knowledge of a

'9 the Corp, that it should have been critical.

i,j 20 Q

Were you the only person in that particular July 3rd j

meeting that argued that there was a criticality?

21

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l 23 Q

Do you recall Mr. Lessor making any cosaments at that 24 particular meeting?

25 A

Well, he did a fair amount of talking, but I don't recall 11 t

.3 the details.

2 Q'

Did he agree with you?

Mr. Lessor?

'A Well, I think that he was more concerned that instead of 3

4 recovering, that they might have stopped where they were 5

to actually an assessment of criticality'et that time; e

but having recovered, then, the whether or not, that was t

7 essentially a moot point, because you would never re-8 establish that situation again to find out.

9 So I think it was more of a line of to his comments.

tj Q

Before you went into this July 3rd, meeting, had you 12 discussed your findings with Mr. Arora?

13 A

Yes, Hari was in understanding of my position, and so 14 was Mel Batch and Dave Wehmeyer.

15

,O Mel Batch, understood your position before the meeting, l

16 prior to the meeting?

[

17 A

I believe so, yes.

I is Q

Did he agree with you?

?

19 A

well, I think he was -- he is much more conservative than I

ij 20 e I am.

I am not sure -- he would never express whether 21 he held the same opinion as I did or not, if at that it 22 was an opinion.

23 Q

But he understood the basis for your argument?

24 A

Sure, yes.

25 Q

And do you think Mr. Batch had more confidence in your 1;t O

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argument than the operations people?

2 A

I don't know.

I have no way to judge that.

i 3

0 Okay.

1 j

I believe that at that Particular July 3rd meeting, Mr. Batch argued that the reactor was not critical.

7 Do you recall that?

8 A

Not as such.

I recall that Greg discussed his --

10 the response of the SRM's to the reactivity insertions, 11 and that at some point along the way, Mel started clinging 12 9

to the idea of maybe the slopes that were indicated on the 13

i charts might be kneeling over; but as to whether or not 14 i

j; he decided to take a position on one side or the other, I 15 don't really recall it that way.

16 But that was very late in the meeting.

I 17 Q

Did you and Mr. Arora and Mr. Batch go into the July 3rd g

i meeting with a unified understanding of your position or 19

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your argument?

20 1 3

A I don't recall us coming to an understanding of any sort.

21 j

Q I mean, was this a meeting where the Reactor Engineering 22 had this position, and operations had an opposite position, 23 and there was an argument back and forth between the two 24 groups?

25 A

I recall the meeting as more in the sense that the Reactor 13 i

L-

1 Engineering was going to present what it knew to that point 2

to the plant staff.

3 Q

Okay.

4 A

And I had no idea what to expect from operations; and we did 5

not plan the meeting in any way; it was that Greg wanted 1

6 to have a meeting to find out where*We are on this thing 7

and we walked into a room.

l l

8 So that when I say that Hari Arora 9

knew what my opinion was, he did; but I did 'not ask him 10 what his opinion was and he did not volunteer it, and that 11 would be the same for Mel Batch.

12 O

Did yourexpect either of those individuals to support your 13 ?

position?

b 14 A

Ygg, I yggld hgyg gxpegggd thgg go, hgg I ggyg ggg bggn n

15 ll in very many meeting with them; so I did not know what 16 to expect.

But I really expected to have supporting 3

17 8

18 arguments or -- well, not supporting arguments, but pretty

.I 19 auch I led the discussion.

Ij 20 Q

Were you surprised that plant staff did not accept your j

21 argument?

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22 A

Yes, I think I was at first, but it became.more.: clearer,you 23 know, as soon as we got further in what the problem was, 24 that they had with my argument that was not fully developed.

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25 O

So you did not have any problem with going back and doing 14

'I some further analysis?

2 A

No.

It was not conceptionally difficult to do it, it was 3

just a matter of gatherina the data and refining it to the 4

point of it was useful.

5 Q

So if you were asked subsequent to the July 3rd meeting by, 6

say, one of the NRC resident inspectors if that the reactor 7

had been critical, what would your response have been?

8 A

At what point along the way?

Immediately?

9 Q

Well, between the July 3rd meeting, and when you actually 10 came tip with your findings by the 4th.

11 A

Well, I would probably have said that I have a strong 12 inclination that it was critical; but not to the point --

13 I don't have the data to support it.

14 IQ Was there a company position developed at the July 3rd 15 meeting that there was not a criticality?

16 A

Not that I know of.

i 17 Q

were you, in fact, cc,ntacted by any NRC persons?

