05000282/FIN-2015008-04: Difference between revisions

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| identified by = NRC
| identified by = NRC
| Inspection procedure = IP 71152
| Inspection procedure = IP 71152
| Inspector = C Lipa, N Feliz,-Adorn
| Inspector = C Lipa, N Feliz-Adorno
| CCA = N/A for ROP
| CCA = N/A for ROP
| INPO aspect =  
| INPO aspect =  
| description = The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green), and an associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the licensees failure to manage potential gas accumulation due to safety injection isolation check valve leakage following maintenance outages. Specifically, the licensee did not evaluate the potential to accumulate nitrogen at multiple RHR and safety injection gas susceptible locations due to safety injection check valve unseating caused by maintenance outages. As a result, the station did not manage this gas intrusion mechanism. The licensee captured this issue into their CAP with a proposed corrective action to revise procedures to verify that the safety injection check valves are seated as part of the unit startup activities following a maintenance outage. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of equipment performance, and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding screened as of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not result in the loss of operability or functionality of mitigating systems. Specifically, the licensee performed a past operability review of the limiting void found at one of the affected piping locations and reasonably concluded that the associated system remained operable. The inspectors did not identify a cross-cutting aspect associated with this finding because it was not confirmed to reflect current performance.
| description = The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green), and an associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the licensees failure to manage potential gas accumulation due to safety injection isolation check valve leakage following maintenance outages. Specifically, the licensee did not evaluate the potential to accumulate nitrogen at multiple RHR and safety injection gas susceptible locations due to safety injection check valve unseating caused by maintenance outages. As a result, the station did not manage this gas intrusion mechanism. The licensee captured this issue into their CAP with a proposed corrective action to revise procedures to verify that the safety injection check valves are seated as part of the unit startup activities following a maintenance outage. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of equipment performance, and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding screened as of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not result in the loss of operability or functionality of mitigating systems. Specifically, the licensee performed a past operability review of the limiting void found at one of the affected piping locations and reasonably concluded that the associated system remained operable. The inspectors did not identify a cross-cutting aspect associated with this finding because it was not confirmed to reflect current performance.
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Latest revision as of 20:54, 20 February 2018

04
Site: Prairie Island Xcel Energy icon.png
Report IR 05000282/2015008 Section 4OA2
Date counted Dec 31, 2015 (2015Q4)
Type: NCV: Green
cornerstone Mitigating Systems
Identified by: NRC identified
Inspection Procedure: IP 71152
Inspectors (proximate) C Lipa
N Feliz-Adorno
Violation of: 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion III, Design Control
INPO aspect
'