18 A

Never.

s 19 0

What did you do after you came up with your. findings on ij 20 July 4th?

l 21 A

I called up Greg overbeck.

22 Q

And what did you tell him?

l l

l 23 A

I told him that I had completed my analysist.that I believed 24 that I had enough dooumented evidence that would prove that 25 the reactor was critical.

15

.i Q

What was Mr. Overbeck's response?

2 A

He said fine, we will take it up in the morning; and I 3

promised to have him a set of my papers at that time.

4 Q

Did you attend a meeting on the 5th, then?

l 5

A Yes, I did.

6 Q

When was that?

7 lA Sometime in the afternoon, I think.

8 Q

Did you make a presentation at that meeting?

9 A

I don't recall that I did.

It was this evidence that I to had given Greg before that and had discussed with him at j

l l

11 that time pretty much what made 2 presentation a moot point.

12 Q

So prior to the meeting, you met with Greg Ovarbeck?

13 1A Yes.

14 1 Q And you gave him whatever documentation you had?

15 A

Right.

i 16 Q

What was the July 5th meeting?

What was the purpose of a

17 that meeting?

I 2

is A

Well, there was still a lot of work to do on the DER.

You l

have criticalities, it was a very small point on the DER.

19 i

i 20 a-The same error occurred whether or not 1

l i

^

the reactor went critical; and that needed to be investigated 21 22 and resolved.

23 0

What was the plant staff's attitude about this finding of 24 criticality?

/.

25 A

Well, they have a very mixed opinion about it.

There were 16

i

)

many people that still believed'that the plant was not I

i 2

critical; so their opinion is that it runs from the gamit 3

of well, it is a good piece of work to that is crazy.

How 1

can we be critical?

5 Q

Well, do you recall if there was, at the July 5th meeting, 6

if there was any NRC people at that meeting?

7 A

I am sure there was not.

8 Q

Was there any discussion as to notifying the NRC of your 1

8 findings?

4

'O A

No.

Q Okay.

12.

A I don't recall where in what conversation whether it was i

'3 j even at that meeting, but it was my understanding that

'd the resident, one of the two residents had been at the l

h 15 [

staf f meeting from Des Moines, Iowa, when this finding was l

i

'8 discussed; and that the entire staff was a very large F

'7 meeting, and they were notified that it was now believed

'8 g

that based on the documents, that the reactor had gone

'8 critical during that incident.

T l

20 And I believe that one of the residents 21 was there.

! i 22 0

Was this July 5th or subsequent?

23 A

This was July 5th, a.m.

8:00.

24 Q

Mr. Overbeck was at -- was it general knowledge on July 5th 25 in the morning at the staff meeting?

f 17 l

'I A

Yes, absolutely, although I did not attend it.

2 Q

And you did not have your documentation to Mr. Overbock at.

3 that time?

A Yes, I did.

l 5

Q When you came in on the morning of the 5th?

6 A

Yes, I gave him, and spoke to him before the meeting.

Q Before this?

)

7 8

A Yes.

9 Q

What was Mr. Overbeck's impression of your findings?

What 10 did you discuss on that morning of the 5th?

Q Essentially, I just showed him what I had done and explained l

12 to his how I had drawn in the line that completed the SRM-A l

l!

trace, I believe it was; and then showed him what each of

'3 I

the pages were and how I had come to the conclusions that l

'S I had.

.I

'6 He seemed to be satisfied, and it was 19 not a big deal.

And just went on to get the rest of the l!

'6 lg analysis which was how the thing came to happen in the i;

'8 first place.

l$

Q Well, how did you know that Mr. Overbeck'would -- did he 2D ll say he was going to advise the staff at that particular 21 ii 22 meeting?

23 g

yo, 24 Several people that I worked with 25 frequently go to that meeting; so they told me that it had 18

__-________D

1 been discussed.

2 Q

On the 5th?

3 A

on the 5th.

1 4

Q Okay.

t' s

You are quite certain of that, that it 6

was the 5th?

7 A

Yes.

j B

Q And were you the only person involved in this -- in the 9

Analysis of this incident that was of the opinion that to criticality had been achieved?

11 A

I really don't know.

12 I think the objective airly on was to 13 decide whether or not criticality had been achieved; and 14 whether or not they had an opinion pre-formed, but I don't 15 know.

16 Q

Well, it seems like you were the only person out there that i

17 took this position early on &Dd it was you against the i

'I' 18 rest of the world here.

l";

19 Is that the way it was?

i l

20 A

I don't think so.

3; 21 What I think is that these people have i

. 22 a fair amount more experience in investigation 9 problems 73 than I do; and rather than going down the road with a 24 pre-conviction of what the outcome over their ecxch is 25 going to be, I think they tended to be a little bit more 19

l 1

cautious.

2 It just seemed to me that that was the 3

way -- it just did not seem like there was any other out-4 come to me.

l 5

Q Well, I have a hard time conceptualizing this July 3rd 6

meeting and subsequently on the 5th if you were the only l

person arguing criticality and everyone else was convinced 7

8 that it did not occurs and all of a sudden on the 5th, 9

you come in with a finding documented, and it seents like 10 everyone was just disinterested.

11 A

No.

I don't think it is quite that.way..

12 I think on July 3rd, the other people i

P.l investigating the issue were not led to take a position 13 f

and certainly did not to the point to get in a heated 14

{

15 j

debate ovsr whether an SRM tracks out to be a very straight 16 line, then kneels over when you don't have any record 3

17 of what the control rods are doing.

I.

l 18 So in retrospect, I think they have a la more correct position than I did.

[

20 0

Well, why were you so convinced on that July 3rd meeting, tj 21 that you were correct?

i 22 A

I don't know.

23 Q

That you were correct in your argument?

24 what drew you to the conclusion that 25 the reactor had been critical?

20 ;

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._______m___________m______.._m.

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3 A

WEll, I just' looked at some data that was available, for instance, the start up data book, which has reactivity 3

notches for the third rod group, which ies had done a shut 4

down margin demonstration; so that was fairly validated, 5

although we did not bring them out the same way.

It just seemed like there was that one 6

7 Particular rod, the lith rod and too much worth not to be e

critical.

g Q

And this is the type of argument you made at the July 3rd to meeting?

13 A

Pretty much.

12 O

Weren't the other people, scuse of the other people at the 13 July 3rd meeting,.also Nuclear Engineers?

u A

Sure, but, you know, we spend an awful lot of time chasing j

15 around estimated clinical positions and we don't do a real is good job with that; and that is based on this same sort of a

17 analysis.

I is Q

Well, what I am getting at, though, is that those people is at the meeting could understand the type of argument you ll 20 were making?

21 A

Absolutely, s

t 22 O

And it seems to me, a layman, a non-Nuclear Engineer, that 23 your type of argument is much more persuasive and you have 24 more to back up your argument than someone looking at a 25 chart that is a mere, you know, a graph of something, there 21 l

1 is no data there really.

2 A

well, look at it from their perspective, the reactor 3

there is performing and putting out a trace, and the trace is the real data.

This is what-is really happening; and-5 what I as talking about is esoterics and this is the way 6

things ought to behave; and, you know, it is not a real 7

world so much, as a Chart that it is monitoring the AChual 8

acitivity of that source range. monitor.

9 You know, you can have lots of neat 10 theories about how things ought to be, but that thing is 11

real, If you see a behavior on that, that looke to be 12 normal behavior for pulling out rods and it is sub critical 3

in a sub critical fashion.

a i

'd o

Well, if the charts themselves were inconclusive, and 15 your type of analysis is that what they are relying on to 16 make the argument one way or the other --

i A

The charts are real.

They are all real.

1a g

Q I know, but the charts you had on the table at the July a

19 3rd meeting, were they conclusive?

r I

20 i

A They were conclusive to the point that the operations people l

21 thought that they looked.to be a sub critical situation.

I 22 Q

But there was enough doubt to have you perform an analysis?

23 A

Well, when we brought the chart in, this was the first time 2#

they had really seen the chart to my knowledge; and as I 25 had them for most of the time.

t 22 1

• 1 I don't think they had seen the charts 2

or at least to analyze them.

Certain persons had seen them,

~

3 but, you know, I think that was a first-time anapshot for 4

those folks, and when they looked at it, it locked like a 5

sub critical assembly.

6 0

Then why did you -- where you asked to perform additional 7

analysis?

I mean, if it was so obvious to them from the 8

charts that they were sub critical, then why did you continue 9

to perform an analysis?

Were you directed to do that or to did you do that on your own.

1 11 A

Well, they told me if I was convinced that that was the 12 situation, to proceed with the analysis.

13 0

Well, were you directed to perform an additional analysis or was it something that -- if you insist on this argument 14 15 and go ahead and do your analysis?

16 A

No, the argument came down to the charts looked sub critical; E

17 and my point was that you Cannot really say that unless you l;

can understand where the rods are with relationship to the 18 i#

19 charts; then get that data, that was' the way it went; so l 1

{

20 that is what I proceeded to do.

21 0

So what was the outcome of the meeting?

'(

r 22 A

That it was indeterminate.

I still had more work to do.

t 23 Q

Was that the way -- was it stated at the meeting that, 'We 24 are undecided.

The conclusion is indeterminate."?

25 A

Yes, but I don't recall the exact words, if it was, "We are 23

not done.

There is still more to be done."

3 O

2 Now, after the' July 5th meeting, where this criticality was 3

discussed or the DER was discussed, did you have any involvement in the preparation for any' additional meetings?

4 f

Did you have any discussions with any plant personnel?

6 A

I had discussions a few times with Leo Lessor, who was 7

doing the remainder of the work, yes.

s Q.

Okay.

9 A

And providing him with whatever he needed.

l 10 0

At the July 3rd meeting, did you know Mr. Lessor or --

ii A

oh, yes.

12 Q

Did you know of his background as a former plant manager?

13 A

I had heard of it, but I was not detailed in the knowledge 14 of his background.

15 Q

Do you recall him making comments at the July 3rd meeting?

16 A

I recall he Vas there and he did talk at various times.

17 Q

Was his input at the meeting, was it given a lot of I'

priority or confidence based on his experience?

is le

+

is g A I don't know.

s s

l 20 i He is a high-priced consultant.

If q

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you are paying big bucks, you had better pay some attention 21 22 ?

to what he is saying or you had better get rid of him.

23 Q

And you don't recall Mr. Lessor suporting your position?

24 A

I don't recall whether or not he came to the opinion that 25 there was a criticality.

I don't think-it is relevant.

24

~

1 o

Well, I don't understand.

I 2

A Well, I just don't think, you know, if he had come to that 3

opinion, then, I don't know, he is not am operator or a d

Nuclear Engineer.

He is some -- he is a plant manager.

5 I don't thfnk he has the final conviction 6

that would sway it either way.

l 7

I think it was more a problem where the 8

engineers or the operators had to come to a common ground.

9 It did not exist.

10 0

Well, Mr. Lessor, you just stated was a consultant, an 11 advisor?

12 A

Sure.

jQ okay.

3 14 A

But to that extent, you know, he was focusing, as I recall, i

15 l

on a much different problem, and that was you came into a l

16 problem, and you took some actions that made the problem I

l U

not understandable in a direct sense; and I don't see 18 that he got into the issue that it was critical or it was 19 not critical.

l 20 I don't think he chose to get in that C

21 issue, but his exact words, % could not recall.

_ 22 o

well, if you had been on the shift when this incident 23 occurred, would you have logged a criticality */

24 A

Well, I don't know.

I don't -- from what I understand, 25 of Barry's perspective, he was not highly aware of what 25

had happened until it was well over.

The chart paper was

• ^ '

2 I

rolled up, so it would be very difficult to guess at what 3

any particular person's reaction would have been if they were not there.

Certainly, I don't know, 5

If I thought there was a criticality, 6

I certainly would have logged it, but that is a different 7

question.

]

8 I don't know if I would have thought that there had been.

I 9

i O

So apparently, you talked to Barry Myers about the incident

)

'O as he understood what happened in the control room?

12 3

y,,,

'3 0

What did he tell you?

bA He told me that there had been -- the operator had pulled

'd 1

is rods out of -- out beyond the position that they were

'6 supposed to have been in and that he did not know about it because he wac doing something else,

'7 i

'8 That the STA had come back and asked him why the rod worth minimiser program had not stopped.

l

{0 When was the time period between the actual' error and when 20 5

s g

Mr. Myers was notified?

li 22 lA I don't know.

23 0

Did you get the impression that it was sometime later?

24 A

Well, I got the impression that this event occurred somewhere 25 around midnight and I don't recall when the last rod got back 26 L

e 1

into its normal position; but after that, Barry became 1

really -- well, aware, at least, that is my impression.

2 3

Q That they had already inserted the rods before Barry was 4

notified?

5 A

Yes, or at least were inserting the rods, 6

Q Had you been in Mr. Myer's situation, would you have reacted 7

differently?

Would you have conducted some type of s

9 analysis of that shift to determine a criticality?

l 10 A

I don't know.

Like I said before, I think it's pretty 11 l

12 hard to guess what the reaction is.

My reaction is cartainly l

13 colored a lot more by what I know now and where I would i

i I

14 have been at that time, i

1 15 Q

Yes.

16 A

So I cannot conclude whether I would or would not have.

17 Q

If the STA in training came to youp let's put you in I

j 18 Mr. Myer's situation, and Mr. Myer's position on that 19 particular shif t,- and the STA came to you and said,"The 20 operator mispulled 11 through three rods."

And gave you the s

le' ;

21 steps and the notches and all, and he also stated that we i*

22 had out of sequence criticality or something to that 23 effect, what does that tell a Reactor Engineer?

Do you 24 accept that, I mean, does that sound like something that

/.

25 is plausible?

27 i

a A

Well, I guess at one time, I believed it, an event like 3

2 this could not happens the event in and of itssif, I don't 3

believe is a serious thing.

In the context that the reactor went 4

critical, that has happened frequently in the past when 5

s they used to withdraw rods in this manner, they would get 7

a very short period and the reactor would scram out on the 8

high RM flexion; so that would not cause me a great deal of concern.

9 3o I think -- the thing that caused me i

33 concern is that the operator is pulling in accordance with I

12 a document, and that.he did not follow that document for t-some reason or another, and it is a concern because I h

helped write those documents.

14 is So my concern was and is now:

is Why couldn't he follow that document?

Is it something I did or failed to do?

What could have 37

)

18 made it better?

L ig And I think that would have been much 20 the way that I would have approached the thing; but it is 21 very difficult to conclude.

22 O

Well, actually, what I was trying to get at was if you were told, you know, the start up procedures and you.are very 23 familiar with the reactor and the design and everything, 2e 25 and you were told that'll rods of group 3 in its pull out 28

l 4

position caused a criticality, is that something that is 2

conceivable?

l 3

iA oh --

4 Q

Is that something --

5 A

That this arrangement of rods is a critical pattern?

l

)

6 Q

Right.

7 A

Sure, no problem.

B Q

So that is not something --

9 A

That is not a surprise to me; but I have worked with the l

10 pattern for the last year, and excrutisting details, i

11 It is not something that Barry has done, for instance, 12 or that other -- our Reactor Engineers have done; so they

)

13 are not as sensitive to how much power is in a particular 14 pattern.

So I don't expect they would react quite

'S l

.I l

16 the same way as I would.

i 17 Q

Well, if you were on a shif t and an incident such as this I

IB occurred and you wrote in your Reactor Engineering log that 19 a criticality occurred, and the shift supervisor came to you 20 and said, "No, we did not go critical, " would'you change e

O l

your log?

21 i,

'g 22 A

No, but I might make a note that there was a shif t supervisor's 23 opinion that we did not have a criticality.

24 Q

Mr. Thorpe, have I or any other NRC representative threatened 25 you in any manner or offered you any rewards in return for 29

l

=

i l

a I

1 for your statement here today?

2 A

yo, 3

Q Have you given this statement freely and voluntarily?

)

l 4

A Yes.

5 0

Is there anything further you care to add for the record?

6 A

No.

7 0

Thank you.

8 (Deposition concluded at 3:15 p.m.)

9 i

10 l

11 12 l

13 D 14 l

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16 t

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17 1

18

.I 19 Ii aj 20 j

21 ii Ir 22 23 24 25 l

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30 l

i

,1 STATE OF MICHIGAN)

) ss.

2 COUNTY OF WAYNE

)

3 I, Elizabeth Diann Ferguson-Ryans, do hereby 4

certify that the witness whose attached deposition was taken beforo 5

me, in the above-entitled matter, was by me f rat duly cautioned e

.and sworn to testify to the truth, the whole truth and nothing bu!:

7 the truth in the cause aforesaid; that the testimony contained l

e in said deposition was by me reduced to writing in the presence 1

9 6f said witness by means of stenography and af terwards transcribed to upon a typewriter.

The said deposition is a true and correct 11 transcript of the whole of the testimony given by the said witness 12 aforesaid.

l I do further certify that I am not connected 13 f

14 by blood or marriage with any of the parties or their agents, and i

15 that I am not an employee of either of them, nor interested, 16 directly or indirectly, in the matter of Controversy, either as 6

17 counsel, attorney, agent or otherwise.

18 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my 19 hand and af fixed my notarial seal at Detroit, Michigan, County of Wayne, State of Michigan, this Obda'y of h h9, 1985.

20 8

3

~

21 22 h

chtm 4 LXL ha,

i y

v 23 Elizabeth Diann Ferguson-s, CSR-1347 Notary Public, Wayne County, Michigan 24 My Commission expires:

May 14, 1986 25 31

,